the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant (published by the present lord bishop of rochester) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell. cowley, abraham, 1618-1667. 1688 approx. 3 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 1 1-bit group-iv tiff page image. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-03 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a34820 wing c6670a estc r33502 13431051 ocm 13431051 99529 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a34820) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 99529) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1547:47) the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant (published by the present lord bishop of rochester) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell. cowley, abraham, 1618-1667. 1 broadside. [s.n.], london printed : 1688. "reprinted, with 'several queries...', as an attack on james ii."--nuc pre-1956 imprints. reproduction of original in the harvard university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng despotism. political science. great britain -politics and government -1660-1688. 2002-10 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-11 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-12 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2002-12 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant , ( published by the present lord bishop of rochester ) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell . i call him a tyrant , who either intrudes himself forcibly into the government of his fellow-citizens , without any legal authority over them , or who , having a just title to the government of a people , abuses it to the destruction or tormenting of them : so that all tyrants are at the same time usurpers , either of the whole , or at least of a part of that power which they assume to themselves , and no less are they to be accounted rebels , since no man can usurp authority over others , but by rebelling against them who had it before , or at least against those laws which were his superiours . several queries proposed to the sages of the law , who have studied to advance the publick , equally with , if not more than their own private interest . q. i. whether the legislative power be in the king only , as in his politick capacity , or in the king , lords , and commons , in parliament assembled ? if in the latter , then q. ii. if the king grants a charter , and thereby great franchises and priviledges , and afterwards , the grantees obtain an act of parliament for the confirmation hereof , is this the grant of the king , or of the parliament ? if the latter , as it seems to be , because it is done by the whole , and every part of the legislative power , then q. iii. to whom can these grantees forfeit this charter ? and who shall take advantage of the forfeiture ? if the king , then an act of parliament may be destroyed without an act of parliament . if the parliament only can call them to an account , then q. iv. of what validity is a iudgment pronounced ( under a colour of law ) in b. r. against a charter granted by parliament ? if it be of any force , then the king's bench is superiour to the legislative power of the kingdom ; if not , then q. v. what reason can be assigned , why it is not as safe to act pursuant to an act of parliament , notwithstanding a iudgment entred in the king's bench , as it was to act against an act of parliament , before the iudgment was entered ? and then , q. vi. whether they that did the latter , were not right down knaves , and whether they that refuse to do the former , be not more nice than wise ? london : printed in the year 1688. an essay of a king with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative / written by the right honorable francis, lord verulam, viscount saint alban. bacon, francis, 1561-1626. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a69585 of text r16627 in the english short title catalog (wing b282). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 12 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 5 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a69585 wing b282 estc r16627 11930904 ocm 11930904 51109 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a69585) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 51109) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 50:15 or 249:e128, no 38) an essay of a king with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative / written by the right honorable francis, lord verulam, viscount saint alban. bacon, francis, 1561-1626. 8 p. printed for richard best, london : 1642. reproduction of original in huntington library and thomason collection, british library. eng political science -early works to 1800. kings and rulers -duties. a69585 r16627 (wing b282). civilwar no an essay of a king, with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prero [no entry] 1642 2194 5 0 0 0 0 0 23 c the rate of 23 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the c category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-02 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-03 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2007-04 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2007-04 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an essay of a king , with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative . written by the right honorable francis , lord verulam viscount saint alban . decemb. 2. london , printed for richard best , 1642. an essay of a king written by sir francis bacon . a king is a mortall god on earth , unto whom the living god hath lent his own name as a great honour : but withall told him hee should die like a man , lest he should be proud and flatter himself , that god hath with his name imparted unto him his nature also . 2 of all kinds of men , god is least beholding unto them , for he doth most for them , and they do ordinarily least for him . 3 a king that would not feele his crown too heavy for him , must weare it every day , but if he think it too light , he knoweth not of what mettall it is made of . 4 he must make religion the rule of government , and not the scale ; for he that casteth in religion onely to make the scales even , his own weight is contained in these characters tekel uphrasin , he is found too light , his kingdom shall be taken from him . 5 and that king that holds not religion the best reason of state , is void of all piety and justice , the supporters of a king . 6 he must be able to give counsell himself , but not to relye thereupon : for though happy events justifie their councels , yet it is better that the evill event of good advice be rather imputed to a subject then a sovereigne . 7 he is the fountain of honour , which should not run with a wast pipe , lest the courtiers ●ell the waters , and then ( as papists say of their holy wels ) to lose the vertue . 8 he is the life of the law , not onely as he is lex loquens himself , but because he animateth the dead letter , making it active towards all his subjects praemio & poena . 9 a wise king must doe lesse in altering his laws , then he may ; for new government is ever dangerous , it being true in the body politique , as in the corporall , that omnis subita mutatio est periculosa , and though it be for the better , yet it is not without a fearfull apprehension ; for he that changeth the fundamentall laws of a kingdome , thinketh that there is no good title to a crown but by conquest . 10 a king that setteth to sale seats of justice , oppresseth the people , for he teacheth his judges to fell justice , and praecio parata , praecio vincitur justicia . bounty and magnificence are vertues , verae regiae , but a prodigall king is neerer a tyrant , then a parcimonious : for store at home draweth his contemplations abroad , but want supplyeth it self of what is next , and many times the next way , and herein he must be wise and know , wh●t he may justly doe . 12 that king which is not feared , is not loved , and he that is well seen in his craft , must as well study to be feared as loved , yet not loved for feare , but feared for love . 13 therefore as hee must alwayes resemble him whose great name he beareth , and that in manifesting the sweet influence of his mercy over the severe stroke of his justice sometimes , so in this not to suffer a man of death to live , for besides that the land doth mou●n , the restraint of justice towards sin doth more retard the affection of love , then the extent of mercy doth enflame it , and sure where love is bestowed , feare is quite lost . 14 his greatest enemies are his flatterers , for though they ever speak on his side , yet their words still make against them . 15 the love which a king oweth to the weal-publike , should not be restrained to any one particular , yet that his more speciall favour do reflect upon some worthy ones , is somwhat necessary , because there are so few of that capacity . hee must have a speciall care of five things , if hee would not have his crown to be put upon him . first , that simulata sanctitas , be not in the church , for that is duplex iniquitas . secondly , that inutilis aequitas , sit not in the chancecery , for that is inepta misericordia . thirdly , that utilis iniquitas , keep not the exchequer , for it is crudele latrocinium . fourthly , that fidelis temeritas be not his generall , for that will bring but seram poenitentiam . fiftly , that infidelis prudentia , be not his secretary , for that he is anguis sub viridi herba . to conclude , as he is of the greatest power , so hee is subject to the greatest cares , made the servant of his people , or else he were without a calling at all . he then that honoureth him not , is next an atheist wanting the feare of god in his heart . an explanation what manner of persons those should be , that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative , written by the said sir francis bacon late lord chancellour , and lord st. albans . that absolute prerogative according to the kings pleasure revealed by his lawes , may be exercised and executed by any subject , to whom power may be given by the king , in any place of judgement or commission , which the king by his law hath ordained , in which the judge subordinate cannot wrong the people , the law laying downe a measure by which every judge should governe or execute ; against which law if any judge proceed , he is by the law questionable and punishable for his transgression . in this nature are all the judges and commissioners of the land no otherwise then in their courts , in which the king in person is supposed to sit who cannot worke that trespasse , felony or treason which the law hath not made so to be , neither can punish the guilty by other punishment then the law hath appointed . this prerogative or power as it is over all the subjects so being knowne by the subjects , they are without excuse if they offend ; and suffer no wrong , if they be punished . and by this prerogative the king governeth all sorts of people according unto knowne will . the absolute prerogative which is in kings according to their private will and judgement cannot be executed by any subject , neither is it possible to give such power by commission , or fit to subject the people to the same . for the king in that he is the substitute of god immediatly the father of his people , and head of the common wealth by participation with god and his subjects , discretion , iudgement , and feeling love towards those over whom he raigneth only proper to himselfe , or to his places and person , who seeing he cannot in any others diffuse his wisedome , power , or gifts , which god in respect of his place and charge hath enabled him withall , can neither subordinate any other iudge to governe by that knowledge , which the king can no otherwise then by his knowne will participate unto him . and if any subordinate iudge shall obtaine commission according , of such iudge to govern the people , that iudge is bound to think that to be his sound discretion , in which the law in which the kings known will sheweth unto him to be that iustice which hee ought to administer : otherwise he might seeme to esteeme himselfe above the kings law , who will not governe by him , or to have a power derived from other then from the king , which in the kingdome will administer iustice contrarie to the justice of the land . neither can such a judge or commissioner under the name of his high authoritie shrowde his owne high affection , seeing the conscience and discretion of every man is particular and private to himselfe ; as the discretion of the judge cannot be properly or possibly the discretion of the king , or conscience of the king ; and if not his discretion , neither the judgement that is ruled by another m●ns only . therefore it may seeme they rather desire to bee kings then to rule the people under the king , which will not administer justice by law , but by their owne wills . this administration in a subject is derogative to the kings prerogative , for he administreth justice out of a private direction , being not capable of a generall direction , how to use the kings pleasure in causes of particular respect , which if another then the king himselfe can doe , how can it be so , that any man should desire that which is unfit and impossible , but that it must p●oceed out of some exorbitant affection , the rather seeing such places to be full of trouble , and being altogether unnecessary , no man will seeke to thrust himselfe into it , but for hope of gaine . then is not any prerogative oppugned but maintained , though it be desired that every subordinate magistrate may not be made supreame , whereby he may seale up the hearts of the people , take from the king the respect due unto him only , or to judge the people otherwise then the king doth himselfe . and although the prince be not bound to render any accompt to the law , which in person administreth it selfe . yet every subordinate judge must render an accompt to the king by his lawes how hee hath administred justice in his place where he is set . but if he hath power to rule by private direction , for which there is no law , how can he be questioned by a law , if in his private censure he offendeth . therefore it seemeth that in giving such authority the king ordaineth not subordinate magistrates , but absolute kings ; and what doth the king leave to himselfe , who giveth so much to others as he hath himself ? neither is there a greater bond to tie the subject to his prince in particular then when he shal have recourse unto him in his person or in his power for releif of the wrongs which from private men be offered , or for reformation of the oppressions which any subordinate magistrate shall impose upon the people : there can be no offence in the judge , who hath power to execute according to his discretion , when the discretion of any judge shall be thought fit to be unlimited ; and therefore there can be therein no reformation , whereby the king in this useth no prerogative to gaine his subjects right . then the subject is bound to suffer helplesse wrong , and the discontent of the people is cast upon the king , the lawes being neglected , which with their equitie in all other causes and judgements , saving this , interpose themselves and yeeld remedy . and to conclude , custome cannot confirme that which is any wayes unreasonable of it selfe ; wisedome will not allow that which is many wayes dangerous , and no wayes profitable ; justice will not approve that government where it cannot be , but wrong must bee committed . neither can there be any rule by which to try it , nor meanes for reformation of it . therefore whosoever desireth government , must seeke such as he is capable of , not such as seemeth to himselfe most easie to execute ; for it appeareth that it is easie to him that knoweth not law nor justice to rule as he listeth , his will never wanting a power to it selfe : but it is safe and blamelesse both for the judge and people , and honour to the king , that judges bee appointed who know the law , and that they bee limited to governe according to the law . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a69585e-120 1. custome . 2. wisdome . 3. justice . 4. rule against it . aphorisms political by james harrington. harrington, james, 1611-1677. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a45610 of text r335 in the english short title catalog (wing h805). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 30 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 11 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a45610 wing h805 estc r335 13650137 ocm 13650137 100976 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a45610) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 100976) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 789:30) aphorisms political by james harrington. harrington, james, 1611-1677. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a45610 of text r335 in the english short title catalog (wing h805). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread [2], 18 p. printed by j.c. for henry fletcher ..., london : 1659. errata: p. 18. reproduction of original in huntington library. eng political science -quotations, maxims, etc. aphorisms and apothegms. a45610 r335 (wing h805). civilwar no aphorisms political. the second edition enlarged, by james harrington. harrington, james 1659 4876 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a this text has no known defects that were recorded as gap elements at the time of transcription. 2004-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-12 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-01 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2005-01 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion aphorisms political . the second edition enlarged , by james harrington . obsequium amicos , veritas odium parit . london : printed by j. c. for henry fletcher , at the sign of the three gilt cups in st. pauls church-yard . 1659. aphorisms political . i. the errours and sufferings of the people , are from their governours . ii. when the foundation of a government cometh to be changed , and the governours change not the superstructures accordingly , the people become miserable . iii. the monarchy of england was not a government by arms , but a government by laws , though imperfect or ineffectual laws . iv. the later governments in england , have been governments by arms . v. the people cannot see , but they can feel . vi . the people having felt the difference between a government by laws , and a government by arms , will always desire the government by laws , and abhor that of arms . vii . where the spirit of the people is impatient of a government by arms , and desirous of a government by laws , there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their liberty . viii . the spirit of the people of england , not trusted with their liberty , driveth at the restitution of monarchy by blood and violence . ix . the spirit of the people of england , trusted with their liberty , if the form be sufficient , can never set up a king ; and if the form be insufficient , ( as a parliament with a council in the intervals , or two assemblies co-ordinate ) will set up a king without blood or violence . x. to light upon a good man , may be in chance ; but to be sure of an assembly of good men , is not in prudence . xi . where the security is no more then personal , there may be a good monarch , but can be no good commonwealth . xii . the necessary action or use of each thing , is from the nature of the form . xiii . where the security is in the persons , the government maketh good men evil ; where the security is in the form , the government maketh evil men good . xiv . assemblies legitimately elected by the people , are that onely party which can govern without an army . xv . not the party which cannot govern without an army , but the party which can govern without an army , is the refined party , as to this intent and purpose truely refined ; that is , by popular election , according to the precept of moses , and the rule of scripture : take ye wise men , and understanding , and known among your tribes , and i will make them rulers over you . xvi . the people are deceived by names , but not by things . xvii . where there is a well-ordered commonwealth , the people are generally satisfied . xviii . where the people are generally dissatisfied , there is no commonwealth . xix . the parties in england declaring for a commonwealth , hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xx . to hold that the government may be managed by a few , or by a party , is inconsistent with a commonwealth ; except in a situation like that of venice . xxi . to hold that there can be any national religion or ministry without publick indowment and inspection of the magistracy , or any government without a national religion or ministry , is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xxii . to hold that there may be liberty , and not liberty of conscience , is inconsistent with a commonwealth that hath the liberty of her own conscience , or that is not popish . xxiii . where civil liberty is entire , it includes liberty of conscience . xxiv . where liberty of conscience is entire , it includes civil liberty . xxv . either liberty of conscience can have no security at all , or under popular government must have the greatest security . xxvi . to hold that a government may be introduced by a little at once , is to wave prudence , & commit things unto chance . xxvii . to hold that the wisdom of god in the formation of an house , or of a government , goeth not universally upon natural principles , is inconsistent with scripture . xxviii . to hold that the wisdom of man in the formation of an house , or of government , may go upon supernatural principles , is inconsistent with a commonwealth , and as if one should say , god ordained the temple , therefore it was not built by masons ; he ordained the snuffers , therefore they were not made by a smith . xxix . to hold that hirelings , ( as they are termed by some ) or an endowed ministry , ought to be removed out of the church , is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xxx . nature is of god . xxxi . some part in every religion is natural . xxxii . an universal effect , demonstrateth an universal cause . xxxiii . an universal cause is not so much natural , as it is nature it self . xxxiv . every man , either unto his terrour or consolation , hath some sense of religion . xxxv . man may rather be defined a religious , then a rational creature ; in regard that in other creatures there may be something of reason , but is nothing of religion . xxxvi . government is of humane prudence , and humane prudence is adequate unto mans nature . xxxvii . the prudence or government that is regardless of religion , is not adequate nor satisfactory unto mans nature . xxxviii . where the government is not adequate or satisfactory unto mans nature , it can never be quiet or perfect . xxxix . the major part of mankinde giveth it self up in the matter of religion unto the publick leading . xl . that there may be a publick leading , there must be a national religion . xli . vvhere the minor part taketh away the national religion , there the major part is deprived of the liberty of conscience by the minor . xlii . vvhere the major part is deprived of the liberty of conscience by the minor , there they will deprive the minor of that liberty of conscience which they might otherwise enjoy . xliii . in israel there was an endowed clergie or priesthood , and a national religion under inspection of the magistrate : whence the christians in apostolick times , defraying their own ministry , could have liberty of conscience ; whereas if the christians by going about to take away tythes , and abolish the national religion , had endeavoured to violate the consciences of the unconverted jews , these being far greater in number , must needs have taken away the liberty of conscience from the christians . xliv . paul in athens could freely and undisturbedly convert dionysius and others ; therefore in athens there was liberty of conscience : but if paul and his converts had gone about to drive hirelings , or an endowed priesthood or clergie out of that church , who seeth not that the athenians would have driven paul and his converts out of athens ? xlv . that there may be liberty of conscience , there must be a national religion . xlvi . that there may be a national religion , there must be an endowed clergy . xlvii . commonwealths have had their wayes of union . as the athenians , by bringing their confederates unto subjection . as the united provinces , by an equal league . or as the romans , by an unequal league . the first way is tyrannical : in the second , one commonwealth under the league , is no more then another , and each one as to her self hath a negative : which kinde of union , is not onely obstructive , but tendeth ( as we have seen both in holland and switz ) towards division . in the third way , the commonwealth uniting other commonwealths , retaineth unto her self the leading of the whole league , leaving unto each of the rest her own laws , and her own liberty . xlviii . till a commonwealth be first framed , how such a commonwealth should make an effectual union with another nation , is not possible to be seen . xlix . the new , unpractised , and heretofore unheard-of union , ( as it is vulgarly spoken ) with scotland , by uniting deputies of divers nations , not in a council apart , or by way of states general , as in the united provinces , but in the standding councils of some one commonwealth in the league , is destructive to liberty both in england and in scotland . l. if the commonwealth of england receive deputies from scotland in a greater number then that of her own , she receiveth law from a forraign interest , and so loseth her own liberty . li. if scotland be received in an equal number , it obstructeth the freedom of both , or occasioneth war or dissention . lii . if scotland be received in an inferiour number , she receiveth law from england , and so loseth her liberty . the like is understood of ireland . liii . whereas a well-ordered commonwealth should give the balance to her confederates , and not receive it from them . the councils in which divers others are thus united , though in a far inferiour number of deputies , yet if these lie in wait , or lay their heads together , may be over-ruled , obstructed , or over-balanced by forraign interests . liv. vvhere countries are divers in their laws , and yet are to receive laws one from the other , neither the common-wealth giving law , knoweth what to give , nor the common-wealth receiving law , understandeth what she receiveth : in which case the union returneth unto force or confufion . lv . the best way of holding a nation different or not different in laws , is the roman , that is , by way of province . lvi . a province , especially if she have strong holds , may by defraying of a small guard , be kept unto a just league , and for the rest enjoy her own laws , her own governmeut , and her perfect liberty : other wayes of union , will be found more chargeable , and less effectual , on both sides : for if england have no army in scotland , scotland will receive no law from england ; and if england have an army there , her hold consisteth not in the union , but in the force . the like is to be understood of ireland . lvii . if a country be very small , and not able to subsist of it self , as wales , it may be safely united and held : but the advantage that wales hath in participation of all magistracies and offices , is not that which england is able to afford unto such a country as scotland , without subjecting her neck unto the yoke . lviii . the order of a commonwealth requireth , that it consist , first , of a civil ; secondly , of a religious ; thirdly , of a military ; and fourthly , of a provincial part. the manner of uniting provinces or different nations , appertaineth unto the last part ; and in the formation of a commonwealth , to begin with that first , which is naturally last , is to invert the order , and by consequence the commonwealth , which indeed is nothing but order . lix . where there can be any other government , there can be no commonwealth . lx . where there can be a commonwealth , what tumults soever there happen , and which soever prevail , there can be no other government ; that is to say , without forraign invasion , which throughout , i must be understood to except . lxi . if sir george booth had prevailed , he must either have introduced a commonwealth , or have restored a king . lxii . if a king were restored , he must either govern by an army , or by parliaments . lxiii . a king governing now in england by an army , would for the same causes finde the same effects with the late protector . lxiv a king governing now in england by parliaments , would finde the nobility of no effect at all . lxv . a parliament where the nobility is of no effect at all , is a meer popular council . lxvi . a meer popular council , will never receive law from a king . lxvii . a meer popular council giving law unto a king , becometh thereby a democracy , or equal commonwealth ; or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the form . lxviii . a commonwealth or democracy to be perfect in the form , must consist especially of such an assembly , the result whereof , can go upon no interest whatsoever , but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people . lxix . an assembly consisting of a few , may go upon the interest of one man , as a king ; or upon the interest of one party , as that of divines , lawyers , and the like ; or the interest of themselves , and the perpetuation of their government . lxx . the popular assembly in a commonwealth , may consist of too few , but can never consist of too many . lxxi . in every commonwealth there hath been a popular assembly . this in israel at the least consisted of twenty four thousand , upon a monthly rotation . in athens , lacedemon , rome , it consisted of the whole citizens , that is , of all such as had right in the commonwealth , whether they inhabited in city or country . in venice it consisteth of about two thousand . in the province of holland onely , which containeth eighteen or nineteen soveraignties , the popular or resolving assemblies consist at the least of five hundred persons : these in the whole union , may amount unto five or six thousand ; in switz i believe they come unto a greater number . and the most of these assemblies have been perpetually extant . lxxii . if the popular assembly consist of so few , and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate , it is good for nothing but to destroy the commonwealth . lxxiii . if the popular assembly consist of so many , and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate , there must be a senate to help this defect . lxxiv . the reason of the senate , is , that a popular assembly rightly constituted , is not capable of any prudent debate . lxxv . the reason of the popular assembly , is , that a senate rightly constituted for debate , must consist of so few and eminent persons , that if they have the result too , they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people , but according to the interest of themselves . lxxvi . a popular assembly without a senate , cannot be wise . lxxvii . a senate without a popular assembly , will not be honest . lxxviii . the senate and the popular assembly being once rightly constituted , the rest of the commonwealth will constitute it self . lxxix . the venetians having slain divers of their dukes for their tyranny , and being assembled by such numbers in their great council as were naturally incapable of debate , pitched upon thirty gentlemen who were called pregati , in that they were prayed to go apart , and debating upon the exigence of the commonwealth , to propose as they thought good unto the great council ; and from thence first arose the senate of venice , to this day called the pregati ; and the great council , that is , the senate and the popular assembly of venice : and from these two arose all those admirable orders of that comwealth lxxx . that a people of themselves should have such understaning as when they of venice did institute their pregati or senate , is rare . lxxxi . that a senate or council of governours having supreme power , should institute a popular assembly , and propose to it , though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable , is that which is rarer . lxxxii the diffusive body of the people is not in a natural capacity of judging ; for which cause , the whole judgement and power of the diffusive body of the people must be intirely and absolutely in their collective bodies , assemblies or representatives , or there can be no commonwealth . lxxxiii . to declare that the assemblies or representatives of the people have power in some things , and in others not , is to make the diffusive body , which is in a natural incapacity of judging , to be in a political capacity of judging . lxxxiv . to bring a natural incapacity of judging , unto a political capacity of judging , is to introduce government . to bring a natural incapacity of judging , to such a collective or political capacity of judging , as yet necessarily must retain the interest of the diffusive body , is to introduce the best kind of government . but to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging , to a natural incapacity of judging , is to frustrate all government , and to introduce anarchy . nor is anarchy , whether imposed or obtruded by the legislator first , or by the people , or their demagogues or incendiaries afterwards , of any other kinde whatsoever , then of this onely . lxxxv . to make principles or fundamentals , belongeth not unto men , unto nations , nor unto humane laws . to build upon such principles or fundamentals as are apparently laid by god in the inevitable necessity or law of nature , is that which truly appertaineth unto men , unto nations and unto humane laws . to make any other fundamentals , and then build upon them , is to build castles in the air . lxxxvi . whatever is violent , is not secure nor durable ; whatever is secure or durable , is natural . lxxxvii . government in the whole people , though the major part were disaffected , must be secure and durable , because it waveth force , to found it self upon nature . lxxxviii . government in a party , though all of these were well-affected , must be in-secure , and transitory , because it waveth nature , to found it self upon force . lxxxix . commonwealths , of all other governments , are more especially for the preservation , not for the destruction of mankinde . xc . commonwealths that have been given to cut off their diseased limbs , ( as florence ) have brought themselves unto impotence and ruine . commonwealths that have been given unto healing their diseased limbs ( as venice ) have been healthful and flourishing . xci . athens under the oligarchy of four hundred , was in finitely more afflicted and torn with distraction , blood and animositie of parties , then is england ; yet by introduction of a senate of four hundred , and a popular assembly of five thousand , did thereupon , so suddenly , as if it had been a charm , recover might and glory . see the eighth book of thucydides ; a story in these times most necessary to be considered . xcii . to leave our selves and posterity to a farther purchase in blood or sweat , of that which we may presently possess , enjoy , and hereafter bequeath unto posterity in peace and glory , is inhumane and impious . xciii . as certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispelleth the peevishness and peril of sickness , doth a good state of government , the animosity and danger of parties : xciv . the frame of a commonwealth having first been proposed and considered , expedients ( in case such should be found necessary for the safe , effectual and perfect introduction of the same ) may with some aim be applied or fitted ; as to an house , when the model is resolved upon , we fit scaffolds in building . but first to resolve upon expedients , and then to fit unto them the frame of a commonwealth , is as if one should set up props , and then build a house to lean upon them . xcv . as the chief expedients in the building of an house are axes and hammers ; so the chief expedient in the building of a government , is a standing army . xcvi . as the house , which being built , will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of axes & hammers , is imperfect ; so the government , which being formed , cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing army . xcvii . while the civil and religious parts of a commonwealth are in forming , there is a necessity that she should be supported by an army ; but when the military and provincial parts are rightly formed , she can have no farther use of any other army . wherefore at this point , and not till then , her armies are by the practise of commonwealths , upon slighter occasions , to have half pay for life , and to be disbanded . xcviii . where there is a standing army , and not a formed government , there the army of necessity will have dictatorian power . xcix . where an army subsisteth upon the pay or riches of a single person , or of a nobility , that army is alwayes monarchical . where an army subsisteth not by the riches of a single person , nor of a nobility , that army is alwayes popular . c. the english armies are popular armies . ci. where armies are popular , and exercise dictatorian power in deposing single persons , and monarchical assemblies , there can be no greater , nor needs any other expedient for the introduction of a commonwealth . nevertheless unto this may be added some such moderate qualifications as may prune the commonwealth , not lop off her branches . whom these will not satisfie , it is not a commonwealth , but a party , that can . cii . if the late king had freely permitted unto the people the exercise of the power inevitably devolved upon them by the change of the balance , he had not been destroyed . if either of the late single persons had brought the people into an orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them , he had been great . vvhat party soever shall hinder the people from the exercise of the power devolved upon them , shall be certainly ruined : who or what party soever shall introduce the people into the due and orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them , shall be forthwith secure , and famous for ever . ciii . a man useth , nourisheth and cherisheth his body , without understanding it ; but he that made the body , understood it . civ. the reason why the nations that have commonwealths , use them so well , and cherish them so much , and yet that so few nations have commonwealths , is , that in using a commonwealth , it is not necessary it should be understood : but in making a commonwealth , that it be understood , is of of absolute necessity . caput reipublicae est nosse rempub. cicero . cv . as the natural body of a christian or saint can be no other , for the frame , then such as hath been the natural body of an israelite or of an heathen ; so the political bodies , or civil governments of christians or saints , can be no other , for the frame , then such as have been the political bodies or civil governments of the israelites , or of the heathens . cvi. it shall be as foon found when and where the soul of a man was in the body of a beast , as when or where the soul or freedom natural unto democracie , was in any other form , then that onely of a senate , and an assembly of the people . cvii . in those things wherein , and so far as art is directed or limitted by the nature of her materials , it is in art as in nature . cviii . that democracie , or equal government by the people , consist of an assembly of the people , and a senate , is that whereby art is altogether directed , limited and necessitated by the nature of her materials . cix . as the soul of man can never be in the body of a beast , unless god make a new creation ; so neither the soul or freedom natural unto democracie in any other form whatsoever , then that onely of a senate , and a popular assembly . cx . the right constitution , coherence and proper symmetry of a form of government goeth for the greater part upon invention . cxi . reason is of two parts ; invention , and judgement . cxii . judgement is most perfect in an assembly . cxiii . invention is most perfect in one man . cxiv . in one man , judgement wanteth the strength which is in a multitude of counsellours . cxv . in a multitude of counsellours , invention is none at all . xcvi . through the defect of invention , the wisest assemblies in the formation or reformation of government , have pitched upon a sole legislator . xcvii . it is not below the dignity of the greatest assembly , but according unto the practice of the best commonwealths , to admit of any man that is able to propose to them , for the good of his country . cxviii . unto the making of a well-ordered commonwealth , there goeth little more of pains or charge , or work without doors , then the establishment of an equal or apt division of the territory , and the proposing of such election unto the divisions so made , as from an equal foundation , may raise equal superstructures ; the rest being but paper-work , is as soon done , as said or voted . cxix . vvhere such elections are proposed , as being mad by the people , must needs produce a well-ordered senate and popular assembly , and the people ( who as we have already found by experience , stick not at like work ) elect accordingly ; there not the proposers of any power in themselves , but the whole people by their peculiar and natural right and power , do institute and ordain their whole commonwealth . cxx . the highest earthly felicity that a people can ask , or god can give , is an equal and well-ordered common-wealth . such an one among the israelites , was the reign of god ; and such an one ( for the same reason ) may be among christians the reign of christ , though not every one in the christian commonwealth should be any more a christian indeed , then every one in the israelitish common-wealth was an israelite indeed . septem. 12. 1659. finis errata . aphor. 47. line 1. for their wayes , read three wayes . a satyr against common-wealths h. p. 1684 approx. 28 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 9 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a55808) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 97289) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 747:26) a satyr against common-wealths h. p. [6], 10 p. printed for joseph hindmarsh ..., and francis hicks ..., london : 1684. preface signed: h.p. poem. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -anecdotes 2007-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-12 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2008-02 elspeth healey sampled and proofread 2008-02 elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-09 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a satyr against common-wealths . fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit servitium : nunquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio . claudian . de laudibus stiliconis . london , printed for joseph hindmarsh bookseller to his royal highness , and francis hicks , bookseller in cambridge , 1684 , a preface to the reader . in vain do we give kings the pompous titles of great and mighty : in vain has heaven allotted them a power , resembling that of its own , free and uncontrolable , if like billiard-table kings they are onely set up to be shaken and thrown down by the saucy touches of their humble vassals . if their authority has such confinements , as some men would have us persuaded it has , princes are at best but glittering pageants , all the professions of steady loyalty but solemn impertinencies , and heaven it self is a sharer in the gaudy delusion . it is not long since this isle was reckon'd amongst the blackest instances of treason and rebellion , when the best of kings and the best of men fell by the rude violence of a consecrated axe ; ever since we have felt the unfortunate consequences of that dismal blow ; a blow which like that that was given to the worlds great redeemer , rent the vail of the church of england in two , abolish'd all its pious canons , and made them give place to the new-fangled whimsies of religious hypocrites ; a fact so horrid and unexampled , that if we may believe salmasius , cui simile nec praeterita secula vidêrunt , nec ventura forsitan videbunt . all this was done under the flattering disguises of religion , by men who had the impudence to boast of a more than ordinary inspiration , and who pretended to have received more light from heaven , than that ass whom the antients fondly accused for drinking up the moon , who could throw themselves into all the postures of religion , with as great facility as a skilfull tumbler can act the italian strades , and with a sort of popular piety cheated three nations into a belief , that whatsoever they did , was highly lawful , so true is that which machiavel says , fere omnes homines magis specie , & colore rerum , quàm rebus ipsis permoventur & judicant . in vain do our learned tribe go about to reclaim these men by dint of argument , all their sober reasonings are to them but important trifles , and were always accounted too weak baits to catch the carpes of geneva lake . and who i pray would take the pains to convince a taylor by a syllogism , who perhaps after the consummation of a pair of breeches , creeps into a coffee-house , where after he has lin'd his pallet with that factious juice , he looks upon his long and limber fingers to have been contriv'd by nature for the handling of a scepter , and curses the bitter fates that had dwindled it into a needle , away he goes home , and performs the offices of distributive justice upon his apprentices shoulders , and fancies every piece of parchment cut from an old bond to make his measures withal , little less to be than clippings from of magna charta . such a knave as this deserves no other logick than what the pillory can afford him , to make his ears pay for the petulancy of his tongue . another sort of man there is , whom in the country language we may call substantial , who perhaps has got fourscore pounds a year , and joys in having a little dove-coat annex'd to his farm-house , who is famous all over the neighbouring villages for his little chesnut mare , who in a race at a late wake signalized her self by distancing a cart-horse ; such a man as this you can never convince by dint of argument , he tells you roundly that at the first opportunity be'l draw his yard and half of rapier to defend his religion and rusty bacon from the rude insults of arbitrary power : you would laugh in your sleeve ( if you have any ) to hear his brisk and debonair reasonings , about the authority of the commons of england , and you cannot imagine with what deference and regard he is entertain'd amongst the mobile , beeause he gives them to know the transactions of state , and fills the whole lordship with news ; 't is odds but you shall see him at the next election of a knight of the shire , brandishing in his campagn coat and mountero , at the head of a troop of dapper-day-labourers , on whom prodigal fortune has munificently bestow'd two pounds a year , and who with complicated interests are striving to set up their idol representative . now the defections of such a man as this from the principles of loyalty , we cannot think to obviate by the most improved reasonings ; his prejudices stop up all the avenues of his soul , hindring the least beam of truth to enter in , and enlighten his understanding : his too fervent zeal for his principles will not give him the leisure to be convinced , and his ignorance baffles all the attempts of reason : as he does not take up any opinion for the affinity it bears to truth , so neither does he relinguish any for its opposition to the same , if his interest invites him he easily accords with any thing , and his reason finds no regrets in entertaining a profitable error : as you cannot disengage him from his mistakes , so neither can you settle him in a truth , although you bring all the credentials of a firm demonstration , and the reason is , because a discourse to him is no more than it is to a school-boy , the jingling of a noun and verb together . if then any thing will do , it must be satyr , and we may if we observe , find in the dullest apprehensions a quicker resentment of a jest than of an argument , the one renders that ridiculous , which the other perhaps cannot make appear to be false , and satyrs are like those indian apes , of whom i have read , that when alexander came into those parts , they straight rally'd thelr deformed squadrons , rank'd themselves in battalia , camp'd and decamp'd with all the moving solemnities of a real army , and brought greater affronts upon that all-conquering army with their martial grimaces , than all the force of darius and parus , i have made the comparison , let some courteous reader make out the application . for this cause it is that i have ridicul'd all the commonwealths that lay in my way , from great old rome to little modern geneva ; what i have said on this theam , if the peruser be not too phlegmatick , must needs create in him some fastidious thoughts of that way of governing . more especially i have hinted at our late pretended republican powers , and in particular at their monstrous innovations about religions ; where i have let any thing slip from my pen , that may seem extravagant , i hope it will not be look'd upon as an unruly effort of my own , but onely as an endeavour to expose the giddy enthusiasts of those times . i shall say nothing neither as to the matter or manner of the verse , i know the whole poem will labour under the imputations of uneasie roughness , yet i could never imagine that smoothness should be so absolutely necessary in the dressing up of a satyr ; it always seeming to me as disagreeable to see a satyr cloath'd in soft and effeminate language , as to see a woman scold and vent her self in billings-gate rhetorick in a gentile and advantageous garb. i have no more to say , onely to desire the reader to be as favourable as he can to the first endeavours of an unexperienc'd pen , which is all from h. p. a satyr against common-wealths . ( 1 ) i 'le not forbear — for who can longer stay when loyal muses bid me not delay but nodding promise an auspicious way ? thus caesar once heaven's anger to attone beck'nd to , by a god , pass'd rubicon , to scourge his own republick , haughty rome . a commonwealth ! curse on that nauseous name which from the devil with damnation came ; he first set up the curs'd reforming trade , and boldly sought heaven's empire to invade ; till blasted by joves thunder , down he fell , state-holder to the commonwealth of hell. 't is a poor sneaking form of government ; kings , gods : but they , the people represent ; here men with swinging trowsers awe . and divine collar-bands give law. tell me my muse for thou knows best — is it not worth a jest ? to see a pair of representatives leaving their charge of children , and their wives , who th' other day in their nown country sate as referees about a broken pate ? and talk'd sedition over table-beer at the next sessions streight appear to manage government 's grand affair ? would it not make a stoick laugh to see those men of mickle glee , who in their parish-church all their devotion owe to a fring'd cushion or a matted pew , distinguish'd from the crowd of the church-militant , by a gilt bible of alma mater's print ? and ' mongst the rout for devotees do pass , ' cause their devotion 's height'nd by their bass , at the next opening of a parliament , loudly dispute about church-government ; and with grave speeches , tell you to an hair where lies the placket of the roman whore. nay and unravel , with the greatest ease rash calvin's mystical decrees . can tell the intrigues of the celestial powers ; and open heaven as a chest of drawers : in this box , they give out the elect must lye , in that reprobates damn'd to eternity . ( 2 ) lash satyr , lash with furies hissing snake those knaves , who kill'd their king for conscience-sake . 't was conscience was the fatal dog and bell that led those blinded bigots down to hell. in outward show they hated worldly coin , yet conscience still , like christmas-box , took in cavaliers feasters , and without a sin. they us'd the cutting hanger of the spirit ; as switz his sword for money , not for merit . had they seen jove when danae's lap he wet with golden showers , to heav'en he near had got , tho a god , to guinies he had turn'd him streight . they made a golden calf without a sin ; each attribute had a jacobus been . conscience in them was very free , and kind , it was the spaniel dictate of the mind that leap'd for every thing , that rump ordain'd . what ever government was fram'd by fate , shock fetch'd and carried still the glove of state ; o conscience ! conscience ! what thou art i 'le tell ; thou art the goodman's goose , that with each yell , when danger 's nigh , saves the souls capitol . thou art the bad man's * peak , that straightway turns all the souls softer dictates , into stones . like the prodigious hebrews rod , that turn'd the aegyptian waters all to blood . ( 3 ) from presbyter to independent pass : we 'l throw some grains in nol the brewer's face , 't is true he 'd have his beer both old , and strong , but his religion always new and young. h' abus'd the catholick faith in pious mock , and primitive religion , stil'd old hoc . yet for all his zeal , to reform the rout , he always wore a popish snout ; the red upon his nose as poets tell ; look'd like what we a scarlet hood do call , couchant on surplice theological . not in hell his nose more piercing flames could find tipt with damnation , while on earth he reign'd : prometheus did not his whole man inspire , his nose onely was damask'd with that fire . ( 4 ) this england once was thy unhappy state , when best of monarchs felt the worst of fate . when they had sent the martyr to his grave ; they threw hey jinks what government they 'd have : they fillip'd up what powers should prevail , and stead of head the counter threw up tail , for proof of which , to the english rump was given , a pair of span-new breeches , sent from heaven . these were their arms , by which a man may guess , codpiece , and conscience was the good old cause . long had the english nation been fed with the manna of a monarch's reign ; long had one dish , their cravings satisfi'd , their weak and squeamish stomachs cloy'd , at last , their vitious palats , not content , would have an ollio of government : something of every thing they crave , an anarchy or nothing they would have . the gods , who never punish with remorse , gave 'em their wish , although they wish'd a curse . ' stead of the royal oak , which long had stood , the top , the glory , of the wood : from off the poplar tree , the giddy rout wedg'd their blockish sovereigns out . from thence they hew'd those logs of power , and whittl'd scepters , as you whittle scures . a brace of patriots from each county sent , sate like the ghosts of deceas'd government . and without the house of lords — made but a rigdel parliament . these ap'd their sovereign with as good a meen as dives's guinies did the lawful coin. they rob'd the land , by wars before decay'd , and whilst they robb'd they wept and pray'd , t' attone the mighty sin they fast in tears , they pray'd by sabbaths and rebell'd by years . thus the gods punish'd charles's foes , thus the gods reparteed all their rebellious vows . ( 5 ) tame tarquin ! that so easily was won to part with all the splendours of a crown ; unking'd he fell in age and glory green , when rome was young and in her teens . the latin rebels push'd him from his throne , and put a brace of consuls in his room : these clubbing in conjunction did dispence like planets their united influence . a snivelling peer that lov'd his spouse too well , rather than be a cuckold would rebell ; for 's country's sake he thought it was no sin : for well knew he that petticoat and property with the same letters did begin . lucrece the chast , the fair , of noble blood would not be buss'd for all that 's good , she would not truckle to her loves decree , she would not kiss , poor heart , not she . bravely the noble doxy strove , though at last forc'd to pay her tax of love. when the lascivious scene was done , and the slut saw she was not made a queen , she tore her hair and dainty quoif , with a sharp ponyard ended all the strife , and quickly did the little job of life . for this the roman bullies seiz'd his crown , for this they threw the mighty lecher down , and in his stead two consuls fill'd the chair , almanack kings that lasted but a year : they and their senate all reform'd anew from cit and bumkin to the nobler crew . the alphabet it self was crost , the letters that made rex were lost and s. p. q. did rule the roast , at last their civil wars made such a stir , they were forc'd to accept the kingly power a monarch of three syllables an emperour . ( 6 ) speak out venetian punk , thou that do'st prate of a republick of so long a date ; an idle common-wealth , that has these several hundred years been making glass ! each puny mortal there , pretends to power , a calcin'd cobler makes a senator . a covie of islands seated in the sea , make up this proud venetiae : ' mongst th' quae-genus-monsters she is found , onely in th' plural sense declin'd ; some bits of earth from th'continent purloyn'd make up the wonders of that place ; famous for bawds , and mighty pretty lace ; each suppliant punk unto her lord does pay the glorious tribute of poynt-veny . each senator for 's crown a thimble takes ; and hieroglyphick bobbings scepters makes . a duke they have , god-wot , so low in stock , that his toes stink for want of royal sock . his stingy meals , hardly deserve a rhime , he keeps an exc'llent house in peas-cod-time ; at second hand he buys his cloaths , and runs on tick for hose and shoes : scarcely odd money they allow the crotchet , to keep the devil out of 's pocket . ( 7 ) stand off you little dwindling states , make room holland the buttock of the world is come although not half so generous as the bum that freshly does discharge it's nat'ral load relieves the hungry earth with dung and food : but they like greedy leaches still suck in they drink , and eat , and drink again , till like them too you 'd think they 'd burst their skin they love their ransack'd , sordid pelf so well that their low countries may be reck'ond hell pluto and they in the same region dwell . frugal they are beyond all measure , they 'l damn their very souls for treasure . they hate free spending as they hate free-grace and count it fond arminianism in purse their dortish synod has determin'd thus . for gold they search the world and traverse indies , for sickly earth that has the jaundies ; they 'l change their athanasian faith for a rich diamond or an elephants tooth : give 'em a china dish or persian cap , they 'l streight turn turks and nice for mecca swap ; of an english herring they make no bones , their commonwealth consists of milts and roanes ; the apostles here in great esteem are had onely because they practis'd fishing trade , these knaves those pious anglers imitate , and boldly british gudgeons captivate . to let you see what good they wish unto the commonwealth of fish , elziver prints with greatest care he can fishmonger hobs's great leviathan , a book which proves men to be whales , a state of nature stuck with finns and scales , they are a people fit for satyr , their low countries are no better , than the pudenda of modest nature . those netherlands of which they boast , are but creation below the waste . ( 8 ) cold switzers that amongst your other ills have planted a republick upon hills ; their snow that on their mountains lies , gives them kib'd heels and consciences ; that cold and dirty clime puts them hard to 't , they ne'r can make a law without their boot , neither do justice without riding coat . they fetch all their dictators from the plow , who scarcely any other purple know , but when with frosts their fire burns blew . a cold and barren soil's the reason why , kind heaven ne'r thaws 'em into monarchy . 't is strange that there a commonwealth should thrive , or that republick weeds or alps should live . these men so much extoll'd by fame , at first from hannibal's vinegar bottle came ; when he to cut an easier way did use that acid , peevish , and ill-natur'd juice , the riggling animals that thence did rise leap'd into men , and made this brutish race . ( 9 ) of all the commonwealths of greatest fame once more step forth romulian dame let your rebublick consuls if they can , match the victorious macedonian , a king , whese actions spake him more than man. sauny the great who'th race of men subdued , conquer'd the world was drunk and spu'd . to th' furthest east he spread his victories , his glories set where the sun's glories rise ; a fight to him was but a drinking bout , with his enemies lives he paid the shot , their veins like pitchers emptied out , he grudg'd over one world tipling to stand , he wou'd have drunk a dozen in a hand , finely faith he firkt the persian ninny , whose father got his kingdom by a whinny , mounted on buceph'lus this bully crack'd to ride inch and half-stone with any king beside , match him all latium , match him if you can , consuls you had when commonwealths began , conquer'd a lust or two but ne'er a man. poplicola of whom fame speaks so loud demolish'd his farm-house to please the croud , to pull it down he thought 't was best , cause 't was a cock-loft higher than the rest . for these and such like things by livy told , amongst records of fame he stands enroll'd . ( 10 ) all hail geneva ! to thy lake all health , whom calvin made a common-wealth : calvin a bishop grudg'd to see lord it in robes of soveraignty . he push'd the miter'd moppet from his throne , he threw the mighty lawn-sleeves down : bishop and bible both believe me got a translation at geneva . she cleansed away the filthy rags of rome , landress she was to the whore of babylon ; with gospel-soap she purg'd her popish sins , stifned her rites and starch'd her disciplines ; women reform'd there at their will , women the strapping sex that spells so ill . the city dames more zealous far than wise put the apocrypha under their pies , and made bumfodder of the maccabees . judith they forc'd to stop a broken pane , and gave holofernes his head again . christ-cross out of their alphabet they turn'd each babe an horn-book had true protestant . tell me religious roysters , tell me now why you are so angry when the organs blow ? our thoughts like theban stones disorder'd lie , till that religious harmony shapes and cements them into unity . i hate that common-wealth of all the worst , i hate their prick-ear'd senate and their priests , who love a common whore , but hate the common-prayer . ( 11 ) fain would i know eternal dunces why you hate the godlike sway of monarchy ? a government in heaven allow'd , where the bright monarch makes his throne a cloud , and gently aws the angelick lovely croud . where cherubins like glorious muses sit , and praise the almighty power in numbers fit , in the seraphick strains of heavenly wit. grosly then must they err who do affirm , that common-wealths are of an heavenly stem , and make an hans-town of the new jerusalem . no , base republicks you can n'er agree with that delightful unity . your tide of rule runs in divided streams . glow-worms of power , you shine in sep'rate beams ▪ i hate that gaudy sanhedrim of lights , who by gommittees rule the nights ; i mean the stars , whose short commissions run all in the name of the departed sun. give me the glittering monarch of the day ; at whose approach those tapers sneak away . he reigns by day and all the night he drinks , he sips and revels on the ocean's brinks , and like a monarch never shrinks . the epilogue being an anti-republican catch . ( 1 ) let the speculative sot , who thinks and lives not , tell the world what paps alma-mater has got ; let him if he please his appetite bilk , and huzza the king's health in a glass of her milk : from the nipples of the vine ( the wiser do know ) that a brisk and more generous liquor do's flow . ( 2 ) would you be a bard sir , of any regard sir ? believe me wine is the best crambo word sir. homer was drunk as e'r son of a woman was , when he hickupt so often 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the old greekish rhimer had been dabling in claret , when he made that reeling verse we call pindarick . ( 3 ) a pox of old noll , who our barrels did toll , and excis'd each caviliers affluent bowl . to be reveng'd of him , and his council of asses , let 's break on the table all common-wealth glasses , boy , take that venice glass to republican saints ; we 'll drink the king's health in true english flints . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a55808-e510 * a river famous for it's petrifying quality . letters that often occur in roman history for senatus populusque . the power of kings, and in particular of the king of england learnedly asserted by sir robert filmer, kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. 1680 approx. 33 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 9 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2006-06 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a41311 wing f926 estc r19499 12043326 ocm 12043326 53029 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a41311) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 53029) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 67:21) the power of kings, and in particular of the king of england learnedly asserted by sir robert filmer, kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. [4], 12 p. printed for w.h. & t.f. and are to be sold by walter davis ..., london : 1680. reproduction of original in yale university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng monarchy. monarchy -great britain. political science -early works to 1800. 2005-11 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-11 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2006-02 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2006-02 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2006-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . learnedly asserted , by sir robert filmer , kt. with a preface of a friend : giving an account of the author and his works . in magnis voluisse sat est — london : printed for w. h. & t. f. and are to be sold by walter davis in amen-corner , near paternoster-row . 1680. the preface . whoso would go about to speak sir robert filmer's worth , hath no more to do but onely to number and to name his writings , as they were written in the following order . questio quodlibetica , or a discourse of usury , written about 1630. and first published in the year 1656. patriarcha , or the natural right of kings maintained , against the unnatural right of the people to govern , or chuse themselves governours . written about the year 1642. and never published till of late . of the blasphemy against the holy ghost . published in the year 1656. the anarchy of a limited and mixed monarchy , or observations upon mr. hunton's treatise on that subject . first published in the year 1646. the free-holders grand inquest , touching our soveraign lord the king , and his parliament . in the year 1648. of the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . first published in the same year . observations upon mr. hobbes ' s leviathan , mr. milton against salmasius , and h. grotius de jure belli & pacis , concerning the original of government . to which those upon mr. huntons book being re-printed , were annexed in the year 1652. observations upon aristotle's politicks , touching forms of government . published in the same year . and the advertisement to the jury-men of england touching witches , with the difference between an english and an hebrew witch . in the year 1653. whoso would give his writings their due , hath done it already , in saying that they are his. of which , who reads any one , may have some cause to wonder how he came to be sufficiently furnished to write that ; but who proceeds yet farther to read them all , will have more abundant cause to wonder , should any else but he have wrote the rest . his political writings are chiefly levell'd against a doctrine but too generally embrac'd of late that , all men are born equal . to disprove which , though it might be sufficient to appeal to the practice and experience of mankinde , whether all nations have not still with one consent mounted their kings upon thrones ; and whether all the masters of philosophies and religions have not constantly appeared in their chairs , and in their pulpits , while their disciples have humbly presented themselves at their feet ? not to speak of all the several heights of authority , or extents of command , which either popular oratory have attained to by their wit , or conquerours have raised themselves to by their arms. our author himself is an undeniable proof of his own assertion , and has given us the best evidence that all men are not equal by birth , while he himself hath no equal in writing . so impossible is it for him to treat either of the means of acquiring , or the rights of exercising soveraignty , without acquiring and exercising a new soveraignty over his readers . for does he overcome others ? even we at the same time are made captives without resistance , and are his by right of conquest . or does he govern in their stead ? even then all readers are insensibly under his command , as much as if they were his subjects , and are his by right of natural soveraignty . a reason so far exalted above ours as his , makes him appear like those kings of old , who were in stature much superiour to their subjects , and seemed so far to overtop the rest , as if nature it self had marked them out for heads of all . to be short , no power , whose cause our author pleads , can be so absolute , as what he obtains over us at the same time himself . and yet of so sweet a tyranny , who that are under it can complain ? arguments so prevailing , who is able to withstand ? and where the mastery is gained over us by no other force than that of perswasion , who would forego the pleasure of obedience ? the empire which wit and eloquence have over men , seems to be like that command which musick hath over the wilde beasts , that civilizes and subdues them at one and the same time . and we , while we read this author , feel the highest of rational pleasures , even then when we are made at once both better subjects , and wiser men. the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . to majestie or soveraignty belongeth an absolute power not subject to any law. it behoveth him that is a soveraign , not to be in any sort subject to the command of another ; whose office is to give laws unto his subjects , to abrogate laws unprofitable , and in their stead to establish other ; which he cannot do , that is himself subject to laws , or to others which have command over him : and this is that which the law saith , that the prince is acquitted from the power of the laws . the laws , ordinances , letters-patents , priviledges , and grants of princes , have no force but during their life ; if they be not ratified by the express consent , or at least by sufferance of the prince following , who had knowledge thereof . if the soveraign prince be exempted from the laws of his predecessors , much less shall he be bound unto the laws he maketh himself ; for a man may well receive a law from another man , but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself , no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will : there can be no obligation which taketh state from the meer will of him that promiseth the same ; which is a necessary reason to prove evidently , that a king cannot binde his own hands , albeit that he would : we see also in the end of all laws these words , because it hath so pleased us ; to give us to understand , that the laws of a sovereign prince , although they be grounded upon reason , yet depend upon nothing but his meer and frank good will. but as for the laws of god , all princes and people are unto them subject ; neither is it in their power to impugne them , if they will not be guilty of high treason against god ; under the greatness of whom , all monarchs of the world ought to bow their heads , in all fear and reverence . a question may be , whether a prince be subject to the laws of his countrey that he hath sworn to keep , or not ? if a soveraign prince promise by oath to his subjects to keep the laws , he is bound to keep them ; not for that a prince is bound to keep his laws by himself or by his predecessors , but by the just conventions and promises which he hath made himself ; be it by oath , or without any oath at all , as should a private man be : and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise , as for that it was so grievous , or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumvented , or induced thereunto by errour , or force , or just fear , or by some great hurt ; even for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his majesty : and so our maxime resteth , that the prince is not subject to his laws , nor to the laws of his predecessors , but well to his own just and reasonable conventions . the soveraign prince may derogate from the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep , if the equity thereof cease , and that of himself , without consent of his subjects ; which his subjects cannot do among themselves , if they be not by the prince relieved . the forraign princes well-advised , will never take oath to keep the laws of their predecessors ; for otherwise they are not sovereigns . notwithstanding all oaths , the prince may derogate from the laws , or frustrate or disanul the same , the reason and equity of them ceasing . there is not any bond for the soveraign prince to keep the laws , more than so far as right and justice requireth . neither is it to be found , that the antient kings of the hebrews took any oaths , no not they which were anointed by samuel , elias , and others . as for general and particular , which concern the right of men in private , they have not used to be otherwise changed , but after general assemblies of the three estates in france ; not for that it is necessary for the kings to rest on their advice , or that he may not do the contrary to that they demand , if natural reason and justice do so require . and in that the greatness and majesty of a true soveraign prince is to be known , when the estates of all the people assembled together in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince , without having any power in any thing to command , or determine , or to give voice ; but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike , to command or forbid , is holden for law. wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates , have deceived themselves , in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince ; a thing which oft-times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their soveraign prince , aud ministreth matter of great troubles in commonwealths ; of which their opinion , there is neither reason nor ground . if the king should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people , he should neither be king nor soveraign , and the commonwealth neither realm nor monarchy ; but a meer aristocracy of many lords in power equal , where the greater part commandeth the less ; and whereon the laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth , but in the name and authority of the estates ; as in an aristocratical seignory , where he that is chief hath no power , but oweth obeisance to the seignory ; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themselves to owe their faith and obedience : which are all things so absurd , as hard it is to see which is furthest from reason . when charles the eighth , the french king , then but fourteen years old , held a parliament at tours , although the power of the parliament was never before nor after so great , as in those times ; yet relli then the speaker for the people , turning himself to the king , thus beginneth : most high , most mighty , and most christian king , our natural and onely lord ; we poor , humble , and obedient subjects , &c. which are come hither by your command , in all humility , reverence , and subjection , present our selves before you , &c. and have given me in charge from all this noble assembly to declare unto you , the good will and hearty desire they have , with a most fervent resolution to serve , obey , and aid you in all your affairs , commandments , and pleasures . all this speech is nothing else but a declaration of their good will towards the king , and of their humble obedience and loyalty . the like speech was used in the parliament at orleans to charles the 9th , when he was scarce eleven years old . neither are the parliaments in spain otherwise holden , but that even a greater obedience of all the people is given to the king ; as is to be seen in the acts of the parliament at toledo by king philip , 1552. when he yet was scarce twenty five years old . the answers also of the king of spain unto the requests and humble supplications of his people , are given in these words : we will , or else , we decree or ordain ; yea , the subsidies that the subjects pay unto the king of spain , they call service . in the parliaments of england , which have commonly been holden every third year , the estates seem to have a great liberty , ( as the northern people almost all breathe thereafter ) yet so it is , that in effect they proceed not , but by way of supplications and requests to the king. as in the parliament holden in octob. 1566. when the estates by a common consent had resolved ( as they gave the queen to understand ) not to treat of any thing , until she had first appointed who should succeed her in the crown ; she gave them no other answer , but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead . all whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking , neither did she in that any thing that they requested . albeit by the sufferance of the king of england , controversies between the king and his people are sometimes determined by the high court of parliament ; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the king , who is no way bound to follow their advice , neither to consent to their requests . the estates of england are never otherwise assembled , no more than they are in france or spain , than by parliament-writs and express commandments , proceeding from the king ; which sheweth very well , that the estates have no power of themselves to determine , command , or decree any thing ; seeing they cannot so much as assemble themselves , neither being assembled , depart without express commandment from the king. yet this may seem one special thing , that the laws made by the king of england , at the request of the estates , cannot be again repealed , but by calling a parliament ; though we see henry the eighth to have always used his soveraign power , and with his only word to have disannulled the decrees of parliament . we conclude the majesty of a prince to be nothing altered or diminished by the calling together , or presence of the estates : but to the contrary , his majesty thereby to be much the greater and the more honourable , seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soveraign . we see the principal point of soveraign majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects without their consent . it behoveth , that the soveraign prince should have the laws in his power , to change and amend them according as occasion shall require . in a monarchy , every one in particular must swear to the observation of the laws , and their allegiance to one soveraign monarch ; who , next unto god , ( of whom he holds his scepter and power ) is bound to no man : for an oath carrieth always with it reverence unto whom , and in whose name it is made , as still given to a superiour ; and therefore the vassal gives such oath unto his lord , but receives none from him again , though they be mutually bound , the one of them to the other . trajan swore to keep the laws , although he under the name of a soveraign prince was exempted ; but never any of the emperours before him so sware : therefore pliny the younger , in a panegyrical oration , speaking of the oath of trajan , gives out , a great novelty , saith he , and never before heard of , he sweareth , by whom we swear . of these two things the one must come to pass , to wit , the prince that swears to keep the laws of his country , must either not have the soveraignty , or else become a perjur'd man , if he should but abrogate but one law contrary to his oath ; whereas it is not only profitable that a prince should sometimes abrogate some such laws , but also necessary for him to alter or correct them , as the infinite variety of places , times and persons shall require : or if we shall say , the prince to be still a soveraign , and yet nevertheless with such conditions , that he can make no law without the advice of his councel or people ; he must also be dispensed with by his subjects , for the oath which he hath made for the observation of the laws ; and the subjects again which are obliged to the laws , have also need to be dispensed withal by their prince , for fear they should be perjur'd : so shall it come to pass , that the majesty of the commonweal enclining now to this side , now to that side ; sometimes the prince , sometimes the people bearing sway , shall have no certainty to rest upon ; which are notable absurdities , and altogether incompatible with the majesty of absolute soveraignty , and contrary both to law and reason . and yet we see many men , that think they see more in the matter than others , will maintain it to be most necessary , that princes should be bound by oath , to keep the laws and customs of their countreys : in which doing , they weaken and overthrow all the rights of soveraign majesty , which ought to be most sacred and holy , and confound the soveraignty of one soveraign monarch , with an aristocracy or democracy . publication , or approbation of laws , in the assembly of the estates or parliament , is with us of great importance for the keeping of the laws ; not that the prince cannot of himself make a law , without the consent of the estates or people ( for even all his declarations of war , treaties of peace , valuations of the coin , charters to enable towns to send burgesses to parliament , and his writ of summons to both houses to assemble , are laws , though made without the consent of the estates or people ; ) but it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the senate . what if a prince by law forbid to kill or steal , is he not bound to obey his own laws ? i say , that this law is not his , but the law of god , whereunto all princes are more straitly bound than their subjects ; god taketh a stricter account of princes than others , as solomon a king hath said ; whereto agreeth marcus aurelius , saying , the magistrates are judges over private men , princes judge the magistrates , and god the princes . it is not only a law of nature , but also oftentimes repeated among the laws of god , that we should be obedient unto the laws of such princes , as it hath pleased god to set to rule and reign over us ; if their laws be not directly repugnant unto the laws of god , whereunto all princes are as well bound as their subjects : for as the vassal oweth his oath of fidelity unto his lord , towards and against all men , except his soveraign prince : so the subject oweth his obedience to his soveraign prince , towards and against all , the majesty of god excepted , who is the absolute soveraign of all the princes in the world. to confound the state of monarchy , with the popular or aristocratical estate , is a thing impossible , and in effect incompatible , and such as cannot be imagined : for soveraignty being of it self indivisible , how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince , the nobility , and the people in common ? the first mark of sovereign majesty is , to be of power to give laws , and to command over them unto the subjects : and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience to the law , if they should have also power to make the laws ? who should he be that could give the law , being he himself constrain'd to receive it of them , unto whom he himself gave it ? so that of necessity we must conclude , that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state , that there the state must needs be popular . never any commonwealth hath been made of an aristocracy and popular estate , much less of all the three estates of a commonwealth . such states , wherein the right of soveraignty is divided are not rightly to be called commonweals , but rather the corruption of commonweals ; as herodotus hath most briefly but truely written . commonweals which change their state , the soveraign right and power of them being divided , finde no rest from civil wars . if the prince be an absolute soveraign , as are the true monarchs of france , of spain , of england , scotland , turkey , moscovy , tartary , persia , aethiopia , india , and almost of all the kingdoms of africk and asia ; where the kings themselves have the soveraignty , without all doubt or question , not divided with their subjects : in this case it is not lawful for any one of the subjects in particular , or all of them in general , to attempt any thing , either by way of fact or of justice , against the honour , life , or dignity of the soveraign , albeit he had committed all the wickedness , impiety , and cruelty that could be spoke . for as to proceed against him by way of justice , the subject hath not such jurisdiction over his soveraign prince , of whom dependeth all power to command , and who may not only revoke all the power of his magistrates , but even in whose presence the power of all magistrates , corporations , estates and communities cease . now if it be not l●wful for the subject by the way of justice to proceed against a king , how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact or force ? for question is not here what men are able to do by strength and force , but what they ought of right to do ; as not whether the subject have power and strength , but whether they have lawful power to condemn their soveraign prince . the subject is not only guilty of treason in the highest degree , who hath slain his soveraign prince , but even he also which hath attempted the same , who hath given counsel or consent thereto ; yea , if he have concealed the same , or but so much as thought it : which fact the laws have in such detestation , as that when a man guilty of any offence or crime , dyeth before he be condemned thereof , he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect estate , except he have conspired against the life and dignity of his soveraign prince . this only thing they have thought to be such , as that for which he may worthily seem to have been now already judged and condemned ; yea , even before he was thereof accused . and albeit the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men , but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity ; yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his soveraign prince , although he have attempted nothing , they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death , notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof . lest any men should think [ kings or princes ] themselves to have been the authors of these laws , so the more straitly to provide for their own safety and honour ; let us fee the laws and examples of holy scripture . nabuchodonosor king of assyria , with fire and sword destroyed all the country of palestina , besieged jerusalem , took it , rob'd and razed it down to the ground , burnt the temple , and defiled the sanctuary of god , slew the king , with the greatest part of the people , carrying away the rest into captivity into babylon , caused the image of himself made in gold to be set up in publick place , commanding all men to adore and worship the same , upon pain of being burnt alive , and caused them that refused so to do , to be cast into a burning furnace . and yet for all that , the holy prophets [ baruch 1. jeremy 29. ] directing their letters unto their brethren the jews , then in captivity in babylon , will them to pray unto god for the good and happy life of nabuchodonosor and his children , and that they might so long rule and reign over them , as the heavens should endure : yea even god himself doubted not to call nabuchodonosor his servant , saying , that he would make him the most mighty prince of the world ; and yet was there never a more detestable tyrant than he : who not contented to be himself worshipped , but caused his image also to be adored , and that upon pain of being burnt quick . we have another rare example of saul , who possessed with an evil spirit , caused the priests of the lord to be without iust cause slain , for that one of them had received david flying from him ; and did what in his power was to kill , or cause to be kill'd , the same david , a most innocent prince , by whom he had got so many victories ; at which time he fell twice himself into david's hands : who blamed of his souldiers for that he would not suffer his so mortal enemy , then in his power , to be slain , being in assured hope to have enjoyed the kingdom after his death ; he detested their counsel , saying , god forbid that i should suffer the person of a king , the lords anointed , to be violated . yea , he himself defended the same king persecuting of him , when as he commanded the souldiers of his guard , overcome by wine and sleep , to be wakened . and at such time as saul was slain , and that a souldier , thinking to do david a pleasure , presented him with saul's head ; david caused the same souldier to be slain , which had brought him the head , saying , go thou wicked ; how durst thou lay thy impure hands upon the lords anointed ? thou shalt surely die therefore . and afterwards , without all distimulation , mourned himself for the dead king. all which is worth good consideration : for david was by saul prosecuted to death , and yet wanted not power to have revenged himself , being become stronger than the king ; besides , he was the chosen of god , and anointed by samuel to be king , and had married the king's daughter : and yet for all that , he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king , and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of saul , or to rebel against him ; but chose rather to banish himself out of the realm , than in any sort to seek the kings destruction . we doubt not but david , a king and a prophet , led by the spirit of god , had always before his eyes the law of god , exod. 22. 28. thou shalt not speak evil of thy prince , nor detract the magistrate ; neither is there any thing more common in holy scripture , than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince , but even for the very magistrates , although , saith the scripture , they be wicked and naught . the protestant princes of germany , before they entred into arms against charles the emperour , demanded of martin luther , if it were lawful for them so to do , or not ; who frankly told them , that it was not lawful , whatsoever tyranny or impiety were pretended ; yet was he not therein by them believed ; so , thereof , ensued a deadly and most lamentable war , the end whereof was most miserable ; drawing with in , the ruine of many great and noble houses of germany , with exceeding slaughter of the subjects . the prince , whom you may justly call the father of the country , ought to be to every man dearer and more reverend than any father , as one ordained and sent unto us by god. the subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against the prince , how naughty and cruel soever he be : lawful it is , not to obey him in things contrary to the laws of god , to flie and hide our selves from him ; but yet to suffer stripes , yea , and death also , rather than to attempt any thing against his life and honour . o how many tyrants should there be , if it should be lawful for subjects to kill tyrants ? how many good and innocent princes should as tyrants perish by the conspiracy of their subjects against them ? he that should of his subjects but exact subsidies , should be then , as the vulgar people esteem him , a tyrant : he that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people , should be a tyrant : he that should keep strong guards and garrisons for the safety of his person , should be a tyrant : he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state , should be also counted a tyrant . how should good princes be assured of their lives , if under colour of tyranny they might be slain by their subjects , by whom they ought to be defended ? in a well-ordered state , the soveraign power must remain in one onely , without communicating any part thereof unto the state , ( for in that case it should be a popular government , and no monarchy . ) wise polititians , philosophers , divines , and historiographers , have highly commended a monarchy above all other common-weals . it is not to please the prince , that they hold this opinion ; but for the safety and happiness of the subjects . and contrarywise , when as they shall limit and restrain the soveraign power of a monarch , to subject him to the general estates , or to the council ; the soveraignty hath no firm foundation , but they frame a popular confusion , or a miserable anarchy , which is the plague of all estates and commonweals : the which must be duely considered , not giving credit to their goodly discourses , which perswade subjects , that it is necessary to subject monarchs , and to give their prince a law ; for that is not only the ruine of the monarch , but also of the subjects . it is yet more strange , that many hold opinion , that the prince is subject to his laws , that is to say , subject to his will , whereon the laws which he hath made depend ; a thing impossible in nature . and under this colour , and ill-digested opinion , they make a mixture and confusion of civil laws , with the laws of nature and of god. a pure absolute monarchy is the surest commonweal , and without comparison , the best of all . wherein many are abused , who maintain that an optimacy is the best kinde of government ; for that many commanders have more judgment , wisdome , and counsel , than one alone . for there is a great difference betwixt councel and commandment . the councel of many wise men may be better than of one ; but to resolve , determine , and to command , one will always perform it better than many : he which hath advisedly digested all their opinions , will soon resolve without contention ; the which many cannot easily perform : it is necessary to have a soveraign prince , which may have power to resolve and determine of the opinions of his council . finis . brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood harrington, james, 1611-1677. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a45611 of text r4541 in the english short title catalog (wing h807). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 41 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 12 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a45611 wing h807 estc r4541 12315735 ocm 12315735 59396 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a45611) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 59396) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 632:9) brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood harrington, james, 1611-1677. 23 p. printed for daniel pakeman ..., [london : 1659] caption title. imprint from colophon. signed at end: "novemb. 13. 1658. octavian pulleyn warden". partly inked out, perhaps indicating a printer's error. reproduction of original in bodleian library. eng political science -early works to 1800. a45611 r4541 (wing h807). civilwar no brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood. harrington, james 1659 7773 8 0 0 0 0 0 10 c the rate of 10 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the c category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2004-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-12 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-01 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2005-01 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made , found , or understood . there is nothing more apparent , than that this nation is greatly disquieted and perplexed through a complication of two causes : the one , that the present state thereof is not capable of any other form , than that onely of a popular government ; the other , that they are too few who understand what is the form or model naturally necessary unto a popular government , or what is required in that form or prudence , for the sitting of it unto the use of this nation . for these infirmities , i shall offer some remedy by a brief discourse or direction , consisting of two parts . the first shewing those forms or models of popular government , or of common-wealths , which have been hitherto extant , whether fit or unfit for the present . state of this nation : the second , shewing a model form of popular government fitted unto the present state of this nation . in the first part i shall propose seven models roughly and generally : in the second , one , but more particularly and exactly . the first part . in every frame of government , either the form must be fitted unto the propriety as it standeth , and this onely is practicable in this nation ; or the propriety must be altered and fitted unto the frame , which without force hath been sometimes , but very seldom , practicable in any other nation . nevertheless , for the better knowledge of the one way , it will be best to propose in both wayes . the first model of popular government , proposed . that the nobility , the gentry , and the people , be perswaded to give up their whole lands unto the common-wealth . that if the whole people shall so give up their lands , they be divided into twelve equal precincts , called tribes . that the man of greatest quality in every tribe have about ten thousand pounds a year given unto him and his heirs , with the hereditary dignity of prince of his tribe . that some ten other men of the next quality under the prince in every tribe , have about two thousand pounds a year in the same given unto each of them and their heirs , with the hereditary dignity of patriarchs , or chief of the fathers . that the remaining part of the lands , except forty eight cities and their suburbs , be distributed unto the whole people equally by lots . that it be not lawful for any prince , patriarch , or other , to sell or alienate his land , or any part thereof , in such manner , but that upon every fiftieth year , being for this cause a year of jubile , all lands within that compass sold or alienated return unto the ancient possessors or lawful heirs . that there be one other tribe added unto the twelve ; that this tribe so added , be not local , nor suffered to have any lands at all , except the forty eight cities above reserved , with their suburbs ( that is ) with a quantity of land to each of them , being in depth two thousand cubits round . that these be setled upon them and their heirs for ever , besides the annual tithe of the whole territory , and a piece of money every year upon every head under the notion of an offering , in regard that other offerings are now unlawful ; and that this tribe consist of clergy , having one hereditary archbishop , or high-priest , for the head and prince of their tribe . that there be no other law than that of the word of god onely ; and that the clergy being best skilled in this law , be eligible into all courts of justice , all magistracies and offices whatsoever . that the prince of a tribe , together with one or more courts , consisting of twenty three judges elected by the people of that tribe for life , be the government of the same . that the people of the twelve local divisions , take by the ballot wise men and understanding among their tribes , and of these constitute a senate for the whole common-wealth , consisting of seventy elders for life . that every local tribe monethly elect two thousand of their own number ; and that these elections amounting in all unto four and twenty thousand , assemble at the metropolis or capital city , and be the monethly representative of the people . that the senate be a standing judicatory of appeal from all other courts , with power to shew the sentence of the laws of god . that besides the law of god , whatever shall be proposed by the seventy elders , and resolved by the monethly representative of the people , be the law of the land . a second model of a common-wealth . proposed . that there be a king without guards . that the word or command of this king be the law . that this king stirring out of his palace , it may be lawful or any man to slay him . in this model there wanteth but security , that while the people are dispersed , the king can gather no army ; to demonstrate , that either the people must be free , or the king a prisoner . a third model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the nobility , the gentry , and the people , having upon perswasion given up their lands to the publick , the whole territory be divided into one hundred thousand equal lots , and two more , being each of ten thousand acres . that the inferiour lots be distributed unto the people . that every man possessing a lot , be a citizen . that the rest , except onely the children of citizens , be servants unto , and tillers of the ground for the citizens . that there be no professed students . that no citizen exercise any trade , but that of arms onely ; and that the use of money , except it be made of iron , be wholly banished . that there be two kings hereditary : that each of them possess one of those lots of ten thousand acres . that they be presidents of the senate , with single votes ; and that in war they have the leading of the armies . that there be a senate consisting , besides the kings , of twenty eight senators , elected for life by the people . that whatever be proposed by this senate unto the whole people , or any ten thousand of them , and shall be resolved by the same , be the law . that there be a court consisting of five annual magistrates , elected by the people ; and that this court have power to bring a king , a senator , or other , that shall openly or secretly violate the laws , or invade the government , unto justice . a fourth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that there be a representative of the people , consisting of five thousand . that these annually elect by lot a senate , consisting of four hundred , and a signiory by suffrage consisting of nine annual princes . that each fourth part of the senate , for one fourth part of their annual term , be a council of state . that the council of state may assemble the senate , and propose to the same : that the senate may assemble the people , and propose unto them . and that what is proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law . that the executive power of the laws made , be more especially committed and distributed in various functions , and divers administrations , unto the nine princes . a fifth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the whole nation be divided into three distinct orders ; the one senatorian , or nobility ; the other equestrian , or gentry ; and the third plebeian , or popular . that the equestrian order be the cavalry of the common-wealth , and the plebeian the foot . that there be a senate consisting of the senatorian order , and of three hundred senators for life . that there be two magistrates elected by the people ; for five years term , called censors . that the censors have power upon cause shewn to remove a senator out of the senate ; and to elect a noble man , or sometimes a plebeian , thereby made noble , into the senate . that there be two annual magistrates elected by the people , and called consuls . that the consuls be presidents of the senate , and have the leading of the armies . that the senate ( as they shall see occasion ) may nominate one person to be dictator for some short term . that the dictator for his term have soveraign power . that there be a division of the whole people , of what orders soever , into six classes , according unto the valuation of their estates . for example : that the first classis consist of all such as have two thousand pounds a year , or upwards ; the second , of all such as have one thousand pounds a year , or upwards , under two ; the third , of all such as have six hundred pounds a year , or upwards , under one thousand ; the fourth , of all such as have three hundred pounds a year , or upwards , under six hundred ; the fifth , of all such as have under the former proportion ; the sixth , of all such as pay no taxes , or have no land ; and that these be not used in arms . that the senate propose all laws to be enacted , unto an assembly of the people . that all magistrates be elected by the same . that this assembly of the people consist of the five classes , in such manner , that if the votes of the first and second classis be near equal , the third classis be called , and if these agree not , the fourth be called ; and so for the rest . that what is thus proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law . in this frame the senate , by the optimacy of the first and second classes , ( which seldom or never disagree ) carrieth all , to the exclusion of the main body of the people : whence ariseth continual fewd or enmity between the senate and the people ; who consulting apart , introduce popular debate , set up some other way of assembly , as by tribes , or by parishes , with more equality of votes , elect magistrates of their own , make decrees binding the senate or nobility , endevour to curb their power by weakning their ballance , or diminishing of their estates : all these tumultuously , and to the alteration of the government , with so frequent changes under so divers shapes , as make a very proteus of the common-wealth , till having been all her life-time afflicted with anarchy , she end her dayes in tyranny . the sixth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the soveraign power be estated upon four thousand select men , to them and their heirs for ever . that there be a great council consisting of these four thousand ; and that their sons at five and twenty years of age have right unto the same . that the great council elect one duke for life ; that the duke have a royal palace assigned , with a guard , at the states charge , and a revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year ; and that he bear the soveraign dignity of the common-wealth . that this duke have six counsellors annually chosen by the great council . that he have no power to sign any writing , though in his own name , nor to do any of his political functions without his counsellors . that his counsellors have power to sign any writing in the dukes name , or to do any of his political functions without him ; and that the duke with these six counsellors be the signiory of the common-wealth . that the signiory of this common-wealth have session and suffrage in all the councils of the same , with right also to popose unto each or any of them , either joyntly or severally . that one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great council , together with other councils and magistrates , to whom of course the like honour is appertaining , be the senate . that sixteen other magistrates proposed by the senate , and confirmed by the great council for the term of six moneths , be a council apart , with three weekly provosts or proposers , called the colledge . that the signiory may assemble the college , and propose to them ; that the college may assemble the senate , and propose to them ; and that the senate may assemble the great council , and propose to them . and that whatever is resolved by the senate , and not contradicted , nor questioned by the great council , be the law . that there be a council of ten elected annually by the great council ; and that this council of ten , with the signiory , and some of the college , having right of session and suffrage in the same , may upon occasion exercise dictatorian power in this common-wealth . that the rest of the people under the empire of this common-wealth , be disarmed , and governed by lieutenants of provinces . that the common-wealth have a standing army of strangers or others , in discipline and pay . and that the city wherein she shall reside , be founded in the sea , after such a manner , that it can no more be approached by a fleet , than by an army without a fleet . otherwise , this common-wealth is exposed both to the provinces , and to a mercenary army . a seveneth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the people in every city , and in every province or county within these three nations , elect unto every city , province , or county of the same , a matter of twenty , thirty , or forty magistrates for life . that these magistrates being so elected , be the senate of that respective city , province or county . that the senates , thus elected , thence-forth have and enjoy the soveraign power within their respective jurisdiction , for ever . that every senate annually elect two or four burgomasters or consuls , to be presidents of the same . that they also elect seven magistrates , or present fourteen persons unto the governour of the province , and that he elect seven . that the seven so elected be judges , or have the executive power of the laws for their term , and within their respective jurisdiction . that in case of affairs of more publick and general concernment , as war or peace , levy of men or money , and the like , the governour of the province give information of the things to be considered , unto the nobility & to the senates of that province ; therewithall appointing a time and place for the assembly of the states provincial . that each of the senates , having debated the matter proposed , delegate one consul , with some other senators well informed and instructed with their will and pleasure , unto the assembly of the states provincial . that the nobility of the same province delegate some of their order likewise , to the provincial states . that the delegates both of the nobility and of the senates , give the vote of their principals according unto instruction ; and that neither the nobility , nor any senate or soveraignty be otherwise bound , than by their own vote . that the provincial estates elect one magistrate for life , or during pleasure , to be provincial governour : that they elect one or more other magistrates for life , or during pleasure , to be states general . that the states general being elected , and well instructed by their provinces , have the direction of the whole league : that each give not his own vote , but the vote of his province ; and that no province be othewise bound , than by her own vote . if these models ( in which i clame to be the first that hath laid the whole , and the highest mysteries of the ancient common-wealths , unto the lowest capacity of vulgar debate ) be not all in the mouthes of great men , and in pamphlets , for chymera's or utopia's , it is great chance : yet contain they no less than the whole revolution of popular prudence . nor is it more certain , that no one of them would fit the present state of this nation , than that he or they , whose contemplation and vnderstanding is not well versed in the most , or in the best of these , shall never fit a model of popular government unto the present state of this nation , or of any other . in which assurance , i come to fulfil my promise in the second part ; or to propose such a model as is fitted unto the present state of this nation . the second part , proposing a model of a common-wealth fitted unto the present state of this nation . but so it is ever , that the humours or interests of predominant parties , hold themselves to be national : and that which fitteth them , can never fit a nation ; nor that which fitteth a nation , ever fit them . this in the introduction of government , is alwayes the main difficulty . but where parties are no better founded , or fitted for vsurpation , than now in england , they are rather to be slighted than considered , as these , the stoutest whereof have but given this example unto the rest , that they , who in this state of affairs shall obstruct an equal and well-ordered government , shall but ruine themselves . for which cause it is proposed . 1. that all citizens , ( that is ) freemen , or such as are not servants , be distributed into horse and foot . that such of them as have one hundred pounds a yeer in lands , goods , or money , or above this proportion , be of the horse , and all such as have under this proportion be of the foot . 2. that all elders , or free-men , being thirty years of age or upwards , be capable of civil administration , and that the youth , or such free-men as are between eighteen years of age , and thirty , be not capable of civil administration , but of military only , in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this model . 3. that the whole native , or proper territory of the common wealth be cast with as much exactness as can be convenient , into known and fixed praecincts , or parishes . 4. that the elders resident in each parish annually assemble in the same , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of december : that they then & there elect out of their own nnmber every fifth man , or one man of every five , to be for the term of the year ensuing a deputy of that parish , and that the first and second so elected be overseers , or presidents for the regulating of all parochial congregations , whether of the elders , or of the youth , during the term for which they were elected . 5. that so many parishes lying neerest together , whose deputies shall amount to one hundred or thereabouts , be cast into one precinct called the hundred , and that in each precinct called the hundred , there be a town , village , or place appointed to be the capital of the same . 6. that the parochial deputies elected throughout the hundred assemble annually , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of january , at the capital of their hundred . that they then and there elect out of the horse of their number one justice of the peace , one jury man , one captain , one ensigne ; and out of the foot of their number one other jury man , one high constable , &c. 7. that every twenty hundreds lying neerest , and most conveniently together , be cast into one tribe , that the whole territory being after this manner cast into tribes , some town or place be appointed unto every tribe for the capital of the same ; and that these three precincts , ( that is the parish , the hundred , and the tribe , whether the deputies thenceforth annually chosen in the parishes , or huudreds , come to increase , or diminish , remain firm , and inalterable for ever , save only by act of parliament . the tribes are presumd throughout these propositions to amount unto fifty . 8. that the deputies elected in the several parishes , together with their magistrates and other officers both civil and military elected in the several hundreds , assemble or muster annually , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of february , at the capital of their tribe , for the space of two days . 9. that this whole body thus assembled , upon the first day of their assembly elect out of the horse of their number , one high sheriff , one lieutenant of the tribe , one custos rotulorum , one conductor , and two censors . that the high sheriff be commander in chief , the lieutenant commander in the second place , and the conductor in the third place , of this band or squadron : that the censors rotulorum be muster-master , and keep the rolls ; that the censors be governours of the ballot , and that the term of these magistracies be annual . 10. that the magistrates of the tribe ( that is to say ) the high sheriff , lieutenant , custos rotulorum , the censors , and the conductor , together with the magistrates and officers of the hundreds , ( that is to say ) the twenty justices of the peace , the forty jury men , the twenty high constables , be one troop , or one troop and one company a part , called the prerogative troop or company . that this troop bring in and assist the justices of assize , hold the quarter sessions in their several capacities , and perform their other functions as formerly . 11. that the magistrates of the tribe ( that is to say ) the high sheriff , lieutenant , custos rotulorum , the censors and the conductor , together with the twenty justices elected at the hundreds , be a 〈◊〉 for the government of the tribe called the phylarch , and that this court proceed in all matter of government as shall from time to time be directed by act of parliament . 12. that the squadron of the tribe upon the second day of their assembly , elect two knights , and three burgesses out of the horse of their number , and four other burgesses out of the foot of their number , that each knight upon election forthwith make oath of allegiance unto the common-wealth , or refusing such oath , the next compe●itor in election to the same magistracy , making the said oath , be the magistrate . the like for the burgesses . that the knights thus sworn , have session in the senate , for the term of three years , and that the burgesses thus sworn , be of the prerogative tribe or representative of the people for the like term . 13. that for the full and perfect institution of the assemblies mentioned , the squadron of the tribe in the first yeer of the common-wealth , elect two knights for the term of one year , two other knights for the term of two years , and lastly two knights more for the term of three years , the like for the burgesses of the horse first , and then for those of the foot . and that this proposition be of no farther use than for the first years election only . 14. that a magistrate or officer elected at the hundred be thereby barred from being elected a magistrate of the tribe , or of the first days election ; but that no former election whatsoever , bar a man of the second days election at the tribe , or to be chosen a knight or burgess . that a man being chosen a knight or burgess , who before was chosen a magistrate or officer of the hundred , or tribe , may delegate his former office or magistracy in the hundred , or in the tribe , to any other deputy , being no magistrate ; nor officer , and being of the same hundred , and of the same order , that is of the horse or foot respectively . 15. that the knights of the annual election , take their places upon monday next ensuing the last of march in the senate ; that the like number of knights whose session determineth at the same time recede . that every knight or senator be paid out of the publick revenue quarterly , one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of session , and be obliged to sit in purple robes . 16. that annually upon reception of the new knights , the senate proceed to election of new magistrates and counsellors . that for magistrates they elect one general , one speaker , and two censors , each for the term of one year , these promiscuously , and that they elect one commissioner of the great seal , and one commissioner of the treasury , each for the term of three years , and out of the new knights only . 17. that the general and the speaker as consuls of the common-wealth , and presidents of the senate , be during the term of their magistracy paid quarterly out of the publick revenue five hundred pounds ; that the ensigns of these magistracies be a sword borne before the general , and a mace before the speaker , that they be oliged to wear ducal robes . and that what is said of the general in this proposition be understood only of the general sitting , and not of the general marching . 18. that the general sitting , in case he be commanded to march , receive field pay ; and that a new general be forthwith elected by the senate to succeed him in the house , with all the rights , ensigns and emoluments of the general sitting , and this so often as one or more generals are marching . 19. that the three commissioners of the great seal , and the three commissioners of the treasury , using their ensigns and habite and performing their other functions as formerly , be paid quarterly unto each of them three hundred seaventy five pounds . 20. that the censors govern the ballot , that they be presidents of the counsel for religion , that each have a silver wand for the ensigne of his magistracy , that each be paid quarterly three hundred seaventy five pound , sand be obliged to wear scarlot robes . 21. that the general sitting , the speaker , and the 〈◊〉 commissioners abovesaid be the signory of this common-wealth . 22. that there be a council of state consisting of fifteen knights , five out of each order , list , or election , and that the same be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new knights or last elected into the senate . 23. that there be a council for religion consisting of twelve knights , four out of each order , and perpetuated by the annual election of four out of the knights last elected into the senate . that there be a council for trade consisting of a like number , elected and perpetuated in the same manner . 24. that there be a council of war not elected by the senate , but elected by the council of state out of themselves . that this council of war consist of nine knights , three out of each order , and be perpetuated by the annual election of three , out of the last knights elected into the council of state . 25. that in case the senate add nine knights more elected promiscuously , or not promiscuously , out of their own number , unto the council of war , the said council of war be understood by such addition , to be dictator of the common-wealth for the term of three moneths and no longer , except by farther order of the senate the said dictatorian power be prolonged for a like term . 26. that the signiory have session and suffrage , with right also joyntly or severally to propose both in the senate , and in all senatorian councils . 27. that each of the three orders or divisions of knights , in each senatorian council , elect one provost for the term of one week , and that any two provosts of the same council so elected , may propose unto the same council for their term and not otherwise . 18. that some fair room , or rooms well furnished , and attended , be allowed at the states charge , for a free and open academy unto all comers , at some convenient hour , or hours towards the evening ; that this academy be governed according unto the rules of good breeding , or civil conversation by some one or more of the provosts , and that in this academy it be lawfull for any man by word of mouth or by writing , in jest or in earnest , to propose unto the proposers . 29. that for ambassadors in ordinary , there be four residences , as france , spain , venice , and constantinople ; that every resident upon elction of a new embassador in ordinary , remove to the next rsidence in the order hereby mentioned , till having served orderly in all the said residences , he return home , that upon monday next ensuing the last of november , there be every second year elected by the senate some six person being above twenty five and under thirty five years of age , and not of the senate , nor of the popular assembly . that the party so elected , repair on monday next ensuing the last of march following , as an embassador in ordinary unto the court of france , and there reside for the term of two years to be computed from the first of april next ensuing his election . that every embassador in ordinary , be allowed three thousand pounds a year during the term of his residences . and that if a resident come to dy , there be an extraordinary election into his residence for his 〈◊〉 , and for the remainder of his removes , and progress . 30. that all emergent elections be made by scrutiny , that is by a council , or by commissioners proposing , and by the senate resolving in the manner following . that all field officers be proposed by the council of war . that all embassadors extraordinary , be proposed by the council of state . that all judges and serjeants at law , be proposed by the commissioners of the great seal . that all barons and officers of trust in the exchequer be proposed by the commissioners of the treasury , and that such of these as are thus proposed unto , and approved by the senate , be held lawfully elected . 31. that the cognizance of all forein negotiation , and of all matter of state to be considered , or law to be enacted , whether provincial or national , domestick or forein , appertain unto the council of state . that all such affairs of like kind as the council of state shall judge fit to be carryed with more than ordinary secrecy , be committed by them , and appertain unto the cognizance , and trust of the council of war , to this end consisting of a 〈…〉 , or committee of the council of state . that the cognizance , and protection , both of the national religion , and of the liberty of conscience , equally established in this nation , after the manner provided in the religious part of this model , appertain unto the council for religion . that all matter of traffick , and regulation of the same unto the council for trade . that in the exercise of these several functions , each being naturally senatorian of authoritative only , no council assume any other power , than such only as shall be particularly or expresly estated upon the same by act of parliament . 32. that what shall be proposed unto the senate by any one or more of the signiory , or of the proposers general ; or what ever was proposed by any two of the provosts , or particular proposers unto their respective council ; and upon debate at that council shall come to be proposed by the same unto the senate , be necessarily debatable , and debated by the senate . 33. that in all cases wherein power is derived unto the senate by law made , or by act of parliament , the 〈◊〉 of the senate be ultimate ▪ that in all cases of law to be made , or not already provided for by act of parliament , as some particular peace , or war , levy of men or mony , or the like , the result of the senate be not ultimate , but preparatory only , and be proposed by the senate unto the prerogative tribe , or assembly of the people , except only in cases of such speed or secrecy , wherein the senate shall judge the necessary slowness , or openness of like proceeding to be of detriment , or danger unto the common-wealth . 34. that if upon the motion● or proposition of a council , or proposer general , the senate adde nine knights promiscuously , or not promiscuously chosen out of their own number unto the council of war , the said council of war , be thereby made dictator , and have power of life and death , as also to enact laws in all cases of speed or secrecy for and during the term of three moneths and no longer , except upon new order from the senate : and that all laws enacted by the dictator , be good and valid for the term of one year , and no longer , except the same be proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people . 35. that the burgesses of the annual election returned by the tribes , enter into the prerogative tribe upon monday next ensuing the last of march ; and that the like number of burgesses whose term is expired , recede at the same time . that the burgesses thus entred . elect unto themselves out of their own number two of the horse , one to be captain , and the other to be cornet of the same , and two of the foot , one to be captain , the other to be ensign of the same , each for the term of three years . that these officers being thus elected , the whole tribe or assembly proceed to the election of four annual magistrates , two out of the foot to be tribunes of the foot , and two out of the horse to be tribunes of the horse . that the tribunes be commanders of this tribe in chief so far as it is a military body , and presidents of the same , as it is a civil assembly . and lastly , that this whole tribe be paid weekly as followeth , unto each of the tribunes of the horse seven pounds , unto each of the tribunes of foot six pounds , unto each of the captains of horse five pounds , unto each of the captains of foot four pounds , unto each of the cornets three pounds , unto each of the ensignes two pounds seven shillings , unto every horseman one pound ten shillings , and to every one of the foot one pound . 36. that inferiour officers , as captains , cornets , ensignes , be only for the military discipline of the tribe , that the tribunes have session in the senate without suffrage . that of course they have session and suffrage in the dictatorian council , so often as it is created by the senate . that in all cases to be adjudged by the people , they be presidents of the court or judicatory . 37. that peculate or defraudation of the publick , and all casts or crimes tending to the subversion of the government , be tri●ble by the prerogative tribe , or the assembly of the people , and that unto the same there●y an appeal in all causes , and from all courts , magistrates , or councils , national , or provincial . 38. that the right of debate , as also of proposing to the people , be wholly and only in the senate , without any power at all of result not deriv'd from the people , and estated upon the senate by act of parliament . 39. that the power of result be wholly and only in the people , without any right at all of debate . 40. that the senate having debated and agreed upon a law to be proposed , cause promulgation of the said law to be made for the space of six weeks before proposition , ( that is ) cause the law to be written fair , and hung up for the time aforesaid , in some of the most eminent places of the city , and of the suburbs . 41. that promulgation being made , the signiory demand of the tribunes fitting in the senate , at assembly of the people . that the tribunes upon such demand of the signiory , or of the senate , be obliged to assemble the prerogative tribe in arms by sound of trumpet , with drums beating , and colours flying , in any town , field , or market-place , being not above six miles distant , upon the day , and at the hour appointed , except the meeting through inconvenience of the weather , or the like , be prorogued by consent of the signiory and of the tribunes . that the prerogative tribe being assembled accordingly , the senate propose to them by two or more of the senatorian magistrates thereunto appointed , at the first promulgation of the law . that the proposers for the senate open unto the people the occasion , motives , and reasons of the senate for the law to be proposed , and that the same being done , they put the law or proposition by distinct clauses unto the ballot of the people . that if any material clause or clanses of the proposition , or law so proposed , be rejected by the people , the clause or clauses so rejected may be reviewed , altered , and proposed again unto the third time , if the senate think fit , but no oftner . 42. that what is thus proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law of the land , and no other , except what is already received as such , or reserved unto the dictatorian council . 34. that every magistracy , office , or election throughout this whole common-wealth , whether annual or triennial , be understood of course or consequence to injoyn an interval or vacation equal unto the term of the same . that the magistracy or office of a knight , and of a burgess , be in this relation understood as one and the same , and that this order regard only such elections as are national or domestick , and not such as are forein , or contained in the p●ovincial parts of this model . 44. that for an exception from this rule , where there is but one elder of the horse in one and the same parish , that elder be eligible in the same without interval , and where there be above foure elders of the horse in one and the same parish , there be not above half , nor under two of them eligible at the same election . 45. that throughout all the assemblies & councils of this common-wealth , the quorum consist of one half in the time of health , and of one third part in a time of sickness , being so declared by the senate . the use of the ballot , being as full of prolixity and abstruseness in writing , as of dispatch and facility in practice , is presumed throughout all elections and results in this model , and for the rest referr'd rather unto practice than writing . there remain the relgions , military and provincial parts of this frame . but the civil part being approv'd , they follow , or being not approv'd , may be spared . conclvsion or the use of these propositions . these propositions are so layd out to debate or examination , that a man having the mind to weigh discourse upon , or object against this model , may do it in the parts with the most convenience . any examination of , or objection against the whole , or any part in print or in writing , the author holdeth himself bound to acknowlege , or answer : but as to meer discourse upon matters of this compass it is usually narrow : besides that in writing a man must put himself upon hetter aym , than he can be obliged to take in discourse . any one objection lying in writing against any one order in this part of the model , after such manner as to shew that the part or order so invaded ought to be expunged , altered , or amended , unless it may be expunged , altered , or amended accordingly , destroyeth the whole . and any one or more objections so lying against any one or more of these orders or propositions , that thereby they may be expunged , altered or amended , must in the whole or in part make a better model . in this case therefore , or in case no objection ly , the use of these propositions will be such , as thereby any man or any assembly of men , considering or debating upon them in order , may find or make a true model of a well-ordered common-wealth . and that an assembly can never make , or frame a model of any government otherwise than in some such manner , is proveable first by a demonstration from the effect ; and secondly by a demonstration from the cause . the demonstration from the effect is , that an assembly no otherwise frameth a law , or order , than by having it first penned by some one man , and then judging upon it , and the model of a common-wealth must consist of many laws or orders . the demonstration from the cause is , that whereas reason consisteth of two parts , the one invention , and the other judgement , a man may be as far beyond any assembly for invention , as any assembly can be beyond a man for judgement ; or which is more , that the formation of a model of government requireth a strong faculty of invention , and that an assembly is naturally voyd of all manner of invention . 〈…〉 finis . london , printed for daniel pakeman , at the rain-bow in fleet-street , 1659. the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power, or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullness of submitting to the present government by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it. one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's [sic] it. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a57692 of text r205686 in the english short title catalog (wing r2015). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 55 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 9 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a57692 wing r2015 estc r205686 11846795 ocm 11846795 49851 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57692) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 49851) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 38:17) the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power, or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullness of submitting to the present government by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it. one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's [sic] it. rous, francis, 1579-1659. 16 p. s.n., [london : 1649] caption title. one in a series of pamphlets replying to francis rous's the lawfulness of obeying the present government. the 1st was "a religious demurrer ..." (1649) possibly by nathaniel ward and 3 others identified as "a.b.c."; the 2nd, "a second part of the religious demurrer, by another hand", and the present piece are by "a" or "c". the 4th was "discolliminium ... by b.", widely but erroneously attributed to ward. not to be confused with the grand case of conscience concerning the engagement stated & resolved. erroneously attributed to rous by wing. place and date of publication from wing. reproduction of original in harvard university libraries. eng rous, francis, 1579-1659. -lawfulness of obeying the present government. allegiance. political science -early works to 1800. great britain -politics and government -1642-1649. a57692 r205686 (wing r2015). civilwar no the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power. or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning t [no entry] 1649 10589 105 15 0 0 0 0 113 f the rate of 113 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2003-08 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2003-09 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2003-10 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2003-10 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-12 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the grand case of conscience stated , about submission to the new and present power . or , an impassio●…te answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullnesse of submitting to the present government . by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery , a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it . although i love not contention , yet i desire satisfaction : that whilst ●… live a midst a tumultuous generation , and unquiet times , i may be delivered from a troubled spirit and discalm'd minde ; a wounded spirit who can bear ? i was willing to have sate down in silence , res●…lving to hav●… kept my conscience , as void of offence to others , so ●…ree from disturbance in it self , ch●…sing rather quietly to suffer for not doing what was commanded , than knowingly to act what is ( at least to me ) ●…lawfull : such a liberty of conscience i conceive none will deny me . but since ●…at book came to mine hands , i ( although unwillingly ) undertook this task , not only out of an earnest desire i had to finde out truth , but for the unusuall modesty of the tract it s●…lf , knowing that the fowlest corn is best winnowed in a gentle gale ; a tempestuous winde blowes away ch●…ffe and corn too . i shall take a brief view of the book , and submit what i shall speak to the authours judgement , a declaration hath been lately published , &c. indeed there was such a declaration published , which i desired with much earnestnesse , and read with some d●…ration , expecting to have found the very quintessence of reason , and stre●…gt of argument , whereby judicious men might have been wholly convinced ▪ and abundantly satisfied ; but my s●…ruples were not answered by it . for suppose that had been proved , which was there much argued , that the government of a free state were in some respects more convenient than that of monarchy ; that might have been a prevalent argument to an irregulated people , who were ( de novo ) to constitute a government , not to those , who had before an antient form suited to the people , established by law , confirmed by oath , and engaged to by the severall declarations of them who are so sollicitous for the altering of it . surely if convenience or inconvenience only can break a promise , and disingage an oath , david was much mistaken in the 15th psalm , and others may be easily cheated , who expect ready performance of , not needlesse disputing about oaths , in wh●… 〈◊〉 stand bound to them . what is there said concerning declarations [ that the lords and commons were of that minde when they made them ] may serve their turns for the present , but would equally serve others turns for the future ; for by the same reason , when those that penned and published that declaration , shall borrow money of men , and declare to pay them , imploy souldiers with an engagement to satisfie them , people may suspect that their mindes may alter , and then ( by this rule ) their former declarations will be of no strength . what is further spoken in the preface for a lawfull obedience to an unlawfull change of government , will be touched on in the further prosecution of this discourse . it is said [ the apostle commands obedience to higher powers , rom. 13. and thence it is inferred , that he speaks not in that place meerly of power or authority abstracted from persons , but of persons cloathed with that authority . ] the apostle speaks there directly of authority , of men only in subordination to that authority ; no further than as the executioners of that power , because it is impossible authority should be exercised , but where men are to manage it . the apostle in that place requires submission to legall authority , by whomsoever executed , not to any men commanding by an illegall power . higher powers are there expressed indefinitely , not pointing at any particular government : in a monarchy , an aristocracy , a democracy , the people under the severall constitutions may , yea must , by the apostles command obey the higher powers , those who by their legall constitution are in authority , not in power , over them : there is a law of nature , that will make man obey a power if h●… cannot ●…sist , but the injunction of the apostle ( there ) is only to lawfull author●… ▪ 〈◊〉 the authour of that book knows , that those only can be the higher powers , or legall authority of any kingdom , which the constitution of that kingdom makes such , and that only can exact obedience according to the scripture rule . now what the higher powers of england are , by the constitution of this kingdom , is sufficiently known . the apostle commands wives to submit to their husbands , ephes. 5. 22. surely the injunction is for obedience to husbands , quà husbands , not quà men , indeed not abstracted from their persons , because it is impossible the authority of an husband should be submitted to , where a man is not to exercise it : but should a stranger come to anothers wife , and call himself husband ( having before either imprisoned or slain the rightfull husband ) and require submission , i scarce think the authour himself ( especially if he be married ) would presse for obedience to such an usurped power : such a woman may be forced , and overpowr'd , but to submit to him as an husband , were a sinne . what is there urged as the great argument to prove the lawfullnesse of obedience to the present government , hath been my main deswasive ( viz. ) the apostles command to obey higher powers for conscience sake : had i been convinced that the king in his person had been the higher powers of england , and that his personall command ●…ad by the apostles rule exacted undeniable obedience , although he had been visibly ●…ing what we suspected , and palpably introducing what we feared , i should have submitted for conscience sake . the great inducement i had to adhere to the parliament , was ( besides the hopes of better reformation ) that thorow conviction that lay upon me , both by mine own reason , and parliamentary practices , that the two houses of parliament , in case of the kings absence , weaknesse or refusall , had in them such a part of the higher powers , and supream authority , as to defend , and preserve the people without , yea against the king , doing , commanding or exacting any thing besides or against the law . and this is that main block , at which i stumble in yeelding obedience to this new power , because i am yet convinced , that they are not the higher powers of our kingdom , to which the apostle requires obedience . i acknowledge a government may be altered ( although i think it not safe , but upon urgent and evident necessity ) to which being altered obedience is required , but it must be done by the higher powers still , whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered , as a continued form ; but for any party by force to lay low the higher powers , and to exact obedience as to the legall authority , is to me a sinne . i am not ignorant what pleas there may be from inconvenience in such a doctrine , but according to the light i have , where lawfull or unlawfull are in question , their convenience and inconvenience must keep silence . it is to be observed what is spoken by the apostle in the same place , the powers that are , are ordained by god : to which in the second page of the book is a little addition , viz. rulers and those that were in authority were ordained of god : the scripture enjoins obedience to powers , to men only as intitled to those powers : the authority was ordained by god , not the rulers , they were constituted by men , the power may be gods ordinance , when the deputing of persons to the exercise of that power may be ( at most ) but gods permission : nay , that men in authority ( rulers in the apostles expression ) are to be obeyed no further then as acting according to that authority , is the judgement of one much used by the composer of that book . when a tyrant shall offer violence to his private subjects . which they can by no other means avoid , they may defend themselves and theirs against that tyrant as against a thief ; when are men properly called tyrants , but when they either usurp or exercise a power contrary to the law and usage of those places where they rule ? when a consciencious obedience is required to the authority , but not to those , who by their own will , or procured force , either usurp or exercise a power besides that authority . should we grant that men assuming to themselves the place and power of magistrates , by what right or means soever they came by it , must be obeyed , surely it would be the greatest inlet to tyranny in the world , and the speediest means of destroying states that could be invented : for then should none govern in any kingdome any longer , then their swords and their strength could bear them up . thus much i shall yeeld , that when any shall usurp authority , by whatsoever title or force he procures it , such may be obeyed in reference to their power , while they command lawfull things , but not in reference to authority : a man being overpower'd may yeeld for his own safety , but to submit to that usurp'd power , as to the legall authority of that kingdome where it is , is to assert that as lawfull , which is but usurp'd , and in the scripture language to make a lie . from this i shall take a just occasion to speak to those instances there urged , from obedience to whom , the argument is drawn to prove the lawfullnesse of our submission now . concerning claudius caesar and nero which are mentioned , pag. 2 , 3. how they came in by force , yet were obeyed by the people , i shall not trouble my self nor the reader with any taedious search into , or large recitall of the story , but take it as there laid down , and give a brief answer to it . but before i fall upon a plain answer to what is there fallaciously urged , and shew the insufficiency thereof to prove that for which it is asserted : i conceive there will appear such a disproportion between the quoted instances and our present case , that should we grant all the premises , yet the conclusion would not directly follow to prove the question . the most that can be asserted from those examples is , that people did obey a supream power as exercised by those who had no true ( at least but a dubitable ) title , when the same form of government was still continued , for so it had been for many years before , during the reign of a 4 emperours , yea , such a government which was the pristine constitution of that place , it being monarchicall for above b 44●… . years , till tarquinius , about the businesse of his son with lucretia , was rejected . whether party had or pretended most right , and the best ends in their changing of the goverment , either i. brutus from , or iulius caesar to monarchy , i shall not dis●…ute : nor shall i decide , whether god might not justly give them to see the evill of a change , who ( it may be ) chiefly out of a desire of change , would wholly alter a constituted form . but this is not our case : the insubmission of people now , is not grounded upon a suggested sc●…uple of a dubious title to the same , but upon an apprehended illegality of the new and needlesse establishment of another government : it is one thing , and as in it self more lawfull , so to people lesss scrup●…lous , upon a pretended title to usurp the exercise of an established authority : another , and as in it self less just , so to people more doubtfull upon pretended apprehensions to eradicate a lawfull authority , and illegally to lay low those which legally are the higher powers of a kingdome : in the one , people lesse able to ●…mine titles , submit to the established government of that kingdom where they are , and this is sufficient to yeeld obedience , that they know not who hath the right : in the other , they must give themseves up to a new-fashioned modell illegall to them , because not the constituted powers of that place , and this is enough to withold allegiance , that they know such have not ( nor pretend ) a title . now to the instances themselves , to see how farre they prove the lawfullnesse of our submission to a change of government , although the change be beleeved unlawfull . after the death of caius caligula , the consuls and senate of rome entred in●…o a consultatio●… , how they might restore the common-wealth to her ancint free●…m , i think this argument will take in all that is therein spoken : if the peo●…e of the roman empire did submit to the power of claudius and nero , who by force were put upon them , then the people of england may lawfully submit to a change of goverument , though beleeved unlawfull : but they did submit , therefore these may , i will finde no fault with the syllogisme , because it is of mine own making , although it be the very summe of what is urged : what aequivocall terms there are whereby a spirituall eye would quickly see four terms ( at least ) in it . i shall discover in mine answer to the severall propositions . in the first proposition , it being hypotheticall , i shall deny the consequence : for 1. a people may possibly do what is not in it self lawfull either for themselves or others to do , a facto ad jus non valet argumentum , had the author proved their submission legall , it had been more urgent . indeed it is said at the end of that paragraph , we see rulers put by souldiers into that power which is said by the scripture to be ordained of god , and even to these rulers men must be subject for conscience sake . but the apostle doth not command obedience to these men , but to the powers , nay not to any men , but as commanding according to th●…se powers ( as was said before ) nor is it materiall who put men in , nor what men are put into powers , if they are the powers that are ordained of god : those that command according to that authority , must be obeyed : and whatsoever the souldiery of rome did , had the souldiery of england ( in this tacitely pleaded for ) observed that doctrine before , we had not been ( i think ) disputing this question now . but 2. what might be lawfull for the people in the roman empire , may not be lawfull for the people of this kingdome : i finde not in any history that ever they were sworn to a particular government as we have been : things in themselves indifferent are made necessary , when by an oath engaged to . but of that more afterward . to the minor proposition , i shall say 1. that those mentioned had ( at least seeming ) titles to the empire . indeed it is agreed by all historians i have met withall , that they were first encouraged by souldiers : but what iniquity is in that , if they might pretend a title ? the very end of power and strength is or should be to conserve and recover just right , we have alwaies acknowledged it lawfull and expedient by force of arms to acquire a rightfull possession illegally detained ; but i could wish that this story had been printed and read by the sword-men in this kingdome five moneths agoe , that they might but have thought whether it had been greater honour to be recorded as men , that should guard a king of a doubtfull title to the crown , or to be storied as men that should bring a king of an indubitable right to the scaffold . i will not here dispute by what title , or according to what law iulius caesar , not yet his successour octavius assumed the empire , but when that government and those governours were received , and acknowledged by the senate , it became lawfull to that people . although conquest be no true title , nor durable tenure any longer then strength can keep it , yet compact upon that conquest , gives a title to the conquerour , and engageth submission from the other party to those rules resolved on at , or given out according to that agreement . tiberius from whom indeed both claudius and nero had their government , did not only for a great part of his time , do all he did by the advise of the senate , but would ( at least seemingly ) be chosen by the senate , as not contented secretly t●… step into a government either by the earnest engagement of his mother , or by the fond adoption of augustus , but would have the c●…ll and election of the common-wealth too : now here surely was a lawfull title , if the consent of the people could make it lawfull , although ( it may be ) not in it's first acquisition , yet in it 's after establishment : and claudius deriving his title from him , why should not people obey it ? yea , me thinks the authour of that book intimates a title that claudius had , where he saith , pag. 3. claudius being frighted with the news of caligula's death , and fearing himself might be enquired for , upon suspicion withdrew : had not he been the heir apparent to the empire , what ground of fear , or what cause of withdrawing ? nay , if he had not been looked on as the rightfull successour , why should the souldier primo intuitu salute him by the name of emperour ? for nero he descended in a direct line on the mothers side , from livia augustus his wife , and although brittanicus was the naturall son of claudius , yet nero ( by agrippina's means ) was his adopted son for the empire , and brought to the senate , where it was consented unto , that he should have his togam virilem , and he called prince of youth : it being their usage , as far as i have observed in the story , that an adoptive title assented to by the senate , hath commonly been acknowledged , when a lineall succession hath been rejected : yea , the authour seems to grant a kinde of title to nero too , where it is said , pag. 3. that the sentence of the souldiers was followed by the consent of the senate : if the senate had any share in either constituting or declaring a king , nero's title was hereby established . but what is this to our case ? a rightfull or doubtfull heir was brought by souldiers to the senate , who among themselves were contriving to alter their government : this heir was received by the senate , and upon that submitted unto by the people : but doth the authour think that if the senate had declared and acknowledged , yea , promised to preserve the title of a rightfull prince , and the souldiers by the advice , counsell , or assistance of some party in this senate , should imprison or slay their prince , and take away the major part of the senate , only because against their actings , and this minor part relict should alter their government , yea , make themselves without the consent of the people their rulers , that then the people would or lawfully could have submitted to them as their legall and rightfull governours , nay , would not rather have resisted them , as not being those higher powers , whom they ought for conscience sake to obey ? indeed had the king for some reason hid himself ( as claudius ) or for other reasons absented himself , and the two houses of parliament legally elected , and freely sitting ( at such a time esteemed ) the higher powers , contrived a way for the altering the government , although i should not have proclaimed their wisdome , yea , should have bewailed their sin , in respect of the many ties and bonds of declarations and oaths upon them , i think i should have submitted to their power , yet i would not for my oath 's sake ( had i liked the thing ) have acted in it . in which i think i ●…eeld more then many anti-malignant men in england will do : yet how far from our case this is , what hath been spoken will testifie . but 2. had the instance been of iulius casar , who by meer force and violence , without the least pretence of title acquired the government , which had better suited our businesse , yet i should say , that what submission the people yeelded , and what commands he gave , were in relation to a power which he by force had gotten , and did exercise without any pretence to a legall constituted power , till received and acknowledged by the senate . i confesse should these rulers now in our kingdom command submission to them , as to a conquering party , and acknowledge they did by power exercise , what by force they had gotten , i should in that sense submit to them , because not able to defend my self against them : but they call themselves the legall authority , and higher powers of england , under which notion i cannot submit , because positively to obey what is thus commanded , what soever secret reservation i may have , i doe and must assert their power as lawfull , and their authority as the legall authority . by this i shall fitly descend to those instances of our nation , to which what hath been already spoken , will give ( me judice ) sufficient answer : for 1. what submission was given to the conquerour , was yeelded as to a forc'd power , untill by after-compact it was acknowledged and made legall . 2. what was practised by the successors mentioned ( besides the acknowledged force in their unrightfull acquisitions , and violent exercise of power ) it was only upon difference of title , which people may not be able to judge of , as the authour saies , pag. 9. but amongst us , here is an alteration of government , where a change only seems to be asserted , no title at all pretended . 3. what is spoken of hen. 7. may be enough to answer the argument drawn from him and the rest too . although the title might be unjust , and the power illegally gotten , yet when the title was acknowledged , at least , confirmed by parliament , and the laws whereby he ( or they ) should rule , were enacted in a parliament , that did engage the people to an unquestionable obedience , the constituted higher powers then commanding , to whom the apostle requires obedience : for although a parliament ( such i mean , which by the known law and continued usage of the kingdom as a parliament ) should acknowledge or do any thing civilly evill ( i mean in reference to the state ) it is lawfull and just in respect of the people , and engageth obedience , which i think will be a sufficient excuse for peoples yeelding obedience to their laws , not only because then enacted , but since confirmed by the higher powers of our nation : although in the mean time upon the same ground they rest ●…nsatisfied in the lawfullnesse of submission to the present power . i might adde , that what the whole body of a nation did , if illegall , doth not engage our practice : for we know papists ( and such they were all who submitted to the fore-mentioned rulers ) make no conscience of denying a rightfull title , nor yeelding to an illegall power , when they may but probably carry on their own design : but what is spoken already will satisfie , and i had rather give a rationall answer , then question the wisdome or honesty of ancestors , where it may be avoided . what is urged from the casuis●…s and paraeus ( although i am not bound jurare in verba , being of dr moulins his minde , rather to like one argument then ten authours ) i shall agree to in that sense , in which i conceive they delivered it , to submit to such power as forced , not to their authority as legall , unlesse it be 〈◊〉 an authority which by constitution and usage are the higher powers of our kingdom ▪ the authour after the example of others , proceeds now to give some reason o●… his own , which i shall also endeavour to examine , and so far as they carry streng●… and truth ( as least to me ) shall submit : where otherwise , i shall give mine on the contrary . indeed how can it be otherwise ? for when a person or persons have gotten supream power , and by the same excluded all other from authority , either that authority which is thus taken by power must be obeyed , or else all authority must fall to the ground . persons may indeed get themselves the greatest strength , and in that sense may be submitted to ▪ but they cannot illegally get themselves the legall power , nor can they exclude others from their authority , although by force they may keep them from the exercise of it , a man may be a man , yea a living man , although by the violence of disease , he may be kept from outward actings . an husband may be a husband still although imprisoned and thereby kept from the exercise of his duty to his wife . a parliament may be a parliament still , although by violence kept from sitting and executing their authority . i am so far from thinking that disobedience to such power will make all authority and government fall to the ground , that i beleeve submission to such will quickly lay all authority waste : for by the same reason that we obey this altered government and usurped authority now , we must obey any other suddenly , if another party get more strength , and what an unsetled state and unknown authority we should then have may easily be judged : nor do i think the authour himself would be of the same minde , should the prince with a potent army get the power into their hands . surely were this doctrine true , those renowned men shall be rased out of the calendar for saints , that opposed the kings power in ship-money : nor must such be sequestred who under the kings power formerly did lend or give whatsoever he required , whether men , money , horse or arms : nor these put out of the parliament , who obeyed him in sitting at oxon : nay , nor himself neither put to death for doing what was urged against him , if men in power howsoever they come by it are rulers ordained by god , and to be obeyed for conscience sake . if confusion be worse then titular tyranny , i wish that seeing we had no titular tyranny , we had had no confusion neither : and i should be glad that confusion may befall ( if any ) only such , who in this kingdome have been the greater introducers of it , either those who acquire and assert , or those who cannot receive or submit to an usurped government : for although the end must not be destroyed for the means , yet he that destroies the means in it's tendency to the end , will scarcely preserve the end at last . if a masters mate had thrown the master over-board , and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himself , if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the ship , the ship must needs perish , and themselves with it . i doubt here is a fallacy , and this case will not concern our question , for i suppose , although i am not so well skilled in the discipline of marriners , as to know that a masters mate hath a kinde of title to the government of the ship in case of the masters miscarriage , which suits not our condition : but suppose him to have no title , or state the question somewhat nearer our case , that if a party of the sea-men should throw the master over-board , and assume to themselves the government of the ship : ●…●…hall then answer , that if that mate or this party having the greater strength , ●…hould by power enforce and exact obedience of the rest , these ought for the safety of their own lives , although not to obey the authority , yet to do the commands of the enforcing party , and if ever they come ashoar , to doe what they can to bring such unworthy persons to condigne punishment , who , besides the murder of the master , would so basely hazard the ship too ; but if that mate or party should command the sea-men to obey them as the rightfull master , i think ( although with submission to better judgements ) they ought not , although for the safety of their lives thus to obey them . it is better to lose a naturall life , then a quiet conscience , and a spirituall soul : the greatest advantage will not warrant the least evil . in such a case it would easily be judged both by god and men , to whose fault the losse of the ship should be imputed , either to them that did unjustly require , or those who dared not unwarrantably to do an unlawfull thing . i know not what the sodain fear of unavoidable death might make such men ( de facto ) do , and i can easily think what harsh censures their hazarding or losing their lives upon such refusall , may bear from rash and lesse considerate men , as an empty product of meer peevishnesse : but i am confident that a synod of religious and intelligent divines would conclude , that ( de jure ) they ought rather to adventure the losse of all , than call him a lawfull , who is but an usurped master , which they must by yeelding to his or their commands under that notion . whereas some speak of a time for settlement , they indeed do rather speak for a time of unsettlement , for they will have an unsettlement first and a settlement after . if i mistake not the desires of those who withhold submission to the present power , the authour of that book is mistaken in his apprehensions of them : that they desire a settlement ( i think ) is true , but that they desire an unsettlement first , is besides my thoughts of them ; i know it is the grief of their souls , and causeth sad searchings of heart , that ever they were brought into such unsettlements , and thereby put upon such racks of conscience as these are . it is not unsettlement but a deliverance from unsettlement they long for : i scarce see how we can be more unsetled then now we are : indeed being unsetled , we would use any means for a settlement , although for it's procurement our unsettlednesse were more unsetled ; if a man be at the rivers brink , i would advise him to keep out of the water , but if at once he leap into the middle of the river , i should perswade him to come to the bank , although he wade through much water to come thither : i would counsell a man to prevent distempers , but when the disease is already contracted , i should prescribe some physick for the safety of his life , although for the present it should more disease him . what is spoken of the former scriptures and casuists in the same page , i shall refer to what was before answered . but it is asked : whether that may not be called a settlement , how soon soever it is , when there is such a way setled , that men may have justice if they will , and may enjoy that main end of magistracy , to live a peaceable life in godlinesse and honesty ? to speak of what justice some have had at westminster , since the unsettlement of our times , or what to be expected , when colonels appear as parties with their arguments by their sides before committees , ( an argument too often used in the house too , as i beleeve the gentleman knows , ) where to engage a bustling daring colonell is to carry a cause : as also what peaceable lives men live , when the souldiers having put other men in power in the state , put themselves in command in mens houses : and what godlinesse and honesty may be looked for , when blasphemy must be tolerated , wickednesse must not be punished , when in the mean time godly men ( if but of a contrary judgement , a liberty of conscience formerly pleaded for ) are made offendors for a word , would be too large a field to walk in , and besides the swelling of this tract , but give too wide an occasion to further contests . but this shall suffice , that the gentleman a little begs the question in calling it justice , for although men may have , or might expect , what he cals justice , viz. things in themselves just , yet if he grant , as i have proved , that authority illegall by which they act , what they do or is done by any under that authority , although in it self just , yet is not properly justice : judgement ( for i conceive the authour means justitiam distributivam ) is then only just , when it is exercised by the higher powers , the legall magistracy of that kingdome where it is acted . the hebrews expresse justice by that word , which they likewise use for the usage and custome of that people , that are concerned in it . another argument the authour useth is , because people cannot judge of titles : when they cannot judge , then an usurped title is true to them , and will exact obedience : but if this be an argument , then ( for contrariorum eadem est ratio ) when titles are visibly unlawfull , people are disingaged from obedience . this is our case , where there is not any pretence of title . but some say , there are oaths that justifie disobedience to the present government : there are indeed severall oaths that engage us to the continned observance of our formerly established government , and then how far they justifie disobedience to this , let the authour judge . that oaths are sacred bonds and reverend obligements , and where they do not themselves leave or make us free , we are not to cut or break them in peeces : i shall equally assert , and could heartily wish it had been as truly practised in the kingdome as plainly spoken in the book : but seeing there are indeed ( as the authour affirms ) concerning these , faults on both hands , let us a little examine the faults he mentions , and see whether there are not other faults too , that he speaks not of . on the one side the slieghting of an oath , &c. this is a fault indeed : oaths and covenants are the strongest engagements ▪ whereby we can binde our selves either to god or man , if these come once to be sleighted and no longer observed , then they may conduce to the palpable advantage of those that made them , i am afraid that may justly be written upon the door-posts of england , what was set in the front of davids song , psa. 12. 1 , 2. i am loth to misjudge any person , whom i finde so modest , else i should fear that this fault was purposely argued , the more secretly to insinuate another , though not under the name of a fault : it is said , we finde some part of the covenant to speak of ●…ll th●… daies of our lives : as if some part had been but of a temporary engagement : but if i mistake not , the covenant did in every part of it oblige us to a continued observance of it : we did not swear constantly to keep this part , or that clause , but all our lives to keep this covenant , which is known to comprehend every part of it . true it is , that the obligation of some things end , because they can no longer be kept , as that of the kings person &c. i grant that the obligation of a people to any thing ends , when that thing obliged to , necessarily , and in its own nature ends ; but if men shall by violence put an end to the thing , that thereby the obligation may end too , i doubt such will be esteemed by god as covenant-breakers ; i do not think , that he breaks his covenant , that doth not preserve the kings person , when he is dead ▪ but i think he is guilty , that did not endeavour to preserve it while he was living ; had the covenant , in that part , been observed then , for all that i know , it might have obliged now . a woman promiseth to be faithfull to her husband so long as he lives , but if she , out of love to another man , shall lay violent hands on her husband to end his life , that thereby she might marry another , i beleeve she would scarcely be thought to have performed her promise . a tenant bargains with his land-lord to pay him rent for his house , so long as he lives in it : but if he through malice shall pull down the house , that he cannot live in it , and thereby to extinguish his bargain , it may be easily thought what determination the law would make in such a case . what is spoken here of the kings person , might as well have been spoken of any other part of the covenant : it is covenanted to preserve religion , but if those that made the covenant should by force extirpate , or by deceit undermine religion : would the authour think himself or others disingaged from that part of the covenant , or rather look upon himself as bound to preserve it , while it hath a being ? if this liberty should be given , no man would keep any oath any longer , than he saw good , if it were in his power to put an end to that thing to which he is obliged . but let 's see what faults are found on the other hand . but on the other side there are other faults : such are the urging of an oath or covenant against enemies , and not against friends in one and the same action . in this i am wholly of his judgement , and could wish that he had instanced in some things , whereby i might have guessed what aim he had taken , and against what he had levelled it . as i would not have any unequally excused , who are equally guilty , so i would not have him free from blame , who imputes guilt to one , when another shall be connived at , or incouraged in the same thing . in that clause of bringing delinquents to condigne punishment : if the covenant engage to bring one to punishment , that raised arms against the parliament in kent and essex , why not another that raised arms against the parliament in oxon shiere and berks shiere ? if according to our covenant we should preserve the priviledges of parliament against a malignant party , that would have taken away but five members ; why not against an haereticall party that took away above two hundred ? if one party be charged as guilty in not obeying orders of , but offering violence to the parliament ; why should another be excused as faultlesse , whose disobedience was more manifest , and whose violence was more palpable ? or if not altogether so , yet ( as the authour ) a slight and diminishing charge of it upon one , and a vehement and aggravating charge of it upon the other . another fault may be , a stiffe insisting on one part , and a neglect or at least silence in another part . this is not alwaies a fault , for when there is no occasion given to speak , silence is no evil ; one part may be in more danger to be broken than another , when a more violent asserting , and stiffe contending for that part is more necessary . if i had two children , the one at home in safety , the other in imminent danger , that i were more earnest and industrious for the saving and preserving of this , doth not at all argue lesse love or care to the other . but to take it in the best sense , to pretend much care in the keeping of one part , and in the mean time , to neglect another , i think a fault . as when men are seemingly violent against popery and prelacy , yet very indulgent to heresie and profanesse . when men shall plead covenant in the preservation of subjects liberties , yet forget their oath for the safety of the kings person in the preservation of religion ; which in respect of the covenant are of equall concernment ; for although it be pleaded by fome , and granted by all that religion , yea asserted by others , that the subjects liberties are of greater concernment than the kings person , it must be ratione mat●…riae , not ratione juram●…nti , for in that regard , we are equally obliged to one as the other . as also when by event two parts of it came to be inconsistent , to choose and inforce the keeping of the higher and lesse necessary part , and to give way to the losse and not keeping of the greater . here is to me a falsum suppositum ; i think it a sinne in any to ●…njoin , and wickednesse in any to take a covenant for the doing of two things that are or may be inconsistent ; nor do i know what parts of our covenant are such ; when the authour makes such appear , i shall bewail my sinne in taking it . if it be by him meant , what is talke●… by others , ( viz. ) that the safety of the kings person , and the preservation of religion are inconsistent , i must declare my dissent in this ; for i am yet convinced , that both the truth and honour of religion might have better been preserved by the safety of his person , and the continuance of our government , than hitherto it hath been , or for all i see , like to be , by the altering of the one , or taking away of the other . there is another , in racking an oath or covenant , to make it speak that which it meant not . i will adde , there is another fault to stop the mouth of a covenant , and denying it to speak what it would . nay , there is yet one more , when men shall put what interpretation upon covenants they please , or reserve to themselves a power to make any other interpretation upon them , than what the common and naturall sense of the words in which they are taken doe afford . oathes ought to be their own interpreters ; we may deceive men , but god is not mocked . but to come to what i conceive is the main end of what hath been hitherto asserted about oathes ▪ to consider whether there be any clause in any oath or covenant , which in a fair and common sense forbids obedience to the commands of the present government and authority . there is in the solemne league and covenant , that which engageth to another government , and then what forbids obedience to this ? in one clause we solemnly covenant to preserve the person , and not to diminish the just rights of the king ; had his person and just rights been preserved , his government could never have been attempted ; but seeing that cord is broken ( unhappy blow that strook it ●…sunder ! ) is there yet no bond will hold us ? yes ; we do in the same clause faithfully promise to preserve the law of the kingdom , and surely to change the government is to alter the fundamentall laws of the kingdom ; if we are bound to preserve our law , then that government that is established by law ; nay yet further , in the same place , we doe swear , yea and call the world to witnesse it , that we will not diminish the just rights and greatnesse of the king : is not a mans right as much concerned in his heirs inheriting , as in his own enjoying what legally belong'd to him ? is it not a mans undoubted right to have his lawfull heirs succeed him in his lawfull enjoyments ? but now by this government the kings heirs are wholly divested of any possession , and absolutely debarred of that right , which by the usage of the kingdom belongs to them . much lesse when no other can be had ( as the authour ) i do not yet see impossibility in having another , truly i think , if the covenant had been strictly observed , we had never had this , and if it were yet carefully performed , we might quietly have another government , such under which godly people might live with more comfort , and lesse scruple . if it be said that in the oath of allegiance , allegiance is sworn to the king , his heirs and successors . if his heirs be not his successours , how doth that oath binde ? either the word successours must be superstuous , or else it must binde successours as well as heirs , &c. if i should grant that the word successours were superfluous , it would not be the only superfluous word in things of that nature ; or that it is an exegeticall expression which is not unusuall in all writings both divine and profane , the more fully to expresse the same thing by two words : his heirs and successours are conjunctive , which must necessarily imply , that his heirs according to the usage of this kingdom ought to be his successours : so that it can binde to no successours besides the heir : indeed should the line extinguish , then the legall successour were to be obeyed by that oath , and yet that too in the continuance of the government , for he is not properly a successour , unlesse in the same form of government ; for without asking lawyers and learned men , he is properly a successor , that succeeds any man in the place where he was . if the agitators in the army should depose the generall , and order the army according to their wills , would they be justly called his successours , when the frame of their discipline were altered ? this seems partly to be acknowledged by the authour in the same page , where he instanceth only in those for successours , which su●…ceeded in the same government , and saith that the word successour is taken for him that actually succeeds in government , i conceive it must be meant , when the same form still is continued , else what he asserts , and the instances he names , would hold no proportion . but there is one engagement to the former government yet lies upon us in reference to our oaths , which is mentioned either in that ( before named ) or in the oath of supremacy , that no power on earth shall deter or absolve us from the keeping of it , if so , i would but humbly begge the authour conscienciously to judge , whether the force or fear of any party , were they stronger than they are , should affright a people into a submission to any other government , then that to which they have thus sworn . i may take the same liberty to propose a few short , yet considerable quaete●… ▪ while the son is in the same posture in which the father was , how comes this oath at thi●… time to stand up , and pl●…ad for disobedience in regard of the son , that was asleep and silent in regard of the father ? i do not know in what one title this oath is more urged for the son , then it might have been , and was for the father ; unlesse that now there is more need of pressing it , because in the sons daies the government is altered ; in the fathers , it was ( at least ) promised to be continued . those , who were against the irregular actings , the court-faults , the wicked counsels of the father , were for the safety of his person , the preservation of his rights , and the continuance of his government : and now the same persons that are for the rights of the son , and the continuance of the government , are as much against the vices and counsels in and about him , as about the father . besides it might be said , that the father was not opposed , untill there was a parliament , that being the legall means in our kingdom of resisting arbitrary and extra-legall power ; the king in the intervalls of parliaments being the chief officer , not to be resisted by private subjects : and certainly i think , were there now a parliament sitting according to the constitution of england , and the received to the crown , should act any thing against the known law , and ●…he kingdoms safety , those who are now for the reception of the son , and for the performance of their oaths , would as truly and conscienciously ( according to their covenant ) join with them against the exorbitancies of the son , as they did against the evil of the father : only i beleeve they would expect some security , that his person and rights ( parts of the covenant ) should be better preserved and lesse diminished then his fathers were . besides what hath been spoken to the book , i might adde also one small quaer●… about altering the government : whether in such an alteration there is not necessarily required , either the generall consent of the major part of the people , or at least the major part of their trustees ? if so , what right have these men to do , who now act in it , some of them being the trustees of no people , having no election , others who were legally chosen denied their liberty ? may not any number of people ( there being no known law nor constituted rule for this transaction ) by the like reason conceive , and ( if they have strengt●… ) alter it again to morrow ? but if they will ( which is but equall ) give them liberty of di●…enting from their government , whom they deny the liberty of delating or consenting to it , i shall be free . whether there be any scripture example or prudentiall rule unnecessarily to oppress●… , and , where it may be avoided , to rack the tender consciences of unquestionably godly men , not only when they are the major part , and most judicious christians ( both of ministers and people ) and most likely to know the truth , but when they are the least strong , and most discountenanced , and therefore unlikely to be byassed by any private interests ? indeed those who side with the strongest party , lye under grounded suspition of having particular ends , who can turn any way , to any party , where they may get the best places , the greatest preferments , and the largest rewards : such many have received , and i beleeve more expect ; for it is observable , that for the most part , your only parliament convert●… before ▪ are ●…our greatest parliament assertors now : but how a poor people despised and opposed by power , who can expect the conferment of nothing but punishment , should design an interest in standing to their principles , when they know ( some of them at least being very able and prevalent ) they might upon their least turning have as large a share in the rewards of the kingdom as those who now enjoy the greatest , is to me irrationall and improbable . the apostle paul would avoid a lawfull thing rather then offend the scrupling consciences of weak brethren : what then is their fault , who do unlawfull things , and thereto engage the dijudicating consciences of weak christians ? whether both in humane probability , and religious reason , it were not more likely to conduce to gods glory , to religions settlement and honour , to christians union and satisfaction , to the kingdoms peace , to the prevention of danger , and the safety of all ( who have not wickedly out-acted all hopes of safety , and are conscious to themselves that their bucket must sink , whensoever authorities bucket shall arise ) to endeavour ere it be too late , to join authority and power , title and strength together ; that as power may arm authority , and render it formidable , so authority might justifie power , and make that lawfull ? least when the title shall be claimed , those who may dislike the vices , and oppose any tyranny ( were they legally authorized ) of the claimer , yet should not for conscience sake deny his right ; and those who could like well the pretensions of our new governours ( were they justifiably managed ) should not adventure for religions sake to assist their usurpation : whereby , as by our unwise actions , we have too much justified malignants actions , and made them our deriders : we may strengthen their hands , and make them our masters . i am confident that if the great managers of our new-work , and the violent assertors of this changed government would but seriously lay these things to heart , it might make them seasonably retract , what they untimely attempted , and rather finde out waies to settle , then further unsettle the kingdom , rather to satisfie then disturb the peaceable consciences of religious and unbyassed men ( the lord prevail upon their spirits . ) thus have i endeavoured to answer that with a meek , which was written with a peaceable spirit , where i shall professe ( if i mistake not my self ) to side rather with truth then with any party . what i have hastily spoken i shall submit to the deliberate judgements of more intelligent men : i shall be willing to receive a rebuke wherein i have erred , and ready to yeeld wherein i may receive satisfaction : i hope i have not discovered any turbulency of spirit , but a willingnesse to examine truth : as i would keep my conscience from being wounded by doubtfull pressures , so i would keep my tongue and pen from wounding others by imbittered expressions : i would not willingly give offence , i hope none will be taken . if it be lawfull for one man to propose , it must be lawfull for other to answer arguments , in reference to satisfaction . i●… would be too great a burthen to true english spirits , to see one man permitted to stand with a drawn weapon daring all that passe by , and he only faulty that takes up the weapons ●…o answer him : either prevent such darings , or else excuse the provoked . 〈◊〉 will be my comfort to give , it will be my advantage to receive satisfaction ▪ howsoever , i shall commit my self , the safety of our kingdom , the establishment of such ●… government that is most conducible to gods honour , to that god , who is able to answer scruples , to preserve a people , and to command settlement according to his own wil●… and way . romanes 3. 8. and not rather as we be s●…anderously reported , and as some affirm , that we say , let us do evill that good may come : whose damnation is just . romanes 13. 23. whatsoever is not of faith is sinne . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57692e-30 pag. 1. pag. ●…1 ▪ of the declaration . pag. 1 , 2. it is not {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . eph. 5. 〈◊〉 . rom. 13. 1. pag. 2. dis●…ernendum est inter potestatē quae semper est a deo , 〈◊〉 inter acqui●…onem & us●…pationem . paraeus in ro. 13. hos. 8 4. subditis merè privatis , s●… tyrannus t●…nquā latro in ipsos faciat impetum , & ipsi nec potestatem ordinariam implorare , nec ali●… ratione eff●… re pe●… possi●…t senti per & s●…os tyrann●… contra pr g ssa●…or fendere paraeus rev. 2●… . 15. pag. 2 , 3. a iulius caesar . augustus . tibertus caius caligula . b principio reges ibi sep●… impera●…unt , a●…nis ducentis quadraginta quatuor . sl●…dan . de 4. monarch . pag. 4. t tiberius augu●…ti oct a viij prirignus & gen●…r , & filius adoptivus admodum invitus , ut prae se serebat , & vix tandem exoratus a supplice sena●…u principatum accepit . sle●…dan . de 4. monarch . tiberius maximos dolores & gemitus simula vit principa●… tanquam onerosam servitutem recusans . pezel . mel. histor. par . 2●… . pezel , mel. hist. part . 2●… ▪ tacitus annal. lib. 〈◊〉 . pag. 3. pag. 4 , 5. pag. 9. pag. 5. pag. ●… . pag. 6. pag. ●… . pag. 6 , 7. pag. 7. pag. 7. pag. 8. pag. 8. pag. 8 , 9. ut judicium ●…it actus justitiae , requiritur ut procedat ex authoritate praesidentis : quando ●…omo judicet de his de quibus non ●…abet authoritatē dicitur judiciū usurpatum . aquin. 22. q. 60 cap. 2. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} exod 21. 9 ▪ & josh. 6. 〈◊〉 . pag. 9. pag ▪ 9. pag. 10. i pag. 11. pag. 11. pag. 11. pag. 11. pag. 11. pag. 12. pag. 12. pag. 12. pag. 13. the tenure of kings and magistrates proving that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or wicked king, and after due conviction, to depose and put the author, j.m. milton, john, 1608-1674. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a50955 of text r21202 in the english short title catalog (wing m2181). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 73 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 23 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a50955 wing m2181 estc r21202 12296190 ocm 12296190 59034 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a50955) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 59034) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 155:12) the tenure of kings and magistrates proving that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or wicked king, and after due conviction, to depose and put the author, j.m. milton, john, 1608-1674. [2], 42 p. printed by matthew simmons ..., london : 1649. attributed to john milton. cf. halkett and laing (2nd ed.). reproduction of original in huntington library. eng political science -early works to 1800. divine right of kings. a50955 r21202 (wing m2181). civilwar no the tenure of kings and magistrates: proving, that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any, who have the power, to ca milton, john 1649 14149 7 0 0 0 0 0 5 b the rate of 5 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than 10 defects per 10,000 words. 2002-07 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-07 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-08 john latta sampled and proofread 2002-08 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the tenure of kings and magistrates : proving , that it is lawfull , and hath been held so through all ages , for any , who have the power , to call to account a tyrant , or wicked king , and after due conviction , to depose , and put him to death ; if the ordinary magistrate have neglected , or deny'd to doe it . and that they , who of late , so much blame deposing , are the men that did it themselves . the author , j. m. london , printed by matthew simmons , at the gilded lyon in aldersgate street , 1649. the tenure of kings and magistrates . if men within themselves would be govern'd by reason , and not generally give up their understanding to a double tyrannie , of custome from without , and blind affections within , they would discerne better what it is to favour and uphold the tyrant of a nation . but being slaves within doores , no wonder that they strive so much to have the public state conformably govern'd to the inward vitious rule , by which they govern themselves . for indeed none can love freedom heartilie , but good men ; the rest love not freedom , but licence ; which never hath more scope or more indulgence then under tyrants . hence is it that tyrants are not oft offended , nor stand much in doubt of bad men , as being all naturally servile ; but in whom vertue and true worth most is eminent , them they feare in earnest , as by right their masters , against them lies all their hatred and suspicion . consequentlie neither doe bad men hate tirants , but have been alwaies readiest with the falsifi'd names of loyalty and obedience , to colour over their base compliances . and although sometimes for shame , and when it comes to their owne grievances , of purse especially , they would seeme good patriots , and side with the better cause , yet when others for the deliverance of their countrie , endu'd with fortitude and heroick vertue , to feare nothing but the curse written against those that doe the worke of the lord negligently , would goe on to remove , not onely the calamities and thraldomes of a people , but the roots and causes whence they spring , streight these men , and sure helpers at need , as if they hated onely the miseries but not the mischiefes , after they have juggl'd and palter'd with the world , bandied and borne armes against their king , devested him , disanointed him , nay curs'd him all over in thir pulpits , and their pamphlets , to the ingaging of sincere and reall men , beyond what is possible or honest to retreat from , not onely turne revolters from those principles , which onely could at first move them , but lay the staine of disloyaltie , and worse , on those proceedings , which are the necessarie consequences of their owne former actions ; nor disllik'd by themselves , were they manag'd to the intire advantages of their owne faction ; not considering the while that he toward whom they boasted their new fidelitie , counted them accessory , and by those statutes and laws which they so impotently brandish against others , would have doom'd them to a traytors death for what they have done alreadie . 't is true , that most men are apt anough to civill wars and commotions as a noveltie , and for a flash , hot and active ; but through sloth or inconstancie , and weakness of spirit either fainting , ere their owne pretences , though never so just , be halfe attain'd , or through an inbred falshood and wickednesse , betray oft times to destruction with themselves , men of noblest temper join'd with them for causes which they in their rash undertakings were not capable of . if god and a good cause give them victory , the prosecution whereof for the most part , inevitably drawes after it the alteration of lawes , change of government , downfall of princes with their families ; then comes the task to those worthies which are the soule of that enterprize , to bee swett and labour'd out amidst the throng and noises of vulgar and irrationall men . some contesting for privileges , customes , formes , and that old intanglement of iniquitie , their gibrish lawes , though the badge of their ancient slavery . others who have been fiercest against their prince , under the notion of a tyrant , and no meane incendiaries of the warre against him , when god out of his providence and high disposall hath deliver'd him into the hand of their brethren , on a suddaine and in a new garbe of allegiance , which their doings have long since cancell'd ; they plead for him , pity him , extoll him , protest against those that talke of bringing him to the tryall of justice , which is the sword of god , superiour to all mortall things , in whose hand soever by apparent signes his testified wil is to put it . but certainely , if we consider who and what they are , on a suddaine growne so pitifull , wee may conclude , their pity can be no true and christian commiseration , but either levitie and shallownesse of minde , or else a carnall admiring of that worldly pompe and greatness , from whence they see him fall'n ; or rather lastly a dissembl'd and seditious pity , fain'd of industry to beget new commotions . as for mercy , if it bee to a tyrant , under which name they themselves have cited him so oft in the hearing of god , of angels , and the holy church assembl'd , and there charg'd him with the spilling of more innocent blood by farre , then ever nero did , undoubtedly the mercy which they pretend , is the mercy of wicked men ; and their mercies , wee read , are cruelties ; hazarding the welfare of a whole nation , to have sav'd one , whom so oft they have tearm'd agag , and villifying the blood of many jonathans that have sav'd israel ; insisting with much nicenesse on the unnecessariest clause of their covnant ; wherein the feare of change , and the absurd contradiction of a flattering hostilitie had hamperd them , but not scrupling to give away for complements , to an implacable revenge , the heads of many thousand christians more . another sort there is , who comming in the course of these affaires , to have thir share in great actions above the forme of law or custome , at least to give thir voice and approbation , begin to swerve and almost shiver at the majesty and grandeur of som noble deed , as if they were newly enter'd into a great sin ; disputing presidents , formes , & circumstances , when the common wealth nigh perishes for want of deeds in substance , don with just and faithfull expedition . to these i wish better instruction , and vertue equall to their calling ; the former of which , that is to say instruction , i shall indeavour , as my dutie is , to bestow on them ; and exhort them not to startle from the just and pious resolution of adhering with all their assistance to the present parlament and army , in the glorious way wherein justice and victorie hath set them ; the onely warrants through all ages , next under immediate revelation , to exercise supreame power ; in those proceedings which hitherto appeare equall to what hath been don in any age or nation heretofore , justly or magnanimouslie . nor let them be discourag'd or deterr'd by any new apostate scar crowes , who under show of giving counsell , send out their barking monitories and momento's , emptie of ought else but the spleene of a frustrated faction . for how can that pretended counsell , bee either sound or faithfull , when they that give it , see not for madnesse and vexation of their ends lost , that those statutes and scriptures which both falsly and scandalously , they wrest against their friends and associates , would by sentence of the common adversarie , fall first and heaviest upon their owne heads . neither let milde and tender dispositions be foolishly softn'd from their dutie and perseverance with the unmasculine rhetorick of any puling priest or chaplain , sent as a friendly letter of advice , for fashion sake in private , and forthwith publish't by the sender himselfe , that wee may know how much of friend there was in it , to cast an odious envie upon them , to whom it was pretended to be sent in charitie . nor let any man bee deluded by either the ignorance or the notorious hypocrisie and selfe-repugnance of our dancing divines , who have the conscience and the boldnesse , to come with scripture in their mouthes , gloss'd and fitted for thir turnes with a double contradictory sense , transforming the sacred veritie of god , to an idol with two faces , looking at once two several ways ; and with the same quotations to charge others , which in the same case they made serve to justifie themselves . for while the hope to bee made classic and provinciall lords led them on , while pluralities greas'd them thick and deepe , to the shame and scandall of religion , more then all the sects and heresies they exclaime against , then to fight against the kings person , and no lesse a party of his lords and commons , or to put force upon both the houses was good , was lawfull , was no resisting of superiour powers ; they onely were powers not to be resisted , who countenanc'd the good and punish't the evill . but now that thir censorious domineering is not suffer'd to be universall , truth and conscience to be freed , tithes and pluralities to be no more , though competent allowance provided , and the warme experience of large gifts , and they so good at taking them ; yet now to exclude and seize on impeach't members , to bring delinquents without exemption to a faire tribunall by the common nationall law against murder , is now to be no lesse then corah , dathan , and abiram . he who but erewhile in the pulpits was a cursed tyrant , an enemie to god and saints , laden with all the innocent blood split in three kingdomes , and so to bee sought against , is now though nothing penitent or alter'd from his first principles , a lawfull magistrate , a sovrane lord , the lords annointed , not to bee touch'd , though by themselves imprison'd . as if this onely were obedience , to preserve the meere uselesse bulke of his person , and that onely in prison , not in the field , and to disobey his commands , denie him his dignitie and office , every where to resist his power but where they thinke it onely surviving in thir owne faction . but who in particular is a tyrant cannot be determind in a generall discourse , otherwise then by supposition ; his particular charge , and the sufficient proofe of it must determine that : which i leave to magistrates , at least to the uprighter sort of them , and of the people , though in number lesse by many , in whom faction least hath prevaild above the law of nature and right reason , to judge as they finde cause . but this i dare owne as part of my faith , that if such a one there be , by whose commission , whole massacres have been committed on his faithfull subjects , his provinces offerd to pawne or alienation , as the hire of those whom he had sollicited to come in and destroy whole cities and countries ; be hee king , or tyrant , or emperour , the sword of justice is above him ; in whose hand soever is found sufficient power to avenge the effusion , and so great a deluge of inuocent blood . for if all humane power to execute , not accidentally but intendedly , the wrath of god upon evill doers without exception , be of god ; then that power , whether ordinary , or if that faile , extraordinary so executing that intent of god , is lawfull , and not to be resisted . but to unfold more at large this whole question , though with all expedient brevity , i shall here set downe , from first beginning , the originall of kings ; how and wherefore exalted to that dignitie above their brethren ; and from thence shall prove , that turning to tyranny they may bee as lawfully deposd and punishd , as they were at first elected : this i shall doe by autorities and reasons , not learnt in corners among schismes and herisies , as our doubling divines are ready to calumniate , but fetch 't out of the midst of choicest and most authentic learning , and no prohibited authors , nor many heathen , but mosaical , christian , orthodoxal , and which must needs be more convincing to our adversaries , presbyterial . no man who knows ought , can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free , being the image and resemblance of god himselfe , and were by privilege above all the creatures , borne to command and not to obey : and that they livd so , till from the root of adams transgression , falling among themselves to doe wrong and violence , and foreseeing that such courses must needs tend to the destruction of them all , they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury , and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement . hence came citties , townes and common-wealths . and because no faith in all was found sufficiently binding , they saw it needfull to ordaine some authoritie , that might restraine by force and punishment what was violated against peace and common right : this autoritie and power of self-defence and preservation being originally and naturally in every one of them , and unitedly in them all , for ease , for order , and least each man should be his owne partial judge , they communicated and deriv'd either to one , whom for the eminence of his wisdom and integritie they chose above the rest , or to more then one whom they thought of equal deserving : the first was calld a king ; the other magistrates . not to be thir lords and maisters ( though afterward those names in som places were giv'n voluntarily to such as had bin authors of inestimable good to the people ) but , to be thir deputies and commissioners , to execute , by vertue of thir intrusted power , that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of cov'nant must have executed for himselfe , and for one another . and to him that shall consider well why among free persons , one man by civill right should beare autority and jurisdiction over another , no other end or reason can be imaginable . these for a while governd well , and with much equitie decided all things at thir owne arbitrement : till the temptation of such a power left absolute in thir hands , perverted them at length to injustice and partialitie . then did they who now by tryall had found the danger and inconveniences of committing arbitrary power to any , invent lawes either fram'd or consented to by all , that should confine and limit the autority of whom they chose to govern them : that so man of whose failing they had proof , might no more rule over them , but law and reason abstracted as much as might be from personal errors and frailties . when this would nor serve , but that the law was either not executed , or misapply'd , they were constraind from that time , the onely remedy left them , to put conditions and take oaths from all kings and magistrates at their first instalment to doe impartial justice by law : who upon those termes and no other , receav'd allegeance from the people , that is to say , bond or covnant to obey them in execution of those lawes which they the people had themselves made or assented to . and this oft times with express warning , that if the king or magistrate prov'd unfaithfull to his trust , the people would be disingag'd . they added also counselors and parlaments , not to be onely at his beck , but with him or without him , at set times , or at all times , when any danger threatn●d to have care of the public safety . therefore saith claudius sesell a french statesman , the parlament was set as a bridle to the king ; which i instance rather , because that monarchy is granted by all to be a farre more absolute then ours . that this and the rest of what hath hitherto been spok'n is most true , might be copiously made appeare throughout all stories heathen and christian ; eev'n of those nations where kings and emperours have sought meanes to abolish all ancient memory of the peoples right by their encroachments and usurpations . but i spare long insertions , appealing to the german , french , italian , arragonian , english , and not least the scottish histories : not forgetting this onely by the way , that vvilliam the norman though a conqueror , and not unsworne at his coronation , was compelld a second time to take oath at s. albanes , ere the people would be brought to yeild obedience . it being thus manifest that the power of kings and magistrates is nothing else , but what is onely derivative , transferrd and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all , in whom the power yet remaines fundamentally , and cannot be tak'n from them , without a violation of thir natural birthright , and seeing that from hence aristotle and the best of political writers have defin'd a king , him who governs to the good and profit of his people , and not for his owne ends , it follows from necessary causes that the titles of sovran lord , naturall lord , and the like , are either arrogancies , or flatteries , not admitted by emperors and kings of best note , and dislikt by the church both of jews , isai. 26. 13. and ancient christians as appears by tertullian and others . although generally the people of asia and with them the jews also , especially since the time they chose a king , against the advice and counsel of god , are noted by wise authors much inclinable to slavery . secondly , that to say , as is usual , the king hath as good right to his crown and dignitie , as any man to his inheritance , is to make the subject no better then the kings slave , his chattell , or his possession that may be bought and sould , and doubtless if hereditary title were sufficiently inquir'd , the best foundation of it would be found but either in courtesie or convenience . but suppose it to be of right hereditarie , what can be more just and legal , if a subject for certaine crimes be to forfet by law from himselfe and posterity , all his inheritance to the king , then that a king for crimes proportionall , should forfet all his title and inheritance to the people : unless the people must be thought created all for him , he not for them , and they all in one body inferior to him single , which were a kinde of treason against the dignity of mankind to affirm . thirdly it followes , that to say kings are accountable to none but god , is the overturning of all law and goverment . for if they may refuse to give account , then all covnants made with them at coronation ; all oathes are in vaine , and meer mockeries , all lawes which they sweare to keep , made to no purpose ; for if the king feare not god , as how many of them doe not ? we hold then our lives and estates , by the tenure of his meer grace and mercy , as from a god , not a mortall magistrate , a position that none but court parasites or men besotted would maintain . and no christian prince not drunk with high mind , and prouder then those pagan caesars , that deifi'd themselves , would arrogate so unreasonably above human condition , or derogate so basely from a whole nation of men his brethren , as if for him onely subsisting , and to serve his glory , valuing them in comparison of his owne brute will and pleasure no more then so many beasts , or vermine under his feet , not to be reasond with , but to be injurd ; among whom there might be found so many thousand men for wisdome , vertue , nobleness of mind and all other respects , but the fortune of his dignity , farr above him . yet some would perswade us that this absurd opinion was king davids ; because in the 51 psalm he cries out to god , against thee onely have i sinn'd ; as if david had imagind that to murder uriah and adulterate his wife , had bin no sinne against his neighbor , when as that law of moses was to the king expresly , deut. 17. not to think so highly of himself above his brethren . david therefore by those words could mean no other , then either that the depth of his guiltiness was known to god onely , or to so few as had not the will or power to question him , or that the sin against god was greater beyond compare then against uriah . what ever his meaning were , any wise man will see that the patheticall words of a psalme can be no certaine decision to a point that hath abundantly more certaine rules to goe by . how much more rationally spake the heathen king . demophoon in a tragedy of euripides then these interpret●s would put upon king david , i rule not my people by tyranny , as if they were barbarians , but am my self liable , if i doe unjustly to suffer justly not unlike was the speech of traian the worthy emperor , to one whom he made general of his praetorian forces . take this drawne sword , saith he , to use for me , if i reigne well , if not , to use against me . thus dion relates . and not traian onely , but theodosius the younger a christian emperor and one of the best , causd it to be enacted as a rule undenyable and fit to be acknowledgd by all kings and emperors , that a prince is bound to the laws ; that on the autority of law the autority of a prince depends , & to the laws ought submit . which edict of his remaines yet unrepeald in the code of justinian . l. 1. tit. 24. as a sacred constitution to all the succeeding emperors . how then can any king in europe maintaine and write himselfe accountable to none but god , when emperors in thir owne imperiall statutes have writt'n and decreed themselves accountable to law . and indeed where such account is not fear'd , he that bids a man reigne over him above law , may bid as well a savage beast . it follows lastly , that since the king or magistrate holds his autoritie of the people , both originally and naturally for their good in the first place , and not his owne , then may the people as oft as they shall judge it for the best , either choose him or reject him , retaine him or depose him though no tyrant , meerly by the libertie and right of free born men to be govern'd as seems to them best . this , though it cannot but stand with plaine reason , shall be made good also by scripture , deut. 17. 14. vvhen thou art come into the land which the lord thy god giveth thee , and shalt say i will set a king over mee , like as all the nations about mee these words confirme us that the right of choosing , yea of changing thir owne goverment is by the grant of god him self in the people . and therefore when they desit'd a king , though then under another forme of goverment , and though thir changing displeasd him , yet he that was himself thir king , and rejected by them , would not be a hindrance to what they inended , furder then by perswasion , but that they might doe therein as they saw good , 1 sam. 8. onely he reserv'd to himself the nomination of who should reigne over them . neither did that exempt the king as if hee were to god onely accountable , though by his especiall command anointed . therefore david first made a covnant with the elders of israel , and so was by them anointed king , 1 chron. 11. and jehoiada the priest making jehoash king , made a cov'nant between him and the people , 2 kings 11. 17. therefore when roboam at his comming to the crowne , rejected those conditions which the israelites brought him , heare what they answer him , what portion have we in david , or inheritance in the son of jesse . see to thine own house david . and for the like conditions not perform'd , all israel before that time deposd samuell ; not for his own default , but for the misgovement of his sons . but som will say to both these examples , it was evilly don . i answer , that not the latter , because it was expressely allow'd them in the law to set up a king if they pleas'd ; and god himself joynd with them in the work ; though in some sort it was at that time displeasing to him , in respect of old samuell who had governd them uprightly . as livy praises the romans who took occasion from tarquinius a wicked prince to gaine their libertie , which to have extorted , saith hee , from numa or any of the good kings before , had not bin seasonable . nor was it in the former example don unlawfully ; for when roboam had prepar'd a huge army to reduce the israelites , he was forbidd'n by the profet , 1 kings 12.24 . thus saith the lord yee shall not goe up , nor fight against your brethren , for this thing is from me . he calls them thir brethren , not rebels , and forbidds to be proceeded against them , owning the thing himselfe , not by single providence , but by approbation , and that not onely of the act , as in the former example , but of the fitt season also ; he had not otherwise forbidd to molest them . and those grave and wise counsellors whom rehoboam first advis'd with , spake no such thing , as our old gray headed flatterers now are wont , stand upon your birth-right , scorne to capitulate , you hold of god , and not of them ; for they knew no such matter , unless conditionally , but gave him politic counsel , as in a civil transaction . therefore kingdom and magistracy , whether supreme or subordinat is calld a human ordinance , 1 pet. 2. 13. &c. which we are there taught is the will of god wee should submitt to , so farr as for the punishment of evill doers , and the encouragement of them that doe well . submitt saith he , as free men . and there is no power but of god , saith paul , rom. 13. as much as to say , god put it into mans heart to find out that way at first for common peace and preservation , approving the exercise therof ; els it contradicts peter who calls the same autority an ordinance of man . it must be also understood of lawfull and just power , els we read of great power in the affaires and kingdomes of the world permitted to the devill : for saith he to christ , luke 4. 6. all this power will i give thee and the glory of them , for it is deliverd to me , and to whomsoever i will , i give it : neither did hee ly , or christ gainsay what hee affirm'd : for in the thirteenth of the revelation wee read how the dragon gave to the beast his power , his seat , and great autority : which beast so autoriz'd most expound to be the tyrannical powers and kingdomes of the earth . therfore saint paul in the forecited chapter tells us that such magistrates hee meanes ' , as are , not a terror to the good but to the evill , such as beare not the sword in vaine , but to punish offenders , and to encourage the good . if such onely be mentiond here as powers to be obeyd , and our submission to them onely requird , then doubtless those powers that doe the contrary , are no powers ordaind of god , and by consequence no obligation laid upon us to obey or not to resist them . and it may be well observd that both these apostles , whenever they give this precept , express it in termes not concret but abstract , as logicians are wont to speake , that is , they mention the ordinance , the power , the autoritie before the persons that execute it , and what that power is , lest we should be deceavd , they describe exactly . so that if the power be not such , or the person execute not such power , neither the one nor the other is of god , but of the devill , and by consequence to bee resisted . from this exposition chrysostome also on the same place dissents not ; explaining that these words were not writt'n in behalf of a tyrant . and this is verify'd by david , himself a king , and likeliest to bee author of the psalm 94. 20. which saith , shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee . and it were worth the knowing , since kings , and that by scripture boast the justness of thir title , by holding it immediately of god , yet cannot show the t●me when god ever set on the throne them or thir forefathers , but onely when the people chose them ; why by the same reason , since god ascribes as oft to himself the casting down of princes from the throne , it should not be thought as lawful , and as much from god when none are seen to do it but the people , and that for just causes . for if it needs must be a sin in them to depose , it may as likely be a sin to have elected . and contrary if the peoples act in election be pleaded by a king , as the act of god , and the most just title to enthrone him , why may not the peoples act of rejection , be as well pleaded by the people as the act of god , and the most just reason to depose him ? so that we see the title and just right of reigning or deposing in reference to god , is found in scripture to be all one ; visible onely in the people , and depending meerly upon justice and demerit . thus farr hath bin considerd briefly the power of kings and magistrates ; how it was , and is originally the peoples , and by them conferrd in trust onely to bee imployd to the common peace and benefit ; with libertie therfore and right remaining in them to reassume it to themselves , if by kings or magistrats it be abus'd ; or to dispose of it by any alteration , as they shall judge most conducing to the public good . wee may from hence with more ease , and force of argument determin what a tyrant is , and what the people may doe against him . a tyrant whether by wrong or by right comming to the crowne , is he who regarding neither law nor the common good , reigns onely for himself and his faction : thus st. basil among others defines him . and because his power is great , his will boundless and exorbitant , the fulfilling whereof is for the most part accompanied with innumerable wrongs and oppressions of the people , murders , massacres , rapes , adulteries , desolation , and subversion of citties and whole provinces ; look how great a good and happiness a just king is , so great a mischeife is a tyrant ; as hee the public father of his countrie , so this the common enemie . against whom what the people lawfully may doe , as against a common pest , and destroyer of mankinde , i suppose no man of cleare judgement need goe surder to be guided then by the very principles of nature in him . but because it is the vulgar folly of men to desert thir owne reason , and shutting thir eyes to think they see best with other mens , i shall shew by such examples as ought to have most waight with us , what hath bin don is this case heretofore . the greeks and romans as thir prime authors witness held it not onely lawfull , but a glorious and heroic deed , rewarded publicly with statues and garlands , to kill an infamous tyrant at any time without tryal ; and but reason , that he who trod down all law , should not bee voutsaf'd the benefit of law . insomuch that seneca the tragedian brings in hercules the grand suppressor of tyrants , thus speaking , — victima haud ulla amplior potest , magisque opima mactari jovi quam rex iniquus — — there can be slaine no sacrifice to god more accetable then an unjust and wicked king — but of these i name no more , lest it bee objected they were heathen ; and come to produce another sort of men that had the knowledge of true religion . among the jews this custome of tyrant-killing was not unusual . first ehud , a man whom god had raysd to deliver israel from eglon king of moab , who had conquerd and rul'd over them eighteene yeares , being sent to him as an ambassador with a present slew him in his owne house . but hee was a forren prince , an enemie , and ehud besides had special warrant from god . to the first i answer , it imports not whether forren or native : for no prince so native but professes to hold by law ; which when he himselfe overturnes , breaking all the covnants and oaths that gave him title to his dignity , and were the bond and alliance between him and his people , what differs he from an outlandish king or from an enemie ? for looke how much right the king of spaine hath to govern us at all , so much right hath the king of england to govern us tyrannically . if he , though not bound to us by any league , comming from spaine in person to subdue us or to destroy us , might lawfully by the people of england either bee slaine in fight , or put to death in captivity , what hath a native king to plead , bound by so many covnants , benefits and honours to the welfare of his people , why he through the contempt of all laws and parlaments , the onely tie of our obedience to him , for his owne wills sake , and a boasted praerogative unaccountable , after sev'n years warring and destroying of his best subjects , overcom , and yeilded prisoner , should think to scape unquestionable , as a thing divine , in respect of whom so many thousand christians destroy'd should lye unaccounted for , polluting with thir slaughterd carcasses all the land over , and crying for vengeance against the living that should have righted them . who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and brotherhood between man and man over all the world , neither is it the english sea that can sever us from that duty and relation : a straiter bond yet there is between fellow-subjects , neighbours , and friends ; but when any of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to another so as hostility 〈…〉 doth the law decree less against them , then oepn enemies and invaders ? or if the law be not present , or too weake , what doth it warrant us to less then single defence or civil warr ? and from that time forward the law of civill defensive warr differs nothing from the law of forren hostility . nor is it distance of place that makes enmitie , but enmity that makes distance . he therefore that keeps peace with me neer or remote of whatsoever nation , is to mee as farr as all civil and human offices an englishman and a nighbour : but if an englishman forgetting all laws , human , civil and religious offend against life and libertie , to him offended and to the law in his behalf , though born in the same womb , he is no better then a turk , a sarasin , a heathen . this is gospel , and this was ever law among equals ; how much rather then in force against any king whatsoever , who in respect of the people is coufessd inferior and not equal : to distinguish therfore of a tyrant by outlandish , or domestic is a weak evasion . to the second that he was an enemie , i answer , what tyrant is not ? yet eglon by the jewes had bin acknowledgd as thir sovran , they had servd him eighteen yeares , as long almost as wee our vvilliam the conqueror , in all which time he could not be so unwise a statesman but to have tak'n of them oaths of fealty and allegeance by which they made themselves his proper subjects , as thir homage and present sent by ehud testifyd . to the third , that he had special warrant to kill eglon in that manner , it cannot bee granted , because not expressd ; t is plain that he was raysd by god to be a deliverer , and went on just principles , such as were then and ever held allowable , to deale so by a tyrant that could no otherwise be dealt with . neither did samuell though a profet , with his owne hand abstain from agag ; a forren enemie no doubt ; but mark the reason , as thy sword hath made women childless ; a cause that by the sentence of law it selfe nullifies all relations . and as the law is between brother and brother , father and son , maister and servant , wherfore not between king or rather tyrant and people ? and whereas jehu had special command to slay jehoram a successive and hereditarie tyrant , it seemes not the less imitable for that ; for where a thing grounded so much on naturall reason hath the addition of a command from god , what does it but establish the lawfulness of such an act . nor is it likely that god who had so many wayes of punishing the house of ahab would have sent a subject against his prince , if the fact in it selfe as don to a tyrant had bin of bad example . and if david refus'd to lift his hand against the lords anointed , the matter between them was not tyranny , but private enmity , and david as a private person had bin his own revenger , not so much the peoples ; but when any tyrant at this day can shew to be the lords anointed , the onely mention'd reason why david with held his hand , he may then but not till then presume on the same privilege . we may pass therfore hence to christian times . and first our saviour himself , how much he favourd tyrants and how much intended they should be found or honourd among christians , declares his minde not obscurely ; accounting thir absolute autoritie no better then gentilisme , yea though they flourishd it over with the splendid name of benefactors ; charging those that would be his disciples to usurp no such dominion ; but that they who were to bee of most autoritie among them , should esteem themselves ministers and servants to the public . matt. 20. 25. the princes of the gentiles exercise lordship over them , and mark 10. 42. they that seem to rule , saith he , either slighting or accounting them no lawful rulers , but yee shall not be so , but the greatest among you shall be your servant . and although hee himself were the meekest , and came on earth to be so , yet to a tyrant we hear him not voutsafe an humble word : but tell that fox , luc. 13. and wherfore did his mother the virgin mary give such praise to god in her profetic song , that he had now by the comming of christ cutt down dynasta's or proud monarchs from the throne , if the church , when god manifests his power in them to doe so , should rather choose all miserie and vassalage to serve them , and let them still sit on thir potent seats to bee ador'd for doing mischiefe . surely it is not for nothing that tyrants by a kind of natural instinct both hate and feare none more then the true church and saints of god , as the most dangerous enemies and subverters of monarchy , though indeed of tyranny ; hath not this bin the perpetual cry of courtiers , and court prelates ? whereof no likelier cause can be alleg'd , but that they well discern'd the mind and principles of most devout and zealous men , and indeed the very discipline of church , tending to the dissolution of all tyranny . no marvel then if since the faith of christ receav'd , in purer or impurer times , to depose a king and put him to death for tyranny hath bin accounted so just and requisit , that neighbour kings have both upheld and tak'n part with subjects in the action . and ludovicus pius , himself an emperor , and sonne of charles the great , being made judge , du haillan is my author , between milegast king of the vul●zes and his subjects who had depos'd him , gave his verdit for the subjects , and for him whom they had chos'n in his room . note here that the right of electing whom they please is by the impartial testimony of an emperor in the people . for , said he , a just prince ought to be prefer'd before an unjust , and the end of government before the prerogative . and constantinus leo , another emperor in the byzantine laws saith , that the end of a king is for the general good , which he not performing is but the counterfet of a king . and to prove that some of our owne monarchs have acknowledg'd that thir high office exempted them not from punishment , they had the sword of st. edward born before them by an officer who was calld earle of the palace eev'n at the times of thir highest pomp and solemnitie , to mind them , saith matthew paris , the best of our historians , that if they errd , the sword had power to restraine them . and what restraint the sword comes to at length , having both edge and point , if any sceptic will needs doubt , let him feel . it is also affirm'd from diligent search made in our ancient books of law , that the peers and barons of england had a legall right to judge the king : which was the cause most likely , for it could be no slight cause , that they were call'd his peers , or equals . this however may stand immovable , so long as man hath to deale with no better then man ; that if our law judge all men to the lowest by thir peers , it should in all equity ascend also , and judge the highest . and so much i find both in our own and forren storie , that dukes , earles , and marqueses were at first not hereditary , not empty and vain titles , but names of trust and office , and with the office ceasing , as induces me to be of opinion , that every worthy man in parlament , for the word baron imports no more , might for the public good be thought a fit peer and judge of the king ; without regard had to petty caveats , and circumstances , the chief impediment in high affaires , and ever stood upon most by circumstantial men . whence doubtless our ancestors who were not ignorant with what rights either nature or ancient constitution had endowd them , when oaths both at coronation , and renewd in parlament would not serve , thought it no way illegal to depose and put to death thir tyrannous kings . insomuch that the parlament drew up a charge against richard the second , and the commons requested to have judgement decree'd against him , that the realme might not bee endangerd . and peter martyr a divine of formost rank , on the third of judges approves thir doings . sir thomas smith also a protestant and a statesman in his commonwealth of england putting the question whether it be lawful to rise against a tyrant , answers that the vulgar judge of it according to the event , and the learned according to the purpose of them that do it . but far before those days gildas the most ancient of all our historians , speaking of those times wherein the roman empire decaying quitted and relinquishd what right they had by conquest to this iland , and resign'd it all into the peoples hands , testifies that the people thus re-invested with thir own original right , about the year 446 , both elected them kings , whō they thought best ( the first christian brittish kings that ever raign'd heer since the romans ) and by the same right , when they apprehended cause , usually deposd and put them to death . this is the most fundamental and ancient tenure that any king of england can produce or pretend to ; in comparison of which , all other titles and pleas are but of yesterday . if any object that gildas condemns the britanes for so doing , the answer is as ready ; that he condemns them no more for so doing , then hee did before for choosing such , for saith he , they anointed them kings , not of god , but such as were more bloody then therest . next hee condemns them not at all for deposing or putting them to death , but for doing it over hastily , without tryal or well examining the cause , and for electing others worse in thir room . thus we have here both domestic and most ancient examples that the people of britain have deposd and put to death thir kings in those primitive christian times . and to couple reason with example , if the church in all ages , primitive , romish , or protestant held it ever no less thir duty then the power of thir keyes , though without express warrant of scripture , to bring indifferently both king and peasant under the utmost rigor of thir canons and censures ecclesiastical , eev'n to the smiting him with a final excommunion , if he persist impenitent , what hinders but that the temporal law both may and ought , though without a special text or president , extend with like indifference the civil sword , to the cutting off without exemption him that capitally offends . seeing that justice and religion are from the same god , and works of justice ofttimes more acceptable . yet because that some lately with the tongues and arguments of malignant backsliders have writt'n that the proceedings now in parlament against the king , are without president from any protestant state or kingdom , the examples which follow shall be all protestant and chiefly presbyterian . in the yeare 1546. the duke of saxonie , lantgrave of hessen , and the whole protestant league raysd open warr against charles the fifth thir emperor , sent him a defiance , renounc'd all faith and allegeance toward him , and debated long in counsell whether they should give him so much as the title of caesar . sleidan . l. 17. let all men judge what this wanted of deposing or of killing , but the power to doe it . in the yeare 1559. the scotch protestants claiming promise of thir queen regent for libertie of conscience , she answering that promises were not to be claim'd of princes beyond what was commodious for them to grant , told her to her face in the parlament then at sterling , that if it were so , they renounc'd thir obedience ; and soone after betooke them to armes . buchanan hist. l. 16. certainely when allegeance is renounc'd , that very hour the king or queen is in effect depos'd . in the yeare 1564. john kn●x a most famous divine and the reformer of scotland to the presbyterian discipline , at a generall assembly maintaind op'nly in a dispute against lethington the secretary of state , that subjects might and ought execute gods judgements upon thir king ; that the fact of jehu and others against thir king having the ground of gods ordinary command to put such and such offenders to death was not extraordinary , but to bee imitated of all that prefer'd the honour of god to the affection of flesh and wicked princes , that kings , if they offend , have no privilege to be exempted from the punishments of law more then any other subject ; so that if the king be a murderer , adulterer , or idolater , he should suffer not as a king , but as an offender ; and this position hee repeates againe and againe before them . answerable was the opinion of john craig another learned divine , and that lawes made by the tyranny of princes , or the negligence of people , thir posterity might abrogate , and reform all things according to the original institution of common-wealths , and knox being commanded by the nobilitie to write to calvin and other learned men for thir judgements in that question refus'd ; alleging that both himselfe was fully resolv'd in conscience , and had heard thir judgements , and had the same opinion under hand-writing of many the most godly and most learned that he knew in europe ; that if he should move the question to them againe , what should he doe but shew his owne forgetfulness or inconstancy . all this is farr more largely in the ecclesiastic history of scotland l. 4. with many other passages to this effect all the book over ; set out with diligence by scotchmen of best repute among them at the beginning of these troubles , as if they labourd to inform us what wee were to doe and what they intended upon the like occasion . and to let the world know that the whole church and protestant state of scotland in those purest times of reformation were of the same belief , three years after , they met in the feild mary thir lawful and hereditary queen , took her prisoner yeilding before fight , kept her in prison and the same yeare deposd her . buchan . hist. l. 18. and four years after that , the scots in justification of thir deposing queen mary , sent embassadors to queen elizabeth , and in a writt'n declaration alleag'd that they had us'd towards her more lenity then shee deservd ; that thir ancestors had heretofore punishd thir kings by death or banishment ; that the scots were a free nation , made king whom they freely chose , and with the same freedome un-kingd him if they saw cause , by right of ancient laws and ceremonies yet remaining , and old customers yet among the high-landers in choosing the head of thir clanns , or families ; all which with many other arguments bore witness that regal power was nothing else but a mutuall covnant or stipulation between king and people . buch. hist. l. 20. these were scotchmen and presbyterians ; but what measure then have they lately offerd , to think such liberty less beseeming us then themselves , presuming to put him upon us for a maister whom thir law scarce allows to be thir own equall ? if now then we heare them in another straine then heretofore in the purest times of thir church , we may be confident it is the voice of faction speaking in them , not of truth and reformation . in the yeare 1581. the states of holland in a general assembly at the hague , abjur'd all obedience and subjection to philip king of spaine ; and in a declaration justifie thir so doing ; for that by his tyrannous goverment against faith so oft'n giv'n and brok'n he had lost his right to all the belgic provinces ; that therfore they deposd him and declar'd it lawful to choose another in his stead . thuan. l. 74. from that time , to this no state or kingdom in the world hath equally prosperd : but let them remember not to look with an evil and prejudicial eye upon thir neighbours walking by the same rule . but what need these examples to presbyterians , i meane to those who now of late would seem so much to abhorr deposing , whenas they to all christendom have giv'n the latest and the liveliest example of doing it themselves . i question not the lawfulness of raising warr against a tyrant in defence of religion , or civil libertie ; for no protestant church from the first waldenses of lyons , and languedoc to this day but have don it round , and maintaind it lawfull . but this i doubt not to affirme , that the presbyterians , who now so much condemn deposing , were the men themselves that deposd the king , and cannot with all thir shifting and relapsing , wash off the guiltiness from thir owne hands . for they themselves , by these thir late doings have made it guiltiness , and turnd thir owne warrantable actions into rebellion . there is nothing that so actually makes a king of england , as righful possession and supremacy in all causes both civil and ecclesiastical : and nothing that so actually makes a subject of england , as those two oaths of allegeance and supremacy observd without equivocating , or any mental reservation . out of doubt then when the king shall command things already constituted in church , or state , obedience is the true essence of a subject , either to doe , if it be lawful , or if he hold the thing unlawful , to submit to that penaltie which the law imposes , so long as he intends to remaine a subject . therefore when the people or any part of them shall rise against the king and his autority executing the law in any thing establishd civil or ecclesiastical , i doe nor say it is rebellion , if the thing commanded though establishd be unlawfull , and that they sought first all due means of redress ( and no man is furder bound to law ) but i say it is an absolute renouncing both of supremacy and allegeance , which in one word is an actual and total deposing of the king , and the setting up of another supreme autority over them . and whether the presbyterians have not don all this and much more , they will not put mee , i suppose , to reck'n up a seven yeares story fresh in the memory of all men . have they not utterly broke the oath of allegeance , rejecting the kings command and autority sent them from any part of the kingdom whether in things lawful or unlawful ? have they not abjur'd the oath of supremacy by setting up the parlament without the king , supreme to all thir obedience , and though thir vow and covnant bound them in general to the parlament , yet somtimes adhering to the lesser part of lords and commons that remaind faithful as they terme it , and eev'n of them , one while to the commons without the lords , another while to the lords without the commons ? have they not still declar'd thir meaning , whatever their oath were , to hold them onely for supreme whom they found at any time most yeilding to what they petitiond ? both these oaths which were the straitest bond of an english subject in reference to the king , being thus broke and made voide , it follows undeniably that the king from that time was by them in fact absolutely deposd , and they no longer in reality to be thought his subjects , notwithstanding thir fine clause in the covnant to preserve his person , crown , and dignitie , set there by som dodging casuist with more craft then sinceritie to mitigate the matter in case of ill success , and not tak'n i suppose by any honest man , but as a condition subordinate to every the least particle that might more concern religion , liberty , or the public peace . to prove it yet more plainly that they are the men who have deposd the king , i thus argue . we know that king and subject are relatives , and relatives have no longer being then in the relation ; the relatiō between king and subject can be no other then regal autority and subjection . hence i inferr past their defending , that if the subject who is one relative , takes away the relation , of force he takes away also the other relative ; but the presbyterians who were one relative , that is to say subjects , have for this sev'n years tak'n away the relation , that is to say the kings autoritie , and thir subjection to it , therfore the presbyterians for these sev'n yeares have removd and extinguish the other relative , that is to say the king , or to speake more in brief have depos'd him ; not onely by depriving him the execution of his autoritie , but by conferring it upon others . if then thir oathes of subjection brok'n , new ` supremacy obey'd , new oaths and covnants tak'n , notwitstanding frivolous evasions , have in plaine tearmes unking'd the king , much more then hath thir sev'n yeares warr not depos'd him onely , but outlawd him , and defi'd him as an alien , a rebell to law , and enemie to the state . it must needs be cleare to any man not averse from reason , that hostilitie and subjection are two direct and positive contraries ; and can no more in one subject stand together in respect of the same king , then one person at the same time can be in two remote places . against whom therfore the subject is in act of hostility we may be confident that to him he is in no subjection : and in whom hostility takes place of subjection , for they can by no meanes consist together , to him the king can bee not onely no king , but an enemie . so that from hence wee shall not need dispute whether they have depos'd him , or what they have defaulted towards him as no king , but shew manifestly how much they have don toward the killing him . have they not levied all these warrs against him whether offensive or defensive ( for defence in warr equally offends , and most prudently before hand ) and giv'n commission to slay where they knew his person could not bee exempt from danger ? and if chance or flight had not sav'd him , how oft'n had they killd him , directing thir artillery without blame or prohibition to the very place where they saw him stand ? have they not converted his revenue to other uses , and detain'd from him all meanes of livelyhood , so that for them long since he might have perisht , or have starv'd ? have they not hunted and pursu'd him round about the kingdom with sword and fire ? have they not formerly deny'd to treat with him , and thir now recanting ministers preach'd against him , as a reprobate incurable , an enemy to god and his church markt for destruction , and therfore not to bee treated with ? have they not beseig'd him and to thir power forbid him water and fire , save what they shot against him to the hazard of his life ? yet while they thus assaulted and endangerd it with hostile deeds , they swore in words to defend it with his crown and dignity ; not in order , as it seems now , to a firm and lasting peace , or to his repentance after all this blood ; but simply , without regard , without remorse or any comparable value of all the miseries and calamities sufferd by the poore people , or to suffer hereafter through his obstinacy or impenitence . no understanding man can bee ignorant that covnants are ever made according to the present state of persons and of things ; and have ever the more general laws of nature and of reason included in them , though not express'd . if i make a voluntary covnant as with a man to doe him good , and hee prove afterward a monster to me , i should conceave a disobligement . if i covnant , not to hurt an enemie , in favor of him and forbearance , and hope of his amendment , and he , after that , shall doe me tenfould injury and mischief to what hee had don when i so covnanted , and stil be plotting what may tend to my destruction , i question not but that his after actions release me ; nor know i covnant so sacred that withholds mee from demanding justice on him . howbeit , had not thir distrust in a good cause , and the fast and loos of our prevaricating divines oversway'd , it had bin doubtless better , not to have inserted in a covnant unnecessary obligations , and words not works of a supererogating allegeance to thir enemy ; no way advantageous to themselves , had the king prevail'd , as to thir cost many would have felt ; but full of snare and distraction to our friends , usefull onely , as we now find , to our adversaries , who under such a latitude and shelter of ambiguous interpretation have ever since been plotting and contriving new opportunities to trouble all againe . how much better had it bin , and more becomming an undaunted vertue to have declard op'nly and boldly whom and what power the people were to hold supreme , as on the like occasion protestants have don before , and many conscientious men now in these times have more then once besought the parlament to doe , that they might go on upon a sure foundation , and not with a ridling covnant in thir mouthes , seeming to sweare counter almost in the same breath allegeance and no allegeance ; which doubtless had drawn off all the minds of sincere men from siding with them , had they not discern'd thir actions farr more deposing him then thir words upholding him ; which words made now the subject of cavillous interpretations , stood ever in the covnant by judgement of the more discerning sort an evidence of thir feare not of thir fidelity . what should i return to speak on , of those attempts for which the king himself hath oft'n charg'd the presbyterians of seeking his life , whenas in the due estimation of things they might without a fallacy be sayd to have don the deed outright . who knows not that the king is a name of dignity and office , not of person : who therfore kils a king , must kill him while he is a king . then they certainly who by deposing him have long since tak'n from him the life of a king , his office and his dignity , they in the truest sence may bee said to have killd the king : nor onely by thir deposing and waging warr against him , which besides the danger to his personal life , set him in the fardest opposite point from any vital function of a king , but by thir holding him in prison vanquishd and yeilded into thir absolute and despotic power , which brought him to the lowest degradement and incapacity of the regal name . i say not whose matchless valour next under god , lest the story of thir ingratitude thereupon carry me from the purpose in hand , which is to convince them that they , which i repeat againe , were the men who in the truest sense killd the king , not onely as is provd before , but by depressing him thir king farr below the rank of a subject to the condition of a captive , without intention to restore him , as the chancellour of scotland in a speech told him plainly at newcastle , unless hee granted fully all thir demands , which they knew he never meant . nor did they treat or think of treating with him , till thir hatred to the army that deliverd them , not thir love or duty to the king , joyn'd them secretly with men sentencd so oft for reprobates in thir owne mouthes , by whose suttle inspiring they grew madd upon a most tardy and improper treaty . whereas if the whole bent of thir actions had not bin against the king himselfe , but against his evill councel , as they faind , and publishd , wherefore did they not restore him all that while to the true life of a king , his office , crown , and dignity , when he was in thir power , and they themselves his neerest counselers . the truth therefore is , both that they would not , and that indeed they could not without thir own certaine destruction , having reduc'd him to such a final pass , as was the very death and burial of all in him rhat was regal , and from whence never king of england yet revivd , but by the new re inforcement of his own party , which was a kind of resurrection to him . thus having quitc extinguisht all that could be in him of a king , and from a total privation clad him over like another specifical thing with formes and habitudes destructive to the former , they left in his person dead as to law and all the civil right either of king or subject the life onely of a prilner , a captive and a malefactor . whom the equal and impartial hand of justice finding , was no more to spare then another ordnary man ; not onely made obnoxious to the doome of law by a charge more then once drawn up against him , and his owne confession to the first article at newport , but summond and arraignd in the sight of god and his people , cutst and devoted to perdition worse then any ahab , or antiochus , with exhortation to curse all those in the name of god that made not warr against him , as bitterly as meroz was to be curs'd , that went not out against a canaanitish king , almost in all the sermons , prayers , and fulminations that have bin utterd this sev'n yeares by those clov'n tongues of falshood and dissention , who now , to the stirring up of new discord , acquitt him ; and against thir owne discipline , which they boast to be the throne and scepter of christ , absolve him , unconfound him , though unconverted , unrepentant , unsensible of all thir pretious saints and martyrs whose blood they have so oft layd upon his head : and now againe with a new sovran anointment can wash it all off , as if it were as vile , and no more to be reckn'd for then the blood of so many dogs in a time of pestilence : giving the most opprobrious lye to all the acted zeale that for these many yeares hath filld thir bellies , and fed them fatt upon the foolish people . ministers of sedition , not of the gospell , who while they saw it manifestly tend to civil warr and bloodshed , never ceasd exasperating the people against him ; and now that they see it likely to breed new commotion , cease not to incite others against the people that have savd them from him , as if sedition were thir onely aime whether against him or for him . but god as we have cause to trust , wil put other thoughts into the people , and turn them from looking after these firebrands , of whose fury , and sals prophecies we have anough experience ; and from the murmurs of new discord will incline them to heark'n rather with erected minds to the voice of our supreme magistracy , calling us to liberty and the flourishing deeds of a reformed common-wealth ; with this hope that as god was heretofore angry with the jews who rejected him and his forme of government to choose a king , so that he will bless us , and be propitious to us who reject a king to make him onely our leader , and supreme governour in the conformity as neer as may be of his own ancient government ; if we have at least but so much worth in us to entertaine the sense of our future happiness , and the courage to receave what god voutsafes us : wherin we have the honour to precede other nations who are now labouring to be our followers . for as to this question in hand what the people by thir just right may doe in change of government , or of governour , we see it cleerd sufsiciently ; besides other ample autority eev'n from the mouths of princes themselves . and surely they that shall boast , as we doe , to be a free nation , and not have in themselves the power to remove , or to abolish any governour supreme , or subordinate with the government it self upon urgent causes , may please thir fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom , fit to coz'n babies ; but are indeed under tyranny and servitude ; as wanting that power , which is the root and sourse of all liberty , to dispose and oeconomize in the land which god hath giv'n them , as maisters of family in thir own house and free inheritance . without which natural and essential power of a free nation , though bearing high thir heads , they can in due esteem be thought no better then slaves and vassals born , in the tenure and occupation of another inheriting lord . whose government , though not illegal , or intolerable , hangs over them as a lotdly scourge , not as a free goverment ; and therfore to be abrogated . how much more justly then may they fling off tyranny , or tyrants ? who being once depos'd can be no more then privat men , as subject to the reach of justice and arraignment as any other transgressors . and certainly if men , not to speak of heathen , both wise and religious have don justice upon tyrants what way they could soonest , how much more mild and human then is it to give them faire and op'n tryall ? to teach lawless kings and all that so much adore them , that not mortal man , or his imperious will , but justice is the onely true sovran and supreme majesty upon earth . let men cease therfore out of faction and hypocrisie to make outcrys & horrid things of things so just and honorable . and if the parlament and military councel do what they doe without president , if it appeare thir duty , it argues the more wisdom , vertue , and magnanimity , that they know themselves able to be a president to others . who perhaps in future ages , if they prove not too degenerat , will look up with honour and aspire toward these exemplary , and matchless deeds of thir ancestors , as to the highest top of thir civil glory and emulation . which heretofore in the persuance of fame and forren dominion spent it self vain-gloriously abroad ; but henceforth may learn a better fortitude to dare execute highest justice on them that shall by force of armes endeavour the oppressing and bereaving ofreligion and thir liberty at home : that no unbridl'd potentate or tyrant , but to his sorrow for the future , may presume such high and irresponsible licence over mankind to havock and turn upside-down whole kingdoms of men as though they were no more in respect of his perverse will then a nation of pismires . as for the party calld presbyterian , of whom i beleive very many to be good & faithful christians , though misled by som of turbulent spirit , i wish them earnestly and calmly not to fall off from thir first principles ; nor to affect rigor and superiority over men not under them ; not to compell unforcible things in religion especially , which if not voluntary , becomes a sin ; nor to assist the clamor and malicious drifts of men whom they themselves have judg'd to be the worst of men , the obdurat enemies of god and his church : nor to dart against the actions of thir brethren , for want of other argument those wrested lawes and scriptures thrown by prelats and malignants against thir own sides , which though they hurt not otherwise , yet tak'n up by them to the condemnation of thir owne doings give scandal to all men and discover in themselves either extreame passion or apostacy . let them not oppose thir best friends and associats who molest them not at all , infringe not the least of thir liberties ; unless they call it thir liberty to bind other mens consciences , but are still secking to live at peace with them and brotherly accord . let them beware an old and perfet enemy , who though he hope by sowing discord to make them his instruments , yet cannot forbeare a minute the op'n threatning of his destind revenge upon them when they have servd his purposes . let them feare therefore , if they bee wise , rather what they have don already , then what remaines to doe , and be warn'd in time they put no confidence in princes whom they have provokd , lest they be added to the examples of those that miserably have tasted the event . stories can inform them how christiern the second , king of denmark not much above a hundred yeares past , driv'n out by his subjects , and receavd againe upon new oaths and conditions , broke through them all to his most bloody revenge ; slaying his chief opposers when he saw his time , both them and thir children invited to a feast for that purpose . how maximilian dealt with those of bruges , though by mediation of the german princes reconcil'd to them by solem and public writings drawn and seald . how the massacre at paris was the effect of that credulous peace which the french protestants made with charles the ninth thir king : and that the main visible cause which to this day hath sav'd the netherlands from utter ruine , was thir finall not belei●ing the perfidious cruelty which as a constant maxim of state hath bin us'd by the spanish kings on thir subjects that have tak'n armes and after trusted them ; as no later age but can testifie , heretofore in belgia it self , and this very yeare in naples . and to conclude with one past exception , though farr more ancient , david after once hee had tak'n armes , never after that trusted saul , though with tears and much relenting he twise promis'd not to hurt him . these instances , few of many , might admonish them both english and scotch not to let thir owne ends , and the driving on of a faction betray them blindly into the snare of those enemies whose revenge looks on them as the men who first begun , fomented and carri'd on beyond the cure of any sonnd or safe accommodation all the evil which hath since unavoidably befall'n them and thir king . i have something also to the divines , though brief to what were needfull ; not to be disturbers of the civil affairs , being in hands better able and more belonging to manage them ; but to study harder and to attend the office of good pastors , knowing that he whose flock is least among them hath a dreadfull charge , not performd by mounting twise into the chair with a formal preachment huddl'd up at the od hours of a whole lazy week , but by incessant pains and watching in season and out of season , from house to house over the soules of whom they have to feed . which if they ever well considerd , how little leasure would they find to be the most pragmatical sidesmen of every popular tumult and sedition ? and all this while are to learne what the true end and reason is of the gospel which they teach ; and what a world it differs from the censorious and supercilious lording over conscience . it would be good also they liv'd so as might perswade the people they hated covetousness , which worse then heresie , is idolatry ; hated pluralities and all kind of simony ; left rambling from benefice to benefice , iike ravnous wolves seeking where they may devour the biggest . of which if som , well and warmely seated from the beginning , be not guilty , t were good they held not conversation with such as are : let them be sorry that being call'd to assemble about reforming the church , they fell to progging and solliciting the parlament , though they had renouncd the name of priests , for a new setling of thir tithes and oblations ; and double lin'd themselves with spiritual places of commoditie beyond the possible discharge of thir duty . let them assemble in consistory with thir elders and deacons , according to ancient ecclesiastical rule , to the preserving of church discipline each in his several charge , and not a pack of clergie men by themselves to belly cheare in thir presumptuous sion , or to promote designes , abuse and gull the simple laity , and stirr up tumult , as the prelats did , for the maintenance of thir pride and avarice . these things if they observe and waite with patience , no doubt but all things will goe well without their importunities or exclamations : and the printed letters which they send subscrib'd with the ostentation of great characters and little moment , would be more considerable then now they are . but if they be the ministers of mammon instead of christ , and scandalize his church with the filty love of gaine , aspiring also to sit the closest and the heaviest of all tyrants , upon the conscience , and fall notoriously into the same sins , whereof so lately and so loud they accus'd the prelates , as god rooted out those immediately before , so will he root out them thir imitators : and to vindicate his own glory and religion , will uncover thir hypocrisie to the open world ; and visit upon thir own heads that curse ye meroz , the very motto of thir pulpits , wherwith so frequently , not as meroz , but more like atheists they have mock'd the vengeance of god , and the zeale of his people . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a50955e-120 jer. 48. 10. prov. 12. 10. political aphorisms: or, the true maxims of government displayed wherein is likewise proved, that paternal authority is no absolute authority, and that adam had no such authority. that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure, and that all such pretended government is void. that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture. that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors, and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance. that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes. together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government, in israel, france, spain, portugal, scotland, and in england before and since the conquest. 1691 approx. 77 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 18 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2007-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a45694 wing h917e estc r216382 99828113 99828113 32540 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a45694) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 32540) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1926:5) political aphorisms: or, the true maxims of government displayed wherein is likewise proved, that paternal authority is no absolute authority, and that adam had no such authority. that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure, and that all such pretended government is void. that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture. that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors, and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance. that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes. together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government, in israel, france, spain, portugal, scotland, and in england before and since the conquest. locke, john, 1632-1704. two treatises of government. languet, hubert, 1518-1581. vindiciæ contra tyrannos. defoe, daniel, 1661?-1731, attributed name. ferguson, robert, d. 1714, attributed name. harrison, t. (thomas), fl. 1683-1711. the third edition. [2], 31, [1] p. printed for tho. harrison at the west end of the royal exchange in cornhill, london : 1691. variously attributed to daniel defoe, john locke, robert ferguson, and the printer, thomas harrison. the most complete discussion of this difficult issue may be found in: r. ashcraft and m.m. goldsmith, "locke, revolution principles, and the formation of whig ideology," historical journal 26, no.4 (1983): 773-800. text consists of material plagiarized or adapted from a number of pamphlets including john locke's "two treatises of governement" and hubert languet's "vindiciæ contra tyrannos". copy cropped at head, affecting pagination. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng great britain -politics and government, (1680-1714) -early works to 1800. political rights -england -early works to 1800. political science -philosophy -early works to 1800. 2005-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2006-04 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2006-06 john latta sampled and proofread 2006-06 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2006-09 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political aphorisms : or , the true maxims government displayed . wherein is likewise proved , that paternal authority is no absolute authority , and that adam had no such authority . that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure , and that all such pretended government is void . that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture . that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors , and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance . that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes . together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government , in israel , france , spain , portugal , scotland , and in england before and since the conquest . the third edition . london , printed for tho. harrison at the west end of the royal exchange in cornhill . 1691. political aphorisms : or the true maxims of government displayed . it is evident that no rule or form of government is prescribed by the law of god and nature ; for that then they would be both immutable , and the self-same in all countries . for the better proof whereof , it is necessary to shew , how far government proceeds from nature , and how far from man ; to wit , that man is sociable , and inclined to live together in company , which proceeds from nature , and consequently also from god , that is author of nature ; from whence do proceed all private houses , then villages , then towns , then castles , then cities , and then kingdoms and common-wealths ( as aristotle saith in his book of politicks ) . tho government in like manner , and jurisdiction of magistrates , which does follow necessarily upon this living together in company , be also of nature ; yet the particular form or manner of this or that government , in this or that fashion , as to have many governors , few , or one , and those either kings , dukes , earls , or the like ; or that they should have this or that authority more or less , for longer or shorter time , or be by succession , or election themselves and their children , or next in blood : all these things ( i say ) are not by law natural or divine ( for then , as hath been said , they should be all one in all countries and nations ) for god said , gen. 2.18 . it is not good that man should be alone , i will make him an help-meet ( or assistant like unto himself ) : so that as this first society of our first parents was of god , and for so great purpose as the one to help and assist ( not destroy or inslave ) the other : so all other societies , as proceeding from this first , stand upon the same ground of god's ordinance , for the self-same end of mans utility or happiness ; all which is confirmed by the consent and use of all nations throughout the world ; which general consent cicero calleth ipsius vocem naturae , the voice of nature her self . for there was never yet any nation found either of ancient times , or of later days , by the discovery of the indies , or else-where , where men living together , had not some kind of magistrate , or superior to govern them ; which evidently declareth , that magistracy is also from nature , and from god that created nature ( though not in this or that particular form : ) which point our civil law doth prove in like manner , in the beginning of our digest , de origine juris civilis & omnium magistratuum , of the beginning of the civil law , and of all magistrates , which beginning is referred to the first principle of natural instinct , and god's institution . though common-wealths and government of the same by magistrates are of nature ; yet the particular forms or manner of governments are not of nature , but are left unto every nation and country to chuse what form of government they like best , and think most fit for the natures and conditions of the people . by the state of nature we are all equal , there being no superiority or subordination one above another ; there can be nothing more rational , than that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature , and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another , without god by any manifest declaration of his will had set one above another , and given him superiority or soveraignty . were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men , there would be no need of any other state ; for every one in that state being both judg and executioner of the law of nature , which is to punish according to the offence committed . men being partial to themselves , passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far in their own cases , as well as negligence and unconcernedness makes them too remiss in other mens . this makes every one willingly give up his single power of punishing to one alone , of more , as they shall think most convenient , and by such rules as the community , or those authorized by them to that purpose , shall agree on , with intention in every one the better to preserve himself , his liberty and property . what is it but flattery to the natural vanity and ambition of men , too apt of it self to grow and increase with the possession of any power , who would perswade those monarchs in authority , that they may do what they please , because they have authority to do more than others ; since rational creatures cannot be supposed , when free , to put themselves into subjection to another for their own harm , which were to put themselves in a worse condition than in the state of nature , wherein they had liberty to defend their lives and properties against the invasions of any man or men whatsoever ; whereas by giving up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power of any man , they have disarm'd themselves , and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases . i have been the longer in speaking of the state of nature , and the natural instinct to society and government , for that it is the fountain of all the rest that ensueth in a common-wealth ; but if we respect god and nature , as well might all the diversity of governments , which have been , and now are in the world , have followed one law , as so different , but that neither god , nor nature ( which is from god ) hath prescribed any of those particular forms , but concurreth or permitteth such which the common-wealth appoints . can any man say that god and nature did not concur as well with italy when it had but one prince , as now when it hath so many , and the like with germany , and also with switzerland , which was once one common-wealth under the dukes and marquesses of austria , and now are divided into thirteen cantons or common-wealths , under popular magistrates of their own ? england also was first a monarchy under the britains , and then a province under the romans , and after that divided into seven kingdoms at once , under the saxons , and after them of the danes , and then the normans , and then the french , and now a monarchy again under the english ; and all this by god's providence and permission , who suffered his own peculiar people the jews to be under divers manner of governments at divers times ; at first under patriarchs , abraham , isaac and jacob ; then under captains , as moses , joshua , and the like ; then under judges , as othoniel , ebud and gideon ; then under high priests , as eli and samuel ; then under kings , as saul , david , and the rest ; then under captains and high priests again , as zorobbabel , judas maccabeus , and his brethren ; until the government was lastly taken from them , and they brought under the power of the romans . and last of all that god does concur with what magistrate or magistrates the community thinks fit to appoint , is plain by the testimony of holy scripture , as when god said to solomon , by me kings rule , and nobles , even all the judges of the earth , prov. 8.16 . that is , by his permission they govern , tho chosen by the people ; and st. paul to the romans avoucheth , that authority is not but of god , and therefore he that resisteth authority , resisteth god , rom. 13. which is to be understood of authority , power and jurisdiction in it self according to the laws of every country . all politick societies began from a voluntary union and mutual agreement of men , freely acting in the choice of their governours , and forms of government . all kings receive their royal dignity from the community by whom they are made the superiour minister and ruler of the people . aristotle , cicero , augustin , fortescue , and all other politicians agree , that kingdoms and common-wealths were existent before kings ; for there must be a kingdom and society of men to govern , before there can be a king elected by them to govern them ; and those kingdoms and societies of men had ( for the most part ) some common laws of their own free choice by which they were governed , before they had kings , which laws they swore their kings to observe , before they would crown or admit them to the government , as is evident by the coronation-oaths of all christian and pagan kings continued to this day . the safety of the people is the supreamest law ; and what they by common consent have enacted , only for the publick safety , they may , without any obstacle , alter when things require it , by the like common consent . the lawful power of making laws to command whose politick societies of men , belongeth so properly unto the same intire societies , that for any prince or potentate , of what kind soever upon earth , to exercise the same of himself , and not by express commission immediately and personally received from god , or else by authority derived at first from their consent , upon whose persons they impose laws , it is no better than meer tyranny . laws they are not therefore , which publick approbation hath not made so . hooker's eccl. pol. l. 1. § . 10. whosoever ( says aristotle ) is governed by a man without a law , is governed by a man , and by a beast . as every man , in the delivery of the gift of his own goods , may impose what covenant or condition he pleases ; and every man is moderator and disposer of his own estate . so in the voluntary institution of a king , and royal power , it is lawful for the people , submitting themselves , to prescribe the king and his successors what law they please , so as it be not unreasonable and unjust , and directly against the rights of a supream governour . no man can be born an absolute king ; no man can be a king by himself ; no king can reign without the people . whereas on the contrary , the people may both be , and are by themselves , and are in time before a king. by which it appears that all kings were and are constituted by the people , because , by the law of nature , there is no superiority one above another ; and god has no where commanded the world , or any part thereof , to be governed by this or that form , or by this or that person ; therefore all superiority and authority must , and does proceed from the people , since , by the law of god and nature , there is no superiority one above another . aristotle saith , that the whole kingdom , city , or family , is more excellent , and to be preferred before any part or member thereof . succession was tolerated ( and appointed in the world ) to avoid competition , and inter-regnum , and other inconveniences of election . 't is plain , from what hath been said , that all government proceeds from the people . now i will prove that they have authority to put back the next inheritors to government , when unfit or uncapable to govern : and also to dispossess them that are in lawful possession , if they fulfil not the laws and conditions by which , and for which their dignities were given them ; and when it is done upon just and urgent causes , and by publick authority of the whole body , the justice thereof is plain ; as when the prince shall endeavour to establish idolatry , contrary to the laws of the land ; or any religion which is repugnant to the scripture , as popery , &c. or to destroy the people , or make them slaves to his tyrannical will and pleasure : for as the whole body is of more authority than the head , and may cure it when out of order ; so may the weal-publick cure or purge their heads , when they are pernitious or destructive to the body politick ; seeing that a body civil may have divers heads by succession or election , and cannot be bound to one , as a body natural is : which body natural , if it had ability to cut off its aking or sickly head , and take another , i doubt not but it would do it , and that all men would confess it had authority sufficient , and reason so to do , rather than the other parts should perish , or live in pain and continual torment : so may the body politick chuse another head and governour in the room of its destructive one ; which hath been done for many ages , and god hath wonderfully concurred therein ( for the most part ) with such judicial acts of the common-wealth against their evil princes ; not only prospering the same , but by giving them commonly some notable successor in place of the deprived , thereby both to justify the fact , and remedy the fault of him that went before . first , king saul was slain by the philistines by god's appointment , for not fulfilling the law and limits prescribed unto him . ammon was lawful king also , yet was he slain , for that he walked not in the way prescribed him by god , 2 king. 21. and david and josiah were made kings in their rooms , who were two most excellent princes . shalum , pekahiah , and pekah , three wicked and idolatrous kings of israel , were , by god's just judgment , slain one after another . and all the kings of israel , who violated the covenant and conditions annexed to their crowns , did , for the most part , lose their lives , and underwent the utter extirpation of their posterities from the crown . rehoboham ( for only ) threatning to oppress the people , was deserted by them , who chose jeroboham his servant in his stead , which was approved on by god. if i should instance all the kings over the children of israel whom god permitted ( and appointed ) to be slain , and those that were carried away captive by the heathens for their unjust government , i should be too copious . but i will leave the hebrews , and give you several examples of the depriving of evil princes of the government , in france , spain , portugal , &c. and last of all in scotland and england ; and of the happiness and prosperity that did attend those kingdoms upon such acts , which can be imputed to nothing but the blessing of almighty god which attended those proceedings ; and by consequence he approved thereof , and does approve of such acts. there has been two great changes made of the royal line in france ; the first from pharamond to the line of pepin , the second from pepin to hugo capet . childerick the third was deprived for his evil government , and pepin was chosen king in his stead , whose posterity reigned for many years after him , and were brave kings , as history doth testify . lewis the third , and charles sirnamed le-gross , were both deprived by the states of france for their ill government , and such who were thought more worthy , appointed in their stead . all french histories do attribute to these great changes that have been made by the people , the prosperity and greatness of their present kingdom . henry the third , before he was king of france , was chosen king of polonia : but for departing thence without leave , and not returning at his day , was deprived by publick act of parliament . if i were to mention all the acts of this nature throughout europe , i should be too tedious , therefore i will mention only some few . in spain , flaveo suintila was deprived for his evil government , together with all his posterity , and sissinando chosen in his room . don pedro , sirnamed the cruel , for his injurious proceedings with his subjects , they resolved to dethrone him ; and to that intent sent for a bastard brother of his , named henry , that lived in france , desiring him to come , with some french men , to assist them in that act , and take the crown upon himself . which he did , by the help of the spaniards , and slew him in fight hand to hand , and so enjoyed the crown , as doth his off-spring to this day . this henry was a most excellent king , as well for his courage in war , as for his other brave qualities . in portugal , don sanco the second , was deprived , by the universal consent of all portugal , and don alanso his brother set up : who , amongst other great exploits , was the first that set portugal free from all subjection , dependance , and homage to the kingdom of castile . and his son , who was his successor , builded and founded above forty great towns in portugal : who was likewise a most rare prince , and his off-spring ruleth there to this day . cisternus , king of denmark , for his intolerable cruelty , was deprived , and his wife and three children disinherited , and his uncle frederick was chosen king in his stead , whose off-spring remaineth in the crown . in scotland , the nobility and gentry , &c. took arms against durstus their king , for his intolerable cruelty , and slew him and his confederates in battel , ( and put by his sons , lest they should imitate their father's vices ) and elected even , his brother , king ; who leaving a bastard son , the kingdom was conferred on him . crathy cinthus having surprized and slain donald for his tyranny , he was unanimously elected king. ethus was , for his evil government , deprived , and gregory made king in his stead . buchanan , a scots-man , speaking of his country , saith , that it was free from the beginning , created it self kings upon this very law , that the empire being conferred on them by the suffrages of the people ; if the matter required it , they might take it away by the same suffrages . of which law many footsteps have remained even to our age. i will end this narration with examples out of england , ( before and since the conquest ) archigallo , emerian , vortigern , sigibert king of the west-saxons ; beornred , and alured king of northumberland , were all deprived of their thrones for their evil government , and such who were thought more worthy preferred in their stead . king edwin being deprived for his unjust government , the crown was given to his brother edgar , who was one of the rarest princes that the world had in his time , both for peace and war , justice , piety , and valour : he kept a navy ( saith stow ) of three thousand and six hundred ships , distributed in divers parts for defence of the realm ; and he built and restored forty seven monasteries at his own charge , &c. the crown of england hath been altered by the community , and settled upon those from whom they expected more justice than from the right heirs ; witness the electing and crowning of edelwald and casebelian ; egbert not next in blood , edward , adalston , and harold , who were all illegitimate ; and edred , against the right of his two nephews , canutus a foreigner , and hardiknute , without title , and edward the confessor , against the right heirs . after the conquest , anno. 1087. robert the elder brother was put aside , and william rufus , the third son of william the conqueror , was elected : after whose death , henry the first , his younger brother ( though not next heir ) was chosen by the people , not summoned by writ . after the death of henry the first , stephen was chosen king against the right of maud , the daughter of henry the first . after his death henry the second was admitted king , against the right of his mother maud. after the death of richard the first , king john ( earl of morton ) was elected , and arthur the right heir disinherited . henry the third was chosen against the right of eleanor prince arthur's sister . at the death of henry the third , the states of the kingdom met and setled the government , by appointing officers , and what else was necessary for the defence of the realm , and edward the fourth was set up by the people during the life of henry the sixth . now it is plain , that the kings and queens of england , ever since william rufus's time , have proceeded from those who were set up by the people against the next heirs . king edward the second , richard the second , and richard the third , were , for not governing according to the laws of the land , deprived of the government , and edward the third , and henry the fourth and seventh , were preferred in their rooms , which were most rare and valiant princes , who have done many important acts in this kingdom , and have raised many families to nobility , put down others , changed states both abroad and at home , altered the course of descent in the blood royal , and the like ; which was unjust , and is void at this day , if the changes and deprivations of the former kings were unlawful , and consequently all those princes that have succeeded them ( which yet never failed of a constant lineal descent ) were usurpers ; and those that do pretend to the crown of england at this day , have no title at all , ( which was yet never denied ) for that from those men they descended , who were put in the place of the aforementioned , deprived by the common-wealth : and this is , and hath been the custom and practice of all kingdoms and common-wealths , to deprive their princes for their evil government ; and that god hath , and does concur with the same , is plain from the examples before-mentioned , of the prosperity and happiness that hath attended those acts. the barons , prelates , and commons took a solemn oath , that if king john should refuse to grant and confirm their laws and liberties , they would wage war against him so long , and withdraw themselves from their allegiance to him , until he should confirm to them by a charter , ratified with his seal , all things which they required : and that if the king should afterwards peradventure recede from his oath , as they verily believed he would , by reason of his double-dealing , they would forthwith , by seizing on his castles , compel him to give satisfaction . he afterwards breaking his oath and promise , the barons said , what shall we do with this wicked king ? if we let him thus alone he will destroy us and our people ; it is expedient therefore that he should be expelled the throne , we will not have him any longer to reign over us : and accordingly they sent for lewis the prince of france , to be their king , and swore fealty to him , but they afterwards discovering that he had sworn that he would oppress them , and extirpate all their kindred , they rejected him , and set up henry the third . the bishops of hereford , lincoln , and several earls , barons and knights for each county , being deputed to go to edward ii , and demand a surrender of the crown , said to him , that unless he did of himself renounce his crown and scepter , the people would neither endure him , or any of his children , as their soveraign ; but disclaiming all homage and fealty , would elect some other for king who should not be of the blood ; upon which the king resigned his crown , &c. by the common usage of england , which is the common law of england , kings may be deprived for evil government , and others set up in their stead , is plain from the afore-going examples . richard the first being taken prisoner by the emperor in his return from the holy land , it was decreed , that the fourth part of all that year's rents , and of all the moveables , as well of the clergy as of the laity , and all the woolls of the abbots of the order of cistersians and of semphringham , and all the gold and silver chalices , and treasure of all churches , should be paid in towards the ransom of the king , which was done accordingly . if all this was given for the liberty of one man ; certainly much more ought to be given now , when all our liberties and properties , and even our religion too lies at stake , if necessity required it , which god forbid . by the law of nature , salus populi , the welfare of the people , is both the supream and first law in government , and the scope and end of all other laws , and of government it self ; because the safety of the body politick is ever to be preferred before any one person whatsoever . no human law is binding which is contrary to the scripture , or the general laws of nature . religion doth not overthrow nature , whose chiefest principle is to preserve her self ; and god doth not countenance sin in the greatest , but rewards the punisher , witness jehu , &c. the end for which men enter into society , is not barely to live , but to live happily , answerable to the excellency of their kind , which happiness is not to be had out of society . all common-wealths are in a state of nature one with another . as magistrates were designed for a general good ; so the obligation to them must be understood so , as to be still in subordination to the main end ; for the reason of all law and government is the publick good. government being for the benefit of the governed , and not for the sole advantage of the governours , but only for theirs with the rest , as they make a part of that politick body , each of whose parts and members are taken care of , and directed in their peculiar function for the good of the whole , by the laws of the society . the end of government being the preservation of all as much as may be , even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent . the publick power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society ; and the principal use of that power is to give laws unto all that are under it , which laws in such cases we must obey , unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce that the law of reason or of god doth injoyn the contrary . hooker eccl. pol. l. 1. § . 10. t. cicero saith , there is one nature of all men ; that even nature it self prescribes this , that a man ought to take care of a man who ever he be , even for this very cause , that he is a man. if otherwise , all human consociation must necessarily be dissolved ; therefore , as there are two foundations of justice : first , that no hurt be done to any ; next , that the profit of all , if it can be done , be advanced . that all magistates and governours do proceed from the people , is plain from the following examples in scripture ; deut. 16.18 , 19. the children of israel are commanded to make judges and officers throughout their tribes . deut. 17.14 , 15. when thou art come into the land , &c. and shalt say , i will set a king over we , like as all the nations that are about me : thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee , whom the lord thy god shall choose : one from among thy brethren shalt thou set over thee ; thou mayst not set a stranger over thee . so god did only reserve to himself the nomination of their king ; by which he designed to make his people more happy than they could expect by their own peculiar choice ; he knowing the heart of man , and corruption of his nature , would be sure to nominate such who was most fit to govern his people . god did not require the jews to accept of him for king whom he should chuse , but left it to their own free will , whether they would accept him or no , is plain from the following examples . upon the death of saul , david was set up by the appointment of almighty god , yet there was only the tribe of judah that followed david and made him king , eleven tribes following ishbosheth , saul's son , whom they made king ; and though david had a long war against the house of saul , yet he calls them not rebels , neither do we find that god punished them , or sent any judgment upon them for not accepting of david as king ; and when rechab and banah had slain ishbosheth , and brought his head to david at hebron , saying , behold the head of thine enemy ! yet david , instead of rewarding them , caused them to be slain for killing of ishbosheth , whom he calls a righteous person , not a rebel : after whose death all those tribes came to david , and made a compact with him for the performance of such conditions which they thought necessary for the securing of their liberty before they made him king : 2 sam. chap. 2 , 3 , 4 , 5. the making of solomon king by david his father , was not thought sufficient without the peoples consent , else why did the people anoint solomon , and make him king the second time . we read , judg. 8.21 , 22 , 23. that after gideon had slain zebah and zalmunna with the midianites , the children of israel said unto gideon , rule thou over us , both thou and thy sons , and thy sons son also ; for thou hast delivered us from the hand of midian . but he refusing their offer , they afterwards made his bastard-son abimelech king , though he had threescore and ten lawfully-begotten sons . zimri having slain baasha king of israel , reigned in his stead , but the children of israel hearing thereof , rejected him , and made omri the captain of the host king of israel , 1 kings 16.15 , 16. the kingdom of edom appointed a deputy to rule over them instead of a king , and gave him royal authority , there being then no king in edom , 1 kings 22.47 . see macchab. 9.28 , 29 , 30. & 13.8 , 9. & 14.41 to 49. by which it is further apparent that their kings and governours were chosen by the people . as propinquity of blood is a great preheminence towards the attaining of any crown , yet it doth not bind the common-wealth to yield thereto , and to admit at hap-hazard every one that is next by succession of blood , ( as was falsly affirmed by r. l'estrange and many others , when the parliament would have disinherited the duke of york as unfit to govern this nation , he being a papist ) if weighty reasons require the contrary , because she is bound to consider well and maturely the person that is to enter , whether he be like to perform his duty and charge to be committed to him : for to admit him that is an enemy or unfit to govern , is to consent to the destroying of the common-wealth . see how god dealt in this point with the children of israel , 1 sam. 8. after he had granted to them the same government as the other nations round about them had , whose kings did ordinarily reign by succession as ours do at this day , and as most of the kings of the jews did afterwards : yet that this law of succeeding by proximity of birth , though for the most part it should prevail , yet he shewed plainly that upon just causes it might be altered , as in the case of saul , who left behind him many children , yet not any of them succeeded him , except ishbosheth , who was not his eldest son , who was anointed king by abner the general captain of that nation , to whom eleven tribes followed , until he was slain ; and then they chose david . and jonathan , saul's other son , so much praised in holy scripture , being slain in war , his son mephibosheth did not succeed in the crown , though by succession he had much greater right to it than david ▪ god promised david that his seed should reign ( for ever ) after him — yet we do not find this performed to any of his elder sons , nor to any of their offspring , but only to solomon his younger and tenth son. rehoboam , the lawful son and heir of king solomon , coming to shichem , where all the people of israel were assembled together for his coronation and admission to the crown , ( for until that time he was not accounted true king ) who refusing to ease them of some heavy impositions which they had received from his father , ten tribes of the twelve refuse to admit him their king , and chose jeroboam his servant , and made him their lawful king , and god allowed thereof ; for when rehoboam had prepared an hundred and fourscore thousand chosen men , who were warriours , to reduce those ten tribes to the obedience of their natural prince , god commanded them to desist by his prophet shemaiah , and so they did . these and the like determinations of the people about admitting or refusing of princes to reign or not to reign over them , when their designments are to good ends , and for just causes , are allowed by god , and oftentimes are his own special drifts and dispositions , though they seem to come from man. he who is set up or made king by the consent of the people , hath a just title against the next heir of the blood and his issue , who are put by the crown ; else most of the princes now reigning in europe would be usurpers , and want good titles to their crowns , they or their ancestors being set up by the people , which were not the right heirs of the royal stock . the laws of the commonwealth is the very soul of a politick body . kings and emperors always have been , are , and ought to be subject to the laws of their kingdoms ; not above them , to violate , break or alter them at their pleasures , they being obliged by their coronation-oaths , in all ages and kingdoms , inviolably to observe them : for st. paul saith , a prince is the minister of god for the peoples good , and tribute and custom are paid to him , that he may continually attend thereto . the defence and procuration of the common-wealth is to be managed to the benefit of those who are committed , not of those to whom it is committed . a just governour for the benefit of the people , is more careful of the publick good and welfare , than of his own private advantage . allegiance is nothing but obedience according to law , which when the prince violates , he has no right to obedience . there is a mutual obligation between the king and people , which whether it be only civil or natural , tacit , or in express words , can be taken away by no agreements , violated by no law , rescinded by no force . a kingdom is nothing else but the mutual stipulation between the people and their kings . the supream authority of a nation belongs to those who have the legislative authority reserved to them ; but not to those who have only the executive , which is plainly a trust when it is separated from the legislative power ; and all trusts by their nature import , that those to whom they are given are accountable , though no such condition is specified . if the subject may in no case resist , then there can be no law , but the will and pleasure of the prince : for whoever must be opposed in nothing , may do every thing ; then all our laws signify no more than so many cyphers : and what are the law-makers but so many fools or mad-men , who give themselves trouble to no purpose ? for if the king is not obliged to govern by those laws that they make , to what purpose are the people to obey such laws ? whether another has right to my goods , or , if he demand them , i have no right to keep them , is all one . if the king sue me by pretence of law , and endeavour to take away my money , my house or my land , i may defend them by the law ; but if he comes armed to take away my liberty , life and religion , which are mine by the laws of god and man , may i not secure them with a good conscience ? every man has a right to preserve himself , his rights and priviledges , against him who has no authority to invade them : and this was the case of moses , who seeing an egyptian smiting an hebrew , he slew him . and samson made war upon the philistines for burning his wife and her father , who were both but private persons , who knew they could have no other kind of justice against them , but what the law of nature gives every man. we ought ( saith the learned junius brutus in his discourse of government ) to consider that all princes are born men. we cannot therefore expect to have only perfect princes , but rather we ought to think it well with us if we have gained but indifferent ones : therefore the prince shall not presently be a tyrant if he keep not measure in some things , if now and then he obey not reason , if he more slowly seek the publick good , if he be less diligent in administring justice . for seeing a man is not set over men as if he were some god , as he is over beasts , but as he is a man born in the same condition with them : as that prince shall be proud , who will abuse men like beasts ; so that people shall be unjust , who shall seek a god in a prince , and a divinity in this frail nature . but truly if he shall wilfully subvert the republick ; if he shall wilfully pervert the laws ; if he shall have no care of his faith , none of his promises , none of justice , none of piety ; if himself become an enemy of his people , or shall use all or the chiefest notes we have mentioned , then verily he may be judged a tyrant , that is , an enemy of god and men : and by how much longer he is tolerated , the more intolerable he becomes , and they may act against him whatever they may use against a tyrant either by law or just force . tyranny is not only a crime , but the head , and , as it were , the heap of all crimes ; therefore is he so much the more wicked than any thief , murtherer , or sacrilegious person , by how much it is more grievous to offend many and all , than particular persons . now if all these be reputed enemies , if they be capitally punished , if they suffer pains of death , can any invent a punishment worthy so horrid a crime ? the laws are the nerves and sinews of society ; and as the magistrate is above the people , so is the law above the magistrate , or else there can be no civil society . he who makes himself above all law , is no member of a common wealth , but a meer tyrant . if a magistrate , notwithstanding all laws made for the well-governing a community , will act plainly destructive to that community , they are discharged either from active or passive obedience , and indispensibly obliged by the law of nature to resistance . is it not reasonable and just i should have a right to destroy him who threatens me with destruction ? for by the fundamental law of nature , man being to be preserved as much as possible , when all cannot be preserved , the safety of the innocent is to be preferred ; i say , he who having renounced his reason , the common rule and measure god hath given to mankind , by endeavouring to destroy me , is thereby become as a beast of prey , and ought to be treated accordingly . the laws ( says tully ) are above the magistrates , as the magistrates are above the people . he who is destructive to the being of another , hath quitted the reason which god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man of justice and equity , hath put himself into the state of war with the other , and is as noxious as any savage beast that seeks his destruction . no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it : for if there be no appeal on earth , for redress or security against any mischief the prince may do , then every man in that society is in a state of nature with him , in respect of him . thucidides l. 2. saith , not only those are tyrants who reduce others into servitude , but much rather those , who when they may repulse that violence , take no care to do it ; but especially those who will be called the defenders of greece and the common country , but yet help not their oppressed country . if a man may be a wolf to a man , nothing forbids but that a man may be a god to a man , as it is in the proverb . therefore antiquity hath enrolled hercules amongst the number of the gods , because he punished and tamed procrustes , busyris , and other tyrants , the pests of mankind , and monsters of the world. so also the roman empire , as long as it stood free , was often called the patrocine against the robberies of tyrants , because the senate was the haven and refuge of kings , people and nations . it is as lawful , and more reasonable , to prevent the overthrowing of our religion , laws , rights and priviledges , from any man or men whatsoever amongst our selves , as from a foreign power ; because one acts contrary to the laws of god and the country , and the other being not subject to the laws of the country , can be no ways bound by it . it was thought no injustice in the ship to cast out the prophet , when they found he was likely to prove the wrack of them all ; and the almighty shewed he approved of their act , by quieting the storm when he was gone . the scripture , that hath set us none but good examples , tells us , that some princes should not have one of their race left that pisseth against the wall : now what were their faults but idolatry and oppression of their people ? then how can it be a sin in a nation to free themselves from an idolatrous and oppressing king ? when it is done by the greatest and most considerable part thereof , it does silently imply a consent of god ; for it cannot be covetousness or ambition that moves such a multitude . when once the christian religion is become a part of the subjects property by the laws and constitutions of the country , then it is to be considered as one of their principal rights : and so may be defended as well as any other civil right ; since that those different forms of government that the jews were under , is no rule for the government of any nation or people whatsoever . the principles of natural religion give those who are in authority , no power at all , but only secure them in the possession of that which is theirs by the laws of the country . that cause is just which defends the laws , which protects the common good , which shall preserve the realm : and that cause is unjust which violates the laws , defends the breakers of the laws , protects the subverters of the country . that is just which will destroy tyrannical government ; that unjust which would abolish just government ; that lawful which tends to the publick good , that unlawful which tends to the private . but alas , that bug-bear dagon of passive obedience , is a notion crept into the world , and most zealously , and perhaps as ignorantly defended : here all our laws and decrees , by which we are governed , are of the peoples choice ; first made by the subject , and then confirmed by the king. here a king cannot take our sons and daughters , our fields and vineyards away , unless we please to give him them . where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when elisha prayed for blindness to come upon those who were sent by the king of syria to fetch him ? and when he commanded the door to be shut , and the messenger to be held fast who was sent for his head by the king of israel ? and when azariah , with fourscore valiant priests , thrust out vzziah , their lawful king , out of the temple ? and when elijah destroyed the two captains with fire from heaven , with the hundred men under their command , who were sent at twice , by king ahaziah , to fetch him ? and when the children of israel slew amasiah , their lawful king , for his idolatry , without any appointment in scripture , or prophecy of his downfal ? and yet that is no where called rebellion , neither were they punished by his son , whom they had made king in his father's stead . and when mattathias slew the king's commissioner , for compelling men to idolatry ? and when mattathias and his friends pulled down the altars which were adapted to idols , 1 macc. 2.25 , 45. where was the doctrine of passive obedience when the edomites revolted from jehoram , and made themselves a king ? and libnah did also revolt , because of his evil government , 2 chron. 21. without any appointment , or foretelling of their revolt by god in scripture , or being called rebels . and when saul's subjects swore that saul should not kill jonathan ; and they rescued him that he died not ? 1 sam. 14.45 . and when david ( though a private man ) armed himself with six hundred men , no doubt but he designed to have fought saul and his army , if the men of keliah would have assisted him , and have been true to him ; when he enquired of the lord , whether the men of keliah would deliver him and his men into the hands of saul ? upon the lord 's answering , they would deliver them up , he and his men departed the city , 1 sam. 23. can any man imagine their meaning was to run up and down the country together , and fly before saul and his army , if they had been able to cope with any number he could bring or send against them ? if resistance was unlawful , and a sin , surely david , a man after god's own heart , would have known it ; and then he would not have involved the six hundred men that came to his assistance in the sin of rebellion , but have told them , that the prince was not to be resisted , though never so great a tyrant . where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when constantine the great aided the oppressed christians and romans , against the tyranny and persecution of the emperors , maxentius and maximinius , with force of arms , with which he conquered those persecutors in several battels , fought against them at the christians earnest importunity ? and when the primitive christians resisted lucinius their emperor , for persecuting them contrary to law ; and constantine the great joined with them , who held it his duty , saith eusebius , to deliver an infinite multitude of men , by cutting off a few wicked ones , as the pests and plagues of the time. and when the primitive christians of constantinople opposed asper's being made emperor ; but leo being named , they consented thereto . an4 when the christians , under the king of persia , resisted him for persecuting them , and was assisted by theodosius the roman emperor , who told the king of persia , he was ready to defend them , and no ways to see them suffer for religion ? and when the christians of armenia the greater , made a league with the romans for the securing of their persons and their religion , against the persians under whom they lived ? and when the novatians , assisted by the orthodox , resisted and beat the macedonians , though they were assisted by constantius the emperor , with four thousand men to drive them from pap●lagonia ? and when the primitive christians destroyed julian's idolatrous temple in his reign ? where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when the lutheran churches defended themselves against the emperor charles the fifth ? and when the protestants austria took up arms , anno 1608 , against matthias king of hungaria , for denying them the free exercise of their religion ? and when queen elizabeth assisted the hollanders against their lawful soveraign ? and when she assisted the protestants of france , against their lawful soveraigns charles the ninth , and henry the third ? and when king charles the first , and the bishops and clergy of england assisted the protestants of france ? and when the protestant princes of germany invited gustavus adolphus , king of sweeden , to come into germany to assist the protestants against their lawful prince for persecuting them ? and when the protestants joined with him upon his arrival ? and when king charles the first assisted them with men from england ? so that , according to this christian doctrine of passive obedience , queen elizabeth , and king charles the first , with the bishops and clergy of england , and several other princes and states , have been guilty of st. paul's damnation ; for they that are aiding and assisting to rebels , are as guilty as those that are actually in it . lucifer calaritanus , a famous christian , wrote a book against constantius the emperor , which he sent him to read ; wherein he calls him , and his idolatrous bishops , blasphemers ; and charges him with inviting the christians to idolatry , and tells him , he ought to be put to death for so doing , by the command of god , in deut. 13. where god says , that he that ( but ) intices secretly to idolatry , shall be put to death . and this was approved on by the great bishop athanasius , and those christians that were with him , who calls it , the light of truth , the doctrine of the true faith : how came you ( says he to calaritanus ) to understand the sense and meaning of the scripture so perfectly , if the holy ghost had not assisted you in it ? now i would fain know , whether , he that is aiding and assisting towards the bringing in of idolatry , ( as the popish religion is ) is not as worthy of death , as he that only inticeth to idolatry ? and this is the case of many who call themselves of the church of england , who are for the restoration of king james , and by consequence of idolatry . surely if god had commanded the yoke of subjection to the tyrannical will of princes , 't is strange that neither the prophets , elisha and elijah , nor azariah , nor david with his followers , nor the jews under their kings , nor the primitive christians after their religion was established by laws , nor any of the reformed churches , should not have known this doctrine of passive obedience . in the barons wars , under simon of monfort , the king and his sons were taken prisoners ; but the prince escaping , fights simon and kills him : the historians of those times calls him not a rebel or a traytor , but a martyr for the liberties of church and state. if resistance be unlawful upon any account whatsoever , then were all those people guilty of rebellion , who in all ages have resisted or turned out their evil and destructive kings and governours ; and then the jews were guilty of this sin , for slaying and turning out several of their kings , without any appointment from god in scripture . so likewise the primitive christians did involve themselves under the guilt of st. paul's damnation , for resisting of their kings and emperors ; and likewise the christians in all ages since , who have resisted their princes by turning them out , &c. and then bishop athanasius , ( author of our creed ) and those christians with him , did also come under the guilt of st. paul's damnation , for approving of calaritanus's book , which , according to the doctrine of passive obedience , was a treasonable and rebellious book ; for the incendiaries to rebellion , are as guilty as they that are actually in it . and then all those princes that have been set up by the people , in the room of those whom they have turned out , ( for their evil government ) were usurpers ; and consequently all those who have succeeded them , where the descent of the blood is altered , are intruders , usurpers , and no lawful kings . were the doctrine of passive obedience , without reserve , a true doctrine , no doubt but we should have had a better account thereof than from a few court-divines , who have most learnedly interpreted the will and pleasure of the prince against the laws of nature , or of the country , to be the powers which st. paul requires obedience unto , under the pain of damnation . so by consequence the law ceaseth to be the powers ; then we are in a worse condition than in the state of nature . with what face can any man assert that passive obedience , without reserve , is the doctrine of the gospel ? which is charging god with as palpable a contradiction as any two things can be , it being diametrically opposite to the law of self-preservation , which is the law of nature , and the decree of the almighty , which law is sacred , and not to be infringed by any man. god never commanded any thing contrary to the law of nature , unless it were in the case of abraham in commanding of him ( as a tryal of his faith ) to offer up his son isaac . protection is the only cause of allegiance and obedience , is plain , from the example of david and his six hundred men , who were protected from saul and his army , by achish king of the philistines , who gave them ziklag to live in , and david and his men fought for the philistines against the geshurites , gezrites and the amalekites , and subdued them . david owed no allegiance to saul , who sought his destruction , is plain ; for when achish told david that he and his men should go with him to fight against the children of israel ; david offered his service , and said to achish , surely thou shalt know what thy servant can do . then achish said unto david , therefore i will make thee keeper of my head for ever . so david and his men went in the rear of the army ; and when the lords of the philistines would not let david and his men , fight for them , lest they should betray them into the hands of saul and his army , then david expostulated with achish , and said , what have i done ? and what hast thou found in thy servant , so long as i have been with thee unto this day , that i may not go fight against the enemies of my lord the king ? 1 sam. chap. 27 , 28 , 29. this is a plain case , that david intended to fight saul and his army . now the intention of the mind is as bad as the act ; and yet it is no ways said , that david repented thereof , or of his arming the six hundred men ( before mentioned ) with design to fight his lawful soveraign king saul . the primitive christians took protection to be the only cause of allegiance : for when julian the apostate was chosen emperor of the romans , ( not by the free consent of the people , but ) by the souldiers , during the life of constantius the lawful possessor of the throne . the christians did not reckon themselves obliged to fight for constantius against julian ; for they troubled not their heads with the rights of princes . augustus , tho he had violently usurped the throne , yet he was confirmed in it by the people and senate of rome , who established it in his family by a long prescription , when st. paul's and st. peter's epistles were wrote , of obedience to the laws to kings and magistrates : so that we see that obedience was required to an usurper under the pain of damnation , when the government was confirmed to him by the people , that is , by the majority , for it cannot be thought by every body consented thereto . apolonius thyanaeus , writing to the emperor domitian , saith , these things have i spoken concerning laws ; which if thou shalt not think to reign over thee , then thy self shalt not reign . in matrimony , which is the nearest and strictest obligation of all others , by which those who were two , are made one flesh , if one party forsakes the other , the apostle pronounceth the party forsaked to be free from all obligation , because the party deserting violates the chief conditions of marriage , &c. 1 cor. 7.15 . and shall not the people be much more absolved from their allegiance to that king who has violated his oath , and the laws of the land , the very cause for which they swear allegiance to him ? absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society ; and therefore can be no form of civil government , which is to remedy the inconveniencies of the state of nature . no man , or society of men , have power to deliver up their preservation , or the means of it , to the absolute will of any man ; and they will have always a right to preserve what they have not power to part with . no power can exempt princes from the obligation , to the eternal laws of god and nature . as no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself , and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself , or over any other , to destroy his own life , or take away the life and property of another ; therefore a man cannot give such authority to any , or subject himself to the arbitrary power of another : for the law of nature is an eternal rule to all men , whose actions must be conformable to that law , which is the will of god. for the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind , no human law can be good or valid against it ; and much less the will and pleasure of a prince against the law and custom of the country , which shall be prejudicial to the subject . as the happiness and prosperity of kingdoms depend upon the conservation of their laws ; if the laws depend upon the lust of one man , would not the kingdom fall to ruin in a short space ? but the laws are better and greater than kings , who are bound to obey them . then is it not better to obey the laws , rather than the king ? who can obey the king violating the law ? who will or can refuse to give aid to the law when infringed ? it is impossible any body in a society should have a right to do the community harm . all kings and princes are , and ought to be bound by the laws , and are not exempted from them , and this doctrine ought to be inculcated into the minds of princes from their infancy . let the prince be either from god , or from men , yet to think that the world was created by god , and in it men , that they should serve only for the benefit and use of princes , is an absurdity as gross as can be spoken ; since god hath made us free and equal : but princes were ordained only for the peoples benefit , that so they might innocently preserve human and civil society with greater facility , helping one the other with mutual benefits . in all disputes between power and liberty , power must always be proved , but liberty proves it self ; the one being founded upon positive law , the other upon the law of nature . with what ignorance do some assert , that adam was an absolute monarch , and that paternal authority is an absolute authority ? for that the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will , and the father is not to be resisted by his child ? and that adam had a monarchical , absolute , supream , paternal power ? and that all kingly authority is a fatherly authority , and therefore irresistable ? and that no laws can bind the king , or annul this authority ? how could adam be an absolute monarch , when god gave him the herbs but in common with the beasts ? gen. 1.29 , 30. can it be thought that god gave him an absolute authority of life and death over man , who had not authority to kill any beast to satisfy his hunger ? certainly he had no absolute dominion over even the brutal part of the creatures ( much less over man ) who could not make that use of them as was permitted to noah and his sons , gen. 9.3 . where god says , every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you ; even , as the green herbs , have i given you all things . is it not as reasonable to believe , that god would have cursed adam if he had killed his son abel , as cain for killing him ? cain was very sensible every one had , by the law of nature , a right to kill him for being guilty of blood , when he said , every one that found him should slay him , gen. 4.14 . god made no exemption to the greatest man living who should be guilty of innocent blood , when he said , he that sheddeth mans blood , by man shall his blood be shed , gen. 9.6 . neither noab or his sons were exempted from this great law ; and therefore could have no absolute authority : since god has no where given any man such authority , there can be no such authority ; for the community cannot make themselves slaves by investing such an authority in any man : should they do it , it is not binding , it being against the law of nature . if noah was heir to adam ( i ask ) which of noah's sons was heir to him ? for if by right it descended to all his sons , then it must have descended to all their sons , and so on ; if so , then are all men become equal and independent , as being the off-spring of adam and noah : if it descended only to the eldest , and so on , then there can be but one lawful monarch in the world , and who that is , is impossible to be found out ; so that paternal monarchical authority , take it which way you will , it comes to just nothing at all . where human institution gives it not , the first-born has no right at all above his brethren . no man has an absolute authority over the creatures ( much less over mankind ) because they were given ( for the use of all men ) as occasion should serve : should any man or men destroy them for their will and pleasure , beyond what is necessary for the use of man , or for his preservation , it would be a sin , and therefore could be no authority ; for god authorizes no man to commit a sin , tho he often permits it . the law of god and nature gives the father no absolute dominion over the life , liberty or estate of his child , and therefore he can have no absolute authority ; and where there is no absolute authority , there can be no absolute subjection due . there is an eternal obligation on parents to nourish , preserve , and bring up their off-spring , and under these circumstances obedience is due , and not otherwise . what is a father to a child more than another person , when he endeavours to destroy him ? nay , is he not so much the more odious as the act is more barbarous , for a father to endeavour to destroy his own off-spring , than for another person endeavouring it ? certainly in such a case no passive obedience can be due , it tending to his destruction ( not for his good ) which is no fatherly act , and therefore not to be submitted to . he that lets any person whatsoever destroy him , when it is in his power to preserve his life by defending himself , does tacitly consent to his own death , and therefore is guilty of his own blood as well as he that destroys him : whereas by defending himself , there can be but one guilty of blood , ( which is the invader ) in which defence , if he kills the other , his blood lies at his own door : by which it follows , that passive obedience to unjust violence is a sin , but resisting such violence is no sin , but the duty of every man. the first duty that i owe is to god , the second to my self in preserving my self , &c. the third to my parent and soveraign , in obeying them in all things reasonable and lawful . by all the precepts in scripture which require obedience to parents , homage and obedience is as due to the one as to the other ; for 't is nowhere said , children obey your father , and no more ; the mother is mentioned before the father in lev. 19.3 . ye shall fear every man his mother , and his father . sure solomon was not ignorant what belonged to him as a king , or a father , when he said , my son , hear the instructions of thy father , and forsake not the law of thy mother : and our saviour says , matth. 15.4 . honour thy father and mother . and ephes . 6.1 . children , obey your parents , &c. if paternal authority be an absolute authority , i ask , whether it be in the eldest of the family ? if so , whether a grandfather can dispense with his grand-child's paying the honour due to his parents by the fifth commandment ? 't is evident in common sense , the grandfather cannot discharge the grand-child from the obedience due to his parents , neither can a father dispense with his child's obedience due to the laws of the land ; therefore the obedience required to parents in scripture is not to an absolute authority , for there can be no absolute authority where there is an authority above it . with what folly and ignorance do some assert , that the kings of england are absolute , as proceeding from william the conqueror ? to which i answer , that a conqueror has no right of dominion ( much less any absolute authority ) over the wife and children of the conquered , or over those who assisted not against him . conquest may claim such a right as thieves use over those whom they can master , which is a right of tenure , but no tenure of right . conquest may restore a right , forfeiture may lose a right , but 't is consent only that can transact or give a right . there is no other absolute power , than over captives taken in a just war. if the possession of the whole earth was in one person , yet he would have no power over the life or liberty of another , or over that which another gets by his own industry , for propriety in land gives no man authority over another . william the conqueror made a league or compact with the nobles and lords of the land , to the performance of which , he takes an oath to observe the ancient laws of the realm , established by his predecessors the kings of england , and especially of edward the confessor ; as likewise did henry the first , with the emendations his father had made to them . stephen who succeeded henry , made a compact , and promised a meloration of their laws according to their minds . william rufus , henry the first , and stephen get the consent of the people by promising to grant them their usual laws , and ancient customs . henry the first , richard the first , king john , and richard the second , oblige themselves at their coronations to grant them , and then the people consented to own them as their king ; and richard the first , and king john were conjured by the arch-bishops not to take upon them the crown , unless they intended to perform their oaths . if any king refused so to do , the nobles thought it their concern to hinder his coronation , till he had either made or promised this engagement . what can be more absurd than to say , that there is an absolute subjection due to a prince , whom the laws of god , nature and the country , have not given such authority ? as if men were made as so many herds of cattel , only for the use , service and pleasure of their princes . but some do object , that the anointing of kings at their coronations makes their persons sacred , unquestionable and irresistable , for any tyrannical or exorbitant actions whatsoever . to which i answer , that every christian's ▪ baptism is a sacrament of christ's institution ; a spiritual unction and sanctification which makes a person as sacred , yea more holy than the anointing of kings can or doth of it self , ( that being no sacrament ) a truth which no christian can , without blasphemy , deny : and yet no christian is exempted from resistance , censure , or punishments , according to the nature of his crime ; and therefore the anointing of kings at their coronations cannot do it ; it being a ceremony of the jews , not instituted by christ , or any ways commanded to be continued by the apostles , or their successors ; it signifying only the chusing or preferring one before another , and so became the ceremony of consecrating to any special office , and so was ordinarily used in the enstalling men to offices of any eminency . the reign of a good king resembles that of heaven , over which there is but one god , for he is no less beloved of the vertuous than feared of the bad ; and if human frailty could admit a succession of good kings , there were no comparison , power being ever more glorious in one , than when it is divided . 't is not the title of a king , but the power ( which is the laws ) which is invested in him , which makes the difference betwixt him and other men in the executing of this power : his person is sacred , and not to be resisted , he being above every soul contained in the same society , and therefore cannot be resisted , or deprived of his office by any part , or by the whole community , without the greatest sin of robbery and injustice imaginable . if a government ( say some ) may be disturbed for any unlawful proceedings of the governour , or his ministers , how can any government be safe ? to which i answer , that it is not lawful for every private man to fly into the bosom of his prince , for he is no competent judg , be he of never so great a quality ; else a king was the most miserable man living , lying at the mercy of every desperate fellow's censure . it is impossible for one , or a few oppressed men , to disturb the government , where the body or the people do not think themselves concerned in it , and that the consequences seem not to threaten all ; yea when it does , yet the people are not very forward to disturb the government ; as in king charles the second's time , when the charters were condemned , and seized upon in order to make us slaves , and the laws perverted to the loss of many innocent lives , and many other oppressions too many to insert , and yet no body offered to disturb the government ; i say , till the mischief be grown general , and the designs of the rulers become notorious , then , and then only , will the people be for righting themselves . whosoever , either ruler or subject , by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people , and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government , he is guilty of the greatest crime , i think , a man is capable of , being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood , rapine and desolation , which the breaking to pieces of governments brings on a country ; and he who does it , is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind , and is so to be treated accordingly ; and how far the late king james was guilty of this , i leave the world to judg . finis . the author's advertisement . just as i had finished this book , i received a reply to my former book , which i thought to have answered ; but finding the arguments to be frivolous and weak , and my necessary avocations allowing me but little time , therefore i forbore answering it . advertisements . the doctrine of passive obedience , and jure divino disproved . price 1 d. the letter which was sent to the author of the doctrine of passive obedience and jure divino disproved , &c. answered and refuted . wherein is proved , that monarchy was not originally from god. that kings are not by divine appointment , but that all government proceeds from the people . that the obedience required in scripture , is to the laws of the land , and no otherwise . that resisting of arbitrary power is lawful . that the oath of allegiance to the late king james was dissolved before the prince of orange ( our present king ) landed . that upon the non-performance of an oath on one side , the other becomes void , is plainly prov'd from several examples in scripture . that protection is the only cause of allegiance ; and that obedience or allegiance is due to the present government , is proved from scripture , law and reason : and those texts of scripture which relate to government , of monarchy , are explained . price stitch'd 6 d. both written by the same author , and printed for tho. harrison . the prince, or, maxims of state written by sir walter ravvley ... raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a57525 of text r23010 in the english short title catalog (wing r179). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 85 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 27 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a57525 wing r179 estc r23010 12492505 ocm 12492505 62401 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57525) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 62401) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 249:e132, no 41) the prince, or, maxims of state written by sir walter ravvley ... raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. [6], 46 p. [s.n.] london : 1642. reproduction of original in thomason collection, british library. eng political science -early works to 1800. a57525 r23010 (wing r179). civilwar no the prince, or maxims of state· written by sir walter ravvley, and presented to prince henry: raleigh, walter, sir 1642 15360 101 5 0 0 0 0 69 d the rate of 69 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the d category of texts with between 35 and 100 defects per 10,000 words. 2000-00 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2001-12 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-01 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2002-01 tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the true and liuely portraiture of the honourable and learned knight sr walter ralegh . the prince , or maxims of state . written by sir walter ravvley , and presented to prince henry . sapere & silere . london , printed , mdcxlii . the contents . of government . of policy . of monarchy . of aristocraty , or senatory state . of free state , or popular state . of tyranny . of olygarchy , or the government of a few . of a common-wealth . of causes of states , and common-wealths in generall . of founding a state . of causes preserving a state or common-wealth . of mysteries or sophismes . of axioms or rules of preserving a state . rules for preserving of a kingdome . hereditary . conquered . kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . kingdomes new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by 10. rules . rules politique of tyrants . sophismes of a barbarous and professed tyranny . sophismes of the sophisticall , or subtill tyrant to hould up his state . of preservation of an aristocraty . of preservation of an olygarchy , by sophismes . rules . of conversion of states in generall . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : generall and particular . particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . of sedition . causes of sedition are of two sorts . of alteration without violence . a method , how to make use of the booke before , in the reading of story . old age is not ever unfit for publique government . example of the like practise in charles the fif● . of observation for the affirmative and the negative . of defence for david in marrying abishag . politicall nobility . of adoniah aspiring to the kingdome . observations . of wayes of such as aspire to the kingdome , and marke● to discerne them . of government . government is of two sorts . 1. private of himselfe . sobriety . of his family ; called oec●nomy . 2. publique of the common-wealth ; called policy . a man must first governe himselfe , ere he be fit to governe a family : and his family , ere hee bee fit to beare the governement in the common-wealth . of policy . policy is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , or form● of government wherein it is setled for the publique good . state , is the frame or set order of a common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , specially of the chiefe and soveraigne governour that commands the rest . the state or soveraignty consisteth in 5. points . 1. making or annulling of lawes . 2. creating and disposing of magistrates . 3. power over life and death . 4. making of warre , or peace . 5. highest or last appeale . where these 5. a●e , either in one or in more , there is the state . these 5. points of state rest either in ; 1. one monarchy or kingdome . 2. some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisedome , called an aristocra●y . 3. many , called a free state or a popular state . these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are iust and lawfull states . these 3. degenerate into 3. other governements . 1. monarchy . 2. aristocraty . 3. popular estate . into 1. tyrany . 2. oligarchy , or government of a few , rich or able . 3. common-wealth or government of all the common & baser sort , and therefore called a common wealth , by an vsurped nickname . these all respect there owne , and not the publique good , and therefore are called bastard governements . 1. monarchy . a monarchy , or kingdome , is the governement of a state by one head , or chiefe , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchies or kingdomes are of 3. sorts touching the right or possession of them ; viz. 1. hereditary , by discent , as the english , french , &c. 2. elective , by suffrage of the other orders , or some of them , as the p●l●nian . 3. mixt , or of both kinds ; viz , by discent yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient jewish state . monarchies are of 2. sorts touching their power or ●uthority : viz. 1. intier . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both in peace and warre , doth by law and custome appertaine to the prince , as in the english kingdome , where the prince hath power to make lawes , league and warre , to create magistrates ; to pardon life : of appeale , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a sufferage in making lawes ; yet ever subject to the princes pleasure , nor negative will . 2. limited , or restrained that hath no full power in all the points or matters of state , as the military king that hath not the soveraignty in time of peace , as the making of lawes &c. but in warre onely as the poloni●● kings . 2. aristocraty or senatory state . an aristocraty is the government of a common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisedome and other vertues for the publique good . aristocraties are of 3. sorts , viz , where the senators are chosen , for 1. vertue , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . 2. vertue and the publique good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman when some of the senatours , were fetched from the plough , and some from the schooles . 3. vertue and wealth , more respecting their private , then the publique good which inclineth towards an oligarchy , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . 3. free state or popular state . the popular state is the government of a state by the choiser sort of people , tending to the publique good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort . in every iust state , some part of the government is , or ought to bee imparted to the people ; as in a kingdome , a voice or sufferage in making lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of armes ( if the charge bee great , and the prince forced to borrow helpe of his subjects ) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a parliament , that the taxe may seeme to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in judiciall matters may in part bee referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs bee many enemies to the present state . for which cause , tyrants ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other meanes , whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in rusheland , turkey , &c. 4. tyranny . a tyranny is the swarving , or distorting of a monarchy , or the government of one tending not to the publique good , but the private benefit of himselfe , and his followers . as in the russe and turkish government , where the state and wealth of other orders are employed onely to the uphoulding of the greatnesse of the king , or emperour . this is the worst of all the bastard states , because it is the perverting of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchy , which resembleth the soveraigne government of god himselfe . 5. obligarchy , or the government of a few . an oligarchy is the swarving , or the corruption of an aristocraty ; or the government of some few that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without any respect of the publique good . the chiefe end of these governours is their owne greatnesse and enriching . and therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their estates . this state is not wholly so bad , as is the tyra●nny , and yet worse then the common-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . 6. common-wealth . a common-wealth is the swarving or depravation of a free or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the oligarchy and common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings and dissentions betweene them . for that the richer or nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely , to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common people suppose , there ought to bee an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equall with the rich or noble , touching their liberty , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching government and fitnes thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich● noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , vertuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to governe a state . these severall states are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complections of the body . so in the roman state , the people had their plaebiscita , and gave the sufferage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chiefe rule . so in the venetian state , the duke seemeth to represent a monarch , and , the senate to bee his councell : yet the duke hath no power in state matters , but is like a head set on by art that beareth no braine . and so that state is senatoricall or , aristocraticall . causes of states and common-wealths in generall . causes of states or of common-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. founding or setling a state where to bee considered . 2. preserving a state . 3. changing and alltering a state . 1. measure . 2. parts and their qualities . founding a state . in founding a state are to bee considered 2. things . 1. proportion . 2. parts . proportion is a just measure or mediocrity of the state , whereby it is framed and kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind ; to wit , so that a monarch bee not to monarchicall , nor strict , or absolute , as the russe kings ; nor aristocraticall , that is over-mated ; or ecclipsed by the nobility , as the scottish kingdome ; but ever respective to the other degrees . that an aristocraty bee not to magnificent nor intier to it selfe , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government as the venetian , and sometimes the roman allowed the people to elect certaine magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plaebiscita &c. so a free state or common-wealth that it bee not over popular , viz. that it depresse not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and misteries of that state . that they seeke no alteration of the present state . the reason , because the moderate states in their severall kindes ( as all other things that observe the meane ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give lesse cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and liberty which they see in others , that governe the state ; and so are lesse subject to stirres , and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that beare place or sway in the publique government . parts or partakers of publique government , are 1. counsell or senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to warre and peace , magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to bee a more speciall care that they bee men expect in matter of policy , because it is their trade and vocation , as men use to choose pilots and masters of shippes such as know the art of navigation , and not husbandmen &c. and so the contrary . 2. magistrates and officers which are to bee executioners of that which is consulted and found to bee expedient for the common-wealth , wherein are to bee observed the kinds of magistrates , that they bee such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be choosen . 3. iudges ; to determine in civill and criminall matters , where are to bee observed , out of whom they are to bee chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of judgement and judiciall proceeding . i● magistrates are to be observed , 1. kindes of magistrates , as 1. civill . 2. ecclesiasticall . 1. superiour , which are to bee such and of that kind as agree with the state ; as consuls for a yeare , and not perpetuall dictatours in a senatory state . preators and censors that oversee manners and orders of the people . for a kingdome lieutenants of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatours of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth , that take care of their education for civill and warlike exercise . clarkes of the market that provide for the quantity and prize of victuall . ediles for buildings , streets , bounds . quaestours or treasurours to keepe and despence the publique treasury . actuaries or recorders , which keepe the publique records . gaolers , to keepe prisons , and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. as bishops , or pastours , elders , wardens . 2. time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetuall , some for a time , viz. , for more yeares ; a yeare , halfe a yeare , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetuall ; or at least not hereditary in a kingdome . yearely in an aristocracy , or halfe yearely in a free state . 3. manner of choise , by whom and how to bee chosen , where especially they are to bee chosen by sufferage , and not by lot . causes preserving a state or common-wealth . in preserving of states , two things required . 1. misteries or sophis●es . 1. generall to all states . 2. particular for every severall state . 2. rules or actioms . 1. generall for all states . 2. particular for every state . mysteries or sophismes . mysteries or sophismes of state , are certain● secret practizes , either for the avoiding of danger ; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of 2. sorts . 1. generall : that pertaine to all states ; as first , to provide by all meanes , that the same degree or part of the common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality . in quantity as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more then the state or common-wealth can-beare . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more then that is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights beare downe the skale ; so in common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in qu●lity and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations and conversions of state . secondly , to provide by all meanes , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames ( viz. ) of nobility and gentry , and the base , rascall and beggerly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firme , when both the extreames are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together , it is not to bee feared . to these two points , the particular rules or sophismes of every common-wealth are to bee applied . 2. particular : that serve for preservation of every common-wealth in that forme of state , wherein it is setled as in a kingdome . that the nobility may bee accustomed to beare the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the princes court under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to bee attendant upon the prince , as of speciall favour towards them and theirs , that so they may bee trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and bee as hostages for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially if they bee of any suspected note . to that end , serves the persian practize in having a band or traine of the satrapaes children ; and other nobles to attend the court which was well imited by our traine of henchm●n , if they were of the nobler sort . againe , sometimes to borrow smale summes of his subjects , and to pay them againe , that hee may after borrow greater summes and never pay : so in an oligarchy , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophismes ( viz. ) they compell their owne sort , to wit , the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercise , making an execution of lawes , &c. by that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer ; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent , and to neglect those assemblies under pretence , that they will no● draw them from their businesse and private earnings : yet withall to cite thither some few of them ( viz. ) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people , or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of fines , if they should mi●doc . to the end to make them unwilling to come againe , or to have to doe with those consultations ; by which meanes the richer sort doe still governe the state with the people● liking and good contentment . axioms . axioms or rules of preserving the state , are 1. generall , that serve for all common-wealths . 2. particular , that serve for every severall state . generall rules . 1. the first and principall rule of policy to bee observed in all states is to professe , and practize , and maintaine the true worship and religion of almighty god , prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chiefe end of all government . the axiom , that god bee obeyed simply without exception , though hee command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to humane policy , as in the iewes common-wealth , that all the men should repaire yearely to one place to worship god foure times , leaving none to defend their coast ; though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh yeare , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or feare of famine , &c. 2. to avoid the causes of conversions , whereby states are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions ; for that common-wealths ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , and are so cured by contrary medicines . 3. to take heed , that no magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the lawes and policy of that state . as that in a senate , there bee not created a perpetuall dictator , as caesar in rome . in a kingdome , that there bee no senate or convention of equall power with the prince , in state matters ; as in poland . 4. to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practize , as to advance popular persons in a kingdome , or aristocraty . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discerne what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present state . 5. to that end to have certaine officers to pry abroad , and to observe such as doe not live and behave ●hemselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present state ; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of government . 6. to take heed that magistracies bee not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which is specially to bee observed in that common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort : for if the magistrate gaine nothing but his common fees , the common sort and such as want honour take in good part , that they bee not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private businesse . but if the magistrate ●uy and sell matters , the common people are do●bly grieved , both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gaine which they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the germaine olygarchies continue ●o firme , for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that meanes freed , and secured from being under the poore . 7. to take heed that the state as it is setled and maintained bee not over strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdome be not too monarchicall ; nor a popular state bee too popular : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popularly with the common people , which is the cause that some common-wealths , though they bee very simply and unskilfully set ; yet continue firme , because the magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour ; and therefore , some kind of moderate popularity , is to bee used in every common-wealth . 8. to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of lawes , as of other rules which concerne the continuance of every severall state . for the disease and alteration of a common-wealth doth not happen all at once but growes by degrees , which every common wit cannot discerne , but men expert in policy . 9. to provide , that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the state , as now it stands . this is to bee observed as a very oracle in all common-wealths . 10. to observe a meane in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed ; or decay overmuch . as first for pre●erments , to provide that they bee rather small and short , then great and long ; and if any bee growne to overmuch greatnesse , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where the sophismes are to bee practized ( viz. ) to doe it by parts and degrees ; to doe it by occasion or colour of law , and not all at once . and if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose vertue and faithfulnesse , wee are fully assured , to as high a degree , or to greater honour : and to bee the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that tho●e of the middle sort ( as before was said ) bee more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the sophismes of a popular state ; ( viz. ) to send him on embās●ages , and forram● negotiations , or employ him in some office that hath great charges and litle honour , &c. to which end the edelishi● served in some common-wealths . 11. to suppresse the factions and quarrels of the nobles , and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions . 12. to encrease or remit the common taxes and contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the people and common-wealth . if the people bee increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may bee increased . if they bee poore , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffique , &c. to forbeare taxes and impositions , or to take litle . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophismes that serve for impositions are these , and other of like sort , to pretend businesse of great charge , as warre , building of ships , making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may bee bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealing needs no pretences . 13. to provide that the discipline and training of youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdome , the sonnes of noble-men to bee attendant at the court , that they may bee accustomed to obedience towards the prince : in the senatory state , that the sonnes of the senatours bee not idly , no● over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and martiall exercise ; that they may bee able to beare that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and contrary wise in a popular state . 14. to take heed , least their sophismes , or secret practizes for the continuance and maintenance of that state bee not discovered , least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used and with great secreflie . particuler rules . rules and axiomes for preserving of a kingdome ; hereditary . conquered . kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering . 1. himselfe ; ( viz. ) by the tempering and moderation of the princes power , and prerogative . for the lesse and more temperate , their power and state is ; the more firme , and stable is their kingdome and government , because they seeme to be further off from a master-like and tyrannicall empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree ; to wit , the nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy . 2. nobility ; ( viz. ) by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed not in number more then the realme or state can beare , as the scottish kingdome , and sometime the english , when the realme was overcharged with the numbers of dukes , earles , and other nobles ; whereby the authority of the prince was ecclipsed , and the realme troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excell in honour , power or wealth , as that hee resemble another king within the kingdome ; as the house of lancaster within this realme . to that end not to load any with too much honour or preferrement , because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to beare their greatnesse and high fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinite examples in all states . the sophismes for preventing or reforming this inconvenience , are to bee used with great caution and wisedome . if any great person bee to bee abated , not to deale with him by calumniation , or forged matter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if hee bee gratious among the people after the machivilian policy , which besides the injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . nor to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , if hee bee gratious for his vertue and publique service . nor to banish him into forraine countries , where hee may have oportunity of practizing with forraine states , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the examples of coriolanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophismes : ( viz. ) to abate their greatnesse by degrees , as david , ioabs , iustinian , bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great or greater honour , to shadow or over-mate the greatnesse of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends and followers , by preferrements , rewards , and other good and lawfull meanes ; especially , to bee provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the common-wealth , whereby they may have more oportunity , to sway the state . 3. people : ( viz. ) so to order and behave himselfe , that hee bee loved and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly feare home-conspiracies , or forraine invasion , if hee bee firmely loved of his owne people . the reason , for that the rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise ; no● any refuge being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended hath cause to feare every moving , both at home and abroad . this may bee effected by the prince , if hee use meanes and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt : ( viz. ) if hee s●●me as a ●utor , or a father to love the people and to protect them , if hee maintaine the peace of his kingdome ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people then is peace . 4. if hee shew himselfe oftentimes gratiously , yet with state , and majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like . 5. if hee sit himselfe sometimes in open courts and place of justice , that hee may seeme to have a 〈◊〉 of justice among his people . if hee bestow many benefits and graces upon that city which hee maketh the seat of his empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to bee in the middle of his kingdome , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the sunne in the middle of heaven , both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . if hee goe in progresse many times to see his provinces , especially those that are remote . 6. if hee gratifie his courtiers and attendants in that sort , and by such meanes as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with monopolies , and such like . 7. if hee commit the handling of such thing● as procure envy , or seeme grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe , as the french kings , who for that purpose● as may seeme , have erected their court at paris , which 〈◊〉 the prince from grudge and envy , both with the nobles and the people . 8. if hee borrowes sometimes summes of money of his people , though hee have no need , and pay the same 〈◊〉 without defalcation of any part by his exchequer or other officers . 9. if hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person , which may bee done , if hee shew himselfe not too light , inconstant , hard , cruell , e●●eminate , fearefull , and dastardly , &c. but contrariwise , religious grave , just , valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machivilian policy ; with feare , the better meanes , to keepe the people in obedience , then love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . 9. if the prince bee well furnished with warlike provision , which is to bee rumored and made knowne abroad : if it bee knowne , that hee is revereneed and obeyed by his people at home . 10. if hee provide so much as lieth in him , that his neighbour kingdomes grow not overmuch in power and dominion ; which if it happen , hee is to joyne speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abare that greatnesse , and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it . an overfight of the christian princes towards the king of spaine . 11. if hee get him intelligencers by reward , or other meanes , to detect or hinder the de●ignes of that prince , with whom hee hath differences , if any thing bee intent●ed against his state . or at least have some of his owne lydging abroad about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other pretence ; which must bee men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turne . 12. to observe the lawes of his conntrey and not to encounter them with his prerogative , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . 13. to provide especially that that part which favoureth the state as it standeth● bee more potent , then the other that favoureth it not , or desireth a change . 14. to make specially choyce of good and sound men to beare the place of magistrates , especiall of such as assist the prince in his councels , and policies , and not to leane overmuch to his owne advise , contrary to the rule of machivill , who teacheth that a prince can have no good councell except it bee in himselfe ; his reason , because if hee use the councell of some one ; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and supplanted by him : and if hee councell with more , then hee shall bee distracted with the differences in opinion . as if a prince of great , or meane wisedome could not take the judgement of all his counsellours in any point of policy , or of so many as himselfe thinketh good , and to take it either by word or in wr●ting ; and himselfe then in private peruse them all , and so after good 〈◊〉 mature deliberation make choice of the best , without any destraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one . for the proverbe is true , that two eyes see more then one ; and therefore , the advises and consultations of a senatory state is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the shot , by which meanes they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite . 15. the prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisedome and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of solomen ; which may seeme the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publique iustice , after the manner of the ancient kings that sate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some speciall causes may bee selected , which may throughly bee debated and considered upon by the prince in private , with the helpe and advise of his learned counsell , and so bee decided publiquely , as before is said , by the prince himselfe ; at least the prince is to take accompt of every minister of publique iustice , that it may bee knowne , that hee hath a care of iustice , and doing right to his people , which makes the iusticers also to bee more carefull in performing of their d●ties . 16. to bee moderate in his taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , to doe it by parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparant unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them . finally , ●o to use it , that it may seeme rather an offer from his subjects , then an exaction by him . 17. to stop small beginnings , unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the nobles , with caution that such as are free , bee not drawne into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whole common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons warres , and the late warres of france , which grew from a quarrell betwixt the guision faction and the other nobility . 18. to stirre up the people , if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or feare of danger at-home , to make them more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldome to bee used least it bee supposed a false alarme , when there is need indeed . 19. to have speciall care , that his children , especially the heire apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king ( viz. ) in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in marshall exercise , contrary to the practize of many princes , who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason o● their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state . 2. kingdomes new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these meanes . 1. first , if they have beene subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions as have his owne countrey , it is an easie matter to retaine such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey bee wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condition , doe easily shole and combine themselves together , so much the rather if the people of that countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their owne liberty , wherein specially is to bee observed , that the lawes and customes of that purchased countrey bee not altered nor innovated , or at least it bee done by litle and litle . so the burgundians and acquitaines were annexed to france . the rea●on● because partly they have bin accustomed to serve ; and partly , for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their prince , if the blo●d royall bee once extinguished . as for the invasion of a forraine countrey , whereunto the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living ; it is not the part of a ju●t civill prince , much lesse a prince christian to enforce such a countrey ; and therefore , the machivilian practizes in this case to make sure worke by extinguishing wholly the bloud royall i● le●d , and impertinent : the like is to bee said , of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession . a thing not onely against christian religion : but inhumane iustice , cruell , and barbarous . 2. the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives bee transplanted into some other place , and our colonies consisting of so many as shall bee thought meet be planted there in some part of the province , castles , forts , and havens , seised upon , and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch which transplanted 10. tribes of the iewes : and of the romans in france , germany , britany , and other places . the reason : 1. for that otherwise forces of horse and foote , are to bee maintained within the province which cannot bee done without great charge . 2. for that the whole province is troubled and grieved , with removing and supplying the army with victuals , carriages , &c. 3. for that collonies are more sure and faithfull then the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former seates , they have no meanes to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may bee so served , if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to bee quiet . the turkes practize in asia , where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the souldiours , whom they call timariotae . that the prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase , especially for a time , till things bee well setled ; especially if the province bee great and large , as the turke in greece . the reasons : 1. because the presence of the prince availeth much to keepe things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects . 2. they conceive that they have ref●ge by the princes presence , if they bee oppressed by the lieutenants and inferiour governours : where it will bee convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . 3. because being present hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , hee cannot doe , or not doe in time . 3. if the prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , on new purchases bee committed to such as bee sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes favour ; and not to natives , or other of their owne subjects , that are gratious there for their nobility , or vertue ; especially if the province bee great , and somewhat farre distant , which may soone seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects . as for such governours as depend wholly upon the princes favour being not bor●● , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their du●y ; and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers to keepe them in subjection , and not for any good will . 4. to have the children of the chiefe noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping ; the more the better : for that no bound is stronger , then that of nature to containe the parents and allies in obedience , and they the rest . 5. to alter the lawes , but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present government . 6. to keepe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may bee , that they may seeme , by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather then a tyrant ; for the common-people if they enjoy peace , and bee not distracted , nor drawne from their businesse , nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience● yet notwithstanding , they are to bee dis-used from the practise of armes , and other exercises which encrease conrage , and bee weakened of armour , that they have neither spirit nor will to rebell . 7. if there bee any faction in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better , and stronger part , and to combine with it , as caesar in france . 8. to looke well to the borders and confining provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equall power to himselfe , to joyne league with some other borderers , though of lesse strength to hinder the attempts ( if any should bee ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth often , that a countrey insested by one neighbour prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the romans were called into greece by the aet●lians ; the saxons by the britaines , the danes by the saxons . 9. to leave their titles and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority wholly to his owne . 10. not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the sophisimes of policy , especially those that appertaine to a tyrannicall state , which are soone detected by men of judgement , and so bring discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very evill effects . the sophisimes of tyrants , are rather to bee knowne , then practized , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannicall states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politique of tyrants . rvles practised by tyrants are of 2. sorts : viz. 1. barbarous and professed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves without others helpes , as in the turkish and russe government . 2. sophisticall and dissembled ; as in some s●tes , that are reputed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet setled nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and helpe of others , and so are forced to bee politique sophisters . 1. sophisimes of a barbarous and professed tyranny . 1. to expell and banish out of his countrey all honest meanes , whereby his people may attaine to learning , wisedome , valour , and other vertues , that they might bee fit for that estate and servile condition . for that in these two , learning , and martiall exer●ise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : ( viz. ) wisedome and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile state . to this end to forbid learning of liberall arts , and martiall exercise ; as in the russe governement , so iulian the apostata dealt with the christians . contrarywise , to use his people to base occupations , and mechanicall arts , to keepe them from idlenesse , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may bee sotted , and so made unfit for great enterprizes . so the aegyptian kings dealt with the hebrewes ; so the russe emperour with his russe people● and charles the fifth with the netherlanders , when hee purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . 2. to make sure to him and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other meanes , especially his guard , or praetorian band ; that being partakers of the spoile and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firme to it ; as the turke his ianizaries , the russe his boyarent , &c. 3. to unarme his people of weapons , money , and all meanes , whereby they may resist his power ; and to end , to have his set & ordinary exactions , viz. once in two , three , or foure yeares ; and sometimes yearely , as the turke , and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must bee used as his flock of sheep : viz. their fleece taken from them , least it overlade them , and grow too heavy ; that they are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven , the thicker it would grow . and if there bee any of extraordinary-wealth to borrow of them in the meane while , till the taxe come about , or upon some devised matter to con●iscate their goods , as the common practise is of the russe and turke . 4. to bee still in warres , to the end , his people may need a captaine ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearely against the tartar , polonian , and sweden , &c. 5. to cut off such as excell the rest in wealth , favour , or nobility , or bee of a pregnant , or spiring wit , and so are fearefull to a tyrant , and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turke his bashaes , and the russe his r●ezzes . 6. to forbid guilds , brotherhoods , feastings , and other assemblies among the people , that they have no meanes or oportunity to conspire or conferre together of publique ma●ters , or to maintaine love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practise . 7. to have their beagl●s , or listners in every corner , and parts of the realme , especially in places that are more suspect , to learne what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , and take away such as mislike their state . 8. to make schisme and division among his subjects , ( viz. ) to set one noble man against another , and one rich man against another , that through faction and disagreement among themselves , they may bee weakened , and attempt nothing against him ; and by this meanes entertaining whisperings and complaints , hee may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the zemsky and the oppress●ie . 9. to have strangers for his guard , and to entertaine parasites , and other base and servile fellowes , not too wise , but yet subtill , that will bee ready for reward to doe and execute what hee commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men cannot flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises and such like , may bee contracted into one or two , ( viz. ) to bereave his subjects of will and power to doe him hurt , or to alter the present state . the use is caution , not imitation . 2. sophismes of the sophisticall , or subtill tyrant to h●ld up his state . 1. to make a shew of a good king by observing a temper and mediocrity in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end it is necessary , that this subtill tyrant bee a cunning polititian , or a machivilian at the least , and that hee bee taken so to bee , for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded , and is thought thereby not not unworthy for to governe others . 2. to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , habite , and other demeanour . 3. to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end to seeme loath to exact tributes and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is , to that end to procure such warre as can bring no danger towards his state , and that might easily bee compounded , or some other chargeable businesse ; and to continue it on , that hee may continue his exaction and contribution so long as hee list . and thereof to employ some part in his publique service , the rest to hoord up in his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes ; as edward the fourth in his warres against . france , when having levied a great summe of money throughout his realme , especially of the londoners , hee went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . 4. sometimes to give an accompt by open speech and publique writing of the expense of such taxes and impositions as hee hath received of his subjects , that hee may so seeme to bee a good husband , and frugall , and not a robber of the common-wealth . 5. to that end , to bestow some cost upon publique buildings ; or some other worke for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chiefe cities of his realme , that so hee may seeme a benefactour , and to have a delight in the adorning of his countrey , or doing some good for it . 6. to forbid feastings and other meetings , which increase love , and give oportunity to conferre together of publique matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses . to that end , the curfieu bell was first ordained by william the conquerour to give men warning to repaire home at a certaine houre . 7. to take heed , that no one grow to bee over great , but rather many-equall great , that they may envy and contend one with another ; and if hee resolve to weaken any of this sort , to doe it warily and by degrees , if quite to wrack him and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull triall after the manner of his countrey ; and if hee proceed so farre with any of great power and estimation as to doe him contumely or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto honour , which great spirits doe most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , then to any thankfulnesse , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismission ; true in athiests , but not in true christian nobility . 8. to unarme his people , and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth , and then to arme with them , such and so many as hee shall thinke meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . 9. to make scisme or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine not together , and that himselfe by hearing the griefes and complaints may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter against them both , when it listeth him to call them to an accompt . 10. to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially about womens matters , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath beene the ●●●e of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of tarquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices duke of florence , aloisus of placentia , rode●icus king of spaine , &c. 11. to that end to bee moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely that hee bee not seene ; for that men sober or watchfull , or such as seeme so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies● of their owne . 12. to reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprize , or doe any speciall action for the common-wealth in that manner as it may seeme , they could not bee better regarded , in case they lived in a free state . 13. all rewards and things gratefull to come from himselfe but all punishments , exaction● and 〈…〉 gs ; ungratefull to come from his officers and publique ministers ; and when hee hath effected what hee would by them , if hee see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . 14. to pretend great cure of religion and of serving of god , ( which hath beene the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people doe lesse feare any hurt from those , whom they thinke vertuous and religious , nor attempt lightely to doe them hurt , for that they thinke that god protects them . 15. to have a strong and sure guard of forraine souldiours , and to bind them by good turnes , that they having at least , profit , may depend upon him , and the present state ; as caligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practifed by lawfuls kings , as by the french king . 16. to procure that other great persons bee in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause● they bee forced to desend the tyrant , for their owne safety . 17. to take part , and to joyne himselfe with the stronger part ; if the common people , and meane degree bee the stronger to joyne with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyne with them . for so that part with his owne strength will bee ever able to over match the other . 18. so to frame his manners and whole behaviour , as that hee may seeme , if not perfectly good , yet tollerably evill , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hipocriticall tyrants are to be known , that they may bee avoided and meet withall , and no drawne into imitation . preservation of an aristocraty . rvles to preserve a se●atory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that 〈◊〉 a kingdome . preservation of an olygarchy ; by sophisimes . rules . 1. in consultations and assemblies abo●● publique affaires so to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies and councels : but to impose a fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty . on the other side to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to beare with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , and not bee hindred in their trades and earnings . 2. in election of magistrates and officers : to suffer the po●●er sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them ; or to enjoyne some great charge as incident to the office , which the poore cannot beare . but to impose some great fine upon those that bee rich , if they refuse to beare office , being elect unto it . 3. in judiciall matters : in like manner to order that the people may be absent from publique trials , under pretence of following their , businesse . but the richer to bee present , and to compell them by fines to frequent the court . 4. in warlike exercise and armes , that the poore bee not forced to have armour , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to bee drawne from their trades by ma●tiall exercises ; but to compell the richer sort to ke●pe their proportion of armour , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in warlike matters , &c. 5. to have speciall care of instructing their children in liberall arts , policy , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequency and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer is preserved by discipline and good order of governours . 6. to provide good store of warlike furniture , especially of horse , and horsemen ; and of armed men , viz. ●●ke , &c. which are proper to the gentry ; as shot and light furniture are for a popular company . 6. to put in practise some points of a popular state , viz. to lade no one man with too much preferrement ; to make yearely or halfe yeares magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this meanes from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatnesse , to abate him by the sophis●●● fit for this state . 7. to commit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to beare the greatest charges for publique matters , which both tendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they ●●ape some releife and benefit by it . 8. to the same end to contract marriages among themselves , the rich with the rich , &c. 9. in some things which concerne not the points and matters of state as electing magistrates making lawes , &c. to give an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common-people , and not to doe , as in some olygarchies they were wont , viz. to sweare against the people , to su●presse and bridle them ; but rather contrary , to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall doe no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of servere punishment . for other axioms that preserve this state , they are to bee borrowed , from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular and tyrannicall state ; for the strict kind of olygarchy is kinne to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophismes . rules or axioms . 1. in publique assemblies and consultations , about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publique justice , and exercise of armes , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an olygarchy . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to bee drawne to those assemblies , magistracies , offices , warlike exercises , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to bee spared , and not to be forced , by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . 2. to make shew honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to sweare against them , as the manner hath beene in some popular states ; but rather to preferre them in all other matters , that concerne not the state and publique government . 3. to elect magistrates from among the commons , by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . 4. to take heed , that no man beare office twice , except it bee military , where the pay , and salery , &c. is to bee reserved in their owne hands , to bee disposed of by a common councell , &c. and to see that do man bee to highly preferred . 5. that no magistracy bee perpetuall , but as short , as may bee , to wit , for a yeare , halfe yeare , &c. 6. to compell magistrates , when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publiquely before the commons . 7. to have publique saleries and allowance for their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearely dividence for the common-people , and such as have most need among them . 8. to make iudges of all matters , out of all sorts , so they have some aptnes to performe that duty . 9. to provide that publique iudgements and trials , bee not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilatours , as the law of requitall ; &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby , many times , the popular state is turned into an olygarchy , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civill law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad senatos consultum turpilianu● , lib. 1. di calumniatoribus . 10. in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publique assemblies bee not after : because they want salery for pleaders and oratours ; and if they bee rich ; yet to bee wa●y . that all the revenew bee not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distribution of the common revenue among the multitude is like a purse or barrell without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue bee stored up for the publique affaires . 11. if the number of the poore encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next country places , and to provide , above all , that none doe live idly , but bee set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farmes and coppiholds , such decayed citizens . 12. to bee well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to bee fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is best for the continuance thereof . and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer , or common treasury , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it bee practised , confiscations , and fines of the common people would bee frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in generall . conversion of a state , is the declining of the common-wealth , either to some other forme of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god . causes of conversions of states , are of two sorts : generall and particular . generall , ( viz. ) 1. want of religion ●viz . of the true knowledge , and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sinnes that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of saul , vzziah , the iewish 〈◊〉 ; the foure monarchies , and all other . 2. want of wisedome , and good councell , to keepe the state , the prince , nobles and people in good temper , and d●● proportion , according to their severall orders and degrees . 3. want of iustice , either in administration ( as ill lawes , o● ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should bee , or there bestowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be . 4. want of power and sufficiency 〈◊〉 maintaine and defend it selfe ; viz of provision , as armour , money , captaines , souldiours , &c. execution when the mea●es or provision is not used , or ill used . 2. particular : to bee noted and collected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealths . particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . 1. forraine : by the overgreatnesse of invasion of some forraine kingdome , or other state of meane power , having a part within our owne , which are to bee prevented by the providence of the chiefe , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state . this falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine state . 2. domestique : sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it selfe with , force of armes against the superiour power , quasi diti● secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . 1. generall . liberty .   riches . vvhen they , that are of equall quality in a common-wealth , or doe take themselves so to bee , are not regarded equally in all , or in any of these 3. or when they are so unequall in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with lesse respect , then those that bee of lesse defect in these 3. things , or in any of them . honour .   1. in the chiefe : covetuousnesse or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chiefe encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure , either with the publique or ( private calamity , whereby the governours grow to quarrell among themselves as in olygarchies ) or the other degrees conspire together , and make quarrell against the chiefe , as in kingdomes : the examples of wat tyler , iarke straw , &c. 2. in the chiefe : injury , when great spirits , and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured , or take themselves so to bee , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earle of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . 3. preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have overmuch , and so wax proud and aspire higher : or have more or lesse , they deserve as they suppose ; and so in envy , and disdaine seeke innovation by open faction , so caesar ; &c. 4. some great necessity or calamity ; so xerxes after the foile of his great army . and senacheris after the losse of 185. in one night . 2. p●rticular . 1. envy , when the chiefe exceed the medio●●ity before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar . 2. feare , viz. of danger , when one or more dispatch the prince , by secret practise or force to prevent his owne danger , as artabanus did xerxes . 3. lust or lec●ery , as tarquinius superbus , by brutus ; pisistratinde , by armodius , appius by virginius . chiefe . 4. contempt ; for vile quality and base behaviour , as sardanapalus , by arbaces ; dionisiu● the younger by dion . other degrees . 5. contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula , by chaereas . other degrees . 6. hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mithidrates , an●barsanes . alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; 1. excesse of the state ; when by degrees , the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity , wherein it was , or should have bee setled , and exceedeth in power , riches and absolutnes in his kind , by the ambition & covetousnesse of the chiefes , immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c. applying all to his owne benefit without respect of other degrees , and so in the end changeth it selfe into another state or forme of government , as a kingdome into a tyranny , an olygarchy into an aristocraty . 2. excesse , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one , or more , in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or vertue ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the soveraignty : by which meanes , popular states grow into olygarchies ; and olygarchies , and aristocraties into monarchies . for which cause , the athenians and some other free states made their lawes of ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excell , though it were in vertue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , t' is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the meanes , that none should grow to that hight and excellency , then to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the booke before , in the reading of story . david being seventy yeares of age , was of wisedome , memory , &c. sufficient to governe his kingdome ; 1. reg. chap. 1. old age is not ever unfit for publique government . david being of great yeares , and so having ● cold , dry , and impotent body , married with abishag a faire maide of the best complection through his whole realme , to revive his body and prolong his life● 1. reg. chap. 1. verse 3. example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of body by the 〈◊〉 of his nobles and phisitions , married a young maide called abishag , to warme and preserve , his old body . observation . vvhether david did well in marrying a maide ; and whether it bee lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old-worne , and decrepite woman to marry a young and lusty man . for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is society and mutuall comfort ; but there may bee society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young party . ergo 't is lawfull . answ. society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage ; but none of the principall end is of marriage , which are : 1. procreation of children , and so , the continuance of mankind . 2. the avoiding of ●ornication . as for comfort and society , they may bee betwixt man and man , women and women where no marriage is● and therefore no proper ends of marriage . the negative . arg. 1. that conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ordained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old impotent , and young party hath no respect to the right end , for which marriage , was ordained by god . therefore it is no lawfull marriage . 2. no contract , wherein the party contracting , bindeth himselfe to an impossible condition , or to doe that which hee cannot doe , is good , or lawfull . but the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition to doe , that which hee cannot doe ( viz. ) to performe the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull . for the same ca●se , the civill law determineth a nullity in these marriages , except the woman know before the infirmity of the man , in which case she can have no wrong , being a thing done with her owne knowledge and consent , because volenti ne fit injuria : — in legem iulian . de adulteriis leg. si uxor &c. it provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity , that three yeares bee expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men , that have beene infirme at the first , by reason of sicknesse , or some other accident , afterwards proved to bee sufficient : de repudiis leg. in causis . defence for david in marrying abishag . 1. it was rather a medicine then a marriage , without any evill or disordered affection . 2. it was by the perswasion of his nobles and phisitians . 3. it was for the publique good to prolong the life of a worthy prince . 4. it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmity , and to what end shee was married unto him ; who if shee did it for the common good , and for duties sake , having withall the guift of continency , shee is to bee commended ; if for ambition , or some vaine respect , it is her owne , and not davids fault . politicall nobility . adoniah aspiring to the kingdome . first , tooke the advantage of davids affection and kindnesse towards him , and made him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crowne . fourthly , got him chariots , horsemen , and footemen , and a guard to make shew of state . fiftly , being a comly and goodly person , made a popular shew of himselfe , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himselfe in faction ioab , the generall of the army , who was in displeasure for murdering of abner and amasa , and feared that david would supply benajah into his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferrement of zadoch . seventhly , had meetings with them , and other his confederates , under a pretence of a vow and offering at the fountaine of raguell , in the confines of iudaea . eightly , made a shew of religion by sacrificing ; &c. ninthly , made himselfe familiar with the nobles and people , and entertained them with feasting . tenthly , drew into his part the chiefe officers of the court , and servants to the king , by rewards , familiarity , &c. elevently , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as hee knew , would take part with him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . twelftly , had ionathan a favorite of the court , and neere about the king to give him intelligence , if any thing were discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himselfe was in hand about his practize . observations . wayes of such as aspire to the kingdome , and markes to discerne them . first , they wind into the princes favour , by service , officiousnesse , flattery , &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulnesse , thereby to make him secure of their practises . 2. they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotency , negligence , sexe , &c. and worke upon that by disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his person and government . 3. they blaze their title , and claime to the crowne , ( if they have any ) with their friends , and favourers . 4. they provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres , make much of good souldiours , and have a pretence ( if it bee espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to bee in readines against forraine enemies , &c. 5. they make open shew of their best qualities and comlines of their person ( which though it bee vaine as a dumbe shew , it is very effectuall to winne the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rule of the election of kings , in the bees common-wealth ; thinke that fo●ma est digna imperare ) activity , nobility , ancestry ; &c. 6. to have their blazers abroad to set out their vertues , and to prepare their friends in every province . 7. to draw into their part , and make sure unto them , of the chiefe peeres , & men of best quality , such as are mightiest , and most gratious with the souldiours , and the military men , and most subtill and politique , especially such as bee ambitious , and discontent with the state . 8. to have meetings f●r conference under some pretence of some ordinary ●a●●er in some convenient place , not to● neere , nor too farre of , but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . 9. to take up a shew and pretence of religion more then before , and beyond the practise of their former life . 10. they use popular curtesie ( which in a great person is very effectuall ) feasting , liberality , gaming , &c. 11. to bee over liberall , and winne to them by guifts , familiarity , &c. the chiefe officers of the court , and governours of shires . 12. to have some neere about the prince , to keepe them in credite , and remove suspition , if any rise . 13. to disgrace such as they know to bee sure and faithfull to the prince , and present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all meanes they can , and to conceal● the designes from them , least they bee discovered before they bee ripe . 14. to have some spie neere about the prince , to advertise them if any inckling of suspition arise whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolon : 2. sam. chap. 16. and of cyrus minor , in xenophon : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} cap. 1. politicall prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisedome , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet growne into age , grew withall into contempt , ●nd had many , both of his nobles and common-people , that fell from him ; first with absolon , then with adoniah , who affected the kingdome and rebelled against him : for remedy whereof , hee stirred up himselfe to publique actions which might shew his vigour and sufficiency to mannage the affaires of his kingdome . 1. after the victory against absolon , hee forced himselfe to forbeare mourning , and shewed himselfe to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his sonne . 2. after the victory , hee caused a generall convention to bee assembled of the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to ierusalem , which was a renewing and re-establishing of him ; 2. sam. 19. 12. 3. hee gave an experiment of his power and authority , by deposing a person of great authority and estimation , to wit , ioab , generall captaine of the army , and advancing amasa to his place . 4. hee sent kind messengers to ierusalem , and to other chiefe and head townes , and speciall men of iude● , his contributes , putting them of their alliance with him , with these words , that they were of his owne flesh and bloud , with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them , to provoke them with like kindnesse and affection towards him . 5. hee assembled a parliament of his whole realme , and tooke occasion upon the designing of his successour , to commend unto them the succession of his house , and the continuance and maintenance of gods true worship and religion , then established , and gave a grave and publique charge to his successour , now designed , touching the manner of his government , and maintaining o● religion , 1. chron. 12. 13. 6. hee shewed his bounty and magnificence in congesting matter for the building of the temple , as gold , silver , brasse , &c. and caused it to bee published and made known to the parliament and whole nation , 1. chron. 22. 13. 7. hee revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to every church officers his place and function . 8. hee suppressed the faction of adoniah , and ordained solomon his successour ; 1. reg. 1. 22. by these meanes . hee retained his majesty and authority in his old age , as appeareth by th'effect ; for that being bedred , hee suppressed the faction of adoniah , ( which was growne mighty , and was set on foote ) with his bare commandement , and signification of his pleasure , and so hee died in peace . finis . maxims of state written by sir walter raleigh ; whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne, and the son's advice to his aged father. prince raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a57483 of text r9131 in the english short title catalog (wing r174). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 92 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 44 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a57483 wing r174 estc r9131 12383728 ocm 12383728 60797 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57483) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 60797) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 224:25) maxims of state written by sir walter raleigh ; whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne, and the son's advice to his aged father. prince raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. [9], 78 p. : port. printed by w. bentley, and are to be sold by w. shears ..., london : 1650. first published in 1642 as: the prince, or, maxims of state. reproduction of original in british library. imperfect: filmed copy lacks all after "maxims". eng political science -early works to 1800. political science -quotations, maxims, etc. a57483 r9131 (wing r174). civilwar no maxims of state. written by sir walter raleigh. whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne; and the son's advice to his aged father. raleigh, walter, sir 1650 15784 333 5 0 0 0 0 214 f the rate of 214 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2002-01 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-02 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-03 tcp staff (oxford) sampled and proofread 2002-03 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion sr. walter ralegh kt. maxims of state . written by sir walter raleigh . whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne ; and the son's advice to his aged father . london , printed by w. bentley , and are to be sold by w. shears , at the sign of the bible , over against the north door of pauls . 1650. the contents . page . of government . 1 of policie . 2 of monarchie . 3 of aristocracie , or senatory state . 5 of free state , or popular state . 6 of ●yranny . 7 of olygarchie , or the government of a few . ibid. of a common-wealth . 8 of causes of states , and common-wealths in general . 10 of founding a state . ibid. of causes preserving a state or common-wealth . 15 of mysteries or sophisms . ibid. of axioms or rules of preserving a state . 19 rules for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . 25 rules for preserving of a kingdom . conquered . 25 kingdoms hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . ibid. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by 10. rules . 35 rules politick of tyrants . 41 sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . 42 sophisms of the sophistical , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state . 46 of preservation of an aristocracie . 52 of preservation of an olygarchie , by sophisms . ibid of preservation of an olygarchie , by rules . ibid of conversion of states in general . 59 causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . ibid. particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . 60 of sedition . 61 causes of sedition are of two sorts . ibid. of alteration without violence . 64 a method , how to make use of the book before● in the reading of the storie . 67 old age is not ever unfit for publick government . ibid. example of the like practice in charls the fifth . 68 of observation for the affirmative and the negative . ibid. of defence for david in marrying abishag . 70 political nobility . of adoniah aspiring to the kingdom . 71 observations . of ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . 73 political prince . 75 the table of the chapters contained in sir walter raleigh's instructions to his son . chap. page . virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends . 1 i. great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . 4 ii. wisest men have been abused by flatterers . 10 ●v . private quarrels to be avoided . 11 ● . three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . 17 vi . what sort of servant● are most fit to be entertained . 20 vii . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . 2● viii . riches not to be sough● by evil means . ibid● ix . what inconvenience happen to such as deligh● in wine . 2● x. let god be thy protectour and directour in all the actions . 2● maxims of state . of government . government is of two sorts . 1. private , of himself . sobrietie . of his family ; called o●●onomie . 2. publick , of the common-wealth ; called poli●ie . a man must first govern himself , e're he be fit to govern a family : and his family , e're he be fit to bear the government in the common-wealth . of policie . policie is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , or form of government wherein it is setled for the publick good . state , is the frame or set order of a common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , specially of the chief and sovereign governour that commandeth the rest . the state or sovereignty consisteth in 5. points . 1. making or anulling of laws . 2. creating and disposing of magistrates . 3. power over life and death . 4. making of war , or peace . 5. highest o● last appeal . where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the state . these five points of state , rest either in , 1. one monarchie or kingdom . 2. some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an aristocracie . 3. many , called a fr●e-state , or popular state . these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and lawful states . these 3. degenerate into 3. other governments . viz. 1. monarchie , 2. aristo●racie , 3. popular est●t , into 1. tyrannie . 2. oligarchie . 3. common-wealth o● government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a common-wealth by an usurped nick-name . these all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are ●ailed bastard governments . i. monarchie . a monarchie , or kingdom , is the government of a state by one head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchie , or kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right , or possession of them ; viz. 1. hereditarie , by de●cent , as the english , french , &c. 2. elective , by suffrage of the other orders , or some of them , as the polonian . 3. mixt , or of both kinds ; viz. by descent , yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient iewish state . monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority ; viz. 1. intire . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both in peace and war , doth by law and custom appertain to the prince , as in the english kingdom , where the prince hath power to make laws , league , and w●r ; to create magistrates ; to pardon life : of appeal , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a suffrage in making laws , yet ever subject to the princes pleasure , nor negative will . 2. limit●d or restrained , that hath no full power in all the points o● matters of state , as the military king that hath not the sovereignty in time of peace , as the making of laws , &c. but in war onely , as the polonian kings . ii. aristocracie , or senatorie state . an aristocracie is the government of a common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good . aristocracies are of three sorts , viz. where the senatours are chosen , for 1. virtue , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . 2. virtue and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman , when some of the senatours were fetched from the plough , and some from the schools . 3. virtue and wealth , more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an oligarchie , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . iii. free-state , or popular sta●e . the popular state is the government of a state by the choiser sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort . in every iust state , some part of the government is , or ought to be imparted to the people ; as in a kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of arms ( if the charge be great , and the prince forced to borrow help of his subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in judicial matters , may in part be referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many enemies to the present state . for which cause , tyrants , ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in a●shland , ●urk●y , &c. iv. tyranny . a tyranny is the swerving , or distort●g of a monarc●ie , or the governm●●● of one , tending not to the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , and his followers . as in the russe and turkish government , where the state and wealth of other o●●ers , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the king or emperour . this is the worst of all the basta●d states , because it is the perverting of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchie , which resembleth the sovereign government of god himself . v. oligarchie , or the government of a few . an oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an aristocracie ; or the gov●●nment of some few , that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without a●y respect of the publick good . the chief end of these gover●●●●s , is , their own greatness and enriching . and therefore their manner is , to prepare fi● mean● to uphold their esta●es . this st●te is not wholly so bad , as is the tyrannie , and yet worse than the commo●-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . vi . common-wealth . a common-wealth is the swerving or depravation of a f●ee , or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the olig●●chie , and common-wealth , are very adve●se the one to the other , and have many b●ckerings between them . for that the richer or nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some re●pects onely , to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common-people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equal● with the rich or noble , touching their lib●●tie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour , as touching government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich , noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , virtuous , valiant , &c. and so have fit parts to govern a state . these several states are sometimes mixed , and inter wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . so in the rom●n state , the people had their plehis●●ta , and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chief rule . so in the ven●tian state , the duke seemeth to represe●● a mon●rch , and the s●nate to be his counc●l : yet the duke hath no power in state matt●rs , but is like a head set on by art , that heareth no brain . and so that state is s●natorical or aristocratical . causes of states & common-wealths in general . causes of states or of commō-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. founding , or setling a state where to be considered . 1. measure . 2. parts , & their qualities . 2. preserving a state . 3. changing , and altering a state . founding a state . in founding a state are to be considered 2. things . 1. proportion . 2. parts . proportion , is a just measure or mediocritie of the state , whereby it is framed and kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a monarch b● not too monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the ●usse kings ; nor aristocratical , that is over-mated or eclipsed by the nobility , as the scottish kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . that aristocratie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government , as the v●netian , and sometimes the roman allowed the people to elect certain magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plebiscita , &c. so a free-state or common-wealth that it be not over popular , viz. that it depress not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and mysteries of that state . that they seek no alteration of the present state . the reason , because the moderate states in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and libertie which they see in others that govern the state ; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick government . parts or partakers of publick government , are 1. councel or senate , which consul●eth of all matters pertaining to war and peace , magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care , that they may be men expert in matter of policie , because it is their trade and vocation , as men use to chuse pilots , and masters of ships , such as know the art of navigation , and not husband-men , &c. and so the contrary . 2. magistrates and officers , which are to be executioners of that which is consulted , and found to be expedient for the common-vvealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of magistrates , that they be such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be chosen . 3. iudges ; to determine in civil , and criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner o●iudgement , and iudicial proceeding . in magistrates are to be observed . 1. kinds of magistrats as , 1. civil 1. superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the state , as consuls for a year , and not perpetual dictatours in a senatorie state . praetors , & censors , that oversee manners & orders of the people . for a kingdom lieutenant of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatous of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth , that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise . clarks of the market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual . ediles for buildings , streets , bounds . questours , or treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick treasury . a●●uaries , or reco●ders , which keep the publick records . ga●l●rs , to keep prisons and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. 2. ecclesiastical . 1. as bishops or pastours , elders , wardens . 2. time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not hereditary in a kingdom . yearly in an aristocracie , or half yearly in a free-state . 3. manner of choise , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by lot . causes preserving a state , or common-wealth . in preserving of states , 2. things required . 1. mysteries , or sophisms . 1. general to all states . 2. particular , for every several state . 2. rules , or actions . 1. general , for all states . 2. particular , for every state . mysteries , or sophisms . mysteries , or sophisms of state , are certain secret practises , either for the avoyding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of two sorts . 1. general : that pertain to all states ; as first , to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the common-wealth , do not exceed both in quantity and q●ality . in quantity , as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the state or common-wealth can beare . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights bear down the scale : so in common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in quality , and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of state . secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of nobility and ge●t●y , and the base rascal , and begarly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firm , when both the extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . to these two points , the particular rules or sophisms of every common-wealth , are to be applied . 2. particular : that serve ●or preservation of every common-wealth , in that form of state wherein it is setled as in a kingdom . that the nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the princes court , under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their prese●ce ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and be as hostages for the good behaviour , and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . to that end serves the pe●si●● practise , in having a band , or train of the s●trapa's children , and other nobles to attend the court ; which was well imitated by our train of h●n●●men , if they were of the nobler sort . again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his subjects , and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : so in an oligarchy , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms , ( viz. ) they compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercises , making an execution of laws , &c. by that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sor● to be absent , and to neglect those assemblies und●r pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings , : yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are easily over matched by the ●icher sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies , with the tediousness of consultations , greatness of fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those consultations ; by which means , the richer sort do still govern the state , with the peoples liking , and good contentment . axioms . axioms or rules of preserving the state are , 1. g●neral , that serve for all common-wealths . 2. particular , that serve for every several state . general rules . 1. the first and principal rule of policie to be observed in all states , is to profess , and practise , and maintain the true worship and religion of almighty god prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all government . the axio● , that god be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to humane policy ; as in the iews common-wealth , that all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship god four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c. 2. to avoid the causes of conversions , whereby states are over-thrown , that are set down in the title of conversions ; for that common-vvealths ( as natural bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , a●d are so cured by contrary medicines . 3. to take heed , that no magistrate be created or continued contrary to the laws and policy of that stat● . as that in a s●nate , there be no● created a perpetual dict●tor , as caesar in rome . in a kingdom , that there be no senate , or convention of equal power with the prince in state matters , as in poland . 4. to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practise , as to advance popular persons in a kingdom , or a●istocracie . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present stat● . 5. to that end to have certain of●icers to p●y abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in sit sort , agreeable to the present state , but de●●e rather to be under some other form , or kind of government . 6. to take heed that magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which is specially to be observed in that common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; for if the magistrate gain nothing but his common fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . but if the magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debar'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the germ●in oligarchi●s continue so firm ; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor . 7. to take heed that the state , as it is setled and maintained , be not overstuct , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdom be not too monarchical , nor a popular state too popular : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popula●ly with the common people , which is the cause that some common-wealths , though they be very simply , and unskilfully set , yet conti●●e ●●rm , because the magistrates behave thems●lves wi●ely , and with due re●pect towards the r●st that are without honour ; and therefore ●ome kind of modera●● popularity is to be used in every ●ommon-wealth . 8. to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaki●g and altering of lawes , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several state . for the disease and alteration of a common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in policie . 9. to provide , that that part be ever the grea●er in number and power , which favours the s●ate as now ●t sta●ds . this is to be observed as a ve●y oracle in all common-weal●hs . 10 to observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no pa●t to exceed , or decay over much . as first for p●efe●ments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if a●y be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where the sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . and if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtu● and faithfulness , we are fully assur●d , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followe●s of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the so●●isms of a po●ula● state , viz. to send him on embassages , and forreign negotiations , or imploy him in some office that hath g●●at charges , and little honour , &c. to which end , the edil●ship served in some common-wealths . 11. to suppress the factions , and quarrels of the nobles , and to keep other that are y●● free from joyni●g with them in their partakings and factions . 12 to increase or remit the common taxes and contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the people and common-wealt● . if the people be increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may be increased . if they be poor , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffick , &c. to forbear taxes and impositions , or to take little . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophisms that serve for imposi●itions , are these , and other of like sort , to pretend business of great charge , as war , building of ships , making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealings needs no pretences . 13 to provide that the discipline & training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdom , the sons of noble men to be attendant at the court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the prince : in the senatory state , that the sons of the senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in le●rning , tongues , and martial exercise ; that they may be able to bear that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and contrariewise , in a popular state , 14. to take heed , least their sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that state , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and with great secrecie . particular rules . rules and axioms , for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . conquered . kingdoms hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering , 1. himself , viz. by the tempering and moderation of the princes povver and prerogative . for the less and more temperate their povver and state is , the more firm , and stable is their kingdom and governm●nt ; because they seem to be further off from a master-like , and tyrannical empire ; and less unequal in condition to the next degree , to wit , the nobility , and so less subject to grudge and envy . 2. nobility ; viz. by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the realm , or state can bear , as the scottish kingdom , and sometime the english , when the realm was overcharged with the number of dukes , earls , and other nobles ; whereby the authori●y of the prince was eclipsed , and the realm troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excel in hono●r , power , or wealth , as that he resemble another king within the kingdom , as the house of lancaster within this realm , to that end , not to load any with too much hono●r or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatness , and high fortune tempera●ely , as appeareth by infinite examples in all states . the sophism for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . if any great person be to be abated , not to deal with him by calumniation , or forg●d matter , & so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the machiavilian policie , which besides the injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . nor to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the peole , and so greater love , if he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . nor to banish him into forreign countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with forr●ign states , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the example of coriolanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophisms , viz. to abate their greatness by degrees , as david ioabs , iustinian bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great , or greater honour , to shadow , or over-mate the greatness of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by prefe●ments , rewa●ds , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be pr●vided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the common-wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the state . 3. people , viz. so to order and behave himself , that he be loved , and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies , o● forreign invasion , if he be firmly loved of his own people . the reason , for that the rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , nor any refuge , being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . this may be effected by the prince , if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt ; viz. if he seem as a tutor , or a father to love the people , and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his kingdom ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people , than is peace . 4. if he shew himself oftentimes graciously , yet with state and majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like . 5. if he sit himself sometimes in open courts , and place of iustic● , that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people . if he bestow many benefits and graces upon that city , which he maketh the seat of his empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his kingdom , as the hear● in the middle of the body , or the sun in the middle of heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts● at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . i● he go in progress many times to see his provinces , especially , those that are remote . 6. if he gratifie his courtiers and att●n●ants in that ●ort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with monopolies , and such like . 7. if he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the french kings , who for th●t purpose , as may seem , have erected their court at paris , which acquitteh the prince from grudge and ●nvy , both with the nobles and the p●ople . 8. if he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalca●ion of any part by his exchequer , or other officer . 9. if he avoid all such things as may breed ●atred , or contempt of his person , which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , inconstant , hard , cruel , ●sfeminate , fearfull , and dastardly , &c. but contrarywise , religious , grave , iust valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machiavilian policie , with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . 10 if the prince be well furnished with warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home . 11. if he provide so much as lyeth in him , that his neighbour kingdoms grow not over much in power and dominion ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . an oversight of the christian princes towards the king of spain . 12. if he get him intelligencers by reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his state . or at least have some of his own lydging abroad , about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other p●etence ; which must be men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turn . 13. to observe the laws of his countrey , and not to encounter them with his pr●rogative , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them ●●●ir commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . 14. to provide especially , that that part , which favoureth the state as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not , or desireth a change . 15. to make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of magistrates , especially , of such as assist the prince in his counsels , and policies , and not to lean over much to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of machiavil , who teacheth , that a prince can have no good counsel , except it be in himself ; his reason , because if he use the counsel of some one , he is in danger to be over-wrought , and supplanted by him ; & if he counsel with more , then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions . as if a prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the iudgement of all his counsellorurs in any point of policie , or of so many as the himself thinketh good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choice of the best , without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one . for the proverb is true , that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and consultations of a senatory state , is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the shot , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare ; and yet every man may make choice of that dish , that serveth him best ●or his health and appeti●e . 16. the prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of solomon , which may seem the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publick justice , after the manner of the ancient kings that ●ate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some special causes may be selected , which may throughly be deba●ed and considered upon by the prince in private , with the help and advise of his learned councel , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the prince himself ; at least , the prince is to ●ake accomp● of every minister of publick justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the justic●rs also to ●e more ●●reful in performing of their duties . 17. to be moderate in his taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , ●o do it by parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingness in charging them . finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his subjects , than an exaction by him . 18. to stop small beginnings ; unto ●his end to compound the dissentions ●hat arise amongst the nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whole common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons wars , and the late wars of france , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the guision faction , and the other nobility . 19. to stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negl●gent of a●mour , and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false alarm , when there is need indeed . 20. to have special care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in martial exercise , contrary to the practise of many princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state . ii. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these means . 1. first , if they have been subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions , as have his own countrey , it is an eas●● matter to retain such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condi●ion , do easily shole , and combine thems●lves together , so much the rather , if the people of that countrey have served before , and were not accustomed to their own lib●r●y , wherein specially is to be observed , that the laws and customs o● that purchased countrey be not altered nor innovated , or at least it be done by little and little . so the ●urgundians and acquitains were annexed to france . the reason , because partly they have been accustomed to serve , and partly , for that th●y will not ●asily agree about any other to be their prince , if the bloud royall be once extinguished . as for the invasion of a forreign coutrey , whereunto the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living , ; it is not the part of a just civil prince , much less a prince christian to enforce such a countrey ; and therefore , the machiavilian practises in this case , to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the bloud royal , is lewd and imper●inent : the like is to be said of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end he may hold the rest in sure posession . a thing not onely against christian religion , but it is inhumane injustice , cruel , and barbarous . 2. the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives be transplanted into some other place , and our colonies , consisting of so many as shall be thought meet , be planted there in some part of the province , castles , forts , and havens , seized upon and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch , which transplanted 10. iews : and of the romans in france , tribes of the germany , br●tany , and other places . the reason : 1. for that otherwise forces of horse and foot , are to be maintained within the province , which cannot be done without great charge . 2. for that the whole province is ●roubled and grieved with removing and supplying the army with victuals , carriages , &c. 3. for that colonies are more sure and faith●ul , than the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former ●ears , they have no means to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to be quiet . the turks practise in asia , where the chief grounds and dwellings are posessed by the souldiers , whom they call , timariotae . that the prince have his seat and his residence , in his new purchase , especially , for a time , till things be well setled ; especially , if the province be great and large , as the turks in greece : the reason ; 1. because the presence of the prince availeth much to keep things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects . 2. they conceive that they have refuge by the princes presence , if they be oppressed by the lieutenants , and inferiour governours : where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . 3. because being present , he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , he cannot do , or not do in time . 4. if the prince himself cannot be present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes favour , and not to natives , or other of their own subjects , that are gracious ●or their nobil●●y , or virtue ; especially , if the province be great , and somewhat far distant , which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects . as for such governours , as depend wholly upon the princes favour , being not born , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty , and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers , to keep them in subjection , and not for any ill will . 4. to have the children of the ch●e● noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping , the more the better : for that no bound is stronger , than that of nature , to contain the parents and alies in obedience , and they the rest . 5. to alter the laws but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present govern●ment . 6. to keep the people quiet and peaceable , and well affected so much as may be , that they may seem by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather than a tyrant ; for the common-people , if they enjoy peace , and ●e not distracted nor drawn from their business , nor exacted upon beyond measure , are easily con●ained under obedience ; yet notwithstanding , they are to be dis●used from the practise of arms , and other exercises which increase courage , and ●e weakened of armour , that they have neither spi●it , ●or will to rebel . 7. if the●e be any ●action in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part , and to combine with it , ●as caesar in fra●●e . 8. to look well to the borders , and confining provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equal power to him●elf , to joyn league with some other borderers , though of less strength , to hinder the attempts ( if any should be ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth often , tha● a countrey in●e●ted by one neighbour p●ince , ●calleth in another , of as great , o● greater power , to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the romans were called into greece , by the aetolians ; the saxons , by the britains , the danes , by the saxons . 9. to leave their ti●les and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority , wholly to his own . 10. not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the sophisms of policy , especially those that appertain to a tyrannical state , which are soon de●ected by men of judgement , and so bring discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser , and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very ill effects . the sophisms of tyrants , are rather to be known , than practised , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannical states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politick of tyrants . rvles practised by tyrants are of 2. sorts . viz. 1. barbarous , and pro●essed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves , without others help , as in the tu●kish , and russe government . 2. so●histical , and dissembl●d ; as in some states that are repu●ed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet ●●tled , nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and help of others , and so are forced to be politick soph●st●●s . i. sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . to expel and banish ou● of his countrey all ho●est means , whereby his people may a●tain to learning , wisdom , valour , and other virtues , that they might be fit for that estate , and ●ervile condition . for that these two , learning , and martial exercise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : viz. wisdom , and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding , can hardly endure a servile state . to this end , to forbid learning of li●eral arts , and martial exercise ; as in the rus●e government , so iulian the apo●tata dealt with the christians . contrarywise , to use his people to base occup●tions , and mechanical arts , to keep them from idleness , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted , and so made unfit for great enterprises . so the egyptian kings dealt with the heb●ews ; so the russe emperour with his russe people : and charles the fifth with the neth●rlanders , when he purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . 2. to make sure to him , and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other means , especially , his guard , or praetorian ●and ; that being partakers of the spoil and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firm to it ; as the turk , his ianizaries ; the russe , his boyarens , &c. 3. to unarm his people of weapons , money , and all means , whereby they may resist his power ; and to that end , to have his set and ordinary exactions , viz. once in two , three , or four years , and sometimes yearly , as the turk and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must be used as his flock of sheep , viz. their fle●c● taken from them , least it overlade them , and grow too heavy ; that t●ey are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven , the thicker it would grow . and if there be any of extraordinary wealth , to borrow of them in the mean while , till the tax come about , or upon some devised matter , to confiscate their goods , as the common practise is of the russe and tu●k . 4. to be still in wars , to the end , his people may need a captain ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearly against the tartar , pol●nian , and sweden , &c. 5. to cut off such as excel the rest in wealth , favour , or nobil●ty ; or be of a pregnant , or a spiring wit , & so are fearfull to a tyrant , and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turk , his bas●●●s ; and the russe , his ●u●zzes . 6. to forbid guild● , brotherhoods , feastings , and other assemblies among the people , that they have no means or oportunity to conspire , or confer together of publick matters , or to maintain love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practise . 7. to have their beagles , or listeners in every corner , and parts of the realm ; especially , in places that are more suspect , to learn what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , & take away such as mislike their state . 8. to make schism , and division among his subjects , viz. to set one noble man , against another , and one rich man against another , that through faction & disagreement among themselves , they may be weakened , and attempt nothing against him , and by this means entertaining whisperings , and complaints , he may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the ze●●ky , and the oppress●nie . 9. to have strangers for his guard , and to entertain parasites , and other base and servile fellows , not too wise , and yet subtile , that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men cannot flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises , and such like , may be contracted into one or two , viz. to bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt , or to alter the present state . the use is caution , not imitation . ii. sophisms of the sophistical , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state . 1. to make shew of a good king , by observing a temper and mediocritie in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end , it is necessary , that this subtile tyrant , be a cunning polititian , or a machiavilian at the least , and that he be taken so to be , for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded , and is thought thereby , not unworthy for to govern others . 2. to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , and habite , and other demeanour . 3. to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end , to seem loath to exact tributes , and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is : to that end , to procure such war as can bring no danger toward his state , and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on , that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list . and thereof to imploy some in his publick service , the rest to hoord up in his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes , as edward the fourth in his wars against france , when having levied a great sum of money throughout his ●ealm , especially of the londoners , he went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . 4. sometimes to give an account by open speech , and publick writing , of the expence of such taxes and impositions , as he hath rec●ived of his ●ubjects , that he may so seem to be a good husband , and frugal , and not a robber of the common-wealth . 5. to that end , to bestow● some cost upon publick buildings , or some other work for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chief cities of his realm , that so he may seem a benenefactour , and have a delight in the adorning of his countrey , or doing some good for it . 6. to forbid feastings , and other meetings , which increase love , and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses , to that end , the curfieu bell was first ordained by william the● conquerour , to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour . 7. to take heed that no one grow to be over-great , but rather , many equally great , that they may envy , and contend one with another ; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort , to do it warily , and by degrees ; if quite to wreck him , and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull tryal , after the manner of his countrey ; and if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation , as to do him contumely , or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace , are things contrary unto honour , which great spirits do most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , than to any thankfulness , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismistion ; true in atheists , but not in true christian nobilitie . 8. to unarm his people , and store up their weapons , under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth , and then to arm with them , such and so many as he shall think meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . 9. to make schism or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine no● together , and that himself by hearing the grieff and complaints , may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter a●ainst them both , when it listeth him to call them to an account . 10. to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially , about womens mat●ers , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath been he ruin of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of ●arquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices , duke of florence , aloisus of placentia , rodericus , king of spain , &c. 11. to that end , to be moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely , that he be not seen ; for that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own . 12. to reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any special action ●or the common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem , they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a free-state . 13. all rewards and things gratefull , to come from himself , but all punishments , exactions , and things ungratefull , to come from his officers , & publick ministers ; and when he hath effected what he would by them , if he see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . 14. to pretend great care of religion , and of serving god , ( which hath been the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people do less fear any hurt from those , whom they think virtuous and religious , nor attempt likely to do them hurt , for that they think that god protects them . 15. to have a strong & sure guard of forreign souldiers , and to bind them by good turns , that they having at least profit , may depend upon him , and the present state ; as c●ligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practised by lawfull kings , as by the french king . 16. to procure that other great persons bee in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause they be forced to defend the tyrant , for their own safetie 17. to take part , and to joyn himself with the stronger part ; if the common people , and mean degree be the stronger , to joyn with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyn with them . for so that part with his own strength , will be ever able to overmatch the other . 18. so to frame his manners & whole behaviour , as that he may seem , if not perfectly good , yet tolerably evil , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hypocritical tyrants , are to bee known , that they may be avoyded , and met withall , and not drawn into imimitation . preservation of an aristocracie . rules to preserve a senatory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that preserve a kingdom . preservation of an oligarchie , by sophisms . rules . 1. in consultations and assemblies , about publick affairs , to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies , and councels , ; but to impose a fine upon the richer sort , if they omit that duty . on the other side , to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to bear with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , , and not be hindered in their trades , and earnings . 2. in election of magistrates , and officers : to suffer the poorer sort to vow , and abjure the bearing of office , under colour of sparing them , or to enjoyn some great charge , as incident to the office , which the poor cannot bear . but to impose some great fine upon those , that be rich , if they refuse to bear office , being elect unto it . 3. in judicial matters : in like manner to order , that the people may be absent from publick trials , under pretence of following their business . but the richer to be present , and to compel them by fines , to frequent the court . 4. in warlike exercise and arms : that the poor be not forced to have armour , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to be drawn from their trades by martial exercises ; but to compel the richer sort to keep their proportion of armor , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in war-like matters , &c. 5. to have special care of instructing their children in liberal arts , policie , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequencie , and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer , is preserved by discipline , and good o●der of governours . 6. to provide good store of war-like furniture , especially of horse , and horse-men , and of armed men , viz. pike , &c. which are proper to the gentry , as shot , and light furniture , are for a popular companie . 7. to put in practise some points of a popular state ; viz. to lade no one man with too much preferment ; to make yearly , or half years magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatness , to abate him by the sophisms fit for this state . 8. to commit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters , which both tendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they reap some relief , and benefit by it . 9. to the same end , to contract marriages among themselves , the rich with the rich , &c. 10. in some things which concern not the points , and matters of state , as electing magistrates , making laws , &c. to giv● an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common people , and not to do , as in some oligarchies they were wont ; viz. to swear against the people , to suppress and bridle them ; but rather contrary ; to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall do no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of severe punishment . for other axioms that preserve this state , they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular , and tyrannical state ; for the strict kind of oligarchie , is kin to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophisms . rules or axioms . 1. in publick assemblies and consultations about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publick justice , and exercise of arms , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an oligarc●ie . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those assemblies , magistrates , offices , war-like exercises , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to be spared , and not to be forced by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . 2. to make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to swear against them , as the manner hath been in some popular states ; but rather to preferre them in all other matters , that concern not the state and publick government . 3. to elect magistrates from among the common● by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . 4. to take heed , that no mā bear office twice , except it be military , where the pay , and salary , &c. is to be reserved in their own hands , to be disposed of by a common-councel , &c. and to see that no man be too highly preferred . 5. that no magistracy be perpetual , but as short as may be , to wit , for a a year , half year , &c. 6. to compel magistrates when their time expireth , to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publickly before the commons . 7. to have publick salaries and allowance for their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearly dividents for the common people , and such as have most need among them . 8. to make judges of all matters out of all sorts , so they have some aptness to perform that duty . 9. to provide that publick judgements and trials be not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilators , as the law of requital , &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby many times the popular state is turned into an oligarchie , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civil law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad s●natus-consultum turpilianum , l. 1. de calumniatoribus . 10. in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publick assemblies be not after : because they want salary for pleaders and oratours ; and if they be rich ; yet to be wary , that all the revenue be not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distribution of the common revenue among the multitude , is like a purse or barrel without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs . 11. if the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next countrey places , and to provide above all , that none do live idly , but be set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farms and coppiholds , such decayed citizens . 12. to be well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is ●est for the continuance thereof : and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer , or common-treasurie , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it be practised , confiscations , and fines of the common people would be frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in general . conversion of a state , is the declining of the common-wealth , either to some other form of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . general , ( viz. ) 1. want of religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sins that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of saul , uzziah , the jewish state ; the four monarchies●●nd all other . 2. want of wisdom and good councel to keep the state , the prince , nobles , and people in good temper , and due proportion , according to thei● several orders and decrees . 3. want of justice , either in administration ( as ill lawes , or ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should be , or there ●estowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be . 4. want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self ; viz. of provision , as armour , money , captains , souldiers , &c. execution , when the means or provision is not used , or ill used . 2. particular : to be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules , that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealths . particular causes of conversion of states , are of two sorts . 1. forreign : by the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign kingdom , or other state of meaner power , having a part within our own , which are to ●e prevented by the providence of the chief , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state . this ●alleth out very seldom for the great diff●cul●y to overthrow a forreign state . 2. domestick : sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of arms against the superiour power , quasi ditio secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . 1. general . liberty richer when they , that are of equal quality in a commō-wealth , or do take themselves so to be , are not regarded equally in all , or in any of these three . or , when they are so unequal in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with less respect than those that be of less de●ect in these three things , or in any of them . honour 1. in the chief : covetousness or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chief , encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure , either with the publick or ( private calamity , whereby the governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in olygarchies ) or the other degrees conspire together , and make quarrel against the chief , as in kingdoms : the examples of wat tyler , iack straw , &c. 2. in the chief : injury , when great spirits , and of great power , are greatly wronged and dishonoured , or take themselves so to be , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earl of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . 3. preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have over-much , and so wax proud and aspire higher : or have more or less , than they deserve as they suppose ; & so in envy and disda● , seek innovation by open faction , so caesar , &c. 4. some great nec●ssity or calamity ; so xerxes after the ●oil of his great army . and sena●harib after the loss of 185. in one night . 2. particular . 1. envie , when the chief exceed the mediocri●y before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar . 2. fear , viz. of danger , when one or more dispatch the prince , by secret practice or force , to prevent his own danger , as artab●nus did xerxes . 3. lust or lecherie , as tarquinius superbus , by brutus ; pisistratindae , by armodius ; appius by virginius . 4. contempt ; for vile quality & base behaviour , as sardanapalus by arbaces ; dionysius the younger by dion . 5. contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit , who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula by chaereas . 6. hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mituridates , anobarsanes . chief . other d●gr●es . other degrees . alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; 1. excess of the state ; when by degrees the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was , or should have been setled , and exceedeth in power , riches , and absoluteness in his kind , by the ambition and covetousness of the chiefs immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c. applying all to his own benefi● , without respect of other degrees , and so in the end changeth it self into another state or form of government , as a kingdom into a tyranny , an oligarch●● into an aristocraci● . 2. excess , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one or more in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or virtu● ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the sovereignty : by which means , popular states grow into oliga●chies ; and oligarchi●s and aristocracies into monarchi●s . for which cause the athenians and some other free states , made their laws of ostrocismos , to banish any for a time that should excel , though it were in virtue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , 't is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means , that none should grow to that heigth and excellency , than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the story . david being seventie years of age , was of wisdom , memorie , &c. sufficient to gouern his kingdom ; 1. reg. cap. 1. old age is not ever unfit for publick government . david being of great years , and so having a cold , drie , and impotent bodi● , married with abishag , a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole realm , to revive his bodie and prolong his life , 1. reg. chap. 1. verse . 3. example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of bo●t● , by the advise of h●s nobles and p●isitians , marri●d a young maid call●d abishag , to warm and pres●rve his old bodi● . observation . vvh●ther david did well in m●●rying a maid ? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man , to marrie a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old , worn , and decrepite woman , to marrie a young and lustie man ? for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is societie and mutual comfort ; b●● th●r● may be soci●tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young partie ; ergo , 't is lawful . answ. societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage ; but none of the principal ends of marriage : which are : 1. pr●creation of children , and so the continuance o● mankind . 2. the av●iding of fornication . as for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man , woman and woman , where no marriage is , and therefore no proper ends of marri●ge . the negative . arg. 1. that conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ●rdained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old im●otent , and young partie hath no respect t● th●●●ght end , for which marriage was ordain●d by god . there●ore it is no lawful marriage . 2. no contract , wherein the part●e cont●acting , bindeth himself to an impossible condition , or to do that which he cannot do , is good or lawfull . but the contract o● marriage by an impoten● person , wit● a young partie , bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot d● , viz. to perfo●m the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull . for the same cause , the civil law determineth a nullity in these m●r●iages , except the woman know before the infi●mitie of the man , in which case she ca● have no wrong , being a thing done with her own knowledge and cons●nt , because volenti non fit injuria : — in legem julian . de adulteriis leg. si uxor , &c. it provideth further , ●or the more certaintie of the infirmiti● , that three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men that have been infirm at the first , by reason of sickness , or some other accident , afterwards proved to be sufficient : de repudiis leg. in causis . defence for david , in marrying abishag . it was rather a medicine , than a marriage , without any evil , or disordered aff●ction . 2. it was by the perswasion of his nobles , and phisiti●ns . 3. it was for the publick good , to prolong the life of a worthie prince . 4. it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmitie , and to what end she was married unto him ; who if she did it for the common good , and for duties sake , having withall the gift of continencie , she is to be commended ; if for ambition , or some vain respect , it is ●er own , and not davids fault . political nobilitie . adoniah aspiring to the kingdom . first , took the advantage of davids affection and kindness towards him , and made him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crown . fourthly , got him chariots , horsemen , and footmen , and a guard to make shew of state . fifthly , being a comly , and goodly person , made a popular shew of himself , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himself in faction , joab , the general of the armie , who was in displeasure for murthering of abner , and amaza , and feared that david would supplie benajah in his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferment of zadoch . seventhly , had meetings with them , and other his confederates , under pretence of a vovv , and offering at the fountain of raguel , in the co●●ines of judea . eightly , made a shevv of religion by sacrificing , &c. ninthly , made himself familiar vvith the nobles and people , and entertai●●d them vvith feasting . tenthly , drevv into his part the chief officers of the court , and servants to the king , by revvards , familiaritie , &c. eleventhly , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as he knevv vvould take part vvith him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . tvvelftly , had jonathan a favorite of the court , and near about the king to give him intelligence , if any thing vvere discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himself was in hand about his practise . observations . waies of such as aspire to the kingdom , & marks to discern them . first , they wind into the princes favour by service , officiousness , flatterie , &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyaltie and faithfulness , thereby to make him secure of their practises . 2. they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotencie , negligence , sex , &c. and work upon that by disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his state , and government . 3. they blaze their title , and claim to the crown , ( if they have any ) with their friends and favourites . 4. they provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces , and furniture for the wars , make much of good souldiers , and have a pretence ( if it be espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to be in readiness against forreign enemies , &c. 5. they make open shew of their best qualities , and comliness of their persons ( which though it be vain as a dumb shew , it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rul● of the election of kings , in the bees common-wealth ; think that porma est digna imperare ) activitie , nobilitie , ancestrie , &c. 6. to have their blazers abroad , to set out their virtues , and to prepare their friends in every province . 7. to draw into their part , and make sure unto the● , of the chief p●ers , and men of best qualitie , such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers , and the militarie men , and most subtile and politick , especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the state . 8. to have meetings for con●e●rence under some pretence of some ordinari● matter in some convenient place , not too near , nor too far off , but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . 9. to take up a shew , and pretence of religion , more than before , and beyond the practise of their former life . 10. they use popular courtesie ( which in a great person is verie effectual ) feasting , liberaliti● , gaming , &c. 11. to be over liberal , and win to them by gifts , familiaritie , &c. the chief officers of the court , and governours of shires . 12 to have some near about the prince , to keep them in credite , and remove suspition , if any rise . 13. to disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the prince , and present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all means they can , and to ●onc●al the designs from them , least they be discovered before they be too ripe . 14. to have some spie ●●ar about the prince , to advertise them if any i●ckling of suspition arise , whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolom : ● sam. chap. 16. and of cy●us minor in xenophon ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . cap. 1. political prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisdom , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet grown into age , grew withal into contempt , & had many , both of his nobles , & common people , that fell from him ; first with absolom , then with adoniah , who affected the kingdom , and rebelled against him : for remedy whereof , he stirred up himself to publick actions , which might shew his vigour and sufficiencie to mannage the affairs of his kingdom . 1. after the victorie against absolom , he forced himself to ●orbear mourning , and shewed himself to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son . 2. after the victorie , he caused a g●n●ral convention to be ass●mbled o● the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to jerusalem , which was a renewing , and re-establishing of him . 2 sam. 19. 12. 3. he gave an experiment of his power and authoritie , by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation , to wit , joab , general captain of the armie , and advancing amasa to his place . 4. he sent kind messengers to jerusalem , and to other chief and head towns , and speciall men of judea , his contributes , putting them of their alliance with him , with these words , that they were of his own flesh and bloud , with protestation of his special love and affection towards them , to provide them with the like kindness and affection towards him . 5. he assembled a parliament of his whole realm , and took occasion upon the designing of his successour , to commend unto them the succession of his house , and the continuance and maintenance o● gods tru● worship and religion then established , and gave a grave and publick ch●rge to his successour , now designed , touc●ing the manner of his gov●rnment , and maintaining of religion . 1. chron. 12. 13. 6. he shewed his bountie and magnificence in cong●sting matter for the building of the temple , as gold , silver , brass , &c. and caus●d it to be published and made known to the parliament and whole nation , 1. chron. 22. 13. 7 he revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to ●v●ry church , officers , his place and function . 8. he suppressed the faction of ado●niah , and ordained solomon his successour , 1 reg. 1. 22. by these means , h● retained his majestie and authoritie i● his old age , as appeareth by the eff●ct ; ●o● that being bed-rid , he suppressed the fa●ction of adoniah , ( which was grow●● mightie , and vvas set on foot ) vvith h●● bare commandment , and si●nification 〈◊〉 his pleasure , and so he dyed in peace . finis . a general draught and prospect of government in europe, and civil policy shewing the antiquity, power, decay, of parliaments. with other historical and political observations relating thereunto. in a letter. rymer, thomas, 1641-1713. 1681 approx. 103 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 49 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-05 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a58019 wing r2426 estc r219765 99831213 99831213 35676 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a58019) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 35676) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 2040:18) a general draught and prospect of government in europe, and civil policy shewing the antiquity, power, decay, of parliaments. with other historical and political observations relating thereunto. in a letter. rymer, thomas, 1641-1713. [8], 88 p. printed for tho. benskin, in greens-rents near fleetbridge, london : 1681. with three initial contents leaves. running title reads: a general draught or prospect of government in europe, &c. pages marked. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic 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understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. comparative government -early works to 1800. representative government and representation -early works to 1800. 2002-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2003-01 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2003-03 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2003-03 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a general draught and prospect of government in europe , and civil policy . shewing the antiquity , power , decay , of parliaments . with other historical and political observations relating thereunto . in a letter . dimidium plus toto . — medium non deserit unquam coeli phoebus iter , radiis tamen omnia lustrat . claud. london : printed for tho. benskin , in greens-rents near fleetbridge . 1681. the contents . too narrow conceptions of parliaments . civilians , instruments of servitude . common lawyers how biassed . my lord cook 's etymologies . holy scripture teaches not politicks . caesar in the gospel . europeans particularly love liberty . arbitrary sway inconsistent with a civil people . the gospel disposes not to slavery . power , not titles , makes a king. declining power casts the greatest shadow . modern french parliament in scarlet robes . the english without pontificalibus . jupiters scepter what . pastors of a m●re excellent species than the flock . king a politick creature . mixt government ordinary in europe . in asia and africa , tyrannical . og the king of bashan . land of gyants . excellency of kingly government . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cyclopses rul'd without parliaments . tyrants ordinarily men of great vertues . tarquin the proud left off the use of the senate . authority of the senate lost , emperors but tenants at will to the army . the common council in gaul and britain the german people and laws transplanted . the government in germany . pharamond . what names for the common council in england , france , and germany . curia , hoss . reichs versamblung . conventus . placitum . synodus . dyet . parliament . populus . & principes , often used for the same assembly . hundreds . sheriffs . iuries . queen edburga . germany the source of our people and laws . charlemain governed by annual parliaments . what power they had in his time . succession referred to the parliament . the elector princes . fallacies of an aristocracy . the golden bull. aristocracy when begun in the church . english laws in danger . pretences of conquest . magna charta . in germany title by the sword. imperial crown . lex regia . civil law. the french insensibly enslaved . the english arms in france . the project of a new sort of parliament . it some check upon the king. the clauses mandato regis , expresso mandato , expressissimo mandato regis . lewis the eleventh his character . la royauté hors du page . remonstrances for the parliament . abhorrers . the war called le bien publique . alexander sforza , his advice . finesse . franc-archers laid aside . adventuriers soldiers . guard of switzers establisht . the parliamentary changed into a military government . improbe factum . different times require different laws . radamanthus his way of judging . kings most reserved when they had no bounds . the venetians . how they dealt with their princes . what the ordinary policy in germany . the emperor adorned with titles . the jura majestatis where . count palatine iudge , when the emperor is impeacht . the legislation where . religion . war and peace . iurisdiction . the princes . furstenrecht . chamber at spires . taxes . chief magistrates . electors . what they assume . flowers of the imperial crown . tarquinius priseus his artifice . the emperors of old time came to the states . maximilian . the regiment instituted . their platform . charles the fifth . his new model . the assembly of the deputies . they managed by ferdinand the second . the privy council . expedients . reason of state. the iesuits like not a mixt government . turken-stewer , or aid against the turk . caesar and the electors combine against the diet. the roman decemviri . the states wanting to themselves . differences about religion . the protestants out-voted . the german dyet encumbred . french in a manner defunct . the former from charles the fifth . this from lewis the eleventh . the english parliament still vigorous . legereté of the french. the english steady . dance not after the french politicks . magna charta . petition of right . annual parliaments . uncertainty of historians . records not accurate . forms fallacious . civilians breath a forreign ayr . rules of common law too short . divines no statesmen . kingly race may degenerate . sons of hercules . tasso . the emperor aurelian . his account of cabals . parliaments necessary . cyclopean presumption . hesiod's proverbial paradox . cyrus moderate . cambyses . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 romulus torn in pieces . roman civil empire fell to barbarians . charlemain . austrians influenced by iesuits . the french court's correspondence with avignon . potestate absolutâ mortified by the english arms. lewis the eleventh . standing army . english generosity . conquest a compendious title . gunpowder-treason . pensioned parliament . not subject to the mischiefs in france , or germany . division in religion avoyded . poets and divines regard not second causes . jure divino . latin service a mark of roman slavery . iudges durante beneplacito . the three states . stands , reich-stands . why so called . who they are . the three governing parts of the common-wealth in polybius . the three states of sparta . of the romans . of france . the clergy a mixt state with the laiety . the three states of germany according to tacitus . according to hincmar in charlemain's time . seniors who . when hereditary . proclamations to call the states . particular writs when first used . imperial cities . electors , when a several state. the clergy never a distinct state in germany . the emperour one of the states . charlemain a german . sacri imperii minister . tricks of state , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sir , see the effect of your commands . the want of time , of books , and assistance in this my retirement , make me very uncapable of the undertaking . but my obedience and performance with a kid , will i hope be accepted , when i cannot sacrifice an hundred bulls . without farther ceremony or introduction , according to my apprehension , when we enquire into the authority and nature of parliaments , our thoughts should be raised above all prejudice and particularities ; we should not conceive of them , as of some creature form'd and nourisht under this or that constitution , but have a notion as large and general , as is that of government of civil society . we must not be confin'd to the writers of this or that age , or countrey ; but consult the universal reason and sense of humane kind , where civil government has been exercised . much less is any particular profession or faction of writers , to be the only authors of credit with us , in this enquiry . our knowledge must be something digested ; and an impartial result from a consideration of all as well times and countries , as writers and customs . the civilians , with their bartolus and baldus , are not to dictate to us on this occasion . these were bred out of the corruption of the roman liberty ; and were instruments of servitude from the beginning . their work was by hook and crook , to rap and bring all under the emperours power ; that was their study , that their province . but they were always ignorant of the practises of better times , and utter strangers to the just rights of a free-people ; their rules and their maxims were , in effect , no other , than so many stripes , so many marks and items of slavery to the subjects . then , for the municipal lawyers of every nation , they also are educated under too narrow a dispensation to think justly in these matters . the letter is their sphere where they show their activity , even , sometimes , to the perverting and turning it against the reason and intentions of the legislator . their small niceties , and their subtleties , and their inferences , are too fine drawn to bear or support a matter of this weight and circumference . their deductions and argumentations must ever be taken with some grains of allowance ; the cause here requires other forms and considerations . we are not to stick at the letter , but go to the foundation , to the inside and essence of things . by their acquaintance with the customs and laws , they may aid and direct , but not over-rule ; they may apply their observations to strengthen the fundamental reason , but are not to perplex and subvert the form of government . my lord cook tells us , parliament is derived from parler le ment , i. e. from speaking the mind . he might as honestly have taught us that firmament is firma mentis , a farm for the mind ; or fundament , the bottom of the mind . my lord cook , how sage soever otherwise , in parliament-house is no more authority than thomas aquinas . and take him from his ordinary element , his reasons are many times as ridiculous as his etymologies . then for the holy scripture ; the design of it is no more to teach us politicks , than to make us philosophers . ahaz's dial is no president for our time or measures ; nor may the theocracy of the iews authorize us to set up for king jesus . our blessed saviour did not distinguish whether caesar demanded tribute , as tribune and servant of the people ; and whether the roman empire remained still democratical , ( as caesar pretended ) or was monarchical , as , in effect , it prov'd . the holy ghost neither alter'd the complexion , nor refin'd the education ; but a shepherd , notwithstanding the oracles he delivered , continued the same in other circumstances , as if he never had been inspir'd . in like manner , where-ever christ is preached , the soul-saving doctrine in no wise operates upon the policy or civil constitutions ; but leaves those affairs to be influenc'd by the ordinary prudence and discretion . whether it be some particular generosity in our nature , that renders us impatient of slavery : or whether the temperateness of the climate inclines us to a moderation in our government : or whether it may be some favourable aspect of the planets , ( as ptolomy would perswade us ) that disposes europe to the love of liberty . so far as any record or history can inform us , that arbitrary and unlimited domination , so familiar in the eastern parts of the world , amongst us did always shew uncouth , and to be stared upon no less than their elephants . and indeed to us seem altogether inconsistent with a civil people . and it can be no more the business of the gospel to reconcile us to that yoak , than it is to emasculate our complexion and nature , to change the temper of our climate , or to turn our stars from their course . all power is from god , and we are to be subject to the higher powers ; this all consent to ; this is doctrine alike true in holland , as in france , at venice , as at constantinople . but where this high power and soveraignty rests , in whom 't is lodged , this is a point not so obvious : nor can the s. s. or holy fathers any way help us in the discovery . the customs and particular laws of every nation , are only capable to direct us in that scrutiny . obedience is as much a duty , and rebellion as black a sin where the people are king , as where a single person has the soveraign sway . the title of king , monarch , or emperour , the scepter , the crown , the royal throne , with all the robes and pomps and badges of soveraignty , and the precedence before other christian kings , have the shadow of majesty , but have none of the substance , as bodin truly observes . the caesars were never so absolute , as when the senate had the show , and the name of all . but afterwards when their power declin'd , then did their shadows lengthen , and the titles swell beyond all sobriety and proportion . the french parliaments in their scarlet robes , know none of that soveraign power which their plain ancestors so long had exercised in their grey jackets . the pontificalibus and formality , derogates from the antiquity and independency . and our house of commons may seem in a manner , ( if i may so say ) to have committed some kind of solecism , in taking a mace to be carryed before them , but that their simplicity and plainness otherwise sufficiently demonstrates them the true , sincere , original , fundamental , common councel , constituted and form'd before forms and pageantries and fopperies obtain'd in our english world . for badge and ornament they had iupiter's scepter ; which pluto interprets to be , not a tipt batoon , or glittering engraven thing , but the laws and legislative power . homer has taught the world to call kings pastors of the people . we commit not the charge of our cattle to any one of the herd , nor for our sheep do we choose one out of the flock to be their shepherd ; but set over them a more excellent sort of animal , some man is appointed for the neatherd , and for the shepherd , to govern and take the charge of them . now since for the conduct and sway over men , the world is not furnisht with any species more noble than man , art supplies what wanted in nature ; an artificial man is fram'd , a politick creature , a king that never dyes , that can do no wrong , that cannot be deceived , whose counsels and determinations are the result of the joynt experience and wisdom of a whole nation . now whether this artificial , may be call'd a mixt sort of government , as the antients imagin'd . or that it be originally , essentially , and fundamentally a democracy monarchical in the administration , as bodin and our modern politicians seem to understand . this certainly is the government that always has obtain'd in europe ; and that which all , amidst their commotions , distractions , and convulsions , in some manner or other , with more or less success and perfection , have tended to , as the center , and onely place of rest . if therefore the jews had desired a king after the manner of the europeans , their importunity peradventure might not have been so provoking to the almighty . and we should have found another kind of catalogue of their fair qualities , than that delivered us by the prophet . for however their asian or african neighbours might have domineer'd it , and bluster'd ; a calmer gale was always wont to breath amongst us in europe , and , god be thankt , we are many degrees northern latitude from og the king of bashan , and the lands of those other gyants , amalekites , and philistines . the first writers amongst us had their imaginations so over-born with the excellency of kingly government , that they fancied in heaven iupiter to be the king of the gods. and yet they thought the common councel so necessary and essential , that homer represents even iupiter , upon a great occasion , calling his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , his parliament of the gods. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i have heard divines observe something of this kind , as figured of god almighty from those words , let us make man. those words in the plural number to them seemed to import , as if god summon'd a parliament of the trinity , to consult upon that arduous affair . our christian poets have taken the same liberty , and fancied this , as an image of greatness , where could be no accession to the wisdom and omnipotence . but again , homer ( whom plato in his book of laws , mentions as a prophet , and one who reveals those things concerning government , by inspiration , which are not by humane knowledge to be attain'd ) to shew the utmost inhumanity and barbarity of the cyclopses and their government , tells us , they neither held parliaments for counsel , nor had right . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he joyns parliament and right , as of late days guicciardine does parliament and liberty ; as if parliament , right , and liberty , were to stand and fall together . and indeed amongst the greeks , how many persons , excellent otherwise , have been branded for tyrants and monsters , and made odious to all posterity , because they affected a more singular and unbounded power than was consistent with the customs and constitutions of their country ? nor was this policy less known or practiz'd by the latines . none of the antient kings of italy or rome exercis'd other government than by parliament , till tarquin the proud with much stratagem and artifice attempted a new way . but how fatal did he find that innovation ? afterwards that the caesars usurped the empire , when their power was the highest , they affected to have all done in the name of the people and senate . neque tam parvum quicquam , neque tam magnum publici privatique negotii , de quo non ad patres conscriptos referrebatur . and notwithstanding the antient liberty and government was so run down , yet on some occasions , the authority of the senate would be exerting itself . they declared nero an enemy of the state , and their sentence had its effect . nor could ( the delight of humane kind ) titus , though so far engaged in love and honour , stem the authority of the senate , in favour of his dear berenice ; but was forced to dismiss her , because they forbad the banes. and in effect , the power of the senate once gone , that of the emperors signified little ; the giddy souldiers broke all rules and measures . they mutinied , and made and unmade emperours , where , and when , and whom they had a mind to . so that the emperour was onely tenant at will to the army . our botchers of history , shew a jolly succession of monarchs on their file for britain in those days . but caesars commentaries are of much better credit , who represents the government of gaul and britain , as muchwhat the same in his time ; says he of britain , summa imperii bellique administrandi communi consilio permissa est cassivellano , &c. the chief command and conduct of the war , was by the common councel committed to cassivellaun . compare these words with what he writes of the gauls , l. 7. re in controversiam deductâ totius galliae consilium bibracte indicitur , eodem conveniunt undique frequentes multitudines , suffragiis res permittitur , ad unum omnes vercengentorigem probant imperatorem . here the counsel of all gaul , by reason of the war , put it to the vote who shall be their general ; and it was carried with a nemine contradicente for vercengentorix . and 't is beyond dispute , that their government continued the same in the times of which dion cassius and tacitus write . nor is their uniformity so strange , considering the authority of the druyds , and their correspondence in both nations . when the english and french came from germany to people britain and gaul , the german liberty and moderate sway were transplanted with them ; and still the common councel had the main stroke in all weighty affairs ; for to that policy had they also been educated . the scheme of the german government appears in these passages of tacitus . de minoribus rebus principes consultant , de majoribus omnes . in lesser matters the principal men onely , in the greatest affairs all consult . elsewhere he says of them , vbi rex vel princeps audiuntur authoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi potestate . where the king or prince are heard for the reasons they bring to perswade , rather than for any authority to command . hereby 't is manifest , that in germany also the people had their share in debating and directing all affairs of moment . when therefore the french under waramond , or pharamond , came to settle and mix with the gauls , whatever other differences might happen , in point of government they were agreed before hand , both resting upon the same basis , the common councel . accordingly in those first days , we find them making their kings , and again upon occasion unmaking them by general consent . hence come these phrases so frequent in aimoinus , sigebert , engenhardus , and the other writers of those times . consensu francorum , electione francorum , secundum morem francorum , in regem electus , &c. on the other hand , franci regno deturbant , a francis repudiatur , depositus ac detonsus in monasterium detrusus est , a francis in monachum tonsuratur , &c. where we may note , that our authors intend by their per francos , as much as per consensum francorum , or secundum morem francorum , which is , by the common counsel , and not in any unusual , mutinous , and tumultuous way , as some might object . nor are we to imagine the government presently altered , so often as we find the historians varying their phrase . we must now and then be content with such words as the monks of those times were pleased to coyn for us , and have new barbarous names for the same old civil constitution . whether they speak of germany , of the french , or of our nation , they indifferently diversifie , and employ for the same common assembly amongst others , the appellations and circumlocutions following . sometimes they call it curia , and curia imperialis , and curia regalis , curia solennis , generalis curia , magna curia . concelebranda patrum solenni curia coctu , curia roncaliis jampridem indicta coïret , say their poets . which is expessed in the german tongue , by hove , koniglicher hove , grossen hoff. elsewhere it is call'd congregationes , which the germans render reichsversamblung . sometimes it is call'd concilium principum , totius germaniae concilium , concilium generale . gunther says , concilium procerum toto de corpore regni convocat . and the monk of paderborn , who liv'd about eight hundred years ago , in his annals of charles the great , anno 772. et rex wormatiam carolus collegit in urbem , francorum proceres ad concilium generale . imperialia . concilia postquàm cessavere , omnes pene deformitates introductae sunt , says cardinal cusan . elsewhere these were called conventus , conventus generalis , conventus imperatorem . convenire generaliter populum suum praecepit . habuit populi sui generalem conventum . habitoque juxta morem conventu generali . the monk of paderborn thus versifies . anno 775. ad duriam vicum properant , nam rege jubente , illic conventus populi generalis habetur . elsewhere , venit , & ad fontes fluvii cui lippia nomen , conventum fieri procerum jussit generalem . anno 775. publicus in paderbrunon conventus habetur . most commonly it was called placitum . compendii placitum generale habuit . aimoinus . rex pipinus habuit placitum suum in nivernis regino , an. 773 , and an. 777. tenuit placitum in loco qui dicitur paderbrunnon . abbas stadensis in chr. an. 811 ▪ imperator habito placito , &c. and the aforesaid monk , anno 770. conventum placiti generalis habere , cum ducibus se velle suis denunciat illic . regino calls it synodus . an. 770. carolus habuit synodum in wormatiaâ . 771. habuit synodum ad valentinianos . 772. synodum habuit in wormariâ . 775. habuit synodum in villâ quae dicitur duria . 780. in lippa synodum tenuit . convenerant multi episcopi , abbates , & , principes ad imperialem synodum . trithem . abb. afterwards in germany , diet was the name that generally prevailed , as that of parliament in france and england . now these quotations and authorities shew , not only that by all this variety of names were understood the same common councel , but that the principes , proceres , primores , duces , patres , &c. imported no more in truth , nor signified other manner of men , than the very same with populus . and the same assembly by one writer barely called populus , or conventus populi , is by another stiled . conventus procerum , conventus principum , &c. which those terms secundam morem , juxta morem , more solenni , ut solebat , more fully demonstrate ; which seem to refer and send us back to tacitus , consultant de majoribus omnes . this i the rather note , because i find mr. petty ( amongst many other his excellent memorials ) observing the like in old records of parliament , where those somewhere called populus , and vulgus , and the commons , are otherwhiles dignified with the gay additions of noble , most noble , most illustrious , most gracious , seigniors , monseigniours , and sires the commons and likewise for that some unwary and superficial readers from this root have propagated and improved many errours of pernicious consequence to our ancient and fundamental policy and government . the french incorporating and growing one people with the former inhabitants , had a much easier province ; they setled , and pursued their native customs and forms of government , nor met with that difficulty and opposition which in this nation attended the english and saxons . these had a much harder game to play . these could in no wise fix , or find any sure footing , without first clearing their way , and driving the britains up by themselves , into a corner of the land. and after much tumbling and bustle , we find them formed into a heptarchy . how regularly they mov'd as to civil affairs , how closely they followed their country-customs , or where they innovated and varied from their german forms and policy , in those dark times , is hard to be traced . some footsteps however appeared then , which remained to posterity , as the division of the countrey into hundreds , after the german manner described by tacitus . besides the other royalties in the people , as that of appointing sheriffs , and choosing annual magistrates , the jurisdiction and power of life and death by our juries , &c. and even before all came united under one monarch , we find the people interposing their authority , and ( for the miscarriages of queen edburga ) providing that thereafter , no queen shall sit by the king , nor have the title of queen , but be called only the kings wife . gens itaque occidentalium saxonum reginam juxta regem sedere non patitur , nec etiam reginam appellari , sed regis conjugem permittit , &c. asser. menev. & mals . but i shall not repeat what cambden and selden , and our other antiquaries have collected on this occasion ; but germany being the source both of our people and laws , i choose rather petere fontes . and thence it may be concluded how far we do stare super vias antiquas , and continue firm upon the old bottom . when the people and senate of rome had transferred all their right upon charles the great ( or charlemain , as the french call him ) and germany was made the seat of the western empire , one might think , if there could be an opportunity of introducing a new form of policy , this was the time . yet charles , so victorious , so august , so great , the like in no age before him or since ever known on this side the alps , notwithstanding all that power and fortune , and the imperial crown that adorn'd him , his language was still the high german , and his government did still in the old parliamentary way go on and prosper . therefore we find him every year with his parliament . eginhardus , who was his son-in-law , and chancellour , says of him , rex sic ad publicum populi sui conventum qui annuatim ob regni utilitatem celebrabatur , ire , sic domum redire solebat . and aimoynus , l. 4. c. 74. generalem conventum quotannis habuit . and to these parliaments , under god , so far as humane reason may judge , does hincmar ( archbishop of rheims , and chancellour in those times ) ascribe his happy reign . secunda divisio , qua totius regni status anteposito , sicut semper , omnipotentis dei judicio , quantum ad humanam rationem pertinebat , conservari videbatur , haec est , consuetudo tunc temporis erat , ut non saepius sed bis in anno duo placita tenerentur , unum quando ordinabatur status totius regni ad anni vertentis spacium , quod ordinatum nullus eventus rerum , nisi summa necessitas , quae similiter toti regno incumbebat , mutabat , in quo placito generalitas universorum majorum ●am clericorum quam laicorum conveniebat , alterum cum senioribus tantum & praecipuis consiliariis . all this seems but a paraphrase upon the passage afore-cited out of tacitus , as to the form of government . the princes and seniors are for the matters of less weight ; the former here mentioned , was the generale placitum , which the germans more particularly call , die jahrlicke versamblung , the yearly assembly . whose business ( he tells us ) was to order the state of the kingdom . he shows us likewise how binding these their ordinances were , and not to be contraven'd unless upon the utmost necessity , not a suggested , invisible , courtnecessity , but quae toti regno incumbebat , a necessity that lay upon the whole kingdom . in effect , the parliament ordered , and he executed their orders ; his office was the administration . amongst other particulars , we find him in parliament adjusting the matter of succession , as eginhard , and the abbot of staden , an. 813. informs us , of which the monk of paderborn , an. 813. vnde duces , ac primores solenniter omnes atque magistratus , ad concilium generale vndique collegit , natoque suo ludovico cunctorum cum consilio jus omne regendi tradidit imperii , successoremque paterni imposito designavit diademate regni . and accordingly his son lodowic by general consent of parliament did succeed him ; post mortem patris aquisgrani summo omnium francorum consensu administrationem accepit , anony . an. 814. de reb . gest . pip. car. & lud. the same author tells us , that this ludowic , lotharium filium primogenitum consortem imperii constituere volens , aquisgrani in conventu , more solito , instituto , eum coronavit . in like manner we have the son of arnulph chosen in parliament to succeed his father . regino , an. 900. proceres & optimates ad forachem congregati ludovicum silium praefati principis , quem ex legitime matrimonio susceperat , regem super . se ●reant , & coronatum , regiisque ornamentis indutum in fastigio regni sublimant . nor was this done onely out of formality , and for the greater state and solemnity on those occasions , for we sometimes find them refusing to grant what the emperour labour'd to obtain . amongst other instances , we have this last named arnolph , an. 894 , attempting to get the parliament make his son zundelbolk king of lorrain . but they would not gratifie him . filium zundelbolk , an. 894. ordinibus convocatis regno lothoraii praeficere voluit , minime tamen optimates praedicti regni eâ vice adsensum praebuere . regino , l. 2. but the next year after he prevailed , says the same author : anno vero sequenti in conventu wormatiae instituto , omnibus adsentientibus id demum obtinuit . hitherto these appear to be the same germans , ubi rex vel princeps audiuntur authoritate suadendi , ●agis quam jubendi potestate . and seeing that this of succession , is one of those points that are of greatest importance , 't is strange how the right of electing the emperors came afterwards to be left in so few hands , and to be setled in the seven only , who , in course of time got the name of princes electors . neither the occasion , nor the time when this custom began , can be discovered . some would deduce it from charles the great . some from otho the third , who reigned about the year 990. others from otho the fourth , an. 1200. others again from henry the second , who was emperour , an , 1001. from which uncertainty we may only gather , that the custom was very ancient . but it is not to be imagined that the other states by any publick act transferred the right upon those seven . amongst the fallacies and cheats of state , whereby the rich men may impose upon the poorer sort , and worm them out of all their share in the government , aristotle reckons these : that it be penal for the rich to be absent from the common councils , to refuse being in office , to want , or omit the exercise of arms , not to serve upon iuries , &c. but the poorer sort may use their discretion , it shall not be penal to them ; they may choose whether or no they will be present in common council , bear office , be at the charge of arms and training , be impannel'd upon iuries , &c. in these cases this specious liberty fools and bewitches them : for so long as no restraint is upon them , and they are not excluded or slighted , or disrespected any way in the matter , they rather follow their private occasions at home , and the business of their family . and thus by degrees insensibly is the commonwealth and government changed . and that is effected by art and trick , which openly and fairly could never have been brought to pass . we need not think that the germans were over-reached by any the like sophistry and deceitful laws ; but 't is likely , that to many it was sufficient , that it lay in their choice whether they would act or no ; and in that security many sate down : some could not conveniently spare time from their family ; some were indifferent which way the world went ; some could not part from their dear delights , their pots and their hounds ; and some staid at home , because they could not make that show , and appear in a pomp and equipage like their neighbours . by reason of these , and a many the like weighty considerations , together with a general degenerateness , supineness , and neglect of the publick , the affairs of state became abandon'd , and shuffl'd into a very few hands ; insomuch that few besides those now called the seven electors , made any great figure , or much labour'd in that sphere . but those seven were suffered from time to time by a silent usurpation to manage all , till insensibly it grew into a custom . so that ( under charles the fourth , when the priviledges and rights of every body came to be stated , and reduced by general consent into a standing law ) in the beginning of the golden bull , this ministry of the seven electors is said to be an ancient and laudable custom . some will have these electors to be a committee of the whole empire , and that ( there being one king , one duke , one marquess , one count , with the churchmen ) all the several orders in the empire are represented by them ; and consequently that their act is vertually the act of the empire . but it seems more reasonable , that this sort of an aristocracie sprung up to overtop the ancient more popular government , by the negligence or inadvertency of the other orders ; who were satisfied in seeing the emperour thereby effectually held within compass , and had no care or consideration farther . for all their fears and apprehensions had risen from the emperour , and , so be that they might be secured against his encroachments and oppression , they were content to set up those electors ; to oppose the emperour , and stand as a bulwark betwixt him and them . and therefore by their free act in the golden bull , they settle and confirm to the electors that prerogative , which no prescription otherwise could have made just and authentick : above an hundred years before , in the church had the government changed face ; an aristocracy obtain'd , and the election of the pope ceased to be longer popular . about the same time , in england also , the old laws and policy ran a dangerous risque from an inundation of arbitrary power , that threatned to break down all the ancient banks and barriers . for the normans , having come amongst us , partly by consent , partly perforce , pust up and wanton with their new acquisitions and swing of fortune , they could not well be kept within bounds . now and then speeches of conquest and holding by the sword , and the like bugtitles , were bandyed to and fro amongst the giddy courtiers , with now and then a sally and inroad upon the people , trampling property under foot . these insolencies and invasions kept the nation awake , and put them upon their guard , to wait an opportunity whereby their ancient rights and customs might be reduced into form , and solemnly recognis'd by succeeding kings in the great charter . thus was the cockatrice crushed in the egg ; and an early stop put to arbitrary sway in england ; and the government returned to its old center of parliaments again . germany , in this juncture , lay most open and exposed . the emperor , lord of the world , and head of the nations , successour to those caesars that had broken down all forms and fences , so that liberty and property lay wast every where before them . these owed all their power to the sword. the imperial crown , the lex regia , the whole bulk and body of the civil law , were wholly and entirely their own proper creature ; and what more might be devised to make a prince unlimited , uncontrolable , great , and barbarous , and render him a cyclops or a leviathan ? but the result was , the customs and liberties of the germans were far more ancient and more sacred to them , than any new song that the civilians could teach them . therefore all this long rattle of imperial prerogative onely alarm'd them , and made them provide the better for their security . and as their danger was the most threatning , and arm'd with stronger titles and pretensious than in other nations ; so have they with more care sought their preservation . and the golden bull with them was framed , and had the same effect as magna charta with us ; which they strengthen and make supplements to , by new capitulations upon occasion , according as the emperors abuse their power , or that tricks are devised , by colour of the letter , to elude the honest intention of that fundamental law and constitution . thus we see it true , in respect of soveraignes , as well as of subjects , that evil manners are the cause of good and wholesome laws . the french have no golden bull , nor magna charta ; peradventure , because no king of theirs had those pretentions of conquest , as the normans here ; nor had that imperial title of the sword , and the civil laws , as the caesars , to transport them beyond the bounds of moderation and reason . which put them upon other measures , and gave them opportunity step by step , slily , insensibly , and surely , to effect what more openly could never have succeeded . ` as in the fable , the storm and violence of the wind could not force away the travellers cloak from him ; but the sun coming silently upon him , dissolves him presently , makes him unbutton , and strips him of all . noise and bluster make the people the more obstinate and tenacious . but things remote affect them not . they never see consequences , nor lay ought to heart that is not immediately present before their eyes . if any thing now and then in the course of their kings reign happen'd that was shocking , all was lookt upon as some personal and accidental slip only , without foundation for continuance , or without giving jealousie of being repeated to posterity . about an hundred years after magna charta was establisht , was that project of the modern parliament in france set on foot , to render unnecessary the ancient assembly of the states , and consequently to alter the government . but the english arms gave check to their wanton career , and for a long time diverted them from pursuing that design , or bringing it to any head . however , this new assembly and vice-parliament was cultivated and improved daily . they assumed all the power , they consulted and determined the weighty affairs ; and in case the king offered any violence to the laws , they encounter'd and oppos'd his exorbitant courses ; they lay before him his coronation-oath , and plyed him with remonstrance upon remonstrance , till they brought him to reason . neither war nor alliance could be made , nor could any his edict or command have effect , till ratified and approved by them . so that to the unwary multitude these serv'd the turn as well ; these were as effectual and sufficient , and more ready and expeditious than the great old parliament . but afterwards came new-fashioned kings to reign , who would not be overcome by reasons or remonstrances . and yet then also , was a formal complyance of this parliament thought necessary ; and , as an expedient , when not satisfyed in conscience that an edict ought to be ratifyed , was introduced that clause , mandato regis ; which imported , that they did not ratifie such an edict upon their own judgment , but that they were over-ruled by the kings particular command . afterwards again came the expresso mandato , and expressissimo mandato regis , according as they passed it with a greater reluctancy , and greater violence had been offered to their judgment . but henry the fourth , who had fought through all opposition into his kingdom , and had subdued to his will all that had fac'd him in the field , grew impatient , after so great contrasts , to find his resolutions crost , and contested by tame gownmen ; therefore , to rid himself at once of all those verbal frays and formalities , made a law , that thereafter the kings edicts should be ratified and emologated upon sight , without more formal trifling and dispute . thus were those remains of soveraign power , that had surviv'd in this diminutive parliament , baffl'd and extinct , without much labour . but as they never possessed the vigor and spirit of the ancient assembly ; the people were never so stupid to trust , or lay much stress on their valour and performance . and therefore did more early show their resentment ; nor without a general convulsion and civil war , could bear the apprehension of a court-design to lay aside the old parliament . it was the boast of lewis the eleventh on this occasion , that he had mis la royauté hors du page , he had so ordered matters , that the royal state should be no more a pupil ; in him it came of age to dispose things , and act of its own head , and should not need to be tutor'd or be under a guardian any longer . this was a prince of a particular humour , and of singular endowments . it was no wonder if he did not like the check of a parliament ; he had before attempted by two or three rebellions to free himself from the authority of his king and father . the good old king charles , the seventh , weathered the open violence , but fear of poyson overcame him ; insomuch , ●hat he durst neither eat nor drink any thing , but af●●r five days fasting dyed . and now lewis being king , his first work was to clear the court from all who had serv'd his father , and pack off all the princes of the blood , and ancient nobility , and to create a new set of nobles and courtiers for his purpose . the people took the alarm , and clamour'd for a parliament to regulate disorders , and prevent the evils that threatned and hung over them . a parliament , a parliament , was the cry and expectation throughout the kingdom . the bishop of paris and clergy , the courts of justice , and the city , ( the three bodies of greatest consideration and gravity ) presented to him their several remonstrances . he ( dissembling being his talent ) took all kindly ; and to break their discontents , or divert them , he took six persons out of each of their companies , to be of his ordinary counsel ; in show onely ; for in effect he was still the same . and amongst the prosligate rabble about the court , there wanted not in the mean time a sort of wretches who made an hubbub , and as formally declared their detestation and abhorrence of their practises that had importun'd the king with their remonstrances , and call'd it an unparallell'd violation of their duty . nay , ( philip de comines tells us , ) the courtiers went so far , they call'd it rebellion to mention a parliament . nor was it strange such cattle then should be sheltered about the court , when a mounte bank was set up for lord chancellor , taylors and barbars ( iohan de doyac , olivier le diable dit le dain , &c. ) the prime ministers of state. this jarring and misunderstanding was followed by a civil war , which was call'd the publick good . this produc'd a parliament . and this parliament would no longer trust lewis single with the administration of affairs ; but appointed him thirty six commissioners , ( curateurs ) to be his assistants . however , lewis's excellency lay in playing an after-game . in the war , he had sent to his allie alexander sforza for aid ; who returned him answer , that men he had none to spare , but would give advise which should be as effectual ; so the italian advis'd him always to agree with his enemies upon any conditions , then find the opportunity to cut their throats . according to this , bodin speaks of him , pacem inire coactus est , sed eos omnes clam aut apertè , paucis admodum exceptis , necandos curavit fratrem , quoque carolum veneno . this is the dexterity which comines so much labours to gloss over , and set a countenance upon ; these the belles actions , and the finesse , which the modern french so much celebrate at this day ; all is copyed from this original . perjuries and poysons were his ordinary arms , yet none so devout , none so superstitious , none made the like largesses to the church . but his masses and pilgrimages did always portend some strange horrid murder about to be executed . these were but personal vices ; his eajoling the citizens , and affected gallantry to their wives , was politick enough . but what prov'd most effectual to his design of changing the government , and excluding parliaments , was his laying aside the franc-archers ; who hitherto had been the train'd-bands , and ordinary militia of the country . in the war ( call'd the pulick good ) he found that those franc-archers ( being men of a setled habitation , and way of living ) took part with their landlords and neighbours against him ; therefore from thence-forward he slighted them , and by beat of drum from town to town , gathered and listed such as voluntarily offer'd themselves to his service . these were then called adventurers , because they sought their adventure by the fortune of war ; as afterward when charles the eighth carryed them over the alps , they got the name of souldiers , from the sold or pay they received upon that expedition . but as this lewis could not trust the militia , so within a little time he began to think himself not safe amongst his adventurers . these yet were not remote enough from the interest of their countrey , and had some small sense of its oppression . thereupon , for the more immediate guards of his person , he takes into pension four thousand switzers . and by that establishment , seems to have compleated his design , and alter'd the old parliamentary , into a military government . and now it was not so hard a matter to borrow money of the citizens , and otherwise make those levies which no king before him ever attempted . thus it was that he brought the royalty hors du page ; or , rather ( according to the paraphrase of their historian mezeray ) hors du sense & du raisonne . though in germany the condition of their parliaments is not altogether so deplorable and desperate ; yet of later times there have not wanted lusty endeavours by force and by artifice to destroy them . right and wrong are ever the same , but times and manners vary faces very much . one while instead of all other penalty for a crime , it was sufficient that the law censur'd it with an improbè factum . to say he that does so , or so , is to blame , was more effectual and coercive in those saturnian days , than are racks and gibbets with us . radamanthus his way of administring iustice in all causes between party and party , was by putting them both to their oaths , and determining their right accordingly . this , says plato , was a proper and ●eady way in that age , when every body was possessed with the fear of god. but , says he , this would not do , now in our times , when some make it a question whether there be a god or no ; others make a doubt whether god regards what we do on earth ; most and the worst of men have a conceit , that though there be a god , yet they can pacifie him with their vile adulations , their mummeries and their masses ; so that they may still be as wicked as they please . therefore , says he , when mens opinions are chang'd , the laws also must be chang'd ; for , otherwise , if our iudges now were to make radamanthus their president , we should all be over head and ears in perjuries . the like may be observ'd in relation to sovereigns . in old times at first there was onely a simple confidence betwixt them and their people . and never were kings so reserv'd , as then when they had no bounds . afterwards , the misbehaviour of some princes introduced that check of a coronation-oath . and where that is the only check , `t is an argument they had never yet been there tainted with the atheism , and infidelity , which plato mentions ; but had continually liv'd and rul'd with that simplicity and religious fear , so memorable in those days when minos and radamanthus were king and chief justice of crete . claude seisselle reckons several refrains , bridles , that curb the french kings . but now when the old parliament is obsolete , this would be remarkt upon , as a graceless unmannerly metaphor , in the refined language . in the state of venice , at first their prince was as absolute as any barbarian ; till having strayed , and given some instances of humane frailty , new curbs and new tyes were devised for him . but the italian prov'd still too witty to be held by any . the venetians however would not be dallyed withal , they would not suffer the transgressour to rejoyce long in his extravagance , but pursued him with exemplary punishment : sabellicus reckons to the number of twelve that lost their heads for slipping their bridles . at the length , when the venetians found that neither the simple trust was sacred , nor the coronation-oath inviolable , nor the exemplary punishment effectual to contain their prince within the bounds that were consistent with a free people ; they concluded that the publick safety could not be sufficiently provided for , and secured against their prince , till they stript him of all the reality and substance , leaving him barely the formalities and trappings , and empty shadow of soveraignty . now to come to the germans ; what ever shifts other people have been put to , to maintain their liberty , they ( it should seem ) never trusted the soveraignty out of their own hands . so that whether it be a mixt , or what other sort of government you call it ; the great affairs were always reserv'd to be determin'd in parliament ; there was the supreme power , there was the majesty . yet no people have been forwarder in adorning their prince with all the titles and expressions of greatness , and an arbitrary , uncontrolable power , than they . all the acts and laws run in his name ; and are called caesars laws , and caesars constitutions . where the emperor and the empire are named , he constantly has the precedence . in the publick ordinances and recesses , every thing from him are stiled precepts and commands ; from the states merely obedience and prayers , though he cannot wag a finger without their consent . they every where speak of , and own in him a fulness of power vollncommenheit . and this they give also to the king of the romans at the same time ; to show the emptiness and vanity of it . as both are call'd heads of the empire , though the latter has no power at all , during the emperors life . they and all the world salute him by the title of imperial majesty . and the german style will not allow majesty to any other kings ; die koniglicher wurde , not die koniglicher maht , the kings worship , not majesty . yet after all , aeneas sylvius says , in germ. c. 43. imperatorem , & regem , & dominum vestrum esse fateamini , precario tamen ille imperare videtur , nulla ejus potestas est . the shadow and flourish onely were in the emperor ; but the jura majestatis , the vis imperii , the essentials of majesty were always reserv'd and exercis'd by the common assembly , as by the particulars may more plainly appear . 1. one of the rights of soveraignty is to be above the law , and to give laws to the people . neither of these royalties belong to the emperour ; he may be call'd to account for violating the laws . in the golden bull , the forms and proceedings against him are stated . ` t is there said to be the custom , and accordingly setl'd and agreed for law , that the electors may impeach the emperor , in the assembly of the states ; and the count palatine of the rhine , as chief elector , is to be the president or judge . for the legislation , or making laws , the emperor proposes , the states are free which propositions they will proceed upon . when an act is to be passed , the electors have six votes , the princes six , the cities two , the emperor has but one ( the last ) vote . without a majority he can do nothing : they can decree without him if he is absent . the ordinances are to be confirm'd by his seal and subscription ; but if the states persist , he must of necessity comply . even charles the fifth in vain contested that point , as may be seen in sleidan , i. 4. these sanctions are regularly subscribed by caesar , and by some of the states for the empire ; and are enrolled ( at mentz ) in the chancery of the empire . the several members of the states are sworn to be true to the emperor and to the empire ; and are said to be subjects of the emperor , and of the sacred empire . 2. in matters of religion , in all times , the head of the state had the supreme direction , as it was said of tiberius , deûm munere summum pontificem summum hominem esse . and the first christian princes , before the papal tyranny usurpt upon them , were always the chief pontifs , and receiv'd the pontifical habit from that colledge . but upon the reformation in germany , anno 1555. both the emperor and pope were excluded , and their pontifical supremacy abrogated . in the point of religion , the emperor was not consider'd as the chief and head of the empire , but as a party : for by joyning himself to the roman catholicks , he made their cause and concern his own . it was therefore agreed and concluded , that the states onely should determine in matters of religion ; and that with a tender hand , in an amicable way onely . 3. war and peace are transacted in the name of the emperor ; but in effect , all is reserv'd to the states . he must at the least have the consent of the electors . yet any prince of the empire may levy souldiers , may make leagues and associations without any bodies leave . 4. for jurisdiction , and the last appeal , the civilians say the emperor is fons omnis iurisdictionis ; but here it is far otherwise . the princes , in causes touching their life , their honour , or their see , always claim'd their priviledge das fursten-recht ( they call it ) to be try'd by their peers the princes of the empire . the common pleas were tryed by the emperor , and attended his motion , till by the increase of suits , that judicature was no longer sufficient , the judges grew corrupt , and many other inconveniencies appearing , the states in their assembly at franckford , an. 1489. ordered a place certain for the decision of those ordinary causes ; whereupon the imperial chamber at spires was erected . all the process and decrees of the court ran in the emperors name , and are under his seal ; and it is call'd caesars court. but it is also call'd the court of the empire . the emperor onely named the president ; by the states were the rest of the judges appointed ; and the other officers of the court by the elector of mentz arch-chancellour of the empire . the states likewise execute the sentence . they visit and reform the court by their commissioners ; and to these visitors are the appeals , not to the emperor . yet some voluntary referenccs that were made to the emperor and his privy-council , and to their arbitration , gave them opportunity of late to usurp a jurisdiction . 5. taxes are all levyed in the emperors name ; but in truth nothing of that nature can be done without the assembly of the states . nor is the emperor trusted with the money in his exchequer ; the states keep it till it be employ'd ; they have their several treasuries . sometimes the several circles keep their respective money ; sometimes a publick treasury is agreed upon , and one or more pfenning-meisters ( pennymasters ) appointed . anno 1495. they ordered seven treasurers , one to be named by the emperour , and six by the states . these swear to the states . and if any be by special oath or obligation bound to the emperor or other particular state , he is uncapable of that trust . these are accountable to the states onely . if the occasion for which the tax was rais'd be taken away , the money cannot be diverted to other uses , but by the consent of the states . 6. the chief magistrates are , none of them , made by the emperor . the count elector palatine is vicar or protector of the empire , and has the charge of it in the emperors absence . the three ecclesiastical electors , who are chosen by their chapters , are of course the arch-chancellours of the empire . the states appoint the ( reichs-skak-meister , or reichs-psenning-meister ) the treasurer of the empire . sometimes they leave the general to be nam'd by the emperor , and the ten circles appoint their several directors or counsel for him . for the other particulars , as the inspection and care of coyning money , the hearing and sending ambassadours , &c. the emperour has no great matter of advantage above the other states . on a common account , where the concern is general the states must be consulted ; and nothing can be done without their consent and approbation . the electors are in possession , and exercise a particular soveraignty in some points of greatest moment . they are the trustees and representative of the whole empire , in their election of the emperor . and hereupon they undertake likewise to loosen his power , or tye it up short ; and make what capitulations they please with him . and thereby would assume to themselves more than the other states will ever be content to allow them . but the emperour singly , besides the name , and pomps , and empty titles , has very little of the substantial soveraignty entrusted with him . the investiture of the great fiefs belongs to him . this is a prerogative goodly in show , and were of moment , could he lay any conditions or charge on the person invested ; but nothing is left to his will ; he cannot deny , nor delay the lawful heir . nor does the fee for want of heirs escheat to the emperor , but to the publick patrimony . he grants priviledges , where a third person or the publick is not injur'd . he founds universities , grants fairs , makes denizens , &c. he creates kings , princes , dukes , marquises , counts , poet-laureats , doctors , &c. he gives onely the bare titulary honor of prince , but not the qualifications ; he cannot make him capable to sit and vote amongst the other princes of the empire . so that here the states are not subject to that imposition which the roman senate once suffer'd under tarquinius priscus , who created an hundred new senators , to the end he might be sure of a court-party , by his creatures , and have a majority of votes in the house . in short , the germans seem to have observ'd the rule in politicks , that he who is the most high in name and dignity , should in real power be the least considerable . yet in the last age , the states gave way to several innovations , which prov'd of mischievous consequence afterwards . it had anciently been the custom for the assembly of the states , to send for the emperor to come to them upon occasion ; so hincmar tells us of charles the great , rogatu ipsorum in concilium veniebat , quotiescunque voluntas esset ut ad eos veniret ; similiter quoque quanto spacio voluissent , cum iis consisteret , &c. ep. 3. c. 35. upon their message to him , he came to the assembly , as often as they had a mind he should come to them ; and in like manner he stayed so long with them as they desired . and this custom continued , as may be seen in lehem . l. 7. c. 80. and c. 113. till under maximilian . and then the states began to go to the emperor . this maximilian likewise , upon pretence of sudden occasions that admitted not delays , would now and then be acting single , and usurping in several particulars the power that of right could only be exercised by the states . therefore the states , an. 1500. to take off these pretences , and prevent all attempts of this kind , and partly , peradventure , for their own ease , substituted in their absence a committee , which they call'd the regiment , and the members regents . this regiment was an epitome of the whole empire , and was endued with all the powers and soveraignty accordingly . it consisted of twenty persons , who were chosen out of the several orders of the states ; and took an oath to be true to the emperor , and to the sacred empire . the emperor or his proxie was their president ; but lest this might give too great advantage to the emperor , an elector was added , as a joynt-president with the emperor or his proxie . no person of dependance on , or particular obligation to the emperor , was capable of being a member . the emperor had no more vote than any one of the twenty regents ; nor could determine ought , unless the majority were for him . these were not simply to consult , but had the execution also . this constitution held for some years . and then the annual assembly returned , and resumed their power , and acted again . but in case of sudden necessity , left another expedient for the emperor . they constitute for him a councel consisting of eight persons , four chosen by the electors , and four by the other states . these were sworn to be true to the emperor and to the empire , scweren der keyserlichen majestat und dem heiligen reichs getreu , &c. but charles the fifth coming to reign , he was upon the new model immediately . he restor'd the regiment , but the conditions altogether different . now it consisted not of twenty , but twenty two persons . he as emperor would have two votes added ; thereby in effect to be master of five votes ; two as emperor , one as president ; one for austria , and one for burgundy . the former regiment might , according to the old custom , send for the emperor to come to them . now it was order'd that caesar might call them to what place he had a mind . formerly , if the emperor came not , they might proceed without him ; now , charles the fifth forbad them to make leagues and allyances , or do ought in his absence . the oath was alter'd , and the members were only sworn to the emperor , and said to be the councel of the emperor ; whereas the former was called the councel of the empire . in the former constitution , the elector in the name of the empire subscribed their ordinances ; here , with the electors subscription is joyned that of the president , in the name of the emperor . in short , the former was constituted by the states , and entrusted with their power , to be a check upon the emperor ; this was formed by caesar , to quiet the people , and entertain them with a show ; whilst he the more insensibly made his advances to invade their ancient rights , and usurp all the power into his own hands . the next project in case of emergencies , was the assembly of the deputies . this consisted of the six electors , six other princes , and two cities ; to which were after added four princes more . this continued till an. 1606. with some effect . afterwards it prov'd of little consequence , court-artifice prevailing , and the ferdinands found a way to manage the deputies , and render them as unprofitable to the publick , as charles the fifth had made the regiment . the second ferdinand called what deputies he knew would vote for him , the rest he excluded , and supplyed their place with others , who he understood were entirely at his devotion , as he told my lord digby , ambassadour with him , an. 1621. lundorp , tom. 2. amongst these projects , may be mentioned the councel of the emperours court , and the privy-councel . these also , that they might show as if the empire had the interest in them , were at the first sworn to the elector of mentz , as arch-chancellour of the empire . which oath came after some time to be omitted . thus we have seen that the custom of the empire was to have a yearly assembly ; these at the end of their session always appointed the time and place for their next meeting . if necessity for them sooner , then was the emperor to call an assembly extraordinary ; which happening frequently , the states for their ease appointed the regiment , and other expedients . this gave a president for the emperors to devise something of the like nature , which they might more easily pervert to their own arbitrary interest and advantage . if it have but the name or resemblance , the people look no farther ; they see not into the trick and secrets of it ; they are led by the appearance so long , till they are past recovery , and no way is left them for a retreat . and indeed the emperors of the last age ceased to deal bonâ fide ; the old german honesty wore out of fashion . and they no longer treated on the square with their people . artifice and juggle came in place : and in the days of charles the fifth , began to get a specious appellation , and be named ( forsooth ) reason of state. but more especially , since the jesuits there have refined upon the court-sophistry , and minc'd away all the old remains of morality and conscience ; for the jesuits could the worst of all other , endure these same mixt governments . they would have the pyramid inverted , and the whole stress of things rest upon one single leg , that their art might play the more freely , and they the more cleverly trip it down . this broad-bottom'd monarchy , and government founded on the people , puts them to other measures ; a dose of poyson , or consecrated dagger , will not do the work . they must here go about and about , make slow approaches , ripen a plot of many years , and draw a long concatenation of intrigue , ere they can think to compass their design . when the commonwealth has but one neck , the jesuit will have it under his girdle ; if not , one blow does the feat , and his dexterity is admirable . therefore in germany the jesuits have left no stone unturned , for their part , to bring all the soveraign power from the states to the emperor . and to that end , of late times the emperor ( whether by their influence upon his councels or no , is not our enquiry ) has employed all the undue practises , and set all engines a-work , to render the publick assembly useless , burthensome , and odious to the people . on this foot , care has been taken that some vexatious tax should be the only result and conclusion of every session ; aid against the turk , was a constant perpetual pretence ; money the head of all his proposals , money the effect and substance of all his speeches . this affair once adjusted , other debates were out of doors , grievances not then longer to be toucht upon , but all adjourn'd to another session . besides the mischievous devises to embroyl the states amongst themselves , and turn all their heat upon fruitless disputes and altercations . in the second place , the electoral colledge have not been too fair in their respects to the diet. these could be content that betwixt caesar and themselves all the matters of state be transacted . and have sometimes accordingly strecht a text of the golden bull to serve a turn ; and collogued with him , that he again might be complacent to them ; till that amongst them the publick patrimony and common right and prerogatives of the empire become engrost in a few hands , and made a spoyl to their unreasonable ambition . these electors must every one , under his hand and seal , signifie their consent to the emperor , before he can summon an assembly of the states . they got to themselves the making of the emperor . and now in effect the states cannot meet without their order . they were wont to be reckoned six electors , to some purposes seven , now they make eight ; but before they fill up the number of the roman decemviri , they will remember their fate . these ten ( as livy tells us ) having got all the supreme authority for a time into their hands , that they might reign absolute , took an oath together never to call the common councel . yet their tyranny held not long . this cheat would not down with the old romans ; but with a general indignation they break over the forms and captivity of the letter , for that old law in homer , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . to free their country from slavery , they executed an unwarranted piece of justice upon these ten usurpers , or ten tarquins , as some body then call'd them . lastly , the states have not a little been wanting to themselves , in the affair of this their so ancient and fundamental prerogative . one principal cause ( amongst many others ) has been their differences about religion . for the protestants being sure to be out-voted in the dyet , think they can barter with caesar for better conditions . and are therefore well enough content that the yearly assembly be neglected . in a word , the german diet is still on foot , rather incumberd , and clogged , and puzled , than destroyed . the parliament of france seems quite antiquated and subdued ; the ghost and shadow of the defunct has appeared three or four times since lewis the eleventh . but to revive that assembly in its full and perfect vigor , requires a miracle like the resurrection . so that in effect , we may date the demise of the parliamentary soveraignty in france , from lewis the eleventh ; and the decay of that in germany from charles the fifth . it is in england onely that the ancient , generous , manly government of europe survives , and continues in its original lustre and perfection . were there not something in that saying of the emperor maximilian , that the french king is a king of asses ; yet however that same legereté , on which the french so value themselves , is but , in plain english , a lightness of humour , by the which they are easily piped into a new mode of government . but our english ancestors have always been of a more steady principle ▪ more wise , and more weigh'd , than to dance after their politicks . the reformation of religion leaves no room at our court for jesuitical infection , so fatal to the germans . nor , on the other hand , have we yet had any swisse guards , or lewisses for our kings . ours have still been true english original , no copies of the french. magna charta , instead of being superannuated , renews and recovers its pristine strength , and athletick vigor , by the petition of right , with our many other explanatory or declaratory statutes . and the annual parliament is as well known to our laws , as ever it had been famous amongst the customs of france and germany . i have not formally answered many objectons that might be started ; nor much regarded the single instances of some historians ; and perhaps may be judged lame in several particulars that i have slighted . take all together , you may as easily find an answer , as raise a scruple . but the short of what i would have said , is , you are not to expect truth from an historiographer royal : it may drop from their pen by chance , but the general herd understand not their business ; they fill us with story accidental , incoherent , without end , or side , and never know the government or policy where they write . even the records themselves are not always accurately worded . the style of the court , and a form of words , imposes upon many . names are taken for things , ceremonies for essentials . the civilians are vassals to a for reign jurisdiction . caesar , the sword , the military , imperial ( or rather imperatorial ) discipline , is to them for scepter and civil policy . the germans , an. 1441. were for excluding them from all offices , and places of trust . limnaeus , l. 1. de jure publ . our common lawyers are for comparing and measuring by their rule , what is antecedent and above their rules and comparisons . christs kingdom is not of this world ; nor ought the divines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to meddle in this political province . in the general notion , monarchy or kingly government is the most easie , and the most excellent . but corruption coming into the world , neither the sons of iupiter , nor the sons of hercules , found perfection entayled upon them ; nor were exempt from their share of humane frailty . many ( says tasso ) are servants by fortune , who are naturally princes : some again , though descended from an hundred kings , are yet born to be slaves ; and ( maugre all their high race of royal progenitors ) will be commanded , and governed , and managed by a minion , or a mistress . these are , really and indeed , slaves ; but are not judged such , because the people , who onely look on the outside , judge of mens conditions , as in plays , where he is call'd a king , who , clad in purple , and glistering with gold and gems , does personate agamemnon : if he does not represent him well , he has the name of king nevertheless ; onely 't is said , the king was out in his part , or , the king acted his part scurvily . and flavius vopiscus , in aurel. caes. tells us , aurelius caesar dicebat , colligunt se quatuor aut quinque , atque unum concilium ad decipiendum imperatorem capiunt ; dicunt quod probandum sit ; imperator qui domi clausus est , vera non novit , cogitur hoc tantum scire , quod illi loquuntur ; facit judices quos sieri non oportet ; amovet a republicâ , quos debebat retinere , quid multa ? ut dioclesianus ipse dicebat , bonus , cautus , optimus venditur imperator . aurel●us caesar was wont to say , four or five get together about the emperor ; all their consult is , how to cheat him ; what they say , is to be law ; the emperor , who is shut up from other counsel , never knows the true state of things ; but is forced to understand just so much onely , as they tell him ; he makes iudges , who the least of all should be ; turns out of commission those who ought to be the quorum ; in a word ( according to dioclesian's saying ) the emperor , so good , so wary , and so too too good , is bought and sold before his face . if then it be true , that he who is of royal extraction , clad in purple , and called a king , is not always naturally such ; it was wisdom , certainly most seasonable , to find the means that might correct , and ( as it were ) ensure nature against the impotence and tyranny of the minion or mistress which tasso mentions . and if the observation of aurelius caesar be just , that cabals are so pernicious ; and that four or five persons who get the prince into their hands and possession , shall abuse , and cheat , and betray him to his face , in spite of all his goodness , his caution , and royal vertues ; if , i say , these things be true , the necessity of parliaments cannot be disputed . homer reckoned it barbarity in the degree remotest from all things of god and goodness , and a cyclopean presumption to rule without parliaments . old hesiod in his homely way gives an aenigmatical reproof to those kings that would be grasping all , and be so absolute , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . as if he had said , these fools know not , how much more the half is than the whole ; and that a shoulder of mutton , with the love of the people , is more worth than the ragoust , and the hautgousts , and all the french kickshaws whatsoever . plato tells us , that even in asia , they who performed any great atchievements , or enlarged the empire , were those ( as the grand cyrus , for example ) who slackened the prerogative , and admitted the people to a share in the government . but such as cambyses , who against all sense and reason stretcht and strutted upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lordly domination , brought all again into confusion and ruine . amongst the latins , even the founder of the roman name , romulus , because he took upon himself an arbitrary power , to rule without the senate , they ( it is thought ) tore him to pieces , insomuch , that they left nothing of his body for a spectacle to the rabble ; as afterwards their successors unluckily did , who kill'd caesar. the imperial power that began with the caesars , was onely magnum latrocinium , one huge horrid oppression . military government , martial law , barbarous nations , goths and vandals , over-ran , and made havock of the old civil roman empire . in britain , gaul , and germany , all this while , liberty , and a participation in the government , was the common right and inheritance unalienable ; the common councel was the basis and hinge , however the administration roul'd . afterwards , when germany gave us people , it gave us a german and a free people . about an. dom. 800. charlemain ( or charles the great ) united france and germany under one head , and one empire ; pire ; all histories are full of his reign and actions : he rul'd more solenni , secundum morem , in the old customary parliamentary way , every where . the nations round about submitted and took laws from him ; and he submitted all again to the ( ordinatum ) the ordinance of parliament . an annual parliament was then reckoned the custom , and inviolable right of the people . and thus the affairs of state proceeded , and this scheme of government continued in germany , till the late unhappy divisions about religion , weakning and embroyling the states , gave way to the austrian ambition , new projects , and jesuitical artifice ; so that the assembly of the states , at this day , keeps on foot ( indeed ) but sick , heavy , and unweildy . the french court had much sooner learnt the terms de proprio motu , & potestate absolutâ , by their neighborhood and correspondence with the pope at avignon . but so long as the english arms kept them in mind of their mortality , it was no time for them to think of ruling without a parliament . but when charles the seventh had sent home the english , lewis the eleventh , with ( olivier le diable ) his barbars , and his cut-throat devils , thought no attempt too wicked for them . he ( forsooth ) was hors du page ; he wanted not to be led , he was past an infant ; and a lowd outcry he made against the unmannerly , clump-fisted , bumpkin parliament . but when the bien publique , or war for the publick good , hindred him from bringing about his design openly and directly , he compast it , in effect , by slighting the militia , and laying his project of a standing army . in england we have also heard of minions , and mistresses , and cabals ; and have had unhappy princes . but the laws and old customs of the land , the generosity of the people , and the genius of the nation , have still prevailed , and been too strong for all their practises and machinations . when the normans came to the crown , after some years of ease and pr●sperity , they began to forget on what conditions they had entered . conquest was a short , a compendious title , and without intricacy . and now likewise the church-men were every where agog for changing the government both of church and state , into absolute monarchy . but the best on 't was , the pretences were visible and notorious . besides that the temporal and spiritual , the prince and the prelatical lord could not agree who should be supreme . which differences gave breath to the people , and put into their hands an opportunity to assert their ancient just rights , and bottom all upon the parliament again . and now , since the great charter , and petition of right , and the many other declarations , what can threaten us ? neither the gunpowder treason , nor the late more sacred invention of a pensioned parliament , could take effect . no room is left amongst us for a standing army , which enslaved the french. and ( our franc-archers ) our militia continues after the old model , nor , with us , as in germany . , is the papist like to bear up against , and balance our protestant votes in parliament ; thereby to render the constitution useless and unpracticable . and it may be hoped , we shall never so far give way , and be gull'd by jesuitical artifice , to find another division in religion amongst us ; that may favour their designs , and , under other names , do their work as compleatly . you need not be caution'd to distinguish plato the divine , from plato the philosopher . poets and divines , you know , have a particular way of expression , and give their thoughts a turn different from that of other people . they attribute every thing to god ; though the whole operation and train of causes and proceedings ●e never so natural and plain before their face , the images they make are often taken in the grossest sense , and worshipped by the vulgar ; and many times the statesman is willing to contribute to their idolatry . hence it comes , that for the persians , zoroaster was said to receive his laws from horomasis ; trismegistus , for the aegyptians , from mercury ; minos for the cretans from iupiter ; charondas for the carthaginians from saturn ; lycurgus for the lacedemonians from apollo ; draco and solon for the athenians from minerva ; numa pompilius for the romans from aegeria ; xamolxis for the scythians from vesta ; and all these as truly , as mahomet had his alcoran from the angel gabriel . this sort of doctrine went currant enough whilst monkery and ignorance sat in the chair ; but now in an age of history and humane reason , the blind traditions go hardly down with us . so that iure divino at this day makes but a very litigious title . nor was it consistent with the brevity of a letter , to observe minutely how long the remains of the roman domination continued amongst us ; as , namely , that the roman was the only authentick language for judicial matters in germany , till the reign of rudolph the first , about the year 1287. in england till edward the third , in france till francis the first . but in church affairs , that old mark of slavery is not yet worn off : the spiritual emperor will remit nothing , he still holds his vassals to the roman tongue even in divine service ; onely in england , and where the reformation has prevailed , this , with the other appurtenances of roman bondage , are no longer necessary . nor is it proper in this general draught to reflect on all the several steps , and little dispositions to change , in each nation . as how sometimes a practice has prevailed against the form and letter ; sometimes the form of words has been necessary , but the practice obsolete . the use in commissions of the phrase , pour en jouyr tant qu'il nous plaira , was not known in france till lewis the eleventh tryed its vertue ; which occasioned their parliament , an. 1467. to ordain that notwithstanding the clause tant qu'il nous plaira , offices should not be voyd save only by death , resignation , or forfeiture ; as pasquier in his recherches informs us . but peradventure , since it has been so much controverted of late amongst us who are the three states , and the word occurring so frequently in the german tongue , you may expect some account who they be that have the name of states in germany . they express the word states in their own language , and call them stands , and reich-stands , because , says goldastus , the empire stands and rests upon them , as upon its basis and pillars . status imperii dicantur , quod in illis , ceu membris , id est , basibus & columnis , ipsum imperium stet & subsistat . those are said to be stands , who have the right to sit and vote in the common assembly of the empire . hi quidem status , reichs-stands appellantur , ideo , quod statum & locum votandi & sedendi in comitiis imperii habent ; hâc quippe unicâ & propriâ quasi notâ , status ab aliis imperii subject is secernuntur , arumaeus , c. 4. de comitiis . so that all the question is , how many several ranks , or distinct orders , there may be of these stands . from polybius we have had a particular account of mixt governments , where he calls those that represent the monarchical , the aristocratical , and the popular state 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the three governing parts of the common-wealth . so the king , the senate , and the ephori at sparta ; the consuls , the senate , and the tribunes at rome , were there the three states , and had each their particular shares in the government . the like seems to have obtain'd in france , under the names of the king , the peers , and the third state. nor did the power of the clergy , how great soever otherwise , make any new distinct order , but they were mixt and included with the other states ; as their learned archbishop claude seisselle in his treatise of the french monarchy , shows us . in germany how the government has been shared , and who have had a right of voting in old times , we may learn from what has before been cited out of tacitus ; the rex , the principes , and the omnes , denote the three states , who had their several shares , and right of voting in the government . the same distinction continued still under the western empire . hincmar , at the yearly assembly , or generale placitum under charlemain , does comprehend all under the terms of seniores and minores . so that the emperor , the seniors , and the commons , seem to have then been the three states . senior ( which the germans exprest in their ealdermen ) we may suppose , was a word grew currant in the provincial , or vulgar roman about that time ; and afterwards was diversifyed into sieur , and sire , and sir , and monsignior , and monsieur , and was ordinarily applyed to men in great office. cum seniori urbis nunciata fuissent , &c. seniores loci illius , &c. nihil per me feci , nisi quae mihi , a dominis nostris & senioribus imperata sunt , &c. tempore senioris nostri , &c. ex parte senioris mei caroli , &c. these and the like passages , in gregory turonensis , may show the extent of the word , and that the seniores in hincmar , were the same with the principes in tacitus . nor did the signiories become hereditary till otho the first his reign . but what most affected the government , and proved of greatest consequence in this affair , was the innovations that hapned in frederic the third his time : for whereas formerly a proclamation was wont to be issued out , for summoning the assembly , whereupon , delecti ex singulis civitatibus , says aymoinus , from every town and city were chosen the burgesses and citizens to go their representatives to the assembly ; now so many griev'd at the charge , neglected the proclamations , that oftentimes the assembly could not proceed for want of a competent number of members . wherefore frederic let the proclamations alone , and instead thereof , sent particular letters to the several towns ; and henceforward none took themselves obliged to attend , who had not letters directed to them . many of the poorer towns were glad to be excused , and private gentlemen left off going : so that within a little time the government was brought into a few hands , and every day rendered less and less popular . those cities that preserved their share in the government , and right of voting , by continuing to send their representatives to the assembly , are now therefore called imperial cities . although the electoral princes had a name much sooner , yet were they still one and the same state with the other princes , till under this frederic , in the dyet at francford , an. 1489. they parted , and became a particular assembly , and voted severally , and from that time got the name of a distinct state , and form'd a new sort of an aristocratie by themselves . yet all this while the clergy did never set up for a separate order in the common-wealth , but always made a mixt state with the layety ; mixt they are in the electoral state , and mixt in that of the princes , where the geistlicher and weltlicher , ghostly and worldly ( as they call 'um ) together with the counts , barons , and other gentlemen , make but one state. they have indeed a particular bench ( die geistliche bank ) to sit upon by themselves , save that the arch-duke of austria , and duke of burgundy , onely sit upon it above them . now whether we fix our notion of the three states upon the doctrine of the ancients , as delivered by polybius ; or call them the states , who have a right of voting ; the emperour is clearly one of the states . nor is it material that the ordinary stile and form of words seem to imply the contrary : for if the saying , emperor and the states , argues the emperor himself to be none of the states , by the same reason the form so frequent in their recesses or publick ordinances , chur fursten , fursten , und standen , that is , elector-princes , princes , and states , will exclude the electors , and the other princes also , from being either of them states . the form emperor and states , does no more prove him to be none of the states , than with us the saying king and parliament , does imply , that the king is no part of the parliament . i shall not trouble you with the disputes , what were the bounders of anstrasia and newstria , or whether by the devolution of this western empire , germany was added to france , or france to germany . or whether more properly charlemain be to be reckoned amongst the french or the germans . his having been born at ingelsheim , as most affirm ; or at carolsburg in the upper bavaria , as many believe ; and his speaking the german tongue , with this testimony of eginhardus , viz. mensibus juxta patriam linguam nomina imposuit ; cum ante id tempus apud francos partim latinis , partim barbaris nominibns appellarentur , ianuarium appellavit wintermonat , februarium horning , martium lenkmonat , &c. these , i say , are urged by the germans , as no mean arguments . but these matters concern not our enquiry . if you cannot reconcile the emperor his being somewhere said to be sacri imperii minister , and elsewhere declared to have no superiour , nisi deum & ensem , but god and the sword ; bartolus tells you , de verbis non curat jureconsultus . the intention is to be regarded before the words . the intention of the states in that declaration , an. 1338. was none other than to exclude the wild pretensions of the pope ; to deny a forreign jurisdiction , not to confess or introduce any new subjection in themselves : limitata ex certâ causâ confessio non nisi limitatum producat effecium . but i cannot conclude without some reflection on these frauds a la mode , the ruse and finesse , which the french so loudly boast at this day . lewis the eleventh would not have his son learn more latin than qui nescit dissimulare , nescit regnare . the old romans had another sort of spirit ; we are told in livy , haec romana esse . non versutiarum punicarum , neque calliditatis graecae-apud quos fallere hostem gloriosius — dolo quam virtute : 't is like a roman , to deal openly and roundly ; not to practice the carthaginian leger-de-main tricks , or graecian cunning , whose glory is to circumvent and by fraud not vertue overcome an enemy . the venetians at this day are commended for the same style . il procedere veramente regio regli affari publici , il negotiare saldo , e libero , e senza artisicio , o duplicita ; non masquerato , non finto , ma sincero , e del tutto alieno da ogni dissimulatione e fallacia . their proceedings in publick affairs , ( says our author ) is truly royal ; they negotiate upon the square , frankly , and without artifice , or double dealing , not disguised , or upon the sham ; but sincere , and every way far from all dissembling and tricks . and indeed the bugie and inganni , and little italian shifts , would better become duke valentine and the petty princes , than any kingdom or commonwealth of true strength and solid reputation . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sophistries and state-pretences of this kind . however furbisht up , and gloss'd over of late by our politick brokers , were all stale cheats , and worn out even in aristotle's time . thus have i hinted matters to you , and onely toucht upon heads , without anticipating your reflections and applications . i have not treated you like a stranger , but as one thorowly informed before-hand , and to whom all those difficulties are familiar , which i can onely discover at a distance . and after all , i must fly from your judgment , to your good nature . finis . politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. by h.c. s.t.b. grotius, hugo, 1583-1645. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a85748 of text r202255 in the english short title catalog (thomason e1527_2). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 114 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 77 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a85748 wing g2123 thomason e1527_2 estc r202255 99862609 99862609 114773 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is 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(eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a85748) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 114773) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; 194:e1527[2]) politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. by h.c. s.t.b. grotius, hugo, 1583-1645. campanella, tommaso, 1568-1639. h.c., s.t.b. [10], 142 [i.e. 143], [1] p. printed for humphrey moseley, and are to be sold at his shop at the princes armes in saint paul's church-yard., london, : 1654:. original title not traced. based on: campanella, tommaso. realis philosophiæ epilogisticae partes quatuor. p. 142, 143 misnumbered 143, 142. annotation on thomason copy: "decemb. 5". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng political science -early works to 1800. a85748 r202255 (thomason e1527_2). civilwar no politick maxims and observations: written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. b grotius, hugo 1654 19106 5 15 0 0 0 0 10 c the rate of 10 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the c category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2008-07 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2008-09 john pas sampled and proofread 2008-09 john pas text and markup reviewed and edited 2009-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hvgo grotivs translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men . by h.c. s.t.b. london , printed for humphrey moseley , and are to be sold at his shop at the princes armes in saint paul's church-yard , 1654 ; to the reader . i shall not beg pardon for this addresse to the english readers . what is here presented to view , is the digest of the immortal hugo grotius . the subject matter was first lent by that learned frier campanella but hee was rather the occasion than the author . for campanella's share of this work , was onely a piece of his philosophia realis , which had slept forgotten , had not grotius ' wak'd it by these admirable observations . and these speak the author so fully , that you 'l confesse he travail'd farther , while he sate stil , then ever vlysses was feign'd to do ; and ( without the encounters of circe and the sirens ) not onely {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} now if you suspect the english falls short of grotius own latine , i would gladly know who it is that can reach it ? but if you look for the sense faithfully renderd ( and-reasonably you can expect no more ) i assure you 't is done ; and that on his word who hath chosen rather to lose his livelyhood , than to subscribe to a lye . farewell . to the most learned hugo grotius the author . our ages wonder , by thy birth the fame of belgia , by thy banishment the shame : who to more knowledge younger didst arrive than forward glaucius , yet art still alive : whose masters oft ( for suddenly you grew to equall and passe those , and need no new ; to see how soon , how far thy wit could reach ) sat down to wonder , when they came to teach : oft then would scaliger contented be , to leave to mend all times to polish thee , and of that paines effect did highlyer boast , than had he gain'd all that his fathers lost : when thy capella read ( which till thy hand had clear'd , grave and learned did under stand , though well thou might'st , at such a tender age have made ten lessons of the plainest page ) that king of criticks stood amaz'd to see a work so like his own set forth by thee : nor with lesse wonder on that work did look , than if the bridgroom had begot the book , to whome thy age and act seem'd to unite , at once the youth of phoebus and the light . thence lov'd thee with a never dying flame , as the adopted heir to all his fame . for which care , wonder , love , the riper daies paid him with just and with eternall praise ; who gain'd more honour from one verse of thine , than all the canës of his princely line . in that he joy'd , and that oppos'd to all , to titius spright , to hungry schoppius gall . to what ( with cause disguised ) bonarcius writes , to delrio's rage , and all his loyolites but though to thee , each tongue , each art be known , as all thy time that had imploy'd alone , though truth do naked to thy sight appear , and scarce can we doubt more , then thou canst cleer , though thou at once do'st different glories joyne , a lofty poet and a deep divine , canst in the purest phrase cloath solid sence , scaevola's law in tulli's eloquence . though thy imployments have excel'd thy pen , shew'd thee much skil'd in books , but more in men . and prov'd thou canst at the same easie rate . correct an author and uphold a state . though rare praise , do a full truth appear to spain and germany , who more do fear ( since thou thy aid didst to that state afford ) the swedish counsels then the swedish sword . all this yet of thy worth makes but a part , and we admire thy head lesse then thy heart ; which when in want was yet too grave to close ( though woo'd ) with thy ungratefull countries foes . when their chief ministers strove to entice , and would have bought thee , at what ever price : since all our praise and wonder is too small , for each of these , what shall we give for all ? above the reach or stroke of fortune live , not valuing what she can take or give ; for low desires oppresse the loftiest state , and who lookes down on vice , looks down on fate . falkland . manipvlvs politicvs or , politique maxim's and cautions . part i. chap. i. of politique communities . 1. the sense and apprehension of mans self-insufficiency , was the first thing that link'd men into communities . for man finding himselfe unable to stand alone , was compell'd by necessity to betake himselfe to the support of others . 2. dominion therefore requires the union of many into one body , which is called thence a community , a policy or body ; because no man can politically be his owne lord nor the lord of any one singular person . 3. dominion is two fold . 1. naturall , or 2. violent . by the naturall , the soule rules the body , parts , and affections . by the uiolent , the affections sometimes lord it over the reason . observator . 4. man is borne to hold society with all men : an evident signe whereof is , his speech , and naturall tender affections , if they be not corrupted by education . 5. 6. there is a threefold community 1. of soules or mindes . 2. of bodies . 3. of fortunes . first , the community of minds , which is call'd religion , and that is the chiefe community , which is the very soule of policy , & the shield of naturall justice : and it is the great tye that links man to god , and man to man , whence religion hath its name , à religando . observat. this religious union , is evident amongst the jewes , but more amongst true christians : amongst mahumetans very little : amongst pagans none at all : unlesse we rather regard the bare sound of the name , then any morall effect . 2. the community of bodies . this stands in the second ranck of tye's or combinations . by this the great turk rules over mahumetans , iewes and christians , which under his empire are united in body , although in soule and religion far differing . 3. community of fortunes or goods , obtaines the third place . by this the turk rules over the turks , and ragusians too , and the king of spaine over the genoese , neapolitane and spaniard : for the geneoese have estates lying in that kings territories , and traffique there . some communities there are mixt of all these three . chap. ii. of the function and degrees of lords and rulers , whence flowes the divers kinds of republiques and regiments , &c. of their circulations , &c. hee naturally rules , that excells in vertue . he naturally serves that is inferiour in vertue , or has none at all . where the contrary is , there the dominion is violent . 2. politique excellency consists either in the 1. mind , or 2. body , or 3. both . 3. he rules best that excells in both , as caesar did . he rules next-best that excells in mind , as vlysses . thirdly , he that excells in body , that is , in strength and activity , as ajax . observator . but being it is naturall for the soule to excell the body : he that by strength of body over-rules them that excell in mind , rules violently : as of old the giants , and afterwards brennus , and attila , and many more . 4. the first thing that gained dominion amongst men , was 1. power . 2. wisedome . 3. love . the mixture of all three is rare , and admirable . power without wisdom is brutishand barbarous . tyranny , this is lyon-like dominion . wisedome without love , is but a cheating hypocritical dommion . this is fox-like . hence lewis the ii. of france , gain'd the title of lewis the fox . but love cements all , and makes dominion durable . hence poets say that cupid ( or love ) is the antientest of all the gods , for indeed love made the world and harmony preserves it . 5. the supreme power is the power of the sword , that is the power of life and death , which resides in them to whom the last appeale in criminalls is referred . 6. dominion of one good man is called monarchy dominion of one evill men , tyranny . the dominion of many good ones , aristocracy . the dominion of many bad ones , oligarchy . the dominion of all good ones , policy . the dominion of all bad ones , democracy . it is the office ( or duty ) of those that rule 1. to teach and instiruct their subjects 2. defend their subjects 3. nourish or feede their subjects 4. to maintaine the rights of their subjects which seeing no king can undergoe of himselfe alone , he does the 1. by priests , doctors , and lawes . 2. by souldiers . 3. by husband-men , merchants and artificers . 4. by judges , that judge according to law . on the other side , the people owe to their prince two things 1. reverence & . 2. obedience . 8. those are called kings which preferre the publique before their own private good : but tyrants which doe the contrary . 9. a kingly government , does very rarely degenerate ( except by degrees ) into a democratique , yet in athens it did so : which originally was a monarchy . 10. when a popular state , by mis-government , is corrupted ; there springs up in lieu of it , either a tyrant , as pisistratus , at athens , or a * king : as cosmo medices , at florence . or vassalage under strangers , those of pisa , by this meanes , became slaves to the florentines . common-wealths by luxury and pride , shrink and contract themselves into an oligarchy . so some fell into the hands of a decemvirate or government by ten-men : which lasted not long , but was quelled ( observe it ! ) by the people rising under the conduct of virginius : so the athenians , under the conduct of thrasybulus , cut off and suppressed the thirtie tyrants . 11. strife betwixt commons and nobles , encreaseth a common-wealth : but if the commons bee conquerour , so as to draw the nobles to their bent : the republique goes to wrack : as it hapned in florence : a state of all others most subject to changes . but if the noblest win the day , tyranny forthwith steps in : as heretofore in genoa : and the republique falls to ground . but contentions about the change of religion , or the sharing of state ( which by a new name , we call levelling ) is ever the utter undoing of all , especially where the conquerors are but few . yet in flanders , holland , and friesland ; they are not so much wasted by varieties of religion , as the french , polack , and english are : because they are compell'd into union by the common enemy the spaniard . observator . the strife of peares and people , so long as they keepe from down-right blowes , may be reckoned in the number of those which herod calles , good and advant ageous contentions : but when by ambition and avarice the sedition of the apuleij and the gracchi , and after them the warrs of sylla and marius crept in , the republique of rome began to look monarchish : which as jul. caesar ! invaded upon a popular accompt : so would pompey have probably done , upon the senates . in some places , such is the education of divers that are called noble-men ; that you may expect vertue from any men , sooner then from them . strifes about religion are there most pernicious and destructive , where provision is not made * , for dissenters : that they may live secure : and the supreme magistrate makes not their security good to them in good earnest , whereupon tumults and jarrs about religion have risen that have vexed germany , but almost quite destroyed both france and the netherlands . so much for internal changes . externall follow . such are forraign invasion , plagues , inundations , and conflagrations uuniversall . which disasters oft-times so change the face of things , that inhabitants are glad to begin the world again . these we may not ( as the author here seemes to do ) impute to any magicall fatality , in the numbers of 7. or 9. ( which yet he laies , have been experimentally found ominous ) nor yet to the ill-complexion of starrs , that ( as i may say ) attend the horoscope of such and such kingdomes and commomvealths : ( though i will not deny , but god ( the great demiurgus ) brings many plagues upon men , and cities , by the ministry of the planets ) but ascribe these calamities to the finger of god : which writ the period of the assyrian empire upon the wall . dan , 5. and levell'd sodom and gomorrah , with the plain wheron they stood . gen. 19.25 . cities and countries are sometimes destroyed by naturall causes , but yet the hand of god may set them on work : as if aetna ( by its eruptions ) should destroy sicily , or vesevo , campania : ( as it has sometimes done ) earthquakes in italy are naturally frequent : by reason of the many hollow grots and mountaines in that country , but if they bring destruction to whole countries , or cities , ( as they have not long since done ) vere digitus dei — firy sins of that sodom , &c. the city of venice is subject to oblimation : or the casting up of mud , and sands ; which may in time choake her up , and be her ruine : which of her self is so admirably complexion'd , that she can never perish . observator . some remedies for this disease ( though perhaps not strong enough ) shee has already invented : and may devise more and better : yet this advantage her seas bring , that they are her bulwark against strangers : upon confidence whereof , shee has no militia of her own ; yet fears a tyranny from her own strength : and hence perhaps it may fall out , that by hyring of forreign commanders , she may at last come to ruine . chap. iii. of the essence , constitution , and division &c. princedome and dominion , &c. the romans , upon the suddain emergencies of danger , by war , or seditions , did chuse themselves an extemporarie monarch : which they called a dictatour : whence at last ( by the authors leave ) we may inferre thus much : that a monarch is the best & safestengine for any people , in time of war or danger . hence homer makes his wise-man , [ ilysses vote clearly for that ; to carry on the grecian warre — it is not good to have many heads ( say's he ) let there be one chief , one king ! for 1. the dominion of one good man , is alwaies better then the dominion of many , nay , of all good ones . yea , 2. the male-administration of one , is much to be desired , rather then that of many , or of all in a princedome , or rule . 3. simply and naturally , god is the sole lord paramount : as having power-absolute over all : whose will ( as most wise ) is a law to it self , and transcends the whole scale and predicament of things . but 4. man is onely lord in degree and measure : because his will cannot be a law ; unlesse regulated and bound up by the law of god , either naturall , or positive . 5. hee knows not how to rule a kingdome , that cannot manage a province nor can he wield a province , that cannot order a city ; nor he order a city , that knows not how to regulate a village : nor hee a village , that cannot guide a family : nor can that man govern well a family that knowes not how to governe himselfe : neither can any govern himselfe unlesse his reason be lord , will &c. and appetite her vassalls : nor can reason rule , unlesse her selfe be ruled by god , and [ wholy ] be obedient to him . ergo . without the divine rule , no man is truely a king , or prince , according to nature , but rather to be counted , a scourge of god , &c. executioner of men . but neither , according to the divine rule , is any prince simply a lord : but a ruler and pastor of his people : * and the vice-gerent of the lord god by whom kings reign . 6. therefore ought a good prince so farre to excell his subjects in vertue , as the shepheard does his flock : who is of a superiour species to them : now seeing all men are equall as to the species , it must here follow that princes ( as such ) must have somewhat of god , &c. peculiar impresses of elohim , the deity in them . therefore 7. wisdome alone rules best of all : not sophisticall , but philosophicall [ yet ] not the wisdome of the cloister , or the * cell , but civil wisdome , not opposite , but subservient to god . 8. the dominion of the the 1. male over 1. the female is naturall . 2. father 2. his children 3. oldmen 3. young men 4. strong 4. the weake 5. schollars 5. master nature doth bring forth men . 1. of strong intellectuals , though weake in constitution of bodies to be priests , philosophers , councellors . 2. active and strong bodies , with couragious minds to be — souldiers . 3. gross braines and rude hands to be husbandmen . 4. heavy and robustuous for the cavalry or horsemen . 5. laborious and nimble-handed to weaving , and other manufactures . 6. ready tongues , and learned , for embassies , and orations . 7. other sharp wits for merchandize . 8. just men for the bench , or tribunall . 9. weak in body and mind , for * service , and to be instruments for their betters . 10. men of abilities both of body and mind , to be commanders , kings , and masters of the militia . 10. that therefore there is the best republique , where every man bends himselfe to those duties and imployments which nature hath fitted him for : for then reason and wisdom bear sway : and that the worst , where men are put upon imployments , which are contrary to thein grain , and genius : for then fortune , and chance , ( that is the force of ignorance ) rule the rost . 11. whence magistrates are chosen , because they are the sons of nobles , or sons of ☞ friends of such as are in present power , or for their wealth , or bought honour , and not because they are good , or wise men ; there the republique falls to ground . 12. a common-wealth goes to wrack soonest , when the portion makes marriages , and equality of wealth , and not an equall * strength of body and mind , whence ( according to the pythagorean ) the best issue is to be expected : * though plato think ( more rightly ) the best breed to be of strong bodies , and good wits : or on the contrary . 13. all mischiefs sway , where women have the liberty to do , and say what they please , &c. 14. these wee count citizens who not onely are capable and partakers of dignities and honors , in the republique , but such , as by any function , be it never so mean ( as the members of the body ) contribute to the use and advantage of the whole . the rest wee count strangers , excrements of a common-wealth : such as are many noble-men now adaies . 15. the [ true ] office of the noblenesse or peereage [ in any republique ] is to defend that , and private persons . the office of the commons to seed , and sustaine it . the office of the wiser sort , to rule and instruct it . he that takes no prosession , or calling at all upon him is to be look'd upon , as an excrement , or drone : but they that mediate betwixt god and man , are to be esteemed as the diviner part of a common-wealth : such are the legitimate priest-hood . chap. iv. of laws and customes , and that which is called the reason of state . 1. that * good men may be borne , and imployed in those offices and functions , to which they were born , every community stands ever in need of a law . 2. as virtue is the private law , of individualls [ or singular persons ] so law is the publique vertue of a community . therefore being virtue is the rule of actions , and affections in a particular person , ordained by the decree of a potent and * pliant reason , for a chief private good : so law is the rule of affections , and actions publique : constituted and published from the dictates of common reason , which respect the chiefest common good . 3. the chief good is preservation : & that either private or publique . which is ( as far as may be gathered ) from conservatives [ simply ] or expulsives of destructives . simply to coserve is to enternize [ or perpetuate ] therfore simply , both the private & publique chief good is from [ god ] that eternall chief entity . but partiall from other things : as namely , instrumentally and dispositively from the rules of reason . 4. wherefore — no republiques ☞ can make laws , where there is not common reason and common consent ; unlesse where by common reason ( and consent ) the matter is put into the hands of the wise-men ; such as were solon , lycurgus , and numa . or unto one whom god has delegated [ for his vicegeret ] as moyses , &c. as for minos and mahomet , either craft or the the devill led them on , to be apes of the true messengers from god , as moses was . observat. here the observator steps in and saies , i see no reason why the edicts of one or many rulers may not deserve the name of lawes , not at all awaiting the peoples consents : for neither in prescribing medicines , do physicians require the consent of their patients . 5. 1 the eternall and first law is that , whereby god did fashion , create , govern , and change all things and bring them about to his own ends : even changable things , unchangably . 2 from this is derived the law naturall planted in the minds of men , and in the whole volum of nature which is * gods art , and natures directory : neither can it be violated but by god : [ and that by him ] as a lord , not as a legislator . 3 from the law naturall is is derived the law of nations , common to all men . 4 from the law of nations , the positive civill law is derived , and so farre as it is agreeable to nature , it is invariable : but as it serves present necessities , it may , and sometimes ought , to be altered . god himselfe also gave a positive law — which is immutable , where it containes the law of nature , where our necessities [ onely ] mutable , as the law of moses in the decalogue , remains [ in full force ] for ever , but not in the forbidding of swines-flesh : which was made on purpose to * avoid leprosie . yet , ☞ no man can alter lawes , but he that made them , or he that is created his substitute , for that very purpose . observator . note . this observation cannot refer to any thing in the antecedent paragraph . nature is the work of reason without us . humane reason , is the work of nature within us . the will [ of man ] is ( of its own nature ) mutable : but reason immutable , except improperly : namely , when the matter about which which she is conversant is mutable . 6. politique reason , which some call the reason of state : and of old , was the same with equity , does transgresse the [ strict ] letter of the law , but not the sence and scope of it : becauses it does not abrogate or interpret , &c. any thing but for a greater good : as in the case of fabius vitulanus : to whom the roman senate granted his life which was forfeited to the law : and horace that slew the three curatis , * in the quarrell of the roman empire . but the reason of state , as it is now adaies , is nothing else but a devise of tyrants , that carries the face of equity , supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse , not onely their owne , but even the lawes of god , either to gaine or maintain their petty dominions . but , the difference between reason of state , and equity is this . for equity respects the publique good and truth : but reason of state looks upon [ onely ] the private and seeming good of the power in being . now since machiavel was found to play achitophel , the name being confessedly impious , princes began , ( that they might cover the shame of it ) to call it the reason of good government . which names though given by a knavish godfather , may bear an honest meaning . as for example . cleonymus put to death the ephori of lacedamon by a right reason of state : but so does not the [ great ] turk his brethren : because although he seem to do it for the common good ; yet being it is against the law of god , and some other way might bee found out to prevent their aspiring to the throne , the fact is [ barbarous and ] unreasonable . 7. a good prince wants not this reason of state , because his owne goodnesse is a perpetuall shield unto him : and if any rise up against him : all the people stand for him : as for david : whom his rebellious son had deprived of his kingdom . but a thousand thousand machiavillian arts cannot protect a wicked prince : because , cause , he is [ both ] odious to the people , and to god the king of all [ the world ] now , hee that jarrs with [ god ] the prime cause , does foolishly depend upon second causes : as it happen'd to caesar * borgia : who under themost wary , and provident [ discipline and ] mastership of machiavell , lost , both his life , and fortune . thus are machiavillians alwaies taken in their owne snare : for want of divine and heavenly knowledge , and by conceiting that by their owne wisdome they can fathome , and foresee , all things . 10. those lawes are best , which are 1. short . 2. easie . 3. few . and 4. fitted to the manners [ or genius ] of the people and the publique good . tyrannical lawes 02 are many , and [ those ] obscure , difficult , like so many snares : that serve the turnes of some one , or few , but not at all accommodated , either to the manners , or advantage of the publique . 9. where lawes are often changed : they are the forerunners of the instant raine of a republique : as florence found it therefore [ by sad experience . observator . lawes belonging to governments , ought not to be alter'd unlesse necessity compell : nor yet others , but where the profit is [ very ] evident , and [ very ] great . 10. where there are more laws to * punish , then to direct or instruct , it is a sign of an ill tempered government . 11. the acts of laws are : to command what is good : to restrain what is evill : and to tollerate things indifferent . 12. reward , and punishment are the two [ 2 ] spurrs of the law [ to prick men forward to observation ] of them . observat. no law can stand without punishment [ of the transgressors of ] and where no punishment is expressed , there it is arbitrary : otherwise it were rather a counsellthen a law : but whether a reason ought to be annexed to every law , it cannot universally be defined : saleucus , and charondas , and plato too , follow'd this course ; being to make laws for free people , they thought good to use perswasions . where as seneca ( having an eye upon his * own times ) affirmes : a law with a preface to be a foolish thing : being a law should command and not perswade : and dio chrysostome compares custome , to a king , but law to a tyrant : in that custome gives law to men willing [ to receive it ] but law binds the unwilling also . 13. the three guardians or keepers of laws are , 1. honour . 2. love . 3. fear . hee that secures not his law by these three , is either a weak or ignorant lawgiver , or elsea tyrant &c. 14. where a thing which once was good , becomes hurtfull , it is to be forbidden : where an evill thing does prosit [ the publique ] if it be evill of punishment , and not evill of offence , it is to be commanded . where in its own nature indifferent as it falls out , good or evill to the republique , it is to be [ according ] commanded or forbidden . 15. the laws of men make rather good citizens , then simply good men . yet princes [ and rulers ] ought to be simply good , because they are the * light and the law of others . 16. the law ought to make and ordain equality as the nurse of the common-wealth , but not a levelling ; for as the observator saies excellently , such strings make no harmony but an equality opposite to that destructive * consiming inequality , which is fatall to common-wealths . for example : extrem poverty makes theeves , insidious , perjur'd , ignorant , and instruments , of rich wicked men . on the contrary , very rich men are proud , luxurious , unlearn'd , contumelious , [ and i may adde out of * aristotle , injurious too ] very crasty men are [ commonly ] given to change . very stupid , are voluntarily servants [ or slaves ] onely moderatemen are stable in their place , and stations where they live . the florentine republique was ever the most unstable , by reason of the subtlety of their wits : the venetian , the most firm and stable of all , by reason of a mediocrity : and allay of dullnesse . 17. a good custome is a second law : which does more preserve a common-wealth , then the law it self . five customes , made rome , the princesse of republiques : as cato in salust witnesseth . 1. publique wealth . 2. private poverty . 3. just government abroad . 4. freedome of speech at home . 5. unliablenesse to fears , or designes . all these [ customes ] the commonwealth of venice observes as a law : except onely that shee lies open to fear : yet not in her counsels : but from forraigners , through want of a militia of her own . for want of the first [ publique wealth ] the genoesse , are not lords of the sea : nor of the new world , &c. for want of the fifth [ that is unliablenesse to feare , and desire ] the genoesse are as it were servants to forraign princes . for want of the third [ vix , just government abroad ] the french could never fix their dominion , without the verge of france . in which the spaniard is peccant too : every where severely and ceremoniously lording it ; not at all regarding the manners , [ and temper ] of the people [ they rule over . ] for want of the fourth [ custome ] [ that is freedom of speech ] the florentine republique went to wrack . observator . manners doubtlesse ( i.e. customes ) can do more then laws : and either add vigour to the , or take it from them . customs have brought laws under their subjection . obs. customs are either from 1. disposition of people or 2. institution and education . 1. for disposition : the french now have much of the old gaules in them : humanity and ficklenesse saies the observator : give me leave to adde feaverish valour in warre : ( which l. florus observes in their progenitors the gaules ) * in their first onsets they are more then men , in their second , lesse then women . 2. for education : what power that has over nature , consult xenophon , about the persians and lacedomonians . 18. good governors bring in good customes , ill men and women ill customes . ergo , neither ill men , nor [ any ] woman are fit to rule : the law of nations is the custome of the whole species . ( 1 ) all mankind . 19. not a rigid but easie government fit the n●rthern nations , ☞ as being by nature a fierce people , and will hardly brook the fetters of a republique ; as tartars , muscovites , suedes , germans , switzers , &c. where they have kings by succession , the people have much liberty , and the prince little power ; yet after the roman culture , they began to live more severely [ and regularly , then before . ] but for southern people , especially those that live under the tropiques , no dominion fits them but the despotique ( 1 ) lordly rule : and the severest lawes : because they are weak in strength : but strong in subtlety . for which reason they were ever [ very much ] addicted to ceremonies , superstitions , &c. observat. the muscovite and tartar are * slavishly governed : for there the north bears easterly . the king dome of swethland is become hereditary , by occasion of religion : but under such lawes , as are observed in elective kingdomes . 20. eastern people incline much to the disposition of the southern : as the western to the northern , by reason of the sea adjoyning to them : and for other causes : but the spaniard is like in conditions to the african by his vicinity , or neighbourhood . chap. v. of legislators . 1. a legislator is he , who foundeth a new empire : commonly upon new laws , religion and armes , rites , and fortunate essayes , or enterprises : as moyses , a good legislator , mahomet a * wicked one . a lawgiver therefore is either a god , as christ : or the messenger of god as moses : or a subtle politician , ☞ that can counterfeit the good ones : as minos , osiris , jupiter , mahomet , zamolxis , and the like : who to gain belief and love from the people , feigned themselves to be sent from god . for ☞ a lawgiver should be most renowned , most wise , most divine , and most reverend . observator . to pretend the commands of god might perhaps bring some successe to a * skillfull man , amongst a rude and ignorant people : as sertorius amongst the spaniards : or to the spaniard ( now * grown civill , and learned too ) amongst the americans : by the help of naturall philosophie , physick , and astronomic : but in a learned age , and place , this plot and artifice , is cold [ and ridiculous . ] 2. every artist , because is wise , is a king in his owne art : for a physician , hee 's lord and ruler over a sicke king : and so a mariner , in a tempest , saies to the priests and captaines , and the principall men , sit you here ; stand thou there , &c. therefore must the lawgiver be versed in all these arts : at least understand their ends : how they conduce either to the prosit , or prejudice of the republique — to purge out the superfluous and retain the necessary . hence it was plato banish'd poets out of his republique : because they were full of lies , and ribaldry : and by crying up wicked men , cry'd down goodnesse , and discouraged vertue . hence moyses expell'd false prophets and painters ( that pictured the deity ) and hucksters , and whoremongers , &c. a legislator must bee throughly skill'd , in the temperament and manners of countries , by the * air and the earth : as likewise happy or unhappy accidents that usually befall such and such a place , &c. as inundations , fires , leprosies , famines , &c. 3. legislators ought to reform and purifie , not exth pate religion . 4. the noblest profession in mountainous countries , are , 1. shepheards , as in switzerland , and scythia . in plain conutries 2. husbandmen : as in aegypt . in maritime countries 3. seamen and merchants : who for the profit they bring in ; the monies that they returne [ and exchange ] and arts and trades they bring from forraigne countries : have ever been held in highest place and esteem . but where other ( especially superfluous ) arts are preferred before these , imminent , both losse and ruine must needs follow after . 5. a divine legislator hath the idea of his own repubque in the court of heaven . the humane [ lawgiven ] in the government of the universe : and mans body . 6. man ( male and female ) are the elements of a republique : who consists of 1. soul. 2. body , and external . 3. goods . 1. the soul of a republique , is wisdome and religion . 2. the body , a senate or [ grand ] councell : or whoever bear any office advantagious to the publique . 3. for externall good [ the republique hath ] souldiers , mercenary , and auxiliary : and forraign merchants and artificers . for spirits , she hath lawes . for eyes , the searchers into arts , and sciences . for ears , spies and merchants . for a tongue , preachers , and doctors , and embassadors . for hands , her own militia : for feet , husbandmen and tradesmen . 7. as naturally the soul rules the * spirits policically , but the body despotically [ ( 1. ) by an imverious , and arbitrary way ] and the body rules the estate as the soule dictates to it : so religion has a politique dominion over lawes , and the senate : but over souldiers , tradesman , & such like , both * senate , law , and religion , rule proportionably . 8. goods of the mind are first to be look'd after : next , those of the body . those of fortune , in the third place . observat. the lawes of friendship , have a stricter tie then those of civill society . here endeth the first part of politique maxims and cautions . manipvlvs politicvs or , politique maxim's and cautions . part ii. chap. vi . of colonies and cities . they that rule over countries lying under several climes , must either govern them by distinct laws , or make exchanges of inhabitants , by mutuall transplantations . so the romans ( to secure their empire ) carried colonies over into germany , that by their example , the germanes , ( unaccustomed to romane lawes , ) might be the better acquainted with , and subject to them : observator . the trans-rhine ( which are the true , and proper ) germanes , for the much greatest part , were never conquer'd by the romans : but retain'd ( sans mixture ) their own language , and manners , till , under lotharius , they ●oluntarily submitted to the romane yoak . you shall find more germane families in italy , then roman families in germany . 2. colonies are best made up of citizens bred up in the metropolis of the kingdome : or in the neighbouring towns : for example either of romans or latines ; and because so many be planted , as will be able to defend the province [ and any enemy whatever ] 3. if colonies be sent from a free-state , it is good to build their cities on the tops of the hills , for defence of their liberty : if from a monarch , better in the plain . 4. that cities may wax great , 't is expedient they be situate [ either ] upon the banks of rivers , or [ neare ] the sea-shore , and in a plain ; where necessaries for life are easiest to be had : & commerce with strangers is most convenient : but , for the defence of liberty and lawes , and the non-impayring of valour , they are more commodiously seated upon mountaines and rocks . withall great respect is to be had to the wholesomnesse of water and air , and winds , and the prospect to the severall quarters of the heavens . 5. planters of colonies are to be divided — into 1. governors : as priests , and judges . 2. protectors : as soul-diers and commanders . 3. artizans : and such as * feed the republique . as husbandmen , shepherds , and the like . observator . nothing hinders but he that vses husbandry , may also follow a trade , either by himselfe , or his wife rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a plantation , do often faile in the practique . plaines bear most corn , mountaines most wool , hence &c. came chaffering , and exchanging and merchandizing , and stamping of goynes , &c. and for want of souldery [ hereupon ] were forts , and guns invented . chap. vii . of the instruments to gain & keep kingdomes , &c. to gain , keep and govern kingdomes , there are three [ principal l ] instruments : the 1. tongue , 2. sword , 3. treasure . 1. for the tongue ; t is the instrument of religion , and prudence . that is , of the goods of the minde . 2. the sword is the [ proper ] instrument of the body and its goods . 3. treasure is more [ the instrument ] of fortunes , and estates : which serves the body and minde [ onely ] secondarily : but the true instruments are the tongue and the sword . 2. they that use the sword only , founding their power upon that , those quickly lose their dominion ; as tamberlaine , attila , and brennus , and most of the northern nations . the jesuites in japan gaine [ first ] soules , then kingdomes to spaine and the papacy , by their tongues . there be that gaine dominion by crying up some new sect , built upon some specious colour of truth , by sowing discord betwixt the old religion , & the new sect , which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude : but such dominion is of it selfe not very long liv'd . ring-leaders of heresies , although [ commonly ] they gain much , they keep little : as for example , john of leydon , dulcinus & theudas . observat. john of leydon was an ignorant fellow , a person of of no worth at all , who through the hatred against the priests of his time ( whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men ) gathered together a rabble of the basest people . they that use well the sword and tongue , do lay the foundations of durable dominion ; but then the sword must be just , and the tongue veracious . thus did moses build the empire of the jews , [ namely , in veracity and justice , ] which impious machiavell never took into consideration . p. 147. the law of moises survived the empire of the jews , but mahomets laws shall sink with his empire : thus fell the laws of alexander with his person and power ; thus numa's , belus , and minos , pythagoras , and zamolxis his lawes are extinct , even for want of justice and veracity . he , that knows not how to give lawes to those he conquers , doth quickly lose the kingdome he has gain'd . thus charles the fifth lost tunis and germany which he had wonne , for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of lawes and colonies . this misfortune often befell king pirrhus ; but not so the romans . observ. he had need be a very wise man , that can give lawes to men of a different religion , that shal be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them , as it appears by the romans in jewry , who did the utmost of their endeavour , & with all their skill strived , to establish the state and tranquility of that untractable people , by lawes , conforme to their tempers and humors , as the excellent orations of king agrippa , and josephus made to their countrymen , [ the jews ] do witnesse . 5. he that defends his dominions by sword and tongue , preserves them better and more safely , then he that makes use but of onely one . for 6. men of arts are [ usually ] oppressed by men of armes . thus saturn ( being a priest , as antient kings were ) left his kingdome to jupiter ; and perseus the warriour , dethron'd atlas the [ scholler and ] astrologer : thus was pythagoras supported by souldiers ; * and the pope , till such time as he felt the use of his weapons , was often made a prey to his enemies , and many times ( good man ) to his friends . observator . here the thrice worthy grotius , notes well upon this late passage , concerning the bishop of rome ; that the benigne aspects of opportunity , made way for that power which the pope now enjoyes : as for instance , the christian world split into many petty kingdomes , italy torn in pieces , and sluggish withall : an age too dull to apprehend the meaning of that artifice in due time , and diverse other causes , which you may find in guicciardin , and machiavell . 7. he that uses only armes for the defence of his empire , and neglects witt and eloquence , makes but a paper building , rules but weakly : and this is the reason why the emperor of germany prevailes no more , having a people of different perswasions in religion to rule over : and usually such princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts . hence came it that the popes did so frequently make and un-make emperors at their pleasure . therefore ( as salust observes ) did the romans [ wisely ] ever exercise both mind and body together . for , he that exerciseth both , makes his empire last longest , as the king of the turkes , and abassines , and the dake of muscovy . fabulous philosophy affirms as much , whiles it gives pallas ( the goddesse of wisdome ) a book and a spear to make her invincible ; but to mars only arnour , who ( as the poets sings ) was therefore often conquered . hence was it that 9. the northern nations that fell like swarms of bees upon the southern regions , who excell'd them in religion and policy , received laws from them they had conquered : so the tartars and the turks a northern people , had lawes from the conquered arabians , and religion too ; and the hunns , vandals , lombards , and goths , from the romans , whose territories they had invaded . here the observator justly gives a check to the author , and saies that , both the goths that rul'd in italy and spain , and the vandals in asrick , to alienate and estrange the minds of their own people from the romans , jeroboam-like , end : avoured with barbarous cruelties to promote the arian heresia , by all possible means they could . 10. god that he might plant religion and learning among the northern people , and armes and numbers amongst the southern , did often make an enterchange , and engrafted them one into an other , like plants to make them the more generous ; but in both destroyed the degenerous plants from the sonnes of japhet : empires descended from sem , priesthood and laws from cham , servants , and as the author ( but mistakingly ) affirms , tyrants ; for ( as the observator notes ) the greatest tyrants that ever were , came rather out of asia , then africa , which was chams portion . chap. viii . of the causes of policies , and first of the first cause , god , and religion . there are three causes ( if we speak politically ) which found and govern empires , that is 1. god . 2. prudence . 3. occasion . but in some , one is more evident then the other . as in the kingdome of the jews , god was most evident ; in that of the romans prudence ; in that of the spaniard occasion : albeit ( to speak physically ) god is the cause of all causes . 2. all dominations ( except impious machiavels ) have confessed , that prudence hath not power sufficient to foresee the good and evill , which all waies and in all things do await them : therefore did all nations fly to god , some by a straight , others by a crooked way . therefore , the assyrian , aegyptian , and persian kings , consulted the will and pleasure of god , and implored his ayde , by astrology in the starres : the greeks by oracles of the sibylls : the romans by sooth-saying and auguries , whom the brasilians do but a little recede from : but the christians in a direct path [ seek god ] and fly to the spirit of god in his prophets , * and councellors , and his ministry . 3. every princedome is protected by its own proper angell , and every law as it is good is from god , neither can their be any law established which is void of all good ; as divines and nature teach us . 4. the priesthood supplies the place of god in every dominion , and therefore no common-wealth , no assembly of men , either was , or can be , without a priesthood , because not without god . 5. priests ought to be wise , but rather in contemplatives then practicalls ; valiant , but most in suffering ; sober , liberall , ingenious , true , not lying so much as in jeast , faithfull , cheerfull , but enclining more to austerity , then scurrillity ; gentle , prone rather to meeknesse then rusticity , whose character should be piety , wisdome , charitie , and tender-heartednesse , without hypocrisie . priests consult what is to be done , rulers command that to be done , which is contemplated or cousidered , and souldiers and artificers put commands and consultations in execution . 6. religion ever ought to be had in high esteem and veneration , not in vulgar and mean account . 7. the priesthood ought not to be prostitute to the people , lest it lose its honour and reverence . therefore aristotle , no less ignorantly then impiously , would make old souldiers priests . here the author puts the foole upon the calvinists ( under which notion he comprehends the worst of schismaticks ) who ( saith he ) both all and some , count themselves priests , which the famous observator here seems to prove , to defend , out of places ( with reverence be it spoken ) mis-urged both out of the scripture and fathers , in defence of common or universall unction . and ( by an injurious concession ) makes the calvinist guilty of the schismatiques phrensies : whereas 't is most evident , both out of calvin , and beza , in their severall discourses , and conflicts with the antiministeriall enthusiasts , that they were quite of an other temper , and opinion ; ever bearing high for an ordinate ministry : though they brought not clean , or primitive hands , to that great work . 8. that religion which contradicts naturall policy , ought not to be retained . therefore the maccabees in time of necessity taught , that warre might be piously made on the sabbath day , when the jewes under pompey and antiochus ( being that day assailed ) not defending themselves , perished . god gives no law to his people , [ whereby his people should be destroyed ] which is opposite to their own being . observator . rituall lawes , do easily give place to occasions , and times : whence comes the hebrew proverb : the life endanger'd , violates the sabbath : and that [ other ] the sabbath was given into the hands of man , and not man into the hands of the sabbath : yet the foolish gloss of some jewes was such , that some of them kept themselves in the self same posture , both night and day : and therefore paid dear for their superstition ; being not onely by pompey , but by nebuchadnezzar , sossius , and titus , taken captives upon the sabbath day . 9. the doctrine of fatall necessity is pernicious , in , and to commonwealths : for it makes subjects seditious , and princes tyrannous : both pleading necessity for the mischief they act : and thus much cicero acknowledged . but 10. this doctrine of necessity does no hurt among the turks , because they are rude , and illiterate , and are kept within compasse by force , not by law . but in italy , where they are a sharp witted people , it would make them stark mad , and all turne libertines , and lay all their sinns upon gods score , as the author of all evill : but above all , it would make their princes tyrants , in imitation ( forsooth ! ) of god , craftily imputing their own offences to their subjects , that they might [ god-like ] torment them , to their owne glory : then which , what can bee more destructive to a commonwealth ? 11. sophisticall sciences that thwart religion , ought to be banish'd the common-wealth : as plato teacheth . aristotle his school , did the jewes much mischiefe , under antiochus ; and now to christians : as averroes did too , both to us , and his own saracens . see s. vincentius [ lirinensis , ] observat. what is spoken here of aristotle does very well agree with the opinion of the antient christians . in whose iudgement aristotle was accounted impious . in the judgement of all the greeks , and ( amongst the latines ) saint austin , plato's philosophy is more consonant to christianity : aristotle coming but very lately into esteeme , and reputation , with the world . animadversions . what the fryer , or grotius affirme of aristotle is onely true , accidentally , & vitio utentis : and so all the sect of philosophers fall ( as well as aristotle ) under tertullians character , that they are patriarchs of heretiques : but i am clearly of opinion , that plato's idea's in the head of an enthusiast , or national theologue , have done much more hurt to christianity , then aristotles subtleties ever did : who being ( as himself justly boasts ) the father of syllogisme , and the first discoverer of fallacy , might advance all truths ( both natural , morall , and sacred ) more , ( did not men abuse him to sophisticall ends ) then all the whole race of philosophers ever did , or will do . 12. religion that is repugnant to common policy , although it be beneficiall to one particular city or province , is subject to a change , or reformation : and therefore cannot last long , as the decree of moyses , about the choise meates : and the apostles , of abstaining from idols , and things strangled . 1. there are therefore some lawes , convenient for time , and place , [ and person ] as abstinence from swines flesh , for the jewes , subject to leprosie . 2. other lawes are eternall , profitable for all nations : as to honour our parents . 3. some againe are pernicious to all places , and times : as that a man doth sin by destiny , and does profit in any thing without liberty [ in some degree ] of his own wil. observator . here grotius affirmes that the law of not eating swines flesh is of so long continuance , that it not onely remaines in use amongst the jewes at this day , but with the mahometan arabians , and abassin christians : and not without good cause : for that food in those regions begets the scab . as for that antient custom of abstaining from blood and strangled things , it was a long time observed by the christians , either out of hope to gaine the jewes , or out of reverence to antiquity : and that it has nothing in it contrary to republiques , or communities , the continued observation of it , through christian greece , and all the east , and the edict of leo the emperor , make evident . 13. all religions and sects have their proper circles and revolutions ; as republiques have from monarchy into tyranny : thence into aristocracy , thence into oligarchy , from that into a polity , and so into a democracy ; and then revert back again into monarchy at last : either by the same , or some other track . so , when sects arrive at atheisme , the very extremes of all mischiefe fall upon the peoples head : and the fiercenesse of gods wrath breaks in upon them : upon which , ( but through many affections ) they return to their pristine good condition . ☞ but when once they come to that passe , that they deny the providence of god , and the immortality of the soule , they must needs suffer either an [ absolute ] change , or a reformation : because the curb of conscience is taken out of the peoples mouth : and so being themselves wicked , they become a prey to no lesse wicked princes : and thereupon , tyred with evils past , they gladly embrace any lawgiver , whether hee be good or bad . 14. the sects of philosophers , passed not from one opinion to an other , ☞ any further then epicurus : and there they stopt : who denying god , and providence , all their sects were utterly destroy'd , as laertius [ excellently ] observes . the religion established by moyses , when once the sadduces crept in , that denyed the immortality of the soul , suffer'd a reformation by our lord christ * who brought immortality to all our soules . when the gentiles fell into down-right atheism , they fell into a world of miseries : as appears under the romane emperors : whose lawlesse licentiousnesse marr'd all : as cato in salust , and lucan , the poet , observe . the sect of the libertines , that held sin to be no sin , spring out of the calvinists , as the author ( but most slanderously ) affirmes . most of the transylvanians , deny the immortality of the soul , and the holy trinity . that most impious book of the three impostors , the fryer would gladly fasten also upon the reformed churches : but , as grotius notes , it was father'd long since upon the emperor frederick the second : but adds withall , that hee never saw the man , that saw that book . 15. the author ( as it becomes a fryer to do , ex officio ) pleados high for the temporall sword of the pope , and an armed priesthood : affirming that the great turk , the king of persia , tartarie , moors , and the king of fez , living all under an unarmed , naked priesthood , are , by that meanes , split into so many hereticall opinions : whereas the kings of france , spain , germany , and the republique of venice , and [ many ] other potent princes united in one religion under an armed priest , the pope , have no heresies started amongst them , but with manifest hazard of their crownes and kingdomes . observator . the sophie [ of persia ] after many years , began to innovate some thing in the rites of prayer and fasting : & made white hats ( or turbants ) for the cognizance of his faction : — but at long running , the posterity of this sophy , by pretences of sanctity , so bewitch'd the people , that in the end , they translated the crown of persia from the assumbetan kings , to their own . 16. & 17. these two paragraphs , savour altogether of the cell , and the cowle : asserting the necessity , ( at conveniency ) of the papall power , in temporalls , over christian princes . because ( saies he ) the pope 1. poyzes the differences of christendome , being umpire of peace and war . 2. that he [ alwaies ] takes part with those that suffer wrong : neither permits he any king to invade an other christian kings dominion . 3. hee links and unites christian princes , against the [ common ] enemies of the christian faith . and , 4. by his * crusado's and indulgences and excommunications , for good , and against evill rulers , he does erect and defend the christian commonwealth . so that without that pope ( to speak as a man , and politiquely ) christianity had , ere this , gone to utter ruine . and the author adds his opinion ( in fine ) that all christian princes , would be as one : secure from one an other , and from strangers too , and bee alwaies victorious : would they but once make one grand senate at rome . and , that the reason why never any one prince could attain an universall monarchy , over the rest of christian princes , was no other , then the temporall power of his holinesse ; which was a curb in their months . but ( saies hee in the close of all ) 't is likely that the monarchy of christendom , will by little , and little , fall totally into the popes hands . the observator answers thus , to these two paragraphs . he that , with care and diligence , will look into story , shall find that [ farre ] more warrs have been raised amongst christians by the popes of rome , then have been composed . but so farr is it from them , that they either could or would oppose themselves against the spaniard ( that glutton of empires ) that , on the contrary , the papall authority [ alwaies ] gave colour and countenance to the spanish avarice ; as navarre can [ sadly ] witnesse : and france , in the times of henry the third . and lately , with most notorious injustice , armes were raised against the duke of mantua ; yet would h●e receive no assistance at all from the pope , although no bad man . the papall [ bulls and ] edicts if they availe any thing at all , it is with such as are not able to resist them . they catch poor flyes , but eagles break through them . that christendom fell not long since into the hands of an universall monarch , it was no thanks to the papall power , that hindred it : but the germanes were hindred by their own discords , and germany hindred france , and france spain , just as the persian and tartar keep the turk [ from being emperor of the world . ] 18. charles the great , and constantine declared themselves defenders of the pope ; but henry and frederick enemies : for under frederick those pernicious factions of guelfes & gibellines ( that is , imperialists , and pontificians ) arose in italy . julian [ the apostat ] endeavoured to make gentilisme and judaisme aemulate one the other , and vie for the mastery , but perished under the attempt . the mahometan sect has many defects in it . first , because if their armes faile , they fall . 2. because it admitts not of divers princes . 3. because in many things it opposes god . and. 4. because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics . the duke of muscovy ( a country assailed by no man ) defends himselfeby his scituation and schisme ; and stands rather by the discords of christendome , then upon his own bottom , as indeed the turk himselfe partly doth . charles the fifth , was a man that bid fairest for the universall monarchy . when constantius countenunced the arians , and julian paganisme , the pope was not a man in power , had no dominion then . here therefore then is an error [ or fallacy ] of no cause , put for a cause . here in this paragraph , the fryar seems to dream of the return of a golden age , of innocence , under one ( i know not what ) monarch of all , as adam was at first , and seems to point at the spaniard for the man : the observator suspects some poison here ; but i think there is much more vanity then venome . 20. that the world may be governed by one man , the empire of augustus does partly prove it . that the spaniard does rule the 2 hemisphears by religion , which is the very soule of an empire , and dominion , being all in the whole , and wholly in every part . 21. if the world were governed by one man , as alexander said by one sun , warres would cease , and pestilence , by communication of arts and medicines , and by transmigration from infected into wholesome ayre : by the same transmigrations might inundations and fire be avoided ; so famine likewise might be averted , by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy countries , &c. animad. these are but the fumes & fancies of an idle braine , doting upon the spanish interest , and the papall ; and so i dismisse them proceeding to chap. ix . of the second cause of gaining and governing kingdomes , which is prudence . a monarchy is fitter to gain a common-wealth then to conserve dominion . monarchy is sooner depraved then many rulers . grotius confesses then a few ( as oligarchy ) which i undèrstand not ; neither of them gives their reason , nor i my assent . the observator adds . for duration , no common-wealth in the world is worth the naming , but the venetian : and yet the egyptian , assyrian , and french kingdomes have lasted longer then that . some are kings 1. by nature rationall [ as it were kings of wisdome ] as socrates and cato . 2. by fortitude , as domitian and vitcllius . 3. by both , as alexander . augustus . and david . 4. more by nature then fortune , as scipio , and hannibal 5. more by fortune then nature , as tiberius & galba . 3. prudence ( the second cause of dominion ) does properly belong to those that are truely kings ; and to such next under god , is dominion due which prudence is directly opposite to craft or subtlety , which is proper only to machiavels tyrant . prudence is consonant to god , that is to eternall wisdome . craft agrees to nothing but a mans own will and pleasure : that is , acts all arbitrarily . prudence is magnanimous , craft base , yet proud . prudence [ alwaies ] advances wise and valiant men , and puts them in place of power and trust . craft depresses and destroyes them , that she may rule over bastard-subjects , when the legitimate are cut off . prudence treasures up riches for the good of mens souls and that their numbers may encrease : craft aymes at money and strong holds , and rejoyces in the diminution and lessening of her subjects . prudence even in losing conquers , craft by conquering is a loser . prudence is mercifull , craft is cruell . prudence is that of principall men and chieftaines , such as cesar , craft belongs to servile persons , such as davus . prudence has an eye to the stern , but craft to the oare . prudence makes lawes for every mans good , but craft only for her own . prudence punishes , and gains good-will by it , and makes subjects the better ; craft punishes and becomes odious , and the people the worse for 't . it is proper to magnanimity and valour , to gain dominions , as to cesar , and charles the fifth ; but to justice and temperance to preserve them , as to the venetians : and he that is adorned with all vertues , is fit for both , as augustus . 5. he that acquires dominions , must have such a prudence as is magnanimous , stout , liberall , just , &c. but somewhat inclining to pride , boldnesse , prodigality ; but severity mixt with it , &c. he that keepes and preserves dominions , must have the same prudence , but inclining to pusillanimity , to fear , tenacity , and [ some ] licentiousnesse , &c. 6. hee that gaines a kingdome , different from him in religion : must either translate the seat of his empire thither : as the turk did into constantinople : or else translate the inhabitants into an other region , as nebuchadnezzar did the jewes , into babylon : and plant new colonies , in the metropolitane cities of the conquer'd province ; which shall be of thine own religion , and laws ; place [ new ] preachers there , change laws , and bring down the chief of the people ; as cyrus did in lydia , and the spaniniard in america : but if they will buckle to thy religion : thou maist make them artists , and mechanicks , serviceable to thy colony : if not , doom them to slavery , and transplant them farre enough [ be sure ] from thy seat imperiall . but if they embrace the same religion with thee ( as the neapolitanes with the spaniards ) treat them gently , receive them into common friendship , and change not their customes , nor polirie , but by degrees : let the supreme judges be made out of thine own men ; the inferiour out of theirs . if they did violently oppose thine entrance , levell the peers , with the people : but if they did receive the as friends : transplant them out of their native soyle , and drill them with honors , rewards , and promotions ; but be sure let not the chief heads be left behind : for they will either grow insolent , upon familiarity , and render thee odious to the people , or else they will rebell . by these defects , pyrrhus and charles the fifth , lost all the provinces they had gain'd , on a suddain . but beware , lest by calumnies , and fraud , you depresse any man ; for by that meanes you [ only ] prepare ruine and conspiracies against your self , and so alienate their affections , that upon the least occasion , they will rebell against you . 7. he that invades an others kingdome , must not stick at the mischiefs following . viz. to strike at the head , change lawes , pull down forts , and castles ; extinguish the blood-royall , or translate it . animad. this savours of machiavel : whom the fryer so much detests : or ( which is worse ) of the jesuit . 8. a prince should be known to do no evill , except that of punishment : and that too , such as the people wish : as to fleece usurers , and ravenous magistrates , to banish superfluous , and effeminate arts : doom the sluggish to the oare : to punish adultery , pride , and all enormous sins and sinners . 9. the people are kept in obedience , by [ plenty of ] provisions , souldiers by good pay : nobles by honors . 10. for the advance , and encrease of republiques , and kingdomes ; these rules following are to be observed . 1. all persons must take upon them those functions and callings , for which nature has fitted them . 2. magistrates are to be chosen , rather by nature then fortune . 3. the greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse , and the common before the private . 4. let there be a free community of goods , of knowledge , and of religion . 5. foment the emulations of aspiring to honors , by vertue . 6. preferre ever divine things before humane . 7. let every man learn this logick . viz. that god is : ergo , he is wise , and good : ergo , he has a tender care over us : ergo , he is just : and we are his children , and therefore after death , will reward or punish us . if this be not so , ergo , god is not just , not good , ergo , neither is he god : the contrary whereof ; all nature , the fabrick of the universe , and its severall parts , and the use . order and function of cach particle of it , do wonderfully [ and loudly ] proclaim . as also his revealing himselfe to his saints [ on earth ] angells , and devills , and policies , and all sciences in the world , [ confessing it . ] chap. x. of the third cause , &c. viz. occasion . the occasions of acquiring dominion , are innumerable . but the chief are , i. thine own valour , and numbers ; and the imbecillity of thine enemies , and their associates . 2. the division of the province to be surprized , into petty kings , or jarring . republiques ; but especially into various seots , and schisms . 3. but most of all , if any man call thee in , for his protectour . 4. if the rulers son be in his minority . 5. if the ruler be hated of his people . 6. if the people be covetous of change . 7. if the nobles [ or patricians ] may be bought and sold [ as those of rome were , in jugurths daies . ] 8. if there be any interregnum , &c. 9. all grosse and enormous sins , and vices , are so many inlets , and doors for a conqueror , to come in by : as idolatry , and anthropophagie above the rest . chap. xi . of the decay , downfall , and change of monarchies : and the cause and remedies thereof . all monarchy dies , or sinks [ at least ] either 1. through want of vertue in him that succeeds in it : so the assyrian monarchy ended in sardanapalus . or 2. for want of a successor ; which evill augustus prevented , by adopting sons , to succeed him . 3. by division , or discord of many successors : so the romane monarchy under constantius , became a dyarchy under constantine , and constance , and afterwards , in arcadius and honorius , and the spanish monarchy was rivall'd by alonzo , ferdinand , and sanctius . the turk prevents this mischief by killing his brethren : but the king of china by banishing them into some mountain : which the king of the abassines does likewise . 4. because the kings son is young and contemptible , as the son of scanderbeg , and antiochus , and alexander the great : and the last duke save one , of the line of sforza duke of millaine : who all being minors and pupills , were commited to guardian kinsmen , or tutors , or strangers , and so , were either murther'd or deposed . 5. the election of a king , if it be made by souldiers , is dangerous , and schismaticall ; because they are [ easily ] carried from one to another , in their affections . for , souldiers are naturally a dull kind of people : and value them most , who pay them best , at present : not at all considering , the publique good : as it happen'd in the times of galba , vitellius , vespasian , and otho in the romane state ; and under omri in israel : with very much dammage [ to the publique . ] 6. election also made by all the people , is dangerous : for they understand not the deep designes , of hidden , and disguised tyrants : but are distracted , and carried away with smooth orators , whithersoever they please to lead them . besides , the people are ever at odds , with one another , and alwaies changing opinions . hereupon florence by such popular elections , sustained a world of dammage , and prejudice . neither does the populacy confide in their nobles , but call in strangers to pacifie their tunmults ; so the florentines call'd in the commander of athens : by whom , they were more devour'd then before . the remedy is : if onely the heads of families be summon'd to election : but this is a weak one . 7. elections are best made by a prudent senate : out of the body of the senate it self ; as the pope , out of the conclave of cardinalls . 8. if an election suffer a schism in it , or fracture , viz. an interregnum ( or as they cal it ) a vacant see ; the empire may go to wrack ; and therefore the germane emperor doth make choice of his successor before his death ; as also the king of fez , before he dies , advances one of his own sons into his throne . observat. it often falls out otherwise : for the romane emperour of time dies and appoints no successor : and the polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that kingdom . 9. the best is not alwaies elected : but he whom the dying king loves best : as solomon chose rehoboam . observat. the odd number over does best in elections : and therfore the king of bohemia was superadded to the six old electors of germany . 10. a monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise , by the insolency and pravity of a mans children [ as in tarquin the proud ] or of his wife : who often hates the best deserving men : as sophia , the wife of justinian the emperor , hated narses [ the gallant eunuch ] who therefore call'd in the lombards into italy , to the hazard of the whole empire . ☞ 11. monarchy may be in danger also , and be ruin'd by the authority of some prophet , or [ bold popular ] preacher : that dares cry it down . the instance here is made in samuel , and the pope : which is an handsome comparison indeed . here the fryer draws the curtain , and laies open the whole scene of the popes encroachments upon temporall princes : which part i leave the fryer to act by himself , and thither referre the reader : only he tells us ( pag. 198. ) that never any prince prosper'd that opposed his holinesse , but fell at last ; as frederick of swevia , roger guiscand , &c. yet some princes call'd a councell against julius the second , and pope eugenius the fourth . all clergy-men ( under the papacy ) love the pope in their heart , princes only for preferment . armed religion was alwaies invincible , vid. animad supr. it is better for a prince to yeeld to the priest , as theodosius did to ambrose , then to treat him ill , as eudoxa did chrysoctome ; for he was confirmed in his throne , whereas she dyed an infamous death . 12. division in religion , albeit monarchy be not preached downe , does destroy ☞ it , as it appears in france , germany , and poland , &c. for it divides mens minds ; and therefore both their bodies , and fortunes , and armes , and both parties hate the king : the evill , because he favours the good , and the good , because he does not extinguish the evill . obser. here grotius ( the great est advocate and favouror of toleration that lived in our age ) opposes the fryar , and affirms , that there does not upon difference in opinions , seem so much hazard of divulsion ( as he calls it ) of minds , or animosity amongst men , if the magistrate would compell the ministry to forbear mutuall and publique railings , and resutations one of another , and if by a publique law of state , every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own religion , as it is in japan and poland ; which liberty the reformed churches of france being abridged of , tumults and warrs , were occasioned by it . 13. a monarchy also failes by its own vastnesse and bulk , for which reason it cannot [ well ] be governed by one , and he is therefore faine to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burthen , who afterwards will admitt no superiours , and so share the government ; as we have often seen it fall out in the roman empire . the remedy for this is , to keep an empire within its own bounds , lest the commanders and governors , being at too great a distance , usurpe the dominion : as the monarch of japan [ is a great example of this ] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six kingdomes ; and the king of china can * claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe , by walls and rocks , woods , and seas . another remedy for this disease is , for a prince to keep the wives and children of governors and provincialls [ abroad ] at home with him [ as pledges ] and engage them by oath to fidelity and allegiance , &c. which in part the king of spain observes . 14. sometimes a kingdom 's lost for want of provisions , because it has no fruitfull soyle about it : this is the condition of genoa , and venice , and therefore they provide against this [ mischief ] by merchants and factors , and exchangers of commodities , by granaries , munitions , &c. 15. a monarchy may also fall by pestilence ; against which , * the king of the abassines has provided a movable city , and so removes his seat at pleasure for the benefit of wholesomer ayre ; which thing the tartars [ now ] and heretofore the veientes observed ; nay the very birds do the same : but with us there be officers for health purposely appointed , which the author calls magistratus sanitatis , like our masters of the pest houses 16. a monarchy likewise is ruined by invasion of forraign princes , that over-power the right owner ; as the king of persia was by alexander of macedon ; and the sultan of aegypt by selemus the great turk . the best remedy against this , is the love of the subjects to their prince , & their gallantry on his behalfe ; next is , to procure a strong & ready militia , and to enter into league with many princes , that may over-power the rivall of his crown : as the macchabees did with the romans , being affraid of antiochus , and the venetian with the french when they fear'd the spaniard . neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of ; as the spaniard does betwixt the turk and persian , ths abassine and muscovite , polack and transilvanian , all around , &c. and amongst the nobles of france , which is his rivall . when the nobility grow too rich and potent , as the nobles of iapan , and often those of naples , and the french likewise and the german peers , they have destroyed the monarchy under which they lived , defining every one to live for himselfe . the remedy for this is , to cut off entailes of land & honours ; the author means in the words , ne feuda transeant ad haeredes that they be not established , as the turk does . next is to levell their forts and strong holds with the ground , or garrison them with the princes own souldiery , and then under pretence of advancing , to humble the nobles . 18. a kingdome may be lost too , by the treachery of a kings owne souldiers , as it happened to antiochus . the remedy against this is , to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning , and divide them ; and to fortifie thy selfe with a strong guard of thy best friends , whom thou must oblige with perpetuall favours , and benefits , as the turk does his janizaries . 19. a crown may be lost by the suddain incu●sion of barbarous people . the remedy against this is , to oppose wisdome and religion to barbarous folly : so pope leo opposed attilla , and jaddus the high priest in hierusalom , clad in his priestly robes , met , and adored , and so pacified alexander the great . 20. a man may lose his kingdome too for want of souldiery of his owne , and by entertaining too many auxiliaries and mercenary men ; which was the ruine of lodovick sforza , duke of millaine , &c. the remedy of this is to have a choice militia of thine owne alwaies in readinesse ; to arme and unite thine own men , but to disarme and dissipate the strangers . for this reason also it is expedient , that none [ of any family ] but the first-born inherit any estate , and let the rest be made souldiers ; or else do as the turk does , keep schooles or colledges of cloistered boyes , to be trained up in military discipline , which shall know no other father but the monarch . 21. sometimes a kingdome is lost after a victory , by the insolency of the conquering army ; or after a truce [ or league ] as it happened to carthage after the first punick warre , under hamilcar . the remedy for this is , on a sudden to divide the army into distant quarters : and not to be embodyed till the generall commands . 22. a kingdome may bet lost for want of present pay for the souldiery , when the warre is on foot , as it fell out to maximilian of austria . publique treasuries are the best remedy against this . besides the rich ( at such a pinch ) are to be compeli'd by religion ] be meanes sure anathema's and terrors of ecommunication ] and other penalties , to throw all their money and plate into the publique treasury : for so , neither can they rebell , and hereby is the kingdome confirm'd , and established : which was usuall at rome , and venice . and it is lawfull too , in extreamity , to melt down consecrate church plate : and to make the very souldiers themselves part with their gold to this publique purpose : but to sweeten them with fair hopes , and the pillage of the field . thus did caeser , in the beginning of the civill warre : and thus did henry ( the third i take it ) king of france the frer advises too : to make leaden coin ( if need be ) to be currant as long as the war shall last , as the venetians have done . 23. kingdomes are lost too , by the luxury of the conquering army , that does breake and effeminate it self : by the spoiles , and delicates of conquer'd provinces : as it fell out , to the lombards , goths , huns , and gaules ; who possessing themselves of southern kingdomes , full of delights and pleasures . they [ quickly ] lost , both their strength and empire : which happen'd also to all kings of naples ; by reason of the soft delicacies of air , and soyle . josuah found out a good remedy for this ; who would not quite extinguish all the natives , [ of canaan ] that his people might [ still ] have some body , whereon to whet , and exercise their valour . so [ scipio ] nasica advis'd [ the romanes ] not quite to destroy carthage , lest rome should grow effeminate [ by losing her rivall . ] 24. by joyning in commerce and traffique , &c. with two potent princes . thus came the raguscan to serve the turk , and thus the genoesse , to be under the spaniard : but the [ wise ] venetian prevented this . for he would never put to sea with the spaniard ; neither would he ever traffique with him , nor hold any thing by way of tenure or homage , in the king of s'pains dominions , [ as the genoesse and others do ] 25. heavy taxes , and impositions , often lose kingdomes , and enrage the people into mutinies , and rebellion ; as it hapned in israel under rehoboam ; and the duke of alva in flanders . 26. the cruelty of provincialls : may be the losse of a kingdom : which rule by pride and avarice . this the axe must cure , as goesar borgia did by orcus of cesena . punishments must ever be exacted by the sword , tributes by the tongue ; the militia by both . 27. a crown gain'd , may be lost , if the issue royall find friends to help them to their right : as in the case of ioas : who was establish'd in his throne by the high priest : against athaliah and her usurpation , &c. 28. a kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and potent men ; as the tarquins were erected by brutus , and lucretius , and the magi of persia by darius and his complices . hidden vertue in any man is a dangerous thing , especially if it be afraid of the prince that rules : for it will at last break out to the princes loss , if not ruine : as it did in brutus and his confederate . valour and light must be ever set high on a candlestick . smother'd fire may do , and indeed ever does , most mischief . observat. how dangerous it was for tiberius to advance seianus [ himselfe a well born person ] to so great honor : the frince perceived and remedied : but not without hazard . therefore both hee from that time forward and others , took a course to cast honors upon meaner persons : and those but temporary . animad. this observation becomes a man born in a popular state : but god himself seems to make it a curse : when the honorable person is overtop'd by mean fellowes . isa. 3.1 , 2. & 3. the conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a king , &c. is inevitable , as that of adad against the * king of edom : and pausanias against philip of macedon : and frier clement against henry the third of france . a conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided : therefore probity and the peoples love [ when all is done ] is the strongest guard a prince can have . 26. lastly , a kingdome may be lost , when the subject are wasted by warre : and so through want of defendants , it lies open to invasion ; as now ( saies the author ) spaine does . enfranchizing , or endenization , is the onely cure for this disease : by admitting forreigners into your freedome : as the romans did the latines : and so fill up your number . chap. xii . of the fall and change of republiques where many govern , &c. 1. to take off the dissentions , between peers , and people , the author would have them all participate of honors : as , at this time , it is amongst the biscainers : or , as amongst the jewes , that one family chosen out of all the rest should rule . observat. 't is expedient , that betwixt the peers , and the plebeians , there should be a middle sort , and degree of persons , as a seminary of nobility : such as were the knights and gentlemen of rome : for this degree is a kinde of tye , or ligament of both the other . 2. the peeres contend with the people [ usually ] about honours , offices , tributes , and matrymonie , and lands , and the like : and if the nobility get the day , the republique is ruin'd ; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people , and thence comes their downfall . but if the people gain the day , the matter 's worse then before , for either the nobles are driven into banishment , or else they call in strangers , and so the people become a prey to every crafty citizen , or forreign potentate , or valiant commander . if once the nobles mix and couple themselves with the plebians , to the end they may partake of the government with them ; they grow vile and despicable both together , and so the common-wealth falls to ground ; as it alwaies happened in the florentine republique , and divers times in that of genoa . the remedy is , if the people ( of a middle size betwixt the nobles and the pelting plebeian ) get the upper hand , and share magistracies and honours now and then , and lands and provinces also , by such contentions rome flourished and grew great , and yet granted the honour of victories , and the credit of them , to the commons : but florence perished under them . 3. a republique is often destroyed , when lawes are made to the advantage of great ones , and pressure of the people . 4. when the powers in being , usurpe anthority [ over the people ] and keep guards for their defence ; as the decemviri did at rome , and the thirty tyrants at athens . 5. the luxury of the nobles , and their neglect of armes [ and arts ] makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes ; and so makes a republique sink into a base democracy . 6. when a patrician grows too rich or potent , and emulations grow rife about priority , then the republique 's lost : so sylla when he had subdued marius , and cesar when crassus was slaine , and pompey conquered ( who were then rivalls in the empire ) carried all before them , and were tyrants at pleasure . 7. correspondency with some forraign prince , of any person in power , may ruine a republique . 8. when any fawning poplicola , in a time of famin , or other occasion , endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage , and by such arts , gets the power into his own clutches ; these must be lookt to , and suppressed , as metius was in rome , &c. and manlius &c. which king david neglecting in absosom , run the hazard [ of his life and crown . ] 9. a republique falls : to ground oft-times , because it wants a militia ; when the people & patritians mutually fear one another , and thereupon call in forraign commanders , which is usuall in venice . which commanders after some signal victory obtained , either themselves seize upon the common wealth ( as sforza did at millain , * and bartholomew coline might have done at venice ) or else they betray it to forraign princes , as malatesta did florence . 10. the faction of citizens , that bear affection to some faction of strangers , ruine a republique ; so all the republiques of italy split themselves into guelfes and gibellins , or ( which was worst of all ) into neuters ; whereupon dire and dismall slaughters and times ensued . a republique must never be neutrall , because it must necessarily be a prey to the conqueror , not being supported either by friends or enemies [ nec amicis nec inimicis fota lat. ] 11. a republique falls , when the people confide not in the nobility , nor the nobility in them ; and therefore they call in a forraign umpire , that will devour them both : as florence call'd in king robert , & * , the duke of athens . the remedy is , to commit the vmpirage of the quarrell ( not to strangers , but ) to religious men , priests that are natives ; as moises did by gods command , and as the observator well notes , the old gauls did to the druides , and oft times both they and the germans , to [ godly and ] grave matrons . but this latter is a crude observation . 12. changes of republique are innumerable , as their causes are . read the florentine history ( for that city ran through all varieties of change ) and in opposition to that the roman . chap. xiii . of the fate and change of popular , or democratique state , &c. 1. a democracy , or popular state assuredly goes to wrack , when ignorant plebeians rule , that canno agree amongst themselves , and determine all things ☞ by chance or affection . 2. popular elections are ever attended with jarring , and noise of the multitude , and obstreperous rabble . 3. in the senate or parliaments of popular states , he that has the smoothest tongue , is likeliest to cheat the people , and make himselfe be elected , [ rules in chief ] though he be the veriest knave in the pack 4. it marres a popular state , when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique offices , and the wealthier sort grow tyrannous by their riches . it is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice , as the florentines used to do ; for this is a symptome of dissention amongst the natives , and oft brings ruine with it , [ yet has it been practised else-where of late , but with like successe . ] 5. this paragraph about provisions and supplying the publick necessities by corn , &c. is treated of in the precedent chapter . 6. the next barre of a democratique state is , the generall that fights their battails abroad , and returnes home a king as well as a conqueror ; as sforza returned to millain , and cesar to rome , &c. observ. the romans provided excellently against this mischief , they had ever at hand good store of sitt and able men for the conduct of any warre , and ever and anone changed their commanders , whereby they both secured their liberty , and by emulation provok'd them to vertue and valour . 7. an other engine to batter down democracy , is a publique benefactor : that has got power into his hands : and pretends himself in hazard of his life by conspirators : and thereupon desires a kind of life guard for the safety of his person , against his accusers & those he would accuse , and so being thus well provided , hee invades the throne , ( if i may so say ) and dubbs himself king ; so did pisistratus at athens . to prevent this : the people must commit themselves , to the care and providence of wise and religious men : reposing all trust , and confidence in them : for by not believing solon the philosopher , who discover'd to them the design of pisistratus , the athenians lost their liberty . 8. a common wealth may fall , by the approach of suddain [ and unexpected ] dangers : the common people being dull & heavy in deliberations . so the romanes lost saguntum whilst they [ slowly ] consulted , how to get it : and the venetians cyprus , whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it . in this case a dictator must must speedily be pitch'd upon : to rule , and dispatch every thing as himself sees most expedient , without counsell or controll of any man . necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none , but the best and ablest man for that service : as the practice of the romanes [ in that case ] does witnesse . 9. a popular state may miscarry too by some wealthy citizen : who does favour and foster poets and oratours , and preachers , & grammarians , and all sorts of men , that have eloquence or wit , and by his riches , keeps an academy in his own house : of men that can blazon , & trumpet forth his praises and worth to the people &c. thus became cosmo medices dake of florence . let no man , that sets his wits and tongue to sale , have any pare in any senate or parliament . greece quite lost her self , by the liberty of orations : so did germany and france [ by sermons ] and the switzers too late provided a remedy against this disease . the last paragraph concerning the danger of change . all change ( be it never so little ) of the antient state of things , in a commonwealth , or kingdome is either , a sign , or cause , or con-cause , or preparation , to an universall change of minds : and ( by consequence ) of all the republique , or princedome revolting from its own principles . as new meates , and new exercise , beget a new habit of body . so darius by affecting to wear a macedonian sword , did foretell that his kingdome should be ruin'd by the armes of macedon . therefore the change even of old fashions in apparell , of banquets and marriages , and of womens behaviour , and of old discipline , and the pravity and corruption of youth ( as censorinus notes ) new lawes and tributes ought ever to be avoided : for they either suddenly , or totally , destroy a kingdom : whereupon the venetian will not change so much as his old originall garbe in his cloths for ( as solomon saies ) hee that failes in the least things , shall by degrees come to nought . the corollarie , and conclusion . it is probitie , and pietie , that preserves a king and people : and not the unlearned craft , and subtlety of machiavell : for all vertue , and power , derives its originall from hun : who is the essentiall power , and wisdom of his father that governs all things . to whom be all glory . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a85748e-1830 aphor. 1. max. 1. addit . * he was a dubs equall to a king . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} * grotius favours toleration corruptions externall . add. venice subject to oblimation . addit . an excellent gradation . conclusion thereupon . * victrii domini de , &c. * animadvers. they are like to make but sorrie servants and instruments : that are weak bath in body and mind . * valor lat. * observator . * lat. optimis nascuntur . * volentis . 1 yhe divine law . 2 law naturall . qua est ars dei : ejusdemque directrix . 3 law of nations . 4 positive law . * lepram non ] alendam . lat. * in the behalf of ] or rather for the empire . * casar , valentine borgia , lat. ] * punitive quam instructive . * under nero . * aliorum lux & lex . * inequalitas consumptrix . lat. * rhetor . * primus impetus major quam virorum ; secundus minor quam paeminarum . flor. * addictè despoticè . * perversus . l. ] * perito . cunning ] * iam eruditis . a body politique how actuteda . * spiritus . ] sing , i at . pro rata . * nutritios ] reip. l. * of croton● . dux . lat. * vicarium , &c. papam . * the lat. is ambiguous . add. cruciatus lat. franceruns franks . condemnationes lat. * or possess * civitatem portat idem . l. * he means . ehud & eglon. lud. 3.6.20.21 . * or colion . * or generall dux . the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated into english. balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de, 1597-1654. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a30645 of text r33129 in the english short title catalog (wing b617). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 111 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 82 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a30645 wing b617 estc r33129 13102899 ocm 13102899 97432 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a30645) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 97432) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1540:7) the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated into english. balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de, 1597-1654. [10], 153 p. printed by t.n. for j. holden ..., london : 1652. page 5 misprinted 4. errata: p. [9] reproduction of original in the harvard university library. eng political science. a30645 r33129 (wing b617). civilwar no the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated i balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de 1652 19790 7 0 0 0 0 0 4 b the rate of 4 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than 10 defects per 10,000 words. 2006-03 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2006-09 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2006-11 celeste ng sampled and proofread 2006-11 celeste ng text and markup reviewed and edited 2007-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the roman . the conversation of the romans and maecenas , in three excellent discourses , written in french by monsieur de balsac . translated into english . london , printed by t. n. for j. holden at the anchor in the new exchange . 1652. the stationer to the reader . nothing but great subjects can fall from the pen of monsieur de balsac , who having formerly ravished the world with his immortal prince , hath now for a choice cabinet piece illuminated in small an invincible roman ; neither can any pen so powerfully commend his , as his own : even commending antiquity he hath out-done it ; so that the present age may glory , that the vertue of well speaking is as high as ever . nay , hee hath so highly praised our predecessors , that with an unheard of rhetorick he forcibly perswades the contrary , & ravisheth for himself what he seems to bestow on them ; so that by his example we need not doubt but posterity is as capable of true nobility . and that antiquity it self must confess , that in parallel lines , although the parallel must be after the first , yet it may as wel be drawn above as below it . but as he of hero's , so we may say of writers , there is but one balsac . and indeed his translator thought it a bold attempt to make him speak english like himself , and to dare copy so high a subject after so illustrious an hand . and therfore conceals himselfe , behind the curtain , and timerously bids me enquire of you whither he hath don the authour right . if you are therefore pleas'd , wee are all so ; but we are all at a loss , unlesse you favorably pardon the escapes of the presse , which are many , and require thy judgement as well as the help of this errata . errata . pag. 23. line 15. read ever . p. 45 l. 6. r. heroes : p. 48. l. 11. conversation begins the paragraph : id. l. 18. r. nations : p. 98. l. 22. r. writes : p. 120. l , 11. r. he never fell : p. 123. l. ult. r. noblenesse : p. 125. l. 19. r. could : p. 126. l. 1. r. modest : p. 133. l. ult. r. appeas'd : ib. l. 14. r. it : p. 134. l. 6. r. debated : p. 135. l. 2. r. when : p. 136. l. 8. r. even : p. 137. l. ult. r. thornes . p. 142. l. 16. r. of . the roman , to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse i. what hath been told you madam is most true , and if you desire an illustrious witness , i will confirm it , caesar shall assure you in two or three places of his commentaries . there is no doubt but those great souls of which we have so often discours'd , were lodged in bodies of a mean size ; your ancestors were hero's , but were not gyants , and the most part of their enemies had the advantage , both in stature and bulk : this historical truth being without difficulty received , there can be nothing more just , then the consequences drawn from thence ; that had the men of those times been weighed , and valued by weight ; an alman had been neer upon worth two romans . the almans were both longer and larger ; the galls were stronger and more numerous ; the affricans richer and craftier ; the greeks better polished , and better skilled in the excercises of wrestling and coursing ; but the romans fitter for command , better disciplined , and more knowing in war ; and with this discipline which some have called , the foundation of the empire , the source of their triumphs , they have subjugated the strength , the number , the wealth , the subtilty , and even the vertue of other nations . you ought not to doubt but there was vertue in the provinces ; the despising of death was common among the barbarians : the love of liberty , and the desire of glory were not unknown unto them . but , madam , the tru use of al these things was to be found at rome : rome was the shop where the gifts of heaven were wrought , and where the goods of nature were perfected . it was she , who , first of all shewed to the world juditious armies , & wise wars : it was she knew how to mix , as it ought to be , art with adventure , conduct with fury , and the divine quality of the understanding , with the brutal actions of the irascible part . whereby it appears , that the soul is soveraign artisan , of all things , aswel of military actions , as of civil affairs : the principal part of valor depends not on the organs of the body ; neither is it a privation of reason , and a simple overflowing of the gall , as the people fancy it ; 't is neither the eies that see , nor the eares that hear , nor the arms that move ; 't is the soul , as a poet says , quoted by aristotle ; 't is the soul that doth all , whithout which the eies were blinde , the ears deaf , the arms paralitical ; it is the principle , and the author of all the operations of man . by the soul a child hath cast down a giant , and bulls are led in a string ; by the soul an architect sitting still , orders the work of a thousand masons , and builds temples and palaces ; by the soul a pilot without stirring , workes more then all the slaves at the oare , and a man would vainly sweat to hoise and loose the sailes , did he not find his way by the stars ; by the soul , madam , a consul having been commanded to make war against a king , an enemy to the republick , studied the way so well , and became so knowing in a profession , wherein he was altogether ignorant ; that going from the city a man of peace , he arrived at the army a great captain , and divests his robes to gain presently a battel : thus did your predecessors commence ; thus did they manage their first armes ; their prentiship was a master-peece . i am confident you would see one of those people ? can we finde out no way to shew you a roman consul ? is there no safer and more innocent means , then that of magick , to bring him whole from the place where he is ? for , without doubt , you would see him , both in body and minde , with that gravity , which bred respect in the heart of kings , and ravished the people with admiration ; you would see him , with that visible & acknowledgeable authority , which accompanied him to prison and banishment , which dwelt with him when he had lost all , whereof fortune could not dispoyl him , when she had reduced him to his shirt . here he is , madam , who comes not from the elizian fields , nor from a fabulous habitation ; he comes forth of the histories of polibius or of some such like country , and methinks he deserves very well to be looked upon . first , he no less knows how to obey the laws , then he knows how to command men , and with an elevation of spirit , which sees the crowns of soveraigns beneath him , he hath a soul wholly subject to the power of the people ; he reveres the sanctity of that power in the hands of a tribun , or of a furious man , or of an enemy , or perhaps of both . beleeving , that to fail is the onely ill that can happen to an honest man ; he beleeves there are no faults little , and making a religion of the least part of his duty , he even thinks he cannot be negligent thereof without impiety ; he more esteems a day imployed in vertue , then a long delitious life ; a moment of glory , more , then an age of voluptuousness ; he measures time by success , and not by its durance . acting by this principle , he is always prepared to hazardous undertakings ; he is always ready to devot himself , for the good of his citizens , to take upon him the ill fortune of the common-wealth ; and whether the oracle direct him , or the inspiration come from his own spirit , he thanks the gods , as the greatest grace they ever conferred on him ; for that it was their will he should be the general , which was to be killed of that army which should gain the victory . in pursuit of this , madam , there is nothing but must be easie to him , and nothing but we may beleeve of him ; he knows neither nature , nor alliance , nor affection , where the interest of his country is concerned ; he hath no other particular interest but that , and neither loves nor hates , but for publick concernments . a soul without a body , and rid of matter could agitate in no other manner , nor could it be less incommodated with its passions ; but let us say more ; it could not be less sensible of the vain appearance of humane things , aswel those which astonish , and those which dazel us ; the bravadoes of the day make no more impression on his constancy , then yesterdaies caresses : princes are as weak against him with their wild beasts , as with their treasures . and if he had never seen elephants , and were it possible from behind the tapistry to bring forth all those which are in affrica , or in the indies , he would consider them but as a sport , or the mummeries of pirrhus , and not as a frightful and threatning thing for fabritius . all what ever is frightful and terrible , in the world , is not capable to make him wink ; all what is splendid and pretious cannot afford him temtation ; he is neither to be overcome ; nor to be wonn . he is of those courages , madam , which were invincible , were they assaulted onely with a lively force , and were a man alwayes to fight , and alwayes to make war . but proposing for the object of their valor , to overcome what was most to be feared in their enemies , they imagine it unnecessary to mistrust the rest , and are least careful in those things which they beleeve less difficult ; whence perhaps that fancy of the poets comes , that the demy-gods had a part about them which was subject to death , and a place whereby they were mortal : because according to my opinion , there is always imperfection in the works of nature , and that she never takes so much care in finishing what she makes , but that she alwaies leaves the one side weaker then the other : now , madam , it is not to be doubted , but that this commonly is the weake part of great courages , and here their hearts are of flesh , which every where else are of diamond . there needs not so much resolution to resist the violence of tyrants , as to defend ones self from their favours ; and the power which was given them to do ill , is less dangerous then the means they have whereby to oblige men . yet do all these means fail , when they are to be imployed against a roman . this mortal part is not to be found in his soul ; he is equally strong on all sides ; he is impenetrable to vanity , aswel as to fear and avarice ; his severity cannot be sweetned , not even with the complements and flatteries of the king of the parthians ; he at once subverts discovered endeavours , and guards , himself from hidden artifices ; nothing is contagious to a minde naturally so sound , and so well purged by the discipline of his country ; neither the poyson brought from far , nor the neighbouring corrupted air , nor stranger , nor citizen have the power to change the goodness of his constitution . malecontents lose their time and their pains , if they think to make him relish novelties , by infusing in him an ill opinion of the present ; how specious soever the pretences are they propose , though they speake the publick good or liberty , he understands not the language ; you were as good court a vestal ; 't is not a human enterprise to shake his immoveable fidelity ; a poet said the capitol was not so stable , and that rome might sooner change place ; he would rather destroy tyranny , then share it with any man , and rather declare himself an enemy , then a colleague with an usurper . can any thing be added to so great a title . this one thing more , to witness the highest proof of his vertue : the republick , madam , cannot lose him , how negligent so ever she be to preserve him ; he suffers not onely patiently , but gladly injuries and injustices . it never sunk into his minde to revenge himself of her by a civil war , and he prefers the name of an innocent banditi , to that of a guilty victor ; he hath been perswaded from his childhood , and since never doubted , that a son can never acquit himself of all he owes to a mother , though a wicked mother , though even she became a stepmother . and that a citizen is for ever obliged to his country , even to his ungrateful country , which even hath us'd him like an enemy . behold , madam , you have near upon sounded the bottome of our consuls heart , and the root of those wonderfull things which you shall read in the histories of polybius and titus livius . let 's now a while look on his outside , on that part which is more expos'd to the sight of men . you may observe in his actions neither a cowardly or a heavie coldnesse , nor a temerous and precipitat vehemency . he softly makes haste , and advanceth with an insensible motion : without disquieting himself , he moves inferiour things neither more nor lesse , then the intelligences without tiring themselves move the celestial spheres . to see him so little troubled about his business , a man would say , that hee were not the undertaker , and there appeares so much facility in the most painful functions of the charge he executes , that although hee doth nothing meanly , yet he doth nothing with violence . observe how with his eys he leads the whole army ? how a nod of his head keeps all the world in their duty ? how his presence onely establisheth order , and drives away confusion ? truly , there is a delight even for philosophers themselves ; and even for those who take no interest in humane affaires to observe him in those occasions . the least motions of his body are accompanied with some vertue which renders him lovely . 't were hard to tell , whether he be more necessary to the republick , or more pleasing to the citizens . he commands well but it becomes him well to command . his command , madam , is so gratefull , that there is a crowd , there is an ambition , that there is a sensible pleasure to obey him . that good grace which shines in all hee doth , being infused into solid qualities , and being joyn'd with understanding and other necessary qualities , is an admirable charm and enchantment for him to sweeten the bitternesse of disgustfull orders ; so that hee can execute them without trouble of minde , or repugnancy of will : it hath a strange force to winn the heart of the souldiery , and draw their inclinations , were they harder to move , and more insensible then the iron and steel they use . by this charm they binde themselves not only to him , but they unloose themselvs from all other things ; they minde neither pay , plunder , or recompence ; they neither care for the feasts of rome , nor for delights of italy ; they demand and desire nothing but their general , of whom they are so enamor'd , even so jealous , that they apprehend the end of the war , for fear onely they should lose him by a peace : they murmur against the senate , when he is revoked , neither can they consolate themselves with a victory which ravisheth the victor from them . what an one , good god! must so passionate a militia be ; 't is not obedience in pursuit of command ; 't is zeal which even prevents it ; t is not affection which obligeth them to the cause of their chief ; 't is a transport which ravisheth them from themselves , and makes him say , i am going with the tenth legion against the enemy , of which i am no less confident , then of mine own person ; i know it would pass through the midst of flames naked , did honour , will , or necessity require it . so that , madam , they are no more souldiers of his army which march with him ; they are as the members of his body , which move when he stirs ; they are as we may say , stranger parts of himself , which are more united to him then his natural . on the other side , the respect they bare him , is no less powerful , then the love they shew him ; at least its more powerful , then the right of life and death , which he hath over them ; this respect governs and rules all his troopes ; he drives or stops them , as he needs their different obedience ; he might be unto them insteed of discipline . let no man think , that it is the laws of war , or military orders , which hinders the soldiers from committing offences ; t is his presence and his testimony . when they fail , they fear more least he should know it , then they fear to be punished , and divers have been kept in their duties with apprehension of displeasing him , which would nether have done it for fear of punishment , or dishonor . that , madam , was the only thing , which the roman army fear'd ; and never did souldiers so much slight their enemy , nor so much redoubt their cheif . there never was at once spirits so fierce and so docile , did overflow the field with more impetuosity , and retire to their places in the camp with lesse appearance of having even gone out . after they had done wonders for courage , they came to enquire whether they had done well or no ; they came to render an accompt of their victory , wherof they were somtimes fain to justifie themselves , and for which they were somtimes punish'd . this fear of piety and religion , hath produced thousands of examples in pure antiquity , and in the colleges they past over them , they are so common , and so numerous : but we must choose what we are to present you ; i must shew you , madam , a mark of that generous fame , even when the empire declined , when rome was no more then the sepulchre of rome ; when nature according to my opinion , would preserve her rights , and make known that the ashes of things soveraignly excellent are still rich and precious . under the empire of justinian , a captain named fulcar , inconsiderately casting himself amongst the enemies , and having engaged his troop in a disadvantageous fight , when a certain man in that extremity , represented to him , that if hee would hee might yet retreat with a good part of his men . 't were better to die , said hee , for how shall i bee able after this , to endure the sight of narses . 't was not that narses was cruel , but that the soveraign vertue is redoubtable . 't is that the mine of the general of a roman army is frightful to those who have it not from naked swords , or assured death . with a look he pierceth the guilty to the heart , & punisheth them with his sight . is not this , madam , an effect of that authority wch comes from heaven ; of that authority inherent in the person of him who hath it distinct and separate from that other authority bred by the power given him by the republick , verified by the senate , and to be read in pattents of parchment , and confirmed with eagles , and dragons in picture , by rods , axes , and archers ? this second authority of which you presume i should say somewhat , which as yet was never said , is a certain light of glory , and a certain character of greatness , which heroick vertue imprints in the countenance of men . and this character , and this light , corrects the defects and the imperfections of nature , makes little men appear great , imbellisheth ugly faces , defends the solitariness and nakedness of a person expos'd to the outrages of fortune , over-prest under the ruines of a destroyed party , abandoned of his own wishes , and of his own hopes . this character , madam , is to this person a safeguard from heaven , against the violences of the earth ; renders him inviolable to his provoked enemies ; binds the hands of traitors which com against him with ill designs ; findes respect and tenderness amongst scythes and tartars . by this mark the roman princes were known by their enemies in the wars , although they disguised themselves , although they were mixt in a croud of soldiers , although they had never been seen before . nothing is able to blot out this character , nor to obscure this light , not even disgraces , imprisonment , and the chains of a poor captive . the executioner falls backwards at sight of his patient , and can scarce forbear to beg his life of him . hee fancies that a great flame issues out of his eyes , which enlightens the dungeon , and that he hears a hideous voice which cries out , who art thou unhappy man , who darest lay thy hand en cajus marius . are not these , madam , give me leave once more to ask you , are not these the highest and the dearest favours which can be received from the supream vertue . and this second authority which survives the first ; this authority which preserves it self in the ruines of power , which consecrates misfortunes , chains , and dungeons , which renders affliction holy and venerable . is it not far a more noble thing then the unworthy prosperity of the happy ? then all the scepters , all the diadems , and all the magnificence of idle kings . questionless , authority is far more noble then power , and that which is formed from the reverence of vertue , far more worthy then that which is established by the terror of punishments . the pure and innocent triumph of an infinite many subjected hearts , is far a more illustrious and glorious sight , then the bloudy and miserable trophies of some cast-down heads . i mean cast away without any extream necessity , and for a shew only of a tyrannical and savage power , and if the poets fables are the philosophers mysteries . mee thinks , madam , that their jupiter did an action far more admirable and more worthy the father of the gods , and the king of men , when he removed all things with one of his eye-browes , and shaking his head caused olympus to tremble , then when by force of thunder and tempest , he tears up trees , and breakes downe roofs . power is a heavy and material thing , which draws after it a long train of humane means , without which it would remain immoveable . it acts only with land and sea armies . upon a march it must have a thousand springs , a thousand wheels , and a thousand machines . it commits a violence in fetching a step . authority on the contrary , which holds from the nobility of its origine , and from the vertue of divine things , quietly works its wonders , needs neither instruments nor materials , nor even time to set them on work . it s all wrapt up in the person of who exerciseth it , without seeking aid , or demanding a second . it s strong , though naked ; and alone fights , though it bee disarmed . authority needs but one word to perswade ; three of its syllables , madam , humbles the bold , makes the rebel repent , stops the impetuosity , of mutinous legions , stifles sedition at its birth , and those whom the general was wont to cal my companions , cannot endure that he should name them either my friends , or sirs , gentlemen of rome , or how you please to render quirites . they fancy that that very word hath already degraded them , that those three syllables have torn their belts and swords from them , that it hath put them amongst the scum of the most unclean , and most vile populacy . i would but ask you the question , madam , whether the name of quirites , coming out of any other mouth , but that of caesar , would have entred so far into the hearts of the legions , and would have had the same power over their minds . for my part i should hardly believe it . i know the height of rhetorick , and understand the vertue of the best pronounced words . but it reacheth not so far . authority is incomparably more perswasive , then eloquence . the soldiers would have mocked a dozen of ciceroes orations , and yet yeild themselves at one of caesars words . nay , i doe verily believe they would have yeilded to his silence , had he been content to have given them but a sign of leaving the camp , without having taken the pains to have spoken to them . by this dumb condemnation , treating them as accursed , and excommunicated by their country , & declaring them unworthy of any kinde of society with their general , beyond that of complaints and reproaches which hee might have made them . such a scorn would have so griev'd them , that they would have begged death for a favour , & would have cast themselvs at his feet to pray him that he would handsomely dispatch them . but i am vext that so great a word which was so great an action , was not of som roman in the good and healthful time of the republick , that i might not alledge a doubtfull vertue , whose cause was undecided , as was that of caesar . i would , madam , that this example of military authority were either of scipio , or of fabritius , that i might justly join it with that other example of civil authority , after which you will give mee leave to conclude . you know well that honest man appius claudius , look upon him i beseech you , burthened with years and diseases , who so long time never stirred out of his chamber , and can scarce get himselfe from his bed to his chimney . yet in that condition , hee resolves to be carried to the senate , to quarrel with all the senators single , and to oppose himself to the shameful peace they were about to conclude . 't is to bee believed , madam , that they were no lesse frighted to see that hideous old man , then if it had been a ghost , which entred the councel chamber , and in my thought , they did not at first take him for appius claudius , they took him for his shadow , or his fantasme , which came from the other world to give them lessons , and make them remonstrances . who came to tell them with a tone of command , and a strong voice , which his anger raised in the weakness of his confiscate body . who ever was the author of so filthy a proposition , is no true nor legitimate roman . he must either bee a forainer or a bastard . he must be the son of one of our slaves , or he hath not a drop of bloud left of our fathers , which his basenesse hath not corrupted . what would not this angry old man have done had he had his eyes , and the rest of his body at liberty ? would hee not have beaten those which hee was content to chide onely ? would he not have deposed pyrrhus , and interdicted him his kingdome far from relinquishing by treaty an inch of land in italy ? i know not what hee could have done . but i know very well , madam , that he did very much . rome and pyrrhus were agreed upon conditions for a treaty of peace . claudius opposeth it , and at the conclusion , comes and breaks it off . so that hee proves stronger then rome and pyrrhus both together , and carries it away from either of them . when so strange a newes was told cyneas , its likely he cryed out , behold , a greater thing then i have yet admired in rome . i have there seen a multitude of kings , but as yet i had not seen their tutor . 't is this blind man who is the light of the commonwealth . 't is this sick man , who warres against us . 't is this good man , who was unable to stir from his bed , who drives us out of italy . 't is this chair which bore him to the senate , which is more to bee feared , then our towres full of soldiers , then our elephants , then our machins . a discourse of the conversation of the romans . to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse ii. but this was while your ancestors of old for vertue with the gods their names inroll'd . nature in wonders fruitful was , & yong , the world with hero's peopl'd stout as strong , our ages vigor now , alas , was spent , the languors o● old age it doth resent , your rome is d●●● , & all its glory gone , the supream vertue is in hist'ry alone . let 's be content their active strife t' admire , which made that fatal place 'bove all aspire th' example of those grandies let 's adore , with incense let 's your sought for temples store . t is near the matter , madam , what i yesterday answered you in our common discourse , when i took my leave . i have since found the sense of my prose in the verses of a poet , who never made any but those . and i conceived it was not amisse after that manner to enter upon this days conference , and to binde with a knot , which perhaps will not displease you , the things i told , with those which you would have me write unto you . let 's again , madam , confess it . it s certain , that at the beginning , god dispensed great largesses , and although his arm is no shorter then it was , yet are his hands less open then they were . besides , birth-right , which antiquity hath over the latter times , it hath had other advantages which ended with it , and are not to be found in the succession . it hath had vertues which our age is not capable of . it belongs not to us to be camillas , and catoes , we want the vigour of such men as those instead to provoke our courages , they make our ambition despair . they have rather braved us then instructed us by their actions . by giving us examples , they have obliged us to an uprofitable trouble . they have given us what we cannot take . these examples being of that height that there is no way to attain unto them . i do not say , madam , that in the most miserable times , god cannot send some chosen soul to make us remember his first magnificence . i will not deny but that hee may take a particular care of that soul , and but that hee hath meanes to preserve it from the vices of the court , and the contagion of custom . in the most general stupidity of the world , there is some one found to awakē the rest , who breaks the bounds of the age , who is capable to conceiv the idea of ancient vertue , and to shew us that the miracles of history are still possible things . it s true , madam , there is such an one : but this one makes no number ; he marks even sterility , neither doth hee hinder this solitude . is there a priviledged soul , an extraordinary person , an hero or two in all the world . yet is there not a multitude of heroes . there is no people of extraordinary persons . there is no more a rome , nor romans . we must seek them under ruines , and in their monuments . we must adore their reliques in the books i have told you of , and in the places i have desired you to observe . i at first thought to be quit , having marked those places , and chosen you those books . yet are you not satisfied therewith , and it seems you pretend that i should adde what is wanting to those books . the glories and triumphs of rome , satisfie not your curiosity . it enquires of me some things more particular and less known . you would desire , madam , that i should shew you the romans , when they hid themselves , and that i should open to you the door of their cabinets . after having seen them out of ceremony , you would be acquainted with their conversation , and know from me if so direct and elevated a greatness , could stoop to the use of a common life , could descend from affairs and employments even to sports and divertisements . i doubt it not , madam , all the houres of wise mens lives are not equally serious . their souls are not always extended , nor always contracted , & yet in the same vigor , though not the same action . does any man believe that the sibarites only loved feasts , and that they alone rejoiced . the romans did it also : but they did it in another manner , & loved other manner of feasts . a voluptuousnesse which riseth higher then sense , which seeks the superiour part , and fills it with images : that holy , chast , and altogether innocent pleasure , which acts on the mind without changing it , or moves it with so much sweetnesse , that it stirs not out of its place , or with so much addresse , that it removes it to a better place then it had . this pleasure , madam , was not a passion unworthy of your romans , scipio and laelius , used it without scruple . augustus and his friends were of those honest voluptuous persons . the senate and the field , civil affairs and military actions , had their seasons conversation . the theatre and verse had theirs . the pleasures of the mind were never better tasted , then by them , and with the same hands with which they gain'd victories , and signed the fate of nariaeis , they wrote comedies , or applauded those who acted them before them . there is not every day hannibals to bee conquered , nor an africa to bee subjugated . antony and the sonnes of pompey died but every one once . and then came the general calm in which the most turbulent were at leisure , and the world suffered it self to be as peaceably governed , as if it had been but one family . so that they have sometimes wanted enemies , & sometimes rested in peace . and in this state , madam , why should they have made wars against themselves ? why should they have sought enemies in their owne bowels ? why should they give themselves a prey to a distemper worse then hannibal , and more cruel then africa ? why should they bee afraid to rejoice , there being no body to disturb their joy . the sicilian sea being scoured , and aegypt reduced into a province , sixius pompey , and mark antony , being onely names and phantasmes . i must confesse , madam , the desire of glory was a ruling passion : but tyrants themselves doe not always reigne tyrannically . 't was the feavour of their minds , but this feavour did not always burne them with an equall ardour , it had as well its releases , as its doubles . and do you not believ scipio was out of his high fit , when he gathered cockles on the sea shoar with his friend , or when he lent his words to cremes and micio in the fables of terence . i undertake not here to decide whether he & his friend were the true authours of those fables . it sufficeth me to say , that probably they were the first approvers , and that they loved them , if they did not make them . and it may even be , that the poet changed the disposition of some scenes by their advice , and that some half verses of theirs may be there . and what we finde finest and best aju●ed , was not so much what hee borrowed from the works of menander , as what he h●d learnt from the conversation of scipio . as for the emperour augustus , in whose person i consider the end of their good days , as i doe the flower of them in that of scipio . it s most true , madam , that hee hath judged most wholesomly of the value and merit of every thing , and that he loved glory , but that he hated not pleasure . i speak of pleasure in general , because hee tasted of all , and having afforded his senses very much , he refused his mind nothing . he discerned good and fair in all the subjects wherein it was to be found ; and for that enquiry , he employ'd the best skilled , and most curious spies , so that they left nothing for the succeeding ages to discover . i dare not say , as one hath already said , that the muses were his buffoons and iesters ; 't is an injurious and an uncivil word ; i shall onely say , they had the honour to bee his familiars and his domesticks , and at that time they were of his court and cabinet . they were at least call'd at houres of conversation , if not to the deliberation of affaires ; and if it bee too much to say , that virgil was the fourth of the councel held between augustus and his two friends , to know whether he should maintain the empire , or restore liberty . i somewhat suspect the history of that councel , and i can scarce perswade my selfe , that the gallant spirits of those times were so much the emperours confidents that he should communicate with them affairs of that nature . i am satisfied to believe that they intended his vertuous pleasures without aspiring to a more important direction ; and that hee caused the palace gates to bee open for them , when they were shut to supplicants and petitioners . but when in farre distant countries ; nay , in the midst of the palaces clouds did rise , wch obscur'd the calm i spake of ; it was then , madam , when the muses were no lesse necessary , then they had formerly been agreeable : 't was then they did him service , & helped livia to uphold her husband ; who began already to stoop with cares and under affairs . during this diseased and impatient season , they were only imploied to seek pleasures & divertisements for him : they did strive onely to charm his paines with their songs ; they studied to appease and set at rest that impaatient part of his soul which incessantly watched & tormented it self , to estrange his fancy only from the debauches of his daughter , and from the defeat of his legions ; to take away the sight of troublesome subjects by the interposition of pleasing ones . now , madam , as it was no smal matter of merit for human men sometimes to make augustus sleep , & somtimes to chear him , the good goddesses thereby justified themselves from the calumny of the barbarians , who accused them as useless to the republick , & as fit to have no rank in the world . this good prince suffering them also to extend the too large violence of his thoughts , & by taking some intervals of release in those spectacles which they took care to provide for him at the same time they did divers good acts . for besides that they avowed themselves to be his . they protected the innocent against the licence of the old soldiers , & the cruelty of the civil victory . he got pratlers which use to be heard in all ages ; and honouring them with familiarity , he rendred them triburary to his glory . but chiefly , madam , he followed the councel of nature , which will have all who work , rest ; which entertains its durance by moderation , & threatens violence with an end . i know well that this soveraign understanding which was given to princes for the conduct of human things , is incapable of being tired , and would agitate continually , could it be alone . but being ingaged with the body , and having organs which are extreamly frail and delicate , it must manage them for their benefit , and in spight of it self , fit it self , to the necessities of a society , with which it is ingaged . princes cannot always be angels , divorced from sense , and enjoy the purity of a simple beeing ; they must sometimes be men mixt with matter and subject to the changes of things composed . there must , madam , after the tempests of affairs , and the anxious objects of the ills they are to combat , be a care taken to finde them pleasures . ports to divert and refresh their minds , and attracting perspectives which may untire and rejoice their eyes . they are the needs of human life , how rich and sufficient so ever it may otherwise bee of it selfe . labour would weaken the strongest mindes , had they not their helps and stayes to support them . melancholy would suffocate them , did they not thus respire . to speak properly they are the voluptuousness of reason , and the delights of the understanding . and he who hath discovered all the truths under heaven , and was ignorant of nothing which could be known without revelation , made so particular an esteem of it in the fourth book of his ethicks , that he was not afraid to say , that sport and divertisement were no lesse necessary to life , then rest and nourishment . it s true , he makes a difference as well as we of playes and divertisements . hee is not a councellor of all kinds of debauches ; neither will hee have wise men pass their time as the vulgar do . hee hath discovered a mean approved by reason betwixt an ill humour , and a buffoone in which the soul dilates itself by a moderate motion , and doth not enervate it self by a violent dissolution . and of this mean , madam , he hath made a moral vertue , wch respects the good of company , in pursuit of two others , which he proposeth to us in the same chapter , for the same end . the first of these three vertues is a certaine sweetness & facility of manners , which can accommodate it self without servility , and approves not all that is said without choice ; neither by distaste doth hee disapprove it . the second is a cleare freedome , and a custome to speak the truth even in indifferent things , in as far a degree estranged from vain ostentation , and an affected restraint . i intimated before what the third was , and their three vertuous habits , according to the opinion of aristotle , rule all the commerce of words , and extend themselves to all the entertainements which men have of one another , whether wee hold pleasing or distastfull disputes , whether true or false , whether sad or joyful . so that , madam , without the first of these three vertues , the assemblies of men would bee but troops of enemies mixt together , who would scratch & fly in one anothers faces , or circles of lovers , who would adore their owne defects , & esteem their wrinkles fair . without the second , they would but be the schools of dissemblers , who would scarce tell us what of the clock it were , or that it were day at noon , so feareful are they of mistaking . or theaters for captains , who say more then they know , or then they have done , or then indeed could have been done . in fine , without the third , of which we have spoken , the assemblies of men being too sad or too merry , would seem either as the convoyes of afflicted persons , and the representation of a publique grief , or spectacles of naked persons and the image of those licentious feasts , which durst not appear before cato . the mean betwixt these two is a vertue of a truth , neither so splendent nor so high as wisdom and magnanimity ; yet it s a vertue allowed by the philosophers , even by the philosophy of cato . and should we banish it out of our morals , the communication wee have with one another , would have bin but dry and thorny . our discourse would rather have been a toile and a labour of the tongue , then an ease and a discharge of the heart : and society if we had permission onely to dispute and to contradict , would trouble us far more then solitariness , wherein wee at least may laugh out of memory , and rejoice in our own thoughts . i cannot assure you , madam , that the romans were acquainted with so praise-worthy a quality in the infancy of the republick ; and although one of their poets reports well of king numa , and of the nymph of egeria , the conferences which they had together , passing without witness , they could speak of them but by conjecture . these victorious peasants knowing nothing but husbandry and fighting , were sensible onely of gross pleasures proportionable to the hardship of their births ; there is no great likelihood that they did possess a vertue directly opposite to the rudeness they made profession of , and which seldome accompanies poverty , which is almost alwayes followed with an ill humour . so long as their eloquence , to use the termes of varro , smelt of garlick and onions , we could expect nothing very exquisite , and it was hard for so sad an austerity as theirs to hearken to raillery , and to be toucht with joy . first , then they were without weakning to soften themselves ; they must sweeten their courages , and unrust their manners , that at last they might advise to cultivate themselves , as they did their gardens and their lands . they indeed did it with so much success , and found so happy a foundation , that presently the good genius was amongst them a popular thing . this politeness past from the senate to inferiour degrees , even to the lowest form of the meaner people . and if in their cause their own witness is to be believ'd , they have blotted out all the graces , and all the vertues of greece , and have left the atticism thereof far short of their urbanity . it s that , madam , which they call'd that lovely vertue of society , after having practised it many years without having given it a name , and should use have ripened amongst us a word of so ill a savour , and have corrected the bitternesse which might have been found in it . wee might accustome our selves thereunto , as to others , which wee borrowed from the same language . now whether that word expresseth in ours a certain air of the great world , and a colour and tincture of the court , which not only marks words and opinions , but even the tone of the voice , and the motion of the body . or whether it signifie a lesse perceptible motion which is known but by chance , which hath nothing but is noble & high , and nothing which appears studied or learnt ; which is felt , and is not seen , and inspires , a secret genius , which we lose in seeking it . or whether in a farther stretched signification , it means the science of conversation , and the gift to please in good company : or restraining of it , it be taken for an addresse to touch the spirit with i know not what kind of pricking , yet whose pungency is pleasing to who receives it , because it tickles , and hurts not , because it leaves a wound without grief , and awakens only that part which malice offends . to conclude , madam , according to the judgment of a good judge in such cases , it was a knowledge abused by the greeks , which other people were ignorant of , and from whom the romans only learnt the true and lawful use . being so fit for them , and so incommunicable to their nearest neighbours , that those even of italy ; could not acquire it without some failings , nor so nicely counterfeit it , that the resemblance should not mark the diversity . it was then according to this accompt , a domestick plant which could grow up but on the shore of the tiber , or on the mount palatin , or at the foot of the capitol , or near the camp of mars , and near some other quarter of that capitall city of the world . is it possible that the heaven and the sun of rome , should have so much force and so much vertue ? did they so sensibly agitate on the spirits of men ? were they so absolutely necessary to make them good company ? i fear not of my self to say it , not to wrong the rest of italy , and the rest of the civilized provinces . but to speak in general , its certain , madam , that the citizens of rome , had great advantages in the world , owed much to their mothers , and to their breeding , and knew many things which no body taught them : there is no doubt but in their most familiar entertainment , some graces were neglected , some ornaments without art , which the doctors are ignorant of , and which are above rules and precepts . i doubted not but when i had seen it thunder , and heaven and earth mix in the o●ations of the tribunals , but it was a change most agreeably pleasing , to consider them under more then an humane appearance , disarmed of their enthymemes , and of their figures , having left their feigned exclamations , and artificial angers , appearing in a condition wherein one might say , they were truly themselves . 't was there , madam , for example , where cicero was neither sophist , nor rhetorician , neither idolater of this man , nor furious against that ; neither of this , nor of that party : there hee was the true cicero , and after mocked himself privately of what he had adored publickly . 't was there he defin'd men , & painted them not , where he spoke of cato as of a pedant of the portico , or at most but as of a citizen of plato's republick , where he said , that the purple of the senate was finer , but the steele of the rebels was better , where he confest caesar was the contriver of his own fortune , and that pompey was but the work of his . these sentiments which parted from the heart , were hidden in great assemblies , and were discovered but between two or three friends , and as many faithful domesticks , and with whom hee communicated this secret felicity . and if some of them have said that they reign'd all the time they oration'd , so soveraign was the power they exercised over mens mindes ; we may speak even of those which in their conversation restored the liberty which they had taken away in their orations , that they set at large and at ease the minds of those they opprest and tormented ; and that they drew them from that admiration which had agitated them with violence , to make them sensible of a sweeter transport , and ravish them with less force . i have seen a great prince in the low countries , who in that envied the fortune of their free men , and of those inferior friends , and of the meaner sort , which they had brought out of slavery , to choose them their confidents ; and in effect , it was a wonderful contentment to be a witness of their interiour lives , and to be private to the more particular houres of their leisure . and it were an incomparable satisfactiō to know those good things which have been said of scipio and laelius atticus and cicero , and other honest people of every age , to have the history of their conversation and cabinets to adde to those of affairs & state . being born in the empire , and bred up in triumphs , all what proceeded from them bore the character of nobleness , which distinguished thē from subjects . all of them were sensible of command and authority , though government and conduct were not in question ; all was remarkable and exemplary , even their secrets and solitude . having from their infancy seene kings led captives through the streets , and other kings petitioners and solicitors come in person to demand justice , and expect at the doore of the senate their good or ill success . they could retain nothing that was low in such rais'd and purg'd spirits from such spectacles . the very lees of such a people were precious : and if by mischance some gentlemen were found who had vulgar spirits , it s to be believed that such great objects would presently have raised them . it s likely , that being not onely covered and invironed , but penetrated , even filled with so much light which resplended even on their least actions , which they could not lessen nor hide so well , but that they always were strong and illustrious . i speak as i believe , and you know well the dead have no flatterers . 't was impossible for them wholly to devest themselves of their greatnesse , because it was in their hearts and in their mindes , because it was rooted in them , and was not applyed to their fortunes . no gesture , nor outward motion of theirs was unworthy the soveraignty of the world : even they laughed and sported with some kind of dignity . 't is what i fear not madam , to present unto you , who descend not onely from the same origine and from the same bloud , but who beyond all this , are the daughter of their discipline and spirit , and retain no lesse a share of the magnanimity of the caesars , and of the scipios , thē of the honesty of the lelia's , and of the comelia's . your ancestors were great even in the least things . and since formerly a sect did believe , that a wise man sleeping , was like himself ; neither did he then forbear to be wise , ( it was an idol and a wise man form'd at pleasure ) since that sect hath left it for a dogma , that the dreams of this imaginary wise man were reasonable and judicious . we may have leave to believe , that truly wise men might rule with gravity by their reason , and conduct one part of their lives , which is more capable of either then sleeping , and that their lesse violent and lesse serious actions were animated with vigour and the majesty of the republick . would you have me verifie what i tell you , and raise my self higher then scipio's time , to shew you that their was always wit in rome ; but that there was alwayes authority and greatnesse mixt with this wit : it shall be onely the good fabritius , whose letter you saw to pyrrhus , which will furnish the example we seek . and i pray consider it , madam , in that celebrous conversation which hee had with the same pyrrhus , and with cyneas the head of his councel . cyneas having made a long discourse in praise of a contemplative life , and amongst other things having said , that there was a great person at athens named epicurus , who preached rest and voluptuousnesse , and held the government of states unworthy the employment of the wise , because wise men ought not to disturb themselvs for fools , for ungrateful persons , for men . fabritius had the patience to hear the vanity of the grecians , although hee approved them not : yet with a disdainful smile which hee addrest to him who brought them forth . o said he , how soon would the romans have done , if all the world would be but epicurian . do you not beleive , madam , that cyneas was surprised with so unexpected an answer , and so far from the admiration hee looked for from so unlettered a man , whom he thought he had ravished with his eloquence . that little saying at one blow overthrew the opinions of that great man of athens , and the eloquence of that brave orator . and a regular refutation of epicurian philosophy undertaken by a stoick prepared for the businesse , would not have had the force which this exclamation of one line had , wch rendred epicurus ridiculous , which confounded cyneas , and astonished pyrrhus . yet fabritius , madam , did use to astonish pyrrhus with his answers ; hee usually laughed at the propositions which the king seriously made ; and when he once offered him the first place next to him in his kingdome , supposing that hee would not dispute so advantageous a grant , and that without difficulty he would change poverty for riches : the poor citizen answerd the rich prince in these words , which i have drawne from a greek manu script : i love you pyrrhus too well , to accept the conditions you offer . if to day i were your favorite , who could assure you but that to morrow i might be your master ? of a truth you are worth much , yet you cost more ; and doe you not believe , that did your subjects know mee , but that they would rather receive exemptions from me with the security of all they have , then to pay tribute to you , and have nothing they can call their own : make me therefore no more of these offers , which might ruine you if i took you at your word ; and never promise me what you cannot keep without the losse of your crown . a ●ough commonwealths man born with the hatred of monarchy , would have answered rudely , that he would have nothing to do with a king nor to be lieutenant general of the kingdome . but , fabritius , who was harsh in fight onely , and knew onely how to offend armed kings , being unwilling to receive what was offered , yet would hee refuse with a good grace : he would by that gallant and ingenious refusal , once more make himself to be desired by pyrrhus , and shew him that he was not onely a man of very great use , but also a man of good conversation . these , madam , are the first essays of politenesse , and as it were the designe of urbanity in a republick of brasse and iron amongst simple and innocent citizens ; but simple and innocent in such a way , that we cannot say their simplicity was smooth , & their innocency spiritual : the consuls and the dictators laughed after this manner . thus they spake when they did not speake seriously ; and the seriousnesse of the grecians was worth nothing to the rude and imperious raillery of the romans . even the censors , madam , although grief seemed to be one of the functions of their charge , did not absolutely renounce all kind of raillery : they did not opinion at themselvs to an eternal severity ; and that hasty and insufferable honest man , i mean the first cato , did somtimes forbear to be angry and insupportable ; he had raies of joy , and the intervals of a good humor ; sayings have escaped him which were nothing ungrateful ; and if you please , madam , you may judge of others by this . he married a well fashioned woman ; and histories observe , that she extreamly feared thunder , as shee did extreamly love her husband ; these two passions counselled her the same thing ; she ever chose her husband for her shelter against thunder , and cast her self into his arms ; at the first murmure , shee imagined shee heard from heaven cato , who was pleased with the storm , & who was not angry to be carressed more then ordinary , could not retaine the joy of his heart . hee reveales this domestick secret to his friends , and tels them , speaking of his wife , that she had found out a way to make him wish for ill weather ; and that hee was never so happy , as when jupiter was angry . severity it self rejoiced in this manner : it was extream rigidnesse : 't was soveraign justice , which thus laughed ; and indeed , madam , although he and the rest were incorruptible judges , yet must we not therefore say , that their good dispensation of justice proceeded from their ill humor : they knew how to change vertue according to the diversity of time and place : they received at night in their closets , the favours they had in the morning rejected on the tribunal . but the graces being at home with them , they were neither affected , nor licentious : they were wise and modest ; they painted not majesty ; they drest her the least they could , and hindred her onely from frighting others . these graces , madam , and this majesty , were at last separated ; and the graces appeared again under their emperours : but they appeared alone for that majesty , i mean the majesty of words was lost with their liberty . fabritius his style lasted but till brutus and cassius ; and indeed it s very observable whether it bee in some of their letters which are still visible , or in the discourse they had together the eve before the philippi battel . there is no man so much a stranger to antiquity , who is ignorant of brutus his evil angel , and who knows not their dialogue . next day after their funeral conference , brutus related it to cassius , with more trouble and disturbance then he had when the daemon appeared unto him . but observe , madam , with what a byass turn'd so distastful a matter , and how he made it profitable for the use of conversation . without appearing an astonished admirer , or an incredulous opiniator , hee laughing , told his friend , that the cares of the minde , the contention of the spirit , the weariness of the body , and the darknesse of the night might be the cause of his vision , and had formed unto him those strange images . that as for him from the principles of philosophy , which he profest , he could not believe there were daemons , and much lesse that they were visible : yet neverthelesse , hee wished there were , and that his philosophy were false ; forasmuch as apparently those spirits without bodies ought to be just and vertuous . the action of the ides of march was so fair , and the cause so honest , that undoubtedly they would bear their part in it . and that so they would be friends and allies of whom he had not thought , of which would come to his relief , and troops of reserve , which at a need would fight for them ; which being granted , he ought not to reckon of their party , only so many companies of foot , so many cornets of horse , so many legions , and so many vessels : but besides that , there was an immortal people , and a most happy militia , which needed no pay , and declared themselves for the good cause , and which hee never need feare would serve antony against brutus , or preferre tyranny before liberty . these words , madam , were the last words of the republick , which she uttered before she gave up the ghost , and after which she expired : 't was the character of the spirit of rome ; it was the natural language of its majesty : and doe you not finde that cassius was very eloquent in that tongue ? would you not be well pleased to bee more particularly acquainted with that excellent man , to see him in other society then this , and to hear him discourse on lesse ungratefull subjects , and at another time then the eve of the philippin battel . the mischief is , that a quick voice dies assoon as it s brought forth , and leaves nothing after it , forming no subsisting bodies in the air : words have wings , you know its homers epithete , and a syrian poet hath made a sort of language amongst birds : so that , madam , if we stop not these fugitives by writing , they easily escape our memorie . even all that is written , is not sure to last ; and books perish as tradition is forgot : time , which ends marble and iron , wants not strength against frailer subjects . and the northern people who seemed to come to hasten time and precipitate the end of the world , declared so particular a warre to written things , that it was not wanting in them , but that even the alphabet had been abolished . elsewhere , madam , there is a fate of letters which loseth and saveth without choice the motions of human intelligence , which pardon ill verses , and ill intended fables , to suppresse oracles , and deprive the world of the light of needful history . the ancients acknowledged a daemon , who presides at the birth of books , and soveraignly disposeth of their fortune & successe ; whether they result well or ill , whether they are short or long-lived , as it succeeds either favourable or adverse . now its certain , if this daemon were an ill willer to the publick , and envious of honest curiosity , and contrary to the reputation of great persons , it was principally in that part of their memories , which design'd their humour , which acquainted us with the relishes and delicacies of their mindes , which discovered the truth of their manners to posterity , and the secrets of their private lives . what a misfortune 't is , madam , that wee cannot accost them by that accessible part & proportionable to the debility of our strength ; that we have lost that easy object , and which wee could better beare then a higher elevation of their glory ; that we know the most part of their battels , and order of their militia , and yet are ignorant of their calm conferences , and of the method they used in their treaties with one another , knowing of their solemn feasts , and great ceremonies , and yet have no share in their familiarity , or in their domestick affairs . truly , madam it had been no small unhappinesse , had it altogether so befallen us ; yet me thinks wee cannot with reason deny but that some amongst them have had a care of us , nor justly complain , that we have been frustrated of what by succession belongs unto us . two or three by way of comedy have left us the tract of four and twenty howres ; i mean the representation of some merily past day , and others have shewed them us in their dialogues , and in their letters . these dialogues , and these letters are their immortal entertainments : conversations which are still lasting , whereto wee have every houre free admittance ; where that idea of vertue is preserved , of which aristotle speakes in the fourth book of his ethicks , where the first master of this noble & patrician raillery , as they cal it , is to be found , which was so compatible with the romane gravity . these copies are more correct and clearer perhaps then their first originals were ; and if they have not the advantage of a lively voice and presence , which perswades the senses , and gives a lustre to vile things ; they have that of attention , and of a second view , wch polisheth the rude , and unmixeth the confused , which adds what is commonly wanting to sudden and carnal actions . here is enough madam , to satisfie a minde possest onely with languishing passions , and to content a hunger which is satisfied with a little nourishment : but being desirous of much , and greedy of new knowledge , and lovers of change ; we must confesse that there is no more then to whet our appetites . we are not children quite disinherited ; neither are we heirs extreamly rich : and the goods left us , are nothing so great as the losses we have made . my intention here is not to lament the calamities of learnings commonwealth ; i wil say nothing of the ill fortune of history , of its breaches and ruines . the name of luceius is scarce come to our ears ; of that luceius , madam , in whose histories cicero sollicited and begged a place . our salust is but a part of that salust which your fathers had : where is the second decad of titus livius ? where are his civill wars ? where are those of asinius , pollio and crematius cordus , which were master-pieces of the roman liberty and eloquence ? all these madam , are no more ; and if wee would know the news of a season which hath so much relation & conformity with the times we have seen , we must enquire of some stranger of greece , who commonly is what he knows not . neverthelesse i perceive , that in the humour wee now in these days are , and in the disgust of a distempered age , which prefers fawces to meat , and its fancie to health . 't is not the great and serious amongst the romans , which wee must regret , and are most angry to have lost ; we might easily passe over the annals of their wars and fields , had we but a iournal of their divertisements and winter quarters . and wee should without much trouble consolate our selves at the shipwrack of needful histories , could their faire fables have escaped . it were indeed an excellent consolation to afflicted spirits , for the losse of titus livius his decads , could we recover the comedies of plautus and terence , which we have no more , without mentioning other poets of the theatre , from whose wrack there remains only a few lame verses , and some halting sentences . the satyrs of varro , who was the painter of the life and of the minde , would also afford us very grateful knowledges : for though most serious philosophy were in those satyrs , yet was it as it were on flowers , and as in a place for debauch , all painted and perfumed with the gallantry of those times . there wee should have seen the conscript fathers dispatching of their clients , dismantled of their long robes in the purity of their nature ; such as they were in the pleasures of their jollity , and in the liberties they took after supper : such as you have asked me to see them , when you thought i could say somewhat to their books . wee should then have had lions whole , whereas now wee have but their claws ; and if the fate of books would have had it so , the conversations of brutus and cassius , the entertainments of volumnius and of papirius poetus , would have been as long lived , as the controversies of the rhetoricians , of seneca , and the declamations of quintilian . we should judge , madam , of urbanity by it selfe , and in whole and perfect figures , instead that we can now judge but by our suspitions , and by obscure and imperfect tracts . had it pleased the same destiny , the first caesar would yet be one of those authors whom i alledged upon this subject : he with care had gathered what had been said , and what was every day most remarkably said . tyron also made a collection of all the good sayings of cicero , and an ancient grammarian speaketh of two books of tacitus , the title of which was the conceits facetiae . but particularly , madam , the court of the second caesar , of which was spoken in the beginning of this discourse . that gallant and witty court which mocked the conceits of plautus , and the raillery of antiquity , would furnish me wherewith to entertain you whole days , with a vertue which belonged unto them in property , and which from thence had received its last form : for wee must confesse with the leave of the republick , that the age of augustus judged very subtilly of things , perfectly purified by reasō , gave lights to the mind which it had not before . it was the golden age of arts and discipline , and generally of all fair literature . all was polisht and refined under his reign ; all were knowing and ingenious in that court from augustus even to his grooms . it s written , that fire and lightning came from his eyes ; whereto i would add , madam , that they also issued out of his mouth , but more quick and glittering then those , which dazled the courtiers of those times , which obliged the one of them to complain , that it was not possible to look him in the face : he composed verses and supprest them ; and suppressing them , he gave out a word of the ill work he had made , which was worth as much as the best work which could bee made . he in four words answered the long oration of the spanish ambassadors ; but those four words deserved another oration longer then the former to commend them . besides the commentaries of his life , there was a long time in the world a volume of his letters ; and you may believe , madam , they were not alwayes concerning state-affaires nor all addrest to the senate or to the legions ; some were of raillery , some of confidence to his friends ; others of love , and of the gallantry of his mistresses , and of the same style with those which his unckle writ to queen cleopatra , on tablets of corinthians and saphirs . but i am coming , madam , to astonish you . do you believe , that at this day there is anywhere any fragments to bee found of those letters written to cleopatra ? and that love , and the love letters of caesar , surviv'd her hatred , and her anti-cato's . this rarity hath been preserved in an old greek manuscript , which happily came to my hands , whence i have taken what i have already told you of fabritius , of cato , and of cassius . the author of this manuscript is not unknown , is not the son of earth , hee hath a name , and a countrey , and bears the marks of his nativity : he lived under the empire of the antonines ; he seemed to have the same design with the sophist aelian : but his manner of writing is more at large , and his work may be called a mixture of common with rare things . yet truly , madam , i cannot speak so affirmatively of the truth of these letters , but that you still have leave to suspend your judgement . i dare not assure you , that they were found in cleopatra's cabinet , when the inventory of her goods was made by order of augustus . besides , the sophist are men , whom i trust but in some sort : the roman poet teacheth us to feare the greeks , even when they present us ; and the cardinal historian of the church made use of his advice on the subject of the donation of rome , made to pope silvester by the emperor constantin . since then the largesses which come from greece ought to be suspected by us , and that in that countrey there is a number of good willing people which are at leisure : since the sophists served as secretaries to falaris and other princes ; i know not how many ages after their deaths , they may have rendred the same service to caesar upon this occasion : but before wee determine thereupon , it will not be amisse to consult the infallible . **** their answers which formerly were rendred at delphos , were not more certain then his . all the impostors of antiquity ; all the sinons , and all the ulisses of greece , are not subtill enough to make him take one for another : and hee will instantly resolve , whether what we present him be legitimate or base ; whether it be gold from the mine , or gold of chymistry . however it be , i believe its antiquity ; and had those pieces wch the greek sophist alledgeth been counterfeit , it would have according to my opinion awhile after caesar , and perhaps in the time of augustus . we will in another observ them with what remains concerning that age ; unlesse you , madam , esteem it as already done , and the age also ; and affording me the favour of a second discourse , you would spare the pains of tiring my selfe with disquieting you . maecenas to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse iii. the last time i had the honour to see you , the emperour augustus was the chief subject of our discourse . i brought you to consider him in the beginning , continuance , and perfection of his glory : you observed how at nineteen he vyed , with the age and experience of cicero ; how in one work he acted three or four different persons ; how he shewed the conscript fathers , who would have treated him like a young man ; that although he had not studied so long as they , yet he had learnt more ; and how he did with addresse imploy their forces to make his designes succeed , instead that he thought to use his own name and credit to establish his authority . i past as lightly as i could that bloudy act of the triumvirat , whereof there was no way to clear his reputation ; and i wished for his honour , that that part of his history were blotted out of the memory of things ; i staid at the frequent broils , the plaistered reconcilements , and the last rupture betwixt him and mark antony , and accompanied him even to rome , and even to the day of his triumph , after the fatal voiage of egypt . it was not without informing you by the way , that the dexterity of his minde was always mixt with the good fortune of his arms : and that having overthrown in the philippick plains the two dear sons of the republick , he thought he had done nothing , could he not free himself from the two co-heirs he had in the succession of his unckles power , that he might secure what he had done . the conduct of that work was admirable , he went beyond his unckle , and placed himself in a better seat . the opposing vertue was unhappy ; force was found impotent : hinderance made him a passage to arrive thither . and then , madam , the romans began to know the design of providence , and the mortall disease of the old republick . at last they loved to have rather an assured master , and a peaceable servitude , then changes every day , and a perpetual fright of civil war . rest , which they did believe to bee an essential good , was to them in lieu of liberty , which seemed now no more then a delight of the fancy . every man was pleased to be quiet after such troublesome affairs , and the sweetnesse of quietnesse did so agreeably slide into their mindes , that they even wished not for their first condition , when augustus with assurance would have restored it ; they were so weary of leagues and parties , that they acknowledged him for a benefactor , who would take frō thē the trouble of governing themselvs ; & blest his usurpation , who delivered them from their ill conduct . since he leads us , said they , let 's sleep in our vessel with security ; let 's if we will debauch our selves ; let 's laugh at bacchus and pirats : t is impossible we should be lost , caesar is responsible for our safety . even the grandchildren of the consuls and dictators forgot their honour to follow their interest , and forsook a ruinous and imaginary liberty , to yeild to an obedience which was convenient and full of effective advantages . they were the most subtile & most watchful courtiers , and although they bore the names , which had made the kings of the earth tremble , they cared not to be seen in the crowd amongst those which give good morrows , asking favours at the door of one of their own citizens . they said their fortune had shewed them the example of their duty , and the way to the palace of augustus . that they went whether the gods were gone before them ; and that if they had changed party , the destin of things , and the daemon of rome , had done so before them ; thus this soveraign soul , and of the first rank , which had a navual empire over all other mindes , found neither contradiction nor resistance : the proudest submitted to the yoak , yeilded to the superiority of his spirit without difficulty past under so elevated an height , and submitted humane vertues to somewhat of divine , which they acknowledged in the person of augustus . there was no fierce courage , madam , now to be daunted ; neither cato nor brutus to resuscitate a dead party . mutiny lost even its breath and noise , envy was changed in to admiration . whence i conclude , if i remember right , that envy goes not always so farre as vertue . that opinion is at last tired in following its constancy , and that there is a degree whereat desert having arrived , 't is beyond the reach of the ill wishes , and the ill will of men . in pursuit whereof , madam , an irreproachable judge as you may call monsieur chappellain , raising his voice but a little more then ordinary , pronounced this fair decree in favour of augustus , and his new dominion . who is that presumptuous man that dares complain , that heaven is above him , that thinks it strange , that the most luminous amongst creatures , is the highest , and that the worthiest is the greatest ? no man did ever appeal from that decree augustus was crowned by , the suffrage of all the company after his life was made after my manner in little . but because agrippa and maecenas were forgot in that life , you witnessed at our issuing out of your cabinet , that you would not be displeased , if i should tell you what i knew of either of them . and that it would be grateful to you if i made you a particular relation of moecenas , of whom so many have unknowingly spoken . you shall be obeyed after my fashion , and i wish it may be to your content : but as i usually do , madam , i will give you the things you ask as they fal into my mind , and rather according to the liberty of discourse , then the course of history . agrippa was bold and wise in war , infatigable in military labours , a religious observer of discipline , and had all the other parts of a good captain : but on the other side , he wanted those sweet and sociable vertues which are necessary for an able courtier : he did better understand the science of the field , then of the cabinet ; stratagems , then intricacies , and what was in time of trouble valour in him , became in time of rest , rudenesse . the same cannot be said of moecenas ; he was esteemed the honestest man of his time , and had nothing in his person which nature had not found with care , and which letters and the great world had not polished . yet madam , you may observe , that the tincture which is taken at this great light , and which gives a colour to natural goods , was taken from him with a reserve , and advanced not to the painting and disguise of intentions , so that it fel from the total alteration of probity . he had the graces of the court , but not the vices , and his actions were even as direct as his manner of acting was pleasing . although the court may debauch saints , and commonly at first infects what it receivs pure , yet it contaminated not maecenas . it made him shew , that besides the use of preservatives , which the study of wisdome furnisheth , there may be disposition inwardly so good , that they are stronger then all corruptions from without . t was he that gave the first example to the world , that was ever seen of an innocent and modest prospering . hee preserved in the court the maxims he brought thither , and in a place where all is false and masked , hee would appear what he was . but he had no need take care , madam , to counterfeit the liberal and the generous : hee could not but have been much troubled to have hindred himself from being so : for which hee needed neither labour nor fighting ; giving but way to the course of his own inclination , he never fell but on good , and on vertue . and so his good actions flowing from the spring and not being drawne by strength of arms , as those of some hero's of this age , the easinesse and liberty of them was no lesse esteemed then the splendor and magnificence : t was said of him that he was the honour of his age , and of the roman empire ; that he was the general good of the world ; that the sun would sooner cease to shine , and the rivers to run , then maecenas to do good . a brave man of his time cries out in a poem which hee addrest to him , t is too much given , moecenas , i am but too rich ; and indeed the discretion onely of those who received his benefits , could make stop of his liberality . if his friends would have believed him , he would have left himself nothing . neither durst a man praise at his house either a picture sent for a rarity from greece , or a statue of corinthian brasse , or a service of chrystal glasse , lest he presently should dispoil his palace of those precious moveables , and force him that praised them to accept of them . excesse and vanity might imitate moecenas : but natural goodnesse onely could reach his height . but we must remember , madam , that this noble man of spirit was not solitary and unaccompanied ; all the vertues marched in its train ; 't was a strong and couragious goodnesse , an able and an intelligent goodnesse ; and out of the same fountain whence particulars drew favors and courtesies , the publick was furnished with councels and resolutions . how great a doctor he was in the science of governing ; the fate of affairs never deceived him ; he never was a false politician , neither did he wander to appear a good speaker in the vast spaces of verisimilies . hee always went right out to truth , and so clearly saw the sequel of things in their first disposition , that the most irregular successes did hardly bely the conjectures hee made . is it not true that the emperor would have done wrong to so excellent a person , had he not honor'd him with his confidence , and had hee not given him a share in the government of the world ? being as he was a just esteemer of men , and knowing the value of every thing , he could not legitimately make twelve to be worth no more then two . that a many eminent qualities should not be of more use then a mean sufficiency . that the most powerful in reason should not have the first place in affairs . in a word madam , augustus tould not but that moecenas must have been favorite to augustus ; and although he was to give long and opinionated battels against the restraints of so modern a spirit to make him accept what he deserv'd , and that he was much troubled to overcome him . yet was he worthy of the magnanimity of the greatest prince in the world , that in this occasion he would not suffer himself to be overcome , and not give way . that his acknowledgement should be inferiour to the modesty of one of his friends . hee did then much good to this friend , but it was as you have already seen , to distribute it and divide it every way . to inlighten and rejoyce all the earth with the light of his riches . with this wealth moecenas bought for augustus all hearts & all tongues , and consequently rendred them of so much the better , more noble , and of the more durable species : so that considering so new a commerce , he who gave was lesse liberal then he was a good husband ; and who received from him was rather his factor then his favorite . but , madam , what i am going to tell you , deserves to be well observed : he was ever of the religion , to receiv nothing which might not justly be given , he would have nothing wch might be reproach'd him , not onely from the publick complaint of his renown , but also by the secret sight of an interessed particular . those who since had the same favour under other reigns , used it not so . their morrals were larger and more indulgent to their passions . they had none of those delicacies of conscience . when they died not soon enough of a natural death , they had recourse to accusations to advance the term of the account they made : they caused innocents to be condemned to make their charges vacant , and in the sight of afflicted orphans , they bore the marks of their fathers fortune which were not yet dry of his bloud . moecenas his proceedings were far different from these ; he would have believed himself sullied with the confiscated goods of one proscribed , and as you may ghesse , how many places and houses hath he refused , because hee would not touch funeral spoils , nor take away the successions of unhappy men . i shall say more , and his scruples went farther ; he hath often sent back the presents and gratifications of the provinces , which he had eased , fearing lest the lightest sign of their gratitude , and that a nosegay received in such an encounter , made not the least resentation of interest appear in his advice . he oftner set aside the profitable , which was not dishonest to embrace , what was honest barren and unfruitful ; he preferred a simple satisfaction of minde to those things which the world esteems solid and essential . i believe , madam , that so discreet and limited a greatness raised no jealousies in his prince . there was no treason to bee feared from so superstitious an integrity . how should he bee a pensioner to mark antony , had he not accepted all kind of augustus his favours ? and how should he desire new things to meliorat his condition , since he contented himself with a little part of those advantages , which the present offered . o rare example for happy men ! such a man is not to be found . how strong and solid a piece he was in the foundation of a growing principality . tyranny it self might have been justified by the innocency of this minister , as it might have been upheld by the rest of his more lively and more ardent vertues . yet would i not deny , but that his delicate complexion sometimes rendred him lesse fit for the labours of his body , and for the toils of war , and was the cause that ordinarily his minde could onely work . but , madam , without being prest he did not forbear to do much , and to render as useful services to the state , as his colleague , although they were not followed with so much noise and pomp . the solitude he built himselfe in town , and the shadowes of his gardens , hid the half of his vertue . his employments were covered with an outward appearance of lazinesse . and perhaps agrippa , who appeared was praised for the conduct of moecenas , whilest he was retired . the emperour had more inclination for this ; but remembring the battels gotten in sicilia and egypt , he esteemed the other more . the one he believed loved him more , and the other had obliged more . all these deliberated of general affairs : but sometimes he consulted only moecenas concerning the life and fortune of agrippa . witnesse madam , that little word , upon which one of machiavels disciples composed a great discourse . you must either put him to death , or make him your sonne in law . that is to say , you must either lose him , or quite gain him . you must secure your self of a greatnesse which is suspected to you either by taking him out of the world , or planting him in your house . you may thereby observe that moecenas regarded onely his master : i speak like a french man , and thought onely of confirming his authority . agrippa had a taste of the lost liberty , and turned his head about from time to time towards the ancient republick this never proposed counsels but such as were purely honest ; but his companion wherein concerned the good of the state , would add profit to honesty . the first had the command of armies , and fought the enemies of the empire . the second exercised his power even over the emperours minde , and therein appeased the motions which rose up against reason . which he did madam , with so much liberty , that the prince being once on the seat of justice , where some criminal processe was deba●●ed , and where he began to be carried away with the deceits and calumnies of the accusers . moecenas thereupon arriving , and being unable to divide the croud , which hindred his passage to him , he handed a note to him , wherein were these words : hangman , wilt thou not come away from them ? augustus in stead of taking offence at the boldnesse of the word , and of so pricking a familiarity , took his friends zeal kindly : and at the same time broke up the assembly and descended from his tribunal , whom perhaps he had not innocently gotten down , had he staid longer . he often received such like proofs of his fidelity . t was maecenas who tempered the heat of his passions , and sweetned the sharpnesse of his spirit ; who healed the wounds when he could not prevent the blows ; who consolated him , when he was not in a condition to admit of joy . augustus very well understood the desert and value of this friendship . he perceived well that his person being nearer to him then his fortune , such like services were to be valued in his minde , more then the taking of towns , and gaining of battels . he witnessed him also al the acknowledgments you can imagine from a just prince , and who knew how to distinguish inclination from duty , and those who loved caesar , onely from those who mixt other passions therewith . even after his death , he continued to acknowledge it to his memory ; and whensoever any domestick affliction befel him , or some outward displeasure , sighing hee would say , this would not have befaln me had moecenas been living . hee thought himself unhappy in possessing the empire of the world , since he had lost his moecenas . hee had indeed a great deal of reason to regret a person so equally good and intelligent , who could neither deceive nor be deceived ; who could do ill neither out of weaknesse , nor out of designe . he had great cause to weep the losse of a friend , who was both so necessary and so pleasing . a friend at all houres , and at all times , in whom he found all he sought , which was his table and common place book , the witnesse and the repository of his thoughts ; the treasury of his mind , even his second soul . in effect , madam , ( to shew you the worth of a faithful friend about a great prince ) how much doe you think hee confirmed , fortified , and augmented the reason of augustus ? how many thrones hath hee drawn out of those businesses he hath had to dispatch ? how many expedients did he propose to himself to facilitate his designes ? how many platforms hath he made to raise his works ? you need not doubt but hee hath often spared the pains of his foresight , and charged himself with the cares and disquiets of the future , that he might leave him entirely in the action . that the vigour of his spirit might not by being divided , bee diminished . that i might with truth at this time say , that they divided amongst themselves the several functions of the same duty , and that they both lived but one life . the faithful moecenas divers times , madam , upheld augustus , when hee was tired with the search of difficult good , and presented him with the image of a crowned and enjoyed vertue , to divert his sight from the sad object of suffering and labouring vertue , after a discovered conspiracy , and when hee judged clemency better then iustice . he fancied glory to him fairer and more attractive , then shee was , to provoke him the more to the love thereof , to oblige him to convert wicked persons to honest men . by changing sentences of death into abolitions , to doe so that hee preferred the praise of goodnes , which lasts as long as the families and races are preserved , before vengeance , which passeth as quickly as the stroak of a hatchet can bee given , and an head cut off . and after this you may if you please believe seneca , who condemns the style and eloquence of moecenas . me thinks madam , that to obtain such like graces from a provoked soul , a man should not want eloquence . i speak of that good and wise eloquence , the eloquence of affairs and action bred in the sun , and in the light of the great world , incomparably stronger then the rhetorick of the sophists , although that can far better hide and dissemble its strength . there is no doubt but it s absolutely necessary to speak well , for to have to doe with princes , who commonly cannot relish reason if it be not delicately prepared . 't is not enough that there bee vertue in the remedies they are to use , they will have no bitternesse in them . 't is not sufficient that the things we present them bee good , if they are not as well good in their form , as in their matter . but it is not princes onely who desire pleasing words , and who are offended against the reason which reproves them . to speak generally , there being nothing so free and elevated as the mind of man , it will bee treated according to the noblenesse of its nature : that is to say , with sweetnesse , method , and addresse . thereby madam , the will is carried away without much resistance , and from the will wee come to the understanding , which is so much an enemy to constraint , that to eschew it , it estrangeth it self from its proper object , and rejects the truth when any one will cause another to embrace it by force . it s certain that the understanding of an art so necessary to government , was soveraign in the person of moecenas . as hee was most clear sighted in discerning of wits , he was full of addresse in their conduct ; and was no lesse subtile in handling them , then he had light to discover them . with this efficacious eloquence which is nothing but the right use of prudence , which is communicated to men by speech ; he gained augustus an infinite many servants , and after he had perswaded him moderation , hee perswaded them obedience . all the conferences which were held in his palace , were sacrifices of praise and glory for augustus . he was there adored every day in prose and in verse . they began to reform then the ancient language of the republick , and to swear by the genius and good fortune of the prince . the temples which at first were built for him in spain , and in asia , and since in other povinces of the roman world , were designed in that place . and to take it from its rise , a man may say , madam , that maecenas with his orators and his poets , was founder of all those temples , was the institutor of that new religion which consecrated a living man . believe me and all antiquity rather then seneca ; that incomparable favorite left always i know not what sting in the heart , which provoked the courages of the hardest to the love of the prince and country , to the study of vertue and wisdome . a man could not get from him without a sweet esmotion able to awaken the deadnesse of those who were not sensible of the felicity of the reign of augustus , who never dreamt of the beauty of good things . the air of his face , the tone of his voice , and what the rhetoricians comprehended under the eloquence of the body , gained the outward sense in an instant , and made even to the soul by the facility of whose guard it was presently taken . he perswaded even with the negligence of the most familiar entertainment . in his free conversation when he devested the pomp of the court , and gravity of his ministry , when he forsook what dazled the people , he still had many ornaments left which he could not leave ; he had unvoluntary charms about him which hee minded not , which every where accompanied him . these charms , madam , particularly inspired all he said : it supplied the default of his favour ; and even when hee did not grant requests , he did not forbear to give satisfaction : for you know well , that all things are not always possible , and that a man must sometimes refuse . but i beseech you , what must those presents be which enriched so charming a mouth , since the refusals which issued were not displeasing , and that in speaking he so much pleased that with his words alone hee could have paid his debts . yet nero's tutor will not have the confident of augustus , to speak well . he reproaches his delicacies and affectednesse , even the softnesse and debauches of his speech , and as he says , he was the first corrupter of the roman eloquence . he broached forth sayings , wch to him seemed lighter then they ought , but which he hath cut from a work whose matter and design we are ignorant of . and thereupon without telling us whether moecenas spoke in cold bloud , or whether he only had a mind to laugh , he declaims against the liberty of his style with all the sharpnesse and all the rage of his . to tell you the truth madam , i doubt there was somewhat of the philarchus , & of ill wil in the proceeding of seneca : if the pieces he makes at , were seen whole , we should see that hee distinguisheth not the two characters , and that he takes a suit once used at a mask for the robes of a senator , wch he every day wears to the councel . doubtlesse he seems not to understand raillery . he certainly is one of those testy hypomies , who would have plays as serious as affairs , and comedies as sad as funeral orations . let 's draw him back in all the occasions of moecenas . his aversion towards him is too visible and too discovered . and after having scratched at his writings , hee falls on his manners , with so much passion , that a man may easily perceive the spirit of his sect possest him , and that he had a design to appear a reformed stoick in prejudice of the honestest epicurian that ever was . i do not say , to weaken the testimony of seneca , that hee was a doctor of the court , who philosophis'd in purple , and with ease discoursed of vertue . and that even perhaps he exclaimed against voluptuousnesse , that he might wholly enjoy it , & no man envy it in him . i onely say in justification of moecenas , that its impossible the soul should give without enervating it self , and that as there is a composed and melancholy folly , there may be a free and jovial wisdom . i have heard , madam , from our learned monsieur*** ; but he said it far handsomer then i can repeat it , that there is an art of using pleasure innocently ; that this art was taught by aristippus in greece ; that since it was corrupted at rome by petronius and by tigillin , who abused it as poisoners have physick . he added that the practise of that art was not defended by the laws of your country . that on the contrary , they had created magistrates expresly to have a care of the pleasures of the people . that besides the edicts of the republick , there was under the emperors spoken of a tribune for pleasures . and that he had seen a science and a discipline of pleasure in the formularies of cassiodorus . he concluded , madam , that it was not just to accuse the purity of things for the intemperance of men , and that it is not credible that the goods of this life should have been made only for the wicked . it is not credible i am of the same opinion wth this rare soul , that god should have sent vertue into the world for the punishment of poor men , and that it is not vertue if it combat not against grief , unlesse it march on thorns , if it lodge not in an hospital , if it even inhabit not sepulchres . moecenas would expect till he was dead to take possession of so displeasing a dwelling ; and if he were alive , & had changed rome for paris , i am confident a man should oftner finde him in some place which i know , where there is nothing which contents not the eyes and the mind , then in other places which i will not name , where there is nothing opposeth them not . what a pleasure you would take to learn his history from himself ? what a glory would he receive to have som of your audiences ? how would your modest conversation touch his minde ? you could not hide your self , madam , he would discover that soveraign understanding , which you vail with all the restraint , & all the sweetnesse of your sexe . he would admire you in despight of you . we would reconcile his enemy with him at the first request you should make him , and even without a request , so confident am i of the sweetnesse and facility of his manners . the serenity of his minde would not be disturbed by the fumes and flourishes of the violent sophists . he would but laugh at the pettishnesse and paradoxes of seneca . he would tell you onely , madam , that wee must suffer all from the race of zeno , and the nation of the stoicks . that all is permitted to a philosopher , who called alexander a fool , who it s believed had a better title then the king of persia to be king of kings . and what particularly makes for our subject , who was so much an enemy of life , that hee councelled men to hang themselves when they were never so little disturbed , or in an ill humour . finis . modern policies taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors by an eye-witnesse. sancroft, william, 1617-1693. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a61533 of text r16763 in the english short title catalog (wing s557). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 81 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 84 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a61533 wing s557 estc r16763 13623329 ocm 13623329 100856 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a61533) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 100856) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 801:18) modern policies taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors by an eye-witnesse. sancroft, william, 1617-1693. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a61533 of text r16763 in the english short title catalog (wing s557). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread [166] p. printed for tho. dring ..., london : 1653. written by william sancroft. cf. dnb. "an indictment of the religion and politics of the commonwealth"--dnb. reproduction of original in huntington library. eng machiavelli, niccolò, 1469-1527. borgia, cesare, 1476?-1507. political ethics -early works to 1800. political science -early works to 1800. a61533 r16763 (wing s557). civilwar no modern policies, taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors, by an eye-witnesse. the fourth edition. sancroft, william 1653 14337 153 255 0 0 0 0 285 f the rate of 285 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2003-05 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2003-06 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2003-08 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2003-08 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion modern policies , taken from machiavel , borgia , and other choice authors , by an eye-witnesse . hom. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} salust . fragm. libidinem dominandi , causam belli habent , & maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant . plautus in captivis . nam doli , non doli sunt , ni si astu colas , sed malum maximum , si id palam pervenit . trinummus . ambitio jam more sancta'st , libera'st a legibus , petere honorem pro flagitio , more sit : mores , leges perduxerunt jam in potestatem suam . the fourth edition . london , printed for tho : dring , at the signe of the george in fleet-street neer cliffords inne . 1653. to my very good lord my lord r. b. e. my lord , i was never so proud , as to think i could write any thing that might abide the test of your judicious eye ; what i now send , appeales to your candor , intreating you to lay aside the person of a iudge , for that of a friend . it is at best but a pamphlet , whether you consider its bulke , or worth . the result of a few pensive houres spent in recollecting what the memory had registred from publike observance , or private reading , in a theme so sadly copious as this is . if it be not impertinent to tell you what hinted to this trifle , it was this ; having had opportunity to looke abroad into the world , i tooke some notice of the contrastos of the italian princes ; i remark'd the spaniards griping portugal ; his grounds for the challenge of that kingdome , & his way of managing those grounds ; i lookt upon his method of propagating christianity in the west : ( where one saies the indian is bound to be religious and poore upon pain of death . ) moreover , i observed with what artifice the pope moderated in the european quarrels , and with what devices he twisted the gops●ll , and the advantage of the chaire toge●hir ; and in all the struglings and disputes , that have of late years befalne this corner of the : world , i found ●hat although the p●letence was , fiue and spirituall , yet the ultimate end , and ●●●●sedpe , was gold , and greatnesse , and secular glory . but ( my lord ) to come nearer , when i saw kingdomes tottering , one nation beeding against another , yea , one piece of a nation justling the other , and split into so many parties , and petty enmities : and each of these quoting bible to palliate his mad , and exorbitant opinions ; i sigh'd , and it grieved mee to see popular easinesse , and well-meaning abus'd by ambitious self-seeking men ; for there is a generation that is born to bee the plague , and disquiet , and scourge of the age it lives in ; that gladly sacrifice the publike peace to private interest ; and when they see all fired , with joy warme their hands at those unhappy flames , which themselves kindle , tuning their merry harps ; when others are weeping over a kingdomes funerall . but above all , it pierced my heart to see the clergy in such an high degree accessory to the civill distempers , and contentions that have every where shak'd the foundations of church and state ; so that ( as a catholike noted ) there hath been no floud of misery , but did spring from , or at least was much swel'd by their holy-water . i searched evangelicall records , and there was nothing but milde and soft doctrines , i inquired into the breathings of the spirit , and they were pacificatory ; i wondered from what precedents and scripture incouragements these men deduc'd their practises ; and at last was forced to conclude , that they were only pretended chaplaines to the prince of peace ; those torches that should have been for saving light , were degenerated into firebrands ; those trumpets that should have sounded retreats to popular furies , knew no other musicke but martiall all-armes . i have endeavoured in the sequell to represent to you the arts of ambition by giving you the picture of a person over covetous of glory , the peice is course , but yet like ; drawne onely in water colours , which some of greater leisure and abilities may possibly hereafter lay in oyle . you know that the desires of man are vast as his thoughts , boundless as the ocean , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a bored tub is not more insatiate . t is pity that greatnesse should at any time be out of the rode of goodnesse ; and i would sometimes , if i durst , with socrates , curse him that first separated profitable and honest ▪ ● it does to me a little relish of paradox , that where ever i come , machiavell is verbally curs'd and damn'd , and yet practically imbraced and asserted ; for there is no kingdome but hath a race of men that are ingenious at the perill of the publike ; so that as one said of galba in respect of his crooked body : ingenium galbae malè habitat ; so may i say of these in regard of their crooked use ; that wit could not have chosen a worse mansion , then where it is viriated , and made a pander to wickednesse . if you aske mee what i mean to trouble the world , that is already under such a glut of books ? you may easily perceive that i consulted not at all with advantaging my name , or wooing publike esteeme by what i now write ; i knew there was much of naked truth in it , and though it might possibly be of some caution to prevent the insinuation of pious frauds , and religious fallacies into my native country : if any plaine-hearted , honest man shall cast away an houre in perusing it , he may perhaps finde something in it resembling his owne thoughts , and not altogether strange to his owne experience . it is not the least of our misfortunes , that sins and vices are cost times endear'd to us by false titles and complements : being couzened with a specious name , though much incoherent to the thing we ascribe it : or el●e , omi●●ing the vice which is the maine , it intimates onely the ●e●i●e which is the by ● as for example , we call an ambitious man {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a person of notable aime and high enterprize whereas in truth , signifies , an indirect affectour of grandeur : and i finde that by incautelous intertainment of these phrases , our judgments are often brib'd to misapprehensions , & we seduced to bad actions . i have endeavoured in the ensuing discourse to wipe off the paint and fucu● : that so things may appeare in their true complex●o● , unadulterated with the slights and subtilties of deluders . my lord , that your lordship may be one of those which the darke poet calls {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that the youth of your honours may be renewed to you , that your happines may be acquainted with no other season but a spring , is the earnest vote of your bounden servant . the name of prince , which i often use , must be understood , as convertible with any person , or persons , whom god hath intrusted with a just supremacy ; all the dialects of government being concerned in the abuse ; i have made the cheife , and most familar , to represent the rest . i am not ignorant that the quotations may justly seeme more numerous than method , and the rule of art will conveniently allow ; i have this to say , to vindicate me from affecttednesse ; that i have been little studious of elegance , and curiosity in the composure ; esteeming nakednesse to be the best dress of truth : and if i mistake not , those attendants i have here procured for her , may afford some material , though litle ornamentall advantage . a praemonition . it is farre from the designe of this treatise , to derogate from the honour of the calling , or worth of the person of any sober statesman ; 't is a knowledge that no man observes with more due respects then my selfe ; because , i know it is no meane degree essentiall to the peace , and flourishing condition of a kingdome or common-wealth . 't is a jewell to be lock'd up in some few rare cabinets , and not to be made cheape , and expos'd to irreverence , by being bared , and prostituted to every vulgar eye . the pseudo-policy here mention'd is contradistinct to that science , which is ever built upon piety and prudence ; for upon these solid bases , your wise architect delights to raises he glorious superstructure of government in a prince , and subjection in a people : so knitting the interest of both with reciprocall mixture , that the welfare of the one may be involv'd in the good of the other : the majesty may be preserv'd in its just splendor , and ye● the liberty of the subject remaine inviolate : hee is the atlas of the falling state , cures it when sicke , sets it when dis-joynted , meets it in its severall pressures with sutable reliefs . such was philip de commines , of whom one said , it was a measuring cast , whether lewis were the wiser king , or philip the wiser counsellour : such was burleigh to our late queen elizabeth , whose advise had very eminent influence into the prosperitie of her reign , which was such , as i beleive few ages can parallel , and future times will read her happy annals , as written like xenophon's cyrus , non ad historiae fidem , sed ad exemplum justi imperij ; so that if we love peace , or plenty , or liberty , we are bound in way of acknowledgment to owne that in plutarch , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} pav . but as the corruption of the best things makes them worst , so this noble knowledge has been abused to loose and ambitious ends , by some men who seem to have suck'd the venome out of all politicks , misapplying what was good , and creating new according to the urgency of their own occasions , like the lawes that were made in causinus his babel , to beru'd by manners , and not manners by lawes . they vex true policy by misinterpreting , and false glossing ; framing in their hearts diana's of hypocrisy and subtilty , and worshiping them in their actions . the rules following there are few so silly as to beleive , though too many so wicked as to practise ; and not only so , but by a bold imposture to perswade that such actions as are deduc'd from these principles , are justifiable , and if fortunate , commendable . that all may see these rocks , and shun them , and detest knavery though never so specious , and nauseate sinne , though robed in successes and triumphs , is my daily prayer . first principle . the polititian must have the shadow of religion , but the substance hurts . there is no superstition in politicks more odious , then to stand too much uponniceties and scruples : and therefore machiavel cut the haire , when he advis'd , not absolutely to disavow conscience , but to manage it with such a prudent neglect , as is scarce discernable from a tendernesse : not permitting it to be techy and relucting , nor yet prostituting it , unlesse upon solemne and insuperable occasion : hee notes it from papirius in livy , who slighted the pullarii handsomly , and was rewarded ; whereas appius pulcher did it grosly , and was punished . but because the polititian is best able to tell his own documents , you may please to conceive you found these broken discourses in his study : to each of which i shall adde an antidote . externall holinesse invites awfull regards ; there is no mask that becomes rebellion and innovation so well as religion ; nothing that so much conceals deformity , & pretends beauty . 't is an excellent thing so to dissimulate piety , that when we act strongly against it , in that very article of wickednes the people saint us : herod would faine worship , when he means to worry . — ipso sceleris molimine tereus creditur esse pius : this is that which leades the world in a string , that hallowes the most hellish enterprises : for the common people ( which are the {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ) never see behind the curtain , a handsome glosse is with them as good as the text : i believe the great naturalist was in the right , when h● call'd a● deity a jolly inven●ion , irridendum , agere curam rerum humanarum quicquid est summum , sed credi ex usu vitae est , let me enjoy the temporall advantages of religion , and let others take the eternall ; let me use it for a cloak or a crutch , and let others expect from it a crowne . the river in athenaeus is my emblem , whose upper waters were sweet and gratefull , but towards the bottome brackish . let me be a superficiall , let others be fundamentall christians : i like the humour of the samseans in epiphanius , that were neither iewer , nor gentils , nor christians , but preserving a commodious correspondence with all ▪ whatsoever i act in reference to heaven is meerely theatricall ; and done in subordination to some other interest . lycurgus could never have ingratiated his lawes so effectually , if he had not pretended a dialogue wth his goddesse . 't is to me indifferent , whether the religion i personate be true or false , so it be but popular : and if the people i meane to juggle with err fundamentally , i can by no means court them more , then by imbracing their delusion ; it buckles them very close to me in morall observance , to assist them in their spiritual soundnes , and mix with their distemper ; and therefore i commonly lead the van in the faction , and call it iure divino , though i never found it but in hells blacke canons . how comfortably the pope and cardinall confer'd notes , — quantum nobis lucri peperit illa fabula de christo ! o the rich income and glorious result of hypocrisie ! this , this must be diligently studyed and practis'd . — da justum sanctumque videri , noctem peccatis , & fraudibus objice nubem . privacy for a sinne , and cleanly conveyance for a cheat , make it to common eyes seeme as white as innocency it self : the strictness of that thiefe was very notable , who alwayes before hee went about the worke of his calling ( for so he call'd stealing ) went to prayers that god would blesse and prosper him : so i say grace to the design , be it never so wicked , and give thankes for the successe , bee it never so bloody . but further in subserviency to a loose interest , there must bee no such puling thing as conscience ; hell , and heaven , and scripture , and what else the christian esteems most sacred , must all truckle under the plot , but not be observ'd when they come to oppose it : had alexander boggled at invading other mens kingdomes , hee had never wept for the scarcity of worlds . there is noe greater obstacle to generous actions , then a coy and squemish conscience ; t is pretty that some tel us that it strikes surdo verbere , and then how can it bee heard in the noise and bustle of a clamorous world ? had your mighty conquerours , and your valiant captaines , and your thriving popes , listned to this inward charmer , their names had never swell'd , and look'd bigg in the rolls of fame . colasterion . but let all sober christians know , that this shell of religion , though it may be of external conducement , yet there is nothing that gods pure and undeluded eye looks on with more abhorrency : we may possibly deceive men , but t is in vaine to put ironies upon god . a counterfeit religion shall find a reall hel , and t is pitty that such a sacred thing should be violenced , & made to obstetricate to rebellious irregular designes . as for such who have conspir'd with the wrath of god in the stupefaction of their consciences , though they may for a time struggle with those inward checks , yet there will bee a day ( if not in this life ) when that witness , that judge , that jury will not bee bribed . god hath fixed it in the soul as an eternall register , as an impartiall diary as the censor of the affections , and paedagogue of the passions . it does not only illustrate divine justice in an autocat●crisy , but was meant by god for a bridle and restriction : and he that hath by an inveterate wickedness conquer'd the opposition which god seated in his heart to sin , may possibly consult well with his present advantage and greatnesse , but not at all with his future comfort ; for besides the losse of that intimate pleasure which writes upon innocency ; hee ●eels sometimes those bosome quarrells that verberate and wound his soule , — for {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . principle ii. thè politician must by all means make the most insinuating applications to the people that hee can ; and lock up his owne designe , in pretence for religion , liberty , restitution of laws , reformation of gabels , &c. the prosperity of innovation depends in a high measure upon the right knack of kindling and fomenting jealousies and dislikes in the people ; and then weilding those grudges to the favour & advantage of private ends ; for the people are to the polititian like tools to the mechanick , he can performe nothing without them , they are his wings , his wheels , his implements , the properties that he acts with . that this may be done effectually , there must be an excellency in these following slights . first , to assign such a cause of grievances , and such a course for redress , as may open a way to the alteration he ayms at : as if he means to alter the government ' , or to ingross the supremacy , he must artificially convince of a necessity to arme , 1. defensively , and if that succeeds , 2. offensiv●ly ; this hee may do by false alarmes of danger , inventing horrid news , and plying the people with such fictitious perils , as may make them beleive , religion and liberty , and all is at stake , and that they are the geese that must save the capitoll . secondly , when hee sees opportunity to reveale his own designe , he must doe it gradually , and by peece-meale ; for that which at one view would bee a mormo to fright them , give it them in small parts , and they will digest it well enough . thirdly , hee must compose his very garbe and gesture : 't is a great matter to tell a lye with a grace ; as , if religion be the mode , he must in his tales knock his breast , attest god , and invoke imprecations upon himselfe , if hee does not doe that , which hee never intends . fourthly , hee gives them good words , and bad actions , like those the historian brands with a crudelitatem damnatis , crudelitatem initis , ravishes them with apprehensions of liberty , under the highest strain of oppression : for it is most certaine if , you please them with the name , they will imbrace it for name and thing . something like this had beene imposed upon rome , when the orator writ to his friend atticus , — nominu rerum perdidimus , & licentia . militaris libertas vocatur , that they were cheated in names , for military licence was miscal'd liberty ; this is wel describ'd by plautus in truculentu . in melle sunt lingu● sitae vestrae , atque orationes , lacteque : corda felle sunt sita , atque acerbo aceto . elinguis dicta dulcia datis , at corde amare facitis . fifthly , he observes that they receive probabilities wisely propounded , more greedily then naked truths : and therefore he is very studious to glase and polish his impostures , that so they may to a loose eye dissemble truth , according to that of pindar , — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : or that of menander : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . sixthly , when hee hath by the assistance of the people got the sword into his owne hands , he awes them with it , and frights them into future complyance . hee tha● courted them before with all the adulator● termes , that ambition could invent , or they receive ; as if he had bee● vow'd their martyr , and ready to sacrifice his dearest enjoyments upon the altar of publick liberty and freedome ; as if his veines knew no other blood , but such as he would be proud to spend in their service , having now served himselfe of them , he forgets the bosome that warm'd him , they hear from him now in a palinode , he curles up his smooth complements into short laconicks , and exchanges his court-ship for command . colasterion . first , we may be assured that there is no greater index of ambition , then an affectation of popularity : which appeares in meek addresses to the people , wooing and familiar condescentions , bemoaning thei● sufferings , commending a more vigorous sense o● them ; that of the comit● is no bad rule , non temerarium est ubi dives ble● de appellat pauperem , aitera manu fert lapicadem , pa●● ostentat altera : nemini crede , qui longe blandu'st 〈◊〉 ves pauperi . or that which livy notes of a crandee , credebant haud gratuitam in tanta superbid comitatem fore , the extreame kindnesse or fawning of great persons , is alwaies suspicious , because often fraudulent : remember the sileni , that use to kill with huggs , and embraces . secondly , know it 's very usuall for men to personate goodnesse , till they have accomplished their ends ; 't is observed of appius , when he had his wish , finem fecit gerendae alienae personae ; t is an old note , maxima pars morem hunc homines habent , quod fibi votunt , dumid imperiant ▪ honi sunt , se●● ubi iam penes sese habent , ex bonis pessimi , & fraudulentiss●● sunt . athon●●s tells a pretty story , of one atheni●● born obscurely , who 〈◊〉 long as hee was priva●● and poor , excelled in 〈◊〉 soft and tractable disposition , but when by jug●ling he had obtained th●athenian governmen● there was none more ●dious for a cruel , cove●ous , & barbarick tyra●ny : as it is reported 〈◊〉 caligula , there was nev●● a better servant , and a worse master . thirdly , we know that a good aime , much ●ess a good pretence cannot justifie a bad action , and therefore we ought to be as solicitous about the lawfulnesse of the meanes , as about the goodnesse of the end . it ●s a maxim in morality , that bonum oritur ex inte●●●s , and in christianity , ●hat wee must not doe ●vil that good may come ●f it ; & we may possibly ●escue our selves from ●uture cousenage , if we ●xamine the lawfulnesse ●f every circumstance leading to the end propounded , before we are tickled and transported with the beauty of the pretence . principle . iii. if the supremacy be invaded , the lapses of the former magistrate must be inculcated with the greatest advantage , and what is wanting in reality , must be supplyed in calumny . it cannot easily be imagined of what singular importance the aspersing and blotting of a prince is , to boyl up popular discontent to that height which is requisite for a rebellion ; and here it must diligently be enquired if there have not beeene indeed such lapses , as have gal'd the people ; and though they be old sores and skin'd , yet they must be searcht and refreshed , and exasperated with all the urging circumstances , that come within the invention of scandal ; it must be remembred , if any persons of publick note have suffer'd under the sword of justice , whose crimes can by art or eloquence be extenuated , whose hard measure must be mentioned with teares , that so old traytors may be propounded for new martyrs . this hath been the ordinary method of ambition , as you may find it noted by a great scholar in these words , — fuit haec omnibus saeculis , & adhuc est ad occupandum tyrannidem expeditissima via , dum summo se amore ; ac pietate in patriam esse simulant , principum vitia , & populi miseriam , apud suos primum , deinde palam queribunda voce lamentantur , non quo plebem , cuius solius commodis inservire ●ideri volunt , ab illo servitutis jugo asserant in libertatem ; sed quo populari aura subnixi , aditum ●ibi & januā ad eam ipsā dignitatem , nequiora aliquando ausuri patefaciant . and therefore if the prince be severe , he gives him nero's brand , a man kneaded up of dirt and blood : if he be of parts and contrivance , he calls it pernicious ingenuity : if he be mild and favourable to tender consciences , he declaims against his toleration : if he urge uniformity , and decency in divine service , he railes at his superstition . and because there is no such aequilibrious vertue , but has some flexure to one of the extreams he is very carefull to publish the extream alone , and to silence the vertue . but if the prince hath by carriage of extraordinary innocence , vindicated himself from obloquy ( wich shall scarce be , if small faults be rightly improved ) then machiavels advice must be follow'd , to calumniate stoutly , till the people have entertained something to his prejudice : 't is a figure in politicks to make every infirmity a fault , and every faull a crime : and if the people be disposed to alteration , these must be first urged against a monarch to depose him , or if need be to murther him ; which is commendable , if you can dresse him up like a tyrant , as you may find it justified by an honest scot , who complaines that there are not some glorious rewards appointed for tyrannicides : and by the best of orators , — graecos deorum honores tribuisse iis , qui tyrannos necaverunt : and by the tragedian , victima baud ulla amplion potest . magisve optma mactari iovi , quam rex iniquus . and secondly , these personall faults must be artificially devolved upon monarchy it self . there remaines to disperse the commendations of that government which is intended for a successor : if arstocracy , the long-liv'd prosperity of sparta and venice , is a very plausible evidence of its goodnes : if democracy , the happines of the romanes under their tribunes is very memorable ; to which may be added this out of machlavel : that they are the most sutable guardians of any thing , who are least desirous to usurp it : and without doubt considering the designes of the nobility and the people , we must confesse , that the first are very ambitious of rule , the last desire onely not to be opprest . colasterion . i presume that person is very rare , that can boast of such an absolute saint-ship whilst he is amongst mortals , but that there will now and then some actions fall from him , which confesse humanity , and require candor : some leaves in the volume of the fairest life , that are legenda cuno venia : if this be a common frailty , why do we six such rigid censures upon the miscarriages of princes or why do we deny them the same mildness which we use , when wee commiserate the infirmities of other men ? 't is yet much more disingenious to revive and pore upon a few bad actions , which it may be have been long ago expiated with many good : take this from no mean statist . — iniqua in omni re accusanda , praetermissis bonis , malarum enumeratio , vitiorumque selectio ; namne ullus quidem isto modo magistratus vituperabilis no●erit . as greatnesse gives a glosse to the vertues of a prince , so it mitigates his vices ; for if we look upon him as circled with honour , and all outward enjoyment ; we see withal that variety of temptations he hath to struggle with above others , having no other guard , no other weapon then his meer vertue ; sometimes we are defended from a sin by our very impotency , it may be above our sphere , or out of our reach ; we do not , because we cannot ; how often are our wils offenders , when our hands are innocent ? wee are checked from without , he commonly from within , having nothing to dispute with his immoderate desires but himselfe . this is that which inhances the goodnes of a prince , as that excellent poet leads his temperate knight through al the delicacies and charms of pleasure , and delivers him a conquerour . but suppose a magistrate really tyrannical ; it is no contemptible question , whether the evils of the redresse may not be equivalent to the mischiefe . i remember livie's , nec morbum ferre possumus , nec remedum : and plutarchs , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and tacitus , ferendae regum ingenia , neque usui esse crebras mutationes : vitia erunt , donec homines , sed neque haec continua , & meliorum interventu pensantur ; and seneca , infaeliciter aegrotat , cui plus periculi a medico quam à morbo . poise the miseries of a civil war with the grievances of an unjust magistrate , and the polititian must take many granes of allowance from fallacy to make the scales even . for though the fury of incensed tyranny may fal heavy upon many particulars , yet the bloody consequences of an intestine sword , are more epidemicall , and more permanent . as to the charging the faults of a governour upon the government its self , i see nothing in it but delusion , nor can there be a more grosse abuse , then {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for king-killing , because i know it a techy subject , i shall wholly omit all discouse of it ; only i finde it damn'd by an able english divine jesuiticall ; and tacitus commends to subjects rather scutum then gladium , the shield of patience and toleration , rather then the sword . principle iv. the polititian must nourish some mercenary iesuits , or other divines , to cry up his aymes in their churches , that so the poyson may insinuate more generally into all the parts . he that peruses history , will finde that there hath beene no innovation so grosse , no rebellion so hideous , but hath had some ecclesiasticall fomentors : for such as want worth enough of their owne to reach preferment in a regular way , are most apt to envy the just honours of better men ; and despairing to obtain their end by learning and piety , they aspire to it by the crooked meanes of faction and schisme ; nor are these despicable instruments to the polititian ; for the sharpest sword in his army cannot vye services with a subtle quill : you may see his businesse in the comick , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the jesuite reckons it in the number of his merits , if he may by any sinister wayes ruffle and disorder heretical kingdomes ( so he cals them ) encourage weak and unstable mindes to slight magistracy ' , irritate divisions , tumults , rebellions , absolve from oaths , and al sacred ties ; so that it is hard to find any tragicall scene , or bloody theatre , into which the iesuite hath not intruded , and been as busie as davus in the comedy , contributing in a very high measure to every fanatick insolence , justifying the old lemma of loiola's picture , cavete vobis principes : these are the firebrands of europe , the forge and bellows of sedition , infernall emissaries , the pests of the age , men that live as if huge sinnes would merit heaven by an antiperistasis . 2. nor is any nation without some turbulent spirits of its own , the dishonour of the gown and pulpit , the shame , and sometimes the ruine of their countrey ; you would thinke they had their text from a gazet , because you heare so much of a curranto in the application● : that these may be fit implements for the polititian , there are th●se requisite qualifications . 1. there must be a principall gift of wresting the scripture , vexing & urging the holy text , constraining it to patronize the design ; the great apostle expresses this in three very emphaticall termes ; 1. cogging the dye , making the word speake what they list ; 2. crafty applications , and expositions of it ; 3. all the methods and arts of consenage , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , gilding and varnishing rotten doctrines , and this must be done . 1. in publick , vomiting out flames and sulphur from that sacred pegma , where he should deliver none but milde and soft , that is , evangelicall embassages . 2. in private , at parlour sermons , and meeting houses , where he is listened to as an oracle , and here commonly he is more euthsiuast then scripturist , and his auditors beleive his dreams to be as canonical as the revelation ; like those melancthon speakes of , quicquid somniant , volunt esse spiritum sanctum , or those that the father chides , when he tels them that every whimsey is not prophesie {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . 3. hee ought to be of some abilities in disputing , and what he wants in logick , he must supply in garrulity : for whatsoever hee affirmes , the interest he hath in his seduc'd hearers improves into a syllogisme ; if you ask after his topicks ; ex officina carnificum argumenta petit : if after his weapons , armat se ad latrocinium per christi nomen , and the woun●● hee makes is faction ; those consciences which will not surrender to his parly , his master takes by storme : and thus hee abuses christ , by pretending his favour to unwarrantable actions ; hee abuses his prince , by alienating the affection and allegiance of his subjects ; he abuses the church , by shattring it into rents and schisms ; wounding it with a feather from its own wing , snatching a coale from the altar , to fire both church and state ; and lastly he abuses himselfe , for when the polititian hath made his best use of his seditious spirit , hee leaves him to his owne wilde distempers , having directed his owne thoughts to another goale . colasterion . although we have caution enough against these in sad and frequent experiences , these latter ages groaning under the effects of an exorbitant clergy ; yet such is the easinesse and credulity of the vulgar , such the subtlety and dissembled sanctity of the impostor , that hee meets with as great a pronenesse in the people to be couse●d , as he brings willingnesse to delude ; for it is a true observation , that these clancular sermocinators beare as great sway in popular mindes , and make as deep impression upon their consciences , as the loyolists doe , when they impose upon their blinde laity . i dare onely subjoyne these few advises . first , i should suspect ● clericall statu● , i meane such a one as in the dispensation of sacred oracles , tampers with secular affaires , unlesse it be in case of high concernment to his auditors soules . secondly , i should beleive him a jugler , that sprinkles his sermons with murmurs against the lawfull magistrate , ecclesiasticall , or civill , unlesse he hath some better ground for his dislike , then a th warting his humour , in things controversiall and adiaphorous . thirdly , i should more then doubt his knavery , that should suborn scripture , to attest , or incite to illegall actions , as a kin to that , which salvian calls religiosum scelus . 4ly . all newes in religion , whether in doctrine or discipline , is 〈◊〉 common skreene of private design ; let {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} tell it , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} which is noted by the great causabon in his epistle before his baronian exercitations , thus ; cupiditas novandi haec secum mala semper trahit , christ● inconsutilem tunicam lacerat , sectas novas parit , & statim multiplicat , ecclesiam & populum concutit &c. t is sad to see vra●ti● divine vrania inroll'd i● blood , the stars and luminaries of the church , to shed such blacke and malignant influences ; in lieu of pious documents , to heare none but furious incentives ; ite a●acres , tantaeque precor confidite causae ; the cause they serve , is the doctrine and the use , the egg , the apple , the head and foot of all their discourses ; if you like to confer notes , you may finde a peice of their sermon in barclay to this effect , se evangelij libertatem praedicare , ●ill●m christianis animis vim inferre , suam cuique conscientiam liberam relinquere , verbo ducere , non vi quemquam adigere ; ea● esse evangelij doctrinam , u● omnes conscientiae fruantu● libertate : sibique ut id liceat , votis omnibus postulare . principle . v. if successe waites upon his enterprises , he urges it to authenticate his cause . there is no argument more popular then succes , because the bulke of men is not able to distinguish the permission of god , from his approbation : and although it be in its selfe fallacious and feeble , yet the misery of the conquer'd denies them the opportunity to dispute it ; for the opposition of the sword will never be confuted by the bare fist of logick . nor doth the victor commonly permit any ventilation of his dictates ; for when the body is a slave , why should the reason be free ? {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; as the souldiers in plutarch wondred any would be so importunate to preach laws , and morall reasons to men with swords by their sides ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and if armes knew not how to descend to rationall inquiries , but were enough justified by an odd kinde of necessity of their owne creating ; like those in livy , in armis jus ferre , & omnia fortium virorum esse . i have often considered with my selfe , what should move tyrants to print justifications of themselves , and assertions of their proceedings , which i suppose never made an understanding man a convert , nor met with a cordiall reception in any ; unlesse the abuse of a few , poore , shallow beleivers , be thought a tryumph worth their paines . i have sometimes thought they do by these papers please themselves in their abilities to delude , and so gratifie their tyranny over the noblest part of man , by denying the liberty of the thought , and subduing the powers of the soule to an implicit coherence with their owne magisteriall opinions . but our polititian , by quoting the successe of his undertakings , besides the plausibleness ▪ and insinuating nature of the proposition its self , hath the advantage of power to make us beleive him . nor ▪ is this bait contemptible , many of parts and prudence , yea and of religion , have been stagger'd by it ; some question whether diagoras deserv'd the brand of atheisme , considering the wilde conceits they then had of their gods ; or differ'd from the common creed , crying out , o how the gods favour sacriledge ! when he had a merry gale , after a sacrilegious atempt . the best of the roman historians calls the victory , the just arbitresse of the cause , eventus belli velut aequus iudex , unde jus stat , ei victoriam dabit : so hard it is to perswade meer reason , that vertue may b● unfortunate , and vi● happy . he was no small po●● that argued himselfe o●● of his gods , by seei●● wickednesse honoured , 〈◊〉 worth slighted : whi●● he expresses thus ; memtor to li●●us tu mulo iacti● at cato parv● , pompeiusnullo , guis putet esse de● in english . licinus does in marble sleep , a common urne does cato keep pompeys ashes may catch cold , that there are gods , let dou● 〈◊〉 there may be so●● use made of that in se●●ca , honesta quaedam scelera successus facit , prosperous mischiefes are cardinall vertues in the worlds ethicks ; & therefore the tragedian repeates it , prosperum ac faelix scelus , virtus vocatur . the unwarrantablenesse is hid and concealed in the glory of the successe : wee often praise the macedonian conquest , but seldome mention their boundlesse and unjust ambition . on the contrary , if an undertaking really good miscarry , we censure it : so that according to the vogue of the world , 't is the event that gives the colour to the action , and denominates it good o● bad . to {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . colasterion . there is some of this leaven in the judgments of most , notwitstanding those brighter discoveries , in the noone of christianity we live under . a bible throughly observ'd , would expound to us much of the riddle , and dark passages of providence : we are so short-sighted , that we cannot see beyond time , we va●ue things , and men , by their temporall prosperities , and transient glories ; whereas if we put eternity into the othe● seale , it would much out-poise that worldly lusstre , that so much abuses our eye , and cousens our understandings . i finde not in holy writ that god hath in separably annex'd goodness and greatness , justice and victory : hee hath secur'd his servants of the felicities of a better life , but not of this . ch●ists kingdome was not , our happinesse is not of this world . nor doth my bible shew me any warrant for appeal to heaven for th●● decision of this , or that ●ntricacy , by bestowing successe upon this party , or that cause , according to its righteousnesse , and due merit . there is a vast difference betwixt {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} and {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , even in scripture construction . the great turke may justly exult , and prune himselfe in discourses of this nature , if they bee once admitted , & own'd by christians : and i shall forbeare any longer to think mahomet an impostor , and must receive the alcoran for gospel ; ●f i shall bee convinc'd that temporall happiness and triumph , are a true index of divine favour ▪ our religion hath something more to invite our closure with it ; it proposes a conveniency on earth , but the crowne● and garlands are reserv'd for heaven . the mony-god in aristophanes pretends a command from iupiter to distribute as great a largesse to the wicked , as to the good ; because if vertue should once impropriate riches , that faire goddesse would be more wooed for her dowry ▪ than for her native beauty : so if religion were attended with those outward allurements that most take the senses ; we should be apt to follow christ for the loaves , and over-look the spirituall charmes , and more noble ends of christianity . the heathen could say , foelix praedo mundo exemplum inutile , happy pyracy is a thing of unhappy presidency ; fortunate sinnes may prove dangerous temptations ; but to say that god doth signally at test the actions of such a person , or the justice of such a cause , by permitting it to prosper , and taper up in the world , is such a deceit , as deserves our serious abhorrency — i leave it with ovids wish , — careat successibus opto , quisquis ab eventu facta not anda putant . principle vi . the polititian must change with the times . that alterations & revolutions in kingdomes are the rods with which god scourges miscarrying princes , is resolved by my lord of argenton : to which may be added out of aristotle in the fift of his politicks — per fraudem & dolum regna evertuntur , that the ruines of a kingdom are often derived from fraud and subtleties : i shall omit inquiry into other causes , as forrein to my present purpose . the polititian knows best how to improve these popular gusts , because hee caused them ▪ such a storme is his seed time . 't is the boast of a dutch man , that he can saile with all winds ; the aspiring man observes the quarter whence the fairest gales of preferment blow , and spreads the sailes of his ambition to entertaine them ; nor can the compasse breath more varieties , then his dextrous soul has changes and garbs , and suitable compliances . what the orator cals his top and perfection , to make happy application to the severall humours and genius of all sorts of men , qualifying his addresse with what he knowes will most charm the person he treats ; that the polititian does not only with his lip , but life you may finde all those figures and tropes digested into his actions , and made practicall , that are in the other only vocall . he remembers that of an english marquesse ●awlet of winchester ) who having succesfully served four princes , and still in the same room of favour , unshaken with the vicissitudes he had run through , being ask'd by one , by what meanes he preserv'd his fortune , he replies , that he was made , ex salice , non ex quercu , of the pliant willow , not stubborn oak , alwaies of the prevailing religion , and a zealous professor . this easmesse and bending is of absolute necessity ; for , if the same temper , which insinuated in violent times , were retained in a composed and setled government , it would be altogether distastfull ; and so on the contrary . therefore if religion be fashionable , you can scarce distinguish him from a saint : he does not only reverence the holy ministers , but if need be , he can preach himselfe : if cunctation prevailes , he acts fabius : if the buckler must be chang'd for a sword , he personates marcellus : if mildenesse be usefull , soderini of venice was not more a lamb then he : if severities are requisite , nero's butcheries are sanctities , compared with his : as alcibiades in plutarch , shifted disposition as he alter'd place ( being voluptuous and jovial in ionia , frugal & retir'd in lacedaemon ) so he proportions himselfe to time , place , person , religion , with such aplausiblenesse , as if he had been born only to serve that opinion , which hee harbour'd but as a guest whilst it continued in sway : having a room in his heart , if occasion be , to lodge the contrary , and to cry it up with as much ardour ; as hee once us'd to extoll the former . and thus like a subtle proteus , he assumes that shape that is most in grace , and of most profitable conducement to his ends , in eo stant confilia , quod sibi conducere putat . he abounds in that which varo cals , ver●atile ingenium , a voluble wit , like the changling derided by plautus , as more turning then a potters wheele . he hath this advantage of the camelion , that he can assume white ness ; for i finde him often wearing the vest of innocency , to conceale the uglinesse and blacknesse of his attempts . finally , he is the heliotrope to the sun of honour , and hath long since abjur'd his god , religion , conscience , and all that shall interpose , and skreen him from those beams , that may ripen his wishes and aymes into enjoyments . colasterion . but the true statesman is inviolably constant to his principles of vertue , and religious prudence ; his ends are noble , and the means he uses , innocent : he hath a singl eye on the publick good ; and if the ship of the state miscarry , he had rather perish in the wrack , than preserve himselfe upon the plank of an in-glorious subterfuge . his worth hath led him to the helme , the rudder he uses , is an honest and vigorous wisdome the star he looks to for direction is in heaven ; and the port he aymes at , is the joynt welfare of prince and people . this constancy is that solid rock upon which the wise venetian hath built its long-liv'd republick : so that it is not improbable the maiden-queene borrowed her motto of semper eadem , from this maiden common wealth . 't is true , something is to be conceded to the place , and time , and person ; & i grant that there are many innocent compliances ; virgils obliquare sinus is observable , there may be a bending without a crookednesse : we may circumire , and yet not aberrare ; paul became a jew , that hee might gaine the jewes , but he did not become a sinner , that he might gain sinners ; he was made all things to all men , but he was not made sin to any : that is , his condescensions were such , as did we● consist with his christian integrity . greatnesse , and honours , and riches , and scepters , those glorious temptations , that so much inamour the doting world , are too poor shrines for such a sacrifice as conscience , which the polititian hath so much abus'd by an inveterate neglect , that it is become menstruous , and ephemerall . principle vii . if the polititian find reason to impose oathes , let them be of such ambiguity as may furnish with a sense obliging to the design , and yet so soft as the people may not feel the snare . it appeares by sad experience , that in propounding of oaths , requiring promises , and other solemn tyes ; there have been multitudes induced to bind themselves upon some secret loose , and men tall reservation ; w●ch they have framed to themselves as a salvo in case of breach : so apt we are in affaires of greatest importance , to advise more with corrupt ▪ wit than sound conscience . in the catalogue of self-delusions , you may possibly finde these ; 1. we are ready to interpret the words too kindly , especially if they be ambiguous ; and 't is hard to find terms so positive , but that they may be eluded indeed , or seem to us to be so , if we be disposed . 2. some are invited to illicite promises qu● illicit , because they know them to be invalid . 3. some are frighted into these bonds by threats , and losses , and temporal concernments , and then they please themselves that they sweare by duress , and so are disingaged . 4. some are oathproofe ; i mean there are such sear-soul'd men , as will swear pro and con. 5. some have learn'd from the civilians , that though wee sweare to a thing not materially unlawfull , yet if it impedes a greater morall good , it becomes void . some take liberty to sweare , because they judge the person to whom they sweare incapable of an oath : as cic●ro defends the breach of oath to a theife , from perjury , and brutus to a tyrant : as it is in appian , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the first sort of thes● fals most properly under the notice , and practise of our polititian ; though he may also use the last , but at different times . it is not difficult for him to cast his desire into such soft glib expression as will down with most ▪ yea , with many that would absolutely disavow the same thing in rough language . if he be unskil'd in this black art , i commend him to the paedagogy of the delphick devill . now it is most certaine , there is no other tye of such security , and establishment , to a person that hath ravished greatness , and acquired it by violence . usurpation hath only these two pillars , it s owne armes , and militia , and publick oath and acknowledgement ; and it is scarce worth quaerie , whether , when the grosse of a nation is thus bound , the oath be not as valid , and the conscience as much concerned , as if it had beene sworn to a lawful prince . it is reasonable that a● usurping power cannot upon any prudent perswasion have the same confidence in the love of the people that a just hath : nor is the following government inticing , as tacitu● notes , nec qu●squam imperium malis artibus quaesitum benè administravit . the same with guazz● , where one objecting the vices of princes , receives this answer , perchè non erano prencip● per natura , ma per violenza , & erano più temuti che amati : and therefore if the polititian can by the blessed meanes forementioned gaine a superiority , there is no trusting to those ingenuous guards , his own goodnesse , and the love of others : his best defence is awe , and feare , and scaffold , and gibbet , and the like . for he that hath noe voluntary roome in the hearts of his people , must use all meanes to gaine a coercive . for his own promises he puts them into the same bottomlesse bag , which the poets say iupiter made for lovers asseverations : his word is as good as his oath , for they are both trifles , as it is in plautus . — pactum non pactum est , un pactum pactum est , cum illis lubet . 't was he that first invented that useful distinction of a lip-oath , and a heart-oath ; you may find him in euripides . iurata lingua est , mente iuravi nihil he makes good use of that in plutarch , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} that children are to be cousn'd with rattls , and men with oathes . 't is an huge advantage that man hath in a credulous world , that can easily say and sweare to any thing ; and yet withall so palliate his falsifications and perjuries , as to hide them from the conusance of most . the polititian mast be furnished with handsome refuges , that may seemingly heal miscarriages this way . hee need not spend much time in inquiry after such helps ; these declining ages wil abundantly furnish his invention . colasterion . an oath is in its self a religious affirmation , a promise with gods seale ; and therefore it concernes christians to be cautelous before swearing , to sweare liquidly , and to observe conscionably . 't is pity such slender evasions should satisfie us , as have bin scorn'd by heathens . we are bound ( sayes one of them ) to the sense of the imposer , or else we do {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , we are bound to the performance of what wee have thus sworn , or else we do {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : t is much , that a morall conscience should more check them , than a clearer light can awe us : as if they more honour'd the genius of a caesar , than we revere the presence of a god : or else wee should never ingage in new protestations , that do interfere , yea , and somtimes positively quarrell with old . they had their {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , their perjury revenging gods ; to whose vindictive powers they referr'd their offenders : they punished such as swore falsely by their prince with fustigation ; but such as abus'd their gods , were left to the dispose of their injur'd deities , as if they were at a loss how to finde a punishment equall to the sinne . hear how soberly plato mentions it ( out of the noble commentator upon philostratus ) en toutes manieres sà este un fort belle ordinance & institutition , de n' user point du nom des dieux legerement , de peur de les contaminer ; ca● la majeste des dieux ne se doit imployer , qu' en un saincte & venerabile puretè . see what reall honour they gave to their counterfeit gods : let us have a care that we ascribe not counterfeit honour to the true god . our god hates every false oath : it appears in his severity to zedekiah , for breaking covenant with the babylonian monarch , though a tyrant of the first magnitude . were all subjects duly solicitous about the weight of this bound , we should be lesse prone to take , and more studious ●● observe it ; i remember the scholiast upon aristoyha●es , derives {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , it hedges in and shuts up a man , and tyes his hands behind him ; i know not how some conquerours may cutt this knot with the sword ; or how some sampsons may shake off these cords ; or what gaps the licentious may make in this hedge ; but such as value god , or heaven , or prince , or peace , can discover it no way better than in a sincere use of so divine an ordinance . there can be no certain rule given , when to beleeve , and when not , what such as are , or would be great , please to inculcate to us : i finde more wracks upon the rock of credulity : and ●tis no heresie to affirme , that many have beene saved by their infidelity ; i commend that of epichar●●●● {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} principle viii . necessity of st●te , is a very competent apology for the worst of actions . it has been observ'd , that in all innovations and rebellions ( which ordinarily have their rif●● from pretences of religion , or reformation , or both ) the breach and neglect of laws hath been authorised by that great patroness of illegal actions — necessity . now the polititian is never without such an advocate as this ; for he cares not to distinguish whether the necessity be of his own creating , or no , as for the most part it is ▪ being indeed an appendix to the wrong he undertakes : and signifies no more , then that he is compelled to cover wrong with wrong , as if the commission of a second ●in were enough to justifie the first . he changes that old charitable advise — benefact a benefactis al●js per●egito nè perpluant ; into vitia vitijs alijs pertegito nè perpluant : that so heapi●g one crime upon another , the later may defend the former from the stroke of justice . hee adores that maxime in livy , iustum ●●t bellum quibus necessarium , & pia arma quibus in armis spes est : it were very incongruous to desire that man to leave his crutch , that cannot walk without ; 't is no lesse unnaturall to invite him to quit his sword , whose life and fortune leans intirely upon it . if he can insinuate the scope of the warr to be legall , a little dawbing will serve to legalize the circumstances : that of the civilians must be remember — licere in bello quae ad finem sunt necessaria , the oracles of the gown are too tender for sword-men ; and it may bee he had wit in his anger , who affirmed , that martiall law was as great a solecisme , as martiall peace . if the people be once possest that his aime and intention is faire , they wil never expect that the media for attainment of his end should be retrench'd by the strict boundaries of law : hee manages that rule very practically , rem alienam , ex quâ certum mihi peri●ulum eminet , citra culpae alienae considerationem invadere possum ; now he can very plausibly make this periculum , certum , or incertum , as shall best sute with his affairs . 't is a broad liberty that grotius concedes , quare si vitam aliter fervare non possum , licet mihi vi qualicunque arcere eum qui eam impetit , licet peccato vacet ; & hoc ex jure quod mihi pro me natura concedit . when life , and liberty , and safety come in question , there ought no confideration to be had of just or unjust , pittifull or cruell , honourable or dishonourable : now when the people have according to his desire got over the great obstacle , and digested the plot for pious ; it is easie to set all future proceedings upon the score of liberty , safety , religion : and if he be constrained to use means grosly unlawfull , 't is but to make them seem holy in the application , and all 's well ; for it is the humour and genius of the vulgar , when they have once rush'd into a party implicitly , to prosecute it as desperately , as if they were under demonstrative convictions of its justice . finally , he must make a vertue of necessity , because there is no other vertue will so easily be induc'd to serve his proceedings as this ; she may well smile upon licentiousnesse , who hath her selfe no law . colasterion . let that great rule be received , that no man can be necessitated to sinne : our divines generally damne an officious lye ; and the equity bindes from any officious sinne . it would soon cut the nerves of the eighth commandement , if necessities and urgencies , though reall , were pronounced a sufficient excuse for stealing . but that which our polititian calls necessity , is no more than necessity of convenience , nor so much , except we interpret that convenience , which may favour his own ends , and so is convenient for his design . he uses necessity , as the old philosophers did an occult quality , though to a different purpose ; that was their refuge for ignorance , this is his sanctuary for sin . those civilians that are most charitable to necessity , make it no plea at all except it be absolute and insuperable ; as by the platonick laws onely those persons are allowed to drink at their neighbours well , that had in vaine sought a spring , by digging fifty cubits deep in their owne ground . we allow the disburdening of a shipp in imminent perill of wrack ; but this will not excuse those , who upon a fond or feigned prevision of a state-tempest , shall immediately cast lawe and conscience over-board ; discard , and quit hudder and steerage , and so assist the danger , they pretend to fear . pausanias tells of a chappell in acrocorinth , dedicated to necessity and violence ; those twingoddesses may be fit objects for the worship of heathens ; but 't is pitty they should be so much adored by christians . if i mistake not , the fundamentall deceit lyes in a greedy entertaining those first pretences , and seemingly candid propositions are made to us , before they have passed those scrutinies , and severe inquiries , they deserve ; or been examined by the test of gods word , and nationall lawes : all the rest are but ugly consequences of that absurdity we first granted , according to the ancient philosophick maxime , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . principle ix . the polititian must wave all relations , both sacred and civill , and swim to his design , though in a sea of bloud . such as study to be great by any means , must by all means forget to be good ; and they that will usurp dominion over others , must first become slaves to the worst of tyrants , a lust after greatnesse . crescit interea roma albae ruinis , begins one of the decads , that the wals of rome were cemented with bloud , is known and commended by machiavel ; although the superstructure was brave , yet if we search the foundation , we shall finde it laid in the rod ruines of her wasted neighbours ; that the first founder became a fratricide upon reason of state , to guard his new conquest , by freedom from a competitor ; is not onely vindicated from cruelty , but asserted to be a piece of meritorious policy . nor did this happen to the city in its structure alone , but after in its reparation ; when the sons of brutus were sacrific'd to the design of their father : so that rome was not only nurs'd with bloud , but after grouth and ripenesse , she sustained her selfe ; iived and thrived upon magna & sanguinolenta latrocinia ; so that our polititian can scarce want examples in the applauded actions of this city , to patronize the most crimson and skarlet sin , that ambition can prompt . he admires the generosity of neroe's mother , who is reported to have said of her sonne , a {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , let my son be my murderer , so he may be a monarch ; according to the advice of an high-spirited fury , pro regno velim patriam , penates , conjugem flammis dare , imperia pretio quolibet constant bene ; an empire cannot be purchased too dear , though it cost the blood of millions . he is much taken with the gallantry of the mammalukes , who abused the easinesse of the egyptian sultan , and wore the supremacy three hundred years , upon the length and keennesse of an usurping sword . and rather than want a bongrace , he commends the ottoman wisdom ; for the great turk rivets himself to the imperiall chair , with the bones of his murdered brethren . aspiring desires are not only insatiate , but admit of any sin ; that will promote their ends : see bass●anus murthering his brother geta in his mothers armes ; andronicus strangling his cousin alexius , lest he should have a part in the empire that had right to all : see caesar slighting the oathes by which he had obliged his obedience to the roman senate . finally , ambition knows no confinement , nothing so sacred but it violates . the gods must bow and yeeld to it , as tertullian , id negotium sine deorum injuriâ non est , eadem strages manium & templorum , tot sacrilegia romanorum , quot trophaea ; tot de diis quot de gentibus triumphi . colasterion . the italian polititian seems to intimate a scruple , when he saies , — si jus violandum est , regnandi causâ violandum est , his ( if ) dictates an uncertainty ; and if we appeale to the bar of nature , or divinity ( though possibly the entire assertion may have something of truth ) yet we shall find that wicked ( ●f ) absolutely banished . 't is true , we may more justly pity him , that swallows a bait fair and glistring , than a person that tempts temptations to deceive him ; or catches at flies , and trifling allurements because in the first case a greater reluctancy is requisite , and the dart may possibly be so sharp , as to pierce through the armour of a sober resolution ; but all this will little succour ●im , who knows it to be a bait , and hath before-hand designed its beauty , and fairenesse , to apologize for the foulnesse of the sin : for here the greatnesse of the temptation will not at all extenuate ●●e grossenesse of the ●rime : no more than he mitigates his robbery , who shall plead , that hee stole nothing but gold and jewels . the world is much mistaken in the value of a scepter or crown ; we gaze upon its brightnesse , and forget its brittleness , we looke upon its glory , and forget its frailty ; we respect its colour , and take no notice of its weight . but if all those gay things which wee fondly fancy to our selves were really to be found in greatnesse , yet still he payes too deare , that pawn●● his heaven for it● he that thus buys a shor● blisse , gives not twenty , or an hundred years purchase , but ( if mercy prevent not ) eternity . it will be little advantage here , to introduce the example of a roman , or turk , or christian , if unlawfull ; such presidents may perchance baffle the vulgar ( in whose creede you may insert what you please ) but wil be very cold answers , when we appeare before a severe tribunall : it concernes us rather to observe how ambition claimes kindred with every other vice , stoops , and takes up every sinne lies in its way ; and , if upon enquiry we finde it to bee indeed such a complicated mischiefe , it will become us studiously to shun it our selves , and seriously to detest it in others . principle x. a generall innovation contributes much to the growth and security of vsurpation . wee may receive this as a tradition , handed to us from the great patriarchs of policy , attested by the practice of the subtilest times ; i presume it may be grounded upon these , or the like perswasions . 1. because such an innovation raises the dust , and begets a cloud for the main design ; for when the waters are troubled , t is hard to see the bait . 2. because the parenthesis betwixt an old and new government , flatters the hopes of all parties , soothing those desirs that are for a relapse into the old , and yet incouraging those that wish for the establishment of a new . 3. because when all things are reduced into a chaos and rude heape , when all the lines and lineaments of the former government are blotted out , that which is new written will be more legible , and the old sooner forgotten : for suppose a kingdom made a lump , without shape and void , and it is like materia prima , prone to imbrace any form ; when an instrument is distun'd , you may set it to what key you please ; and he that cannot sometimes lo●s●n the strings , will never make good musick upon synesius his harp. 4. because by n●w moulding of jurisdictions , and offices of state , there may be a fair opportunity offered , of gratifying those that have serv'd us ; and for others its very familiar to see some stubborn and rigid opiniators , who have continued long unshaken either by threat or argument , at length to surrender their principles , and bow the knee before the dagon of honou● and riches ; such is the flexanimous power of golden eloquence , as it is in the adage , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} besides , we can find no better way to breed an absolute dependance , and make others adhere to our fortunes , then by winding the concernments of other men upon the same bottom with our interest ; we may observe this from the practice of great favourites , who alwayes delight in these props , and are carefull to set their whole tribes in the sunshine of favour . 5. because such a general deordination gives a taste and rellish to the succeeding government , though in its selfe not so delectable ; for aristotle notes , that democracy is better than anarchy . there are many other advantages to be made by a due improvement of these turbid intervals ; as the occasion of subdividing , and parcelling out your great end ; for by this meanes they which refused to close with it in grosse , will receive it in retaile : and having entertained some portions of it , the grudge they bore to the whole will be by degrees quieted and appeas'd . besides , when all things are ruffled and confused , it is then the devils holy-day , and therefore our work-day : the noise is so loud , that it drowns the voice of the lawe ; and there may be some truth in his waggery , who sayd , that such as mean to commit a rape upon the body politick , must put out the lawes ; as others upon a like occasion use to put out the lights . finally , if wee ever hope to sin with impunity , to usurp prosperously or to govern arbitrarily ; wee must take out that lesson in plantus : idem facere , quod plurimi alij , quibus res timida aut turbida est ; pergunt turbare usque , ut ne quid possit conquiscere . colasterion . t is most certain , that sinister ends are promoted by innovations ; but it lyes in our bosomes to promote or quench the innovations themselves , which we can no way better do , than by a strict adherence to the laws ; for as long as we maintain them , they will maintain us : if we observe these , it will rescue us from the hands of state-novellists ; for we are not fit for their turns , till we are cross-byassed with faction . as a caution against changes in government , give me leave to repeate , what was long since told us by an ingenious lord , — that all great mutations are dangerous ; even where what is introduc'd by that mutation , is such as would have been very profitable upon a primary foundation : and it is none of the least dangers of change , that all the perils and inconveniencies which it brings , cannot be foreseene ; and therefore such as make title to wisdome , will not undergo great dangers , but for great necessities . but further , let me appeale to generall experience , yea , let me ask thee ( reader ) if thou hast never before heard , or read of a nation , that was once the gaze and envy of its neighbours ; and yet being insensible of its happiness , or possest with fond hopes of bettering its condition , has closed with pretended friends , and reall enemies , and gladly contributed to its owne ruine . so apt men are to catch at the shadow , though they hazard the substance : we may guesse at the morall of the frogs in the fable , who could finde no satisfaction in a still prince , and were after forced to abide the severities of a tyrant they prayed for . but if there be such distempers in a state , as shall necessarily require amendment ; let it be done with the pruning-hook of the law , and not with the sword of violence : for i never read , that illegall , or tumultuous , or rebellious , were fit epithets for reformation . and 't is fit christians should forbear the use of such surly physick , till they have levied a fine in the court of heaven , and cut off the intail of the seventh beatitude . this may suffice to reveale in some measure , arcanum ambitionis , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . i could add much more , but that i judge it a fitter task for our nephews , when pens shall be infranchised . and now ( reader ) let us mix our prayers , that god would for ever banish this cursed policy out of europe , and the whole christian world ; and damne it downe to hell , from whence originally it came , and let such as delight to abuse others , thinke of that self-cousenage , with which in the interim they abuse themselves ; god permitting the devill to revenge the imposture . and whilst we are busie with politick stratagems , and tortious armes to invade the rights of others ; let us all consider that this is not the violence which takes heaven . let it be a piece of our daily oraisons , that god would guard our pulpits from such boutefeus , as like a●tna and vesuvius , belched out nothing but flames , and fiery discourses ; using the scripture as preposterously and impertinently , as some pontificians , who transported with the vehemence of hildebrandian zeal , think the temporall monarchy of popes sufficiently scripturall , from the saying of christ to peter — pasce oves . farr be it from us to intitle the spirit of god to exorbitant doctrines , it is easie to distinguish the vulture from the dove . the miscarriages of the clergy have a deeper stain from the sacredness of their function , as probably he that invenomed the eucharist has the more to answer for his triple crown . it is manifest , that wee are fallen into the dregs of time ; we live in the rust of the iron age , and must accordingly expect to feel , v'tima se●escentis mundi deliria , the dotages of a decrepit world : what is become of truth , sincerity , charity , humility , those antiqui mores , whither are they gone ? did they attend astraea into heaven ? and have left such degenerous successors , as cruelty , pride , fraud , envy , oppression , &c. such qualities as abundantly justifie the worst of heathens , and dishonour the name of christians : i thinke it may safely be affirmed , that if a new europae speculum were sincerely written , it might be contracted into this short summary ; novi ego h●c seculum quibus moribus sit ; malus bonum , malum esse vult , ut sit sui similis ; turbant , miscent , mores mali ; rapax , avarus , invidus , sacrum prophanum , publicum privatum habebit ; hiulca gens , &c. that eternall majesty , which raised so brave a fabrick , out of such indisposed materials ; that weilds the world with his finger , ever since it was made ; that controules the wave , and checks the tumult of the people : that sits above , and laughs at the malignant counsels , and devices of wicked men : let his mercy be implored for the speedy succour of his distressed church ; that the rod of aaron may blossome ; that the tabernacle of david may be raised ; that the subtle may be caught in their own snares ; and that the result of all afflictions , may be the greatning his glory , and exalting of his scepter . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a61533e-560 cato maior . ophyogenes , & pfylli . furialibus commentariis illustraut . notes for div a61533e-790 plin. l. 2.6.7 . 43 fons in mileto , cuius proflue●s aqua dulcissima , guae vero in imo falsa . origen . vinum i● pectore . notes for div a61533e-1360 {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ingeniosi muse pulatores . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . notes for div a61533e-2120 barclay contra monarch ▪ 30. candida vita . buchanan . pro mil●ne . hercules furens . ●pon livi p. 22. spencer . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , arist. pol. 7. isocrates . io. goodwin , in his anticavalerism . notes for div a61533e-2780 aristoph. concutiunt populos , vexant regna , solicitant bella , diruunt ecclesias . classica canere . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . evangelioptho . ri . populi . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ●l● . st. h●erom strada . ecclesiae nomine armamini & contra ecclesiam dimicatis . aug. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} apud . dion . cass. papirius . con. monarc . p. 32. notes for div a61533e-3480 in pompeio . hipp. her. eur. old. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . notes for div a61533e-4080 comin . 170 nantons regalia . rota figulari versatilior . notes for div a61533e-4540 grot. de iur . belli , 245. de civil converse . l. 2. p. 132. aulular . apoph . causabon exercitat . 202. p. 848. notes for div a61533e-5310 {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ●eva ne●essitas victor . de iure belli , nu . 18.39 . de iure belli , l. 424. mach. on livy , 627 ●ess . l. 11 , 12. ●ub . 12. 〈◊〉 70. caelius rhodig. 1025. notes for div a61533e-5770 upon livy l. 2. c. 3●thebe maritum , t●moleon fratrem , cassius filium hoe jure interfecore . in apologer . notes for div a61533e-6160 3 po● , faulkla● trinummus . political and military observations a new collection / by j.d. of kidwelly. davies, john, 1625-1693. 1679 approx. 129 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 81 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a37231) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 95949) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 735:8) political and military observations a new collection / by j.d. of kidwelly. davies, john, 1625-1693. [2], 158 p. printed for h. cox ..., and h. bonwick ..., london : 1679. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. military art and science -early works to 1800. 2005-06 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-06 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-07 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2005-07 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political and military observations . a new collection . by j. d. of kidwelly . london . printed for h. cox next castle-yard in holborne : and h. bonwick in st. pauls church-yard , 1679. political , and military observations . i. it is the common humour of mankind , principally to fear the danger which is next at hand , and to be more carefully concern'd for things present , than is requisite ; and on the contrary , to make less account than they ought of those things which are to come , and at a distance ; and this out of a certain presumption , that time and the contingency of humane accidents may afford some remedy for the latter . ii. it happens many times that the wisdom which is over-curious , and too too considerative , may be blame-worthy ; inasmuch as the affairs of the world are subject to so many and so great a diversity of occurrences and disappointments , that that seldom happens , which wise men imagined would come to pass . that person therefore who quits the present good , out of a fear of the future danger , ( it being presuppos'd that the danger is not inevitable and too near at hand ) finds , to his sorrow , that he has let slip the occasion which presented it self to him of gaining honour or advantage , meerly out of a fear of the danger , which is afterwards found to have been vain . iii. when the prudent man finds himself induc'd to give way to some just cause of discontent ( from what occasion soever it may proceed ) he ought to moderate it , what lies in his power , with a mature judgment ; out of this motive , that he is not so much to mind his own private interest , as that of the publick ; since it is not unlikely , but that his discontent may be prejudicial to the welfare of the state. iv. a great power , and that united in one person , is more to be dreaded than that which is divided amongst several parties ; which latter , as it has a diversity of motives , so has it also a diversity and discordancy of operations , and those promoting a diversity of designes . v. there is this observable in republicks , that they are not govern'd according to the inclinations of a single person , but by the joint deliberations and consent of many ; and thence it comes , that commonly they are thought to carry on their consultations with more moderation and respect . vi. such as the prince is in point of morality , such is the government of affairs . if the prince himself be a person of no great esteem , those are in a condition tending to ruine ; is he be a person of conduct , and vertuous , they flourish . vii . new conquests , if they be not not well regulated , nor prudently governed , do rather burthen the person who has made them , than render him more potent and considerable . for it is not to be expected that he should be the occasion of any good or happiness to a government , which he hath acquir'd by indirect means . viii . aswe find in the ordering of mans body , that it is not sufficient the head be free from all indisposition , but it is withal requisite that the other members exercise their several functions : so neither is it sufficient in the government of a state , that the prince himself be unchargeable with any default in the management of affairs , if there be not a correspondency of diligence and vertuous action in his officers . ix . the prince and the republick are seriously to consider , what difference there is between being the first aggressors in a war against another , and expecting the other to be the first beginner thereof ; between treating about the dividing of another state , and expecting till their own be in danger thereof : and lastly , whether it be better to have one only assistant , or to engage alone against several joint adversaries ; and after such consideration made to deliberate about what is likely to prove most conducive to their particular interest . x. it is a thing of singular prudence and great repute in a great prince , when he so demeans himself in his affairs , as that they who are inferiour to him , have no occasion to suspect , that he does any thing out of dissimulation , or by way of personation , or out of any other design that is not good and justifiable . xi . when princes enter into leagues , in order to the reducing of interests to a certain equality , there easily arise disgusts and jealousies among them ; whence it often happens , that enterprises begun with a great opinion of success , meet with many difficulties , and in fine come to nothing . xii . for a man to be a king may sometimes be the effect of success ; but to exercise that sacred and royal function , which proposes to it self for its last end , the good and welfare of his people , depends wholly on the person himself , and the vertue which ought to be attendant on him . xiii . in difficult and intricate deliberations , the prince ought to approve those for easie and desirable which are necessary , or at least those which in comparison of others , seem to imply less difficulty , and less danger . xiv . the greater and more powerful a king is , the more honourable it is for him to employ his grandeur in the maintenance and administration of justice , and the publick faith ; there being not any thing more unbecoming a prince or republick , than to be defective in the observance of publick obligations . xv. in things that are doubtful , the prince ought to continue in suspence , and to reserve to himself , as much as lyes in his power , the means of taking and fixing upon that resolution , which he shall find by the general course of affairs likely to prove most beneficial and expedient . xvi . the prudential captain is he , who to obtain a victory with greater security , would rather do it with great protraction of time , much hardship endur'd , and cautious adventuring forward , with sufficient provision for all accidents , than to overcome with ease and expedition , meerly to acquire glory to himself by puting all to an immediate hazard . xvii . it commonly happens through the corrupt judgment of mankind , that prodigality is more recommended in a king , though in some measure attended with rapine , than frugality , though accompani'd by an abstinence from encroaching upon that which is anothers . xviii . all the things , for which men are so industrious and concern'd in this world , are reducible to two points , to wit , profit and honour ; under that of profit is comprehended whatever concerns the body , under that of honour , whatever concerns the mind . xix . the prince ought to be grave , by a regular stayedness of demeanour , governing himself with moderation in all his affairs , performing the promises he hath made , and standing more in fear of doing that which is evil , than that any ill should be done to him ; and all this with a continual remembrance , that he being but a man , has receiv'd from god a power almost divine ; but to this end , that he might be a furtherer and advancer of things just , and of good report , in his government . xx. the citizen who begins to concern himself in the management of the publick affairs , ought to live according to the usual course of the other citizens , and accommodate himself to their humour , and with all the dexterity and prudence he can , promote those things , wherewith the populace are more satisfy'd , and by which they are ordinarily kept in a good humour . by these compliances he will come into repute and credit , and acquire authority . xxi . they who are entrusted with the management of the affairs of a free state , ought to be always mindful of two precepts of plato . one is , that they principally promote the advantage of the citizens , and make all their endeavours subservient to that end , not regarding their own private interests . the other is , that they have an eye on the whole body of the republick , so as that though they incline to one party , yet they must notdesert another . the reason of it is , that the commonwealth ought to be govern'd as a guardianship ▪ is , to wit , for the good and advantage of those who are receiv'd under the charge thereof , and not altogether for theirs , to whom it is committed . xxii . it is the peculiar charge of the magistrate , to be careful , that he represent the person of the city , and that he maintain the order and dignity thereof , observe the laws , and be mindful of the things committed to his trust , and make provision not only for what is done , but also for what ought to be done ; it being his business , that the common-wealth be as well regulated after his death , as it was , while he liv'd . xxiii . that war is just which is necessary , and that is a pious ▪ recourse to arms , when there remains no hopes otherwise than in arms ; and that war is just which a prince enters into ▪ either to recover what is lost , or to prevent the wrong intended him . xxiv . this ought to be heeded by governours , that when they pardon a small number of delinquent persons , they disoblige all the good ; in regard that these latter perceiving that mischief is pardon'd , cannot promise themselves that good will be requited by the governours ; and thereupon ▪ persuading themselves that there is more to be gotten among the wicked , they are easily diverted from well doing . xxv . it is always observ'd , that in cities , they who are necessitous envy the good , and have an esteem for the wicked ; they quarrel at things of ancient establishment , and are forward to promote novelties ; and out of the aversion they have for the wealthier sort , they study tumult and seditions , imagining that their poverty and multitude will indemnify them from the punishments , due to the disorders , whereof they are the occasions and abettors . xxvi . when persons of a mean and despicable condition are guilty of any miscarriage , it is known but to few persons , and the noise of their actions reaches no further than their conditions will bear . but the acts and demeanour of those who are of great quality , and owners of great estates , are remarkable to all , and so become more highly censureable . xxvii . it is seldom seen that a vertuous man loses his liberty , but he withal in some respect loses his life ; in regard it is a thing notorious to all , and of great difficulty to those who have been educated and enur'd to freedom , to be reduc'd to a servile life , inasmuch as of all things in the world liberty is the best and most desireable , the very name whereof is a character of vertue , as servitude is a mark of misfortune . xxviii . when a person of noble extraction degenerates from his ancestors by the doing of things that are not vertuous , he ought to remember , that by how much the more illustrious the lives of his progenitors were , in their times , so much the more scandalous and reproachable will his appear : inasmuch as the lustre and reputation of ancestors is as it were a light to their descendents , which discovers , to the eyes of others , the vertue or vice which is remarkable in them . xxix . 't is an humour highly commendable in a victorious prince , when he is so far mindful of himself , as to endeavour rather to do what is consistent with the rules of generosity , than to impose conditions too insupportable upon his conquer'd enemies . xxx . he who is of an humour inclin'd to peace , will not be diverted from the concluding of it by the great difficulties which present themselves in the negotiation thereof ; inasmuch as the difficulties occurrent therein , are remov'd either by the force of down-right justice , or by retaliating injustice with injustice , and counterpoising reason with reason , or by the enduring of a lesser prejudice , or by a mutual deference of several parties in abating somewhat of their right ; as shall seem most convenient to prudent persons , according to the importance of the thing in dispute . xxxi . it is the property of a well establish'd and well regulated commonwealth , that all affairs , or the greatest part thereof , as far as it is possible , be manag'd , and decided by the laws , rather than left to the decision and discretion of a judge ; inasmuch as there are few of so great abilities and sound understanding , as to be sufficiently skill'd in the laws , and withal of unquestion'd integrity , to give right judgement in a doubtful case ; whereas the laws themselves , by long experience of affairs , and by mature consideration , are reduc'd to perfection : but the judgment of man according to his natural bent to love or a version is wrested and corrupted without the support of the law. xxxii . among those of the popular rank , discords arise from the disparity of estates , in regard those of the lower rate are desirous to be equal to those of the higher ; but among the nobility , they proceed from grandeurs , inasmuch as they who are equal are desirous to aggrandize themselves . xxxiii . when men are come near that disaster or inconvenience into which they are fatally design'd to fall , 't is then that they are principally depriv'd of those advantages of circumspection and prudence , with the assistance whereof they might , in all likelihood , have avoided the inconvenience which threatned them . xxxiv . when matters of great importance are under debate , there is not any thing more necessary on the one side , nor more dangerous on the other , than to take advice thereupon ; and no doubt the prudent person stands less in need of counsel than the imprudent , and accordingly the former derives greater advantages from taking counsel than the other , because he has so great a stock of prudence , as to be able to consider and weigh things of himself , and amongst the reasons that are offer'd , to discern those which make most for his interest . but what assurance can the imprudent person have , in asking counsel , that the advertisements he receives are good and faithful ? for if the person who gives counsel be not highly faithful and well affected to him who desires it , but is inducible to be otherwise , out of some notorious concern of his own , or out of some motive of advantage , or flender satisfaction , he will frame his advice so as that it may be most beneficial to himself . and that intention of his being for the most part unknown to the party consulting , he makes no discovery , if he be not a prudent person , of the perfidiousness of the counsel that is given him . xxxv . he who is desirous to ballance things between princes , and to observe a punctual neutrality , must , with the greatest circumspection he can , abstain not only from all acts , but also from any discovery , which may raise a suspicion of his being inclin'd to one side more than the other . xxxvi . youth , as it is that part of man's age which is most greedy of honour , and looks upon disgrace with the greatest indignation , so is it also the most capable of enduring the inconveniencies , difficulties , and hardships , which necessarily attend war. the difference there is between men or nations is not to be measured by years , but by ingenuity , vivacity , and soundness of judgment , study , industry , and the particular exercises of vertue . xxxvii . if a great person has done thee an injury , dissemble thy reception thereof , and smother thy resentments ; for it is a pure extravagance to be disgusted against a person , whom thou dar'st not call to account , and whom it were imprudence in thee further to exasperate . xxxviii . there happens an infinite variety of turns and changes in military affairs ; therefore ought not a man to grow too confident upon new advantages , nor be too much depressed , upon the contrary : inasmuch as ever and anon , there comes some alteration , whereby this lesson may be learnt , that when opportunity presents it self , it should not be neglected , because it lasts but for a short time . xxxix . when matters come first under deliberation , it is most seriously to be consider'd , what the issue thereof may be ; and then ought men to be cautious how they assent to uncivil and pernicious demands . for some have found by experience , that when such as they are treating withal have obtain'd what they desir'd , it has prov'd only an encouragement to them to make a further progress in their demands . xl. the more sudden and unexpected accidents are , the greater discomposure and astonishment do they cause to those to whom they happen . it is therefore the part of a prudent person , to make that provision before-hand , which may prevent his being surpriz'd or disturb'd ; or if it so happen that it cannot be avoided , let him endeavour , from the present state of things , to foresee what may come to pass , using all the precautious remedies , which his experience and prudence can suggest , and not suffering things to grow worse and worse . xli . it always happens , in civil conversation , that , whether a vicious act be chastis'd , or a vertuous act recompenc'd , the whole body of the citizens receives a good thereby ; nor was there ever any expedient more contributory to the preservation of cities in a happy and flourishing state , than that counterballancing of punishment and reward , justly apply'd according to desert . xlii . all the assurances that can be had of an enemy whether by oath , parole , engagement to friends , promises , or whatever other way can be imagin'd , are good ; but by reason of the corruption of persons , the depravation of morality , and the vicissitude of times and accidents , the best expedient is for a man to take such order in his affairs , as that the enemy may not be in a capacity to annoy him . xliii . the present method of carrying on a war is much different from that of the ancients , who did not their work by assassinations , and surprises , but discover'd to the enemy , if any base contrivance were in hand against him , and all out of a confidence that they should be able to overcome him by vertue . xliv . when a man is advanc'd to some great charge ; it is soon discover'd whether he be a person of great abilities , or not ; but above all , by the augmentation of his worldly concerns , and the advantages he may have by his office , the affections of his heart are discover'd , together with his disposition ; inasmuch as , the greater person he is , so much the less cautious will he be , in suffering himself to be carryed away with the current of his own natural humour . xlv . be it thy continual care , that thy superiour conceive no ill opinion of thee , and be not over-confident of the leading an unblameable course of life , but endeavour to be such an one as that thou maist not be much afraid to fall into his hands ; inasmuch as there is an infinite number of unforeseen occasions , wherein thou mayst stand in need of him , and be glad to insinuate into his favour . xlvi . the governour ought rather to fix his consideration upon the substance and reality of the thing , than upon the appearance of it , measuring it rather by prudence , than by his own will , and being always distrustful of himself ; in regard it is a great reproach to a state , when imprudence is attended by danger . xlvii . the grand mystery of war consists rather in obedience , than a curiosity of knowing the reason of the general 's orders ; and that army is well fitted and prepar'd for danger , which , before it is set on work , is the most exactly kept under discipline . xlviii . all those who are concern'd , or commissionated to deliberate and treat of affairs of great importance , ought to consider with themselves , whether that they undertake will prove beneficial to the commonwealth , honorable to themselves , and may be compass'd without any great difficulty . xlix . in the carrying on of enterprises , it is to be observ'd , whether he who gives the advice , is also willing to expose his person to danger ; and when the enterprise has taken effect it is to be consider'd , to whom the honour thereof is principally to be attributed . l. in the times of publick disturbances and seditions , they always have the greatest power and credit , who of all are the most wicked ; but in times of peace and tranquillity , they are most in esteem who are the most remarkable for their conduct , and observance of discipline . li. men would not be so violently addicted to mischief , were it not for the advantages or satisfaction they reap thereby . this gave occasion to wise law givers to make punishments and rewards the ground-work and support of their governments , not so much out of a design to afflict their subjects , as to divert them from those things wherein they are apt to follow their own corrupt inclinations . lii . as discord divides one city and makes it two , or more , and gives occasion to those who have their eye upon it to advance and carry on their designes with greater success against it ; so union restrains and cements the counsels of many , and reduces them into one body , and by that means keeps the government closely compacted together , and uncorrupted . liii . as it happens in a structure of importance , that there is more danger of the falling of one stone towards the foundation , than if a hundred tiles fall down from the roof of it : so is it a much greater fault in point of policy , to disobey justice , than to commit many slight faults against the particular devoir between man and man ; since it has been observ'd , that many times great scandals have been rais'd in the commonwealth , which were occasion'd at first by some small disobedience . liv. it would be a good and wholsom law , if those persons , who observe no regularity in their lives , who are negligent in the managery of their domestick concerns , who order not their affairs as they ought to do , and discover no observance of discipline in their own families , but live in perpetual jarring and contention with their neighbours , should be put under the tuition of guardians , who might treat them and keep them in , as distracted and extravagant persons , to prevent the communicating their extravagance to others ; inasmuch as the commonwealth is never more likely to fall into disturbance , than it is by their means who observe no rule in their private demeanour . lv. there is not any thing more common or more pernicious among men , than that deceitful imagination of one mans condition being better than another . and this proceeds hence , that mens eyes are so blinded with malice and envy , that they would rather with much trouble grasp at what belongs to another , than quietly enjoy their own . the condition of princes is really good , if they make a good use thereof . in like manner , the popular state is good , if men acquit themselves therein as they ought to do . the condition of the wealthy is good , if they use it with moderation ; and so is that of the poor , if it be attended with patience , which is of such a soveraign vertue , as to make that good which is generally accounted otherwise . lvi . if subjects knew what a hard task the prince has in commanding , or if the prince knew how sweet a thing it is to live in tranquillity , the meaner sort would have a great compassion on the grandees , and the grandees would envy those of a mean condition ; inasmuch as the divertisements which the prince enjoies , amount to little in comparison of the discontents he is forc'd to endure . but as the station of the prince is the highest of all , as he can do more than all , as his worth exceeds that of all the rest , as he endures more than all , and surpasses all in government ; so is it necessary , that the court , the person , and life of the prince be better regulated than those of all the rest , inasmuch as it is the rule , measure , and standard thereof . lvii . there is not any thing whereof a wise prince should be more selfsatisfy'd , than that he has about him some persons eminent for their valour and conduct , to carry on the military concerns , and others signal for their prudence and integrity , to manage the civil . lviii . it is a very remarkable observation , that men eminent for their valour and good fortune in military affairs are born and flourish much more in one time than they do in another . for if a valiant person rise up in the time of a daring prince , he shall be in great esteem , and employ'd upon extraordinary designes ; but if he live under a timorous and distrustful prince , such a prince shall make greater account of those who study how to improve and advance his revenues , than he will do of him who shall return crown'd with laurels from the wars . lix . they who are desirous of the reputation of good princes , ought to propose to themselves the examples of such as have been such in their several ages : for to that end are the lives and actions of illustrious persons , by faithful historians , transmitted to posterity ; that princes and grandees may have such exemplars set before them as they ought to imitate . lx. the greatest care a governour ought to take , is to find out the person who shall advise him to govern well , and to maintain his estate with justice . and that is not done with harsh words , but with a meekness that gains mens hearts , and acts of good example ; for a generous soul is easily drawn in to obey , when the person who imposes the command is of good repute and example . lxi . there happens one thing in the world which is worthy our serious observance ; to wit , that as among the good , there is some one , transcendently good , so in like manner , among the bad , there is one transcendently such . but the misfortune is , that the good person does not gain so much honour by his vertue , as the lewd person does reputation by his lewdness ; in regard vertue renders a man naturally inclin'd to retirement , whereas the vicious person never thinks better of himself , than when he appears upon the stage . lxii . princes ought not to betray their surprize and astonishment at any thing , even when things seem to go most against them ; but they should obstinately stand upon the defence of their own , expecting their neighbour princes will find it their own interest to keep them up in their former station , to prevent the over-growth of some ambitious pretender . lxiii . the person o'repress'd with calamities and disasters is always hearkning after some change of fortune , whereas he who is at his ease does not so much as think of any alteration ; the litter is sufficiently satisfi'd with the present posture of his affairs , and the other looks on vicissitude as the only means to cause some amendment in his condition . lxiv . some wise men affirm , that when the commonwealth is upon the choice of a governour , they should be sure to pitch upon a person who has been at least ten years in the wars ; in regard that he alone is most likely to be the best preserver of a desired peace , who has been experimentally acquainted with the miseries and calamities consequent to war. lxv . no doubt but that prince does most wisely , who regulates his affairs answerably to his revenues ; in regard that if he do not , and his territories be but small , he must either run the hazard of losing what he is possess'd of , or , to keep himself up , do those things that are burthensom to his subjects , and so his government must degenerate into tyranny . lxvi . it is the greatest commendation that can be of the supream magistrate , to be conversant and familiar with the good , ( since that familiarity is the greatest incentive and encouragement that can be to goodness ; ) to be liberal of his estate in doing of good works , ( it being notorious , that he who values his reputation , makes but little account of mony ; ) to extirpate tyranny ( inasmuch as the concent and harmony of the princes government consists in the chastisement of the bad , and the rewarding of the good ; ) and to shew his munificence upon all occasions ; in regard there is not any thing more endears the majesty of the prince , than when he makes all the demonstrations he can of his grandeur , in relieving others , and not expecting that he should derive great advantage from others . lxvii . two things render a city secure , and highly contribute to the commendation and honour of its governours ; the one , when it is guarded by those whose estates are the most considerable , & is well provided with all things relating to the defensive part ; the other , when there is a fair correspondence between its governours and their neighbours ; without which there cannot be a free intercourse of commerce , and mutual supplies of all necessary provisions . lxviii . a soveraign lord , who would be obey'd , will do well , in the first place to conclude it necessary , that when he commands , he should make some discovery of his own personal observance thereof , in regard that no lord is to propose that soveraignty to himself , as to be exempted from the acts and exercises of vertue ; especially since that the prince , being the mirrour of others , is oblig'd so evidently and actually to apply himself thereto , as that he himself should give example to those that are under his government . lxix . to meet with some unexpected misfortune , is a thing , of its own nature , not good ; yet may it accidentally contribute to the advantage of a person of sound understanding ; in as much as it may be an occasion to him of standing more strictly upon his guard , in case the like accident may happen another time , there being few who truly believe what evil is , till they have had some experience thereof . whence it comes , that all persons not well vers'd in affairs proceed ordinarily either with too much negligence , or too much presumption ; whereas he who has once weather'd out a disastrous chance , becomes thereby so much the more cautious and considerate . lxx . princes will do well , so to converse with their subjects , as that they may be induc'd to serve them rather out of a readiness of inclination , than out of hopes of reward ; in regard that the less respect men have for mony , the less it implies of servitude . for he who loves another sincerely and generously , does not become arrogant in prosperity , nor flinches from him in adversity ; does not bemoan himself upon the consideration of poverty , nor is cast down and disgusted at his not being much in favour , nor recoyles in the time of persecution . in short , there is a correspondence between life and love to the last gasp . lxxi . every state ought so to desire peace , as to be nevertheless diligent in the making of all military preparations ; for peace without arms is weak and indefensive . thence it came , that the heathens represented even the goddess of arts and sciences armed ; and so , to be desirous of peace and to carry on the preparatives of war , are not things simply contradictory . lxxii . he truly understands the tender and transcendent concern of friendship , who obliges his friend before he be requir'd to do it . for in so doing , he is not only generous in the disposal of his kindnesses , but also causes them to be receiv'd with a greater sense of obligation , by disburthening his friend of that bashfulness and fear of repulse , which commonly attends asking . lxxiii . that prince does well who makes it his business to be well supply'd with prudent commanders and persons eminent for their valour for the management of war : but no doubt , he does better , whose court flourishes with wise counsellors , and statesmen ; in regard that the gaining of battels consists in the prowess and valorous deportment of many , but it happens sometimes , that the government of the commonwealth is committed to the management of one particular person . lxxiv . of all employments the worst is that which is concern'd in the chastisement of other mens miscarriages ; and thence is it that a well-advis'd person does what lies in his power , to avoid them ; in regard that the reprehension of vices does more commonly beget an aversion for the reprover , than it does amendment in those that are reprov'd . lxxv . every fault , what excuse soever there may be for it , is however condemnable ; inasmuch as if it be committed out of a sudden sally of passion , it is already a great miscarriage , but if out of forethought and deliberation , the mischief is so much the greater . lxxvi . 't is well done for a man to endeavour to manage all his concerns with reason , and to carry on every enterprize by order ; but in the doing of it , there is much difficulty . and yet considerate persons , to compass what they have design'd , will use such diligence and precaution , as may prevent those inconveniences ; which , for want thereof , might otherwise ensue . lxxvii . it is but reasonable , that the citizen , who , while he continu'd in the quality of a private person , was affable and familiar with his friends , should demean himself with an equal degree of affability and humanity towards them , when he has put on the robe of magistracy . for as it is the character of a mean spirit to be arrogant upon the honours successively acquir'd by valorous atchievements ; so when a man grows proud upon his advancement to an office , whereof he must within a short time after be devested , he betrays his indigence of modesty and vertue , and little reflects , that if mens exaltation to honours must change their manners , humours , and deportment , it ought to change them for the better , and not for the worse . lxxviii . when persons of understanding propose to themselves the obtaining of somewhat which is not to be obtain'd without some difficulty , they bethink themselves of the proper means to compass their ends . many things are obtain'd , by the dextrous and insinuating applications of those employ'd therein ; as appears frequently by the negotiations of ambassadors , and other publick persons . lxxix . the chief commander of an army , besides his skill and experience in military affaires , ought to be magnanimous , of a sedate temper , valiant , liberal , and prudent . it is expected from him , that he should stand upon his authority in the management of affairs , that he should be grave in discourse , and a punctual observer of his promises . when affairs of importance come into debate , he ought to use all imaginable circumspection , to deliberate with a mature judgement , and then put things in execution with great diligence . his demeanour and countenance towards his soldiers ought to be cheerful , serene , and obliging to all , yet with a remembrance of his quality , and the distance there is between them ; that so he may not , by his excessive familiarity , give his army occasion to be disobedient and undisciplin'd ; nor disgust it , by being too morose and severe . and whereas the good affections of the souldiery is the most certain hope he has for the obtaining of a victory , it ought to be his constant endeavour not only that they should bear him the reverence and respect due to his character , but also that they should have a mutual kindness one for another , and be sensible of their being members of the same body ; rewarding those who merit it , and disgracing and punishing the neglectors of their duty . lxxx . the power of fortune ( by that name did the heathens call the secret and not ordinarily perceptible disposition of the extraordinary works of god ) is of wonderful consequence in humane accidents , but especially in the case of war and armes . so that a command not rightly understood , an order not well executed , some temerarious action , or the voice of an ordinary souldier , does many times transfer the victory to those who before seem'd vanquish'd . and that causes of a sudden an infinite number of accidents , which it is impossible to foresee , or remedy . lxxxi . men are never more easily deceiv'd , than they are by those who have the reputation of being most sincere , that is , at the greatest distance from deceiving . lxxxii . the greater and more important things are , the more apt are men to discourse of them , never minding how closely they keep to the truth , or how far they receed from it . there are some who believe , and hold to be most certain , what they have heard , not regarding whether it be true or false . others , though a thing be ever so true , relate it otherwise than it is , and afterwards time making some additionals to the story , the thing is much augmented beyond what was reported at the first . lxxxiii . to come into favour and authority , one while by ostentation and munificence , another while by industry and vigilance , are two ways equally prejudicial and pernicious , when they are practis'd subtilly in order to a mans advancement to government . thence came it that wise men have affirm'd , that the tracks leading to principality are steepy and difficult , but when once men are gotten into them , every thing helps and sets them forward . lxxxiv . it cannot be easily imagin'd , whence it comes that princes are so favourable to some , and so cross and inflexible to others ; to wit , whether there be in that some secret of nature , or that it lies in our power to keep our selves in a mean , so as that we may not too obstinately oppose the inclinations of him who governs , and yet withal , that we forbear precipitating our selves into a scandalous adulation , and a kind of servile deportment , but that we observe such a moderation as neither to crouch to ambition , nor be over desirous of honour , and by that means pass our lives with more security , and less danger . lxxxv . there are but few that can by prudent advertisements distinguish between good and evil , between what is profitable , and what is prejudicial , but follow the ordinary road of growing better , and more cautious , by the knowledge which they derive from the common events of things . lxxxvi . those things that are foreseen prove much less hurtful , than those whereof we have no preapprehension at all . he therefore may be accounted a person of a sound understanding and excellent temper , who has the government of himelf , and as with an unstartled spirit , entertains the arrival of sudden and unexpected accidents . lxxxvii . though the particular thoughts and imaginations of every one be known only to god himself , yet the natural inclinations of a people or a province is a thing obvious and easy to be known ; inasmuch as their actions being publick , they must needs thereby discover their intentions and affections ; from which prudent men will be able to give a character of them accordingly . lxxxviii . subjects are much more satisfi'd to have their prince near them , than at a great distance from them ; inasmuch as there accrew thence two considerable advantages ; one , that the truly loyal , and well affected , being more immediately under his protection , are so much the more engag'd to his service ; the other , that the pernicious designes of turbulent persons are the more easily prevented . lxxxix . a commander in chief ought to to acquire reputation , not by the hardships and dangers of others ( as many do ) but by the sweat and hazard of his own person , and by the interposition of his own vertue . and whereas it is no less honourable to terminate a war by counsel , than to put a period thereto by arms , he ought to use both means , and should principally reflect , that the first successes are those which rendor him most dreadful to the enemy , or , on the contrary , despicable and of little repute ; in regard that , for the most part , such as the beginning is , such is the issue . xc . as it is a thing unquestionably certain , that victories are gain'd by preventions and diversions , so is it withal certain , that he is at a great distance from good counsel , who , without evident necessity , transfers the war , which another had been first engag'd in , to himself . xci . a person of comprehensive parts , who can husband time well , has no reason to complain that his life is too short ; for he who makes advantage of the infinite occasions that present themselves to him does anticipate time it self . xcii . liberty is a thing makes a great noise in the world , yet few truly understand wherein it consists . but of all kinds of liberty , that of persuasion is the most desir'd by all , in so much that to gain it , some would rather be transplanted to people solitudes , than smother their discontents to live in well-govern'd societies . xciii . he who desires to be in favour with his superiour ought to make all the discoveries he can of the respect and reverence he bears him ; for if there be once a failure in that , the endearing correspondence between superiours and inferiours is immediately dissolv'd . xciv . he who is entrusted with the custody of a city which expects a siege , ought above all things , to be think himself of all the remedies which may protract time , and to cut off all opportunities , though ever so small , from the enemy , inasmuch as many times one day , nay one hour , produces some accident which may occasion the relief of it . xcv . he is easily deceiv'd who relies on the first advertisement he receives of some accident that hath happen'd , in regard that commonly the effects are not aswerable to the first advices that come . he therefore who is not forc'd by necessity to do otherwise , ought to expect several confirmations thereof , ere he takes up his final resolution , what he ought to do . xcvi . it is a dangerous thing to be govern'd by examples , if there be not a concurrence in the general , and also in all the particulars of the same reasons to be consider'd . the same may be said , if things be not regulated by the same prudential motives and reflections ; and withal , if there be not a combination of all the other inducements , and the accidents and success consequent thereto . xcvii . as it is a servile act for any man to be a slave to his affections ; so , to subdue anger , the great disturber of counsel ; to be moderate in victory , which , of its own nature , is insolent and haughty ; to be absolute master of ones self , which is the devoir of a well temper'd and generous soul ; to exercise humanity , meekness , and liberality towards an enemy , is a thing truly royal , divine , and worthy of eternal memory . xcviii . there is not any thing more becoming or more necessary to a prince , than to be just , liberal , and benevolent ; inasmuch as it is the inseparable ; attribute of grandeur and power to relieve the oppressed , and to alleviate the calamities of others ; and this especially in kings , who , by such acts , approach so much the nearer the divinity , whose living images they are , upon the score of their supereminent rank . xcix . persons of lewd inclinations have always some opportunity of doing evil , and though they do it not , yet is it not so great a satisfaction to others , to see that they do not commit those enormities which they might , as it is an affliction , to think that it is in their power to commit them . c. that commonwealth wherein there is justice duly administred for the poor , chastisement for such as are insolent and tyrannically inclin'd , an exact observance of weights and measures , as to those things which concern the sustentation of humane life , discipline and exercise for the younger sort , and as little avarice as may be in those that are advanc'd in age , must needs be an excellent constitution of government . ci. let not any prince think that the choice of a tutor for his son is a thing of small importance . for in that case , his diligence and circumspection ought to be the greater , in that he is not to do in this , as in other offices which are bestow'd either upon the mediation of others , or by corruption , or importunity or friendship , or for a reward of some services already done : in regard that though some one of his courtiers has manag'd an embassy with good success , or been general of an army , or some great officer about the prince's person , or relating to his houshold , yet does it not follow that such a person is fit to teach his son. the reason is , that for a man to be an ambassador , or general , it requires only in the former a good stock of dexterity and dissimulation , and in the latter , that he have valour and good fortune ; but to be governour to a prince , it is requisite , that he have all the accomplishments , and qualifications , suitable to the education of a person of that transcendent dignity . cii . in the disastrous accidents of our life , wherein our own industry and strength are of little account , the only remedy we have , is to look on the worst of misfortunes as things not incompatible with the condition of humanity , and to be so far prudent , as to smother our resentments thereof . ciii . between two princes , the one addicted to the exercises of vertue , the other complying with the suggestions of vice , there is this difference , that the latter is only obey'd , but the former is both obey'd and belov'd . besides , the good and vertuous prince makes the most difficult enterprises seem light , and on the contrary , the tyrant makes the lightest seem most heavy . happy therefore is he who is obey'd , but much more happy he who is both obey'd and belov'd ; for the body grows weary of obeying , but the mind is never wearied nor cloy'd with loving . civ . there is one thing which a wise prince will always be mindful of , to wit , that , in the management of the publick affairs , his governours and judges never permit the abrogation of ancient customes , nor the introduction of new ones ; in regard the populace is commonly so humorous and extravagant , that they would every day have new princes , and new laws . cv . it is an easy matter to design what a man would have done by another person , and by what means it is most likely to be brought to effect ; but to command the execution thereof is no slight thing , inasmuch as between those two there are many things which obstruct , retard , and disturb such executions . cvi. 't is a thing out of all dispute , as aristotle affirms in his rhetorick , that riches do often render those persons , that are possess'd thereof , proud and insolent : but he who shall wisely consider it , will say with seneca , that none is more worthy , none makes greater approaches to the divinity , than he who makes no account of riches ; which , saies he , i am far from affirming that thou shouldst not be possess'd of , but i would have thee possess'd thereof without any fear , distraction , or disturbance . which happiness thou art not to acquire , but by this only expedient , to wit , by a firm persuasion , that thou canst live happily without them , and that thou shouldst always look on them , as if they were taking their flight away from thee . cvii . what presumption soever a man may have of his own abilities , yet ought he not so to rely on his own counsel , as that sometimes it may not be more safe for him to submit to that of others ; in regard that he who is asham'd of consulting , and defies the conduct and directions of another , may assure himself , for the most part , that he has a fool to his guide , and consequently that he must needs be guilty of many miscarriages . cviii . it is not prudence to judge of counsels by the event of things , in regard that many times good counsels have not an issue answerable thereto , and on the contrary , evil counsels may prove fortunate . but when evil counsels are applauded , upon the score of their being successful , it is a secret encouragement for men to do those things that are unjust , which may prove highly prejudicial to the commonwealth , inasmuch as evil counsels are not always fortunate ; and there is also another fault in blaming and censuring the more prudent party , whose advertisements have not had the success which was expected , in regard that such a procedure disheartens the citizens from giving their opinions freely , when the publick concerns of their city requires it . cix . when it happens that there is a necessity of denying some person his request , it is but requisite , to keep the said person from being disgusted , and to assure him of the good will they bear him , and to make some other overture to him , so that he may thereby perceive that they have a respect for him , and would gladly oblige him . upon this demeanour , the other , if he have any sentiment of humanity , will be as much , if not more , satisfi'd , than if his request had been granted : so great an influence have kind words and an obliging carriage over the minds of good natur'd persons . cx . in publick affairs it is requisite that men be extreamly careful and considerate at the beginning of what they design ; in regard it will not be afterwards in their power without dishonour and danger , to receed from the deliberation once fixt upon , and in which they have for some time persisted . cxi . what is wish'd by the greater number does not often succeed in regard that for the most part the events of humane actions depend on the wills of few ; and the intentions of these latter being in a manner always different from those of the greater number , things seldome happen otherwise than according to the intention of those from whose directions they derive their first motion . cxii . neutrality is most commendable in the wars wherein other parties are engag'd , in regard that many inconveniences and great charges are thereby avoided ; and it may be time enough to be concern'd for either party , when success seems to intimate which side is most likely to prevail . cxiii . the clemency of princes hath always gain'd them good-will and reputation ; and , on the contrary , rigour , ( if there be not some extraordinary necessity for it ) has always produc'd the contrary effects , and instead of removing the obstacles and difficulties , which lay in their way , it has made some additionals thereto . cxiv . it is more wisely done for a man to court his friendship who is unwilling to become his enemy , than to curry favour with him , who one time or other cannot be his friend . cxv . there are three principal considerations to be minded in the carrying on of all enterprises , to wit , the justice of the cause , the facility of the victory to be obtain'd , and the conveniences and advantages accruing thereby . cxvi . there is not any thing so short-liv'd as the remembrance of a benefit , and many times , the greater it is , the more likely it is to be repay'd with ingratitude . for , he who is not willing to take off the obligation , by retaliation or remuneration , often endeavours to do the same thing in another sense , perswading himself , that the good turn was not so great ; and they who are asham'd of their having been reduc'd to the necessity of desiring a kindness , are vext and tormented in their minds that they have receiv'd it . so that the remembrance of the necessity into which they were fallen makes a greater impression upon them , than that of the obligation which had been layd upon them . cxvii . many are the inconveniences that happen in the armies of confederated parties ; while they are concerting their designes , the opportunity of entring into action slips away , their preparatives are delay'd , interrupted , and diverted , according to the forces , aimes , and counsels of the princes concern'd , so that it must needs prove a hard matter to make a firm union , where there is so much disorder and distrust , and withal so great a diversity of inclinations , and courages , and varieties of conditions . cxviii . 't is the natural humour of the populace to be always desirous of novelties , and to be easily fill'd with false and vain persuasions , lightly hurry'd away with the insinuations of those who have once set them on work , as the waves of the sea are stir'd by the blowing of the wind . cxix . so extravagant is the nature of mankind , that when they are forc'd out of one extreme , wherein they have been violently detain'd , they ride in full speed to the other extreme , without ever making the least halt in the mean. cxx . there is one thing highly considerable in military concerns , and that is the reputation of the chief commanders . assoon as this begins once to decline , the souldiery is immediately discourag'd ; the loyalty of the nations concern'd is shaken ; there follow distraction and distrust in counsels , and want of a hearty and cheerful concurrence in action ; the provision for the army's subsistence is interrupted ; and on the contrary the enemy is heartned , those who were content to observe a neutrality , are apt to incline to the successful party , and all difficulties grow greater and greater . cxxi . in human actions men ought for the most part to make their counsels complyant with the present necessity , and not , out of an over-earnestness to overcome that which is too difficult , and as it were impossible , to expose the generality to a manifest danger and inconvenience . cxxii . we find many times by experience , that those things which at the first prospect present themselves as highly dreadful , appear by degrees so much the less considerable , that , if the former errour be not renew'd by some additional accident , all the terrour in process of time vanishes , and we are induc'd to laugh and wonder at our former astonishment . cxxiii . he who finds that there is no account made of him , gives way to disgust , and that inspires him with thoughts of revenge , and inclines him to attempt dangerous things , which sometimes meet with their design'd effect ; especially when the person who is become so daring is of any authority , or remarkable for some extraordinary qualification . cxxiv . all subjection is burthensome , all restriction is insupportable to him who would live as he pleases himself . a person of that humour can find but little quiet under a regular government , in regard that there is a necessity either of his complyance which the prince , or of his ruin by him . cxxv . it is commonly observ'd , that a resolution taken either too hastily , or with too much affection comes off with a slur . for the much celerity of the resolver does not allow him the leisure to reflect on those things which ought to be consider'd , before the resolution be taken ; and the excessive affection so prepossesses the mind , that it does not take notice of any thing but what is most pressing in such or such a point . to these two examples may be added two others , to wit , in these cases , when there is time enough to deliberate , and the person deliberating is unprepossess'd with any particular affection , yet out of a certain natural incapacity , or through an insuperable kind of remisness or debility of spirit , remarkable through all their actions , they never do any thing that holds water . cxxvi . when affairs are reduc'd to the extremity , as that there remains nothing for hope to rely upon but the pure providence of god , the prosecution of the adventure in such a case must be look'd on as the result of reason and prudence , insomuch that we ought to attempt the danger , not minding how little ground there presents it self to humane prudence . for god many times takes a certain delight in sending a spirit of infatuation upon the counsels and designs of some people , and making those calamities which they intended to bring on others to recoyle upon themselves . cxxvii . the greater a man's credit and reputation is amongst the generality of the people , the more dangerous it is to support and advance him . as therefore it is an easy matter at the beginning to oppose the disorders which may ensue thereupon , so when they are come to any growth , it will be so much the more difficult to remedy them . cxxviii . the exercise of arms , the observance of the lawes , and the frequent celebration of divine service , in a well regulated city cannot ordinarily be separated , without the destruction of them all . so that there is a correspondence between them and the state of the soul , wherein there are the vegetative part , the sensitive , and the intellectual ; which parts yet do not make three souls , but one only distinguish'd by the operations of the three faculties : so the establishment of the state requires a reciprocal aid and correspondence . cxxix . where ever there is servitude , there is also fear ; and the greater the former is , the greater also is the latter . but though servitude implies tyranny , yet has the tyrant as great a share of the fear , as they over whom he tyrannizes , inasmuch as he who commands slaves , is not himself free ; now the tyrant being such , it follows that he himself is servile as well as his people , and so as there is force and indignity on both sides , so is there a continual augmentation of fear . cxxx . in matter of war , valour and artifice are highly recommended ; but the perfection of arms consists in knowing the true use of the moral vertues , a right understanding of political affairs , and treading in the steps of ancient and eminent commanders . cxxxi . in military affairs , when there is some great designe in hand , the absolute authority of ordering all is to be conferr'd on one single person who transcends all the rest in point of merit ; yet so as that he be oblig'd to have always about him such as are well skill'd in counsel , with whom he may confer , and to whom he may communicate all concerns of importance . cxxxii . men are glad of advertisements and directions in things that are doubtful , not in the certain ; in things subject to hazard , and not to prudence : it were therefore but requisite to consider what is the principal concern in the matter whereof we are to deliberate . for in deliberations , when any one is not constrain'd by necessity , he sets himself on work according to the unconfined plenitude of his own will , which is in all things and every where free , and then his thoughts are wholly taken up with the success of the enterprize , to wit , whether his fears or hopes outweigh one the other ; and thereupon he resolves to forbear attempting any thing when hazard has the principal part , and is most likely to carry it ; or on the contrary he will attempt the execution of his designe , when prudence tells him that it will prove advantageous . cxxxiii . when commonwealths are well govern'd , the prosecutions of envious persons turn to the advantage of those against whom they are intended , for innocency being clear'd by truth , their endeavours prove like the stroaks given to the ball , which the harder it is struck , the higher it rebounds ; so the calumniations of the envious instead of eclipsing , add more lustre to those against whom they are directed . cxxxiv . continual severity must needs exasperate those over whom it is exercis'd . but as the excessive indulgence of parents makes their children apt to lead an irregular and disobedient course of life ; so the remisness of a prince , who suffers his authority to be slighted , renders the citizen dissolute , and the soldier undisciplin'd and licentious , and proves withal the occasion of greater mischief , when persons of quality are concern'd . for the insolence of these last is more dangerous than that of a multitude , it being not so difficult to discover the designes wherein many are engag'd , as it is to pump out the secret plottings of one particular person . cxxxv . when the prince is sollicited by a grandee in some concern of great importance , and that he is unwilling to grant his request , he ought to consider two points , one relating to the necessary circumstances , as the cause from whence the discontent proceeds , the person disgusted , and the present conjuncture of time ; the other , how requisite it may be , to counterballance the refusal , by conferring some other boon on the petitioner . cxxxvi . the good soldier may be likened to polish'd steel , which while it is handled preserves its lustre and brightness , and on the contrary , for want of being us'd , growes rusty , and that rust consumes it , and in time makes it contagious ; so the good souldier , who is good only while he is handling his arms , in the time of war , is prejudic'd in himself , and may prove dangerous to others , when he is out of his proper element and employment . cxxxvii . in the competitions that happen between two several parties , that which is excluded will be rather inclin'd to close with a third party , than comply with that , between whom and it the precedent competition was . cxxxviii . there is not any thing so prejudicial to mankind as a transcendent prosperity ; for the effects of it , are , licentiousness , luxury , confidence to do mischief , an irreclaimable inclination to disturb the publick by some novelty , and all the inconveniencies consequent to satiety . cxxxix . the infamy of being temerarious is more prejudicial to a military commander , than the honour of a victory is advantageous to him ; inasmuch as when he is chargeable with temerity , the blame is wholly attributed to him alone , but the honour of the victory , and the prosperous management of affairs ( at least according to the opinion of many ) is communicable also to others . cxl . since there is frequent necessity of changing orders and deliberations , in the time of war , according to the variety of accidents , it should be the principal consideration of a chief commander , so to accommodate all things at the beginning , as if he had , as much as may be , foreseen all events , and all counsels ; in regard that , as the prosperous successes engage the respects and affections of the army towards their general , so the contrary makes a proportionable abatement of the same respects and affections , and consequently there is not that sympathetical correspondence which ought to be between them . cxli . the prudent person ought not to entertain any suspicion that men distrust his integrity , and if he does suspect it , he should demean himself so as that the wicked may not be sensible of his having any suspicion of them , lest that upon that occasion fear may augment their licentiousness , and that , as to others , there may not be an abatement of their diligence and promptitude . cxlii . 't is prudence in a man to make as if he knew nothing of uncertain newes , or at least to keep it so secret , as not to betray any confirmation thereof ; in regard that many times , either it is absolutely false , or the credit to be given thereto admits of a considerable diminution . cxliii . they who are induc'd to commit some act in the night time proceed commonly upon some sinful motive , presuming that the night covers in them what the day would discover , to wit , their fear and shame . cxliv . for this reason has god entrusted princes with the government of their dominions , that their subjects may , in order to the obtaining of their right , appeale from that law which is dumb , and as it were dead , and without force in it self , to the living law which ought to be the magistrate . cxlv . the principal commendation of military discipline consists in not opposing danger without necessity , by industry , patience and policy to defeat and elude the enterprises of the enemy , rather than by destroying them in a cruel and bloody engagement . cxlvi . a benefit conferr'd upon one who is persuaded that he has receiv'd an injury counterballanceable thereto , is not sufficient to remove out of his disaffected mind the memory of the offence ; especially when the benefit comes at such a time , as that it seems rather occasion'd by necessity , than to proceed from good will. cxlvii . the counsels and secret designs of princes are most commonly divulg'd after a manner much different from that which is true in effect ; and this they do purposely to amuse the generality , that they may busy themselves in discoursing of one thing , while another of different nature is in agitation . cxlviii . peace is desirable and holy , when it smothers all distrusts and jealousies , when it gives a check to all dangers , and when men are exonerated from all charges , and may repose themselves without the least fear of disturbance . but when it hatches the contrary effects , it is a pernicious war , under the counterfeit title of peace , and a pestilent poison under the name of a good medicine . cxlix . ambassadors are the eies and ears of states , and the other publick ministers are the spectacles of the respective princes by whom they are employed . cl. mens favours are to be measur'd by the real effects , and not by the external demonstrations thereof ▪ and yet it can hardly be imagin'd how great a satisfaction it is to a man , to be treated with the ceremonious part of courtesy and humanity ▪ the reason of it may possibly be this , that every one is apt to think , that he deserves more than he receives , and consequently is disgusted when he perceives there is not that account made of him which he thinks due to him . cli . subjects cannot be well govern'd without the exercise of some severity at certain times , yet is there a necessity that it should be season'd with a dextrous insinuation of its being not so much the inclination of the prince to be severe , as that it is requisite for the publick good , that the reformation of some should be occasion'd by the punishments inflicted upon others . clii. a man should endeavor to refrain from whatever may cause the least dissatisfaction or prejudice to another . it is consequent therefore , that he should never say any thing either in a mans presence , or his absence , which may displease him , unless there be some necessity of his so doing ; in regard it is the greatest extravagance in the world , for a man to make a needless creation of enemies to himself . cliii . he who runs himself into a danger without ever considering , of what concern it is likely to be , may be accounted a person of a bestial humour . but he who knows the importance of it , and yet freely exposes himself thereto , either upon the necessity there is of so doing , or upon some honourable account , must a person of great courage , and truely magnanimous . cliv. it is a vulgar errour to affirm , that learning and study are prejudicial to the brain ; though peradventure it might be truly said of some one , who has a weak brain , and is of an infirm constitution ; but where there is a conjunction of a good constitution , and the accidental good of learning , it makes a most accomplish'd person , and of an excellent temperament . clv . that glory is to be accounted vain which is purchas'd with any injury done to another ; but the true , solid , and immortal glory is that which consists not in the ruining of nations , and destruction of cities , but rather in the consolidation of kingdoms , the association of provinces , the settlement of publick tranquillity , the establishment of commerce , and the deliverance of people out of the miseries and calamities attending humane nature . clvi . all the fruit and advantage of having obtain'd a victory consists in knowing how to use it , and it is a greater infamy not to know how to use it , than not to have gain'd it ; in regard it is more ignominious for us to be deceiv'd in those things that are within our power , than in those that are not . clvii . inconsiderate and doubtful deliberations are not excusable in any but those whose concerns are in a distracted and unfortunate posture , or in a person whose thoughts are wholly bent upon ambition , and one who being desirous by all the ways imaginable to get himself a greater name , is afraid he has not time enough to do it in . clviii . all humane actions are subject to many dangers ; but this is the advantage of wise men , that they know that what ever may happen does not always come to pass , but that upon some occasion or other many dangers become none at all , many are stav'd off by prudence and industry ; and many are weather'd out by patience and equanimity . clix. he who is more apprehensive of the future than he ought to be , must not expect to be accounted a wise man , nor yet they who presuppose for certain the dangers that are but doubtful , and accordingly regulate all their deliberations , as if the danger were inevitable . but it argues a certain magnanimity in that person , who knowing and throughly considering the dangers , yet discovers how that many times , either by some unexpected chance , or by the assistance of vertue , men extricate themselves out of great difficulties and inconveniences . clx . it happens sometimes , that when a prince assumes thoughts of aggrandizing himself , or growes jealous of losing his dominions , he takes occasion to forget what obligations may ly upon him for benefits receiv'd . a remarkable instance of this kind of demeanor we find in lewis sforza , who instead of expressing his gratitude to charles viii . of france , for the kindnesses he had receiv'd from him , contributed his assistance for the driving of him out of italy , and sided with his enemies , and all only to preserve his own concerns , and out of the apprehension he had of the greatness of charles . clxi . in the giving and receiving of advice there are many things to be considered , but principally two , to wit , prudence in him who is to receive the advice , and fidelity in him who is to give it . for counsel being nothing else but a discourse consider'd and weigh'd by reason , in order to a discovery whether a thing ought to be done or not , if the person who is to receive the advice be not prudent , he will not accept of that which is given him for the best , but will follow that , which , according to his apprehension , seems most convenient ; in as much as not being prudent , he will be apt to fancy those things that are most inconvenient , and so will never set himself seriously to work as he should do . on the other side , he who gives the advice , it he be not faithful , will find so many ways to disguise the truth , that many times that is put in execution , which is more beneficial to the consultee , than to the consultor . clxii . he who intends to engage in a war ought to be alwaies prepar'd , and to have his mind fortify'd against whatever event may happen , and to be ready to entertain all occurrences ; and he should principally bethink himself not to enter into a war unjustly , and consider well against what potentate he is to be concern'd , what allyances and combinations may be made against him , and lastly examine his own forces and those of his adversary , and what confederates either party may have . clxiii . the ambition of a general often proves pernicious to the state by which he is employ'd . for it is the ordinary humour of such persons to be backward in putting a period to the war , even when they may do it with honour and advantage , that they may continue longer in their charges , and by that continuance they gain the affections of the soldiery , and so are in a fair way to their assumption of soveraignty . he who has a powerful army at his devotion has the command of all as far as that can extend its quarters . clxiv . are men desirous of coming into great repute and esteem ? let them be always careful of doing those things which are commendable and of good report ; inasmuch as vertuous actions are not the effects of honour , but honour is the effect and recompence of vertuous actions . clxv . it is generally acknowledg'd by all , that the government of a country by one single person , when he is but tolerably good , is better than that of a greater number , though it be granted that they also are good . and it may be withal rationally concluded , that in a greater number of govenours there may be a greater likelihood of degeneration from the principles of government , and a greater combination of tyranny , than there can be in one individual person . clxvi . to frame instructions for the particular benefit of every one , is a very difficult task ; but it is much more difficult to put such a project in execution ; in regard that men know well enough what they ought to do , but they are extreamly backward in applying themselves to the performance thereof . let him therefore who thinks that application incumbent upon him , endeavour to offer a certain violence to his own disposition , and make that habitual which yet admits of no greater perfection than that of desire ; by which means , he will easily attain whatever shall be taught him , and will voluntarily do any thing , according as reason shall command him , or experience direct him . clxvii . the acquisition of a great estate or honour is a thing commendable , provided it be done without fraud or any indirect means ; yet so great is the corruption of mankind , that men commonly are ambitious of high titles , and magistracy , as if they were illustious and magnificent of themselves , and did not derive their true value and esteem , from the vertue of those who are deservedly advanc'd thereto . clxviii . a military commander ought so to mind all things as if he had not charg'd any person with the care thereof ; and this , not only out of the distrust he should have that his commands may not be punctually executed , but also out of this consideration , that his soldiers will be more forward to execute his orders , when they shall find him so laborious and vigilant himself . clxix . he who would prognosticate what will be the effects of another mans deliberation , ought , to avoid being deceiv'd , to consider seriously , not only what a prudent person would be inclin'd to do upon the like emergency , but also to measure the abilities and disposition of the deliberator . clxx . a physician who undertakes to cure the infirmity of some particular member , is very careful that the medicine he applies does not prejudice any other member : so ought that privy councellor , who is to advise his prince , to be so his remembrancer of the concerns of the commonwealth , as that he is withal mindful of the honour and preservation of the prince . clxxi. there is not any man of so weak abilities , but that he may manifestly perceive the difference there is between actions proceeding from fear and errour , and those which proceed from fraud and an evil intention . clxxii . he who knows in himself what is advantageous , and for the good of the commonwealth , and yet forbears communicating it to others , is an insignificant member of that body . clxxiii . a commander may make a retreat upon two occasions , either out of timorousness , or prudence ; the former whereof is reproachable , the other deserves commendation , in regard it seems to wave the hazarding of what is not sufficiently secur'd . that victory is the most advantageous and most glorious , which is gain'd with the least loss and effusion of the souldiers blood . clxxiv . as the soul , which ordinarily ought to be the governess of the body , becomes a tyrant , when , regarding only her own excellency , in comparison of the body , she so thinks of her self , as not to allow any part of time for the service of the body , whereby the latter is weakned , and rendered uncapable of performing its offices : so , on the contrary , they who make the body lord over the soul , and employ their whole time in satisfying the appetites thereof , without reserving some part for the other , can never become vertuous , nor have any valour in themselves . clxxv . avarice is , no doubt , much more blameable in a prince , than in a private person ; not only upon this score , that the prince having more to distribute , frustrates men of the benefits they expect from him , but also in regard , that whatever the private person hath , he may dispose thereof without any others being much concern'd in it . but whatever the prince has , he has chiefly for the benefit of others ; what therefore he retains to himself is so much deducted out of what men should receive from him . clxxvi . princes have cause to be more distrustful than other persons , not only in regard they are many times flatter'd , but also that many doubtful advertisements are propos'd to them , and that it is a difficult matter for them to follow those that are most advantageous to their concerns . clxxvii . that prince who has the most obliging way to gain the affections of his people , makes a great discovery of an excellent good nature , and withal gives a certain demonstration of his being unchargeable with the vice of pride , which brings an odium upon the vertues themselves . clxxviii . when any of the enemies forces fall off from him , and come into thy service , it is no small happiness if they prove faithful to thee ; inasmuch as the forces of the enemy are much more weakned , by the defection of those who desert him , than by the loss of those who are kill'd , though the name of turn-coat , or fugitive be suspicious in new-rais'd men , and odious in old souldiers . clxxix . in military concerns ; the prosperous success of the victorious prince proceeds for the most part from the want of counsel and conduct in the enemy . and thence it comes , that it is a difficult task to subdue him who knows the extent of his own forces and those of his enemy . besides , the performances of the souldiery are to be attributed more to their gallantry than to their multitude , and sometimes the advancement they make depends more on the advantages of the place , where the engagement happens , than upon their personal valour . clxxx . men , armes , mony , and provisions are the sinews of war ; but of these four , the two former are the most necessary , in regard that resolute men , well arm'd , will make a shift to find mony and provisions ; but those two last will not so easily find men and arms. clxxxi . when the prince is surrounded by his familiar friends in a time that requires nothing of action , he communicates his favours to those who are most acceptable to him , and most complyant with his humour . but when he has some great design to carry on , he knows how to make a distinction between those who are purely favourites , and such as may be more serviceable to him . clxxxii . a person reputed to be of great conduct and well experienc'd in the management of affairs , who can maintain ten thousand men , is more to be fear'd and esteem'd than ten others confederated together with each of them five thousand men ; in regard they are tedious and dilatory in the concerting of their designes , and much time is commonly lost ere they can be unanimously brought to resolve upon the same end . clxxxiii . that person who is desirous to be entertain'd into the service of some grandee , should rather pitch upon one of some repute for his prudence , than one notorious for his ignorance : in regard that if his dependence be on a wise man , he will find means to ingratiate himself into his favour ; but with an ignorant man , his applications will in all likelihood prove ineffectual , by reason of the want of apprehension in the person to whom they are made . clxxxiv . the affairs of this world are in a perpetual fluxe of uncertainty and instability ; yet are they always in a progressive course towards the end to which they ought to tend according to their nature . but this progress meets with greater obstructions than we imagine , in regard that we measure their motion according to our life , which is of no great duration , and not according to their continuance , which seems long to us in respect of our selves . and thence it comes , that the judgements which we make of them are commonly false and defective . clxxxv . in things of importance , he who does not take into his consideration all the particulars relating thereto , cannot frame a right judgement of them ; in regard that any single circumstance , how inconsiderable soever it be , may change the whole face of the thing which is to be judg'd . yet true it is , that many times , a man may frame a good judgement thereof , though he have the knowledge but of the affair , only in general ; and on the contrary , he who knows the particulars may be guilty of a greater miscarriage ; in regard that if his head be not clear , and disengag'd from passion , his attention to the particular part will confound and disturb his apprehension of the whole matter under consideration . clxxxvi . it is a great felicity for a man to see his enemy cast down and lying at his mercy ; but the greater his happiness is , to whom that happens , the greater reason he has to make a commendable use of that victory , by expressing his clemency and readiness to forgive , it being the particular mark and property of a great and generous soul . clxxxvii . an inferiour prince ought not to hazard all he has in one fight ; for if he get the better , he only gains the more glory ; if he miscarries , he is ruin'd to all intents and purposes . clxxxviii . we find that in the ordinary differences which happen between men upon the civil account , and in the diseases whereto men are subject , the judges and physicians have recourse to the judgements of those who have been anciently eminent in those several professions ; the same may be said of affairs of state and policy , that it were expedient the present statesmen consulted the directions of the ancients , who have been eminent for the good government and civilization of such as were subject to them . clxxxix . there are many who seem to be highly diligent in the reading of ancient histories , and to take a particular divertisement therein , by reason of the remarkable variety of accidents which occur ; but few apply themselves to the imitation thereof ; and that with the greater reproach to themselves , in that they think it a thing not only difficult , but also indeed impossible ; as if the heavens , the sun , and the elements had chang'd their motions , order and influences , in comparison of what they were heretofore . cxc . the friendship there is between persons of quality , of a private condition , proceeds from the mutual correspondence of their minds , and the consonancy of their humours and dispositions . but among princes , this correspondence of humours does not always beget amity , but sometimes , out of a certain judgement which they frame to themselves , of the advantages accrueing by the contraction of such friendships , and sometimes their confederations are the effects of the present exigences forcing them thereto . cxci. adversity is the touch stone which distinguishes between those who are friends out of design , and those who are really such . it makes a full discovery of the fidelity and constancy of some , and how slight and superfluous others may be . so that a man has this benefit by adversity , that there are driven from him , without the help of a staff , all that throng of persons whose souls are mercenary and of no value , full of avarice and ingratitude , and there remain behind only those minds which are fortune proof , and such as cannot be surmounted by adversity . cxcii . he who founds a commonwealth , and establishes laws for the government thereof , ought to have presuppos'd that men are inclin'd to wickedness , and will make a discovery of that inclination , upon any occasion that shall offer it self . and when the malignity lies conceal'd for some time , it proceeds from some secret cause , which , for want of having seen the experience of the contrary , was not observ'd ; but it is afterwards discover'd by time , which brings all things to light . cxciii . neutrality , of its own nature , is full of danger , in as much as it gives offence , on the one side , to the stronger party , who expected to be sided withal upon the score of his grandeur , and on the other to the weaker , who takes it unkindly , and thinks it an injury that he is not assisted and reliev'd . so that the neutral party is neither secur'd against an enemy , on the one side , nor preserves a firiend , on the other . cxciv . as long as a prince continues in a neutral condition , every one endeavours to caress him , & to draw him to his party , and consequently he is honour'd , and not only enjoys his neutrality in quietness , but also makes an advantage of it by the presents he receives from those who would lure him into their allyance ; whereas if he has once declar'd himself , he has lost the satisfaction of being a spectator of the difference , and one of the contending parties must look upon him as an enemy , though the reasons and motives he had to appear against him be never so plausible . cxcv. it is a hard question to decide , whether be the more ambitious person , he who is desirous to keep what he is possess'd of , or he who endeavours to make new conquests . for many times great alterations are caus'd by him who is peaceably possess'd , in regard the fear of losing begets in such persons the same inclinations , which they have who would conquer . nay sometimes , he who is possess'd does not think himself secure , if he be not always in a readiness to make new acquests , and to do that , there is a necessity of having forces , and those must be in action , answerably to the ambitious desires of those by whom they are maintain'd . cxcvi. those who are entrusted with the administration of publick offices , or the government of provinces ought to have these three conditions ; to wit , that they have ● tenderness and affection for those who are under their jurisdiction ; that they be invested with sufficient authority to constrain , where it is requisite ; and that they be persons remarkable for their justice and valour . but with this precaution into the bargain , that they who are advanc'd to the government of others be such as have been in their younger days govern'd and directed by others . cxcvii . in all the resolutions of this world , there is an intermixture of good and evil ; god having so order'd it , that men might be the more sensible of the imperfection of their present state . but it is the part of a prudent person to counterballance the good and evil , and to embrace that resolution wherein he finds either less evil , or more good . cxcviii. since man is to look on his own good and preservation as his main concern , he ought not in reason to be tax'd with any inconstancy , when upon the vicissitude of human affairs , he also admits some change in his designs and procedure , yet continuing constant and resolute as to the end he had propos'd to himself . and this is but to follow the example of good pilots , who being bound for such a port , yet upon alteration of wind and weather seem to change their course , but still in the midst of the tempest they mind the prosecution of their voyage , and the preservation of the vessel . cxcix . good souldiers require a good captain , he being the guide of all , and the success or miscarriage of a design depending on his action and conduct . thence came the greek proverb , that an army of deer having a lyon in the head of it , is more terrible than an army of lyons headed by a deer . but it is however requisite , that both commanders and souldiers should be good , that it may not happen as caesar said going against pompey , that he went against a captain without souldiers ; and afterwards going against afranius that he was to en●gage an army without a captain . cc. there are four sorts of men who are always mention'd with honour . first , they who have been highly successeful in the establishment and promotion of true religion . secondly , those who have been the founders of states and kingdoms , and setled the government thereof by good laws . thirdly , they who have been successors to the last mention'd , and have made great dilatations of the empires which they found so established . and lastly , persons who have been great promotors of literature , and patrons of learned men . on the contrary , the teachers of a false religion or destroyers of the true , the disturbers of government , and the enemies of learning and vertue , have been , through all ages , infamous and detestable . cci. a people which hath been accustomed to live in servitude , being left to their own liberty , may be likened to a beast that has been kept in a park , which having once got out of it , will be continually mischievous , till at last it be either destroy'd or brought into its former restraint . ccii. we ought to be very moderate and cautious in the commendations of persons . for as it is natural for any one , to resent his being disparag'd , so , on the contrary , excessive , commendation ( besides the hazard it implies of his judgement who commends , and the greatness of his merit who is commended ) is many times offensive to him who hears it . that portion of self love , which every one has , even though he is not sensible of it , makes us immediately apply to our selves the commendations and discommendations which we hear given to others , and confequently we imagine our selves concerned therein , though they are not purposely directed to us . cciii . when the prince has fortify'd himself with the allyances of excellent captains , valiant souldiers , arms , mony , and strong places , his next work must be to weaken the forces , and to defeat the designes of the enemy ; and that is done more slowly or with greater expedition , according as occasion offers it self , which is the source of every great and transcendent action . cciv. it seldom happens , that a vertuous man will be ambitious of soveraignty by indirect ways , though his aim therein may be good ; and that a wicked person being once become great , will ever use that authority well , which he has attain'd by evil courses . ccv . though a successor in government be not fully so remarkable for his vertue as the person whom he succeds , yet may he maintain the state in the same grandeur he found it , by the vertue of his predecessor , and make his advantage of the others labours . but if it happen that he does not live long , and that he be again succeeded by one that does not follow the footsteps of the former , such a state must needs degenerate . so , on the contrary , if two persons , both eminent for the greatness of their vertue , happen to be immediate governours of the same province , they commonly do great things , and give a smart stroke to the firm establishment of their government . ccvi. ii is a thing out of all controversy , that if there be not souldiers where there are men enough , it proceeds from some defect in the prince , and not from that of nature , or the situation of the country , or genius of the inhabitants . and thence it comes , that wise princes keep up the exercise of war even in the times of peace . ccvii. in a well-regulated common-wealth , the good services and merits of citizens shall make no plea for their crimes , if they be of any importance . for rewards being appointed for well doing , and punishment for miscarriages , it is an aggravation of their lapses who have done well , that they have done so , and therefore if they do amiss , there is no account made of their former vertuous demeanour . ccviii . he who would reform . a city , to the general satisfaction of all its inhabitants , should endeavour what he can to retain the ancient customs , and that course of life which the people was traditionally inclin'd to , that it may not seem to the generality , that there is any alteration in the government , though really there be , and that the constitution thereof is a quite different thing from what it was before . for it is the humour of the populace , to be contented and layd asleep with that which seems , as much as with that which really is ; and many times there are greater disturbances occasion'd by that which seems to be , than there are by that which really is . ccix. the vice of ingratitude proceeds either from avarice , or distrust . when therefore a prince or state sends out a general upon some important expedition , and the other growes highly into repute thereby ; such a prince or state is oblig'd to acknowledge and recompence the service done them . but if , on the contrary , they dishonour or affront him , avatice prompts him to commit some inexcusable fault , and so he brings himself into perpetual infamy . ccx . ambition has so great an influence over the heart of man , that it keeps a perpetual possession thereof . the reason of it is , that mans disposition being naturally inclin'd to desire all things , and his desires always excessively surmounting the means of obtaining them , proves a continual occasion of discontent and repining . thence proceeds the variety of mens conditions , inasmuch as their labouring to augment , and the fear of losing what they are possess'd of , occasions quarrels , animosities , and wars , and those are the fore-runners of the ruine of one province , and the aggrandization of another . ccxi. that prince who would keep up his estate in a flourishing condition , will not only be careful in the removing of present scandals , but also use his utmost industry in providing against such as may happen . in regard that if he make timely provision against them , they are easily reform'd ; whereas if the evil be grown up to a head , the remedy comes too late . ccxii. it is not to be admir'd , that those princes who are very powerful and have a numerous issue should have their thoughts much bent upon war ; and that , either out of a motive of honour , or to make provision for their progeny , by military employments , or forreign governments , if they have colonies in remote parts of the world ; or lastly to prevent the disturbances which may be occasion'd by the different pretensions of younger brothers . ccxiii. the wise servant ought to imitate the excellent physician , and foresee what he should hope or fear , neither hoping nor fearing more or less than is convenient , so that he may always know whether his hope be in its augmentation , or at its full height , or in its declining state , and accordingly prognosticate what he is to expect . being thus precaution'd , he will have his judgment as it were in his hand , not suffering it to be heightned by hope , or to be depress'd by fear : and so he will prudently manage the affairs of his master , whose advantage . he minds equally with his own repute , in the negotiation wherein he is employ'd . ccxiv. plato would have the devoir of a good citizen to consist in these four things ; to wit , that he should be prudent in diserning well what is most conducive to the common good , as well as to things present , as to come ; that he be just , in distributing to every one what is due to him ; that he be vertuous , in surmounting the fear which commonly obstructs he exercises of vertue ; and lastly , that he have an absolute soveraignty over his affections . ccxv . the shortest and surest way for princes to make a mutual discovery of their different designes , is that of ambassadors , especially if they be persons of great repute either upon the score of the grandeur of their masters , or that of their own vertue . for it being their business to treat always with great persons , and diligently to weigh the actions , deportment , words , and advices of those with whom they negotiate , and also those of the prince himself , they from the present conjuncture of affairs infer what is most likely to come to pass afterwards . ccxvi . when men propose to themselves the doing of some thing of great importance , they ought , with all the industry they can , prepare themselves for it , that when opportunity offers it self , they may be ready to put their design in execution . when therefore all the preparatives are cautiouslly made , there should be no discovery made thereof till the opportunity of action does it ; and then if there be a neglect in the execution , it argues that the persons concern'd therein were not sufficiently prepar'd , or wanted courage to carry it on . ccxvii . distributive justice in a political government ought to be regulated according to geometrical proportion , to wit , according to the quality of persons : otherwise , it is not justice : as we see , that infamy to a person of mean extraction amounts to little , but to one nobly descended , it is the most indigestible punishment . that magistrate therefore who proceeds to the cognizance of merits and miscarriages , favours and disgraces , by the same measure , not considering the diversity there may be between some persons and others , according to their several qualifications , is defective in the understanding of his duty ; in regard , that persons of noble birth are discourag'd by the ignominy of being reduc'd to an equal rank with their inferiours , and those , of the meaner sort , finding themselves treated as persons of better extraction , grow thereby the more insolent and insupportable . ccxviii . when the forces of a prince are regulated by prudence and conduct , they do admirable things , securing his own concerns , and those of his friends , causing confusion and astonishment to his enemies . ccxix. it may easily be observ'd by a person who shall examine things present with a reflection on the past , how that in all cities , and among all nations , there are now the same inclinations , and the same humours , as were heretofore . so that it is no hard matter , for such an examiner , from the things past , to foresee what may happen in any commonwealth , and consequently that prudence advises the practising of the same remedies which were used by the ancients . but in regard those considerations have either been neglected , or not fully comprehended by such as read , or if they have been read , they have not been understood by those who govern , it follows , that the same scandals and misgovernments happen at all times . ccxx . the only way to make a city flourish is to use all possible endeavours to supply it with inhabitants ; and that is done either by love or force . 't is done by the former , when the ways to it are free and secure to strangers who are desirous to make their habitations there ; by the latter , when the neighbouring places are destroy'd , and the inhabitants thereof obliged to transplant themselves thither . ccxxi . a small republick cannot safely be possess'd of a city that is stronger and greater than it self . for otherwise its case would be like that of a tree , whose branches being too weighty for its boal , weaken it so that the first blast of wind lays it on the ground . ccxxii . a prince or republick should submit to any terms rather than have recourse to that nation from which it hath assistance . for there cannot be a more plausible occasion for a prince or republick to possess themselves of a city or province , than when they send their forces for the defence thereof . ccxxiii. of all estates that is the most miserable , whether it be the case of a prince or republick , when they are reduc'd to such extremities , that they can neither accept of a peace , nor carry on a war. such is the condition of those who on the one side are over-crush'd by the conditions that are proffer'd them of a peace , and on the other being oblig'd to continue the war , are forc'd to become a prey either to those who are their auxiliaries , or to their enemies . ccxxiv. the welfare of a government consists in this that the subjects be so kept in , as that they have not the power , nor any reason to make a disturbance . and this is done , either by making all secure in depriving them of the means of doing evil , or gratifying them so well , as that they may not have any plausible reason to desire a change of government . ccxxv. the prince who is set upon by another greater than himself , can hardly commit a greater errour than to refuse all overtures of accommodation , especially when they are offer'd him ; in regard that what is proffer'd cannot be so inconsiderable but that some advantage accrewes to him who accepts of it , and is consider'd as part of a victory obtain'd by him . ccxxvi . among the marks whereby it may be known what condition a state is in , we are to consider the correspondence there is between it and its neighbours . for when it is so govern'd , as that its neighbours to gain its friendship become its pensionaries , it is a certain argument that such a state is in a flourishing condition : but when the neighbours that are inferiour to it , are as so many suckers thereto , perpetually draining its exchequer , it is a great sign of weakness or want of conduct , or corruption in the government . ccxxvii . men in their actions , especially those of importance , ought to consider , what is most convenient to be done , and to accommodate themselves to the present conjuncture ; for they who either through an unfortunate election , or out of a mutinous humour can admit of no acquiescence with the present time , live for the most part in a wretched condition , ever repining , and vainly expecting a change of affairs . ccxxviii . that some men are successful in their undertakings , and others not , it is to be attributed to their complyance or discomplyance with the time proper for the execution thereof . thence is it that we say some men proceed in their actions inconsiderately , and as if they were surprized , while others do nothing without a previous circumspection and scrutiny into all the particulars that may occur in their deportment . ccxxix . that commander who would have a city obstinately defend it self , or an army once engag'd to fight it out to the last man , ought above all things to insinuate into them a persuasion of the necessity there is of fighting . ccxxx . the wise chieftain who proposes to himself the conquest of a country or province , ought to measure the difficulties he may meet withal , by considering the necessity , which may force the inhabitants of the country to defend themselves , answerably to the greatness of the necessity in those who are to defend themselves against him , to make account that his expedition will be more or less difficult . ccxxxi . among other points of military discipline , a wise captain ought to be especially careful , what persons they are who take the word from him ; and to take order that his souldiers believe not any but their own officers , who are not likely to say any thing to them but what they are entrusted withal . for want of a punctual observance of this point , incredible disorders have many times happen'd . ccxxxii . in a military expedition , it is much better to send one single person , though endu'd but with ordinary prudence , than two together , though very valiant persons , invested with equal authority . cxxxiii . some cities and provinces , which have held out against all extremities of war , have been reduc'd by some extraordinay example of generosity , humanity , or chastity . of this there are many examples in the roman histories . ccxxxiv . he who is over-earnestly desirous of being lov'd , if he exceed ever so little in the artifices of insinuating himself , becomes contemptible ; and , on the contrary , he who is over desirous to be fear'd , if he exceeds the true measure , becomes odious . he who can observe a mean in these procedures must be a person of a great and exemplary vertue . ccxxxv . the only way to avoid the infamy or danger which is consequent to the giving of counsel , is , to take things moderately , to give advice without passion , and to defend it with modesty ; so that the prince or city , who receives and follows the advice may do it voluntarily , and not seem to be over-sway'd by the importunity of him who is consulted . ccxxxvi . the wise captain who has to do with a new enemy , whose reputation is great , should make a previous tryal of his souldiers , by small engagements with the enemy , before he comes to the hazard of a pitch'd battel , to the end that by such prelusory skirmishes there may be an abatement made of that terrour , which the noise and reputation of such an enemy might have rais'd in them . ccxxxvii . to use stratagems and circumventions upon all other occasions , raises a dislike of the person using it ; but in military concerns it is otherwise , in so much , that he who subdues his enemy by a stratagem , is as highly commended , as he that does it by force . ccxxxviii . a resolution taken up with too much precipitancy , or an over earnest affection , proves for the most part unfortunate . the former allowes not the time to ruminate on the things which are to be considered ; the latter takes up the mind so , that it heeds not any thing but what immediately press upon it . ccxxxix . a man is much more concern'd at a pleasure or dipleasure newly done him , than he is at a signal kindness , which he had receiv'd some considerable time before . thus a mans immediate exigences make a much greater impression upon him , than either the remembrance of that which is past , or the foresight of that which is to come . ccxl . besides many other misfortunes which must attend a prince who is neligent in the affairs of war , these two are most obvious , to wit , that he cannot be respected by the souldiery , nor repose any trust in them . to remedy this , there are two expedients ; one relating to the body , the other to the mind . the former requires the following of the noblest and most generous sort of exercises , such as hunting , whereby his person is enur'd to the supporting of all inconveniencies , and he is enabled to observe the advantages and situation of places . the latter consists in the reading of histories , and , in them , reflecting on the actions of excellent men , and how they demean'd themselves in their wars , examining the occasions of their victories , or losses , and above all , in imitating those whose great characters time has transmitted to us . ccxli. it is greater wisdom for a man to be accounted poor , though some shame be consequent thereto , provided he do not incurhatred or contempt , than to gain the title of a liberal person by rapine and injustice , which are ever attended by infamy and aversion . ccxlii. he who thinks to advance himself by his dependence on a great person , and is desirous to be employ'd by him , ought to keep as much as he can possibly in his presence . for ever and anon , there happen occasions , wherein he recommends some affair to him who is next at hand , which he would not do , if the other were to seek : and he who misses the beginning of his advancement does many times forfeit his access to great things . ccxliii . in the particular accidents of war , chance ( which is commonly known by the name of fortune ) has a greater influence than in other humane actions . for the different situation of places , the advantages of encamping , the diversity of the air , diseases , want of mony , scarcity of provisions , spies , guides , false intelligence , the contrivances of publick ministers , and divers other things occasion an infinite variety in the occurrences of war. ccxliv . it is more probable , that an experienc'd sea commander , who has ben accustom'd to fight against winds , waves , and men , should make a good captain at land , where he has only men to deal withal , than that a land-captain should make a good commander at sea. ccxlv . those very persons , who attribute most to vertue or prudence , only that they might exclude what is attributed to fortune , cannot deny but that it is an extraordinary chance , for any man to live and flourish at such time , when those vertues are in esteem for which he is most recommendable , or to be concern'd in such an occasion , as where they are most necessarily to be practis'd . ccxlvi . the ministers and favourites of princes , if they are wise , ought to procure all the fair correspondence that may be between them and their neighbouring princes , and withal to raise in them a tenderness and affection for their subjects . ccxlvii. it being every mans case at some time or other to stand in need of anothers assistance , where there is no precedent obligation upon the score of benefits receiv'd , nor any consideration of intimate friendship , or allyance , the person solliciting ought , for this reason , to make it appear , that such his request is of great advantage , or at least not any way prejudicial to him whom he expects liberally to grant his desire ; then he is to make him sensible , how transcendently he will be oblig'd to him . and where he cannot urge any thing of this nature , he ought not to be disgusted , if he does not obtain what he desires . ccxlviii . in all affaires , it is requisite first to use reason , and afterwards force . in military designes therefore , it is of greater concern to set ambushes for the enemy , than only to avoid his . the more a man governs himself by reason in any affair , the more he advantages himself . ccxlix . a man makes a greater complaint when an injury is done him contrary to reason , than when a violence is done him by force : for an injury has place between those who are otherwise equal in condition ; but force is a mark , that he who uses it is more powerful , than he on whom it is used . ccl . when we prepare our selves to go against our enemies , we should make account , that the preparatives on their side are as great as those on ours , not promising our selves any more success for the faults which we imagin they have committed , but rather presuposing , that having their senses , and judgment about them , they have provided for their affairs , as well as we have done for ours . ccli . a wise man ought not to conceal the advantageous advice which he has to give his country , meerly out of the uncertainty there is of its being put in execution ; for time will discover the integrity and prudence of him that gave the advice , and withal the temerity and extravagance of those who rejected it . cclii . though the act of clemency should prove beneficial to the person by whom it is exercis'd , yet does it sometimes tend to his prejudice . but this happens according to the subject on which it is exercis'd . for when it is done to a multitude , it proves so much the more beneficial , the more the obligation conferr'd thereby is multiply'd , it being in a manner impossible , that a numerous party having receiv'd a benefit , should conspire together to be ungrateful to so great a benefactor ; whereas one or few particular persons may be of so malignant a disposition , as to fall , immediatly after the reception of a great kindness , into that horrid vice of ingratitude . ccliii . the best way for a captain to inspire his souldiers with an obstinate resolution of fighting , is , to put them out of all hopes of safety , otherwise than by fighting . and that resolution is augmented in them by the confidence they have of their comanders experience , and the love they bear their country . divers other inducements may concur , but the most pressing consideration is that which forces them either to conquer , or dy . ccliv . the accomplishment of every enterprize is much more difficult than the beginning of it ; since the latter may be the effect of some lucky accident , but the former requires resolution , experience , and conduct . thus a vessel may weather out a tempest at sea , but when it comes near the port , the pilot shews the utmost of his skill by reason of the narrow passage into it . cclv. it is a great presumption , in any person , how much so ever he may imagine himself in favour with his prince , to be over-forward in giving him advice . for the reflectons of soveraigns being many times fixt upon things of a nature transcending the capacities of such as are about them , it happens , that they are secretly dissatisfy'd when they seem in some measure pleas'd . it is therefore the prudence of a courtier , to be alwaies so cautious , in offering his advice , as that there may be a presumptive probability , of it s not becoming prejudicial to the offerer . cclvi. when a person , who thinks himself in savour , is of a sudden discountenanc'd , he should not give the least admission to murmuring , disgust , or animosity ; but , reflecting on what might be applicable to him , upon the score of miscarriage , endeavour , by the arts of insinuation , and complaisance , to recover himself into his former station , in the princes affections . cclvii . there are two eminent requisites , in those , who are concern'd abroad , as publick ministers . for , if they do not give evident proofs of their vigilance , sedulity , and sufficiency , in managing the negotiations wherein they are entrusted , as also of their perspicacity , in foreseeing what influence they may have on posterity , there is a great deficiency in the discharge of the trust reposed in them . cclviii. the main design of government is prudentiallity carried on , and advanc'd , when there is an unanimity of counsels amongst those who have the administration of publick affairs . but when they are divided amongst themselves , and promote different interests , it argues a dangerous crisis . cclix . great are the calamities consequent to war. the treasury of the prince is exhausted : commerce is obstructed : and the devastations , committed in a short time , are not repair'd , without a subsequent peace , of many years continuance . and such must needs be the condition of the many countries , now the seat of the present war. finis . a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade; in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for peace. fuller, thomas, 1608-1661. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a85018 of text r208465 in the english short title catalog (thomason e1021_17). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 164 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 44 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a85018 wing f2437 thomason e1021_17 estc r208465 99867418 99867418 119729 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a85018) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 119729) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; 151:e1021[17]) a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade; in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for peace. fuller, thomas, 1608-1661. [4], 83, [1] p. printed for john williams at the sign of the crown in st. pauls church-yard, london : 1660. epistle dedicatory signed: john williams. a collection of petitions, remonstrances and declarations from various parts of the kingdom. -thomason catalog. annotation on thomason copy: "vide single sheets in fol. printed about a month before this in 4⁰"; "may. 2d". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng england and wales. -parliament -early works to 1800. political science -sources -early works to 1800. great britain -history -commonwealth and protectorate, 1649-1660 -early works to 1800. great britain -politics and government -1649-1660 -early works to 1800. great britain -constitution -early works to 1800. a85018 r208465 (thomason e1021_17). civilwar no a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade;: in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for fuller, thomas 1660 26629 13 0 0 0 0 0 5 b the rate of 5 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than 10 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-02 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-02 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2007-03 mona logarbo sampled and proofread 2007-03 mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a happy handfull , or green hopes in the blade ; in order to a harvest , of the several shires , humbly petitioning , or heartily declaring for peace . diadem psal. 34. 14. seek peace , and follow after it . london , printed for john williams at the sign of the crown in st. pauls church-yard , 1660. to his highness the lord general monck . my lord , what formerly was in single arrows , is here bound in a sheaf , i conceive it good that by such conjunction , they might mutually reflect light one on another . posterity will probably be pleased to look back on such passages . some love to see the little coats they then did wear when children . alas , these all were the essayes in the infancy of our liberty , now grown a stripling , god send it to be a man ! yet they differ rather in sound than in sense , variously expressing the same matter . so many men , and but one minde , is admirable ; prompted certainly by the spirit of unity inditing them . factious petitions , gave the beginning , and loyal declarations must give the end to our miseries . but here is the difference , the first were made by the scum , these by the cream of the nation . aeneas did beg the boon of the sybil , that she would not write her oracles ( according to her usual course ) in leaves of trees blown away with every wind . these declarations formerly were printed in leaves or single papers , which are soon lost , not to say , the best of papers so printed , are oft consigned to the worst of uses . this is a way to preserve , and to propagate them . i remember the verse of the poet , singula cum valeant sunt meliora simul , take each of them asunder , good as either , then needs they must be best , all put together . what ( as single stars ) was good , must be best in a constellation . god happily perfect what is so hopefully begun by your honour , though my voice is too weak to be the eccho to the sound of the whole nation : your honours most humble servant , john williams . an express from the knights and gentlemen of cheshire , now engaged with sir george booth : to the city and citizens of london , and all other free-men of england . worthy citizens , and all other our english free-men and brethren , as we are english-men we are all incorporated into one body , and though distinct and different families , fortunes , and qualities , yet fellow members and coheirs of one and the same birth-right ; not onely by nature , as we are the sons of men ( nature obliging all in one common and equal bond of freedom and unity , ) but by certain sacred laws and customs of peculiar and inherent right to this nation ; general , equal , and impartial to all , without respect of persons , rank , quality , or degree , derived through all successions of ages , by the blood , justice , and prudence of our fore-fathers to us their posterity , as ours , and the right of our children after us , not dis-inheritable : though this age were wholly made up of apostates and traytors to common justice and freedom , and should make sale of , and deliver up their children as slaves and vassals , yet english right abideth , to wit , our just laws and liberties , and may justly be re-inforced as opportunity may present ; sometimes they sleep , but never die , their total extinguishment is not to be imagined , so long as any englishman , or english blood abideth : and whoever undertaketh ( though by arms or otherwise ) their recovery and redemption is justified in that very action by the laws of god , of nations , nature , reason , and by the laws of the land ; and within the bowels of our nation amongst our selves no war can be justified , but upon that score , the contrary is sedition , murde● treason , tyranny and what not , and the instruments thereof no other in the eye of english freedom and right , but as bears , wolves , and other beasts of prey . now right worthy and noble citizens , and all other our english brethren , let us consider and lay to heart the sad and deplorable condition of our native countrey : oppression , injustice , and tyranny reigneth ; division , discord , and distimulation fomented and fostered ; trade and industry discouraged , our land rent into parties and factions , and the common band of unity cancell'd , our fundamental laws supplanted , high courts of justice introduced , the blood of war sh●d in times of peace ; arbitrary and illegal imprisonments , patents , monopolies , excise , and other payments brought upon us , and continued contrary to magna charta , and the petition of right ; no form or face of government of english constitution amongst us ; the name and athority of the people in parliament usurped and abused , and the stamp thereof put upon strange and prodigious actions , vexing and oppressing the people with dayly changes and alterations in government , as the interest of some few ambitious grandees alter and change , or get advantages one of another , and all under the name of a common-wealth , when as the nature is not practised or intended at all , it being utterly inconsistent with their very temper and interest ; they are wrapt up and compounded of nothing but guilt-blood , and tyranny ; and equal and common justice ( the essence of a common-wealth ) are utterly repugnant thereto ; and whatsoever they can do must be planted and maintained by sword and violence against the very heart and sence of the nation ; and they know not where or how to centre an oligarchy , or something they would have to be masters of the people , and perpetuate their power and tyranny , and therefore would amaze and confound us with their new debares of a coordinate power , or senate for life , such as our english , laws and liberties know not of , and of pernicious consequence to this nation ; so that from these men that thus handle the stern at westminster , there is no expectation of any just settlement of peace , or freedom from oppression ; especially considering the apostacy , hypocracy , deceipt , and perjury of those men , their manifold solemn engagements , oaths , vows , protestations , appeals unto heaven ; promises , remonstrances , declarations , all by them broken again and again , never keeping faith , truce , or oath , being unbounded , unlimited , certain to nothing , not to be held either by the law of god or man , of conscience or reason ; and from such persons in government , good lord deliver us , and all the good people of england ; and that all this is true of them , your consciences ( noble citizens , and all other the free-people of england ) can witness , there is no tongue , no pen is able to vindicate them in this point ; it is known of all , owned by all , and can be denied by none ; how then can any honest or just man shed any blood in their quarrel , or lend them assistance ? surely that blood will be required at their hands , and we doubt not but you will be carefull what you do . and therefore from those considerations and just provocations , that we have taken up arms in pursuance of , and inquisition after our government , laws , and liberties , that every english-man may be protected and secured in his religion , liberty , and property ; and though it may be suggested , that we intend to introduce prosecution for conscience into the land again , we do hereby ( in the presence of almighty god ) protest and declare against all coercive power in matters of religion , and that to the utmost of our strength ( through gods assistance ) we will endeavour , to the hazzard of our blood and fortunes , the freedom and protection of all vertuous and religious people , by what name soever differenced from us , equal with our selves : and that no forreign , or other authority , save only the civil be exercised in england : that the practise of the law be reformed ; all corrupt statutes repealed ; annual elections of all officers and magistrates , with the constant succession of parliaments restored ; our fundamental laws cleared and asserted ; and whatever is contrary there to be abolished : that no trials be admitted in england for life , limb , liberty or estate , but by the good old way of juries ; and that they be restored to their original power and purity : that all extrajudicial and illegal proceedings by high-courts of justice , or otherwise , with all illegal and arbitrary committees , be strictly provided against : that the excise , and all other payments and taxes , ( such as our ancestors never knew of ) together with all monopolies and patents destructive to trade and the common good of the nation be also abolished ; and , that our parliaments and magistrates be secured from all force and violence ; and utterly cleared from all boundlesse prerogative , and unlimited priviledge : that the right of the poor in the commons of england , all donations for charitable uses , and all lands formerly belonging to the people , be restor'd again : and that mercy and justice be truly established amongst us . and for these ends , and what else may be of publick good to the nation , we do desire , and indeed challenge , as of english right , the speedy election of a new free parliament . and thus , most noble citizens , brethren and fellow freemen of england , we have dealt truly and plainly with you , and given you the real grounds and reasons of our taking up arms ; looking upon you as the most concern'd in the nation , and therefore hold our selves the more obliged to give you this early advice of our candid and just intentions in this undertaking , that you may not be deluded or frighted ( though falsly ) into any strange opinion of us , either through your own mistake , or by the pollicy of those men who will leave no means unattempted to render us as publick enemies , rebels and traitors , plunderers , tyrants and persecutors , or whatever is odious and monstrous , to engage you in blood . believe us , right worthy citizens , and free-born english brethren , we have no design of fire or sword , or of evil toward you or your city , or any part of the nation , or any person in it : we know there are thousands amongst you that are satisfied in us ; it may be indeed that many or most of the gathered separate churches may be fearfull and jealous of us , and so may be induced to arms against us ; but we do again and again protest before almighty god , and the whole world , that we have no other purpose towards them , but that they with us , and we with them , may be bound up as friends and brethren in the common cause of our countrey , that every english-man may have english freedom and right ; and we do not desire to wrong man , woman , or childe the worth of a shoo-latchet : therefore we hope you will first well advise before you proceed in a new war , lest you bring not only your own , but others blood on your heads , ( for we are resolved to presecute this to the last drop of our blood . ) the case of england is laid before you , our laws and liberties , they are yours as well as ours , and for which we have all engaged in the first war , and not to be so slightly valued as to be set at stake against the private ends of some ambitious and corrupt persons : salus populi , suprema lex ; let the people live , and their enemies perish . therefore we beseech you , we conjure you as english men , to stand by your native countrey , and your countrey's cause : our voice is , and it is no other than the consent and voice of the people , a new free parliament , a new free parliament ; it is the english man's main birth-right , which we are resolved to put the people in possession of , or to perish with our swords in our hands . but if you will not joyn , but degenerate , we hope notwithstanding ( by gods blessing ) to carry on this work : yet to that just and glorious work we may challenge your concurrence , it being your duty as well as ours to endeavour the procurement thereof ? and therefore to you make it our proposal , to your militia , to the army , and the whole people , for the prevention of a new war , and the effusion of english blood , that you would be instrumental with us for the speedy election of a new free parliament , for the ends aforesaid ; and in the interim all hostility to be forborn ; and that a day may be appointed , and the people suffered to go to their free elections , and we shall quietly submit to their authority ; heartily desiring , that all revenge , division , rancor , and animosity of spirit may be for ever buried in one general act of oblivion ; and that all parties , sects , and sorts , ( now jarring and making up interests one against another ) may reconcile , cement , and concenter in the common brotherhood of english freedom and right ; in , and for which we are . sir george booth to a friend of his in london . sir , my last to you of the second instant , i understand you have committed to open view , the publication whereof was of general satisfaction to your friends here , and for which we all hold our selves obliged . i have sent you here inclosed an express from the knights and gentlemen engaged with me , and beg this further addition to your former many favours , that you would please to take the care upon you , to get the same printed and published , for the undeceiving of those amongst you , and all other that are yet doubtfull or unsatisfied in us . the messenger will inform you of the present state and condition of affairs with us , to whom i refer you . in haste i rest , sir , your most affectionate friend and servant , george booth . manchester aug. 9. 1659. alleyn mayor . at a common-council holden in the guildhall , london , on tuesday the 20. of december , 1659. this court having taken notice of divers affronts put upon the right honorable thomas alleyn , the present lord mayor of this city , with many false and scandalous aspersions cast upon his lordship , and the committee appointed by this court to confer with the lord fleetwood touching the peace and safety of this city : as if they had deserted their trust , or betrayed the rights and liberties of this city . and in particular , that the said committee seemed satisfied with the limitations of parliament , called the seven principles , or unalterable fundamentals , printed in a late scandalous pamphlet stiled , the publick intelligencer . the said committee here openly declaring ; that they never heard the said principles , or had them any way communicated to them , much lesse ever consented to the same , or any of them . this court being deeply sensible of these great indignities , doth declare , that the said lord mayor is so far from deserving any of the said affronts or aspersions , that he hath highly merited the great honour and esteem of this court and the whole city , having in all things demeaned himself with much prudence and faithfull integrity to this city and court , which doth therefore return his lordship their most hearty thanks . and that the said committee in all their transactions , touching the peace and safety of this city , have also discreetly and faithfully discharged their trust , to their own trouble , and great satisfaction of this court . and whereas this court and city hath been lately represented by some , as having deserted their first cause and declarations in the use of all lawfull means for the maintenance of the true reformed protestant religion according to the scriptures ; the support and maintenance of a settled lawfull magistracy , a learned pious ministery , and publick universities , with the ancient fundamental laws of the nation , just rights , properties and liberties of all persons : and for these ends will endeavour , all they lawfully may , the speedy convening of a free parliament to sit and act without interruption or molestation , by any persons whatsoever . sadler . to the right honorable , our worthy and grave senators , the lord mayor , aldermen , and comonalty of the city of london , in common council assembled . the humble petition and address of divers young men , on the behalf of themselves and the apprentices in and about this honorable city . most humbly sheweth , it hath pleased the good and only wise god , for our and the nations crying sins , to manifest his displeasure for many years together against these our flourishing , now sadly divided , distracted and almost ruined nations : and yet blessed be god , this honorable city hitherto hath been no proportionable sharer in the calamities which our brethren in other parts of these now miserable nations have suffered , which are now aggravated by our divisions , and such a general decay of trading , as doth exceed the worst of former times ; all which we look upon as a most sad presage of some art , and dismal judgement very near at hand , if not our sudden ruine ; together with the destruction and utter dissolation both of church and state , which will inevitably ensue as a just reward upon our multiplied provocations , under the most signal manifestations of gods most gracious presence , and the most engaging mercies that ever people did enjoy ( unlesse it please our most gracious god whose name hath been exceedingly dishonored , by the violation of many sacred and solemn oaths ) amongst us to work our deliverance out of this contexture of dangerous mischiefs , into which we have already wound our selvs : or which as the innundations of mighty waters may suddenly break in upon us : and being sadly sensible of the calamities under which the three nations groan , for want of a well-ordered and established government . we being members in the same pollitical body , cannot but sympathize with the rest of our brethren : and forasmuch as our endeavours may contribute very much thereto , and the well or ill management of your talents in the discharge of your trusts may now make these nations happy , or else make them irrecoverably miserable . we hold our selves obliged in conscience to god and our countrey , both by the laws of god and the land , in the behalf of our selves , and all good and peaceable people in the land , and the many thousands that know not their right hand from their left ; and in the behalf of the children unborn , who in time to come may have cause to blesse or curse the day of their birth for your sakes , do make this humble addresse to you , as the only means under god now left us to redresse these growing mischiefs which make us and the three nations in these times of our great trouble cry unto you ( as those of macedonia did in the apostles vision ) come and help us . and we beseech you , our most grave and worthy senators , as you tender the welfare of these bleeding nations , to stand in the wide gap of our breaches , with your prayers , improving your councils , and every talent ( which god hath reposed in you ) for the honour of god , and the peace of his church , by a reall reformation , and we question not but our most gracious god will then break through the thick clouds of these black and dark providences , and return unto us our judges as at the first , and our counselors as at the beginning , with the abundance of the blessings of peace , that judgement may run down our streets , and righteousness as a mighty stream . and we humbly desire the two great pillars of the land , magistracy and ministry may be asserted and encouraged : in order unto which , we humbly present unto your grave and serious consideracions . first , the priviledges of the gospel which we do enjoy at this day , in the faithfull preaching and dispensing of gods holy word and sacraments , together with the labours of so many of his faithfull servants in the ministry , and the liberty of these sacred ordinances , being the best and choicest of our national blessings ; in respect of which , we may well say ( with holy david ) god hath not dealt so with any nation : which with thankfulnesse we desire to ackowledge as a great mercy to this land : and should the lord remove this candlestick out of its place , as we have just cause to fear he will , unlesse we do repent ) then may we indeed complain with phineas his wife , the glory is departed from our israel , and a dark and dismal night of black and gloomy ignorance , error and prophanenesse will envelope our valley of vision . and to the end that this choice blessing ( which we account more precious than our lives ) may be conveyed to posterity , we most humbly desire the ministry may be countenanced and encouraged , the universities upheld and maintained , which have nursed many famous preachers for piety and learning in this and former ages , and your authority used for the terror of evil doers , but the praise of them that do well . secondly we esteem and assert , as our undoubted birth-right , the freedom and priviledges of our parliaments , as being the great charter of the people of england , which we account equally dear with our lives ; in the enjoyment of which we yet hope , under god , to see a happy and lasting settlement both in church and scate . therefore we most humbly desire , that a new election may be made , or else that those worthy gentlemen chosen to serve as members in the late free parliament , may be restored to their priviledges , and sit without disturbance or force from the army , that they may consider in this evil time , what england , scotland , and ireland ought to do , which ( with submission to your grave judgements ) we humbly conceive to be the most probable means under god to establish the true protestant religion , reform the laws , secure our liberties and preserve our lives and outward concernments , to promote learning end encourage vertue , whereby peace with our neighbour nations may be renewed and established , the army satisfied , their arrears paid , and trading restored . in all which , most grave and worthy senators , your own concernments ( as well as ours ) are so deeply engaged , that we perswade our selves you will be instumental to further our desires , by all peaceable and lawfull means , and we hope it will put an end to our divisions , which ( if god in mercy prevent not ) may soon break out into another civil war , and render us as a prey to a forreign enemy , for a kingdom divided against it self cannot stand . now we leave it unto you our most grave and worthy senators , duly to consider , if you part with these our great national blessings , whether you will not discover a palpable breach of trust , and leave your names for a reproach to the generations following , who will in the ages to come rise up and call you blessed , if you be carefull to preserve them now , and convey them to posterity : and now we beseech the lord to strengthen both your hearts and hands , and give you wisdom from on high to direct you in all your consultations , as may be most for the honour of god , the peace of his church throughout the world , and the settlement , safety and happinesse of these poor nations : and by his assistance we resolve to stand by you and with you , to the utmost hazzard of our lives and all that is deare unto us , to promote the same . munday 5. december . this day the lord mayor , aldermen , and common council being assembled , the fore-recited pitition was presented by several young-men and apprentices , in behalfe of themselves and several thousands which have subscribed the same ; the which being received , was ordered to be read , and thereupon a committee chosen to consider thereof , and to give their speedy report unto the next court concerning the same . at the same court it was likewise ordered , that the lord general fleetwood should be desired to draw off the soldiers , unto their several quarters ; it being then also ordered , that every common council man in his several precinct , should give notice to the house-keepers within the same , that they should keep their servants and apprentices at home , thereby to preserve the peace of the city . to his excellency the lord general monck . the vnanimous representation of the apprentices and young-men inhabiting in the city of london . humbly sheweth , that the glory of our nation , and the greatest comfort of our lives in our civil interests , consists in the priviledges and liberties to which we were born , and which are the undoubted inheritance of all the free people of england , among which the grand and essential priviledges which discriminates free-men from slaves , is the interest which every man hath in the legislative power of the nation , by their representatives assembled in parliament : without which , however we may flatter our selves , or be flatter'd by others , we are truly no better than vassals govern'd by the will and pleasure of those who have no relation to us , or our common interest . now how much this dear priviledge of the people hath been assaulted by the open violence of some , and secret artifice of others , and to what a deplorable condition we are brought at this present period , when heavy taxes are imposing upon mens estates , and new laws upon our persons , without any consent of the people had in a free parliament , and how generally , through the said distractions in government , trading is decayed , and how much we are likely to suffer thereby in our times and places , we cannot but remonstrate to your excellency , constrain'd through the sense of our present sufferings , and apprehensions of greater , to implore your assistance , most humbly beseeching your excellency , by that ancient love you have born to your native countrey , zeal to our liberties , by that great renown you have lately gain'd in opposing the cruel raging of the sword , by the common cries of the people , and by the hopes and cheerful expectation of all england now fix'd upon you ; and lastly , by your own personal concern in the same common cause as a free-born english man , that you would be pleased to use those great advantages divine providence hath now put into your hands , to the securing your native countrey from those dangerous usurpations , and preserving us in those liberties to which we were born . that no tax may be imposed , nor new law made , nor old abolisht , but with the consents of the people had by their representatives in parliament , freely to be chosen without terror or limitations , and freely to sit without any oath or engagement previous to their entrance , without which special liberties the parliament cannot in any construction be esteemed the free assembly of the people ; and by your excellency's asserting of those our undoubted rights in your present advantages , you will certainly , by the blessing of god , and unanimous concurrence of the people , accomplish our ends , and will thereby gain the hearts and hands of the whole nation , and the city in particular , and purchase to your self a name that shall make every true english man call you blessed , and posterity shall hereafter delight to recount the famous acts of their worthy patriot . this was delivered to his excellency at s. albans , on thursday febr. 2. 1659. by persons elected for that purpose , and had a very cheerfull reception . the declaration of the nobility , gentry , ministry , and commonalty of the county of kent . together with the city and county of canterbury , the city of rochester , and the ports within the said county . having with sadnesse weighed the multiplied calamities wherein we are at present involved , how friendlesse we are abroad , and how divided at home ; the loud and heart-piercing cries of the poor , and the disability of the better sort to relieve them ; the total decay and subversion of trade , together with the forfeiture and losse of the honour and reputation of the nation ( what is more dear to us than all these ) the apparent hazzard of the gospel , through the prodigious growth of blasphemies , heresies and schism , all which own their birth to the instability of our governors , and the unsettlement of our government . lastly , how in all these an universal ruine threatneth us , and will ( if not timely prevented ) doubtlesse overwhelm us . we thought it our bounden duties , both as christians , out of tendernesse to our religion ; as english men , to our countrey ; and as friends , to our selves and our relations , to represent and publish to the world our just griefs for , and our lively resentments of this our deplorable condition , and to seek all lawfull and probable means to remedy and redresse the same . wherefore having the leading examples of the renowned cities of london and exeter , together with the counties of the west , before our eyes ; and the clamors and out-cries of the people always in our ears , ( whereof the one encourageth , and the other enforceth us to this our declaration ) we thought that we would not be silent at such a time , when our silence would speak us to be assentors to our own ruine , or abettors of such proceedings as have neither law nor equity to support them . we therefore the nobility , gentry , ministry , and commonalty of the county of kent , together with the city and county of canterbury , the city of rochester , and the ports within the said county , do by these presents unanimously declare , that our desires are for a full and free parliament , as the only probable means , under god , to lead us out of this maze and labyrinth of confusions in which we are at present engag'd ; that is , that the old secluded members , so many of them as are surviving , may be re-admitted into the house , and that there may be a free election of others to supply the places of those who are dead , without any oath or engagement previous to their entrance ; these we shall own as the true representatives of the people ; these we shall with our lives and fortunes , to the uttermost of our power , assist , and with all cheerfulnesse submit to , and acquiesce in whatsoever they shall enact or ordain . thus concluding , that all publick spirited men , and good patriots , will with all readinesse joyn and concur with us in a matter of so universal concernment , and that we shall finde opposition from none , but such as prefer their own private interests , and temporal respects , to their religion , and laws of the land ; we shall as bodily subscribe our names , as we do heartily declare our desires . advertisement . the forward zeal of some wel-disposed persons , to expresse their cordial and unanimous concurrence with their countrey-men of the several counties and cities of england , having caused a declaration , imperfect in a very weighty and material clause thereof , to be printed and published , in the name of the county of kent , &c. it was thought fit that the genuine and true copy of the said declaration should be set forth , as it was intended to be presented to the speaker , and to the present great arbitrator of the nations peace and happinesse , general monck ; but through the mis-informations of some unquiet spirits , ( who while they may have leave to accuse , will leave no man innocent , nor the state without trouble ) the persons of many gentlemen are secured , and others threatned , by a great force march'd into the countrey , the presentation was necessarily omitted , and the names and subscriptions not exposed to publick view , for reasons very obvious and evident . a narrative of the meeting of some gentlemen , ministers and citizens at the town-hall in canterbury . together with their declaration presented to the mayor at the common burghmoote . understanding that the late procedure of some of the principal gentlemen and citizens , inhabitants of the city of canterbury hath been represented above as a malignant design , tending to tumult and sedition ; we thought fit to publish to the world a brief narrative of the same , together with the declaration it self , that both the one and the other being cleared from the malicious aspersions and calumnies of our adversaries ; the whole nation may judge between them and us , and so give sentence according to the merit of the cause . whereas some peaceable and well-minded gentlemen with some godly and sober ministers , perceiving the people generally bent for a free parliament ( as in the following declaration is expressed ) and hearing that the cities of london and exeter had lately declared for the same , thought it neither unmeet to follow so leading presidents , not unseasonable to joyn their votes with the general desires of the whole nation ; to which end it was resolved to present this following draught to the common burghmoote , and to desire their concurrence therein . thus in an orderly manner , without tumult or noise , without arms in their hands or thoughts , or without anger or threats in their looks ; divers gentlemen , ministers and citizens went to the town-hall on jan. 24. the mayor , aldermen and common councel then sitting , and presented the declaration at the door , desiring that after a serious perusal thereof , they would be pleased to joyn with them , in a business which they judged agreeable , not only to the sense of that court , but also of the whole county and nation : but when it was mentioned to be put to the vote , whether the paper should be read or not ; some of the bench protested against it , although they knew nothing of its contents ; and in conclusion ( having a long time rather wrangled than debated ) the dissenters ( being but seven of twenty four ) quitted the court , not leaving enough to make a burghmoote quorum ; whereupon , the gentlemen ( who though rudely treated , had quietly attended ) withdrew re infecta , and returned home with as little tumult as at first they came : thus was there nothing done to surprise or disturb the court , nothing to raise a tumult , nothing to cause a second kentish insurrection , as our adversaries give it out : no , the design was not arms , but peace ; not tumult , but settlement ; not to surprize and disturb the court , but to desire an amiable correspondence with the same , to the end that the intended declaration might be made the more authentick by the formal intervention and assent in open court , of the magistracy of so considerable a corporation ; and that the declarers themselves might not be thought to tread in any oblique paths , or to proceed in a clandestine manner : but being disappointed ( as you see ) , herein , it was thought fit to strengthen and confirm our declaration , and to make good the title it bears , by private subscriptions , as well through the whole county as this city ; wherein we had , in three dayes time , proceeded so far , that many thousands were then collected ; whereupon , some gentlemen ( from the slie insinuations and false representations of our aversaries ) were secured in several prisons , to the discouragement of well-begun , and well-meant undertaking ; neither can the gentlemen understand wherein they have offended , or how they should merit imprisonment , since there was no order , nor prohibition to the contrary : although they conceive , that had they proceeded therein , they had not trangressed any known laws of the land ; it being the subjects birth-right modestly to represent their grievances by way of petition , remonstrance or declaration . wherefore lest ( through our silence , and the present suppression of our declaration ) the aspersions of our adversaries might be thought deservedly cast upon us ; we thought fit to publish the same , together with this narrative , deeming that as we have done nothing herein worthy the present severity , so the impartial reader will in his private judgement , absolve us from all guilt or demerit . neither shall we answer our adversaries by way of recrimination , nor ( although we can by undoubted testimonies sufficiently prove it ) say , that the same men who now appear so zealous assertors of the parliaments interests and proceedings , did as eagerly joyn with the army , crying them up as much , with whom they would live and dye , as they decryed this present power in their late interruption , as not consisting with the interest of the nation . no , though this might serve to invalidate their testimony , we shall enlarge no further , but refer to the declaration it self . to the right honourable will lenthal speaker to the parliament . by him to be communicated to the members sitting at westminster . whereas we the gentlemen and freeholders of this county of berks , were generally met together at abingdon , upon some intimation of an election of a knight of the shire , in pursuance of your order , for the filling up of this parliament ; and that some solicitations were used throughout the county for voyces , and being jealous to be surprised therein by any clandestine carriage of the writ : and whereas at this meeting it was further taken into consideration , that this county have with the rest of this nation been deeply sensible of many insupportable grievances and oppressions of late dayes , occasioned through the want of a real , setled , and regular government ; and in particular , that the commissioners for the militia having formerly charged the country to provide arms , which was done accordingly , the said commissiooners do yet direct their warrants for the bringing in of twenty shillings for every foot arms ; which we are very confident is besides the intent of the act which impowers them , and are ignorant otherwise by what authority they proceed therein ; that therefore having seriously consulted the remedies which might be proper for these and the like inconveniences for the future , and by gods blessing reduce us unto a firm , free , and legal settlement of our rights , civil and religious : wee conceived it to be our duty towards god and our country , without any private ends whatsoever , to declare our selves in this sense , that we take it the most satisfactory expedient for it , will be the recalling of all those members that were secluded in 1648. and that before the first force upon the parliament . and , that in the elections which shall bee of any other members in the vacant places , such due course may be taken , as that the country may not any way be surprised , or over-awed therein : and that the secluded members may be admitted to sit without any oath or engagement to restrain their freedome in the least ; wherein we shall be ready to defend you and them with whatsoever is dearest unto us , against all opposition : and pray unto almighty god for his assistance to the happy accomplishment of what may best conduce to the peace and safety of this nation . [ this is subscribed by most of the chief gentlemen and freeholders of the county of berks. ] a concurrent declaration of the inhabitants of the city and liberties of westminster : with the declaration of the people of england for a free parliament . whereas by a wonderful revolution of the divine providence , those members of the long parliament which were strangely brought in by the army ( may the 7. 1659. ) and as strangely outed by them ( octob. the 13. 1659. ) are now strangely returned to sit in the house as before , we judge it our concernment to call to minde the act by them made and published , immediately before their forcible interruption , intituled , an act against raising of money upon the people out their consent in parliament : which act of theirs proceeds in these words , and be it further enacted , that no person or persons shall after the 11. of october , 1659. assess , levy , collect , gather or receive any custome , imposts , excise , assesment , contribution , tax , tallage , or any sum or sums of money , or other impositions whatsoever , upon the people of this commonwealth , without their consent in parliament , or as by law might have been done before the 3. of november , 1640. and be it further enacted and declared , that every person offending against this act shall be , and is hereby adjudged to be guilty of high treason , and shall forfeit and suffer as in case of high treason . hereupon we judged it meet and equitable to make this following declaration . we do therefore declare that we do freely , cordially , and unanimously assent to the equity of this act , as consonant to the fundamental laws of our nation , the benefit whereof we doubt not but we may justly claim , as our birth-priviledge in all such cases and concernments . and accordingly we do declare that we are ready and willing , as soon as an opportunity is given us , to make choice of such persons as may declare our consent in parliament , for the raising of such sums of money , as by them shall be thought necessary to defray the publick charges , and manage the publick concerns of the nation , seeing most of those persons that were formerly chosen by us for this purpose , are either taken away by death , or by seclusion debarred from sitting in the house . and we do hereby declare further , that we neither do , nor shall ever give our consent , that any assesment should be made , or imposition laid upon us by any person or persons whatsoever , until our consent be so declared by persons thus chosen and intrusted by us for this end and purpose . and therefore if any person or persons whatsoever shall contrary to the forementioned act , and the fundamental laws of this nation , lay any assesment or imposition upon us before our consent is thus declared , under what pretence or colour soever of authority or necessity it shall be done , we do hereby declare to the world , that we are under manifest constraint and force , and our goods and estates are violently extorted from us , contrary to law and justice , which injuries we shall no longer bear than an opportunity shall be offered us to right our selves , and repossess those priviledges that pertain to us by the laws of our nation . and hereunto so universal and unanimous is our concurrence , that it would be endless for us to subscribe our names ( which neither this , nor any such papers could contain ) but yet if any doubt or mistrust of the truth of the matter hereby declared should be conceived or pretended by any , and the members of parliament now ( whom we conceive it doth in a special manner concern ) shall desire a visible testimony hereunto , for their further satisfaction and more full assurance of the truth and realty hereof , we shall be ready upon the least intimation thereof by them given us , in the several cities and counties of the land , to own and subscribe to what is hereby declared , and act accordingly . for some proof of the premises , we the inhabitants of the city and liberty of westminster , capable of the choice of two burgesses to serve in parliament , have to this present delaration subscribed our hands , and so much the rather that we might hereby take occasion to signifie to the whole nation our cordial concurrence with the common councel of london , in what was done by that honourable court , in the behalf of the city of london in their declaration of 20. decemb. for a free parliament . the humble desires of the kinghts , gentlemen , ministers , freeholders and inhabitants of the county and burrough of leicester . delivered to his excellency , the lord general monk , at st. albans the thirtieth of january , 1659. by george fawnt esquire , high sheriffe of the said county , willam boothby , richard orton , and richard halford esquires , entrusted for that purpose by the whole county . we the knights , gentlemen , ministers , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of leicester , humbly conceiving , that the first force put upon the parliament , hath been an encouragement and occasion to all the rest : and finding that your excellency ( under god ) hath been the principal means , for repairing the last interruption , are the more encouraged to desire your assistance , in the promoting of these our just desires as a visible means of an happy peace and settlement of these nations . and whereas every free-born person of england is supposed to be present in parliament , by the knights and burgesses of the place where he liveth , and thereby is presumed to give his consent in all things that pass in parliament ; there is not ( as we are credibly informed ) one knight for all the counties in wales , nor for divers counties in england , and some of them the greatest in england , as that of yorkshire . we therefore desire , that all vacant places be supplied , whether they became vacant by death , or judgment of parliament : and that those that were secluded by force in the year 1648. may sit again . and that no previous oath or engagement be put upon any , that is chosen by his countrey to sit and vote freely in parliament . that the fundamental laws of england , the priviledges of parliament , the liberties of the people , and the property of goods , may be asserted and defended , according to the first declaration of parliament , when they undertook the war ; and no taxes or free-quarter imposed upon any , without authority of parliament . that the true protestant religion may be professed and defended , all heresies , sects and schisms discountenanced and suppressed ; a lawfull succession of godly and able ministers continued and encouraged ; and the two universities , and all colledges in both of them , preserved and countenanced . that a fitting and speedy course be taken , for the paying and discharging the arrears of such officers and soldiers as submit to authority of parliament , and that they may be speedily reduced to a lesser number , for the easing of the great taxes and burthens of these nations . the humble address , and hearty desires of the gentlemen , ministers , and free-holders of the county of northampton . presented to his excellency the lord general monck , at his arrival at northampton , january 24. 1659. we the gentlemen , ministers , and free-holders of the county of northampton , humbly conceiving , that the first force put upon the parliament hath been an encouragement to open the way to all the rest ; and finding that your excellency under god hath been the principal means for the repairing of the last interruption , are the more encouraged , and ( having the conveniency of your presence now amongst us ) to desire your assistance in the procuring these our just desires , as the visible means of a happy peace and settlement of these nations . 1. that whereas every free-born subject of england is supposed to be present in parliament by the knights and burgesses of the place where he liveth , and thereby is presumed to consent to all things that passe in parliament : so it is now , that there is not one knight for all the counties in wales , nor for divers counties in england , and some of them the largest in england , as that of yorkeshire . 2. that no free-born subject of england may have any taxes levied upon him , without his consent in parliament . 3. to that end , that all vacant places may be supplied , whether they became vacant by death or seclusion ; and that those that were secluded by force in the year 1648 may sit again ; and that no previous oath or engagement may be put upon any that is chosen by his countrey to sit and vote freely in parliament . 4. that the fundamental lawes of england , the priviledges of parliament , the liberty of the subject , and the property of goods , may be asserted and defended , according to the first declarations of the parliament , when they undertook the war . 5. that the true protestant religion may be professed and defended , all heresies , sects and schisms discountenanced and suppressed , a lawfull succession of godly and able ministers continued and incouraged , and the two universities , and all colledges in both of them , may be preserved and countenanced . 6. that all the soldiery that will acquiesce in the judgment of a free and full parliament , in the promoting and setling a happy peace upon those foundations , may have their arrears paid , and as many of them as the parliament shall think necessary , may be continued in the publick service ; and that as many of them as have been purchasers of lands from the parliament , may either enjoy their bargains , or their money paid back with interest , and some considerable advantage over and above , for their satisfactions , as the parliament shall judge expedient for the publick good of the nation . this address was prepared by the gentlemen , &c. abovesaid , to be presented to general monck , at his entrance into northampton . to his excellency the lord general monck . the congratulation and addresse of us the knights , divines , free-holders , and others of the county of bucks. humbly sheweth , that with all possible gratitude we admire the wise and gracious dispensation of things by almighty god , who hath moved your self , and other the worthy officers with you to such just and honorable resolutions , as to put your selves into the breach then , when tyranny , irreligion , and all confusion , like a mighty flood were ready to break in upon us . an occasion in which , whether the noblenesse of the attempts , or the happinesse of the successe were more considerable , after times will take pleasure to discourse : and we at present congratulate these your sentiments of honour and conscience . sir , our credit abroad is impaired , our trade at home is decayed , our fundamental laws are violated , our primitive apostolick religion endangered : the cause of all which we humbly conceive is the force and violence put upon the parliament in the year 1648. and since to obviate all which evils we request the total removal of that force , and that all surviving members so secluded , be restored to the discharge of their trust vacancies be supplied by free elections according to law , that no previous oaths or engagements be put upon any of them that shall be chosen to sit and vote in parliament . sir , this is our desire , and as we observe 't is the voice of the whole people , and that is the voice of god ; we doubt not but that you have been reserved for such a time as this : in pursuance of which we are ready to hazard our lives and estates . a declaration of the city and county of gloucester . being deeply affected , and most sadly sensible of the present miseries , which both our selves and the whole nation lie under : we cannot be altogether silent in the expressions of our griefs , and declaration of our desires and thoughts of the most probable means ( by gods assistance ) to give some remedy to our present sufferings , and prevention of our yet greater calamities , which threaten our speedy ruine : the cause of all proceeding ( as we conceive ) is from that unhappy disorder in that great wheel of government . and that after all our great sufferings and trials , the vast expence of treasure and blood for our rights , liberties , and priviledges of parliament , ( which we take to be the good old cause ) such persons in whom we have already lodged our trusts , and who have sufficiently manifested their endeavours to perform the same , namely , nathaniel stephens , esq sir john seymore , kt. edward steephens , esq john steephens , esq and the right honorable thomas lord fairfax , have been since december 1648. and still are denied the freedom of sitting , and voting in parliament . the restauration of which members we desire with all freedom to their former capacities . and declare we shall not otherwise consent to pay tax , or other impositions , or hold our selves bound by any law to be made , without a restitution of these our representatives , with a supply of all vacancies , by a free election , according to the fundamental laws and constitutions of this nation , it being the undoubted birth-right of all the free-born people of england , that no tax or other imposition be exacted from them , or any new law imposed upon them , but by their consents had by their representatives , in a full and free parliament . and we further declare our hearty desires , for the burying all former animosities and differences , by a full and general act of oblivion and indempnity , with satisfaction to be given to purchasers , under any act of sale ; as by parliament shall be thought fit . and that no officer or soldier , that hath ventured his life for the freedom of his countrey , and shall continue faithfull to those principles , may hereby receive any discouragement . we also declare , that we shall freely and willingly consent , that all such shall receive their arrears , and be continued so long as the parliament shall think fit , in order to the safety and preservation of the nation , and that such liberty be allowed to tender consciences , as is not opposite to the scriptures , or the established laws of this nation . we also declare , that in pursuance of these our just desires , we shall not be wanting to the uttermost of our powers , to engage our selves by all lawful ways and means , with our fellow brethren , in the just vindication of our liberties , and shall neither count our lives or fortunes too dear to hazard for the redemption thereof , and herein we shall not doubt the ready concurrence of all those in the three nations , whose peace , prosperity and safety is equally concerned with ours . this declaration being subscribed by great numbers of considerable persons of that county , was to have been presented to the speaker by some of them ; but considering how sir robert pye , and major finchers handsome behaviour was unhandsomly rewarded with imprisonment , for a particular of the same nature , it was thought more proper to preserve the liberty of personages of so much worth til a better opportunity , and therefore it is thought fit thus to communicate this , for the vindication of this county and satisfaction of the whole nation . the remonstrance of the knights , gentlemen , and freeholders of the county of gloucester . we do claim and avow it to be our undoubted birth-right and liberty , that no new laws , much lesse any new government , can or ought to be imposed upon us ; nor any taxes , contributions , or free-quarter taken of us without the consent of the people of this nation in a free-parliament assembled ; which liberties have been often confirmed to us by the great charter , the petition of right , and many other statutes : and parliaments being the only bulwarks and defence of our liberties , as men and christians ought to be , freely elected , and to sit and vote without interruption or opposition by any persons whatsoever : the priviledges whereof we are all bound to maintain and defend , and to assist and maintain each other in the defence thereof . and therefore we resolve , according to our bounden duty , to joyn with the lord mayor and common-councel of the city of london , and all other counties in england in pursuance thereof . and we do not doubt but all true hearted english men who love their own liberties , and are not willing to be made slaves , or to enslave their brethren , will joyn with us herein . a letter agreed unto and subscribed by the gentlemen , ministers , free-holders and sea-men of the county of suffolk . presented to the right honorable , the lord mayor , aldermen , and common-councel of the city of london , assembled january 30. 1659. right honorable , please you to accept this paper as a testimony , that we are highly and gratefully sensible of those breathings and essayes towards peace , which your renowned city hath lately declared to the world : as we earnestly wish , that our serious and unanimous concurrence may ripen them to a perfect accomplishment . we are willing to consider it as an omen of mercy , when we observe the nation in general , lifting up its vows to heaven for a free and full parliament ; 't is that alone in its genuine sense which our laws prescribe and present to us , as the great patron and guardian of our persons , liberties , and properties , and whatsoever else is justly precious to us . and if god shall by your hand , lead us to such an obtainment , after-ages shall blesse your memory . 't is superfluous to spread before you , your merchandise decay'd , your trade declin'd , your estates wither'd . are there not many within your walls , or near them , that in your ears deplore such miseries as ehese ? your lordship may believe , that our prayers and persons shall gladly promote all lawfull means for our recovery . and we entreat , that this cheerful suffrage of ours may be annex'd as a label to your honorable intendments . this letter was delivered according to its superscription , by robert broke , philip parker , and thomas bacon , esquires . the declaration of the gentry of the county of norfolk , and of the county and city of norwich . we the gentry of the county of norfolke , and county and city of norwich , being deeply affected with the sense of our sad distractions and divisions , both in church and state , and wearied with the miseries of an unnatural civil war , the too frequent interruptions of government , the imposition of several heavy taxes , and the loud out-cries of multitudes of undone , and almost famished people , occasioned by the general decay of trade , which hath spread it self throughout the whole nation , and these counties in particular ; and having met together , and consulted what may best remedy , and remove our , and the nations present grievances and distractions , do humbly conceive , that the chief expedient will be , the recalling of those members that were secluded in 1648 , and sate before the force put upon the parliament , ( we of the county of norfolk ) being by such seclusion , deprived of any person to represent us in parliament ) and also by filling up the vacant places thereof , and all to be admitted without any oath or engagement , previous to their entrance ; which being done , we shall be ready to acquiesce , and submit in all things , to the judgement and authority of parliament , without which authority , the people of england cannot be obliged to pay any taxes . this declaration , subscribed by three hundred gentlemen , was delivered to the honourable will . lenthall , speaker of the parliament , on saturday the 28. of jan. 1659. by the lord richardson , sir john hobart , and sir horatio tounsend , baronets . a declaration of the gentry of the county of devon , met at the general quarter sessions at exeter , for a free parliament : together with a letter from exeter . to the right honourable william lenthall speaker of the parliament . we the gentry of the county of devon , finding our selves without a regular government , after your last interruption designed a publick meeting , to consult remedies , which we could not so conveniently effect till this week , at our general quarter sessions at exon : where we finde divers of the inhabitants groaning under high oppressions , and a general defect of trade , to the utter ruine of many , and fear of the like to others , which is as visible in the whole county , that occasioned such disorders , that were no small trouble and disturbance to us ; which , by gods blessing upon our endeavours , were soon supprest and quieted , without blood . and though we finde , since our first purposes , an alteration in the state of affairs , by your re-assembling at the helm of government , yet conceive , that we are but in part redrest of our grievances ; and that the chief expedient for it will be the recalling of all those members that were secluded in 1648. and sate before the first force upon the parliament . and also by filling up the vacant places . and all to be admitted , without any oath and engagement , previous to their entrance . for which things , if you please to take a speedy course , we shall defend you against all opposers , and future interrupters , with our lives and fortunes . for the accomplishment whereof , we shall use all lawful means , which we humbly conceive may best conduce to the peace and safety of this nation . exon 14. of jan. 1659. sir , the inclosed copy of what this grand meeting , to which the most considerable of the gentry have subscribed . mr. bampfield , recorder of exon , is gone this night post to deliver it to the speaker . that the cornish men have done more , is no news . this city in very great numbers , lordly exprest their desires for a free parliament . the apprentices and young men of the city , got the keys of the gates , and keep them lockt , without taking notice of the magistrates , and less of the souldiers . a letter and declaration of the lords , knights , gentlemen , and ministers of the county of york , and of the lord mayor , aldermen and common-councel of the gity of york . presented to general monck feb. 17. 1659. at his quarters at drapers-hall london , by sir thomas wharton knight , brother to the lord wharton , john dawney , thomas harrison , and john legard esquires . as also a letter , with the said declaration inclosed , delivered by the said gentlemen to the lord mayor directed to him , and to the common-councel of the city of london . to his excellency the lord general monck . my lord , we finde our selves constrained by writing to supply the omission of acquainting your lordship with our thoughts and desires when you passed through our county , which we had then done , if upon so short notice we could have met for a mutual vnderstanding ; your lordship will finde in the inclosed declaration the sum of our apprehensions . we thought it not necessary to multiply particulars , but leave all other things to a duly constituted parliament ; neither have we been sollicitous to multiply subscriptions , trusting more to the weight of the proposals , than to the number of subscribers ; yet we may safely affirm this to be the sense of the generality of the county and city , as your lordship sees it is of others . we have onely to add our earnest desires to your lordship , that you would be pleased to further the accomplishment of what we have represented with such seasonable speed , as that the fear of friends , and the hopes of enemies concerning a dangerous confusion amongst us , may be prevented . your lordships very humble servants , thomas fairfax , faulconberge , bar. bouchier , vicecomes . christopher topham , mayor , &c. the declaration . we being deeply sensible of the grievous pressures under which we lye , and the extream dangers we are exposed to at this time , through the violent alteration of our government , the mutilation and interruption of parliaments : and having no representatives to express or remedy our grievances , have thought it meet ( according to the example of other counties ) to declare and desire , that if the parliament begun november 3. 1640. be yet continued , the members that were secluded in the year 1648. be forthwith restored to the exercise of their trust , and all vacancies filled up , that right may be done to their persons , to parliaments , and the people that have chosen them . if otherwise , that a parliament may be presently called without imposing of oaths or engagements ( the greatest prejudice to civil or christian liberty ) or requiring any quallifications , save what by law or ordinance of parliament before the force in 1648. are already established . and untill this , or one of these be done , we cannot hold our selves obliged to pay the taxes that are or shall be imposed . we not enjoying the fundamental right of this nation to consent to our own laws by equal representatives . subscribed by esquires thomas lord fairfax , tho. lord viscount fauconberge , barrington bourchier esq . high sheriff , christ . topham , mayor , sir thomas wharton , knight of the bath . sir christ . wivel bar. sir john hotham , bar. sir tho slingsby , bar. sir wil. cholmly , bar. sir fran. boynton , bar. sir roger langly , bar. sir hen. cholmly , kt. sir tho. remington , kt. john dawney , henry fairfax , tho. harrison , john legard , william fairfax , william gee , william osbalston , robert wivel , thomas hutton , gustavus boynton , henry bethel , metcalf robinson , henry stapleton , george marwood , robert redman , william adams , col. lancelot parsons william daulton , james moyser , robert belt , henry marwood , john vavasour , john gibson , john micklethwait , bryan fairfax , bryan layton , thomas lovel , wil. rooksby , capt. nicholas bethel , john jackson , thomas yarborough , walter bethel , john riccard , john adams , richard levie , cregory crake , james driffeild , &c. ministers . mr. edward bowles , mr. nath. jackson , mr. witton , mr. waterhouse , mr. bentley , mr. nasebit , &c. the said declaration was also subscribed by the aldermen and common-councel of the city of york . to the right honourable , the lord mayor and common-councel of the city of london . my lord and gentlemen , having taken notice of some vigorous inclinations of your lordship and the city , towards the asserting your common freedomes as english men , too much of late violated , and being now also our selves constrained , from a like sense , to manifest our resolutions to the same effect , in a declaration sent to general monke , whereof the inclosed is a copy ; we have thought good to give your lordship an account of our intentions , as that to which we are most firmly resolved to adhere , wishing it may effect the end by our selves , and ( as we are perswaded ) by your lordship , and all good people of that city intended . we remain , york feb. 10. 1659. your lordship 's very humble servants , thomas fairfax faulconberge , bar. bouchier , vicecomes . christopher topham , mayor , &c. which letter , with the declaration therein inclosed , was also the same day delivered by sir thomas wharton , and the rest of the said gentlemen , to the lord mayor of london , desiring it might be communicated to the common-councel , according as by the letter it was desired . the same day also a particular letter was presented to the lord general monke from the lord fairfax , dated feb. 14. in confirmation of the said declaration , which was delivered by mr. bryan fairfax , who was sent up on purpose with the said letter . the declaration of the gentry , ministers , free-holders of the county and city of lincolne . we the gentry , ministers , and free-holders of the county and city of lincolne , being truly sensible of our miseries and grievances , namely the sad consequents of intestine war , the fear of invasion from abroad , at this time of our distractions and divisions both in church and state , the violent alteration of government , the heavy imposition of unheard of taxes ; all which of late years hath ruined our trade , and impoverished the whole nation , and are all occasioned by reason of the many violences and breaches made upon our known established laws and fundamental liberties , do therefore humbly propose and declare ( having first met and consulted , as other countries have done ) that the onely remedy for our said grievances , will be for a free , full parliament , speedily to be called and assembled , to sit according to our said known established laws , wherein the free votes of all free people of this nation might be included , since that such onely have a legal capacity to enact laws and statutes that may equally binde all the free people of this nation ; and therefore if any persons ( how ever impowred ) not having the authority of such a parliament , shall take upon them to lay impositions upon the free people of this commonwealth , or to prescribe or enjoyn any limitations , restrictions , or quallifications whatsoever , not formerly agreed upon in full parliament . we do declare our selves not obliged thereto , as being destructive to the freedome and undoubted priviledges of parliament . a declaration of all the watermen in about the city of london , between gravesend and stanes . or , a hue and cry after col. whitton and his decoys . whereas it hath been seemingly by the insinuatious of some few of us , cast on our whole company , that we would lay our shoulders , and stretch out our helping hands , for the upholding of something , which to our selves is both unknown and uncertain , and may likewise in probability be a cause of disturbance , if not breaking the peace of the nation : we , to manifest our innocency in the one particular , and vindicate our selves from the scandal thereof , as also to shew our real and hearty concordance with all other , noblemen , gentlemen , citizens and others , of the several counties of england , whose declarations are exposed to the publick view , doe cordially , unanimously , and freely declare . that the list annexed of our names to a petition pretended by our consent to be presented to the members sitting at westminster , is not at all by us owned , neither doe we know any other authors or abettors thereof , than some few here under-mentioned our names in truth being gained by colonol whitton , under the pretence to put down hackny coachmen ; but by him converted to another use , and that so contrary to our thoughts and intentions , that we would sooner have quitted our nearest relations , than have consented to such ebulliences . for the undeceiving therefore of the gentry of this nation , to whom many , yea , most of us are obliged , and consequently not unknown ; for the rectifying the judgments of such as know us not , and for the satisfaction of the whole free-born subjects of england who with us claim a birth-right in magna charta , and the petition of right , we doe further , with one consent , declare . that we conceive it fitting , for the redressing the grievous wants and pressures that lie upon all the good people of this nation , that according to fundamental right , the people in parliament may have their representatives , who may receive their grievances , and present them in their behalf , whereby to obtain a remedy . and because faction and schism hath already too great a root , that honest and prudential men may be elected , whose estates ( as to temporals ) and religion ( as to spirituals ) may oblige them sincerely to endeavour a settlement both in church and state . the onely meanes for attaining of which ends , we conceive by the blessing of god , to be a full and free parliament , which as we know the nation groans for , so we cordially desire , and we shall not acquiesce , till we have regained that our undoubted right , hitherto unquestioned priviledge , and never to be denied lawful demand . in the defence whereof we shall account nothing too dear to lose , being ready to quit not onely our employments , but to lay aside our relations , and lay our lives at stake . this representation is owned by ten thousand of us ( which if desired ) shall be acknowledged both with our hands and hearts , against all the malicious underminings of col. whitton the painter , and his decoys : who upon the tendring that forged petition to the watermens hall , being conscious that the rankness of the trepan would be presently sented , addrest themselves to mr. pryn , to en their protest against it , their names are hereunto annexed . viz. wil. lemond . josias smith . wil. crop. wil. goodale . thomas slator . tho. wasborn . john howard . wil. bugby . robert crop. tho. vincent . john foster . john lee . wil. sound . jacob meade . wil. clerk . martin craul . roger phillips . fran. borrick . richard thusee . wil. butler . the remonstrance of the noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , free-holders , citizens , burgesses , & commons of the late eastern , southern , & western associations , who desire to shew themselves faithful and constant to the good old cause , the priviledges and freedom of parliament , the liberty and property of the subjects , laws of the land , and true reformed religion , which they were formerly called forth and engaged to defend by declarations of parliament , the protestation , and solemn national league and covenant . we the noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , freeholders , citizens , burgesses and commons of the late eastern , southern , and western associations of england , whose names are hereunto subscribed , having for a long season with bleeding hearts , perplexed spirits , weeping eyes , and over-much patience and silence , beheld the miserable publick distractions , intollerable oppressions , various revolutions , great tumults , and destructive confusions , wherewith our former most glorious , flourishing churches and nations ( for want of a setled government , and free parliament ) have many years by-past been violently rent in pieces , wasted , consumed , made the very hissing , scorn , laughing-stock of all neighbour countries , whether friends or foes , christians or infidels ; and thereby exposed to the justly dreaded hostile invasions of combined forraign romish adversaries , whose emissaries have been very active , instrumental in our late combustions and changes ; being now deeply sensible of the deplorable , desperate condition and imminent ruine , not onely of our own persons , families , posterities , but of our dearest , exhausted , enthralled , dying native country , and protestant religion too , far dearer to us than our lives or private interests , the preservation whereof is the supreamest law ; and calling to our minds the first publick ends and causes for which we took up arms ( since totally perverted , subverted , oppugned by ambitious , self-advancing commanders , officers of the army , and others contrary to their trusts and commissions ) with the manifold oaths , protestations , vowes , solemn league and covenant , and other sacred as well as civil obligations lying upon our consciences , engaging us all in our several places and callings in this day of englands trouble , and extream danger , to put our helping hands and best advice to obviate those perils , and remove those disorders , grievances , confusions , which menace utter desolation both to her and us , if we should any longer fit stupidly silent , or unactive in our spheres , like persons altogether uninterested or unconcerned in these perillous times of unprefidented exorbitancies , usurpations , tyrannies over our persns , estates , lawes , liberties , and parliaments themselves , by ambitious , turbulent self-seekers and incendiaries , and of universal decay of trade by sea and land ; have thereupon conceived it our necessary bounden duties in this sad posture of our sacred and civil concernments both as christians and english freemen , by this our joynt remonstrance to tender to the rest of our english brethren throughout the whole nation , of what rank , calling , or condition soever ; such just , legal , safe , rational , honest and christian proposals , as through gods blessing upon our and their unanimous , vigorous prosecution of them against all self-ended opponents , may redeem us from our present bondage , dangers , schisms , confusions , frequent rotations of publick government , and restore our tottering church , state , kingdoms , religion , to their pristine unity , tranquillity , purity , stability , dignity , felicity , and secure them against all future concussions and convulsions . for which end we all passionately desire , and shall unanimously and cordially endeavour by all lawful meanes within our orbs , 1. that a legal , full and free parliament of england may be speedily summoned , according to the prescription of 16 caroli , c. 1. enacted for this purpose , not hitherto put in execution ; and that free elections of able knights , citizens and burgesses , by and of all well-affected persons to peace , and the old parliaments good cause , to represent them therein , may be no wayes disturbed , nor restrained by force of armes or otherwise . 2. that the said parliament may safely , freely meet at westminster on the third monday in january next , to consult of , vote , and settle the peace , government of our distracted churches and nations , without the interruption , disturbance , force or dissolution of any commanders , officers or souldiers of the army , or other tumultuous persons whatsoever , under pain of being declared , prosecuted , executed as traitors and enemies to the publique . 3. that the full power of the militia both by sea and land be delivered up to this parliament , on the first day of their convention therein , for the better assurance of their free and peaceable session , and not continued as a distinct body or interest in opposition , contradistinction , or super-inspection , but in real subordination to the parliament and people . 4. that the whole frame and settlement of the government of our nations be entirely referred to the parliaments unanticipated consideration , the proper judges thereof , without any antecedent restrictions , presciptions , or impositions , by the army-officers , or any others . 5. that the supreme ▪ management of all civil , politique , military affairs , and appointment of all great officers of state , and ministers of justice , shall be in all the surviving members of the long parliament , without secluding any , as in a general council of state and safety only ( who are all desired to meet for that purpose ) till the new free parliament shall assemble , and no longer . 6. that the preservation of the peace , government of each county , shall be in the hands of such sheriffs , conservators of the peace , and other antient officers , as the free-holders of every county , shall publickly elect in their county-court , according to their antient rights and liberties ; and of every city and corporation in the mayors , sheriffs , bailiffs , and other officers elected by them , according to their charters , customs , and in none other officers imposed on them , till the parliament shall take further order therein . 7. that no taxes , contributions , excises , imposts , new customs , militiaes , or other payments whatsoevet , shall be henceforth imposed , assessed , levied upon , or paid by the people , but by their common grant and consent in free and full parliament , by act of parl. under pain of high treason in the imposers , assessors , collectors , and voluntary payers thereof ; this being the peoples indubitable birth right , acknowledged , declared , confirmed by manifold acts and declarations old and new . 8. that such an act of indempnity may be agreed on and assented to in this parliament by common consent , as may secure and indempnifie all persons , whose future peaceable deportment till this act passed shall demerit it . 9. that care may be therein taken for the speedy satisfaction of all just arrears of all officers and souldiers , duly listed before the 7. of may last , who shall peaceably and dutifully submit to the free convening and safe sitting of this desired parliament . that all others who shall tumultuously oppose or interrupt the summoning , assembling , or sitting thereof , shall forfeit all their commands , arrears , indempnity , and incur the penalty of traitors and publick enemies to the parliament and nation . 10. that an effectual course may be taken for the setled old maintenance , succession , protection and encouragement of a godly , learned , painful orthodox preaching ministry ▪ throughout the three nations . 11. that due care and order may be taken for the speedy detection , banishment , and execution of the lawes against all jesuits , seminary priests , freers , and other romish emissaries , or seducers whatsoever , employed to divide , corrupt , seduce the people ; and the oath of abjuration duly tendered by justices of peace and other officers , to all persons who shall be accused and justly suspected to be such , for their better detection . 12. that the causes of the great extraordinary decay of all sorts of trade , merchandise , shipping , scarcity of bullion , coin , with all frauds and abuses in manufactures , dilatory vexatious proceedings , extortions in courts of law and equity , may be diligently enquired into , redressed , punished , and the great destruction and waste of timber in all parts inhibited under severe penalties . 13. that all treasurers , receivers , collectors , farmers of any monies , customes , excises , rents , revenues , taxes , imposts , sequestrations , or other goods , profits whatsoever to the use of the publick , may be speedily called to account in each county , by fitting unaccountable persons appointed for that end , and all their frauds and abuses therein enquired of , and condignly punished . 14. that all good laws formerly enacted for the preservation and defence of the persons , lives , liberties , properties of the subjects , against illegal imprisonments , banishments , restraints , confinements , corporal punishments , execution by any person or persons , powers , committees , council of state , military , civil officers , or judicatures whatsoever , and against all unjust taxes , confiscations , sequestrations , rapines , plunders , may be ratified ; and the late and future violations of them exemplarily punished . 15. that every person who shall from henceforth canvas for voices to make himself a knight , citizen , burgess or baron of the ports , in the next , or any ensuing parliament , either by letters of recommendation from great men , feasting the electors before , at , or after elections , gifts , bribes , or otherwise , shall upon due proof thereof , be made uncapable to sit or serve in parliament . 16. that all members of parliament , officers of state , justices , sheriffs , mayors , recorders , shall henceforth take a corporal oath , to the best of their knowledge , skill , power , inviolably to preserve the fundamental laws , liberties , franchises of the free-men of england , and to give all lawes for the defence of them in charge to the grand jury , in their respective assizes , and general sessions of the peace , that they may enquire and present all offences against , and violations of them , to be condignly punished according to law . 17. that all unnecessary garrisons , supernumerary souldiers , and sea-men , may be speedily paid off , dismantled , disbanded , and all superfluous officers , excessive fees , and extortions whatsoever , taken away , for the impoverished peoples ease : and the manifold extortions , abuses of gaolers , marshals , messengers , and other detainers of prisoners , punished and redressed . 18. that able , faithful consciencious , fitting persons , fearing god and hating covetousnesse , may be preferred to all offices , places of publick trust , and administration of justice ; and detur digniori , made the only rule in all elections and preferments whatsoever . 19. that all universities , colleges , schools of learning in our three nations , with all lands , rents , annuities , gifts , revenues , for their support , may be constantly maintained , preserved from rapine , and all mis-imployments , substractions of them , and of any lands , rents , annuities , monies , gifts , legacies to them , or any other publick or charitable use whatsoever , diligently enquired after and reformed . all which proposals we are resolved by gods gracious assistance with unanimity , constancy , and activity , in our several stations , with our lives and fortunes , to prosecute and accomplish , to our powers , by all just and legal wayes , with what ever else may conduce to the peace , safety , unitie , wealth , prosperity of our lacerated , macerated , naufragated church and state ; wherein as we shall constantly pray for gods divine assistance and blessing upon our weak endeavours , without which they will be altogether succeslesse : so we cannot but confidently expect , and shall importunately desire the cordial concurrence , assistance , prayers of all other noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , free-holders , citizens , burgesses , and english freemen , without the smallest opposition , that fo righteousness and peace may kiss each other , and glory once more dwell within our land , wherein they have been strangers over-long : and let all the people ( by their joynt subscriptions ) say , amen , amen , amen . the declaration of the gentlemen , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of bedford . we the gentlemen , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of bedford , being truly sensible of the heavy pressures that we lie under , having all our civil and religious rights and liberties daily invaded , cannot in this common day of calamity , be silent , but with the rest of the nation , make some enquiry after the way of peace and settlement : and having met , and considered , thereof , doe humbly propose , as the most probable meanes , under god , to compose all our differences , and cement all our breaches both in church and state , the assembling of a full and free parliament , without any previous oaths , or engagements , or qualifications whatsoever ( saving what was in the year 1648. before the force put upon the parliament . ) or the re-admitting of the secluded members to the execution of their trusts , with a full and free supply of their vacancies by death . and until one of these be done , we do declare , we shall not hold our selves engaged to pay the taxes imposed upon us , without our consents so first had in parliament . the declaration of the gentry , clergy , and commonalty of the county of essex . were it not that our former too unhappy zeal ( in idolizing those persons who are now become , by far more oppressing than the egyptian task-masters ) at this time seconded with silence , would bespeak us stupid and insensible ; we needed not to repeat the sighs and groans of an oppressed and almost ruined kingdome : but lest a tacit silence should render us complaint with their sacrilegious and regicidious proceedings , we are necessitated to declare our present thoughts and future resolutions . we cannot look upon our present rulers without casting an eye upon a militant church , and there we finde them converting a house of prayer into a den of thieves ; an orthodox , learned and reverend clergy , by them reduced to the extremest want , under pretence of propagating the gospel ; and those ( who are yet permitted to exercise their ecclesiastical function ) treatned to be deprived of gods allowance , except in effect , they will forsake him , and fall down to their baal . we cannot look into our cloathing towns , but we behold famine ready to assault them , the poor and diligent labourer , for want of work , not able to buy him bread , so that those , who before wrought with their hands at home , are now forced to wander abroad , and work with their tongues to beg life , whilst we , who although willing , are hardly able ( through the oppression which lyes upon us ) to relieve them : and when we look upon the instruments of these our miesries , and consider their persons and qualifications , we cannot finde one publick spirit ( not one wise man ) among them ; their number is inconsistent with our laws , and a large part of that small number are reputed relatives to gaoles and brothil-houses : persons who outwardly profess god , but in their lives and actions utterly deny him , who through their most perfidious treacheries , and reiterated perjuries , have blasted the honour of our nation , and rendred our religion contemptible to all our enemies ; who ( while they pretend to strive for religion and liberties of the people ) have no other cause but cains , thinking their sins greater than can be forgiven ; and therefore per fas , aut nefas , they endeavour to lay a foundation for their own security , although in the church and kingdomes desolation . these premises considered , we conceive our selves obliged , and therefore readily and unanimously we do declare , that with our lives and fortunes we will protect , abet , and assist all tho e worthy remonstrators of the most renowned city of london , ansd the several counties of this kingdome , in the pursuance of their several declarations for a full and free parliament ; which is the onely means ( under god ) to bring us out of this miserable confusion , in which at present we are plunged . and we further declare , that we will pay no tax , or other imposition whatsoever , but by authority from our representatives in a full and free parliament : into whose hands we shall commit our lives and fortunes , and into whose results we will ever acquiesce . our eyes are up unto our god for help , and thence our hopes are fixed on general monke , that god hath called him forth to be the vmpier and determiner of our divisions and oppressions , by whom he will lead us through the wilderness of our present confusion , and bring us to our desired canaan . in this confidence we pray to god to bless , direct , and keep him . advertisement . this our declaration had came forth a week since , had not the trappanning diligence of an unworthy member of our country endeavoured the surprizal of it and us : let not three hundred and thirty hands ( an inconsiderable number for so great a county ) bespeak this declaration forged , we being forced to do in one day the work we had cut out for seven ; had we had time , we had brought ten thousand hands , such as upon a good occasion , will bring hearts suitable to the merits of their cause . the declaration of the gentry of the county of nottingham . and of the town of nottingham , presented by way of address to his excellency the lord general monck , the 28. of february , with a letter to his excellency , and another to the speaker of the parliament . what the people of this land have suffered in their greatest concernments , both religious and civil , by the late disorders , and frequent change of government , hath for a long time been the argument of a general and sad complaint both to god and man : what the most publick sense of the nation is , as to the means of setling it in the possession of its antient and native liberties , is sufficiently known by the several declarations of so many counties already presented and published : what god in great mercy hath done by your excellencies means , as his chosen instrument , to revive our dying hopes , in plucking us as a brand out of the fire , and that with so gentle a hand , is the wonder and rejoycing of our souls . in testimony therefore of our thankfulness to god , and our grateful sense of your excellencies most valiant and wise management of the power he hath intrusted you with : as also to evidence as fellow-members our concurrence and sympath , with those other parts of this great body : we the nobility gentry , ministry and commonalty of the county of nottingham , and of the county of the town of nottingham do declare , that as it is our judgement that the nation ought , so it is our earnest desire , and shall be our endeavour by the use of all lawful means that it may be free in its members in parliament , deputed from all parts , impowred by antient and undoubted right to elect , the best expedient whereto , at present , we conceive to be either an admission of the members secluded in 1648. and a filling up of vacancies by new elections , or the speedy calling of another parliament with such qualifications as were then agreed on before there as a force upon the house . we also claim it with the rest of the nation as our uniquestionable right , that nothing be imposed upon us by way of tax , or otherwise , but by our consents first given and declared in a full and free parliament . and now , considering how great things in prosecution of these just ends are already done for us , as we do in most humble manner bless and praise his glorious name that hath thus far answered our desires , so we do most earnestly beseech him to perfect in his due time what is so happily begun , and in order thereto to bless and conduct your excellency through all the remaining difficulties that may obstruct our present necessary settlement upon the true lasting foundation of our known laws and priviledges . in the vindication whereof we beseech your excellency to be confident , not only of our best wishes and thanks , but also of our utmost assistance to the hazard of our lives and fortunes . my lord , this enclosed was intended to be presented to your excellencies before we had notice of your excellencies happy removal of all force , excluding members from sitting in parliament wherein though our desires are thereby granted , yet we cannot but address the same to you , that it may appear what your excellency hath done therein is according to our sense and desire , as well as those of other counties that have gone before us in time , though not in affection , and that we shall in our places and callings be ready to make good what we have publickly declared for , as the parliament and your excellency shall command us , and remain nottingham , feb. 23. 1650. my lord , your excellencies most humble and faithful servants . mr. speaker , we being desirous amongst other counties to express our thanks to the lord general monke , for his endeavours in our restitution to peace and settlement , and to manifest our adherence to him , and those under his command , in the further prosecution of those good ends mentioned in our address to him , after we had subscribed and ordered these gentlemen to wait upon him with the same , we received the joyful news , that all force was removed , and a free admission given to all members to sit in parliament , whereby our desires are so far accomplished , that we might have acquiessed therein , but only that we would not have our intentions and desires , though obtained , buried in oblivion , we thought fit to present that address to the lord general , and judge it our duties to express our thankfulness to god for your re-admission , and our readiness in our places and callings , to assist you in what you have so happily begun , and humbly desire that by your authority our militia may be so setled that we may be serviceable to your commands , and capacitated to defend our selves against any discontented persons that may upon this change endeavour a disturbance of the publick peace , or deny your authority . nottingham , feb. 23. 1659. sir , your humble and faithful servants . the declaration of sir charles coot knight and baronet , lord president of the province of connavght : and the rest of the council of officers of the army in ireland . present at dublin concerning the re-admission of the sucluded members . since the authority of parliament became openly violated , and that by their own waged servants of the army in england , by whom 41. of the members of parliament were torn from the parliament house in dec. 1648. and imprisoned , and a 160. other members denied entrance into the house , and about fifty more voluntarily withdrew themselves to avoid violence , making in all of secluded members about two hundred and fifty , when the remaining members charged the army with the guilt of that force , and sent to the then general of the army for the restitution of those excluded members which was denied them , how many and manifold have been the miseries and calamities under which these nations have laboured , and do stil labour , is evident to all equal minded men . the godly ministers of the gospel despised : the ministry it self villified : tythes , and other means of their maintenance ( particularly in ireland ) taken from them , and mis-applied ; the protestant religion shaken , and almost overturned ; anabaptists , quakers , and other sectaries set up and countenanced ; heresies and schisms increased ; the fundamental laws of the land trampled upon , and an arbitrary government endeavoured to be introduced ; the civil rights , properties and liberties of the people in their persons and estates broken in pieces ; impositions and taxes on the people without example laid and increased in an excessive manner and measure , whereby thousands of families have been ruined , and enforced to beg their bread ; manufacture at home discouraged , publick trade and commerce abroad interrupted ; the nations become deeply indebted , and generally impoverished ; the reformed protestant churches abroad exposed to great danger , wanting the wonted support of england , which ( under god ) was the bulwark and chief strength of the protestant religion throughout all christendome , and finally the english nation ( which was alwayes deservedly ) in so high honour and estimation at home and abroad , as it was a bridle and terrour to their enemies , and a countenance and support to their friends , and allies , is now become ( we tremble and grieve to have so just cause to speak it ) a scorn and dersion to all nations round about us ; and all this is brought to pass to satisfie the avarice , ambition , lusts , and fears of a few inconsiderable persons of anabaptistical and other fanatique spirits , who have made it their business to occasion still one trouble on the neck of another , so to imbroil and continue the nations in division , war , and bloody confusion , that sober men might not have time or leisure ( with maturity of judgement or counsel ) to look into the inwards of their designs or actings ; and after we had beheld all this with bleeding hearts , and calling to minde that when in december 1648. the said force was put upon the parliament , the then remaining members sent sundry times to the general to know why he imprisoned their members , and desired him to set them at liberty , which was not done ; and we gathering from all this , that if the house were once freed from the force of an army , and they again restored to freedome and liberty of sitting and and acting , they would then upon the firmer grounds ( in conscience of their duties to god and their country , and in testimony of their high resentment of that breach of priviledges of the parliament , have taken into the house those excluded members , and filled vacant places by due and orderly elections of the people ( and after so many years unhappy interruption unite again in a full and free parliament , and there assert the rights and priviledges of parliament , and liberties of the people , which from the very beginning of the war of england have been not the least ground of their contest with the late king , and ever since , and joyn their counsels and endeavours for restoring these nations to peace and tranquillity . and thence it was , that on the 14. day of december 1659. several officers of the army here , on the behalf of themselves , and those under their commands , by their joynt declaration , declared and published their stedfast resolutions to adhere to the parliament in defence of its priviledges , and the just rights and liberties of the people of these nations as men and christians ; in which declaration afterwards concurred the whole army of ireland , but now finding much contrary to our expectations , that when the members of parliament now assembled at westminster , were in decemb. 1659. ( by an extraordinary providence ) restored to their freedome and liberty of sitting and acting as in parliament ; and that divers of those formerly excluded members of parliament on the 27. of decem. 1659. ( as they had formerly done in may 1659. ) offered themselves to discharge their trusts for the several counties and places for which they were elected , and formerly served those their fellow-members assembled at westminster , did not onely deny them admittance , but also voted and ordered the utter exclusion of all the excluded members with this further addition , that none of them should be chosen in future elections to sit in this parliament , whereby they have a more unnatural violence taken away from above the one half of the people of england , their representatives in parliament , and limited and abridged in a high degree the liberty and freedome of the people in further elections , which denial and order of theirs in a time when they were under no force , is so much the more strange , in regard that in december 1648. when they were under a force , they transferred that guilt for themselves to the army , and pretended a willingness to re-admit those members if it were in their power , as is formerly mentioned . and whereas lieut. gen. ludlow had placed in ireland several officers who are anabaptists , and persons of the like fanatique spirits , ( many of whom had been very active in the late conspiracies and actings of the factious part of the army in england , even against those members of parliament now sitting at westminster ; of which officers so placed by lieut. gen. ludlow , it was found necessary to purge the army , and to put in their places persons more soberly minded and well affected to the parliament ; yet after all that done , and after lieut. gen. ludlow stood justly deservedly charged with high treason , the said lieut. gen. ludlow himself , and some others of the like principles with him , were by a report from the councel of state proposed to be appointed to governe not onely the army , but also the whole nation of ireland , to the astonishment of the people and army here , to the unsetling of those persons so well deserving , to the hazard of the peace of the nation and army ( and which is above all ) to the endangering even of religion it selfe . and here it is observable , that those members now sitting at westminster , by their declaration of 23. of january 1659. since their restitution to their present liberty of sitting ) have published that extravagant councels and actions , have engaged the nations in a great debt and charge , which it seems necessitates their laying a new increase of charge on the nations , and yet so indulgent they are to those persons , that in a high degree created that necessity of so unreasonably charging the people , and whose estates might well bear a great part of that burden , as without so much as any suit made to them by those delinquents , they granted them indempnity for their persons and estates , whereby it seems the said members now sitting at westminster , hold it fit , that those who are of sober spirits , and offended not the parliament , should out of their estates pay for those extravagant mens delinquency , rather than the delinquents themselves . and although the said lieut. gen. ludlow , and miles corbet esq . together with col. john jones , and col. mat. tomlinson , stand impeached from hence most justly of high treason , and that charge against them , being known to the house , and there remaing , yet they have admitted two of those persons , namely the said lieut gen. ludlow , and miles corbet actually to sit in the said house . and now the greatness of those miseries which have befaln these three nations in general , by such late actings in england , and those heightned with many aggravations in the circumstances of them ( too many and too long to be repeated ) as it hath begotten in us , and in all good men in the three nations deep impression of astonishment and horror , so it is evident , that if it be any longer continued , it will perpetually nourish dishonour to god , grief to all god men , and ( we doubt and fear ) utter infamy and destruction to the three nations . in contemplation whereof , and considering how god hath in his justice blasted all attempts that since the year 1648. have been made for re-setling of these nations in peace and tranquillity , and that after all the trials and various changes of government which we have in all that time with much long-suffering and patience endured , there is no way visible to us under heaven whence deliverance may be probably wrought or expected , but from the care and wisdome of a free and full parliament in england , which ( by the experience of all former ages hath been found the best and only expedient for providing remedies to be applied to so great and general mischiefs arising in church or state . and considering also that the marks of the true reformed religion according to the word of god , and of the fundamental laws of the land , and of our now dying liberties and freedome , are not yet so utterly razed and defaced , but that some footsteps of them do yet remain , so as ( by the wisdome of a full and free parliament ) they may be again renewed and firmly re-established ; and considering likewise that our hopes of having the said excluded members restored , and of new elections to be made for vacant places , whereby there might be a full and free parliament , as there was on decem. 5. 1648. and the antient and long contested liberties of the people might be asserted , are much contrary to our expectations , and contrary to the fundamental laws of the land , and indeed contrary to all justice and become frustrated ; and considering further how unjust and unreasonable a thing it is , that of above five hundred members , whereof the commons house of parliament usually consisted , there were but four and forty or thereabouts , when that fatal vote passed for the keeping out the aforesaid excluded members by the prevalency of a major part of the said 44. persons ( not much exceeding those who voted then on the contrary side ) which assumes to it self the supreme authority , not onely of england , but also of the three nations , without president or example of any former age , there being above two hundred and fifty which stand eleven years excluded , without so much as the least offer of an impeachment against them in all that time ; which unexampled and unparallel'd assumption in those men is not possible to continue but by the force of an army poisoned with anabaptistical and corrupted principles , to the continual grief and unsupportable burden and charge of the three nations . and besides that act of the aforesaid persons chasing away ( for so it now appears ) about two hundred and fifty members , of above five hundred chosen by all the several parts of england , according to the known laws of the land , to represent the whole nation in parliament ; and after the forcible exclusion of so many , that the four and forty persons remaining ( amongst whom we believe there are some worthy patriots who are not so fully concurring in the actings of the rest of their number , as violently over-voted them , which is a further aggravation of the others guilt ) should dare to usurp to themselves as is formerly mentioned , contrary to all the laws , the supreme power not only of england , but also of ireland and scotland , is a thing which none but conquerors or tyrants would attempt , and in all circumstances is so hideous and monstrous to be endured by a free people , formerly famous to all the world for wisdome and valour , as the english nation have been , as it will be incredible to all posterity and lastly considering , that as in all ages , and more particularly since the beginning of the late horrid rebellion in ireland , our brethren in england have abundantly manifested a tender and compassionate sense of the condition in ireland , and were careful to relieve us in our lowest estate , as bone of their bone , and flesh of their flesh ; which we do , and shal ever acknowledge with humble thankfulnesse , and ( as a debt which we well know to be due from us to them above all people in the world ) shall be for ever as tender of their happinesse and welfare , as of our own , which indeed is involved in theirs , and without whom ireland cannot be happy . we therefore remaining constant in the reasons of our said declaration of dec. 14. 1659. for adhering to the parliament in defence of its priviledges , and the just rights and liberties of these nations ; all which we see now are apparently more and more violated by the ▪ not admission of the said excluded members , and by not filling the vacant places , whereby the house might be full ; and being freed from force , might uninterruptedly act according to their judgements and consciences , towards re-setling the peace of these nations , which otherwise in all humane probability can never be restored to peace and tranquillity . we do therefore declare for a full and free parliament in england , consisting not only of those that sate on oct. 11. 1659. but also of all such of the members of parliament imprisoned , excluded , or withdrawn in december 1648. as are yet living , whom we desire may be restored to the freedome and liberty of sitting , and acting according to the trust committed to them by the several counties and places which did chuse them , that so they may be no longer debarred from discharging their said trust , and that vacant places may be speedily supplied by free and due elections of the people , yet so as none of the persons to be admitted or elected , be any of those who have been in arms , or otherwise aiding , abetting , or assisting the late king or his son in the late war against the parliament , and that the house being so filled , may proceed unanimously to consult the best meanes for re-setling the peace of the nations , the re-establishment of true religion ( the surest foundaon , as of all righteous government , so of all the happinesse of a nation ; ) the fundamental lawes of the land ( whereby all mens rights and properties are preserved ) and the liberties and freedom of the people which are supported by those lawes . and for those ends , and in discharge of our duty to god , and to our country , we do resolve , by the blessing of almighty god ) to joyn with our brethren in england , ireland , and scotland , who have or shall joyn with us for the ends aforesaid ; and do resolve , for the maintenance and preservation thereof , to hazard our lives and estates , and all that is dear to us : and we doubt not but all our brethren in the said nations , who disdain to be made slaves , will joyn with us herein , as being with wisedom and reason desirous to deliver over to their posterity that liberty and freedom which was conveyed to them at so dear a rate by our ancestors . and then we trust , that by the great mercy of god , will speedily follow a happy settlement of these yet miserable and distracted nations ; and consequently that the true protestant religion , in the power and purity thereof , may be established ; the godly , learned , and orthodox ministers of the gospel maintained by their tythes , and other their accustomed rights ; their persons supported and countenanced ; the universities and all other seminaries of learning cherished ; heresies and schisms suppressed , needless impositions and taxes on the people removed , and no charge to be laid on any of the nations , without their own free consents , given by their representatives , in their several and respective parliaments ; manufactures , and publique trade and commerce , at home and abroad advanced ; justice in its due and wonted course administred ; the just debts of the nation satisfied ; the treasure and revenues thereof preserved , and returned to their right and proper channels ; the arreares of the army , and other publique debts duly satisfied ; the armies and forces continued in due obedience to the supreme authority , and not presume as some have done , to give lawes thereunto , which hath been the root of a great part of our miseries ; the nations enriched , united and strengthened ; the reformed protestant churches abroad supported and countenanced ; the honour of the english nation restored , to the comfort of friends , and terror of enemies ; the plantation of ireland in the hands of adventurers and souldiers , and other english and protestants advanced , as a farther accession of honour and greatness to the english nation : and so by the blessing of god , all will shortly terminate in the glory of god , the peace and tranquillity of these nations , the strengthening of them against forreign invasion , and intestine rebellion , and the comfort , contentment of all the good people in these nations , which the lord of his mercy grant . dated at dublin , febr. 16. 1659. sir charls coote william l. cawfield sir theo. jones sir oliver st. ceorge sir hen. ingoldsby sir john king col. chidley coote col. john cole col. will. warden col. richard coote col. john georges col. hen. owen lt. col. tho. scot lt. col. w. purefoy lt. col. oliver jones maj. tho. barrington maj. alex. staples maj. rich. bingley maj. george pepper lt. col. h. smithwick capt. henry baker cap. rob. fitz gerald cap. cha. wenman . cap. adam molineux col. hum. barrow cap. sam. foley cap. john salt cap. simon garstin col. cha. blunt col. hen. slade cap. ant. stamp cap. art. purefoy cap. george s ▪ george cap. peter purefoy cap. thomas curd cap. tho. newcomen cap. tho. newburgh cap. hen. thrimpton lt. hugh clotworthy lt. peter flower lt. her. langrish lt. rich. morrick lt. brian jaques lt. richard butler lt. john ottway lt. john evelin lt. tho. flint lt. edw. harrington corn . art. vsher corn . donw . prothers corn . w. pinsent ensign john hiad tho. sheppard . mar. quarter-master w. f. john payn comptr. a declaration of the gentry of somerset-shire , who were of the late kings party . whereas god by many gracious appearances ha●h raised the hearts of this nation to a great confidence , that their tottering condition draws near to an establishment , by the re-settlement of their antient , just , and solid foundations ; we doe declare , that in thankfulness to our great and good god , we hold our selves bound to look upon , and with humble longings ; to wait for the accomplishment of this great work , as the largest national blessing we are capable of ( being presented to our hope without blood and ruine . ) and likewise that we set up pillars in every of our hearts to the honour of his excellency the lord general monck , who hath not as others , either feared or affected the tyrannical greatness of our oppressors ; but as he undertook the redemption of his countrey with singular resolution , and hath carried it on hitherto with unparallel'd prudence , so we doe not in the least doubt , but that by the good hand of god he will perfect it with shining and glorious sincerity . and because we finde ( as we hope ) the last engine of the enemies of our peace now set on work for the embroiling of the spirits of the well-meaning people of england , by suggesting an unchristian inclination remaining in us , of waiting opportunities of revenge : we do here in the sight of god , and to all the world , disown and abhor all animosity and revengeful remembrance of sides and parties in the late war : and do promise and resolve to co-operate within our sphere towards the publique settlement , with such faithfulness and constancy , as neither to occasion or entertain the least jealousie upon the account of any past difference whatsoever , fully resolving to submit to the determinations of the parliament both in ecclesiastical and civil affairs , which we hope will remove all occasion of jealousie and distinction for the future . john lord paulett . sir francis paulett . sir amos paulett . william paulett esq. edward phillips . william helliar . peregrine palmer henry barkley . charles berkley . thomas warr . john brice . robert hawly . john bonvile . francis windham . thomas pigott . william wandrond . george waldrond . edward berkley . francis hawly . george speake . john tynt . sam. gorges . george syddenham . francis harvey , &c. an alarum to the counties of england and wales . with the ab-renunciatiation of the oath . by tho. fuller , b. d. our nation , which long since hath lost the lustre and well-being , now at last-strugleth for the life and being thereof . our many [ temporal ] miseries are reducible to two principal heads . daily 1. decrease of trading . 2. increase of taxes : so that every hour the burden groweth weightier , and the back of our nation weaker to support it . 2. 't is sad to see , in cloathing countreys , what swarms there are of poor people , the true objects of charity ; if any were as able to give , as they worthy to receive relief : for they would work , and can work , yet cannot work , because there are none to employ them . 3. as for the sea ( which is the land of port-towns ) it returneth small benefit ; for since dunkirk was ours ( more to the credit than benefit of our nation ) the fire of searobberies is removed out of the chimney , and scattered about the house , not lesse destructive , but more diffusive : so that our merchants could better guard themselves against that single staple of pirates , than many lesser ones sprung since every where , the cause why rich men will not ( as poor cannot ) adventure . 4. our second misery is , increase , yea , superfetation of taxes , so long as so numerous an army is maintained : for though some of their souldiers will preach gratis ( conscientious to take nothing for that which they know is worth nothing ) yet none will fight at so cheap a rate . 5. some will say , that what the souldier receiveth with one hand , he returneth with another , expending his pay in victuals , cloaths , &c. whereby coin , by circulation , is continued in our country . this i deny ; for some grandees greatned by the times , have made their monies over in banks beyond the seas , which are put into mortmain , or a dead hand , whereby no profit accreweth to our commonwealth . others having gotten the estates of lords , live after the rate yoomen , whose discretion therein is to be commended , for proportioning their expences ( for fear of afterclaps ) rather according to their original , than present condition . 6. the increase of taxes must inevitably cause the ruine of our nation : for though still there be wealthy men left ( as they shew it in their cowardise , and fear to engage for the general good ) yet they grow thinner every day whilst such as are left no root of their own , rather than they will wither will turn suckers on the stock of others . so that the greatest happiness rich men can promise to themselves , is only to be last devoured , though the comfort of the lateness will not countervail the sadness for the certainty of their destruction . indeed it is miraculous that our nation hath subsisted so long , and few there are that would believe that the whole candle of our english wealth could last so long , as we have beheld it burning in the socket , but now giving the last blaze , if god be not merciful , and men discreet to prevent it . 7. pass we from the sad malady , to the sole remedy thereof , i say sole , not exclusively of divine miraculous power , but according to humane apprehension , this is a free and full parliament . indeed free-parliament is a tautology , like a reasonable-man , who , if not reasonable , is no man ; as the other , if not free , no parliament . but the late frequent forces put on parliaments hath made the needless epethite become necessary , to express what kinde of parliaments we desire . not such in which every word must be spoken under correction of the sword , but wherein every member , without fear of violence ( to interrupt or dissolve them ) may follow the dictates of their own judgement . 8. nor ought a parliament onely bee free from force , but also from any abjurations , or previous engagements . let them take heed of renouncing any thing , save what is simply sinful in it self , as the forsaking of the world , flesh , and devil , as was solemnly promised for them in their baptism . but it is bad to bee busie with other ab-renunciations , especially of the royal family . 9. look backward , and we may say with david , the vows of the lord are upon us ; i mean on so many of us as are of fifty years of age . the oath of supremacy ( not to mention the covenant ) is the eldest brother , to whom the inheritance of our consciences do belong . 10. look forwards , it limiteth gods providence , which is an hainous offence ; wee know not what a day , month , year , &c. may bring forth . this age hath the least reason of any to meddle with the edge-tools of such oathes which in a short ( but strict ) time hath seen so many strange things , that now nothing is strange unto us . have wee not seen o. cromwell from a private gentleman gradatim ascend to bee protector of three nations , and by his courage and wisdome rather than any right ) a more absolute power possessed by , and larger tribute paid unto him than to any king in england . his son and successour ( counted bad by many for his goodness and milde spirit ) for eighth months was congratulated by the most considerable persons of our nation . now if some twenty years since an oath had been tendred unto us to abjure the family of cromwels from ever having the supream magistraey in our nation ; such an oath would have seemed safe , but yet it was not lawful to take it , because none knew what was in the womb of teeming time , though utterly improbable to our belief . 11. besides , the imposers of this oath may miss the mark they propound to themselves , viz. assurance of their own , and discovery of the opposite party ; for many now pass not for the taking or breaking of any oath , and assurance of such is hard in keeping , and indeed not worth the having . other will behold the oath as temporary , and expiring with the power of the imposers . as for the conscientious indeed , esfusing it out of pure principles of piety , it is a barbarous act for persons in power , to turn executioners to strangle tender consciences , whose cordial fear of an oath should be encouraged . 12. as the parliament must be free , no vassal , but enfranchised from the sword , so must it bee full , no cripple , but entire and compleat in all the members thereof . our land hath lately groaned under the most grievous monopoly as ever was , or can be , when a handful of men have grasped to themselves the representing of a whole ( not to say three ) nation , most of them being but burgesses , who though equal in votes , are not equal in their representation with the knights of the shires . if they presume that the rest excluded by them ( far more considerable for birth , estates , number , love of the people , and what not ? ) are vertually included in them , it is an intollerable presumption . that what pertaineth to all should be handled by all , is a truth so clear and strong , that they must offer a rape to their own reason that deny it . such also is this maxim , vnrepresented , vnconcluded : so that if so few have in them the notion of a parliament , it is a bare notion indeed , especially seeing this handful of men were ( say the cavaliers ) dissolved by the death of the king ; dissolved ( said cromwell ) by his sword ; dissolved ( say some great ones ) by an act of their own ( entred into the journall book of the parliament ) dissolved must their own consciences say , by their voluntary accepting of elections in later parliaments . 13. now the members of a free and full parliament ( the onely hope of humane help ) ought thus to be qualified : 1. let them be godly , and well-affected indeed , and not in the canting language of the times . 2. men of estates , who will be tender in taxing others , as striking them thorough themselves , whilst such who bear nothing care not how much they burthen others , as if paying were as easie as voting , and money as free as words . 3. men of spirits , no dull souls , all the sparks of whose activity are quenched in their own flegm . 4. no gainers by the continnance of the army . demetrius the silver-smith was no fool ( what ever else he was ) so sticking for the shrine of diana , by which craft he got his gain . 5. men of moderation , a quality not opposed to diligence , but to violence , not unactiving men , but regulating their activity . 14. this their moderation must appear in considering all interests , seeing there be no two interests in the nation so contemptible , which if united , and twisting their discontents together , cannot draw trouble on all the rest : especially the sectarian ( though presented i beleeve by their party , through a multipling glass ) are considerable on a politick score of their numbers and pious account of their conscience ; for , though many of them carry the latter in their purses , who when they finde the moisture of profit to fail them , will fall off like leaves in autumn ; yet can i not be so uncharitable , but to beleeve that many of them ( having the heat of their affections above the light of their judgements ) follow erroneous consciences ; besides , having gone loose so long , they must needs swell , if hardly girded on a sudden . 15. this moderation also must be used by all other persons , to work themselves to be ( if not pleased ) contented with the decisions of a free parliament . all must sit down losers save such alone , who can plead , that they have been no sinners in our nation . the grand design must be to have none , or , ( if that be impossible ) as few as may be , utterly ruined . i confess two hungry meals makes a third a clutton , and such who have long fasted from their detained estates , will be not onely greedy but ravenous to recover them . yea , such will shrewdly plead , that they now expect moderation from them , who never used moderation to them . however , in such a general danger , men must depose their animosities , labouring , first , to reconcile their spirits , then , their perswasions , the later being at less distance than the former . and men must divide , where they cannot get the whole , seeing few will pity his starving who will eat no bread at all , because he can recover but half of his own loaf . 16. it will be objected that such a full p. is still but an empty parliament , having no house of lords therein : but know , if both hands of a man be bound , no hope of liberty from himself ; but if one be untied , it may do the brotherly office to unloose the other : let us be content to row in a sculler till we can get a pair of oars . and such surely is the ingenuity and publick spiritness of the peers , that laying aside personal interest ( which upon debate may appear more ) they will suspend their rights , immunities , and priviledges , and submit all to the determination of a free parliament to acquiesce therein . 17. god give our nation seasonably to understand their own strength , that the wars begun may be ended amongst our selves before forreigners become the arbitrators of our differences , who will demand great wages for little work , yea and turn their owne paymasters thereof . and may that great general ( whose intentions long have stood in the dark to our nation , whilst our nations desires were all the while in light to him , understand that vox populi is vox dei , and interpret , that god calleth unto him by the declarations of all counties , to be chiefly instrumental in asserting our liberties , and we shall have cause for ever to bless the day of his nativity . 18. indeed had providence fixed our nativities under the duke of muscovy , whose list is his subjects law , we would ( because we must ) work our selves patiently to the obedience of his power . but seeing god hath given us , with st. paul , to be free-born , acts 22. 28. ( though also , with the centurion , we have given great summs , not to obtain , but contrive this freedome ) let us not tamely lose our birth-right , and vigorously endeavour their preservation . 19. the story is well known of the old woman , who having but a small parcel of wood , would leasurably roast her goose ▪ stick by stick , till her wood was all burnt , and her goose still raw . if the several counties singly engage one after another , all will be overthrown , and nothing effected as to our relief . let the two and fifty shires of england and wales ( with the city of london , which eminently is two and fifty more ) be all as one , and unanimously advance the work , and not doe as they dealt with poor cheshire , using it as joab used vriah , putting him forward on action , then falsly ret , eating from him , and leaving him a prey to his enemies . but i hope our old shipwracks will be new sea-marks to us , documented by former nocuments , to steer a course for the general good . 20. there is so englishman so inconsiderable , but he may , at the least in a single capacity , be contributive to the happiness of his native country , the wise with their brains , the rich with their purses , the learned with their pens , the strong with their persons , all with their prayers . and if now they suffer this opportunity which god puts into their hands , to slip through their fingers , they may hereafter have more years to bemoan their folly , than minutes to amend their misery ; it being better now to say , we will not , than three years hence to say , we cannot pay our taxes . the declaration and address of the gentry of the county of essex , who have adhered to the king , and suffered imprisonment or sequestration , during the late troubles . may it please your excellency , we the gentlemen of the county of essex , taking notice how industrious some pernicious and desperate persons have been to raise a jealousie , that all who adhered to the king have such a a settlement of rancour and revenge in their hearts , against those who were of a different party , that the blessing of a firm and lasting peace , so long wisht for , and now hoped to be in a near propinquity , is not likely to take its due and desired effect , have thought fit to express the true sense of our hearts , in a declaration which we have enclosed herein , conceiving it very fitting , not to make the same more publick , till it hath first arrived at the view of your excellency , whom god hath been pleased to make so signally eminent in the delivering of this nation from those pressing miseries it hath so long lay panting and groaning under ; and for which , as we can never enough magnifie his mercy , so can we not sufficiently express that high honour and respect which we retain in our hearts towards your excellency , the great and worthy instrument he hath been pleased to make use of therein . my lord , we subscribe our selves , your excellencies most humble and devoted servants . chelmesford , april 17. 1660. this was subscribed by the gentry , whose names are expressed under the subsequent declaration , and superscribed to his excellency the lord general monck . the declaration . whereas almighty god hath raised this distracted nation to some hopes of re-settlement on just , known , and lasting foundations : we magnifie his mercy from the bottom of our hearts , and shall ever pay a most grateful acknowledgment to his excellency the lord gen. monck as the signal instrument of so great a deliverance . and whereas some pernicious and desperate persons have laboured to raise a jealousie , that those who adhered to the king doe still in their hearts detain revenge against such as were of a different party : we think our selves bound to declare to all the world ( in the presence of god ) that we detest and abhor all thoughts of animosity or revenge against any party or persons whatsoever . for as we could wish the late divisions had never been begotten , so we desire they may for ever be buried , and shall think those persons the greatest and common enemies of our country who shall offer to revive them . and we also declare , that we will thankfully submit and attend the resolutions of the next ensuing parliament , for a just and happy settlement of church and state , that so at last ( by cods blessing ) that so those odious marks of sides and parties may for ever be blotted out , and a perfect union may again be restored to this distressed nation . edward russel , esq. sir henry appleton , baronet . sir benjamin ayloff , baronet . sir denner strutt , baronet . sir humfrey mildemay , knight sir john tirell , knight sir granmer herris , knight sir edmund peirce , knight sir henry wroth , knight william ayloff , fsq . james altham , esq. gamaliel capel , esq. anthony browne , esq. charles fytche , esq. thomas argal , esq. stephen smith , esq. salter herris , esq. henry pert , esq. john fanshaw , esq. thomas roberts , esq. richard humphrey , esq. john lynn , esq. dr. john michaelson , richard symons , esq. anthony kempson , esq. william herris , esq. william bramston , esq. john brown , gent. nicholas serle john vavasour , gent. john green , gent. james cookson , gent. fdmund coole , gent. this declaration and address was agreed upon by the subscribers at a general meeting , at chelmesford in essex , april 17. 1660. sir benjamin ayloffe , and sir edmond peirce being then appointed and desired to present them to his excellency , which was done accordingly at st. james's the 19th . of the same moneth . a declaration of the knights and gentry in the county of dorset , who were in his late majesties army . upon a due consideration of the dangerous jealousies which are promoted ; partly , by the cunning of a close , and malicious faction of separatists , and partly , by the unwarranted liberties of an heady and intemperate sort of people , which falsely tearm themselves royallists : — to the great dissettlement of sober and well-minded persons , and sufficient to blast the hopes we have of returning to our antient freedomes , without a more than ordinary appearance of divine aid , to support , and re-unite us in this our critical necessity . we have thought it highly expedient to declare our seuse , and resolves , in the particular of adherence to the largest assurances of amicable agreement , and correspondence imaginable : looking upon our selves as obliged by an indispensible tye of religious charity , to compassionate and forgive one another , as we expect to be forgiven : and we do further declare , that we are so far from justifying those unchristian animosities , which reign in divers turbulent spirits , even of our own party ( by reputation at least ) that we disclaim any society with men of those wilde principles ; and that to all honest purposes , we will never put any difference , betwixt such as shall now unite with us , in order to the publick peace , and those who first engaged in the same perswasion with our selves , submitting all to the resolves of parliament , upon whose determinations we beseech god to bestow his benediction . sir hugh windham , sir gerard naper , sir john strangwayes , giles strangwayes , john hardy , henry coker , edward hull , henry butler , maximilian mohune , robert mohune , henry hoskins , james hoskins , george strangwayes , nicholas strangwayes , robert lawrence , bruen lawrence , arthur fookes , george brown , major vdvehall , rob. chamberlain , rob. strode , jo. strode of slape , humphrey bishop , john bishop , robert culliford , george cary , george penny , tho. turbervile , george tubervile , tho. paulet , cap. hoare , major dolline , hugh hodges , rich. willoughby , john pesing , john gillin●ham ▪ william elsing , robert ernsly , john dawe , john fisher , ellis collins . the declaration of the gentry of the county of kent , who have adhered to the king , and suffered imprisonment or sequestration during the late troubles . whereas it hath pleased almighty god , after so many trialls , and so long distraction , to raise us to large hopes of resettlement of this nation upon just , known , and lasting foundations ; wee therefore desire from our hearts to render to god the glory of his mercies , and a full tribute of honour to his excellency the lord general monck , who hath been so eminently instrumental in these beginnings of deliverance . and forasmuch as we understand that some malicious and desperate persons ( regarding neither the mercies of god , nor the miseries of their country ) have endeavoured to beget a pernicious jealousie , that those who adhered to the king , do still retain a spirit of revenge against all that were of a contrary party : we do therefore declare in the presence of god , that we utterly abhor all revengeful thoughts and actions against any party or persons whatsoever . and as we have great reason to wish those divisions had never been born , so we hope , and will do our utmost they may never be remembred , and shall look on all persons as the worst and common enemies of this nation that shall offer to revive them . in pursuance whereof we further declare ( as his excellencies army hath given us a noble example ) that we will thankfully acquisce in the resolutions of the next ensuing parliament for a due and just settlement of church and state . col. richard spencer , esquire , thomas lennard , esquire , thom. peyton , kt. and baronet , roger twysden , kt. and bar. edward hales , baronet , richard hardress , baronet , william man , knight , stephen lennard , knight , john boys , knight , col. thomas colpepper , col. edward wilsford , col. george newman , col. henry norwood , robert barnham , esquire , daniel treswel , esquire , thomas collepepper , esquire , thomas herlackenden , esq. francis twysden , esq. john best , esq. edward barham , esq. rich. master esq. francis clerk , esq. edward darell , esq. william rook esq. joh. boys of h●ad , esq. wi●liam kingsley , esq. richard hulse , esq. james newman , esq. john pownoll , gent. william somner , gen● . a declaration of the nobility and gentry that adhered to the late king , in and about the city of london . after the miseries of a civil war , and the many vain and fruitless attempts toward settlement upon several interests and imaginary forms of government , it having pleased almighty god by unexpected and wonderful meanes to give these nations a probable hope of being restored to those lawes and priviledges which have been transmitted to them from their ancestors . we doe declare , that we think our selves obliged , next to divine providence to attribute this glorious work to his excellency the lord general monck , who as he had the courage to assert the publick liberty , and the prudence to carry it on against so many difficulties , has also had the happinesse to lead us thus far through the wilderness of confusion , without passing the red sea of blood . and because the enemies of the publick peace have endeavoured to represent those of the king's party as men implacable , and such as would sacrifice the common good as their private passions . we doe sincerely profess that we doe reflect upon our past sufferings from the hand of god , and therefore doe not cherish any violent thoughts or inclinations to have been any way instrumental in them ; and if the indiscretion of any spirited persons transports them to expressions contrary to this our sense , we utterly disclaim them , and desire that the imputation may extend no farther than the folly of the offenders . and we farther declare , that we intend by our quiet and peaceable behaviour to testifie our submission to the present power , as it now resides in the council of state in expectation of the future parliament , upon whose wisedome and determinations , we trust god will give such a blessing , as may produce a perfect settlement both in church and state . and as his excellency hath not chosen the sandy foundation of self-concernment , but the firm rock of national interest , whereon to frame our settlement : it is our hope and prayer that when the building comes to be raised , it may not like rome have its beginning in the blood of brethren , nor like babel be interrupted by the confusion of tongues . but that we may all speak one language , and be of one name , that all mention of parties and factions , and all rancour and animosities may be thrown in and buried like rubbish under the foundation . subscribed by the marquiss of dorchester the earl of northampton the earl of devonshire the earl of barkshire the earl of dover the earl of peterborough the earl of norwich the earl of corke the earl of carbery the earl of desmond the viscount ogle the viscount grandison the viscount lumley the viscount brounker the lord lucas the lord bellasis the lord loughborough the lord lexinton the lord brereton tho. fuller bp. of kerry sir william compton sir francis vane john russel wil. ashburnham edward villers thomas howard will. howard sir jarvis clifton knight and baronet sir tho. corbet bar. sir tho. littleton bar. sir john greenvil knight and baronet sir wil. thorold bar. sir tho. prestwich bar. sir orlando bridgman sir ed. pie sir lewis kirke sir tho. smith sir rob. stapleton sir wil. coney sir nich. crisp sir hugh cartwright sir sutton cony sir henry chichley sir wil. morton sir ed. savage sir tho. armstrong sir john stephens sir humph. bennet sir wil. howard sir hen. wroth sir wil. dacres sir rich. malevory sir arthur gorge sir anthony jackson sir robert bolles george morley d. d. tho. warmstry d. d. jer. taylor d. d. phil. king d. d. e. penrodock will. legg george penrodock tho. lower herbert price tho. panton robert ruthen coll. fretswel john jeffryes adrian scrope wil. burgh john mayard ed. rosecarack and many others . finis . the bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of the grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians. rous, francis, 1579-1659. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a57691 of text r15008 in the english short title catalog (wing r2013). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 146 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 37 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a57691 wing r2013 estc r15008 11846585 ocm 11846585 49850 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57691) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 49850) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 38:16) the bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of the grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians. rous, francis, 1579-1659. [2], 66 p. printed for john wright ..., london : 1649. in reply to: a religious demurrer, a second part of the religious demurrer, and the grand case of conscience stated. written by francis rous. cf. halkett & laing (2nd ed.). errata: p. 66. reproduction of original in huntington library. eng solemn league and covenant (1643) grand case of conscience stated. religious demurrer. allegiance -early works to 1800. political science -early works to 1800. a57691 r15008 (wing r2013). civilwar no the bounds & bonds of publique obedience. or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed ascham, antony 1649 27599 96 0 0 0 0 0 35 c the rate of 35 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the c category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2003-08 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2003-09 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2003-10 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2003-10 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-12 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the bounds & bonds of publique obedience or , a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government , or to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things . likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant . in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers , and to the author of the grand case of conscience , who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians . london printed for iohn wright at the kings head in the old-bayley , 1649 , the bounds and bonds of publique obedience , or a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government , or to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things . i know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to passe , that in the disquisition of a truth ( though a simple uniforme thing ) yet the contests about it , are usually infinite , and it is as difficult a thing to disincumber it feom errours , as it is a good field from weeds and brambles ; which when the country man hath burnt to ashes , and thinks he hath quite destroyed , the next yeare to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous then before . surely our unhappinesse in the e●adication of civill errours is , that we speake more to the affections then to the iudgement , and therefore offer passion in stead of reason , or make one but the counterfeit of the other , or else not affecting one anothers persons , we fling headily into opposite paths or principles , in which not treading together at first , we cannot possibly meet together at last , and in this aberration we loose both truth and our selves . thus we finde it in these three severall answers to the first treatise , in which ( and the unhappilier , to give foundation to practicable errors ) they at the very entry of the controversie mistake principles , in jure publico , in the riginall of magistracy and government , in the nature of possession , prescription , right of extream necessity , of assertory & promissory oaths , &c. things which were otherwaies stated and proved in that discourse to which they have bin referred ; i should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers , that they do suponere quodlibet , ut probetur quidlibet , were it not but that i see them so majesterially peremptory to prescribe to others , and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man & man ; that i finde one of them give such a losse to his passion , that it carries him into direct blasphemy , advising that a committee might treat with god , yea sentence the blessed trinity . lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attaine publique desolation they will not allow toothers ; wherefore as the subtilties of the vop●●rs are so fine and delicate , that they passe upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we heare them over our heads formd into thunder , lightning and tempests , even so the fumes of these private mens passions passe so subtilly through their soft words , that if we who converse with them , be not maturely advisd of them , their insinuation will draw us into fire and flame , into blood and desolation , into the calamities of a war , which perhaps may end as distantly from our and their now covenant intentions as the two former have already done . the question which was first asserted stands still unshaken and almost untoucht , and in all th●se answers it is evidently granted , that we of the people may lawfully give obedience to an unlawfull power ; this onely is denied , that it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right , which is very uncasuistly and unconscientiously inserted here , because that is not the peoples present case , but the governours , these onely asserting that , contenting themselves with simple obedience from us . the first argument of the first demurrer is formed against the incapacity of the persons governing , and it runs thus : ob. that which is now termed a parliament , is neither formally , materially , nor effectually a parliament , such as is requisite for this kingdom , either according to the mind of god , or the necessities of the state . first , because the change which is made in it , is not made by those who first constituted it , unlesse it be by conquest . the modern modell containes not the whole , nor the major part of the peoplee secondly , the alteration is made by the commons only , the nobility as illustrior pars populi , appeared not in it . ans. though this argument ( with the rest ) relates more to the commanders then to the obeyers , ( of whom our controversie onely is ) and that we of the people have a right to do lawfull things , though there were no magistrate lawfull or unlawful to oversee us , yet i shall not stop at these advantages , but oppose to the main of this argument , the main of our creation and conservation . for we have nothing else to doe in the world , but to praise god and love our neighbour . the circumstance of the magistrate is onely to be an encouragement of this , and to see that it be done with security : and if he doe this ( whatever he be ) we are beholding to him , and should praise god for him , and then why not obey him ? though this were granted , that one magistrate was unjustly ejected by another , and one government by another , yet that relates onely to those who co-operated in it whilst it was doing . how can such a supposed guilt in them , be in any part continued upon , and ascribed to us of the low ranke of the people ? or now especially that we come into it after it is done , and after we are under the full possession of a present power ? people by the effects of it , sustaine punishment enough if they lose a good magistracy , must they likewise be punisht because it is lost , though they were no con-cause of it ? the authour of the grand case of conscience , p. 10. infers yes , and therefore makes our new commotions necessary : because we can do nothing just in a state , where , ( through the defect of a legal magistracy ) we can have no justice , yea though the things we do be in themselves just . for ( quoth he ) judgement is then onely just , when it is exercised by the higher powers , the legall magistracy of that kingdome , where it is acted . i answer , things are considerable , onely so far as they may reach the ends for which they are . the end of every magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated : iusto enim non ponitur lex . the end of justice is to be a measure of equity , that is , of equality . justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive . but neither of these relate so essentially to the legall magistrate , that nothing may be done truly and conscienciously just , without he co-operate in it . as for commutative equality , if titius lend sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity , which bushels have the publique mark upon them , and sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality , but that there wants the former mark , or that the said bushels have another mark , will you say sempronius hath not intrinsically done titius justice , or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity ? especially if in the mean time no more of that former marke can be had ? as for distributive justice , we know that st. paul advised the corinthians to avoyd the iegall magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that countrey , and rather to end things by arbitrement among themselves , which had been an advice unjust , and to the scandall of christianity , if things in themselves just might not be done but by the justice of the legall magistrate . this therefore is but according to an old axiome of justice , provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis . thus much i have thought fit to answer in generall to this objection ; but now more particularly i answer to its terms . and first , why is not this effectually a parliament , seeing it is the supream present power of the whole nation , no part excluded ? which in this controversie is the very term of the question . i hope he means no criticisme by the word parliament ; if he doth , it signifies onely a publique speaking or consulting together for the publique . moreover , the authour would be ( i am sure ) much perplext , if i should aske him , how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a parliament or supreame power requisite for this kingdome , according to the mind of god ? he must pardon us if we thinke formes no more then persons are to last here alwaies ; or that the changes which have been , and still are to be of both , must never be done but according to the customary formalities of a quiet people , but rather according to the extreame necessity of a state . for if he aske me , what it is that forms in-organizd people into a government , of what sort soever ? i answer , necessity . if , what makes or takes away a law in a government established ? i answer , necessity . if , what takes away a government it selfe ? i answer , according to himselfe . page 2. that which first gave it being , viz. necessity . of which there are severall degrees ; for in a peaceable state a word may take away that which in a disturbd state must be taken away by the sword : after which it is but equall that he who gives the last blow , should in that quarrell give the last word , and leave us to a peremptory obedience , unlesse we would have no quarter in the world , or be like the old servati in bello , who were sold , confind to chains all their lives , or condemnd to dig perpetually in mynes ; all which it seems this authour would have the conclusion of this argument , or else we are more beholding to the charity of enemies , then to his . if we will not be perswaded by the states arguments , yet let us hear what grotius , among others , determined long agoe , for all the world in this case . if a king have but part of a supream power ( which consists in making and taking away lawes , in laying universall taxes ) and the people or senate have the other , the king may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his , because for so much he hath no right nor power . this is to hold , although such a king have the militia alone ; for that ( in his hand ) relates onely to forraigne warre , it being unconceivable how they who share in supreame . rights , can be exempt from a right of defending them . when war shall happen betwixt such fundamentall and supreame parties , the king may loose all his share by the right of war . lib. 1. c. 4. § 13. de jubel . & pa. ] which right of warre betwixt those who divide a whole kingdome , if it end clearly to the reduction of one party , is not called so properly conquest as victory . this authour uses the name of the first onely for the hatred every one bears to it , because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole ; whereas victory relates onely to a part of either , as beginning and ending in civill warres , where disputes of right arise betwixt those of the same jurisdiction and country , and of the same common law . but we have arguments more authentique then these , to shew that such changes may be according to the mind of god ; and the demurrer all his life will never prove the contrary , dan. 4.31 , 32. gods power is an everlasting power , and his kingdome is from heneracion to generation ; all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing , and according to his will he worketh in the army of heaven , and in the inhabitants of the earth , and none can stay his hand , nor say unto him what dost thou ? that is , god as universall lord , and king of kings , governes both angels , men , and divels , and all must submit to him , because of his supreame irresistibility . psalm . 75.7 . god is the iudge , he maketh low , and he maketh high . it must be confest that by him princes raigne ; but our authour had rather perpetually imbroile our bodies and soules , then clearly say , by whom it is that princes cease to reign . for then this controversie would easily he reconc●l'd , and we as easily one to another . wee have shewn how the reason of constituting , and of changing governments , is still one and the same , viz. supreame necessity : but the demurrer objects that our change hath not beene done by the same order of persons , who were in the old , viz. by major part of lords , and major part of the commons . although he is againe besides the state of the question , shewing onely how they who are the supream power of the land , ought not to command us , rather then that we may not obey them in lawfull things ; yet i shall here make another sort of reply , which will be very short to those who profess themselves presbyterians , that is , originally parliamentarians . kingdoms which are supream in themselves , and communicate not in one anothers lawes , are all of them iure gentium , in a state of war , unless they be mutually bound by leagues to the contrary ; which leagues if they come to be broken , usually have the conditions of invasion annexed , and the time and places nominated for beginning it ; and because there is nothing any longer due by law , or league from the party injured , where now the sword is onely to end the controversie , therefore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring , rightly changes all titles in iure publico , and in the right of governing what is acquired ; but in one and the same kingdome , where the supremacie of power and right lies divided ( as grotius page 7. states it ) there , if they differ fundamentally , denying one anothers rights and powers , they are then immediately in the same state of war with those other separate kingdoms ; here onely is the difference , that these in their concurrence and constitution , making but one , have none of those ordinary cautions , as leagues have for their right of invading one another by the way of war : a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them , then that in the marriage of two persons , a lawyer should come after the minister hath conjoyn'd them , and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to divorce , and after their divorce , what kinde of marriages they should make next . even so war is suppos'd in that case , as well as divorce in this ; but because war begins there where law ends , and reciprocally , and hath nothing but necessity for its equity , and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen , nor where security may at the end of all be presum'd off , therefore there neither is , nor ever was any fixt rule in any countrey , what people should be bound to do at the end of a a vvar. i hope the presbyterians neither of england , nor scotland intend to deny what all the world knowes , that they concluded the king under the necessity of vvar , as well as others who conjoyned with them , and having stated his case there , they of the kirke long agoe frankly declared , that he not satisfying for the blood of three kingdoms , was not to touch the scepter any more , but as mr. hinderson applyed in his newcastle conference the 4th . of hester 14. that if his majesty reforme not according to their way , he and no lesse then his fathes house were to perish : by which what could hee and they understand lesse , then change of government ? a thing , why now so horrid for the other party to think on , seeing they gave first intimation of it ? they joyntly declared , that the king was not to judge any thing for himselfe , nor upon what tearms his readmittance to simple liberty could stand with their security ; * for , his vvar when it ended ( as they said who imprisoned him ) continued the same necessity upon them , which made them take armes at the beginning . therefore they themselves concluded , that nothing could be changed in the kings concernment , according to the old forme and constitution of the kingdom , which relates to a time of peace , and not to a time of war . but the nobility whom he here stiles , illustrior pars populi , concurred not to this change ; therefore it is formally and fundamentally unlawfull . in the first place , i understand not , and i beleeve the lords doe as little , what he meanes by putting them into such improper latine . for they alwaies understand themselves to be rather of the two comites regis , then partem populi ; and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the kingdome , form'd to themselves a separated house , a jurisdiction over the people , & lay as a barre betwixt the king and them ; whether that power of their's had any congruity with the other supreame and legislative rights of the people or no , is not now the question , but rather this , whether according to their mutuall engagements , their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the house of commons , or no ? this is by them affirmed , and the state of venice as profound platonists deny the other ; for otherwise noble men would be as difficulty reformed as kings , and therefore they rarely conferre illustrious titles of nobility on any but those who are in illustrious offices , things separable from persons , by which meanes all offices with them are questionable : but to return , that which according to themselves thus excluded the king , by the same logicke excluded the lords ; and if they either directly or indirectly concurred to the ruine of the rest of the kingdome , then the argument runs strong , that the house of commons were bound to preserve it , and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under god to them ▪ but because i will suppose nothing here , the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other . wherefore if any will aske whether there was not a warre undertaken last yeare very eminently dangerous to the whole parliament and their party ; the army , and country committees , and that by the contrivance of the royall party here , the scots nation in the north , ormond in ireland , it will be past denying ; likewise whether the house of lords in that extremity declared with the commons that the scots were enemies to the kingdome , or upon the first or second request gave their concurrence for counties to arme themselves for their defence ; the ●oyce of all parties must needs say no : so that , that house undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the parliament , as they did , who were actually in armes against their party every where . and how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them , and to their securities , who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessities ? as for the exclusion of some members of the house of commons , i hope the sincere presbyterians wonder not at that act , because the kirk and state of scotland was preserved by such an act last year , and by the concourrence of the same meanes which did this here . yea though they who from thence invaded our nation , declared as much for the covenant and presbytery as the kirke it selfe , save only that the kirke had the good luck to speake the last word . they who sit at top in the state are tanquam in nubibus , to the eyes of us of the people . wee know not how they manage their counsels , nor contrive their tran●actions , that is best determined by and amongst themselves . it is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act ; and be persons who enter by vertue of free election , and s●t in the legall place . for in a case where five are chosen to a businesses , and that any three of them are to be of the qu●rum , though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained , yet what the other three doe is to all intents and purposes valid , which is the present case . by this gentlemans favour , we have an axiome of law , which saith that in partner-ship or society ( as the civill law calls it ) when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equall contribution either of art or mony , then potior est conditio negantis : nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the negatives , though fewer in number , which was the parliaments case when after the equall provocations of a prince by warre and imprisonment some of the same house thought he might have been securely readmitted into the government again , and others thought it evidently dangerous . in this case the difference was as it were legall betwixt the members , but not to be decided any way but by force , there being no other tribunall to judge them , and their house might not judge of it , because there they were parties and judges , a thing allowed no where ; and if otherwise , then the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure . but what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place , seemes not out of form to us of the people ; which was the case of the house of lords when most of them & many of the commons at the beginning of the first war , fled to the king under pretence of force from westm. yea when the five members were forc't from sitting , yet the rest of the house sat and acted without them , and voted a committee , ian. 5. to sit in london , and there to take into consideration the breach of priviledges , the safety of the king and kingdome , and preservation of ireland , which was accordingly done by vertue of those votes , made when members were thus forct away . all our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawfull or unlawfull in themselves , as for the will of the major part of the people , how will the demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present power , then seeke to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another war ? they usually looke after nothing but their rents , markets , and reasonable subsistances , they are the luxurious and ambitious part onely which pretends to new troubles . the peoples question thereof is not how the change was made , but an sit whether it be so changed or noe ? for if according to its formality that be not rightly done ; it concerneth not their consciences no more then the thunder or lightning over their heads doth , which are things totally out of their power , much lesse may they lawfully desolate neighbours for them . but he hath found one firme axiome , that when part of any thing is cut off , the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma , cessat formatum ; ergo the late force on the parliament hath made this no parliament . i wish he had taken the paines to give either a distinction or an instance in his axiome , or have drawn up his inference into a syllogisme ; for i feare we shall finde wide impertinence in the first , and a grosse non sequitur , in the last as he hath ordered it . the question disputed here is not whither the denominated parliament now sitting at westminster be a parliament according to the old forme and composure of parliament or no , but whither tht parliament now sitting at westminster , be the supreame power of the kingdome or no , and to be obeyed in lawfull things . his argument runs thus ; the surpeme power of the kingdome consists in a parliament of king , lords and commons . but at westminster there is not a parliament consisting of king , lords and commons . ergo at westminster , there is no true parliament at all nam dum cessat forma , cessat formatum . i thought he had been so good a logician , as to have understood that the conclusion of his syllogisme ought to have been contradictory to the question , from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five , which is very true , but how is it any thing to the purpose ? however i will doe him the favour to deny his major — for we speake of powers which now are , and he himselfe hath all along condoled the e●ection of the king , and of house of lords , as things which are not . sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones ; & so consequently they who are now nothing , make nothing now at westminster , or anywhere else . but doth it follow however , that there can not be now any supream power at westminster ? at all if he had proved this , he had proved something . but pe●●aps the very word parliament poses him , or else he would thereby impose on others . i must confesse words are dangerous , when they are not fully explained : and possibly the king mistook himselfe very much upon the very alphabet and word of his title , supposing he could not be named king , unlesse he were ab●olute , as he observed other kings were ; whereas by our constitution he was but one of three , who concurred to the making and abrogating a law , and it belong'd to the commons alone , to lay an universall taxe ; so that he was in most things rather prince by office , then king by power , in tanto , non in toto . even so the word parliament , as it hath been popularly understood , signifies the assembly of severall houses , deliberating and concluding what was judged for the good of the publique . but it is a contradiction to say a parliament cannot at all be truly so called , unles so understood ; we know there are eight parliaments in france , which are not of such a constitution , though of the same denomination . and if severall persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the publique good of the people , sit now at westminster , and that the other concurrent powers be civily dead ; why may not we congruously enough still call them a parliament ? his axiome therefore serves onely against himselfe , and the true english of dum cessat form● cessat formatum ; is this , that seeing the old forme of this state , as it was in the supremacy of kings lords and commons ▪ hath in that relation ceased to be , and is civilly dead , not being able any longer to act any thing ; and that a civill body as well a naturall , cannot live without a head one day ; it followes then by this position , that the regall government is gone , and that we are in the state of a republique ; no other power now informing or actuating us , besides that which pretends to such a state ; and where i pray you is that to be found now , but at westminster . in the next place he offers a case , if the king , when hee came to accuse the five members , had detained all but forty and the speaker ; and had forc't them to vote , that the whole legislative power resided in himselfe ; would we have deemed this a valid vote ? especially seeing some votes since this session were adjudged null , because the house was under a force . by which it seemes ( quoth he ) that with some new veritas non est perpetua ; and duo dum faciunt idem , non estidem . to the first i answer positively , that such a vote attained by the king , had beene no wayes duely valid . but what is this to the purpose ? for the question should have beene after the king had detained such a vote , and had got us all into his full possession , whether we of the people might have obey'd him ever after in lawfull things . secondly , if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel , to the late exclusion of the members , he prevaricates grosly againe ; for he supposes the very forty in the house , with the king , to have been under a force ; whereas in the parliaments late case , none but those who were out of the house , were under restraint ; the former were supposed to be forc't to a particular vote , the latter were kept from voting at all : besides they who de facto voted in the house , have publiquely declared that they past their votes , with all wonted freedome , and were rescued as it were from an overawing power , which concludes against his argument abundantly . as in this argument he hath done truth little service ; so he hath ( by his mistake ) done kingly government lesse . for if princes who have us in their full possession , may be obey'd in no lawful things , after they acquire an addition of some other powers unlawfull ; then he would dislove most of their governments , and have absolv'd us from allegiance to king charles long before this parliament began ; by which sort of arguing the royallists i see will have no great prise this gentleman . but the parliament hath already declared the votes made under a force are null ; this vote i suppose he meanes past , after boyes and apprentices of the towne , had entred the house , and made the speaker propound , and the members vote what they pleas'd . here indeed there were forced votes ; but surely this proves not , that they who voted , when the members were last excluded , voted in that manner . besides the parliament which knowes better then we of the people , what their owne disorders within their house are , are only fit to vote , what votes have beene forc't upon them , and they since that time have declared , they never transacted things with greater freedome and lesse overawing . from whence i easily see that his axiomes will serve him nothing at all . for we acknowledge veritatem esse perpetuam , if we speake of naturall and mathematicall truths , where there is no medium proportionis , to varie the thing ; as , all number are even or odd ; because there is no middle number , so all lines are either crooked or straight : but morall & civil things are alwaies in change , because humane actions are invested with such an infinity of circumstances and accidents ; for which reason duo dum faciunt idem non est idem ; for no two men in the world can act the same thing in all the same circumstances : thus we heare that omnis des●nitio in jure est periculosa ; and summum jus aliquando sit summa miuria , which cannot be but in regard of those various accidents which perplex our actions , and make them like that famous flower the marvell of peru , which changes the colour of it 's leaves every day . his last axiome , that no man ought to take advantage of his owne wrongfull act or of anothers : is impertinent and no way beloning to us of the people . if he intends it to the present governours , he had best to take heed againe , that he determine not against severall lines of our kings : for the clearing of whose titles after usurpations , the judges were ancienty sore put to it , to make this one axiome for all . that the imposition of the crowne takes away all defects , and stops in blood . and if this be true , then we and our forefathers for the most part , have live'd ●nder no better titles then plenary possession , to which they submitted , either because they knew no better titles , or could have none of better to command them , or because they were resolved they might lawfully submit in lawfull things , which therefore as it now seemes , is not so much our present question as our present passion . two principall inconveniences hee findes in this present government , and by the goodnesse of the fruit hee hopes hee may judge of the tree . where i must againe admonish him , that the civill fruit of a government is alike in all governments , especially as to the meum and tuum of a people besides , if the tree and the fruits here were alike , then a good axiome were spol'd ; malus homo potest esse bonus civis , & bonus magistratus , a man bad to himselfe , may be a good magistrate and a good common-wealths man . his first inconvenience is , that wee have now made the basis of the state , a quick-sand ; and it stands like nebuchadnezzars image , upon a mixt footing , part iron , part clay . i answer , that it stands not now on so mixt a footing as before ; for the concurrence of king , lords , and commons , for the product of a supream act , was a mixture of things very heterogeneous , to enter into one and the same composition : by reason whereof , supremacy confin'd as it were on a battable ground ; and if we will believe persidents , king sometimes gain'd upon the other two , sometimes the lords topt both , and now all is more united then ever in the sole sufferage of the people . toleration is the next inconvenience , it being but equitable , that if wee thinke it lawfull to force people to submit to the orders of the state , the same people be compel'd to adhere to an established confession of faith in religion . for it is presum'd that obedience is fully as due to god as to man . i answer , the christian religion is not tolerated amongst us , it is enjoyn'd , as much as one man can passe it upon another ; for , the finall penalty of neglecting it here is not to be required of us mutually in this life . secondly , the confessions of faith , which he would have men forc't too , are ( as i conceive he meanes ) but logicall deductions out of scripture , ergo not indubitably , true enough to be by force obtruded on mens faiths ; it is not enough to say here , that they who compile them verily believe them true , and intend not to deceive , which is all that can be said . for then they doe no more but quote themselves , and we are taught that it is a popish opinion to beleeve any company of men are infallible , in what they purpose : wherefore the magistrate can doe no more safely , then recommend not force , their notions and logick on the people . but in a case of meum and tuum , or in a morall thing he may be more peremptory then in a divine , because those things are certainlyer knowne to us as men , then what is of divine revelation and inference . he feares that by an obedience to an unlawfull power , he may assert its unlawfulnesse ; and should our servants rise against us , and command us by threats to performe a lawfull act , which is but transient we might yeild to avoid their force : but if they should affirme that the government of the family were theirs by right , and that they intended to perpetuate it over us ; we should thinke it a great sinne to betray that place and power wherein god hath naturally and morally placed us . this indeed is a very fine subtilty to end in nothing : and i am sure what ever the basis of the state be , the basis of his argument is put on a quick-sand . for if he intend truth thereby , he should have proved this maine thing ; that the former magistrate was our naturall parent , and that we all derive from him , as from a genarcha , which being so evidently false , is as ill supposed . for in this confusion of families in the world , in which the originall families are lost ; we owe no naturall duty to any , but to those from whose blood we derive . secondly , though it were true , that the chiefe magistrate were our naturall parent , yet it followes not , but there may be a case wherein he might be refrained from government ; the law supposes many , which is sufficient to oppose this gentlemans single judgement ; and if he be indeed a presbyterian , he hath already concluded as much in the last kings case , by concurring to invest his person with the accidents of warre , in detayning him prisoner at holmby , and newcastle &c. thirdly , i understand not what he meanes by gods placing a magistrate morally over us . for god he is our divine and supreame magistrate ; our parent is our naturall and domestik magistrate , and those who command the state wherein we are , are our civill publique subordinate magistrates under god ; and every particular man who is arrived to the maturity of reason , is , ( if any such be ) his owne morall or private magistrate . for the principle of a humane or morall action , is a minde acting freely according to vertue , and those lawes which are written within us . but if by a morall magistrate , he meanes such a one only , as is seated over us , and hath a care that we live conformably to vertue , and honesty in relation to others ; then it followes , that whoever hath the capacity so to hold inspection over us , is a sufficient magistrate ; but that can onely be he under whose full possession we actually are . moreover he is to know againe , that states cannot looke so strictly after vertue , as after publique quiet . for morall vertue is a private thing , and by reason of the free concurrence of the will , cannot be discovered certainely , but by those who are able to look within a man : but that which is ad alterum , and concernes rather wrong , then right , belongs to the politicall magistrate , as a thing which cannot without confusion have redresse otherwayes . for the chiefe convenience of a state , is , that people might be kept from inconvenience , or incommoding one another ; and that they may be conserv'd in a liberty to doe other good things according to piety and honesty : so that he who doth things in themselves good , though under an unlawfull civill magistrate , doth not by those acts assert any magistrates right ; but his only who originally gave law and rules for those internall acts , and that is gods right alone . lastly , whereas in this argument , he saith a father of a family so abused should in his required submission , sin , if he betrayed his place and power which god had naturally given him . i answer that there is a difference betwixt betraying a place so given , and loosing it by force ( which indeed is his first supposition ) the one cannot be done without sin , because it is done voluntarily and totally by himselfe , but it is not our sin if we be forc't out of a place ; to which we are compelled by a principle without us , and totally besides our power . but there is a lawfuller power visible enough to religious eyes , though for the present in an ecclipse , and suspended . it is not lawfull for a man to marry another woman whilst his owne wife is in a sound , or for a woman to marry another man , whilst her husband is in captivity or restraint , and willing to come to her if he might . to this i answer ; first , how knowes he certainely that the other power is onely in an ecclipse or suspended ? or if it be onely in an ecclipse , doth it follow that we of the people might not doe lawfull actions by the suppliment of other lights , whilst we cannot have that of the sun ? must we all that while cease to be men for the absence of that which we cannot help ? the presybterian party would not have that understood so ; when the king was in prison at holmby . there be no more suns in the world but one , but there are many magistrates , and such who give better light one then the other , for which reason god first chose not monarchy for the jewes , certainly in an ecclipse , the sun is never out of his naturall orbe , though his light and influence may be suspended and intercepted from us , but when a prince is in a forraigne country , and lives under the lawes of another magistracy , and that all lawes and di stributions of justice and magistracy in the country he pretends to , are made without him and against him , will you according to the lawes of nature , nations , or policy , say he alone , and in that condition , is the supreame power or authority of that country , or rather that we of the people do nothing but sinne in his absence , though we do things in themselves lawfull ? if you will aske how he came to be out of his orbe or country , ? i am sure it was against the advice either of presbyterian or independent . it is easily granted , that a man may not marry another woman , so soone as his wife falls into a swound . but you must againe be reminded that the nature of marriage and of government differ extreamly there , where you suppose them most to agree . for marriage is not alwaies necessary to every particular man . but the publique body of a people cannot be without government one day , no more then a man can be without a head , because a smalltime serves to the ruine of a man . secondly , to take this or that woman to wife , is a thing of free choice ; but it is not so alwaies with the people in relation to kings , who have many of them committed great rapes upon them , as i beleeve this gentleman will acknowledge . a woman may not marry another husband , whilst her first is in captivity , and willing to come to her if he might . these cases of marriage still makes a very bad paralell with our present case . for first , we have been taught by all parties in this warre , that a king of england is not as a husband to the people of england . for a husband is he who alone makes and abrogates the laws of his owne family , as a right of his propriety , which a king of england could not doe alone in this state . secondly , where was this prince ever crowned by which this author meanes solemnly married to this state ? where was the benedictio sacra , the anointing or the oath of contract taken by him ? i am sure the covenant hath made no provision for him . to this purpose is that argument in the grand case of conscience , [ viz. ] the apostle commands wives to submit to their husbands , surely quà husbands , not quà men but sheuld a stranger come to anothers wife and ca●l himselfe husband ( having before either imprisoned or slaine the right full husband ) and require submission , surely though shee might hee forced , yet it were a sinne to submit to him thus as a husband . i answer , to submit in adultery is a plaine sinne ; but for a woman to submit in lawfull things to the power of a stranger is no sinne , though he please to call himselfe her husband , or exercise the government of the family . there is the same mistake of husband here , as in the former , so that the argument built thereupon , of it selfe fals to the ground . but if by this he meanes that in matter of supreame command , we of the people may not obey any but the husband or the king , why then did the presbyterian party for so many years oppose , and not totally submit to their now supposed husband ? why did they commissionate so many thousand men , who by accidents of warre had the power , though not the chance to kill him ? nay in the parliaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them , that it was he the husband , that would have killed them the supposed wife , for which reason the kirke of scotland long ago sent him a bill of divorce , unlesse he satisfied for the blood of three kingdoms . which of the two parties it was that at last killed him , belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people , though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more ( if he will further argue it ) then dim n●tio and obtruncatio capitis doe , for they who after a long warre , and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that regall power ( here so much argued for ) did according to the terme of the civill law , diminuere caput regis , and they who in consequence of his civill death , tooke away his naturall life , did obtrune are caput regis . if he had been kill'd in an action of warre before , should the souldier , or he who gave the souldier commission have answered for his life ? as for the submission of a wife to a stranger as to her husband , which is indeed a sin , i earnestly pray the author seriously to consider , whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin , ever since this kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an usurping king , if this his way of arguing be true ? as for the second demurrer , i consider he hath given account to another very worthy pen , which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field ; however i shall see what hath escaped his hand , that the world may witnesse at last , that truth hath lovers , as well as errour and passion have cham ions . this author and the grand case of conscience begin with st. paul ro. 13. that wee must submit to higher powers , not that wee may lawfully submit , and that not for wrath onely , but for conscience sake , which is of things necessary , not of things lawfull : wherefore ( say they ) it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things , obedience as a matter of conscience being a thing necessary . i grant it either in lawfull or necessary things , when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole sepremacy of power in themselves . if i hold this lawfull , and he hold it necessary , we are not contrary ; he onely makes what i allow more allowable . but the reason wherefore the apostle requires obedience to such , not onely for wrath ( which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreàme have to destroy us ) but for conscience sake is , least by our resisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw calamity on others , and likewise in regard of their authority from god , tyrants even in title not arriving to the great dominions of the earth , without gods secret order , god having clearly stated the government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife prerogative , he not being known or feared any way so much as by dominio n , which made st. augus . in c. dei . rightly say , potestates omnes sunt a deo , non omnes voluntates , so that the reason wherefore god permits sometimes such princes to attaine to these powers , is the same wherefore he permits devils in his government of the world , a nimrod , or a pharaoh , a caesar , or a herod , an antichrist or a turke , who as bad , and as usurping as they are , and seeme to us in exercising so severe , though so secret a part of gods justice , yet fulfill severall prophecies , which shewes they come not to what they are , meerely by humane contrivance by chance or accident . the grand case of conscience . p. 3. distinguisheth betwixt authority or power , and rulers deputed to the exercise of that authority . the first is by gods positive ordinance , the other bu● by his permission . here he grants enough as to our case , which is of obedience , for if he can assure me that it is consonant to gods permissive will that such persons be my magistrates , i am well satisfied then , that gods will is , i must be their subject , gods free admission of one being the necessary exclusion of all the rest , so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice , but of my necessity . but the demurrer , p. 3 . would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers , and unlawfull powers , if obedience be necessary to both . i answer , if the powers here supposed by him agree equally in their supremacy , and absolutenesse , and differ onely as one is got lawfully , the other unlawfully , then the difference of our obedience to either , is onely in the difference of things commanded , as they are either lawfull or unlawfull ; neither can the author ( now arguing so much for a lawfull power ) conscienciously tell us , that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded ; but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlawfull , and worse to us of the people , then if we were under the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things . the knot of this point lies here , whither a civill circumstance ( such as is the magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull ) can vitiate an act of morall duty ? i believe his distinction p. 2 . of a government constituted or constituting , serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe . for i hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin , though with rooting or without rooting . not but that god and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such , for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression ; the receipt whereof they do not justify the title of such estates , much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull title of a supreame magistrate , from whose care we receive necessary protection . i say much lesse , because cases of estates are juris privati and have courts to judge of them , but the other is so much juris publici , that there is no mortall court to judge of it , for which reason how will these authors ( what governours soever they desire ) evidently prove that they originally had lawfull titles , or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves , but that the people voluntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in nimrods case . from whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of conscience , p. 3. that , if he had that desired governour , yet according to himselfe he would not owne him long , because he were not sure to have in him a supreame power , such as the apostle , ro. 13. in his sence understands necessary for the kingdome of england . but in our sence of plenary possession , which was the case of the apostles time , we can easily see first , how our present power is the higher ( the whole kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate magistracy , from them ) and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the same apostle ; and to the duty of our creation and being in this world . the case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a government may be altered ; but it must be done still by the higher powers , whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered , as to a continued for me ▪ but it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low , and exact obedience as to the legall authority . i thought that he who in his sence understood the covenant in terminis eternall , would not have allowed a change of government here ; no more then he might allow the scots ( though upon never so much reason to themselves ) to change their doctrine or discipline ; because we swore during all our lives , to preserve that which was established among them , at the time of our swearing . but i now see we may well distinguish betwixt the covenant it selfe , and some covenanters , the covenant being as open for one change , as for the other . secondly , if a government though never so reasonably reformed or altered , be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed , ( termes which he did ill to leave out of his argument ) unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers ; then farewell all the old consequences of solis populi suprema lex , and the presbyterians form● . armes are unjustifiable . how corrupt and tyrannicall are most of the governments of the world , and yet how many of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves ? or diminish any thing in themselves , to alter for the better ? although the taking away of something in a government , may be as necessary , as continuing any old or new thing in it . certainly these authors have read but few of ionases , who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a tempest . thirdly , our alteration was made by the present supreame power of the people : and the reason wherefore both houses laid the exercise of regall power aside for some yeares , made the commons as they have agrued it , lay it aside for altogether . viz. salus populi suprema lex ; the laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people ; that it might be laid aside for more yeares , and that one king might be laid aside as well as another . for to us it seemes effectually all one , non esse & non operari , for a thing not to be at all , and in this world to doe nothing at all . if they sinned who did this , is that any thing to any but themselves ? it is an axiome of good law noxa sequitur caput . thus whilst his argument should have been against our lawfull obedience , it is against their exacting it , as to the legall authority , which yet is grosly false ; for they exact it not as to the old legall authority , but as to the present supreame power of the people , non nomine regis , sed nominepopuli : and yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall authority , because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before , and continued in life by them , as our lives themselves are . case of cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obeying those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power , is fit onely to destroy states : for then should none governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up . i conceive ( according to what is already proved ) that nothing can befound , either more consonant to christian charity , or to the preservation of states , then this our principle of obedience ; besides he knowes no kingdome in the world , where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession ; allegiance alwayes relating to protection . and if according to his consequence , we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that per●on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact ( because according to these authors intermediate intrusions , are violations of rights , and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull ) then i pray you of what can we resolve lesse , then certainly to extirpate one another ? which will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle ; and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one , who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully , must we resolve of doing all unlawfull things by warre our selves , and desert unnecessarily , the cares of wife and children , of church and neighbour ? for non-obedience in a state is but a chimaera , neutrality , a state without relation ; there is no subsistence for it in any state , and unlesse you will allow me to concurre with others , and under others in lawfull things , i must leave the world ; my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction . the two demurrers p. 3. & p. 7. except against this our present obedience , beeause the present powers is yet new : neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery . philosophers hold that the definition of a man belongs to an infant , as well as to one of many yeares . because after the organization of the parts , he is informed with the same principle of life and reason , as a growne man is ; and having the same forme , is the same thing . even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this kingdome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection , which are the soule of a state , and the power which preceded this , what did it infuse more vitall then this ? and now that that is taken away , if this other did not presently enter into its place ; the common-wealth were dead , and each man were left in his naturals , to subsist of himselfe , and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre , defend himselfe from all the rest of the world , every man in this state having an equall right to every thing . wherefore let every man , especially , they who would informe consciences , take heed of affecting popular revenge , vvhich must also reach themselves at last : for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull actions , vvhat can they th●n commit but the un'avvfull ? into what an unhappy transport are we fallen , that such a principle should be derived from our church , the very papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull , though the state seemed to them unlawfull . these will judge better of the state now then of the church , the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things , the other deterring us from them . but to return to the argument ; i have already shewed , that new or old powers , never can signifie good or bad powers . the uncertaine hopes of recovering in the future , proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present , and it is our obedience at this time which this q●estion relates to however the king of portugals acquisition , or usurpation was presently acknowledged by our king and others , although the king of spaine then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it , he being alwaies hannibal ad portas , and never removing out of his own dominion into another forreigne magistracy . the first demurrer p. 7. conc●ives our present condition like that of israel , betwixt david and absalom , at which time ( quoth he ) the people had grievously sinned , had they rendrd obedience to absaloms commands and substitutes , so long as david was living . this is very true , but farre from the purpose . for absalom was not a fundamentall legislative party in the state of israel , as the house of commons lately was , and so could not pretend such a right of warre . secondly david had his army hard by in the same kingdome with absalom . we have none here but the parliaments , all the kings forces and adherents being dissipated . thirdly the israelites scruples are supposed during the time of warre in israel , our after the war is ended . but if he mean by this fallacious paralell , that the israelites ought not to have opposed david at all in the way of warre , then how will he salue the scruples of his own breast , who promoted the course of war as well as others against the king ? the author of the grand case of conscience is very ingenuous in his contest with his adversary to forme a syllogisme with foure terms , and their be able to finde them out , and to answer the fallacy : so that whilst he wrastles thus stoutly with himself , he can have but a faire fall in his own shaddow , to prevent which i shall take the pains to part them both . his syllogisme ( as he imputes it to his adversary ) is p. 4.5 . if the people of the roman empire did submit to the power of claudius and nero , who by force were put upon them , then the people of england may lawfully submit to a change of government though beleeved unlawfull . but they did submit . ergo those of england may . here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due title forc't upon people , but still in the same government ; and those persons who without right of title force themselves upon , us now in another government , but what if the syllogisme be indeed and vertually onely this ? if the people of the roman empire were required by the apostle to continue obedience to claudius and nero , then the people of england may lawfully continue obedience to their present governours . but those might , ergo these may . his distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same government , and into a different government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either , because both are supposed unlawfull and differ only secundum m●jus & minus quae non var●ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one , it is not a sin in the other . if he say , obedience to intruders into the same government is not a sin , then he hath dispatcht all controversie concerning the exclusion of the kings line , and that the parliamens fault as to him was that they rather changed the government then the governours , which he acknowledgeth more plainly p. 5. where speaking concerning the persons comming to power , he saith it is not materiall who puts them in , nor what men are put into powers ordained by god . but to come nearer to the point , he cannot say that of the usurping caesars , which may be said of the parliament . for these are the representers of the people of england , and were lawfully a third part of the supreame power before the change of government . caesar had no part of supreame right , but what he rather usurped then acquired by any dicision of right , or fundamentall legislative controversie betwixt the senate and him . to say as the demurrer , p. 4. that caesar had gotten the consent of the senate , and added compact to his conquest , is absurd , unlesse he meanes he had gotten the senate so into his power , that he had them in a condition of quarter ; in which case as the law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata , without doubt if the peoples submission to caesar were lawfull upon his changing a republique into a monarchy , after the senate had for bad the approach of his army , and that he had expelled many members from the senate , why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a senate it self , who have changed monarchy into a republique ? these two changes are so farre alike , that they frustrate this authors distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same , and into a different government . he followes his objection still , p. 5. arguing that though people did de facto , obey such false possessors , and vsurpers , yet that proves not the lawfulnesse of our obedience , nam a facto ad jus non valet consequentia ; their submission should have been proued legall . if he hath a quarrell to us for our peaceablenesse , yet why should he quarrell with st. paul ? he bad the romans submit in the same kinde ; and unlesse we had prophets on purpose to tell governours , as well as us of the people , who must alwaies succeed according to the minde of god , then the state of the world , the nature of politick justic● of society and religion is such that we may & ought to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possesse , protect and command us lawfull things . surely he did not consider his axiome well , for a facto ad jus valet consequentia , from fact wee inferre many civill rights , as custome and prescription , &c. neither is it necessary to prove their submission legall , is it be prov'd absolutely necessary and equitable . and yet we conceive another case ( besides that before mentioned ) wherein this submission to a new power may be call'd legall . for the end of all law and government is to preserve our persons and estates ; and they who are in supremacy of power , have power to preserve or destroy both if they please ; and therefore have as great a power over our lawes , which are lesse , then our lives . so soone as one supreame power is expelled by another , law , life , and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power ; and what it doth not actually take away , stands in effect as deriving from it ; and if that supreame power make a sanction for our obedience to it ( as alwaies is immediately done ) then we may say our submission is legall , or else the supreame power cannot make a law . to that argument where we assert , that the authority which excluds all other authorities must be obey'd , or else all authority falls to the ground ; the grand case of cons. answers obliquely still , that notwithstaning , such authority can never illegally get the legall p●wer ; nor can it exclude others from their authority . in which answer he plainely contradicts himself , p. 7. for caesars power was ( according to himselfe ) legall , and yet got by a circumstance very illegall ; the senate being empty , and intimidated , and not so much in their own , as in his power . this argument is so farre from concerning us , that it is directed onely against those princes who ab origin , drive from illegall acquisitions . of which he will doe well to speake largelyer , when he can assure my conscience by infallible evidence of right , that i may safely sweare or destroy men upon it , that there was ever such a man in england as william the conquerour , or any other ancient king , from whom titles are said to be derived , either legally or illegally : this is a proposition , which i beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off , no more then i now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the kingdom ; is for which reason they assert their authority , and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indubitable right ab origine . but because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right title , none are so blind as the people ( who among other burthens have the imposition of other mens judgements cast upon them ) therefore an usurped title to them is true enough to exact obedience . hence the grand case of cons. answers , p. 10. that then by the rule of contraries it followes , that when titles are visibly unlawfull , people are disengaged from obedience to them . to this i reply , that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question , and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it ; the very question being this conclusion , viz. whether obedience be lawfull to titles visibly unlawfull ? secondly , it hath been shown , that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible ; every man in a state stands in a relation , and must either command or obey ; and owes something to him , by whose care he● sleepes quietly in his bed . thirdly , if by disengagement from obeying a lawfull title , he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no , then though disengag'd , wee ma● obey . these answers helpe us halfe way over the next dificulty . we may not any way affirme the right of the vsurper , or deny interpretatively the just title of the heire , without the guilt of treachery , lying and falsenesse , if not of vow-breaking , in suffering a theife to take my purse , i cannot helpe it ; if i must part with that or my life , i chuse to loose my purse ; not for feare least i breake the fifth or eight commandement , but least i breake the sixt , in being guilty of selfe murther ; yet rather then say he hath authority to take it , i must loose my life . in point of protection among theeves , i may desire some to preserve mee from others , yet may i not say their robbery is just , or joyne or ply with them in robbing others . to say no more of the certaine evidence , and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall titles ( which is here the maine of the argument ) i answer that simple obedience to an establisht vsurper , doth not alwaies interpretatively affirme his right , or deny anothers , but affirmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power . god is the supream magistrate of al the world , and by reason of his omnipotent presence every where , we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of , or right to any of our actions ; but our earthly magistrates may fall into such circumstances , that they may have neither personall or virtuall presence with us , and therefore may be said to be civilly dead , according to the former axiome , idem est non esse & non operari , to doe nothing and be nothing is to us the same thing , motion being the chiefe evidence of life . in his case of the thiefe , i desire any man to consider whether ( as he hath put it ) he hath not clearely broken one commandement , besides those which he hath named , viz. the third , because it is an untruth to say the parliament requires not obedience from any of us , unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their authority , which is the second false supposition here . when officers gather taxes for the state , they have no commission to demand our declarations of the states authority first , but onely to receive the money taxed , which this author knowes is a truth knowne to every one . as for the peoples conjoyning and complying with the state to robbe another , by obeying to the prejudice of another ; he must meane it in a robbery either of power , or of riches . for power , the people aime not at it , their condition alwaies is l●rge who ever sits at top . and for getting by the warre , i hope the presbyterian party which had the authorizing of taxes , as well as others , knowes as well as the people themselves , that this is a grosse prevarication . last of all there is difference betwixt willing compliance , and necessary subjectiion , which is the peoples case . he objects againe p. 6. if obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted , it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party , or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery . here he is started suddainly into two other questions . first , how a title may be recovered ? and secondly , how we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any titles ? these two relate to the future , which is of gods secret disposing ; our question is of the present only . but i pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous ? what are the people of france or the people of spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two kings ? or what was the world better for alexanders conquering it ? the houses which are burnt , and the millions of bodies left dead in the field , are the peoples ; and princes scorning to derive from them , still trample them to dung . we talke of some titles wronged , as if their rights were so certaine , and so necessary to live under , as god almighties is , who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe officers , and not we ; who is it then that can right wronged titles , but he alone who makes all titles right ? to that case where it is argued , that if the masters mate had throwne him over-board , and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himselfe , if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the ship , the ship must needs perish and themselves with it ; it is answered by the grand case of cons. p. 9 that the case should not have been of a mate as a partner ( which is false ) but of a party of the seamen , who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment , especially for acknowledging the vsurping stearesmans right , which is still falsely suppos'd in our case . here i desire this casuist to pull off his maske and speake plainly , whether he doth not plead for his owne punishment , as one who at the beginning of our warre principally incouraged us not to be guided by the then pretending stearesman , whom they of his party said aside , and stear'd a while themselves ; the scots declaring that he was not fit to touch the helme againe , till hee had satisfied , &c. besides , this is true , that they then required obedience from compounding royalists , although to them they seemed an unlawfull power and magistracy , as to the dispencing of publique and private justice . secondly , the reason wherefore these marriners might not acknowledge him the right master , ( as he hath varied the case ) is rather because this is in an inferiour thing de jure privato , master and marriners being accountants to the merchants who have a court of justice to judge the fact ; but what court is there in this world to call that power , which here is the supreamest to any account ? thirdly , he supposes the usurper and the complyers to be brought to account by the others , but not till they come to shore ; whereas in our case we can do nothing but in the ship , that is in the common-wealth , when we leave that , we go into another world , our true patria where indeed we doe not call one another , but are all called together to an account by our supreame magistrate , whose sentence we would faine prejudge here by a confusion of the ship in via . the grand case of conscience , p. 9. adviseth that seeing we are so unsetled , we should use meanes for a settlement , though by its procurement wee were more unsetled : if a man be at the rivers brinke he would advise him to keepe out of the water , but if at once he leap into the middle of the river , he would perswade him to come to the bank , although he wade through much water to come thither . i see according to this horrid tenent , that if god ( as the scotch phrase hath it ) comes not to the whole length of our desire , then there must be no peace betwixt man and man in this world . mr. ste. marshall preacht lately , that god was to be thankt for some thing , that church doores were yet open to those who had a zeale , and a will to congregate , that they were not under their enemies swords , nor compounding with them ; hee saw how they might be worse if god should through their peevishnesse let them see forraigne armies at their doores , who have both faces tongues , religions & affections different from ours ; and wil not care for firing our houses and churches , or for giving us lawes againe in an unknown tongue , and perhaps religion too . can he think the notion of our church government would be a charme to such swords and consciences ? or rather can he assure us of his prophecy here , that if we begin new troubles , we shall certainly have victory ? for his argument supposes it must needs end so , and that by his perswasion we shall wade to the bank . if we were indeed in the midst of the water ( that is in the midst of warre and confusion ) then being engaged for life , we might endeavour to wade through , though the streame were running deepe with our own and childrens innocent bloods , for after all metaphors , that is the element which he means . thus in no diseases but those which are supposeddeadly , may we use desperate remedies , such as may endanger the destruction of the whole body ; but may a man indanger his whole body , when it is not for the cure of himselfe but of another , and by the killing also of others besides himselfe , wife and children ? i will not name what sort of subtilty this gentleman hath used in this argument , nor def●ne with what conscience here he seekes to satisfie anothers ; for , lest we of the people should bogle at comming on the stage to act our late tragedy over againe , hee would impose it on our beleifes , that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it . it is high time for him to consider whither if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our brethren , and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards god ; although i confesse some scars and haltings may remaine yet , after the warre it selfe is ended . methinks he should finde every thing both in nature and christianity more favourable for our present peace , then for our third warre , especially seeing all our former warres have ended very contrary to the expectation of those who were hottest to begin them . but i consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten , of which the fuller men are , the lesse do they ( through a great judgement on their spirits ) perceive into what deformities they doe transport them , it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceivd by any , then by those who are opprest by them . the second part , that this obedience to the present government , is not contrary to , but consistent with our solemn league and covenant . by these steps we are come at last ad sacras columnas , to those sacred pillars on which the holy covenant hangs almost in every church , as a sanctum aeternitati a law sacred to eternity . the hands which hung it there , have not ( they say ) power to take it downe againe . who therefore may undertake to tell these persons , that they actually are or else may be freed from it , seeing they finde themselves obliged if they can , to tie all the world with them in the same sort of knot ? here is certainly a zeal● worthy to be ●ixt on that , which should obliege alwayes ; and the world must confesse that there hath been no publique oath taken by any person anywhere ; who have been more scrupulously attent not to double with their god in relation to his part in contract . but yet let not these consciences be scandalized if i say it was compild by none but mortall men , taken onely by such , and as a promissory oath cannot possibly be free from those exceptions , and accidents wherewith time changes the constitution of all those things , which it doth not absolutely destroy , wherfore upon a sober review of al i doubt not , but as many oaths and leagues are transient , so to shew that this according to its nature , and as it is originally a league or covenant , that is , as it is a formall compact , relating to the publique and united corporation of severall nations and magistracies ( by which each people were united together , and without which neither people were respectively to act any thing separately within and against themselves ) i say i doubt not but to shew that such a covenant , uppon what hath interven'd is expir'd to us the people of england , and that without any default of ours ; and though our magistrate would give it a new life and obligation ; yet to many principall things it can obliege no longer ; and for the next we are to consider that though something of our first end in reformation streame through the covenant ; yet its spring head rises higher then it ; which end we are in all formes to pursue still , & are now left ty'd to so much of the covenant onely as we were oblieged to for all our dayes withall our mights and soules , before we took it at all . lastly , if it were granted , that the covenant is not expired , yet i shall here shew , that our submission to this present government is no way inconsistent with it . in which few words , though i have stated the maine of its difficulties , yet ere i apply my selfe to answer objections , i shall briefly premise what i have observed others have omitted , it being hard to finde how we may be unti'd from a thing , till we have found how the knot at first was made . whatsoever we can say , affirme or deny , is either assertory or promissory the first relates to the time past or present ( is if i affirme titius to be , or have been at rome ) and therefore upon the very saying or swearing , the whole truth and obligation is fulfilled , and past with the time which accompanied it . the other relates to the time present , as it is then sincerely said or sworne ; and to the future for the sincere fulfilling them , which yet is dubious , conditionall , and not in our powers ; as when titius promiseth sempronius 100.l . when his ship returnes . for this reason some say all promissory oathes ase absoutely unlawfull , because oathes must be true and certaine ; but all future effects of things are uncertaine . i answer , that for so much as concerns the forme of my oath here , it is true and certaine , that my minde and words went truly together in the act of swearing , and that i will make my deed and words goe truly together , when the suppos'd condition betwixt us ( and which , as we mutually consent to , is in neither of our powers at present ) shall absolutely come to passe . this was the case of abrams servant , when he swore to take a wife for isaac ; a future ( in severall circumstances ) very uncertaine , both in respect of what might happen to the servant , to isaac and to the virgin we know what hapne'd to iob's children and family through the accident of warre , and the malice of the devill ; and how ioseph was shuffled away by his owne friends and kindred . it is not enough to say , such suppos'd tacite conditions cannot be in oathes ; for first , if such conditions be in promises , and that i may lawfully make a promise to another , then i may lawfully sweare a promissory oath to him , which we see cannot be separated from such conditions as are not , cannot , and need not be exprest betwixt us at the beginning . for ( to take away the supposition of fraud betwixt us ) we both agree in this that we cannot foresee with what circumstances our futures may be perplext . therefore it is sufficient that we swore things not necessary , but possible ; such as might happen or not happen , because depending on things which depend not totally on us , nor on our will , but rather mixtly on the wills of others , and on that which to us is change or fortune , for which reason he is not forsworne , who effects not alwaies what he by oath promiseth , no more then he sinnes , who alwaies effects not his simple promise . secondly , this tacite condition in a promissory oath , and in things naturally and morally possible , is proved by the very nature and definition of the oath . for it is onely an attestation , and imprecation of god in such manner , that if the promiser faile , he would have him to whom he promist , understand , that be puts himselfe under gods severe wrath . from hence it is to be noted , that the bare promise obliged as strictly before he swore , as after he swore ; and of the reason is , because he was obliged by nothing , but by that which was in pact . the investing it with an oath , or with gods punishment , relates onely to the penalty : so that a promissory oath signifies no more , then such a penalty upon such a promise : but a penalty ( as we know ) in law and equity relates onely to that which is unlawfull , such as is the violation of a pact . the addition of never so many penalties , to a thing in it selfe unlawfull , can never fasten any obligation on me to doe it ; nor can severall penalties to an obligation in it selfe lawfull , adde anything to the first ius or right of it , but onely to my future feare , least i doe injustice . the capitall question therefore in these cases will be . what the nature of the things are to which we obliged our selves at first ? for according as they stand or fall , our relations or obligations , to them stand or fall whither we will or no . thirdly , we finde such tacite conditions , conceal'd , and suppos'd in the oathes of solomon to bathsheb●● ; of david , concerning nabals house ; of god concerning the destruction of ninevah , and of abrams servant concerning isaacs wife , &c. by a reflection on all this , viz. that seeing there may be a promise , and consequently a promissory oath ; and that the nature and obligation of a promise , and of such an oath , is one and the same , we have gain'd a great point , that the covenant ( which is a promissory oath ) is not in its owne nature of an eternall obligation , but is involved in tacite conditions and accidents of the world , which may justly incumber us from effecting it , or from being further obliged to it , as well as other promises may , which yet are made bonâfide at the beginning . the difficulty onely is to see , whither de facto that hath interven'd , which hath now taken away the formall and originall obligation , which we of the people had to it at first , by authority of our magistrate ; and so taken away , as we may be secure and out of feare of the penalty , which we then submitted to in it . i shall not here make use of what others have laboriously argued ; that the matter of the covenant is such , as we cannot be obliged to , but let it be as good or as bad as men please to suppose ; i say in the first place , that all the good or bad , was form'd into a politicall oath , authorized upon two kingdomes , by the sanction of two publique magistracies ; who as collaterals obliged themselves to cooperate faithfully together , and obliged those of their distinct nations , to cooperate respectively and subordinately with them , for attaining a former end in such a way of reformation , as is therein exprest ; but by such meanes , as they in their publique and respective capacities , not we in our particulars should judge most consonate to equity and true to religion . for which reason we happily are pointed at there , onely in our private places and callings . here therefore there is a relation of severall things concurrent , viz. of two magistracies united as a meanes for the easier reaching the end of those respective reformations , which they were obliged to make before they entred in league , and of two people , who by the union of their respective magistracies , passe ( for so much as is therein exprest ) into an union one with another , and are to have their private capacities and endeavours managed by them , and never against them by any virtue of this league . besides it is a considerable circumstance in the magistrates managing the whole , that states or civill constitutions by reason of the diseases of ambition and avarice , are naturally as much subject to future changes , as any other things are ; and without the supposition of tacite conditions , we may as little sweare to preserve the state of a publique body , as we may sweare to preserve the state of our own particular bodies , or as a parent may to preserve his childe , which when it shall be taken away by diseases , or by justice , he may be sorry for the losse , but may not justly complaine of it . and indeed so it is come to passe without any default in us of the english people , or of our publique magistrate ( under whom we were to act in these private places and callings ) that neither of us can be said to have laid the covenant aside , although we could not keepe it from expiring ; because the failing was in that which was never suppos'd to be in our powers viz. in many conditionall things which camecr osse , and in the breach of fidelity in another collaterall and concurring power . if you please to object here as an aggravation , and an incitement for us of the covenanted people to rise kill and slay , that the covenant is buried not as a thing really expired and dead , but that the people out of interest must be told so , onely because the former magistracy is really laid aside and changed , which if people should throughly consider , would quickly make them finde matter enough in the covenant to take armes . i shall not in the way of answer to this repeate any thing concerning the cause , the meanes , and the concurrences to this our present change ; every covenanter both of england and scotland , knowing well that there was no change of government here , till the covenant was nationally broke ( and so many here were insnared , both royalists and parliamentarians ) by the scots , who thought to have us'd it for a change of government , and as a stratagem to give law in another judicatory : neither shal i argue in this place , how compatible any change may be with a covenant so conditionall , in which kings as parties are totally excluded from judging either for themselves or for others , which point shall be further argued at last ; but i shall content my selfe to take what is here granted in the objection , viz. that the government is really changed ; the consequence then to us of the people will be , that seeing by the fourth article of the covenant , we may not without apparent breach of it , act the sence of the covenant , but as we receive it from our respective and supream judicatory of england onely , and that the said government which it relates to , is confest to be gone , have you not then clearely confest that the obligation to act any thing publiquely by covenant is likewise gone ? according to an old axiome , sublato relat● tollitur correlatum . if this present government which we are chang'd to , and which now protects us , should thinke fit by the way of covenant to give a new life , to that remaining part of it , which may be observed , yet you will not allow any obedience to them , though in things never so lawfull ; neither will that fourth article allow me to obey any forreigner , nor those without whose consent the covenant was made , and consequently without whom it is to be interpreted , as the late proceedings of the scots at the hague plainely shew : so that after all this , if i in my private capacity be as you say still indispensibly obliged by it , to begin or assist to publique troubles , do you not fall into a worser absurdity , and maintaine an oath against the fifth commandment , or against all magistracy , which is an impossibility ? nothing ever cautiond in termes more expressely for our duty of making discoveries , of bringing to condigne punishment , of our supreame respective iudicatories and the like then the covenant did , which are things relating to none but our supream magistracy , unlesse you please plainly to assert another absurdity , that every single man who hath taken it , is thereby absolvd from his magistrate , and is made one himselfe to judge of the other , and thereby authorizd not by way of toleration to professe but to establish what religion he would , to punish at his own tribunall whom he would , and to reforme the state as he would . for he to whom you will allow a capacity of making warre , hath also a capacity of making peace , and lawes for the security of his peace . thus we see how the government is changed , and the formall obligation of the covenant at an end ; but what if i should grant you by the way of supposition , that in case both the covenant and the former government were standing together in as full force as you desire , and as it was when the scots first delivered the king up to the parliament of england ? i would then know of you whither if our parliament had then for reasons best known to themselves ( and of which wee can never judge competently ) declared us of the people , free from any further obligation of the covenant , might we justly have thought our solemne league at an end , and that we ought to act nothing publiquely any longer by it ? if you will say we should have been still obliged to act upon it , then i aske you againe under whom ? for i have proved it must be alwaies under a magistrate , and you have all along proved that it must onely be under our lawfull magistrate , how lawfull soever the thing be in it self which is commanded , you would not allow the king to be the person to be obeyed , whom you thought fit to keepe in an imprisonment . the parliament ( according to our supposition ) would not be any longer obliged to it , or be obeyed in it , and the scots acknowledge themselves in the 4 article to be the supreame judicatory onely of scotland , and i cannot act publiquely by a private capacity or magistracy . ergo in such a case , the covenant how good soever , had not obliged any longer , nor is it in it selfe eternall . you will not deny perhaps but one man may free another from an oath when it is for the worldly profit of him who pleases to release it , as every man may throw away any thing of his owne right ; but you will not allow it in sacred things where god is a party . i answer , that though no parent can dispence his wife or childe from the feare of god and the duties they owe to him , yet he allowed him to break the childs vow for giving him a sacrifice , and both to be guiltles ; and then why may not we be now absolved , if our publique parent judges it not fit that wee should be any longer tide formally to a conditionall oath ; though it have relation to some sacred things ? you will say no , because the parent did not as a party solemnly concurre to the childs vow , and having never consented he might the better dissent ; but our publique parent did concurre at a party to our oath . the parliament and people tooke the covenant joyntly together , and it is said that if the father heare the vowes , and contradicts them not in the same day , then he confirms them , and cannot break them without iniquity , to this i reply , first , that v. 16 . it is said the childe is free after the dissent of the parent , and that the parent is charged with whatsoever was amisse in him , which is excuse enough for us of the people . secondly , the difference is great in a maine point of the paralell ; because after the concurrence of the father to the childs vow for sacrificing something to god , that might be compleated in the temple without his further helping it on ; but we cannot doe any thing in our case without the cooperation of our publique parent all along , neither can he do any thing without the concurrences of many other possible , but uncertaine conditions , and if he in effect finde those conditions have come contrary to his publique endeavours , what may we doe ? will it be enough for us to rest in having attempted the utmost of our private endeavours with him ? or will you authorize every man upon private judgement or interpretation to begin a warre in his own sence . a league or pact authorized betwixt private neighbours over a whole nation or over part of it , is not as a league betwixt prince and prince : because these have conditions exprest how and when to begin warre upon one another in case their leagues be broken . but there is no such thing exprest in terminis in that covenant which we have made one with another , and which we made subordinately to our magistrate : so that if we or the magistrate faile , we are equally left to gods justice solely and to the forfeiture of our own penalties due to him , and every one is to answer for his owne deficiency in his own station : and being left to our selves againe , we are left to act onely so much of our oath or of the ancient end of it , as we were bound to before we swore : which is a great deale ; because we were bound by precept before wee were by promise all the dayes of our lives to do our utmost for the glory of god , and the good of our neighbour . secondly , princes or states who by the supremacy of their powers , are able to make lawes for their separated kingdomes ; when they unite their supream powers , they are able to make a common law for all their kingdoms together , which is called a league or compact ; but a law when it comes to be broken ( which is a publique thing , and therefore of every mans interest ) may be vindicated publiquely by warre , and by those who have a posse regni . but i cannot say the same may be done for the covenant , for quo jure can it be done ? the scots indeed by one way of arguing make it greater then a law , and by another make it lesse ; which is when they one while affirme it unalterable and unreformable as a divine text , and another while confesse it was not made by the joynt concurrence of all those who with them are essentiall to the making a publique law . i conceive we may safely say it is of a constitution inferriou● to that of a law , and therefore its obligation is lesse , though its penalty be greater to the failers in it . it was made use of , only as a convenient instrument or meanes , for the better attaining some lawes as its end . a law it was not because it was not made by all the then legislative powers of the kingdome . for the kings concurrence in england if not in scotland , was then held requisite for passing a law and he ever dissented from this covenant . halfe the inferiour sort of the people have not any interest in it , nor have taken it : and not having any obligation to it , how i pray you can they justly be drawne into the penalty due to it ? as they must all be , if a warre ( which is effectually a penall thing ) be begun though by a part of the nation ; for the nature of warre is such , that it puts a whole kingdome into imminent danger of desolation , though but begun in a part , and by a party of it . thus far i have endeavoured to shew the true fast and loose of all promissory oaths , and how their obligations cease according to the nature of the things which they are affixed to . the author of the grand case of conscience p , 1. objects , that if inconvenience may break a promise or disengage an oath , then many may be cheated , and david was much mistaken , psal. 15.4 . who saith he shall dwell in gods tabernacle , who sweareth to his own hinderance and changeth not . i answer , david speaks here of an oath violated by a change onely in the promiser , who by his oath hath past a right to another : and therefore can no longer dispose of it againe ; the party to whom he swore may dispose of it as he pleaseth and may dispense him of it ; because no man hath a right to make another man keepe his owne , longer then he please himselfe . it is a duty to pay a debt , but not to receive it . finally , this is nothing to those cases where the change is not in us , but in other persons , and in things which relate principally and conjoyntly to the fulfilling of the oath or promise . for if i promise titius a sword at such a time , and he then chance to be mad , ( an accident not exprest betwixt us at first ) am i bound to put it into his hands in this change because i was the first promiser ? wheras it is said , that the obligation of somethings end , because they can be no longer kept , as that of the kings person &c. he ans. p. 11. that if men shall by violence put an end to the thing , that thereby the obligation may end too , that is a breach of covenant . a woman promiseth to be faithful to her husband so long as he lives ; but if she , to marry another , kills him , she breaks her promise . i grant it easily that they who use violence to break lawfull contracts , sin grievously ; which is a thing now confest in every church of scotland ; but what is that to those who use no violence to breake them at all ; nor can helpe it when it is done although many be undone by it ? one thing i most earnestly desire to learne in this question propounded ( i guesse ) concerning the kings death ; which was a consequence of the others breach and tamperings . if by the covenant we were indispensably obliged to preserve his person , how came it to passe , that we were obliged by the same couenant to wage warre against him ? i have heard of a distinction betwixt his power and his person , but never of any betwixt his person and himselfe . so that if the covenant could have dispenced any souldier of england or scotland to kill his person by an accident of warre ( as his life was oft in danger before he came to the scaffold ) his death had beene violent , and the obligation to preserve him had ended , and yet according to this argument the covenant had not been broken . why then should these men thinke the world so dull as not to understand plainly enough , that the covenant provided for his death more wayes then one ? true it is , that the covenant held out a faint and a conditionall preservation of him , and after all no man can sincerely stretch it further : from whence if we will let him judge this one controversie , he hath left it recorded to posterity , in his suppos'd book chap. 9. in vaine is my person excepted by a parenthesis of words , when so many hands are armed against me with swords : moreover in his chap. of the covenant , he feared it provided for him in a logick too loose and circumstantiall . from all which what did he conclude , but that he would not allow of a covenant-argument for his life ? i know the answer here is obvious , that bullets were not shot directly against him ( as few are against any in a towne or in a battell ) and that if he would have withdrawne his person , he should have beene out of danger ; but then i pray you what advantage had he in this by covenant , more then any common souldier of either side ? who when they retire , are equally out of danger , nay he had lesse advantage , for by preserving him , they meant keeping him after he was rescued from others , and by keeping him they meant not him primarily , but something else , to which all consideration of him was to give way . as for others which were to be brought to punishment , they had some of them leave to go beyond the seas , others to enjoy liberties at home ; and of all the excepted persons , there was never any of them who was here deprived of life , but as our troubles and warres increast , their number ( which was strange ) lessen'd even to six or seven at last , and most of those out of the kingdome . i know they have distinctions wherefore so much might be remitted to those , and not to the king , although he had on his behalfe the word preservation in the covenant ; but these distinctions are but their strong justifications for that which is the bottome of this argument , if all covenanters durst speake plainly alike . he objects . p. 11. that if according to covenant we should preserve the priviledges of parliament , against a malignant party that would have taken away but five members ; why not against an heriticall party which took away above two hundred ? i answer , that when the five membere were in danger , there was a session of neere all the lords , and of all the commons to authorize the people to bring others before them to condigne punishment : but where is there now any session of a supream power in this land , before whom we ought to bring the present parliament ? under what formall supream magistracy can we now cooperate or receive publique orders , but from them ? who have commanded no such thing against themselves . lastly the covenant makes not us private men magistrates , neither doth it authorize us to a war disertly , as to a penalty . certainly he doth not meane that the remaining members make no house , because there are more now kept out , then are admitted into it . for would not such an argument clearly determine , that the house of lords was never a house , since the major part followed the king , under pretence , that they durst not sit any longer at westminster ? or else if the ●itting of so many members as are enough for a legall vote be illegall , after others are forc●t away ; how shall we justifie that session with a new speaker , when the rest were forc't to the armies protection from the citizens servants and apprentices , who forc't them , and indangerd their lives in the house ? or how shall we justifie the house of commons for sitting , when the five members durst not appear ? though force should not be used without a desperate occasion be given ( in which case the preservation of the substance , is alwaies above the consideration of a formality as hath bin argued by the parliament ever since their first warres yet they know few or many sitters in the house , is not a thing of our examination , if they be above forty . the second demurrer p. 6. objects that we have sworne by no terrour to withdraw our selves from this blessed union , but to continuein it all our lives against all opposition . if there were nothing else in the world yet these words sufficiently prove that we are now absolutely absolved from the covenant ; for first , they relate to a state and time of vnion , in which we were according to the united strengths of two nations , two magistracies , and of the respective magistracies and people here enabled , yea commanded to make great opposition against those who then were actually united in armes against the parliament . but now that we are supposed by these authors to be dis-united as our enemies are , and that the magistracy is changed , our state of subordination somewhat varyed ; that the links of our former chaine are broken ; and that the commons act alone without a king , as the lords & commons acted before without one , and that the scotish nation by their invasion , and their attempting to divide the king from us , and us one from another , by their declaration made preparatorily for division , thereby to favour invasion afterward , have in the face of all the world broken whatever was of nationall union and peace , yea and all that which was of confidence betwixt our selves at home , and ( which was yet more horrid ) in incouraging one principall army in ireland to fall off from the advantages it had against the bloody rebells , to turne their swords against the parliament it selfe , only out of a by end of ambition , yea now ( that the war being ended ) we are to enter into an vnion of cohabitation or in cooperation ( as they have done in scotland it selfe ) with those who during their united hostilities occasiond our nationall union , are we i say after all this , in the selfe same union which they at first hoped might have been continued to them & us for all our lives ? that union suppos'd the warre which then was , with the rest , of the circumstances , and if we wish the same effect or union now , do we not thereby wish the same cause or warre againe amongst us ? as we were to oppose armes to armes , so union to union , and certainly that union of the parliaments of both kingdoms was at an end , ever since the scotch army here received their money , and returned , home , leaving the delinquents of both nations dis-united and clearly reduced to receive condigne punishment , ( as the covenant calls it ) at the respective judicatories of both kingdoms ; and if it ended not then , yet it could not bee consistent with their declaration and divisions presently after ; and if not then , yet i am sure it could not be consistent with their nationall invasion , and tampering to divide all in england and ireland , the effect whereof hath been a change of government here , and hath made them totally distinct forrainers to us . the demurrers premisses in this argument by a new logick , relate onely to a state of publique vnion , and his conclusion relates only to a state of publique dis-union , of the consequences whereof the covenant saith nothing at all in any article ; it enjoyn●s the bringing of delinquents to condigne punishment , and those private persons likewise among our selves , who should helpe on , either divisions amongst us , or the invasion of either nation first . but whether should they be brought to punishment ? the covenant answers , either before the respective judicatories of each kingdome ( who onely have power to judge of what is condigne ) or before no body . it speakes likewise how we should unitedly venture our lives against the enemy which then was : it doth not , or at least ought not to sweare us to get the better of them for ever , nor that we should in a rout or dis-union end our lives against all opposition , and without quarter . if the termes of our utmost endeavours , and all the dayes of our lives , are to be understood litterally , and that we must not survive any violation of the covenant , then why do these gentlemen , ( who conclude themselves in the state of the covenant thus understood ) thinke of living till to morow ? the termes of forever , or for all the dayes of our lives are not in our contracts to be understood naturally , but morally ; for we finde it plainly in the judicial law , that after a jew had taken a servant , and bor'd a hole through his eare he was ( as the text saith ) to serve him for ever , although one of them might poss●bly have dyed the next day , and both of them after a while might have beene made captives to others . the law calls the league of marriage individua vitae consue●udo , a c●habita●ion for all the dayes of our lives . for so it should be ex voto contrahenti●m , in the sincere desires of the contractors ; yet we know , one ordinarily dyes before the other , and that many conditions may happen to legitimate their divorce afterwards , though the contract was never so religiously made in the presence of almighty god at first . the scots in their late proceedings with their king at the hague pag. the 6. interpret the words of utmost endeavour , as morally as we doe here ? for the commissioners of the kirk said , they us'd their utmost endeavours to save the kings life according to covenant ; but how ? they answer , that it was in papers , messages , declarations , testimonies , and protestations onely ; they name not warre , or bloodshed , for they protested against that way last yeare , as contrary to covenant , when the parliament of scotland invaded us ; and i hope for the reputation of the religion they professe , they have not altered their publique commentary of that sacred text contradictorily so soone . to conclude , either wee are still in the vnion of the end of the covenant , or we are not : if we be in it , then these breake the covenant , by seeking to dis-unite us : if we be not in it , where then is the article for our private forming a warre upon it ? and under whom , if not under our english supreame iudicatory ? and if they call us not out to revenge that which was more then a bare falling off from the covenant last yeare amongst ourselves , ( when the scots exercis'd such high hostilities , and were the first shatterers of all our frame ( which otherwise might by gods blessing have cemented againe ) how durst these private trumpets sound the alarum , and open the wounds of the nations once more ? though the respective iudicatory of that kingdome now cannot make that which was once done , undone ; yet by the present punishment of the kirke , it is acknowledged that they hold the covenant to have been more then nationally broken , in regard of the harme and damage which was done to us after it was broken . for there is a great deale of difference betwixt ceasing to helpe according to a league , and acting hostily contrary to it , especially when no such penalty is in such a league exprest betwixt the parties . but you will object , that if the covenant were so broken in one or two points by them , yet it doth not follow , that the whole covenant is broken thereby , and dead in every part . i have answered before that we are no longer obliged to any thing in it by the way of league and covenant ; the reason here is , because here in leagues everything is to be observed con●unctively , otherwise all is broken ; which is so true and cleare , that if we looke upon gods league and covenant with israel , we shall finde the same thing pronounc't there . god said , if yee keepe my commandements , i will be your god , and will maintaine you in your plenty , and in your land : yet he said , that if they broke any one commandement in their part of covenant , they were guilty of all , and that all should be at an end betwixt them : just as st. iohn in the conclusion of his revelation saith , who ever shall diminish but one word of that booke defaceth the whole , and looseth the whole benefit which he might expect thereby in the holy city , by vertue of the second covenant . it is asserted , that there is no clause in any oath or covenant , which in a common sence forbids obedience to a present government : to this the grand case of conscience answers , that the covenant engages to another government , therefore it forbids obedience to this , and oathes ought to bee their owne interpreters . here he at first begs the question , whether the covenant can now engage us or no ? seeing it hath beene proved , that that which is now nothing , cannot now engage us to any thing ; and conseqently our submitting to , and acting under the present government , cannot be contrary to covenant ; because things which are contrary one to the other , must have actuall being together at the same time . but the very being of this government , supposes the nullity of the covenant , whose death ( as it was other where contrived before ) gave life to that mutation here afterwards . secondly , though the covenant were still valid and in force , yet when we were sworne to it first , it found us actually out of that government here pointed at , viz. of king lords and commons . for that is the supreame government of a country , which makes a supreame law there : but at that time the supreamest humane law , which ( according to these gentlemens opinions ) was ever made in england or scotland , or perhaps in all the world , was made without the king in those kingdomes , and against his dissent . for which reason the covenant engages not so positively for king or kingly government , as for the vnion of the covenanters in any forme and against any opposition ; whereupon the presbyterians when it was ( as most conceiv'd ) in their power , to restablish king or kingly gove●nment , they omitted both for many dayes of their lives , without question ; because they conceiv'd it not a government absolutely necessary by covenant . when d. hamilton entred england so hostilely for that end , and as he thought by vertue of covenant , yet he was excommunicated for it by the oracles of the covenant . lastly , the reigne of the covenant since the first day of its birth and obligation , was never yet a r●gall reigne , no not for one day anywhere ; so that the change which is , is not determinatly contrary to that principle , out of which ( according to the circumstances of security ) any government may be moulded for any place . for which reason if i should grant you that the covenant were not expir'd , and had not beene so palpably broken , as it was betwixt the nations ; yet scotland ( if they had pleas'd ) might have beene govern'd by a king , and england by a free state , & yet both consonantly enough to covenant and without any contrariety , because the circumstances of securitie in one might have been different from the circumstances of security in the other ; which though different , might as well have been mutually maintained as their discipline differing from ours might have beene preserv'd by us . from all which it appears , that that oath is cloudy in the positive or set government which we ought to have , and so cannot be justly called it's owne interpreter , besides a reformation according to the word of god ; and the example of the best reformed churches , supposes such a latitude of logick as would ( if all sides should be heard ) give us as much exercise as all our wa●res have . and certainly the covenant is alike undefin'd in religion and in civill government . for we swore to bring the church discipline in the three kingdoms , to as neer a similitude as the constitution of the places would bear , not into the very same ; and as for the civill government , it was to receive its forme in the security of that , just as water doth receive not onely the figure of the pot or glasse into which it is put , but its conservation from being totally lost and spilt . but how then will you free your selfe from this contradiction in asserting that the civill state is unalterable by covenant , when that of the church which formes the other is so much alterable ? and seeing that of the state receives from this , not only its form and being , but what ever else you alone please to attribute to your security in it ? from whence i conclude again , that a change of government is consistent with covenant , & that a submission to it in lawful things is much more , and consequently it ingages not to any one determinate government , and so is not against this of ours . i beleeve it hath been a frequent observation of many , who have calmely converst with our divines and others zealous for presbytery , that they have found them little satisfied with that sort of presbytery , which our parliament modelled for us of this nation ; as having little affinity with the couenant . my beliefe is , that they in that discernd not the consequence of their own dissatisfaction . for if their consciences regulated by covenant , can admit no civill government , but the kingly ( which they so much argue for here ) and if the covenant and a scotch presbytery ( whose right they hold to be divine ) be essentially linkt together , then we and they may all of us learne , not onely from direct inferences , but from the declar'd experience of the sonne , the father , the grandfather , and great grandmother , that is of the three last scotch kings and one queene . that if the scotch presbitery come out of the covenant then kingly government cannot derive from it , because they are jurisdictions incompatible and inconsistant in the same place , and if one can conserve it , then may we say as much of the other . how much mary queene of scotland experienced of this , let the world judge by that which she wrote both with inke in her letters , and with her blood on the scaffold . for how came she to be beheaded in england , but by mr. knox ( and the kirkes having done little better than ) put her into the hands of those who could not keepe her long alive with security to themselves ? king iames hath writ and argued largely concerning his dangers & sufferings under it , & it is yet remembred in what dialect they of the presbytery were wont to preach and pray against him to his face , and he not know how to remedy it , or by what right to top theirs . when he came into england he profest his deliverance from that subjection not of small satisfaction to his minde , and therefore at this di●tance he contrived how to extinguish or check that ●ate there , & after some progresse in that worke he himselfe dyed peaceably in a milder country , but k. charles with that crown inherited the consequences of that undertaking , for his first troubles began in the controversie of that presbytery ; and what a preservation he thought the covenant ( from which it seemes their presbytery is so inseparable ) might be to him and what his fate was and who helpt it on , nay who diverted him from agreement here , all the world knowes and in his writings likewise he hath showne to the world that he himselfe was not ignorant of it ; this only is the wonder , that in the midst of this their specious zeale for kingly government , the covenant should be so silent concerning royall posterity , or for their succession , in case the scots or english souldiers had kill'd the king casually before he had given them the satisfaction which they required , the consideration of all this , with some other lately offer'd to the young prince at the hague , by the scotch commissioners , and the satisfaction which they in their late declaration require from him , as they did from his father , have questionlesse made him scruple , so long at his adventure into that country , though so much invited . for they told him p. 14.15 . that for longer then these eight yeares , yea ever since that queene mary , their fundamentall priviledge hath beene to assemble in parliament ; and to conclude there of themselves , either without king or kings commissioners ; and that if his majesty refuse those their reasonable desires , they shall be constrained in so great an extremity , to doe what is incumbent on them , to preserve religion , and the kingdom from ruine . here they plainly acknowledge , and assume that supreame power and right , which shall be proved here more evidently towards the conclusion . but because i intend truth here in the simplicity of my heart , and no way to swell this argument , either with passion in my selfe , or with scandall to any man else therfore i shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mistery to my selfe , and for confirmation of what i have asserted here so positively , i shall give the reader the expresse word of our great english covenant-champion , and of master hinderson especially the scotch champion , betwixt whose fingers the covenant it selfe was moulded . o●●t ●●ind cafe of oonscience , p. 14 , saith , but they who are now for the right of the son , and continuance of the government , are as much against the vices in and about him , as about the father . and should he doe as his father hath done , they who are now for the performance of this oath and covenant , would as truly joyne against him as against the father . who can call this regall language ? which yet will be lookt on as the english presbyterian-alarum , though but by one man . hee had done well in speaking of the performance of covenant by us all if he had offered a catalogue of all that which would fulfill the covenant in all its termes without any further interpretation ; but that which is supposed eternall for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the application of humane logick . mr. hinderson in his newcastle conference , with the king p. 24.25 . saith , that the reforming power is in kings and princes , quibus deficientibus , it comes to the inferiour magistrates , quibus deficientibus , it descends to the gr●sse of the people , but yet supposing still ( as he saith ) that they be all of them rightly , inform'd . for which reason though he conceal'd it from the king , yet he meant , that the reformation of any of those three powers , according to the covenant must be judged & reformed afterwards , by some other body of men here not named . for i conceive that he who is ultimatly to judge of the reformation and of its publique obligation , judgeth likewise of the reformers themselves though never so high or never so low ; and to this strange opinion he would faine intitle two english episcopall champions bilson and iewell . here i must confesse i was at a stand , concerning the nature and interest of the covenant , and was sorry to see that i was no plainlyer told whether it would carry me ( laden with so great a curse ) nor where it would set me downe . at last i found in the same author . 32.33 . speaking of the subordination of powers , under which people were finally to obey , that he would not willingly tell his majesty , whether the church was subordinate to the civill power , either to king or to parliament , or to both : for ( quoth he ) i utterly desol●ima such a headship as the kings of england have claimed , or such a supremacy as the houses of parliament crave , with appeales from ecclesiastiall iudicature to themselves . no man may thinke but mr. henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of england , as well as of scotland , for hee spake of houses of parliament which were plurall in england onely ; and though it may seeme strange at the first view , to heare one say , that the scotch nation state the supremacy of england in their country , or that they endeavour a direct change of government , here , ( which they have indirectly attempted for a long while . ) let every man judge not by our subtilties , but by the kirkes declaration , 27 july , 1649 , p. 11.12 . their words are , that their king after his oath of coronation in scotland , shall assure them under his hand and seale , to injoyne the solmne league and covenant , establish and practise the prerbyteriall government , directory , confession and catechisme , as they are approved by the severall assemblies of their kirke and parliament , in all his dominions , and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof . no man will say but states like judges ought to act , ex bono & aequo conjunctively . so that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually , were never so good , yet they being unequitably deriv'd upon us from their supreame judicatory ( in whose possession we are not so fully now , as they were last yeare in ours ) we ought to abominate their designe , as much as they might the like obtrusion of their presbitery from hence , without power there to rectifie it ever after . for these presbiterians with us grant ▪ that good and lawfull things may not be practiz'd under a power unlawfull , as they say the scots would be here . however here i at last found who was my supream right magistrate in the kirk● sence , but then i conceiv'd i was in a great snare , because i saw the jus publicum of a kingdome totally though secretly changed . i saw all things of direct religion , and whatsoever related collaterally to its security , lodged there , and by the kirke prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in scotland especially . but because religion and its security draws in all humane concernments , and that two supreame collaterall powers cannot stand in one and the same place , in the same time , for the same person , but for contrary actions , therefore i knew not whither of the two supreame powers the ecclesiasticall or the civill i should in this case throw away , for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together ; and i stood in a miserable case betwixt a jaylour and a devill the kirke giving me to the devill if i obeyed the civill power and the civill power giving me to the jaylour if i obey'd the kirke , which was ( to speake the truth ) the state of the whole kingdome of scotland last yeare , betwixt the the kirkes excommunication , and the parliaments order which authoriz'd duke hamiltons expedition , in vindication of the covenant here : in which difference we have no reason but to like the effect , however we may dislike such a cause here . wherefore to answer this ●scruple , i positively say , that in whatsoever is of pact betwixt man and man , or of policy in the covenant , i ought solely to follow the civill magistrate , and the church here ought to follow the magistrate likewise , as a case relating to the disquits to the warres , and to the recovering the peace of earthly kingdomes : if otherwise , then the civil jurisdiction ought clearely to be managed by the ecclesiastique ; which is stated so no where ( that i know of ) but in romagna and dutchy of ferrara and the other places belonging to the pope . this i speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the ministery as it containes it selfe in its own function , no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might not ex officio , be deputed to excite others to vertue and sanctity of life . but yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition , avarice , and severe passions as well as other men ? or have not our antagonists ( whether they would or no ) observ'd them in these cases of worldly rights and interests , to have as oppositly , yet as peremtorily differ'd one from another , as people of any family ever did ? the devill not being able to get the text on his side , by his wiles oft got the commentary , so that we are to be excus'd , if we hold many things in church-men , to be but as an apohrypha at best , which yet for esteem sake is alloted a place before anything else , next after the genuine text , having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences , and to take off maskes not from the faces , but from the consciences of these three , and the multitude of other scotch casnists , who have talkt so speciously for our covenant , vindication of an heirs just title , our submitting to it , and joyning with others immediately , least right suffer wrong one day ; i cannot ( i say ) but aske the same men plainly ; what difference in effect they find● , betwixt the titles and right of the prince of wales , and of the n●w king of scotland , notwithstanding all their obligation of covenant , to submit to him as such ? it is not enough by covenant to preserve an aery title onely to a prince , and by the same covenant , to suspend all the rest of his solid power , and right ? certain●ly his royall commands ( notwithstanding all this talke ) are no more obey'd in scotland now , then the episcopall commands of our countryman , the bishop of c●alcedon are now obey'd in turkey . but what hinders him from exercising any kingly right in scotland as yet ? the covenant which is not yet satisfied . how is it then , that some of our presbyterians say , that the same covenant indispensably opens the doore to him here ? if the ●ing aske the scots why they put the law of the covenant so to his obedience , 〈◊〉 the first thing which determines all his other rights afterwards ? they can onely say , that they swore it in his fathers raigne , and it is now eternall . though i censure nothing here , yet i cannot but conclude-hence ; that they of themselves , as well as our parliament , have made a law above all other lawes , ( and more then a reformable magna charta ) for the government of the kingdome which may be exercised according to it , without kings , and against kings . the first thing which was ever offer'd to him from the kingdome of scotland , was an authority by far transcending his own , viz. that of excommunication . for ( as their late proceedings with him at the hagu● shew ) hee was by that subtilty tryed whether he would refuse first to acknowledge iames graham ( alias montrosse ) or that great power of the churches , by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards . to backe this likewise the commissioners of the synode said ( p. 22 ) that they negotiated with him in a capacity altogether , distinct from the commissioners of parliament , as being persons commissioned by the kirke , which is commisioned with a iusdivinum our bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction & supremacy , and unlesse these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world , no one would believe that in such a poore country , and so much forme of religion , there could be such high passions of ambition . besides if it be a true rule , that he who is the maker , ought to be the interpreter of a law , then let all the world observe one thing , that the kirk having made the covenant ( as the principle of all supream rights both of state and religion ) then they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time ; as they de facto did not onely last yeare , contrary to the interpretation of their owne parliament , but also for many yeares together have peremptorily prest it upon ours : so that it makes a fundamentall change of government there , though differently from what our parliament hath made here , the jus publicum both of religion and security of state with them , lying in the covenant , and that lying in the brests of churchmen , chosen by one another : and our's lying in the power of laymen , chosen by the people , and judging by the common lawes of equity and necessity , and of the word of god . it were in vaine to say the kirke onely recommends their interpretation to the state . for last yeare they did it with a penalty upon the parliament , their whole army , and the body of the people which obey'd them ; if it be a penalty to bee given to the devill , and to bee put into a state of eternall death . wherefore they there are , ( or else none are anywhere ) the true judges of right , who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment . to conclude how practicable soever the covenant was at first , or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct , or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of kingly government , which was actually made first of all by it and their presbytery in scotland ; yet it being originally but a politicall or condition all oath , relating to our former unions when warre w● , and to our cooperation under our respective magistrates only , not in a way contrary to the fifth commandment ; and that all the magistracy which we enjoy , and by whom we are now fully possest , if they have not laid it aside , yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it ; and that it interprets not it selfe : so that each private man is not made by it his owne magistrate ; and that there is no penal article in it obliging us private men to pursue a publique warre upon the magistrates , or any other mens bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves ; who therefore can contrary to all this , peremptorily warrant us now , yea necessitate us to begin , or assist to the desolation of warre and bloodshed upon it ? especially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tyed to it at all or no : further more how good so ever it was at first , yea though that other nation had not given it it 's mortall wound , when they attempted to give us ours , both in england and in ireland , ( which was the cause of this effect of change of government here ) yet if when it was in force , it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among our selves , why might it not by our magistrates order , have been as well carried out of our churches as the brazen serpent was out of the temple , after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end ? if otherwise , and that it must at all hazards be indirectly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct ( as hath been proved ) i shall desire any pious spirit to judge , whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of campanellas censure which he gave upon the spanyards india treasury , that it was gotten in blood , sailes home in a sea of blood , and never rests till it be all laid out in blood . the reader may be pleased to take notice that though these replyes for the most part touch but on simple obedience to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things , yet they virtually extend to our acting under such a government . it is to be presumed that our adversaries not contesting profestly what hath been publiquely argued in that point , do conceive the difficulties of acting under involved in those of our submission to such a power . the distinction of active and passive obedience , is but a nicety , and if one be not a sin , the other is not . they are in a manner the same thing , derive from the same principle , and differ but gradually , just as the morning and the noone light do , which derive both from the same planet . for he who takes paines to furnish in a ●axe , and he who tooke paines to execute the office of a judge or of a justice of peace in honest things by vertue of commissions and orders from the same supreame ( but illegall ) magistracy , doe both of them what they doe , by vertue of the same originall submission which is a passive obedience . if this be otherwise , then ( according to these authors opinion ) we and all our forefathers have sinned , in obeying those actively or passively , who by unjust usurpation have come betwixt us and them , who derive from the first who were in compact , unlesse the lapse of time can justifie the viciousnesse of an action ( which is impossible ) or that we may lawfully obey those who plenarily possesse and protect us , and command us lawfull things . finis . errata . p. 2. losse , r. loose . imperciptibly r. imperceptibly . insinuation r. insinuations . p. 2. l. 2. may be not r. may not be , beholding r. beholden . p. 6. heneration , r. generation p. 7. but in one , r & in one p. 9. understand , r. understood . offices r. officers . p. 10. a businesses , r. busines , p. 11. pretends r. pretend , thereof r. therefore . p. 13. but it is a contradiction r. is it a contradiction . p. 14. for detain'd r. attain'd for dislove , r. disolve . p. 15. best to take heed r. best take heed p. 16. king r. kings . p. 17. purpose r. propose . p. 19. found r. swound . p. 22. at last r. at least . p. 31. drive r. derive . p. 33. ply , r. comply , for or , r. nor p. 34. large , r. subjection . p. 39. person r. persons next r. rest . p. 4 r. change r. chance . p. 42. true to religion r. to true religion . p48 . dispence him of it , r. dispence with him for it . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57691e-80 whence the difficulty of perswading civill truth . ●irst demur . demur . p 6. case of con. p. 3.7 . ● pag. 2. the end of magistracy , subsevient to the end of our being . all justice or just things relate not essentially to the legall magistrate . of commutative justice vid. p. 26.35 . 1 cor. 6. of distributive justice . this present parliament is effectually a parliament . vid p. 18. necessity above formes of , government . the difference betwixt conquest & victory vid. p. 33. object . answer . the state of kingdoms as separated , and as mixt in themselves . of the ri●ht of war betwixt fundamentall parties . page 9. of the house of lords . of secluded members . the negative when prevalent in equall partnarship . whither the transactions of the legall number of the house be invaled , when any members are forct away ? of the present consent of the major part of the people . ob. answ. whither the present power be the suprem ? whither it be a parliament ? object . ans. the case of the kings comming to the house of commons not parallel . the case of the apprentices entring and forcing the house not parallel . the parl. votes against force , still observed & are the same still . vvhy actions of government must change . how wrong hath been fitted for a title . 〈…〉 bac. h. 7. ob. object . of toleration . ob. ans. the magistrate in a state , not as a father of a family . vvhy states cannot looke so strictly after vertue , as after publique quiet o● . ob. ans. of the ecclips suspention and extinction of supream powers . the union of people to a government not like a marriage . obj. ans. a king of england , why not as a husband to the people of england . ob. answ. of taking away the kings life . ob. ans. of obedience for wrath , and for conscience sake . tyrants in titles from whom . of our lawfull submission to a magistrate who rules by gods permissive will ob. ans. obedience necessary to lawfull and unlawfull powers how different . how we may have a right to take what another may not have aright to give . the difference betwixt privat title and publique . of possession . object . answer . of supream powers altering themselves by joynt concurrence . how seperatly ob. ans. demur p. 8. of non obedience . ob. ans. what time makes a form'd government . obj. ans. our condition different from israels betwixt david and absalom . obedience to false governours in the right or wrong government varies not the sin of obedience . wherein caesars case & the parl. disagree wherein cesars case & the parl. agree , as to justifie our obedience . obj. ans. in what sen●● the present submission 〈◊〉 legall . of the 〈◊〉 evidence of 〈◊〉 ri●●ts , to as to satisfie con●●●e●ce for actions of w●r u●on them . ob. ans. object . demn . p. 5. ans. obedience some times asserts not a title but power . they who obey a wrong authority r●bbe not the ri●h●● . obj. ans. of the recovery of dubious rights , and the benefit which people get by most warres . obj. answer . the case of the master of the ship thrown over board . ob. answ. whether we be actually in the unsettlement & deepes which he supposes ? when the whole body may be hazarded for a disperate remedy & when not . 1 joh. 3.17 . notes for div a57691e-4960 we are still obliged to many things of the covenant but not qua league or covenant . of promissory ●nd assertory oathes . vvhither a promissory oath , which alwaies involves a tacite condition , be lawfull . ob. ans. gen. 24.2.34 . of tacite conditions in oathes concerning things possible . the obligation of a pact , or promise with an oath , or without an oath , is all one 1 k●ngs 2 20. 21.22 . 1 sam. 25.22 jo. ● . 10 . gen. 24.2.3.4 argu. the covenant a politicall or state oath . the subordinate conditions of this oath . ob. ans. o● change of ●●●●●nment , 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 cause , or as an effect of ●●●hers for●●● breach of covenant can ●●●her way authorize us to 〈◊〉 against this government . the covenant obliges us not against the ●i●th commandement . page 15. the covena●● make 〈◊〉 eac● man a magistrate . obj. ans. num 30. how a superiour may free an inferiour from ●n oath even in that which belongs to god . the difference btewixt this our league and those of prince● for authorizing war the obligation of the covenant , how lesse then the obligation of a ●ra war how an unjust penalty for the meere breach of covenant . object . ans. of the obligation of such a promise as may be fulfill'd solely by the promiser . ob. answ. of the obligation for preserving the kings person by covenant . how the words of preservation in covenant , provided more for the kings suffering , then the words of punishment provided for delinquents sufferings . ob. ans. how 〈◊〉 that the excluding member , ought to be brought by 〈◊〉 before the excluded . ob. ans. the coveant relates onely to a time of u●nion , with and under the magistrate . how the league of nationall union came to be ended of bringing those who would divide us to condigne punishment . the meaning of our utmost endeavours , and of all the dayes of our lives in the covenant . the covenant how more then broke by the scots hostility . obj. ans. whither the nationall breaking of one part of the covenant put an end to the whole . ob. ans. the covenant ( of all oathes ) interprets itselfe least , especially in the positive government , which it would establish , and in religion . though the covenant were in force , yet a change of government might be consistent with it . how the covenant necessarily points at some change of government . scotch presbytery fit for any government but the kingly . the judgement ●● experience of mary queen of scotland . of king iames . of king charles vid. scotch declaration , 27 july 1649. p. 14. of the prince . vid. decla . p. 8.10 . scotch proceed , at the hague with the prince , p. 14.15 the supream power in scotland in whom . how the scots state the supremacy of england in scotland . how the scotch presbyterians & ours oppose one another . two supremacies in the same place , how in●●●sistent . whether atrue title doth ( according to covenant ) authorize obedience the king of ● scotlands present case , & the actual change of government there by their interpretation of the covenant against kings . page 18. page 22. the interpretation of the kirke is not recommendatory to the state the conclusion the grounds of obedience and government by thomas white ... white, thomas, 1593-1676. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a65787 of text r19669 in the english short title catalog (wing w1827). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 159 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 100 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a65787 wing w1827 estc r19669 12289967 ocm 12289967 58869 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a65787) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 58869) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 930:4) the grounds of obedience and government by thomas white ... white, thomas, 1593-1676. [10], 183 p. printed by j. flesher, for laurence chapman ..., london : 1655. reproduction of original in huntington library. table of contents: p. [7]-[10] eng political ethics. political science -early works to 1800. a65787 r19669 (wing w1827). civilwar no the grounds of obedience and government. by thomas white, gentleman. white, thomas 1655 30274 10 0 0 0 0 0 3 b the rate of 3 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than 10 defects per 10,000 words. 2004-10 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-10 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2004-11 john latta sampled and proofread 2004-11 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-01 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the grounds of obedience and government . by thomas white , gentleman . salus populi , suprema lex esto . tullius de legibus , lib. 3. london , printed by j. flesher , for laurence chapman next door to the fountain tavern in the strand . 1655. to my most honoured , and best friend , sir kenelme digby . sir , the many attempts you have this long time made upon me , to declare a point of philosophy , wherein partly i was ignorant , and partly loth to meddle ( being mindefull of the poets admonition , incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso ) have at the last beaten out of my resistance , this little sparke of fire , or rather light ; borne by the authors intention , to shine , not to burne . for , having by experience of many our debates upon single points , found that such skirmishes were not like to gaine the victory of satisfaction upon your so solid understanding ; i saw my selfe forced to lay before your eyes , in one platforme or designe , the most intimate and bottome principles of obedience and governement . the which , i have strived to doe in the most short and summary manner i was able : not willing to bee over-curious in so awfull a subject . i play therefore the pure philosopher . i deliver the abstract notions onely : leaving to the prudence of particulars , to draw such consequences , as every ones circumstances shall make necessary and evident unto him by the short hints i give . and as for your selfe , i doubt not but my time is well employed . as for others , i feare the fortune of my other writings , may prove constant also to this ; that it will finde , those who reade it not , or who cannot judge of it , severe censurers : and those who like it , fearfull to oppose so loud and clamorous a multitude ; or at least , stonned with the adverse noise . but for this , let the eternall providence care . to me such clamours will bee no novelties : but the content of having given you satisfaction , an abundant reward of the endeavours of sir , your true friend , and most obliged servant , thomas white . the contents . ground 1. wherein consists the perfection of governement . pag. 1 ground 2. that the nature of man reacheth not to the perfection of governement . p. 9 ground 3. that a rationall beliefe is necessary to humane action . p. 12 ground 4. of the vertue of obedience , and wherein it consists . p. 19 ground 5. that fidelity is different from obedience ; and in what it consisteth . p. 27 ground 6. in what consists right or due . p. 34 ground 7. why men desire to live in community ; and of the necessity of governement . p. 40 ground 8. of the authority given to an absolute governour ; and of under-sorts of governement . p. 48 ground 9. of slavery and the lawfulnesse of it . p. 53 ground 10. why a man is to hazard himselfe for the common good . p. 67 ground 11. the quality and rationall power of a supreme governour . p. 78 ground 12. who is such a governour , and the subjects duty towards him . p. 94 ground 13. of the qualities of lawes and commands , in respect to obedience . p. 101 ground 14. in what conditions the subject may resist governement . p. 109 ground 15. wherein consists the power and liberty of the subject . p. 120 ground 16. of the dispossession of a supreme former governour , and of his right . p. 131 ground 17. of a supreme governour dispossessed . p. 144 ground 18. the objection of divines answered . p. 158 ground 19. the authority of lawyers insufficient in this question . p. 172 the grounds of obedience and government . the first ground . wherein consists the perfection of government . xenophon , in his excellent booke of the instruction of cyrus , moves this question , why , of all other living creatures , which are of different natures from man , wee easily attaine to the mastery and rule ; but few men are so intelligent as to be fit to governe men ; and those few are the highest and worthiest part of mankind ? but , to me , the very question seems to beare the solution in its owne bowells . for , when one asks , why man is hard to be govern'd since he governes other creatures ; hee asks , why one , who hath the power to rule others , is himselfe so difficult to be master'd : and the answer is , because the powers , by which he reduceth others to his obedience , makes him apter to resist them who seeke the conquest of himself ; and so renders it a higher taske to weild and manage him , then those creatures which he hath power over . for , we need not looke into philosophy , nor study learned bookes , to know that the nature of man is inclin'd to have its owne will , and casteth all things which are under his consideration to compasse and effect it : as also , that every ordinary mans knowledge and consideration is farre beyond any we find in other living creatures ; and , by consequence , is farre lesse easily masterable then any of them . whence we may plainly collect , that were it possible for a governour to make every single person in his dominion particularly understand , that what was ordered by the governement was his owne truest interest ; such an one would be the most absolute and perfect governour ; and infallibly would find the charge of governing most easie and sweet , as well to himselfe as to his subjects . this case is cleare both in reason and in experience . reason sheweth us , that to draw any thing to action , according to its owne fitnesse and inclination , is both easier to the attempter , and makes the action it selfe more efficaciously and throughly performed . he that will drive a wedge into a hard piece of wood , strives , as far as the scituation gives him leave , to make his hammer fall downewards , because a weight hath , of it selfe , an inclination that way , and so both the impression is stronger and the arme lesse strain'd , knocking and the very fall of a weight encreasing by motion downewards : therefore black-smithes , whose continuall labour is to use the hammer , lay their iron upon their anvile , that is , in such a scituation below their heads , as is most fitting to gaine the best advantage of the descent of their hammers , which they first raise to give them scope of a descent . upon this principle it is , that they who tutour dogges , horses , elephants and hawks , knowing the ordinary attractive of beasts to be meat and some kind of flattery , make them understand , to the proportion of their capacity , that to do the action they breed them for , gaines them food ; to which they joine also certaine motions of stroking and gentle words , that make an impression in the beast of its owne excellency , and that it pleaseth its master . in like manner , to deterre them from certain actions , cudgels , whips , and harsh words are used ; which have a notabler efficacy then one would easily imagine , if he saw it not by experience . this , now , being apply'd to mankind , drives the effect home . for man , being a rationall creature , ( whose inclination it is to worke according to knowledge ) desires to know that the worke prescribed him is good , that is , good for him , or his good . and because if two actions be proposed , whereof the one is better for him then the other , the lesse good action deprives him of some good which the more good had brought him ; his inclination leads him to do the better , and by consequence to know and dispute which is the better ; which is as much as to chuse betwixt them ; and this we call being free , or having naturall liberty to do one and not the other . so that , the nature of man is to be free ; and to act what ever he does , because it seems to him the best . whence it is evidently concluded , that the perfectest way and most connaturall for governing men is , by making them determine themselves to their actions , and to proceed freely , and act , as it were , by their owne inclinations . this if the governour can effect , hee shall finde both his intent generally performed , because the subject proceedeth with much affection and courage ; and seldome or never will his commands be resisted , or their obedience repented : for , men are not wont to repine often at what themselves chuse and judge best for themselves ; especially if , even after the action performed and peradventure the attempt failed , yet the subject remaines satisfied , that it was best for him , in those circumstances , to do what he did : now , if the reasons were solid when the governour proposed them , such must of necessity be , for the most part , the sequell . experience maketh this same as manifest as reason concludeth it . what mother or nurse doth not seeke to perswade and win the yet sucking childe with gay things , with flattery and such demonstrations of love ( that is , of the childs good ) as the child is capable of ? what master or father draweth not his boyes to schoole and sitting exercises , by promises and proposalls of good , as play , goodcheere , fine cloathes , and any other toyes suitable to their tempers ? the stronger ages have stronger motives ; as , of honour , lands , offices , and the like : by which we see the most part of men led , not onely to labour , but even to hazard their lives and those very goods which are proposed them for motives of their actions . on the contrary side , how ill do those enterprises thrive , where the actors conceive themselvs either not concern'd or wrong'd ? how diligently are excuses sought out and easily found , and every cause of delay judged sufficient ? how readily ( if the actours be in great multitudes ( as soldiers or schollars ) do seditions and mutinies spring up , and all disorders grow bold and spread themselves , the commander of the action hated and esteemed an oppressour and a tyrant , his officers scorned and disobeyed ? this then is , of all hands , concluded , that the proper and naturall way of governement is , by making the obeyer understand that it is his owne profit which the action aimes at ; so to make him work out of the inclination of his owne will , and the dictamen of his owne understanding . the second ground . that the nature of man reacheth not to the perfection of governement . notwithstanding this inclination be so naturall to us , yet nature is not able to make it perfect in most both persons and actions . children are not come to the ability of judgeing ; some others are so grosse of capacity , they cannot bee brought to understand their owne good , at least in that time and circumstances which nature hath provided them ; most spend so much of their day in some one businesse , which they have chosen either for their livelyhood or pastime , that they have not sufficient leasure to attaine the knowledge necessary for other occurrences of their life : even the greatest wits are not capable to understand the nature of all things necessary to their owne private conditions . the prince himself must trust the physician , the lawyer , the mariner , the soldier , the merchant , the cook , the brewer , the baker , and divers other trades and knowledges , which he hath no possibility to understand so perfectly as to be a master in them . neverthelesse , nature doth not recede wholly from her principle , in thus subjecting one mans understanding to anothers , and the greater most times to the lesser . for it doth not this , otherwise then by making the party subjected see , it is his owne good to trust another's skill . wherefore , it is true , that he followes his owne inclination , and is ruled by his owne understanding ; and so governes himselfe ; onely , hee is a degree higher , not busying his thoughts about the particular worke , but onely about chusing the master of the worke , or about his own submission , that is , his owne action , as he is a man , and his action as that of a man , and not of a physician or pilot , or such other particular discipline or quality . it remaines therefore still that hee is free , and master of his owne action and the commanding part of it . the third ground . that a rationall beliefe is necessary to humane action . of those things to whose knowledge wee cannot our selves arrive , but must rely on the credit of others , there are two kinds ; some purely to be believed , others to be also acted . as , when we informe our selves of what passed in some forreigne country , or of the nature of trees or beasts wee never have use of ; wee are barely to assent to what is delivered : but , when a physician telleth us wee must take a purge or keepe such a dyet ; wee doe not onely believe him but act according to our beliefe . now , though in truth this second sort belongeth properly to our discourse apart , because the nature of pure beliefe is intrinsecally included in it , as a part in the whole ; yet wee must first note the errours to bee avoided in a meere speculative assent : and these are two ; one of defect , and one of excesse . the vice by defect , warnes you to believe no thing but what your selfe understand , that is , indeed to believe nothing at all . but , were these men bound to their own law , that they should take no physick till they knew it would doe them good , at least as well as the physician doth ; nor trust their cause to a lawyer till they understood the subtleties as perfectly as hee ; and so in other vocations ; i doubt they would have neither health nor wealth for physician or lawyer to worke upon . but , because those who advance this proposition are persons of wit , i must not think they stumble at so notorious a block : therefore , their meaning is onely , that wee ought not to beleeve , but what we are able to understand if wee had will and leisure to study . but , even so explicated , it is a most wilfull proposition , reason being quite on the opposite side : for , let the authority which denounceth me a truth , be sufficient to make it credible , and overvalue the mysteriousnesse of the object ; and the higher it is above my knowledge , the more necessity there is of believing it . what is but a little above me , i may easily come to know ; and so need not believe but take paines and see it : beliefe is ordained for truths whose direct and immediate evidence wee cannot compasse ; and therefore is more proper , more due , more requisite for such as are above our knowledge . but , peradventure these smart persons do suppose that all things which have a possibility to be knowne , are the subject of mans wit ; and so take these two to signifie the same sence , that the object is such as we are able to understand , and that it is understandable , or doth not couch a contradiction in its termes : and peradventure conceive themselves able to shew contradiction in whatever they refuse to believe . if this be their meaning , the maxime they goe upon is safe ; but they must be very carefull not to subsume or apply it to particular instances without much consideration : for , ordinarily , the authority is very great which by understanding men , is alledged for remote and high truths ; and so is dangerously neglected , without an exact perusal and anatomy of the truths maintained by it . there are others soe prodigall of our naturall endowments , that they will teach us a kinde of contempt of reason and understanding . in a word , their position is , that , though you be certaine the proposition made ( for ought you know ) is false , neverthelesse , you may and ought to think it true : which how to excuse , from being an irrationall act and a pure folly , is beyond my skill ; at the same time to be assured it is uncertaine , and to hold it for certaine is , to mee , an impossibility . doe i not hold that which i am certaine of ? that is , that this truth is uncertaine ? how then can i hold it is certaine ? put this in the mouth of a witnesse in any court of justice , and teach him that , though hee know certainly hee doth not perfectly remember whether hee saw the man killed , yet hee may sweare hee saw it ; what justice will remain uncorrupted ? passion and precipitation may prevail with us , to judge that cleare and evident which is not so , and carry us to believe and affirm it ; but that reason should make us believe what it telleth us it seeth no ground for , or not sufficient , is to me , an assertion the most unworthy , the most contrary to reason , and the most biassed by interest that can be imagined . if our nature be rationall , if all our actions should be conformable to our nature , and governed by reason ; there cannot bee a more pernicious proposition , then to tell us we must assent , when there is no proportioned motive think wee ought to assent . thus much i thought fit to say concerning the errours of belief in speculation ; because beliefe in practicall things , and which concernes our actions , depends of it , and includes it , and is , in part , regulated by the same rules . the believing of practical things begins to trench upon the subject of our main discourse : for it is the first and most simple or uncomposed degree of government and obedience , and so the very roots of both are dependent from and to be discovered out of it . for , wee experience by our ordinary apprehensions , that wee esteeme a physician , a lawyer , a schoole-master ought to bee obeyed , though wee doe not acknowledge in them the power of a lord or magistrate . and so wee say , the scholler will never profit , because he will not doe what his master would have him : the client loseth his cause , because he would not obey his counsell : the patient recovers not , because he followeth not the advice of his physician . and though we doe not say the doctour or counsellour commands his patient or client , yet , if we look into it , he both rewardeth and punisheth , which are the concomitants of commanding . for who obeyeth is rewarded with learning , health , and prosperity , and who disobeyeth is punished with ignorance , sicknesse , and losses . the fourth ground . of the vertue of obedience , and wherein it consists . out of this we may easily understand what nature intends by the vertue of obedience , and what are the limits and lawes of it . for it is plaine , the immediate end is that our workes and all that concernes us may be well done , even as to those things wherein our selves have no skill , or not enough , and the more remote end to bee atchieved by this is , that our life may bee good and happy , and the end of nature arrived to by us . the conditions likewise are cleere : first , that the matter of our action bee such as our selves are not sufficiently skilfull in ; the second , that our commander bee a master in that art ; the third , that hee bee a good and honourable person , in whom wee may rest confidently he will deale with us conformably to his skill , and not wilfully or for his own pleasure , or interest , doe any thing against our good and profit . if the first bee wanting , wee also our selves are wanting to our selves ; for nature hath endowed us with reason to provide for our owne good by this power : againe , it is non-sence and folly to expect another man should be more carefull of our good , then our selves : and suppose it were so , it were either our fault or his , and for ought to bee mended on one side ; our fault if wee bee not so sollicitous as wee ought to bee , that is , as much as the weight of the affaire requires ; his if he be more sollicitous of our good then the same demandeth , and soe hee who professeth such a care may bee feared to bee a busie fellow , and one who aimes at his owne profit under colour of love , unlesse it bee in an evident neglect of ours , which cannot well be imagined of one who is ready to obey another . if the second condition bee wanting , there can be no vertue in obedience , since it will nothing mend but rather impaire our life , and to the import of that action , destroy our pretence to happinesse , to submit our selves to one who hath no more skill then wee , nor can bee rationally supposed to bear us more love and care , or that hee will or ought to imploy himselfe in our particular businesse more attentively then we our selves . as for the last condition , without it obedience is a plaine precipitation of our selves into misguidance and absolute ruine , and therefore a pernicious & wicked practice . by this discourse wee may understand , it is a fallacious principle , though maintained by many , that obedience is one of the most eminent vertues , and that it is the greatest sacrifice we can offer to god , to renounce our owne wills , because our will is the chiefest good wee have . for , not denying that obedience is a great vertue ; it being , truly in it selfe , the affection to moderate the pride of our understanding , which is subject to make us think too well of our owne opinions without having evidence of the truth of them , and so hinder us from candidly seeing and acknowledging the truth ( an inclination of all others most deeply rooted in our nature , and both most hard to bee conquered , and most pernicious to be followed ) and therefore , the vertue which tempers and moderates this passion must needs be very excellent : yet i cannot give it so high a rank , as to preferre it before all . for , i see it is only a vertue in case of imperfection , as penance and some others are ; it being grounded on this , that a man is ignorant in those matters wherein hee ought to bee obedient . but , the reason displeases mee more then the conclusion : for what signifieth this , that it is the greatest good we have and can renounce for gods sake ? if it bee a great good , it is no vice , no excesse , but a naturall power or exercise of a power given us by almighty god ; and then would i know , why to renounce such a thing is pleasing to him . can we think it were pleasing to god for any one to binde up his armes or legges , or cut off his hands , pretending to doe it for his sake ? hee that made them gave them us to use ; and there by commanded us to use them according to the manner intended by nature ; and , if wee doe not so , wee offend him . there is a story of origen , that he exsected his virility , thinking to please god ; but the same story saith , hee was reproved by the whole church , and excommunicated for the fact : simeon styletes is reported to have chained himself upon a hill , that he might not goe thence ; but he was taught that such impotency was fit for beasts , not men . so that , to renounce any natural faculty or the legitimate and fitting use of it , under pretence of pleasing god , is a folly , not a vertue . but , let us see what power it is that wee must renounce ; our will : and this word doth not , in this place , signifie any interessed affection or malicious resolution ; but that will which followeth and is guided by our understanding , and that truth which god hath made us capable of : therefore the renouncing of this will , is , withall , the renouncing of our understanding ; that is , of our wits and manhood ; so that it is in effect to renounce our rationality , and that by which we are the image of god . if any man should take a fancy to goe upon all foure like a beast , or subject himself to bee led in a string like a beare about the countrey ; would not all wise men cry out on him for bestiality , and thinke him unworthy the conversation of men ? how much greater is the indignity of him who permitteth himselfe to bee carried in his whole course of life , and those actions that most concerne him without using that wit or understanding which hee hath , and by the sole direction of another ? hee can bee accounted so farre no better then a clock or watch , which tells the houre by the wit and industry of the maker , not by any sence or worth of its owne . if therefore , to renounce our wills for gods sake bee to bee accounted a sacrifice ; as farre as my understanding reacheth , it is no other then that the scripture expresseth upon another occasion , to wit , one by which the sons are sacrificed to the father , the image of god defaced to the glory of him whose image he is . the fifth ground . that fidelity is different from obedience ; and in what it consisteth . but leaving this mistake of simple devotion ; of which wee needed not have spoken so much , had there not depended on it some matter of greater consequence ( as the following discourse will manifest in its due place : ) wee are to take notice of an equivocation which may draw on some errour if not prevented . wee use to say serving-men and waiting-maids ought to bee obedient to their masters and mistresses , whereas indeed , the vertue by which they serve is not that of obedience , but of fidelity and truth , which is manifest to him that looks into the nature of hirelings . for , none thinke a husbandman , who is hired to till or fence a piece of ground , obeyeth the hirer more then hee that selleth a piece of cloth or other merchandize obeyeth the buyer , because he taketh his moneys ; but they are said to contract and performe their part of the bargaine faithfully and truly . so servants pay their duties , performe their bargains : and fidelity is their proper vertue ; to doe it carefully , and uprightly ; not obedience . for , obedience is in such actions as are the proper actions of the obeyer , which concerne his life , and by which hee may derive good if well done , and harme if amisse . now in servants the good successe pertaineth to the master , the servant hath his livelyhood and wages , whether the event goe right or wrong , so hee doe what his master commandeth . and hence it followeth , that neither ought hee bee ignorant in the action hee doeth , nor sollicitous whether his master bee either skilfull or honest : for , since what is done concerneth not him but his master , his duty is to seek to doe what hee is commanded in the best way he can , without interessing himself about the successe . this i say , as farre as he is a serving-man ; but as hee is also an honest man , it may belong to him to suggest to his master what hee thinks best ; and , sometimes , when it lieth happily in his way , to help such errours of his master as he can : without trenching on his masters credit ; still providing for his own indempnity : that hee bee not involved in his masters either imprudence or iniquity ; for by his bargaine with his master , he did not renounce the care of his own preservation . the reason of this equivocation is because wee ordinarily call obeying the doeing another mans will : and distinguish not how , sometimes , this is done with renouncing our own wills , which is in those actions whereof wee are masters , that is , our owne actions ; and , sometimes , without such renunciation , as in the actions which belong to others , in which wee have no will to renounce . now obedience as it is a vertue especially attending on the renouncing of our wills , is properly confined to the former sence , not to the other ; with which it onely hath an alliance in the name , and which truly is fidelity , as we have already declared . but , although fidelity bee a distinct vertue from obedience , yet is it not such a stranger as not to demand a place in this treatise : especially because the kinde of obedience wee desire to look into , which is that by which common-wealths and communities subsist , is founded generally on fidelity or the matter thereof which wee call promise , and in that vertue it bindes to observance . after which discourse wee shall bee prepared to venture on the matter it self of governement , and to our power , declare the force of it amongst men . man therefore being by his nature and definition a reasonable , that is , an understanding creature , or one whose primary and principall inclination is to truth or true knowledge ; and the outward carriage and action of man being naturally proportionable to his inward substance ; it is cleere his chief property , by which he behaves himself outwardly like a man , is to speak truth , and to doe as hee sayeth , when his words have action following them . hence it is , that though honesty ( which in a courtlyer terme is called honour , when applyed to a rationall carriage , and in a more spirituall language , conscience ) bee extended to many other qualities , yet it is most frequently and principally expected in his keeping his word ; in so much that though hee have other faults , either spirituall or carnall , yet if he be true of his word , he , often and in ordinary conversation , passeth for an honest man . againe , this vertue of truth is the principall and first engine of humane conversation , and he that hath it not is unfit to be admitted to treate amongst men , but is to be rejected and banished from all negotiation . thus you see what engagement every one hath , both by nature and necessity of conversation , to stand upon his word or fidelity : for so we call the vertue by which we speake our mind in reference to action , and are constant to performe what wee say . yet , since malice is growne to such a height , all nations , who pretend to the fear of any deity , have used to make men confirme their faith and promise by the invocation of the deity they worship ; hoping religion may worke in them what nature is not strong enough to effect . this confirmation is performed in two sorts : one , when we onely call god to witnesse ; as when we say , god , who sees my heart , knowes this to be truth , or that i meane as i speake : the other , when we pledge our trust in god for a security ; as when wee wish god may punish us , or never doe us good , if we break our promise . and this is properly an execration , as the other an oath ; yet both called oaths , and agree in this , that we pledge our beliefe and feare of god , to another , for his security . by which it is evident , that men generally esteem religion the thing which should pierce deepest into a mans heart and affection ; and the strongest bond and tye of faith and honesty ; and that he , who setteth little by his religion , hath neither honour nor honesty in him ; or at least wanteth the greatest and strongest part of them , and that which ought to rivet in and fixe the naturall inclination which we have to truth and fidelity . the sixth ground . in what consists right or due . the next consideration may appear too metaphysicall a subtlety for a morall treatise : yet such it is , that the ignorance of it is mother of many mistakes and quarrells . we ought therefore , to know that a man , considered in pure nature , lookes on all other things , men and beasts , and insensible creatures , as his subjects to worke on ; his onely rule being reason , which takes nothing to bee good but what is good to himself ; and makes the rule of his actions , to do what is fitting for him or conformable to his , that is , to a rationall nature . by this rule he treats another man , otherwise then a horse or a dog , and them otherwise then a tree or stone : for reason is a faculty to use every thing suitably to their natures ; as , to take a knife to cut , a horse to ride on , a man to read or write or be his counsellour . and this runs through all his actions . but as , though a taylor or mariner governe himselfe by this rule , even when he playeth the taylor or pilot , yet none can doubt but the rules of taylorship or steerage are different from this seeking his owne good and applying all things to that end : so , neither can any justly doubt but the art of a lawyer or counsellour is different from this principle which belongeth to all men . and to find out the difference , wee are to reflect , that he who maketh a promise to another , so it be a perfect one ( which we adde to decline the question of what promises oblige , what not ) puts himselfe and his promissary into a rank of agency and patiency , on a new score , to wit , that of fidelity and negotiating : so that now , not the nature of the two men , but their words , and what followeth out of them , ground their being active and passive . this power of activity is , in latine , called jus or justum , in english , right or due . the difference of these two arts is , one considers onely what is noble , and manly , and conscience ; the other , what is according to promise and consent of parties . whence we finde , by the vertue of a promise , a new order growne amongst men following out of promise : wherein three things are to be considered ; the engagement of nature and honesty ; the confirmation by oath ; and lastly , this right and duty which ariseth from the promise : for , whoever promiseth , submits himselfe to his promissary , and becomes his subject , as far as the contract reaches . the first mistake that springs from the ignorance of this difference is , the great noise we heare of the law of nature and the law of nations . for , we are made imagine that nature hath bound us to certaine lawes , and not left us to the liberty of reason , where no pacts or agreements intervene : as , that men ought to give free trade to leave the seas open , to give immunities to ambassadours , and the like : for these either depend on custome and consent , or are free for every man to dispose of , according to his owne profit , necessity , or convenience of his affaires . it is true , there is an inclination in man , from reason , to do another any good i can without my owne prejudice , and to have a desire to keepe peace with all men : but if i do not , it followes not that i wrong him , even though i do him harme or seeke his ruine ; but i wrong my selfe , nature binding me to make my carriage to every one rationall and becoming a man : for he is no otherwise to me then a piece of cloath or wood , which i cut and shape after my owne will , fittingly for my use . and , on the contrary side , the party prejudiced or refused a courtesy , gets no right over me to revenge himselfe : but nature and reason teaches him , peradventure , that it is good and prudent for him to hurt me , to prevent a greater mischiefe to himselfe ; and he doth right to himselfe in harming me , because he doth an action rationall and suitable to manhood . the different consequents of the two positions , will appeare in this : that , if there be , in nature , radicated such an order of right and naturally just or due ( as many hold ) it is a thing that reason can never infringe nor can any thing justifie what god hath shewed us by example , and we see wise politicians practise sometimes , when , without crime or offence offered , they make themselves masters of convenient places : but , if there bee no such right by nature , then reason is left mistresse to judge whether it be conformable to the nobility of man to do such an action or no . the seventh ground . why men desire to live in community ; and of the necessity of governement . not to make the foundations or under-ground workes bigger then our building ; it is time to enter upon our pretended subject of governement and obedience , and examine what it is maketh governement necessary to mankind . and , because the governement we looke upon is that of a multitude ; first it is fit to understand why men desire to live in flocks or multitudes . neither can any who hath never so little skill in nature doubt , but , as pleasure masters and heads all our actions , so likewise doth it this of living in society . the first community is of man and wife . who seeth not the power of pleasure in their mutuall society ? aristotle , out of experience , teacheth us that we take pleasure in conversing with handsome persons . and if wee consider pleasure to be nothing but the knowledge or sence of our being well or receiving some good ; and , that the immediate cause of pleasure is the impression which some naturall or apprehended good maketh of its owne presence ; and that good signifieth connaturall or fitting for us ; wee shall perceive that handsomenesse in our owne kinde must of necessity cause pleasure in us ; the impression it makes by our eyes being of the features and colour due to the perfection of our nature ; a gracefulnesse , not onely of gesture and voice , but even of wit and discourse being regularly the ground of the outward beauty . so that ( if nature hath not miscarried ) all the parts and actions of a beautifull body are gracefull to nature , and breed pleasure in others who injoy them by conversation and , as it were , communication . this then is the first origine of meeting and living together ; as , whosoever lookes into experience will easily discover : for , he will finde most men burthensome to themselves when they are alone , and to seeke company to divert themselves , so to elude the length of time . i remember to have heard a country fellow complaine of the losse of a dog which was stollen from him ; and gave for his reason , that he was to travell a whole night alone , and the dog would have beene an excellent companion to him . bees also , wee know , love company . horses not onely labour , but even eate better amongst their fellowes : and we often heare sickly stomachs thank those that visit them for the good meale they have made , as if the company helped downe their meat . pleasure therefore and love is the first combiner of men into society . the next is , that god and nature have so managed mankind , that no one hath of himself , as much as he desireth ; but regularly aboundeth in one kinde of goods and wants some other which his neighbour hath : hence , they mutually affect society ; to bee accommodated with such necessaries , as they cannot have but by communication one with another . in the third place comes feare : for hee that findeth himselfe stored with those things which hee and others love , is subject to feare those whom hee suspecteth able to bereave him of them ; and so seeketh company of friends for protection . nor doth any one feare to lose but what he affecteth to have ; so that first love marcheth in the van , and feare followeth in the reare . besides , it is against all generosity , and embases nature it selfe , to set the throne of feare above that of love ; and agreeth neither with philosophy nor morality . to make a step farther : granting once men to be desirous to live together , and taking notice of the passions they are subject to , and how self-love corrupteth the judgement of almost all in their own case ; it is evident they can never live in quiet and content , unlesse there bee some way contrived of agreement , when passion stirreth contention . they must therefore , necessarily , give consent , to end their controversies by some means . and since reason is our nature ; and every ones reason freer to see the truth in anothers case then in his owne ; and a wise and good man fitter then a fool or knave , the most naturall way for a multitude to live in peace is to have some man or men , accounted wise and good , chosen , to whose arbitrement all the rest ought to stand ; the stronger part combining to force the weaker , in case of resistance ; that is , the disinteressed part , which is the multitude , to force the interessed , which generally are but particulars if compared to the body of the people . here you see the nature of governement begin to appeare . but , to make it perfect , wee must farther consider , that many commodities are necessary to a multitude , which are to be furnished by common consent : that likewise there are many forraigne enviers to a multitude which liveth handsomely and happily : and in conclusion , that to provide for goods and prevent evils in common , is a matter of so great weight and difficulty , that it takethup the whole life of one or more men ; and by consequence , these businesses cannot be carried on by the whole body of the community , whose worke and aime is to enjoy themselves to their proportion , in getting by their labour , those accommodations of humane life , which they esteem necessary or conducing to their happinesse . it solloweth therefore , they must entrust some more or fewer to take care of the common concernements . such trustees are called governours , and the commnnity is said to obey them ; and according to the principles forelaid , you see the people are supposed ignorant of what ought to bee done for the publike , this being a businesse requiring a mans whole time ; which they neither can spare , nor doe desire to employ in this : way : you see they entrust others in whose prudence and goodnesse they confide ; and themselves execute what their trustees think fitting , either by practising when they are commanded , or giving a sufficient force to their governours to master such restif parties as will not obey : in conclusion , you see governement is , naturally , a power or right of directing the common affaires of a multitude , by a voluntary submission of the communities wills to the will of the governours ; whom they trust , upon opinion that they are understanding and honest , and will administer the commonalty by the rules of wisedome and goodnesse , as is most convenient and advantageous for the people . it seems to mee no moderate and discreet person can doubt but a governement so ordered is both necessary and connaturall to a rationall multitude , and , in a word , such as humane nature requires ; and is the best , if not the onely , that sutes to the disposition of free men and prudent . the eighth ground . of the authority given to an absolute governour ; and of under-sorts of governement . by this resignation of the peoples will , it is also evident , the magistracy receives such an activity and power as , wee have explicated before , did arise out of a mans promise to his neighbour : and by consequence , that the people as farre as they have renounced their owne will , so farre they have no power left in them to contradict or resist the orders of the magistracy . i say , as farre as the people have submitted their wills : for since this power is in the magistrate in vertue of their wills , it cannot extend farther then the peoples promise : so that if the people binde their magistrates to certaine lawes and limits ; hee hath no right to transgresse such lawes , or extend himselfe beyond the prefixed limits by his installment , and the original power given him : but above all , he cannot dispose of one chip or dispense in one the least law ; farther then he apprehends it as fit and necessary to the good of the common-wealth : and , if hee doth , hee exceedeth his patent and power . true it is , there is a great discretion to bee used in such limits , and the prudent governour will see that the good of the community requireth many of those dispensations , which carelesse governours use out of an overweening of their owne height and power . having thus declared the nature and conditions of naturall governement ; it is not amisse to see whether there bee any other governement ; and wherein distinguished from this . and casting our eyes round about us wee quickly perceive certaine communities which pretend to a defective governement : as companies of merchants or trades-men ; universities and colledges of schollers ; and cloysters of men and women , who pretend to employ themselves wholly to perfect their soules towards eternall beatitude . all these have a participation of governement ; but have not the universall administration of humane goods and evills : for , power of life and death , generally , they have none ; and are subject , for the most part , to appeals from their judgements , in matters of great consequence : neither have they any power of peace and warre : and if sometimes any of these royalties belong to them ; it is not as they are heads of such communities , but as they participate of soveraignty by priviledge , or accident . these therefore are distinguished from the governement wee pretend to declare ; as being slight imitations of it , and certaine likenesses , not the power it self ; or as some art or trade is different from morall philosophy , which is mistresse of the will , and all her actions ; the others being but ushers to the particular , as it were formes or rankes in which petty things are taught . in fine , these others are to our governement , as particulars to the universall . the governement therefore which wee explicate is that which hath power , either of all things belonging to the people it governeth ; or at least , of all comprehensible by nature and falling under sence and experience . the first of these wee see in the pope and such bishops as are withall secular princes ; the second , in other christian governements either of princes or common-wealths , where the spiritual jurisdiction is acknowledged to be higher and greater , though not commander of the temporall . but wee seeke farther , whether there bee any supreme governement different from this wee explicate , or no : and the occasion is from what wee see in certaine instances , that there is a kinde of command or rather subjection , which wee call slavery , exercised , not onely amongst heathens , but even christians , who have more conformity to nature . the ninth ground . of slavery and the lawfulnesse of it . and first , wee must looke into the notion of slavery ; which signifies a subjection to command in all things ; and that meerely for the masters profit . this all things may either reach to the hindring him from those actions which are necessary to obtaine beatitude ; or onely to corporall services , with that moderation , that the master hinders him not from such exercises as concerne the procurement of future happinesse . and clearly , it is against nature for any to submit his will so farre as to renounce eternall blisse . there cannot , then , bee any obedience due to such an extremity ; and , by consequence , there cannot be any power of commanding such enormities in the compasse of nature . the like i conceive of a subjection to be killed or maimed causlessely and without desert , or even tormented ; nay , or so penuriously abused as to have no content in life ; but perpetually to suffer sicknesse , hunger , cold , or any other notably afflictive condition , so that his life is rather a punishment then a content to him . for since life is our beeing , and since beeing is the thing most deeply recommended to us by nature ; it is evidently against the inclination of nature , to consent to the losse either of life or of the profit of life , which is , either to be well in this world or in the next : therefore it cannot be conformable to nature to renounce either ; especially , the quiet in this world being the meanes to gaine blisse in the other . neither doth it scare me to cast my eyes upon so many holy men and women , as have put themselves , voluntarily , upon penurious and painfull lives . for , i can easily answer , that they had not displeasing lives ; enjoying the fruit of contemplation , and the sweetnesse of conscience in expecting a great reward for what they did : so that , they onely refused the pleasures of this world , to gaine those of the next ; which is very rationall . but , for a man to renounce the content of this world , who either thinke not of another , or , at least , hopeth nothing out of his renunciation : this must of necessity be extremely irrationall and against nature ; whose universall aimes are , to be well , either in the next or this present life . but if there be no su●h subjection naturall , there can as little be any power of command gotten either by promise and submission of the subject , or violence of the commander ; who may perforce do what he list , but can never make it conformable to nature , to use an other with such inhumane severity . there followes yet another kinde of slavery ; which consisteth in being bound to do what his master commandeth , while his master affordeth him a convenient livelyhood ; and being subject to due punishment , without farther appeal , when he deserveth it . and this hath no apparent opposition to nature ; why , in circumstances , a man may not binde himselfe to it , and be obliged to maintaine and make good his word to his dying day . and , of such a kind of slavery , we may question , whether nature alloweth a whole people to be involved in it , or it be a thing that onely can happen accidentally in nature . and aristotle is the first man whom wee are engaged to offend in this matter ; who sayes or seemes to say , that some nations are naturally masters and commanders , others , slaves and subjects : to which conceit virgil seemes also to incline ; tu regere imperio populos romane memento &c. hae tibi erunt artes — as if it were proper to that countrey to command . neither doe i thinke aristotle's meaning was any more , then that there was a greater fitnesse in some nations to command , then in others : for , himselfe teacheth , the barbarous prisoners , whose education had been noble , should not be put to servile offices . so that , it was but a little selfe-pleasing in these two great authours , and affection towards their countries , which made them fall into this extremity , of thinking it fit that other nations should submit to theirs : whereas , had they lived in our dayes , long experience would have taught them that , in every nation , there are men fit to governe , if education and discipline be not wanting ; and againe , any nation may prove a slave , even through too much wit , if they have not goodnesse to temper it . but we must not be angry , even with great ones , if they flatter a little their countrey : but take warning it be not our owne case , either for our countrey , or , which is more absurd , for our selves . leaving then this question , whether any nation be , by nature , borne and designed to slavery ? let us see whether , within the latitude of nature , it consists that any nation can enslave it selfe in the sence propounded . i do not here intend to engage in that question ; whether one nation may oppresse another , and , by force of garrisons and armies , keepe them quiet in a legitimate course of governement and subjection ? a question much different from ours , which is onely , whether a whole nation may voluntarily submit it selfe to a government , by which it shall have nothing of its owne , nor be able to deserve or get any thing ; but bee entirely at the disposition of the magistrate it chuseth , without right or property ? that we may not walk too much in the dark , the holy scripture holdeth us out a lanthorne , in the example of joseph ; who bought up the whole nation of aegypt for pharaoh their king , so that he rendred him not onely the governour as before , but also absolute lord and master , and them his slaves ; and this by their consent . neverthelesse , i am not able to understand reason in it . to put therefore the case clearly , the meaning is ; whether a whole nation can ty it selfe so by any promise to one magistrate , as afterward to be bound , they and their children , in force of their words , not to have or dispose of their labours and goods of fortune but at the pleasure of the magistrate ; and that he hath power , arbitrarily and without any farther reason then his owne will , to give what one man possesseth to another , and make any one worke and obey another , meerly because such is his pleasure . that which induceth me to declare for the negative is the nature of man ; whose first and maine operation , is judgement and choice ; and the matter of this is his outward action : so that , who univer●ally renounceth his judgement in externe action , truely renounceth nature it selfe , in renouncing the end and action for which it was made . now , that a single man may be forced to this , i make no difficulty : for , if force can take away a single mans life , much more may it take away his outward action . but , when i speake of a nation , me thinks i speake of nature it selfe : for , i understand a nation to signifie a thing in nothing different from humane nature , except in greatnesse ; as a bit of bread from a loafe or a paile of water from the pond out of which it was taken ; and so , reason cannot teach us to do that to a nation , which ought not bee done to all humane kinde . now , who abhorres not to thinke that the use of judgement and will should bee banished out of mankinde ? were not that quite to unman us and be-beast our whole nature ? on the other side , it being the property of reason to use every thing it knoweth , according as it is fitting to the respective nature of the thing ; and nothing being more fitting for man in common and every one in particular , then to judge and governe in his little spheare of activity ; reason can never demand or approve of the contrary to be practised universally ; as is implyed in this position , that it may be done to a whole nation . i looke not into the inconvenience of such proceeding : how base and unworthy it renders the subjects ; how unfit for the service of the magistrate ; how ready to accept of any occasion to better themselves ; and the like ; which are sufficient to dehort any wise governour from attempting or desiring it : because my theame is onely upon the contracting an obligation of obedience , out of the force of their promise ; and extends no further . and , i suppose , the shewing that such a promise invalidateth the principle upon which a promise grounds its constancy , is enough , to shew that no promise so made can be constant and firme ; since a man stands to his word , because he is a man and hath a principle of judgement or choice upon judgement , by which and according to which he is and ought to be governed : now then , such a promise being a renouncing and bereaving him of this his manlinesse ; it cannot assuredly bee maintained by manlinesse which is the onely or chiefe strength of a promise . but , what must we reply to joseph ? what to many thousands of eminent christians , who seeme to professe and observe , in vertue of a vow , this very kinde of subjection ? as for joseph , he justifies himselfe , in renouncing the vassalage of his people for one fifth part of their lands and fruits . 1. and , not to make an estimate , how proportionable the fifth of a kingdome is to the furnishing of necessaries for governing ; so much at least is plain that , by his remission of foure parts absolutely , that is , for ever , he did not execute what he pretended by the bargaine ; but , by the formality of acquiring all , he obtained what he aimed at , that the people should willingly contribute the fifth part of their labour and goods generally , and , in case of necessity , willingly obey their governour . as for the speciall obedience vowed by some christians of exemplary life , it is professedly only , concerning spirituall instruction or exercise , even then when it is applyed to the knights champions of christendome : and this is expressed by the greatest divine the schoole ever had , in his 22● . qu. 104. art. 5. ad tertium . so that , neither of these objections prejudice the conclusion we have setled ; however the outward undiscerned shew may make an appearance to the contrary . out of this conclusion it is easily seene , that the turkish , moscoviticall , tartarian and other whatsoever governements , setled upon this principle , that the goods and lives of the subjects are the princes , not to defend ( as our lawes go ) but to dispose of at will , without contradiction or limitation , more then of his pleasure ; neither do nor can ever breed any obligation of obedience in the subject , farther then out of feare or present utility . it is not amisse to adde this consideration , that those tyrannicall governours exact of their subjects no lesse then to forgoe all that is deare in this world , at their pleasures , life and meanes , wife and children , and whatsoever hath made impression upon them : so that , truely , there is no protection or security from them ; and if they rob you not , it is because they have no occasion , not because they conceive any unworthinesse in it . whence , no good nor profit doth , regularly and according to the intention of the pact and agreement , result to the particular ; but all is the high masters , and the subjects portion is onely to share those scraps he shall cast down to him , as to a dog , to make him fit to hunt for his master . the tenth ground . why a man is to hazard himselfe for the common good . it is true , this debt in the subject , of hazarding life and limbs and all that is estimable in this world , is exacted , as well in just and legitimate governements as in those hideous tyrannies ; but , there is a recompence for it , and the good of the whole reflecteth on the part ; and if one lose his life , his children and relations at last feele the sweetnesse of it ; and this makes men hazard with courage , and die with comfort . and cleerly , were there not this obligation , no common-wealth could stand . what city could be defended , if the citizens would not venture their lives upon the walls ? what army could bee managed , if the souldier would never be brought into the danger of death , or would fly as soon as the bullets began to play about his ears ? all wrongs must be suffered at their hands who would expose their own lives to hurt others ; and no justice maintained , or innocency defended . nature therefore makes it most cleer that such an obligation is unavoidable , and the daily necessity of it beateth it out so flat and plaine , that wee can no way escape so manifest an evidence . but if it bee by the direction of nature , certainly it is also rationall , and hath some principles of its truth and reasonablenesse . now , in morality the reason of all action is the good obtaineable by it ; which if lesse or not greater then what wee hazard and , peradventure , lose in the attempt , it is no good nor can bee a rationall motive of such an action . we ought therefore to seeke out this great good . aristotle proceeds as cunningly in this businesse as became so wise a master ; and , according to his fashion , where his skill reached not to explicate the particulars , remained in common termes : telling us , that bonum commune divinius est quàm particulare : but , in what this divinity consists , hee no where expresses . truly , if there were a platonick idea of the particular's goods , which might bee termed the common good , i could understand that there were a divinity in it ; but himselfe hath extinguished that flash of plato's , beyond reviving . i understand also , that the notion of common , compared to the notion of individuall , hath a kinde of excellency by its universality , which rendreth it very august and lustrous , and of a higher degree then the particular . i know again the perpetuity a common-wealth pretendeth to , compared to the mortality of a single person , vesteth it selfe with a kinde of infinity , which giveth it a glorious appearance . nay , when i see the same man work for a common-wealth , in a free way of doing it good ; and againe , for a private friend : i see a vast distance between his pretended ends ; and an eminent generosity in one over the other : whence , i believe , it cometh that heroës and heroicall vertues are chiefly taken in respect of doing good to whole countreys or cities . but when , on the other side , i see the same great master teach us , that good is the same with desireable ; and every ones good , what is desireable to him ; i finde it is an intricate labyrinth of equivocation wherein wee endlessely erre , while wee think that good taken in common , should bee accounted good , truly and properly . as , who would bee so wilde as to bend any strong labour here in england to profit the king of persia or siam , if hee expected no good to reflect on himselfe by it ? much lesse would any account it good to bee robbed or maimed , because it was good to another who possessed his money or was afraid of him : and yet if wee stick upon the common notion of good , without determining to whom it is good , ●oth these must bee esteemed not onely goods but great ones ; for , so they are to some body , though nothing or harme to the esteemer . then , to cry , the common good , is a meere deceit and flattery of words ; unlesse wee can shew that the common good is as great to us as wee make it sound . neither can the authority of learned nations and the many endevours of worthy men perswade us the contrary . for these nations generally were of popular governements , where plainly the common good was the good of them who were to reward the causes of it : so that , it was no wonder the common good should be so highly exalted and cryed up ; where it was the particular good , both to them to whom it was commended , as also the commenders themselves were to arrive to their own private pretences through that notion of the common good . the like is of all princes and governours ; who if they bee wise , conceive the common good in most circumstances , to bee compared to them as their own proper good . it remaines therefore , to see what may bee the ground on which an understanding man ought to value so highly the common good ; and expose his life and all that is deare to him , upon the score of the publicke . cleare it is , that hee who ventures his life , ventures all this world : for if hee dies , what reward remaines there in this world ? fame is a slender recompence , when the fruit of it ( which chiefly consists in being respected in company , and having a power amongst his associates ) is once passed . the good of his wife and children ; that may rejoyce a dying man ; but if there rest nothing after death , it is a comfort which soon expires ; being indeed nothing but a flash . it is then past dispute , that for him , who expects nothing in the next world , there can bee no rationall motive of voluntarily endangering his life for the common cause ; if himselfe bee not particularly interessed in it . i know philosophers reply , that there is no harme in death , nor pain after it , and wee are but as if wee never had been ; so they dispute to take away the feare of death . but first , i would ask them , why , even in such a case , the fear of death should be taken away ? what signifieth this to a sound philosopher , to take away the love of his summum bonum ? of the end for which hee is to doe all his actions ? againe if hee must embrace death , upon what motive must he make his onset ? shall hee propose to himselfe none ? or a lesse good then hee loses ? or entertaine frantick apprehensions of glory after hee is nothing ? these are not answers for philosophers and considerate persons ; but for some hare-brained fool-hardy flashes or doating oratours , who , with a multitude of fine words , can plausibly dresse up contradictions and non-sence . this therefore remaines certain , that there is no good to bee expected here equivalent to the hazard of death ; and consequently , none can bee rationally valiant , who sets not his hopes upon the next world : and as , before , wee made it apparent , that hee who was not constant to his religion , could have no rooted honour or honesty in him ; so , now it is likewise evident , hee cannot rationally bee either valiant himselfe or trusted by others in danger , farther then hee is a foole . since then , on the contrary side , the nature of common-wealths makes it beyond dispute that hazarding is necessary ; it is both evident there is another life to bee expected , and that it imports good government to plant deeply in the breast of the subjects a rationall apprehension of it . the cause therefore , and solid reason why men ought to bee valiant , is the hope of reward hereafter for doeing good to our neighbour here : and the common-wealth beeing our neerest and greatest neighbour , as including our friends , parents , acquaintance , and all of mankinde that our knowledge reacheth to ; to performe service to it is , certainly , the greatest act of charity towards our neighbour ; that is the highest externe act which god hath granted to us , and , consequently , to bee preferred before all others ; and , as such , to expect a profit and recompence in the next life . i know , it may bee objected , that in beasts also is to bee found a kinde of valour , even to the hazard of their lives for their mates and little ones , and yet no reward of the next world can be pretended for them . but , wee are to reflect , that beasts are not governed by any reason given them to governe themselves by ; but like clocks and other engines , by the wit of their makers : and therefore it ought not to bee expected they should bee addressed to that which is their individuall greatest good , as man is by his reason ; but onely to what is fittest for their creators intention ; which being onely to continue them for the use of man ; and this passion of audacity which wee see in them , being fit for that , wee are not to seeke a further reason for them to hazard their lives , nor to draw any consequence from them to mankinde , whose propriety is to governe himselfe by the knowledge of his owne good , and not to bee forced out of that for the good of any other , so the notion of good bee rightly taken . by this wee , in part , understand wherein consists the worth and excellency of a magistrate and his office : to wit , that all others ends being purely for the good of their private persons or family ; the magistrates aime is at the universall good of the whole eternall body of the common-wealth , the extent of the persons , the long and farre-sighted care , and the abstraction from his private good , manifestly exalt this function , beyond comparison , above that of private men and their intentions ; and placeth it , as it were , in an orb of honour proper to its dignity . the eleventh ground . the quality and rationall power of a supreme governour . thus is our supreme magistrate or governour mounted on his throne of justice and soveraignty . hee hath for his strength , that right the people have bestowed on him ; devesting themselves , by this submission , from interposing in common affaires . he hath besides , the strength of the people ; both their wealth and swords being delivered up to him ; so that , if he bee wise , he can make himselfe and his lawes obeyed . but chiefely he hath his owne prudence and goodnesse , which is supposed to be the choicest that could bee found in that people ; and the credit of it to be his strength and support . for , if we looke into it ; as we see that , in the naturall generation of governement , the people truely intend to be governed by one whom they esteeme the wisest and best amongst them : so afterward , when they apprehend their magistrate no solomon , yet they still conceive he is the best they can obtaine or prudently aime at ; that is , if they should attempt to change , it would bring greater inconveniences then their continuance under this weaker magistrate . so that , as it were , the essence and forme of his power to governe , is wisdome and goodnesse ; at least , such a degree of both as is supposed and apprehended the greatest possible , according to the circumstances wherein they are . his end wee finde to bee the common good : and to that is he wholly and adequately bound , by his owne goodnesse , by the peoples intention , by his owne acceptance , by the nature of the charge it selfe , and by the very forme of his life and profession : in so much that , he faileth from his duty , from the expectation of his subjects , and his owne goodnesse , if he doth the least action for his private interest , or otherwise then out of his esteeme that it is for the greatest good of the common-wealth . and truely , if it bee duely considered , we may plainely see that his private interest is not distinguished from the publick . for , how can it be ? first for honour , 't is plaine , the welfare of his subjects is his highest honour ; their knowing they are well by him , and so their love to him , his strongest security ; their expressing still on all occasions content with his actions , and esteeme of his person , his greatest pleasure ; and in fine , the more wealth they have , the greater commander is he : so that really , this private interest ( if he be indeed a good governour ) is the true felicity of his people . i doe not , by this , intend to cut off from supreame magistrates that promise and magnificence wee see usually in persons of that quality : but , whereas it may be practised either for pride and vanity , that is , to procure an esteem of the private merit of the magistrate , or else , to facilitate the governement by the awe and reverence it printeth in the subject ; i expect the supreame magistrate to be so discreet , as to understand the former is meerly a shadow or faint and fading colour , the other a reall profit and necessary instrument , and so to be embraced for the good of the people . neither must wee leave our magistrate here , but transplant our discourse into a new consideration . for , if he hath gotten a commission , he hath not , by that , lost the quality of a rationall , wise , and good man ; but joined to that a new obligation of being new fixt upon the common good , as the effect and scope of the actions of his whole life : insomuch that , to determine the quality of his action , we must make one complexe of the whole person ; and aske , what a wise and noble minde , haveing such limitations upon him , by word or oath engaged in his installment , may or ought to do concerning the limitations ? and first , it is undoubted on both sides , that neither may he , without great cause , make a breach in those hedges his way is fenced with ; nor , if he make some small and inconsiderable breaches , that hee violates therefore his oath . for , the nature of humane action is such , as not to consist in an indivisible ; but , of it selfe , to have a morall latitude ▪ our understandings not being able to reach to such small and petty differences as nature maketh and our operations containe , as far as they depend from nature . but , the question cometh , when some great fault discovers it selfe in the limitations , and the end of governement is prejudiced by such a defect ; and neverthelesse it is no doubt but 't is the intention of the people or the trustees of the people to binde their magistrate to such conditions ; whether , in such a case , he be bound to his orders and oath , or whether the duty of a wise and good man doth enfranchise him to doe what is truely best for the people , though it be against their wills ? the question seemeth hard : and therefore it is not amisse to note , that truely best signifieth that it be not onely best , if it had been fore-ordered or if it were in practise ; but that it be best to be brought into practise ; and that , notwithstanding all dammages and dangers which are to be incurred in the setling of it ; otherwise , it is clear , he ought to stand to his oath . another caution is , that the magistrate doe not onely think it so best , but know it by certainty and science ; otherwise , hee proceedeth not wisely , to hazard a disturbance of the common-wealth upon slight and weak appearances . these two suppositions premised , wee are to consider what it is that engageth the magistrate on both sides . and , for his promise , it is above declared , that hee is engaged to it by the connaturality and beauty of truth in mans nature : now not truth onely is conformable to mans nature , but also that noblenesse and goodnesse that bindeth man to man ; which in its highest pitch , that is , as it looketh upon a common-wealth or a little mankinde , is the beauty and vertue of a governour . againe , i see a governour hath in himselfe , as it were , two truths , or degrees of truth belonging to his person : one , which is the publicke honesty , either considered betwixt him and his subject or some aliens ; and this forfeited maketh his publick credit weak and unfit for the use of governement : the other is but a splendour reflecting on his own person , by which hee appeareth in the face of honour and a man of his word . for this latter it is very evident , the affection to the publicke ought to oversway it ; because being but a private good it should doe homage to those vertues which carry a man to the common interest . for the former , the dammage ensueing is to bee esteemed and poised against the profit or necessity of the common-wealth : for , if it bee evident , that the good of the change openly and vastly exceeds the dammage proceeding from the discredit ; cleerly hee is bound to admit of the discredit , to purchase the advantage accrewing by the change : but , where there is none or little difference , there the ballance hangs upon quietnesse side , and change is not to bee ventured on . this seemeth so plainly and evidently concluded , that a rationall man cannot resist it . but , to those who are used to maintaine their credit by custome more then by reason , it is a bolus of hard digestion , to tell them they must break their word for the common good : and seemeth to bee of the same nature , with that famous definition of an ambassadour , witty in england , harsh in other nations , that hee is sent ad peregrè mentiendum pro patriâ , which where the equivocation of lying abroad is not understood , is , in verity , a scandall to statesmen , whose negotiation hangs so tenderly on their credit , that , it once being broken , they have lost a principall instrument to penetrate the hearts on which they are to work . therefore , let us see whether the high magistrate ( in proceeding as wee have declared ) does truly force the rampart of veracity so necessary for a governement . let us first begin with his promise , and consider what it is . hee is entrusted to doe for the common good : and the reason why hee is entrusted is , because the entrusters conceive themselves either through their incapacity or attendance to other imployments , ignorant of what is truly the common good . they entrust him , therefore , with more then they understand ; and so his power is to proceed , according to his understanding , though it crosse theirs : hee then of necessity , must bee false to his oath , if hee doe not , according to his trust , act for the common good what hee evidently sees in a high degree to import it . further , because wee know , in morall businesses , the end aimed at , is more principall then the means ordered to it , and hath such a command over them that they are to bee or not to bee , according as is fitting for the end : and in the oath or promise of our high magistrate , if hee observe his limitations , he destroyeth the end for which they were put : hee offends against both his oath and fidelity to his people , if hee maintain such limitations , when hee is obliged , for the publick good , that is , when hee ought to break them . yes but ( replieth the man who thinketh himselfe wedded to an outward and seeming honesty in this cause ) howsoever , at least hee breaketh that part of his oath , in which hee swore directly , to those limitations . let us therefore see even that point , and ask , what was the peoples will in exacting his oath or promise ? doeth any one will what hee understandeth and knoweth not ? if one should say to another , i give thee what is in that trunk ; in which himselfe had put a suit of apparell , and , without his knowledge , his servant had taken that out and put in bags of gold to the same bulk ; would any divine , or chancery judge , or prudent person assert he were bound to bestow on that promissary all his gold , which was in the trunke ? i thinke not ; and the reason is , because it is the will and understanding which hath the power to give strength to a promise or contract ; and here the will is wanting ; for hee knew not what he said , nor intended to give any thing but a suit of clothes . how many promises doe divines and lawyers pronounce null , though they were good and valid when they were made , by reason of the change of accidents following , which could not be foreseene ? if one promise his daughter in marriage to his neighbour , and shee dyeth ; is he bound to fulfill his engagement , or seeke his neighbour another wife ? nay , if the neighbour be discovered not to be the man he was taken for ; not to have a competent estate and such like conditions ; he may justifie the disperformance of his promise ; nor shall he forfeit his credit if he doeth not keepe his word , but rather , if he do , be accounted a weak man . now , to come to our purpose , let it bee supposed the people were made understand , when they exact the promise from their magistrate , that such limitations would destroy their peace , and contentment : doth any one think they would binde their governour to maintaine them ? if they would not , t is evident , howsoever their mouthes pronounced the words , their hearts were ignorant and inculpable of such an exaction ; for they knew not what they did , they understood not nor meant what they spake . but suppose that truely they knew the incommodities that were to follow , and yet they would have them observed : for , this happeneth often in this our subject , that some ( especially great men , and sometimes the populace ) understand the inconvenience of a law , and yet for private interest will have it maintained : what then is the duty of the supreame magistrate , who is sworne to maintaine the said lawes ? the question is clearely answered by the condemnation of jephthe ; who , when he had rashly vowed to sacrifice the first thing that met him from home , did impiously murther his daughter . all understanding men know , a wicked oath is not to be observed . he that should give a mad mana sword , because he had vowed or sworne it , deserved to be hanged for the murthers by him committed : now , an ignorant and wilfull man , what is he but a mad man ? or what is madnesse but a wilfulnesse in doing evill ? if the action be naught and such as the exactor cannot , with reason , desire , he cannot by any oath bind a swearer to it : now to observe conditions which shall ruine the governement and destroy the end for which they were instituted , is an action contrary to all reason , and to which the promissary cannot binde the promiser , in any wisdome and goodnesse : he is therefore bound , rather to the destroying then fulfilling such conditions ; neither is he therefore perjured , but were rather unjust and wicked , if he observed them . this so resolved , it appeareth plainly , that no supreame magistrate can bee bound to any lawes contrary to good governement ; farther then either the danger of changing them , or the not cleerly seeing them to be such , may hold his hand . the twelfth ground . who is such a governour , and the subjects duty towards him . wee have long talked of a supreame governour ; it is time we should point him out , that he may bee knowne . and , since all agree that there are three sorts of governement , monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy ; when they are simple , there can bee no doubt who is the supreame magistrate . now , mingled they may bee , all together , or some two of them : and againe , their mixing may bee either continually , as when all parts mixed are so often engaged that their authorities run jointly , or else some are continuall , others but at certaine termes . if monarchy bee mixed , either with aristocracy or democracy , so that they be continually joint actors ; the monarch is but a servant , and the other part the master : as is to be seen i● the italian doges , and the lacedaemonian kings ; for his force is nothing , compared to his consort . if democracy and aristocracy be so mixed , the quarrell is more ballanced ; and because it is a governement divided in it selfe , and therefore dangerous ; no doubt but , if the aristocracy get power enough , she is in the posture of supreame authority . the example of this wee have in the roman common-wealth , in the time , specially , of sylla's conquest ; when , if he had setled the state in the senate , there had been no feare of caesar and pompeyes mangling that common-wealth , as afterwards fell out . monarchy and democracy can hardly be so mixed , that democracy be perpetuall , and monarchy by spurts : for that is not monarchy ; the said monarch being not long enough in power to be accounted a setled magistrate ; as wee see in the decemvirs , tribunes and dictators amongst the romans : so that , the monarch hath not the power in his hand to change any thing , which is the case we aime at . and the like is of aristocracy ; when its employment is the ordinary and continuall , and monarchy onely by turnes and seasons . there remaineth onely monarchy in continuance , compared to aristocracy and democracy at certaine turnes . and in both , it is cleare , the monarch is the supreame governour in ordinary ; and so the magistrate of whom we speake , who may alter the inconveniences , if occasion serve . as for the people , they are but a weake part , if the governour be wise : so that he is , by this posture , in the state of doing that good to the commonwealth which his judgement and conscience dictate to him to be necessary . the comparison to aristocracy is much harder ; every one of the aristocracy being , generally and regularly speaking , a petty monarch ; and the whole of them easily assembled ; and , when so , having the power in their hands : so that the monarch is not ( by vertue of his ordinary condition ) in a posture to bee able to rectifie what he seeth necessary to be altered ; therefore he is not the man wee call the supreame magistrate , but the assembly of the nobility , whereof he is but an eminent and considerable one . the subject , being correlative to the magistrate , requireth upon that title , to be reflected on ; but much more because the nature of the magistrate cannot be well understood , unlesse the duty of the subject bee joyntly declared . we must therefore declare , or seeke out at least , what honour and conscience obligeth the subject to : and , to performe this , wee must reflect upon his motive of obedience ; which , as is before insinuated , was grounded on the love and necessity of living in community , that , from it , he may receive good , and , by its protection , secure himselfe against evill . to this end he entrusteth the charge of the common administration to the magistrate ; taking himselfe as one unskilfull or unable for such employment . wee see therefore , the end of the subject in his obedience , immediately , is the publick good or the good of the commonwealth : a farther though more cordiall and deep in the subject , is the good he is to receive out of the commonwealth being well ; which is nothing else but that the particulars of the commonwealth be so . evident then it is , that the immediate motive which the subject is to propose before his eyes , in his obedience , is the good of the commonwealth ; that is , the very same motive the magistrate ought to have in administring , and which hee had when first , in his owne person or in his forefathers , he submitted himselfe to this rule . wee know , by consequence , how excellent a virtue this act of obedience is ; having a motive of so great a price and high elevation above other ordinary employments , which reach no farther then to his private good . but , herein the same vertue is lesse in the subject then in the commander ; that , because the common good is the very private good of the commander , therefore it is not related to any private good of the same nature ; and so not commanded or limited by any other , as in the subject it is by the end of his idioticall good . the next thing that occurreth is the subjects fact by making this trust ; and that is , that he hath made away all power of judgeing and caring for the common good , farther then by the eyes and hands of the magistrate , his trustee , otherwise they have not made him supreame governour : so that , if he thinketh or judgeth any thing to goe amisse , or interpose his opinion , in any reall and effective way , even so farre as to disgust himselfe or any other against the governement ; he breaketh his promise and engagement to his governour : much lesse is it in his power to recall the trust and seeke any way to take it out of the hands of his soveraigne . as for his oath of allegiance , i believe every man sees , it takes its strength from these two ; and , by consequence , is to be understood to reach whither they carry it , and strengthen the obligation that they ground : but , not to extend it selfe to what they doe not ; onely what they begin and , as it were , make , the oath doth , by religion and reverence to god , enholy and consecrate , and so give it the greatest strength that falleth upon humane liberty . by this discourse , we learn , that the magistrates security , from honesty and conscience , is the greatest that humane nature can frame ; being grounded upon the noblest vertue , fortified by the vertue of veracity so naturall and principall as is above signified ; the subject having made as great an alienation of his propriety to governement as will can ratifie ; and lastly , elevated it above his cwne soule by the invocation of him who is master both of soule and body , of time and eternity . whence , nothing but the frailty of humane condition can prejudice a governour once estated legitimately in his seat of justice ; nothing can make a subject more delinquent , then to work against this duty of obedience ; no wonder , therefore , if rebellion be connumerated with soothsaying and idolatry . and obedience preferred before sacrifice , even in the sight of god . the thirteenth ground . of the qualities of lawes and commands , in respect to obedience . out of what hath been said concerning the subject's obligation to obedience , wee may understand a distinction made by many , of the validity and lawfulnesse of commands . for , the lawfulnesse to a soveraigne commander , is no other then that hee truly thinketh it to bee for the good of the common ; that is , for the greatest good , all things considered : which if hee doth , it is , by the former discourse , lawfull for him to command , what he pleases , without reproach of conscience or honour to him ; and on the other side , if hee swerve never so little , hee so farre breaketh his trust : and the greater the abuse is , the greater also his fault and shame . but , the subject is to remember that hee hath put his confidence in his governour ; as beeing himselfe ignorant and not having leasure to look into the depth of the policy : and therefore hee is to think and judge well of his magistrates counsells , and make account hee doeth not understand the bottome of them ; and so bee prompt and forward to obey . the validity of the command consists in the obligation the subject hath to performe it : and this may faile in two degrees ; one to the not fulfilling the command , by avoiding it ; the other , by resisting it . this latter is no waies in the subjects hands , unless it be in such a case as his oath of allegiance and obligation to the good of the community , cease or bind not : the former can never happen as long as it can be presumed to be the commanders will this subject , in these circumstances , should perform this command ; for , so long , his trust obligeth him not to faile . but , because a governour many times is not rightly informed , nor can a law reach home to all particular accidents ; it is very incident that ; in some speciall cases , the subject may presume it is not the magistrates will he should be bound to this particular service . and this is so ordinary that , among us , there is a particular and highest court , to declare when wee are not bound to the written lawes . yet is it necessary to believe that even that court is able to satisfie all cases , or that private men are bound not to avoid a law without having recourse to that court , or to obey all decrees of that court if they can prudently avoid it : because no court ( especially amongst refined pleaders ) can bee without many formalities ; which are not the substance of justice , and therefore may prudently bee declined , neither honour nor conscience obliging to such proceedings . but they must ever have for their rule , that the lawmaker intended not to include them , in these circumstances , within the compasse of his law . some make us a threefold division of lawes ; the first absolute or commanding ; the second permissive ; the third they call penall lawes : the first they averre to bee obligatory , because directly intended by the law-giver ; and of this sort is verified what wee have newly discoursed . the second ( were it expressely the sense of the law to permit a thing ) is also of the former kinde and onely distinguished in the matter : for it would make the thing permitted truly lawfull . but this is not the writers meaning : for they doe not conceive it was the law-makers intention to allow of the practice ; but onely not to punish it , or to ordaine somewhat in supposition of the case . as when usury is limited to such a rate , that greater is forbidden ; but to such a rate is so permitted , that he that hath borrowed is bound and compellable to pay so many in the hundred ; but no man is bound to borrow ; nor as they say , allowed to take interest , though the law constraine the borrower to pay . but , how the law can forc● the one to give , and yet not allow the other to take , is to mee , a hard proposition and like a riddle ; and therefore , i believe , the law it selfe is to bee condemned or the practice to bee justified ; and that truly there neither is nor can bee such a kinde of law , as shall compell a thing to bee done and not approve of the doeing . the third sort also seemeth to mee no lesse contradictory : for though i confesse there are penall lawes unquestionably , that is , such as constitute punishments for offences ; yet these masters meane not such , but under the cloake of the name , teach disobedience to certaine lawes , perswading us the law-givers intention is indefinite , that either a man should doe such a thing , or suffer such a punishment if hee bee discovered to have committed the fault : which is directly against all goodnesse . for first wee are to consider whether the thing commanded bee usefull to the common-wealth ; if so , it cleerly argues it is the direct will of the lawmaker . againe , it is to be looked into , if it be universally neglected , what dammage accreweth to the common ; and this also will assure us , by the necessity of it , that it is intended for the common good , and therefore to be executed to the possibility of the subject . againe , how unworthy a thing is it of a governour , who is sapposed to be all equity and goodnesse , to ly at the catch with his subjects , to entrap them for a thing he doth not aime to have done ? besides , the name of punishment supposeth a fault ; so that , the law must be supposed to speake improperly ; which , in its dogmaticall way of proceeding , is absurd . yet doe i not deny but lawes may bee made indefinitely ; as , to command every townesman to march or pay so much monies , leaving it to his liberty to do which hee listeth : but this is no penall law , nor hath it any likely hood of one ; but is meerly a disjunctive command . neither likewise do i entrench upon such orders in communities , which being almost impossible to bee rigorously observed , have some other obligation annexed to the failing ; to be performed by the conscience of the delinquent , whether discovered or no . for , this clearely remaineth voluntary , and is ordered to make the failing rare , and to acknowledge a defect and fault in the not observing ; and so hath not that crossing of the will , and that force which one feeleth when he is discovered and , by authority , chastised . so that , in conclusion , there is but one sort of law in all these ; and that binding the subject , in force of his promise and oath , to the proportion of his concurrence to the common good , by his act of obedience . the fourteenth ground . in what conditions the subject may resist governement . now , to returne to the former part ; it is evident , if it be rationall to resist the governement , it will be lawfull also to break and remove it : for , these two actions are of the same nature ; and , in truth , pure resistance and disobedience is the annulling it . for , governement , consisting in the power of commanding , that is , of having no resistance ; to resist is not to acknowledge it , but maintaine there is no such power , at least , in this case ; that is , to take it away in this case ; that is , to set another judge or knower when obedience is due and when not ; that is , not to keepe the subject in the nature of ignorance , in which is grounded his being a subject . this being the nature of this disobedience or resisting , the magistrate is bound with all his strength to crush and breake it ; and , by consequence , it draweth along the concussion of the whole state , if the subject bee able to make good his resistance . out of this it is cleare , that a subject may not use this resistance ; but in case when it is fitting to attempt the dissolving of the governement . it followes first , that it cannot be done , but when the occass●on is greater then the value of the publick peace and good of the common-wealth . no man therefore can justly attempt such a disobedience , to save his owne life and goods , or the life and goods of his owne family , how great soever , if contained within the bounds of a private family , or but a part of the common-wealth . now , how farre this extendeth , i dare not subtilize ; it being a kinde of morall consideration and a prudentiall esteeme to weigh it in particular ; the common notion reaching no farther , then that it be not so notorious a part of the common-wealth , that it bee a homogeneall part of it , such as is fit to make a common-wealth of it selfe , to determine whose nature , is not the intent of our present embarquement . the next consideration is , that neither an universall harme , if moderate and such as may bee supported with lesse dammage then followes out of the state , is a sufficient cause of resistance to the soveraigne magistrates command . as for example , an enormous taxe ( such as was thought to be that which revolted guienne from edward the third of england , or the low countries from philip the second of spain : ) as both their wars may well testifie ; in which the taking of any one towne was of more consequence then all such a taxe would have been . how farre this also reaches is not for mee to esteeme ; who should aske me , if the governour exacted for one time all the subject had , so there remained a ground to worke upon of new , and within a little time to live contentedly ; i should be troubled to confesse it were a sufficient injury to take up armes against him , because i cannot judge which were the greater mischief to the subject . thirdly , if the wrong be of that nature as to ruine the whole common-wealth , yet not suddenly but after many yeers , if often repeated ; i cannot allow it a sufficient cause of open resistance . the reason is cleere ; for , on the one side there is no inconvenience so small but ( in processe of time ) may grow to bee the ruine of the common-wealth , if it bee often repeated and so excessively multiplied ; and on the other side , long time breeds so great changes or , at least , is subject to them , that the pure nature of the offence is not able to justifie a rebellion and breach of unity in a common-wealth , and so , not the resistance to the governour . how much the time in which the ruine would follow should bee , to make it a sufficient cause , who can judge ? onely this wee see , that what will not ruine in a set time , wil never doe it ; and i have seen people live happily , where it was said , they paid the value of their whole subsistance to their magistrate once in seven yeers . nor doe i pretend , by these instances , to set any rule for enfranchising the subject ; more then this , when evidently the tyranny of the governour is greater then the mischiefe hazarded . when ever this happeneth , bee the materiall conditions what they will , the subject is free : and if this bee not , whatsoever the circumstances bee , the subject ought not to stirre . for , this and this onely is the finall cause measuring all attempts , what is best for the people ; and knowne it is that , if it bee not evident to bee better to stirre , it is evidently better to remaine quiet : for , not-a-cause is sufficient for not changing ; but , for a change and such a change , it ought to bee a cleer and evident abbetterment . there is further to be looked into what part of the common-wealth it ought to bee that is sufficient to justifie such a quarrell . for , as there is no doubt , but the whole common-wealth , that is , such a portion of it as makes the governours party inconsiderable , is sufficient : so , there will bee lesse doubt on the other extreme , if the number resisting bee a pure single part , it is not sufficient to proceed to this extremity . the question then is , whether the party rising ought to bee the major or equall or , at least , inconsiderably lesse then those who side with the magistrate . but here wee must observe the greatnesse of the common-wealth divided . for if such parts bee of themselves , fit to make common-wealths , nothing considered but the quantity or the number ; it cannot bee doubted but that will susfice : now what that quantity is , belongeth to another science . besides all these considerations , there remaineth another ; that it can bee effected : for who is to attempt an action , ought as well to weigh the cost of compassing , as the worth and recompence when it is compassed : so that , unlesse the hazard of missing and the labour of obtaining , beeing both added into the ballance with the present quiet , bee all overswayed ; it cannot bee prudently done to engage for a change . some will tell mee , never did people expect with so much patience as i require : and your gallants , who pretend to generosity , will exclaime , it is better to dye in the field then suffer such indignities : nay , some will think or , at least , vaunt it fitter to lye in prison or rot in a dungeon , or seeke his fortune in barbary , then to be under such a slavery . my answer to these last gallants is , that they should first try what it is to rot in a dungeon , or to wander amongst barbarians ; before they engage themselves and other ignorant persons in such adventures . to the second , that i understand not those spurgalls of honour , which disquiet their fiery humours : i onely discourse of what is fitting to make a sweet and contented life , to them who thinke it consists in enjoying naturall goods of science and vertue for our mindes , and the accommodation of our sences for our bodies : those high and aereall goods of honour , and vapouring words i esteeme as ajax ( when his eyes were open ) at his death ; vertue ( said hee , meaning honour ) i followed thee as a thing , but i finde thou art but words . to the formost , i answer , i doe not averre men either have been wise or will bee so wise ; onely endevour to lay before them what it is to bee so ; let them look to the exercise . neither on the other side doe i justifie the prince who putteth his subject to such extremities , or think it prudence in him to doe it , or that he doeth not deserve all the mischiefe which may light upon him for it : i leave both to the force of nature , to their wit or folly , and to the force of reason or passion which governes in persons and present circumstances ; keeping my self in the common notions which belong to science . still there remaines one difficulty , which may breed great variety in the resolution ; and it is , who is to bee judge , whether the neglect of the magistrate bee so great , as to deserve resistance ? for , if the magistrate himselfe bee endowed with that power , it is a folly to thinke that circumstance will ever come ; and , if it belong to the people , such hot-spurres , as wee spake of , will make it come long before the season bee ripe for it . but , the truth is , this question seemeth in a manner superfluous : for it supposes , there is a question and ambiquity to bee decided ; and by the conditions put , it is cleer there can bee no question of the necessity of the resistance ; for they are such as to put the question beyond all ambiguity in the very conscience of the magistrate , the objects beating on the subject in every ones particular beyond denyall and dispute . and besides , as long as truly there is any disputablenesse , the trust reposed in the magistrate makes him judge ; for , beeing entrusted as a man both knowing and good , and the people taking themselves as ignorant in what they trust him ; cleerly hee remains sole judge , as long as there remains a case to be judged . and therefore his either ignorance , or carelessenesse , or tyranny ought to bee so evident , that it bee beyond all question ; or else the subject must have patience for his owne good , which is his aime in putting himselfe under governement . the fifteenth ground . wherein consists the power and liberty of the subject . yet may some think , on the other side , that the doctrine delivered contradicts it selfe . for , it beeing before determined , that the people hath alienated all right of judging or medling in governement ; how can it ever happen that they should have a right to interpose againe , or that such circumstances can possibly fall out in which they may resist the magistrate ? and this objection is so much the stronger , by acknowledging so great a power in the magistrate of breaking all lawes and limitations of governement , by the force of reason placed in the circumstances of power and authority , as hath been declared : whence it seemes , since that authority in the magistrate cannot consist with an opposite authority in the subject , to bridle and curb him ; they can never have this power to resist . and the truth is , the people acteth not what it doeth in such a case , by any authority acquired , but by the force of nature ; that same force by which the magistrate overswayes the lawes , but in other circumstances . and first that the people hath no authority to oppose their superiour is manifest : for , authority is a thing instituted by consent and depending on promise ; but here is no need of consent nor any thought of it ; here is no publicke meetings or ligues ; and if there were , they would bee of no value against a former tradition of their wills to their magistrate : it cannot bee therefore , that the people proceed by any such contract . whence is it then that the people come to any such power ? the answer is , as , when they first instituted government , they did it in the force of nature ; without having any other power then the pure force of rationality : so , if , by any circumstance they be devolved into the same state of anarchy that their promise made bindes no more ; then rationality teacheth them and giveth them , by force of nature , to institute another governement . now , the excessive disorders , expressed in the forementioned conditions , make it evident they are not in a governement , that is , in a conspiracy to the common good , which is the offence of governement ; but in an anarchy , and therefore remitted , by the evill managing or insufficiency of their governour , to the force of nature to provide for themselves , and not bound by any promise made to their governour : the whole end and intention of their promise being , purely , to submit to governement , that is , conduce to the common good & safety ; which having failed , there is no more obligation in their oath or promise , then if they had never made them . this is , therefore , the ground of the peoples opposition , and onely circumstance to justifie their breaking their oath and promise : so that , in truth , the magistrate , first , by his miscarriages , abdicateth himself from being a magistrate , and proveth a brigand and robber in stead of a defender ; and the people , in the way of naturall preservation of themselves , make resistance against him . i should passe farther to the change of governement , did not the loud and universall cry of all common people , especially of our northerne countries , diverting my pen , force me to attend their importunity . they say , this doctrine deliver'd ruineth their liberty ; and people are but a knot of slaves and galley-birds , if this be the course of governement . they must be satisfied , or , at least , their courage allay'd , by reason , if it be possible . for this word liberty prints it selfe in such a letter , that it leaves unstudied no man , as one speaketh . the pelagian thinkes he hath lost his naturall liberty , if it may be commanded by gods omnipotency . the worldly man accounts himselfe a slave , if rationall governement be conserved : he must have license to commit wickednesse and ruine governement , or else he is in chaines . let us then repeat the nature of governement , and see wherein consisteth the liberty of the subject , that we may know when he hath it , and what belongeth to it . the people ( we said ) to fall to their owne businesse , and the improving of nature , choose one or more to manage the common interests ; holding them wise and capable , and themselves unskilfull ; and this with a great deale of reason : for nothing but experience , and much debating is able to beget a sufficient art or knowledge , in such subtle points and turnings . besides , they esteemed a few fitter for resolution , and easier to agree then their owne multitude ; where so many private aimes are hard to be avoided , and if not prejudiciall to the common . upon these grounds , it is plaine , out of the very nature of governement , that they reserve no power in themselves to consult of common businesses . for , how absurd is it that he who hath no skill shall give counsell , or sway the resolutions of those whose art and profession it is ? or , what wise man could undertake a governement with truth and honour , if , in his greatest difficulties , he must depend on the advice , or rather wilfulnesse of an ignorant rabble ? let us look now what is left for the obeying party ; and we shall finde , it is to governe their private affaires , as farre forth as they fall not within the verge of the common good or harme . but , once put that the private mans business either hinders , or is necessary to help the common designes : and , as evident as it is that the common is to be preferred before the particular ; so evident it is , that even his proper businesse is not to be managed , so far , by his private understanding and liberty . if the souldier , when he is commanded to stand perdue , should have his private considerations allow'd him , what could the army doe ? if the citizen , being commanded to watch his turne upon the walls , might bring an excuse that he had no body to look to his shop , the city would soone fall to the enemies prey . private interest , then , must yeeld , when the publick is concerned , or else no governement can be hoped for : and , he that will leave matters of great consequence to the resolution of the govern'd party , must make them the governours . wherein then consists the liberty of every subject ? in not being controll'd in his private affaires . if there be not justice administred both against robbers and riotous oppressors , the citizen is not free : if he be molested in his domestick manage , otherwise men when the common demandeth his assistance , he is not free . but , for serving the common , it is the freest act he hath : it was his choice to elect it , it is his good to conserve it , and will be his destruction to infringe it . as it is no liberty to have an immunity to hang or maime himselfe , or his wife and children , or to commit any other unnaturall act ; no more is it to be esteem'd liberty , to have the priviledge to substract himselfe from the service of the common-wealth . they are therefore seditious spirits , who , using the name of liberty , provoke the subject against the magistrate ; and in themselves , ordinarily , it is either ignorance or faction , which is the true mistresse of such attempts . nor can it be feared , that governement , carried connaturally and as it ought to be , doth any way prejudice the liberty of the subject , what seisures soever it makes either upon goods or persons . yes , but governours will exceed the moderation of the true lawes of governement . first , the commonwealth hath a presumption of their goodness to the contrary . secondly , admit they doe , must we seek to remedy it by a greater wound which is , by taking away the life and soule of governement ? againe , the oppression is either in common upon all , or in particular upon some few : if in common , it is almost impossible to be heavy upon every one ; for , many little summes easily rise to a great one , and many hands make light worke : if the wrong be done to particulars , wee ought to consider that accidentall harmes cannot be prevented neither in nature nor in humane affaires ; and so are objects of pity rather then of hope to be amended , and to be tolerated rather , in respect of the great good which is in the common peace , then expose all to such confusion as must be , and ever hath beene where the governement is , in part , placed in unexperient hands . this , therefore , is resolved , that the plenitude of power in the governour hinders not the liberty of the subject : which is to bee contained within an inferiour sphere , and the sphere it selfe within the sphere of governement ; and to be carried by it , as the private good by the common , when the necessity of the publick requires . likewise , the propriety of right of the subject is to bee taken , not against the governour or common right , but against the encroaching of another party : as , whoever understands what common and particular signifie , easily understands that the common and particular are not two ; as the part and the whole make not two , because the part is included in the whole ; but part and part make two , because one hath no community with the other . therefore , it stands not with reason , that any private person should claim a right against the common-wealth , or the governour , which is all one ; for , so he makes the common-wealth a part distinguished from himselfe . the sixteenth ground . of the dispossession of a supreme former governour , and of his right . this rubb being taken away , our march is free to consider the action of the change of governement ; by what it is effected that the former governour remaineth no longer in his authority , and the new one beginneth to have the power . for , we speake of a supreme governour whose power is sworne to ; and so fortified , by an allegiance due from the people , and a right obtained by himselfe . and , we may presently reflect , that our former discourse , of the peoples resistance to a soveraign magistrate , reached not to the resolution of this . for , there we supposed the magistrate to have behav'd himself so unworthily , that he was truely no governour but a tyrant and robber ; and so had really depos'd himselfe , and disannull'd the subjects oath and obligation by renouncing , in deeds and practice , the nature of a governour . now , our question supposeth the governour not to have come to that extremity : but , either to have been good or innocent : or that it is doubtfull whether his excesses deserved expulsion : or , at least , if they did deserve it of themselves , yet the circumstances were not fitting for it ; but the expulsion happened either by the invasion of a stranger , or the ambition of a subject , or some popular headlesse tumult ; for , these three wayes a magistrate comes , forcibly and unjustly , to be outed of his power . and first , if the magistrate have truely deserved to be dispossessed ; or it be rationally doubted that he hath deserved it , and hee bee actually out of possession : in the former case , it is certaine , the subject hath no obligation to hazard for his restitution , but rather to hinder it : for , since it is the common good that both the magistrate and the subject are to aime at ; and clearly , out of what is expressed , it is the common harme , to admit againe of such a magistrate ; every one , to his power , is bound to resist him . if you say , he may or will repent and amend , that importeth not our question , or whether he be to be restor'd ? but , whether he be to be chosen of new ? for , since it was meerely his possession and the interest of not changing or troubling the common-wealth which oblig'd the subject to maintaine him ; it being supposed his owne desert did condemne him , this change and trouble of the common-wealth being now turned on the other side and another in possession , clearly neither he hath any right left , nor the subject any obligation to maintaine but rather oppose him . now , if his desert be doubtfull , then is it also doubtfull whether he hath right or no : and certaine , that the common good is not to be disturbed for it ; nature teaching that wee need no reason to be quiet and remaine where we are , but that to make a change we must see a strong cause and motive . the next case is , if he be innocent and wrongfully depos'd , nay , let us adde , one who had governed well and deserved much of the common-wealth : yet he is totally dispossess'd ; and so , that , it is plaine , in these circumstances , it were better for the common good to stay as they are , then to venture the restoring him , because of the publicke hazard . it is cleare , in this case , there is a comparison betweene the generall good of the common-wealth , on the one side , and the particular of this man or family on the other . let us , then , put the case on his part ; and see , if he be generous , if he hath setled in his heart that every single man ought to preferre the common interest before his particular safety , profit , or honour ; if hee bee fit for a governour , that is , one that is to espouse the common good as his owne individuall ; what he will , in honour and conscience , resolve : whether hee bee not obliged absolutely to renounce all right and claime to governement ; and , if he does not , hee bee not worse then an infidell : for , if he that hath no care of his domesticks , be reputed so ; with how much more reason , he that is ready to plunge a whole nation in blood , for his owne interest ? let us cast the accompts on the other side ; and see , that the subjects aime ought to be the publicke peace , and quiet enjoyment of their lives and interests : it will appeare that , if hee bee bound to renounce his claime , they cannot be oblig'd to maintaine it : and besides , that they are wilfully blinde , if , where the whole concernements of themselves , their wives and children lie at the stake , they will venture all for an aereall fancy , without regard to the end of governement , publicke peace ; meerely for the meanes , this mans governement , without whom the end may be obtain'd . it cannot , therefore , be rationall on either side , for a dispossess'd governour to be restor'd with hazard : unlesse it be certaine the succeeding governement be a pure tyranny , and so the dispossess'd person necessary for the quiet and peace of the common-wealth ; and therefore , that both sides pretend the good of the common-wealth , as well hee that is to be restor'd , as those who seek to restore him . but some cry , he had right ; he hath not deserv'd to lose it ; justice must be done whatever follows on it ; happy they that are unfortunate in so good a cause , they shall not lose their reward , however it fares with them now . well for them , if this plea will serve them in the next world ; nor will i dispute whether the evidence of what i deliver be so great as that ignorance may not excuse them : that question belongs to the tribunall of god onely : i must say that , before men , who are clad with flesh , and whole hearts cannot be pierced by other mens guesses , the law is , that not onely the intention bee good , but also the action be intelligent and prudent ; otherwise , we are subject to believe , that some vanity or secret hopes doe byass the actor and make his proceeding irrationall . i must also tell them , that this principle , fiat justitia & ruat coelum , is seldome practised amongst the wise ; who all agree that charity and prudence ought still to moderate the rigour of justice . it is also too metaphysicall for a morall way , to thinke that justice is a platonick idea in the concave of the moone ; no waies to be changed by circumstantiall occurrences : whereas , the truth is , justice is but a partiall and commanded vertue ; and that which governes in man , is reason or his owne nature and inclination to make all his actions connaturall and fit for a rationall creature ; and so may consult whether justice be in some to bee administred , and pronounce that summum jus est summa injuria . but , the capitall in this matter is , that truely there is no justice on either the magistrates or peoples side , to binde to the restoring him : both these depending on the promise made , and the force of the promise being none , since the ground of it is changed . for , the substance of the promise made to a magistrate , is , to obey him as a magistrate , that is , as farre as is fitting for the common-wealth and peace ; he being nothing but the instrument of the common good : now , take away that fitnesse for the common-wealth , and that which gave strength to the promise is gone , and the promise it selfe is no more a promise , nor can any obligation arise from it . who knows not , that the promise of any man depends on his intention , his intention on his knowledge , his knowledge reacheth no farther then his consideration and present memory when he maketh the promise ? so that , in nature , a promise reacheth onely to presupposed and thought on circumstances : and who , when he sweareth to a magistrate , expecteth to see him dispossessed and turned off ? nature annulleth promises : as , when we promise to come such a day , and either die or are imprisoned before . morality annulleth them : as if we promise to run such a horse against another a month hence , and the horse in the meane time falleth lame ; who will condemne the master for not venturing on such a race ? is not the man better then his word ? if then the man himselfe bee lesse then the common good , which he must violate by keeping his word ; can his word be greater ? but a promise must many times bee kept even with losse of life ? i deny it not : but , first , i must bee assured it is a promise ; which before i have declared to bee none : for , our case is case of nature not of law , we admit no presumptions ; nothing what he meant to doe or should have done , wee onely regard what was done . secondly , if it were intended to be so promised , it was wicked and irrationall ; for , to promise to regard a private mans good against the common , is unnaturall and wicked ; therefore , it never was a promise , can never binde as such , nor be professed with honour , either to be made , or , if made , to bee kept . i need not insist upon the confirmation by oath : for , every one understands , if the oath be but a confirmation of a precedent promise , and there were no promise , there can be no oath , to have the nature and force of an oath . so that , this is manifest , a magistrate actually dispossessed hath no right to be restored , nor the subject any obligation to seek to restore , but oppose him . for , what is man , or rather mankinde ( for , so we have styled a nation ) better then a herd of sheepe or oxen , if it bee to bee owned , like them , by masters ? what difference is there betweene their masters selling them to the butcher , and obliging them to venture their lives and livelihoods for his private interest ? wee know it is naturall , that the part should venture for the whole ; but that the whole should venture the losse of it selfe to save the part , i cannot understand . the governour is the highest and noblest part , yet but a part ; the people is the whole , the end , ( though not by office , yet by worth and dignity ) the master and lord , for whom those who are lords by office are to be vested and devested in lordship , when it is necessary for the common good : who thinks otherwise , deserves not the name of a man . the seventeenth ground . of a supreme governour dispossessed . but one will object , if hee were wrongfully dispossessed , hee suffered wrong ; it cannot then but bee reason hee should have reparation . and this cannot bee denied . but beside the governement taken from him , hee was peradventure injured in his reputation and spoiled of such aliments as are fit to maintaine him according to the quality of his birth and education : and , for these , hee may , as a private man , demand reparation ; but so , as still to remember he is a denizen of that countrey , a member of that people , and compared to it as a particular to its universall ; and may demand his share , yet so that if it cannot bee obtained without the concussion of the publicke , hee is to renounce it and sacrifice that interest to the good of his countrey . likewise , on the opposite side , the common-wealth may demand reparations against the dispossessed magistrate , who abused it or his subjects during his governement : not touching any thing hee did upon intention of the publick good , though it were breaking of known laws or any injurious violence offered , with pretence of serving the common-wealth ; for , the trust put in his hands vindicates him from all such actions , as long as they beare the face of any intention of the common good . but , if , for private mens satisfaction , or his owne lust , or covetousnesse hee did any wrong , of that hee may bee asked an account : not while hee is in governement but after the dispossession , when now the common distemper followeth not the prosecution of such riots , and so , his publicke protection beeing gone , hee is but a private man , and consequently , by the force of nature , subject to a stronger ; obligations of common good and former promises beeing now faded away , and hee left in the condition of a stranger , saving that his demerits follow and pursue him , if other merits doe not counterballance them and exempt him . againe , when hee is to bee judged , he cannot bee proceeded against by law ; which can judge none but the offenders against it . now wee have had often occasion to declare that the chiefe magistrate is not under the law ; the common good for which the lawes themselves were made , beeing committed to his trust , and the end hee is to look after beeing higher then the lawes , which are but a part of the meanes to arrive at that end , and therefore inferiour and subordinate to it . but those who could put their owne agreements , that is , the lawes under his feet , could not put nature under them , nor authorise him to doe any irrationall or unhandsome action : therefore , when the structure of the common-wealth is dissolved , that is , disjointed from him , then any who hath suffered wrong in the fore-declared manner may bee party against him and proceed as if there were no common-weath ; by the law which , in a wildernesse , warranteth us to kill a tyger or robber that seeketh to kill us , not pretending law for our action , but that it is manlike & rational . neither ought it bee called punishment that is done against a dispossessed magistrate , but rather revenge , or some other name that includeth no order to law . by this wee understand the truth of that famous question ; whether a soveraigne bee under the lawes ? to which is ordinarily answered , that hee is , as farre as his example and direction is necessary to his subjects ; but not so , that the law , as such , hath any superiority or force upon him . to declare this more plainly , wee must remember , the rule of his actions is , to doe what reason teaches a man in his posture ought to doe , that is , what is fitting for the publicke : now generally speaking , the common good requireth that the lawes bee observed betwixt fellowes of the same common-wealth ; wherefore nature teacheth him to give example of that observance , as farre as his publick office permits . besides , in the very person of the soveraigne are to bee distinguished , his beeing one of the common-wealth , and beeing the head or magistrate : so that , though his beeing a magistrate exempts his publicke actions and also his person and private actions from the inquisition of the law ; yet it doth not exempt his private actions from the proportion to those of the subjects , that is , from being good or bad , because like or dislike to the actions which the law commandeth or forbiddeth . so that , he is not , even in his private actions , subject to the lawes at his rule ; for that is onely reason ; but , as they are a kinde of way chalked out to him for the materiall part of his action ; as the architect frames his house for him ; or the gardiner his walkes : that is , the lawes are to him as an art under him , an art to shew him what is to bee done , not to command or punish him for not doing ; nay , not so much as necessitating him to doe , at least , universally , whether the businesse be purely betwixt subjects , or betwixt himselfe as a private person , and his subjects . for , the principle of common good beeing higher then the art of making lawes , may , nay ought in some cases , differ from the prescriptions of the law . yet this must not authorize him to dispense frequently with the law ; the governement beeing not possible to bee good in which there is no constancy : but , if the circumstances require any law to bee often forced ; the law it selfe ought to bee limited , that the practice of the subject may bee firme and customary , which is that maketh the lawe-please . thus in conclusion , though the magistrate bee not commanded by the lawes , nor personally subject to them , yet reason ( which is his rule ) bindeth him to observe them as the good of his people ; and ( ordinarily speaking ) essentiall to his end , which is the common good . the lawes therefore are his matter to work on , or instruments necessary to work by , not his rule or mastering directions . there remaines yet untouched the question that seemeth most troublesome to many , when the change of the governement is valid , and such as the subjects obedience is due to the new magistrate and to bee substracted from the old , how unjustly soever hee were bereaved of it . and , others have sought by terme of yeers to decide the difficulty : among whom , one was pope vrban the eight , an intelligent and generous prince and well versed in politick governement . hee published a decision that after five yeers quiet possession of an estate , the church was not bound to take notice whether the title were lawfull or no ; but acknowledge the possessour , in ecclesiasticall businesses . so much hee said for aimes sake . but , wee must proceed upon other principles , that is , the forelaid and main basis of our discourse , that the common good ought to bee the rule of the magistrates title , and the subjects obedience . out of which this followeth , that when ever ( considering all things ) the common good is cleerly on the possessors side , then the dispossessed hath no claime . neither ought wee expect till wee have assurance , that it will not bee better for the subject if the late owner ( after great dangers , gaineth his former power : for , first , this it selfe is uncertaine ; secondly , the successe of endevours to restore him must bee hazardous ; thirdly , many and great mischiefs , during the time of the attempt , are altogether unavoidable ; and all this to bee ballanced against those uncertaine hopes . nor , againe , must wee expect that the wills of all the subjects concurre , actually , to the acceptance of the new governour : for that is either impossible or of so long expectation , as to ruine all dissensions and jealousies in the meane time : nay , the vulgar sort are so easily led by fancy , that they understand not the common good , nor what they should wish . but you may demand , how shall it bee knowne when the common good holdeth it selfe on the possessour's hand ? i answer , wee must first see who are the common , whose welfare is to bee preferred before private interests . and presently it appeareth that , dividing the whole people into governours and governed ; the governed part is the publicke to whose good the governours are to direct their paines : and that these are they that spend their lives in seeking their owne profits , either by improving the land , or in arts and handicrafts : whence , it followes , when their good stands on the possessours side , then cleerly hee begins to gaine right and power ; and this is plaine to bee , when the merchant , the husbandman , and tradesman , with their appendices , are in an undisturbed practice of their functions , and begin to bee afraid of change upon the noise of an invasion . this resolution could not bee doubted , were it not that one might object , that what is said seemes true , abstracting from circumstances ; but it ought to bee considered , that such men see nothing but the outward appearances of what passes in humane negotiations , and so there may many circumstances lie hidden from them , which would make them thinke or wish otherwise if they knew them : as , for example , home-discontents , and forraigne conspiracies ; which if understood , would make these honest men preferre a warre , after which there is to follow a peace farre exceeding the present quiet and such a one as deserves the intervening disturbance and dammages . and indeed , i allow these men understand not such mysteries of state , nor penetrate the value of the hazard : but , if they doe not , why are they not also exempted from engaging on those motives ? and then the rest of the common-wealth will bee but so many private men , who must follow the common ▪ againe , if they think themselves well , they manifestly consent to the present governement , and therefore cut off the title of the dispossessed governour . besides , who can answer they shall be better by the returne of the dispossessed party ? surely , by common presumption , the gainer is like to defend them better then he who lost it . but , let us overslip this opportunity and end of the common good : how long must we expect , till it shall be suppos'd the right of the former magistrate is extinct ? some ages ? as wee kept our title to france , and france did to sicily and naples : or at least some generations ? as the durance of the spaniards warres upon holland : or , till the former magistrate declares the relinquishment of his right ? or , till his followers are weary of inventing new devices , to blind , & ruine their unwary friends ? all these are soone discern'd to bee meere uncertainties ; and rather nets to catch fools and bring them to the ambitious desires of some few men , then any grounded reason . but , what if an open enemy should come , could or ought the subjects joine against him with their new magistrate ? if not , the whole publick must perish : if they may , then the case is the same against their old magistrate ; since his right stood upon the common peace , and that is transferr'd from him to his rivall by the title of quiet possession . the eighteenth ground : the objection of divines answered . reason hath plaid its part ; but authority cannot be silenc'd unheard . let us therefore hearken to what it saith . and , first steps up the divine to preach us , out of scripture , the duty wee owe to priests and kings ; no lesse then death and damnation beeing the guerdons of rebellion and disobedience . the lawyers come yoaked from the popes and emperours court , taking for maxime , tempus non occurrit ecclesiae & regi . the practice seems to confirme the same ; wee seeing both some noble men and divers cities make protestations against the possession of others for many years and ages . but , which is more , they will speak reason too at least , by the divines mouth ; who telleth us , that god , by nature , is high lord and master of all ; that whoever is in power receiveth his right from him ; that obedience consists in doing the will of him who commandeth ; and concludeth that this will ought to bee obeyed till god taketh away the obligation , that is , till hee who is to be obeyed himselfe releaseth his right . the authorities they cite out of holy writ are , for the most part , meere commands to obey where obedience is due , without specifying what or when it is due . this command is extended to wicked and evill governours as well as good . one place there is , where samuel denounceth to the people the evills that will come to them by the power of the king ; and calleth them jus regis , or , as the hebrew text , judicium regis , or , legem regis , and afterward , regni . and these words are , in two sences , true ; one , that the king would do the wrongs there mentioned , by force ; the other , that the people , since they would have a king , ought not to resist him when hee did such things . yet doe i not deny but , if the particulars there mentioned , bee interpreted gently , all that is there recited might , with justice , bee practised by a king : as , when it is said hee should take away their vineyards and olive-gardens ; it may bee understood , upon confiscation and by other lawfull wayes . besides , they may peradventure alledge that god , by his speciall command , transferred the kingdome from saul to david , from roboam to jeroboam , and some others . but , they should also let us know , what they deduce from hence : for in such changes , god gave no new authority or power to such kings , but the same their predecessors had : so that , in fine , all that is brought out of scripture falleth short of proving that no time can make void the right of a king once given him from the hand of god . the reason of this weak way of alleadging scripture is , that when they read that god commandeth or doth this , they look not into nature to know what this commanding or doing is ; but presently imagine god commandeth it by expresse and direct words , and doeth it by an immediate position of the things said to bee done ; whereas in nature the commands are nothing but the naturall light god hath bestowed on mankinde , and which is therefore frequently called the law of nature . likewise , gods doing a thing is many times onely the course of naturall second causes , to which because god gives the direction and motion , hee both doeth and is said to doe all that is done by them ; as truly as the weight of a jack turnes the meat upon the spit , and the spring of a watch makes the clock of it strike : a notion not onely of a large extent and usefulnesse in it selfe , but , which gives mee just occasion of complaining against these verball and winde-blowne divines , as the bane of christendome and christian doctrine . for , whereas the scripture is a book enriched with all science and depth of learning ; this sort of grammar divines , without either logick , philosophy , or morality , meerly by the vertue of their dictionary , and such like lip-learning , undertake to bee interpreters of the sacred bible , and in stead of the sence of the letter , obtrude to the readers their owne low and many times phreneticall fancies . let us instance in our present question . the first position they take is , that god is lord and master of all things . what seems , nay truly is more conformable to scripture and reason then this assertion , as it lies in words ? and yet many not looking into the nature of god and rationall and intelligent substances , make a shift to pervert it into a meer blasphemy : for , if the sence bee onely this , that god is omnipotent and no resistance possible in any creature to his absolute will ; nothing is more certaine , nothing more holy . but , this is not the meaning of the divines ; but , that there is an attribute or notion in god of being lord and master , to which they do not say we cannot , but , ought not resist , and rather admit that wee can . and herein is the first faltring , that , in effect , they deny the omnipotency , and reduce that which is a true physicall power to a morall obligation . but this is not all . the next point is , that , if even this morality were founded in that great nature of beeing , and beeing intelligent , which is in god almighty ; and that they also held his commands were to bee obeyed , because they proceed from an understanding which cannot erre , and which is essentially the very order and well beeing of all creatures ; the former would seeme pardonable : but , they will have it quite contrary , that therefore things amongst creatures goe well , because not reason , not the eminentiall beeing of themselves in god is their off-spring , but because a high and overpowering will or voice commandeth it so . a position in respect of god , absolutely blasphemous ; as far as it makes him worke without the guidance of his understanding , that is , like the lowest order of creatures , as stockes and stones &c. it is againe afflictive and vexatious to mankinde ; taking away that sweetnesse of obeying , which consists in the perswasion that because creatures are the participation of gods owne nature , every one in its degree and mankind in the first and highest place , therefore all gods command and governement , are most conformable to their good , as it were salves to their sores , and allurements to the bringing them to their final end and perfection . but , that which is more to our purpose is , that , upon this blasphemy against god , they build the greatest inconvenience that , peradventure , is to bee found in man's nature ; to wit , that god gives to all in power the likeness and participation of this irrationall dominion which they conceive in him ; and that truly there is in superiours a kinde of dote or free gift of mastery derived from god , in vertue whereof hee is master of the inferiours and what belongs to them , either wholly or in a certaine measure , according to the extent of the power given ; that , lawfully and validly , he may dispose of all or a certain part of the things under his charge , meerly because such is his will and pleasure , & that the subject ought to be content to let him doe his will , upon this score , because it is gods will that this mans will should be fulfilled . which doctrine , though it bee manifestly against christs directions left to his disciples , and the practice of all good men ; yet , because this treatise doth not pretend to divinity , i will onely insist upon its naturall inconveniences . as first , that it is not connaturall to mankinde : which , consisting , for its better part , in understanding , is not governed conformably to its disposition , unlesse it be so guided that the understanding be principall and satisfied in it selfe and leader to the will and action ; which course of proceeding when it is observed , then is a man truely a man and his action goes on with sweetnesse , as is before declared . againe , it maketh the governour proud , insolent , and carelesse . proud , because hee taketh himselfe to bee of another orbe then his subjects ; that they are all slaves and beasts , himselfe onely master , himselfe onely intelligent and a man . infolent , because fully perswaded , by this doctrine , that he can doe them no wrong ; that they are bound to suffer what he layes on them ; that his pleasure is and must be their content and rule . carelesse , because he thinks he hath no account to make , either to god or man : not to god , since he hath submitted the people to his will and disposition ; and therefore he being incapable of doing them any wrong , cannot bee charged with any crime : much lesse is he sollicitous to content his subjects , in whom he taketh it for an insolency to repine at any thing , and esteemes it their duty to commend all he does , and to have his authority for their rule to judge all things by . on the other side , the subject becomes base , restive , ambitious . for , the worth and dignity of man , which is his liberty or guidance of himselfe , being taken away , it followes , he must be servile and flattering , a slave , a body without soule and understanding . the more worldly and rustick part must , of necessity , grumble and feele it harsh to see their labours disposed on to people , of whom they have opinion that they are idle , vicious , and unworthy : and therefore , desire liberty from such a yoke , and to become masters of their owne goods and labours ; and are easily susceptible of propositions tending to that purpose , when they come from faire tongues . lastly , the higher spirits have governement in admiration , and take it for the onely happinesse ; and therefore have their hearts wholly bent , how , by flattery , by cunning , by force , to arrive to this power to depose him that is in possession , and sit downe themselves in his seat of glory . if their hopes mount not so high , for the impossibility of the fact and the remotenesse of their quality ; then their aime is , by adulation and compliances , to come neere the highest , to bee participant of his authority , and have the like power to rob and oppresse , which they esteeme vertuous and glorious in him , and not unjust but fitting in themselves , as farre as they can doe it by the participation of that dote which god hath bestowed upon the highest magistrate . lastly , we must looke into the lame proceeding of the common good and publicke actions of such a governement ; where the subject , by the consequence of this doctrine , is set eagerly upon his owne interest , thinkes all lost that is done for his , not governour or protector , but lord and master , and therefore alienated from him . whence , it must come to passe that , what he can cousen , what hee can excuse , what hee can delay , hee is still forward to ; and , by a secret instinct of nature which abhorreth such a governement , thinketh it well done , though he cannot give an account to justifie his action . in a word , who sees not this common-wealth to be a kingdome divided in it selfe alwayes in affection , and very neere in outward action ; wanting thereunto nothing but an occasion , and some head to manage the sedition ? who sees not that the whole governement is violent ; and so may indeed continue whilst actuall force hangeth over it , but hath not the possibility of a naturall duration and length . the nineteenth ground . the authority of lawyers insufficient in this question . the divines errour being thus discovered , our plea against the lawyers will be of lesse either debate or consequence : for , this question belongeth not to their science or employment . the maximes , the rule , the highest tribunall of their judgements is the text of the law , the agreements of men , and , at most , to declare the law-makers intention : but , to judge whether the law-makers intention be conformable to nature and such as it ought , whether he exceedeth his power , whether hee bee master of the lawes , and the like , is beyond the verge of their jurisdiction . therefore , nothing is more absurd , then to demand that lawyers should plead cases betweene the soveraigne magistrate and the subject , where the common good and governement is interessed : for , there , things are not to be carried by the dictates of justinian or lancelotus , or the command of caesar or peter's successours , but either by the science of politicks , or the certitude of faith and tradition ; which are the onely two rules a high governour hath . if the divine findeth any thing contrary to the knowne law of god , he may speake : if the philosopher finde any thing against the nature of man , his mouth is not to bee stopped : the lawyer , what can he say ? it is against the agreement heretofore made by the governement of the countrey ? the governour may reply , yes ; but what you say is against the present good of the countrey , with which i am entrusted . is the countrey made for the lawes , or the lawes for the countrey ? the lawes therefore must give place , where the good of the people is against the former resolutions . if any law be repealed by the authority which made it , or by another equal ; is it the lawyers part to plead what was law before , or what is now ? when a supreme governour speaketh as such , as declaring what the present necessity requires ; if any former law bee against it , it is by his declaration annulled ; it was law before , but it is not now . but the lawyer will reply , there is no law in the land which giveth such authority : it is easily answered ; it is not a case for which a law is to bee made . see the romane governement : when there came an exigence of desperation , all their magistrates , all their formes ceased ; a dictatour was made , whose word was law , nor could any man appeale to law . such is the case when the high governour pronounceth against the law : for hee ought not to doe it , but when the law standeth not with the good and safety of the subject ; and when hee doth , law is not to be pleaded against him . againe can any law be enacted of what shall bee done in case of a conversion of the governement ? it is clearely a folly to pretend it . the ordering of the common-wealth is , then , in new hands : the former's power is expired : and to prescribe rules to them who will assuredly be their owne judges , is a piece of great simplicity . the lawyer may peradventure reply , there is no power in the land to repeale the former lawes or to oppose them . i thinke hee will bee wiser ; yet , if hee doth say it , i aske him , who made the former lawes ? was it not the people , by themselves or their deputies ? and which is the stronger , if they make them by their deputies , or by themselves ? certainely , it will be answered , by themselves ; for the deputies have no power but what they impart to them . is it then possible to put a case , in which there is no power in a countrey to repeale lawes ? evidently , who sayes so must say there is no people in the countrey ? for , if there be people , there is in them a power to dispose of themselves , more strong then in deputies . but the lawyer may say , the people cannot speake their mindes freely . i answer , certainely , they not onely can , but cannot choose but speake their mindes , in the case we put . who knoweth not that liberty and speaking of ones minde belo●geth to all circumstances a man can be put in ? the merchant that , in a tempest , throweth the precious fruits of his venture and labour into the sea , doth not he doe it freely and willingly ? the hollanders of late made a peace with the spaniard ; wee , both with the hollander and the dane , and are pretending to others : in any of these , were all parts pleased ? did no party agree to somewhat which hee would not have done , but in consideration of his present circumstances ? or , was there ever peace made after a warre , but one part grudged at somewhat ? must none of these be accounted freely done ? must none of these promises binde , and be kept , upon honour and veracity ? this is to destroy all commerce of mankinde ; nay , not to allow man so much wit as to know what is fit for him to doe in time of necessity . if then the people speake , in one circumstance , something that they would not in another ; it is not to be said they speake not their mindes , but that , according to circumstances , they alter their mindes , as all wife men doe . they agree and submit to the present conjunctures , not because they are not free , now as before , but because circumstances are changed , and now render it fitting . but , i said that , in the case i put , they could not choose but speake . my case was , that then a governour is acknowledged , when the people casting off the care and thoughts of innovation , fall to their trades and manufactures : can it be deny'd that by so doing they acquiesce to the present governement ? which if they doe , can it be questioned whether they consent or not to the repealing of all such lawes as cannot stand with the present governement ? such lawes therefore are repealed , not by deputies , but by the deputants and masters of the deputies . the lawyer , therefore , must either proclaime the present governement none , or not plead law against it : for it is pure folly to admit both , that is , faire and full contradiction . in a new governement , all lawes prejudiciall to it are annulled , by the pure admission of it : other indifferent lawes so goe on , as to bee subject to its judgement , whether and how farre to stand ; but a wise governour will continue them as farre as hee can with prudence , because innovation is contrary to the sweetnesse which is in custome , as in a kinde of nature . the conclusion . bee this then so resolved , that god himselfe hath no irrationall and dead title of lordship over his creatures , but onely his all-right-setled understanding , and irresistible omnipotency . and , as hee hath none in himselfe , so likewise not given any to those hee hath put in authority ; but , that their power is either in the submission of the subject by promise and agreement , or in the rationall disposition of the magistrate , which maketh him work what is conformable to humane nature ; and the obedience or obligation to obey in the subject is out of this , that hee hath entrusted the magistrate with the governement , and is , by that , to suppose he doth regularly what is best ( all things considered ) for the common good . that , by consequence , the title of the magistrate begins and dies with the good of the common-wealth ; and holdeth purely so long as it is good for the people . that , no lawes made by the power or agreement of men , can judge betwixt subject and soveraigne , in dispute of the common good and governement ; but onely the tribunalls of god and nature , or divinity and the science of politicks : and therefore , the maximes of law have no force in these questions ; now , if princes lose their pretences by the force of nature , it is ridiculous for private men to build hopes , upon rotten titles of ages long passed , upon weake maximes of law , after nature , by her revolutions , hath cast all law and mortall acts and agreements . and so is finished this small treatise , to the profit of them who are able and willing to make use of it . some , by the method i have used , something new in morall discourses , may imagine the doctrine i deliver , to bee more subtle in explication then solid in practice : but , let them either looke into the causes of governements , or the effects ; they will see nature and practise both conspire to give testimony to the truth . the cause of all morall effects , if morally carried , are the end and intention for which they are sought and endeavoured after ; this is manifest to bee the well-being of particulars under a governement . the practises , which are the effects , will shew , that governements breake when it is not well with the subjects , but they are oppressed by the governour ; that wise and good governours are forced sometimes to breake disordered rules which hinder their free administration ; that people , as it were , forced by naturall changes , violate the promises made to their governours , cast them off when they think them pernicious , and proceed against them , per viam facti , as they speake in the schooles , not by lawes , which cannot bee made for such matters . these are , in a manner , the whole subject of the precedent discourse . finis . political discourses of sir robert filmer, baronet, viz. patriarcha, or the natural power of kings. the free-holders grand-inquest. observations upon aristotles politicks. directions for obedience to government. also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan. mr. milton against salmatius. hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis. mr. hunton's treatise on monarchy. with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches patriarcha. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. 1680 approx. 171 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 80 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2006-06 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a41310 wing f925 estc r215623 99827438 99827438 31856 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a41310) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 31856) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1864:31) political discourses of sir robert filmer, baronet, viz. patriarcha, or the natural power of kings. the free-holders grand-inquest. observations upon aristotles politicks. directions for obedience to government. also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan. mr. milton against salmatius. hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis. mr. hunton's treatise on monarchy. with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches patriarcha. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. [16], 141, [1] p. [s.n.], london : printed in the year m dc lxxx. [1680] a reissue of patriarcha (wing f923) with new title page in place of frontispiece; original title page not cancelled. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng monarchy -great britain -early works to 1800. political science -early works to 1800. 2005-11 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-12 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2006-01 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2006-01 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2006-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political discourses of sir robert filmer , baronet , viz. patriarcha , or the natural power of kings . the free-holders grand-inquest . observations upon aristotles politicks . directions for obedience to government . also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan . mr. milton against salmatius . hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy . with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches . london , printed in the year m dc lxxx . patriarcha : or the natural power of kings . by the learned sir robert filmer , baronet . lucan . lib. ● . libertas — populi , quem regna coercent libertate perit — claudian . fallitur , egregio quisquis sub principe oredit servitium ; nusquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio — london , printed , and are to be sold by walter davis book-binder , in amen-corner , near pater-noster-row , 1680. the copy of a letter written by the late learned dr. peter heylyn , to sir edward filmer , son of the worthy author , concerning this book and his other political discourses . sir , how great a loss i had in the death of my most dear and honoured friend , your deceased father , no man is able to conjecture , but he that hath suffered in the like . so affable was his conversation , his discourse so rational , his judgment so exact in most parts of learning , and his affections to the church so exemplary in him , that i never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living , than i did in his : in which respects i may affirm both with safety and modesty , that we did not only take sweet counsel together , but walked in the house of god as friends : i must needs say , i was prepared for that great blow , by the loss of my preferment in the church of westminster , which gave me the opportunity of so dear and beloved a neighbourhood ; so that i lost him partly before he died , which made the misery the more supportable , when i was deprived of him for altogether . but i was never more sensible of the infelicity , than i am at this present , in reference to that satisfaction , which i am sure he could have given the gentleman whom i am to deal with : his eminent abilities in these political disputes , exemplified in his judicious observations upon aristotles politiques ; as also in some passages on grotius , hunton , hobbs , and other of our late discoursers about forms of government , declare abundantly how fit a man he might have been to have dealt in this cause , which i would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling : and had he pleased to have suffered his excellent discourse called patriarcha to appear in publick , it would have given such satisfaction to all our great masters in the schools of politie , that all other tractates in that kind , had been found unnecessary . vide certamen epistolare . 386. the contents . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( 1 ) the tenent of the natural liberty of the people , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( 2 ) the question stated out of bellarmine , and some contradictions of his noted . ( 3 ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( 4 ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( 5 ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( 6 ) and from them all kings descended . ( 7 ) all kings are either fathers of their people : ( 8 ) or heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . ( 9 ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( 10 ) of regal and paternal power and of their agreement . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( 1 ) aristotle examined about the fredom of the people , and justisied . ( 2 ) suarez disputes against the regality of adam . ( 3 ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin , and others . ( 4 ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( 5 ) of election of kings , ( 6 ) by the major part of the people , ( 7 ) by proxie , and by silent acceptation . ( 8 ) no example in scripture of the peoples choosing their king. mr. hookers judgement therein . ( 9 ) god governed alwayes by monarchy . ( 10 ) bellarmine and aristotles judgement of monarchy . ( 11 ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( 12 ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected it under emperours . in danger the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( 13 ) vvhether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or whether they crept in by stealth . ( 14 ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( 15 ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( 16 ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( 17 ) the people may not judge nor correct their king. ( 18 ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( 1 ) regal authority not subject to positive laws . kings were before laws . the kings of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( 2 ) of samuel's description of a king. ( 3 ) the power ascribed to kings in the new testament . ( 4 ) vvhether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( 5 ) the benefit of laws . ( 6 ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( 7 ) of the oaths of kings . ( 8 ) of the benefit of the kings prerogative over laws . ( 9 ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector of the common laws . ( 10 ) the king iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( 11 ) the king and his councel anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( 12 ) of parliaments . ( 13 ) vvhen the people were first called to parliaments . ( 14 ) the liberty of parliaments not from nature , but from the grace of princes . ( 15 ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( 16 ) he governs both houses by himselfe , ( 17 ) or by his councel , ( 18 ) or by his iudges . errata . page 4. line 3. for calume read calvin . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( 1 ) the tenent of the natural liberty of mankind , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( 2 ) the question stated out of bellarmine : some contradictions of his noted . ( 3 ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( 4 ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( 5 ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( 6 ) and from them all kings descended . ( 7 ) all kings are either fathers of their people , ( 8 ) or heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . ( 9 ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( 10 ) of regal and paternal power , and their agreement . since the time that school-divinity began to flourish , there hath been a common opinion maintained , as well by divines , as by divers other learned men , which affirms , mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection , and at liberty to choose what form of government it please : and that the power which any one man hath over others , was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude . this tenent was first hatched in the schools , and hath been fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity . the divines also of the reformed churches have entertained it , and the common people every where tenderly embrace it , as being most plausible to flesh and blood , for that it prodigally destributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude , who magnifie liberty , as if the height of humane felicity were only to be found in it , never remembring that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of adam . but howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation , yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive church : it contradicts the doctrine and history of the holy scriptures , the constant practice of all ancient monarchies , and the very principles of the law of nature . it is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity , or dangerous in policy . yet upon the ground of this doctrine both jesuites , and some other zealous favourers of the geneva discipline , have built a perillous conclusion , which is , that the people or multitude have power to punish , or deprive the prince , if he transgress the laws of the kingdom ; witness parsons and buchanan : the first under the name of dolman , in the third chapter of his first book labours to prove , that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths : the ●atter in his book de jure regni apud scotos , maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince . cardinal bellarmine and calume , both look asquint this way . this desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects , follows ( as the authors of it conceive ) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind , and liberty to choose what form of government it please . and though sir john heyward , adam blackwood , john barclay , and some others have learnedly confuted both buchanan and parsons , and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , yet all of them , when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind , do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable , not so much as once denying or opposing it ; whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of it self . the rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it ; much hath been said , and by many , for the affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative . in this discourse i shall give my self these cautions : first , i have nothing to do to medle with mysteries of state , such arcana imperii , or cabinet-councels , the vulgar may not pry into . an implicite faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft , how much more is it then due to a prince in the profound secrets of government ? the causes and ends of the greatest politique actions and motions of state dazle the eyes , and exceed the capacities of all men , save only those that are hourly versed in the managing publique affairs : yet since the rule for each men to know in what to obey his prince , cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command , it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiours come abroad and call for an obedience , that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings ; for according to the quality of the thing commanded , an active or passive obedience is to be yielded ; and this is not to limit the princes power , but the extent of the subjects obedience , by giving to caesar the things that are caesar's , &c. secondly , i am not to question , or quarrel ●● the rights or liberties of this or any other nation ; my task is chiefly to enquire from whom these first came , not to dispute what , or how many these are ; but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty , or from the grace and bounty of princes . my desire and hope is , that the people of england may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world ( if it be duely considered ) is for a people to live under a monarch . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews or pretexts of liberty , are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . if such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind , take offence at the liberty i take to examine it , they must take heed that they do not deny by retail , that liberty which they affirm by whole-sale : for , if the thesis be true , the hypothesis will follow , that all men may examine their own charters , deeds , or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties . thirdly , i must not detract from the worth of all those learned men , who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty : the profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable ; neither aristotle in philosophy , nor hooker in divinity . they are but men , yet i reverence their judgements in most points , and confess my self beholding to their errors too in this ; something that i found amiss in their opinions , guided me in the discovery of that truth which ( i perswade my self ) they missed . a dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilest one truth is curiously searched after , another must necessarily be neglected . late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile school-men , who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope , thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king , that so the papal power might take place of the regal . thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith , that a man may become a martyr for his countrey , by being a traytor to his prince ; whereas the new-coyned distinction of subjects into royallists and patriots , is most unnatural , since the relation between king and people is so great , that their well-being is so reciprocal . ( 2 ) to make evident the grounds of this question , about the natural liberty of mankind , i will lay down some passages of cardinal bellarmine , that may best unfold the state of this controversie . secular or civil power ( saith he ) is instituted by men ; it is in the people , unless they bestow it on a prince . this power is immediately in the whole multitude , as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine law , but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man — if the positive law be taken away , there is left no reason , why amongst a multitude ( who are equal ) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest . — power is given by the multitude to one man , or to more , by the same law of nature ; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power , therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man , or some few . — it depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king , or consul , or other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy . thus far bellarmine ; in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever i have read , or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject . before i examine or refute these doctrines , i must a little make some observations upon his words . first , he saith , that by the law of god , power is immediately in the people ; hereby he makes god to be the immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democracy is nothing else but the power of the multitude . if this be true , not only aristocracies , but all monarchies are altogether unlawful , as being ordained ( as he thinks ) by men , whenas god himself hath chosen a democracy . secondly , he holds , that although a democracy be the ordinance of god , yet the people have no power to use the power which god hath given them , but only power to give away their power ; whereby it followeth , that there can be no democratical government , because he saith , the people must give their power to one man , or to some few ; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate ; which the multitude is tyed to do , even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power : and why then doth he say , the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy ? thirdly , he concludes , that if there be lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom . here i would fain know who shall judge of this lawful cause ? ●f the multitude ( for i see no body else can ) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion . ( 3 ) i come now to examine that argument which is used by bellarmine , and ●s the one and only argument i can find produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people . it is thus framed : that god hath given or ordained power , is evident by scripture ; but god hath given it to no particular person , because by nature all men are equal ; therefore he hath given power to the people , or multitude . to answer this reason , drawn from the equality of mankind by nature , i will first use the help of bellarmine himself , whose very words are these : if many men had been together created out of the earth , they all ought to have been princes over their posterity . in these words we have an evident confession , that creation made man prince of his posterity . and indeed not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs had , by right of father-hood , royal authority over their children . nor dares bellarmie deny this also . that the patriarchs ( saith he ) were endowed with kingly power their deeds do testifie ; for as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a command and power over their own children ; but still with subordination to the first parent , wh● is lord-paramout over his children children to all generations , as being the grand-father of his people . ( 4 ) i see not then how the children of adam , or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents : and this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows that civil power not only in general i● by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , which quite takes away tha● new and common distinction , which refers only power universal and absolute to god ; but power respective , in regard of the special form of government , to the choice of the people . this lordship which adam by com●●nd had over the whole world , and right descending from him the pa●●●archs did enjoy , was as large and ●ple as the absolutest dominion of ●y monarch which hath been since the ●eation : for dominion of life and ●eath , we find that judah the father ●onounced sentence of death against ●amar his daughter-in-law , for play●●g the harlot ; bring her forth ( saith 〈◊〉 ) that she may be burnt . touching ●ar , we see that abram commanded an ●rmy of 318 souldiers of his own fa●ily . and esau met his brother jacob ●ith 400 men at arms. for matter of ●eace , abraham made a league with ●●imelech , and ratified the articles with ● oath . these acts of judging in ca●al crimes , of making war , and con●●uding peace , are the chiefest marks of ●overeignty that are found in any monarch . ( 5 ) not only until the flood , but ●fter it , this patriarchal power did con●●nue , as the very name patriarch doth ●● part prove . the three sons of noah ●ad the whole world divided amongst them by their father ; for of them ●● the whole world over-spread , according to the benediction given to him a● his sons , be fruitful and multiply , a● replenish the earth . most of the civil● nations of the earth labour to fet● their original from some one of t●● sons or nephews of noah , which we● scattered abroad after the confusion babel : in this dispersion we must certainly find the establishment of reg● power throughout the kingdoms of t●● world. it is a common opinion , that at th● confusion of tongues there were ●● distinct nations erected , all which we● not confused multitudes , without hea●● or governours , and at liberty to choo●● what governours or government the● pleased ; but they were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears that even i● the confusion god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families for so plainly it appears by the text first , after the enumeration of the son● of japhet , the conclusion is , by these ●ere the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families , in their nations ; so ●t is said : these are the sons of ham ●fter their families , after their tongues , ●● their countreys , and in their nations . the like we read , these are the sons of ●hem after their families , after their tongues , in their lands , after their nations . these are the families of the sons of noah after their generations in their nations ; and by these were these nations divided in the earth , after the flood . in this division of the world , some are of opinion that noah used lots for the distribution of it ; others affirm he ●ayled about the mediterranean sea in ten years , and as he went about , appointed to each son his part , and so made the division of the then known world into asia , africa , and europe , according to the number of his sons ) ●he limits of which three parts are all ●ound in that midland sea. ( 6 ) but howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes . amongst these was nimrod , who n● doubt ( as sir walter raleigh affirms was , by good right , lord or king over his family ; yet against right did h● enlarge his empire , by seizing violentl● on the rights of other lords of families : and in this sense he may be sai● to be the author and first founder o● monarchy . and all those that do attribute unto him the original regal power , do hold he got it by tyranny o● usurpation , and not by any due election of the people or multitude , o● by any faction with them . as this patriarchal power continued in abraham , isaac , and jacob , even until the egyptian bondage ; so we find it amongst the sons of ismael and esau . i● is said , these are the sons of ismael , and these are their names by their castles and towns , twelve princes of their tribes and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families & their places by their nations . ( 7 ) some perhaps may think that these princes and dukes of families were but ●ome petty lords under some greater kings , because the number of them are so many , that their particular territories ●ould be but small , and not worthy the ti●e of kingdoms ; but they must consider , ●hat at first , kings had no such large dominions as they have now adays ; we find ● the time of abraham , which was about ●00 years after the flood , that in a little ●orner of asia , 9 kings at once met in ba●●il , most of which were but kings of ●ities apiece , with the adjacent territo●es , as of sodom , gomorrah , shinar , &c. in ●he same chapter is mention of melchise●ck king of salem , which was but the ci●● of jerusalem . and in the catalogue of ●●e kings of edom , the names of each ●ing's city is recorded , as the only mark ● distinguish their dominions . in the ●and of canaan , which was but a small cir●it , joshuah destroyed thirty one kings ; ●nd about the same time , adonibeseck had ●o kings , whose hands and toes he had ●t off , and made them feed under his ta●●e . a few years after this , 32 kings came ● benhadad king of syria , and about seventy kings of greece went to the wars of troy. caesar found more kings in france , than there be now princes there , and at his sailing over into this island , he found four kings in our county of kent . these heaps of kings in each nation , are an argument their territories were but small , and strongly confirms our assertion , that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction of families . by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into aegypt , where th● exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince after the return of these israelites ou● of bondage , god out of a special ca● of them , chose moses and josuah successively to govern as princes in th● place and stead of the supreme fathers and after them likewise for a time , h● raised up judges , to defend his people in time of peril . but when god gav● the israelites kings , he reestablished th● antient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently ●n the person of the father , although the father only was named in the graunt . ( 8. ) it may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers : and therefore we find , that god told cain of his brother abel , his desires shall be subject ●nto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . accordingly , when jacob bought his brother's birth-right , isaac blessed him thus , be lord over thy brethren , and ●et the sons of thy mother how before thee . as long as the first fathers of families lived , the name of patriarchs did aptly belong unto them ; but after a few descents , when the true fatherhood it self was extinct , and only the right of the father descends to the true heir , then the title of prince or king was more significant , to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy ; by this means it comes to pass , that many a child , by succeeding a king , hath the right of a father over many a gray-headed multitude , and hath the title of pater patriae . ( 9. ) it may be demanded what becomes of the right of fatherhood , in case the crown does escheate for want of an heir ? whether doth it not then devolve to the people ? the answer is it is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to die , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir● although the knowledge who should be that one one man be quite lost . 2. this ignorance of the people being admitted , it doth not by any means follow ; that for want of heirs the supreme power is devolved to the multitude , and that they have power to rule , and chose what rulers they please . no , the kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and independent heads of families : for every kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made . by the uniting of great families or petty kingdoms , we find the greater monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again , as into their first matter many times they return again . and because the dependencie of ancient families is ●oft obscure or worn out of knowledge ; ●herefore the wisdom of all or most princes have thought fit to adopt many times ●hose for heads of families , and princes of provinces , whose merits , abilities , or fortunes , have enobled them , or made them fit and capable of such re●al favours . all such prime heads and ●athers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please : and he that is so elected , claims not his power as a donative from the people ; but as being substituted properly by god , from whom he receives his royal charter of an universal father , though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people . if it please god , for the correction of the prince , or punishment of the people , to suffer princes to be removed and others to be placed in their rooms either by the factions of the nobility or rebellion of the people ; in all suc● cases , the judgement of god , who ha●● power to give and to take away kingdoms , is most just : yet the ministry of men who execute god's judgment without commission , is sinful and damnable . god doth but use and turn men unrighteous acts to the performance o● his righteous decrees . ( 10. ) in all kingdoms or common wealths in the world , whether th● prince be the supreme father of the people , or but the true heir of such father , or whether he come to the crown by usurpation , or by election of the nobles , or of the people , or by any other way whatsoever ; or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth : yet still the authority that is in any one , or in many , or in all these , is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father . there is and always shall be continued to the end of the world , a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude , although by the secret will of god , many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it . to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which enjoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms of honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . if obedience to parents be immediately due ●y a natural law , and subjection to ●rinces , but by the mediation of an ●umane ordinance ; what reason is there ●hat the laws of nature should give ●ace to the laws of men ? as we see he power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . if we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king , we find them all one , without any difference at all , but only in the latitude or extent of them : as the father over one family , so the king as father over many families extends his care to preserve , feed , cloth , instruct and defend the whole commonwealth . his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour father , and to their children , their rights and privileges ; so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( 1. ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people , and justified . ( 2. ) suarez disputing against the regality of adam . ( 3. ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin and others . ( 4. ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( 5. ) of election of kings . ( 6. ) by the major part of the people . ( 7. ) by proxy , and by silent acceptation . ( 8. ) no example in scripture of the peoples chosing their king. mr. hooker's judgment therein . ( 9. ) god governed always by monarchy . ( 10. ) bellarmine and aristotle's judgment of monarchy . ( 11. ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( 12. ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected under emperours . in danger , the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( 13. ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or rather that they came in by stealth . ( 14. ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( 15. ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( 16. ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( 17. ) the people may not judge or correct their king. ( 18. ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . ( 1. ) by conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture , it appears little less than a paradox which bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude , to chose what rulers they please . had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children ? bellarmine does not say it , but the contrary : if then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature , when was it lost , or when forfeited , or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude ? because the scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people ; therefore many fly to natural reason , and to the authority of aristotle . i must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ; but briefly , i find this sentence in the third of his politiques . cap. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens , since a city consists of equals . d. lambine in his latine interpretation of this text , hath omitted the translation of this word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of aristotle , which aristotle alleadgeth to be the opinion but of some . this negligence , or wilful escape of lambine , ●n not translating a word so material , hath been an occasion to deceive many , who looking no farther than this latine translation , have concluded , and made the world now of late believe , that aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men ; and not only our english translator of aristotle politiques is in this place misled by following lambine ; but even the learned monsieur duvall in his synopsis bea● them company : and yet this version of lambine's is esteemed the best , and printed at paris with causabon's corrected greek copy , though in the rendring of this place , the elder translations have been more faithful ; and he that shall compare the greek text with the latine , shall find that causabon had just cause in his preface to aristotle works , to complain that the best translations of aristotle did need correction : to prove that in these words which seem to favour the equality of mankind aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment , but recites only the opinion of others ; we find him clearly deliver his own opinion , that the power of government did originally arise from the right of fatherhood which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of : for in the first of his politiques he agrees exactly with the scripture , and lays this foundation of government , the first society ( saith he ) made of many houses is a village , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster-brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at he beginning , cities were under the government of kings , for the eldest in very house is king : and so for kindred●ke it is in colonies . and in the fourth of his politiques , cap. 2 , he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings , by defining tyranny to be a digression ●●om the first and divinest . whosoever weighs advisedly these ●assages , will find little hope of natural reason in aristotle to prove the natural ●iberty of the multitude . also before ●im the divine plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large ●amily . i know for this position aristotle quarrels with his master , but most ●njustly ; for therein he contradicts his own principles : for they both agree ●o fetch the original of civil government from the prime government . no doubt but moses's history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection deduced from the laws of the first parents , according to that rule o● st. chrysostom , god made all mankind of one man , that he might teach the world to be governed by a king , and not by a multitude . the ignorance of the creation , occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers . polybius , though otherwise a most profound philosopher and judicious historian , yet here he stumbles ; for in searching out the original of civil societies , he conceited that multitudes of men after a deluge a famine , or a pestilence , met together like herds of cattel without any dependency , untill the strongest bodies and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows ; even as it is ( saith he ) among bulls , bears and cocks . and aristotle himself , forgetting his first doctrine , tells us , the first heroica● kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude either by teaching them some new arts or by warring for them , or by gathering them together , or by dividing land amongst them ; also aristotle had another ●ancy , that those men who prove wise of mind , were by nature intended to be lords , and govern , and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey , and to be servants . but this is a dangerous and uncertain rule , and not without some folly ; for if a man prove both wise and strong , what will aristotle have done with him ? as he was wise , he could be no ●ervant , and as he had strength , he could not be a master ; besides , to speak like a philosopher , nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength . the folly or imbecillity proceeds from some errour in generation ●r education ; for nature aims at perfection in all her works . ( 2 ) suarez the jesuite riseth up against the royal authority of adam , ●● defence of the freedom and liberty of the people ; and thus argues . by ●ight of creation ( saith he ) adam had only oeconomical power , but not political ; he had a power over his wife , and a fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free : he might also in process of time have servants and a compleat family ; and in that family he might have compleat oeconomical power . but after that families began to be multiplied , and men to be separated , and become the head of several families ; they had the same power over their families . but political power did not begin , until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community ; wherefore a● the community did not begin by the creation of adam , nor by his will alone but of all them which did agree in this community : so we cannot say that adam naturally had political primacy in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles because by the force of the law o● nature alone , it is not due unto an● progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . and if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature , w● cannot say , god by a special gift o● providence gave him this power ; fo● there is no revelation of this , nor testimony of scripture . hitherto suarez whereas he makes adam to have a fatherly power over his sons , and yet shuts up this power within one family , ●he seems either to imagine , that all adam's children lived within one house , and under one roof with their father ; or else , as soon as any of his children ●ived out of his house , they ceased to be subject , and did thereby become free. for my part , i cannot believe that adam ( although he were sole monarch of the world ) had any such spacious palace , as might contain any such considerable part of his children . it is ●ikelier , that some mean cottage or tent ●id serve him to keep his court in . it were hard he should lose part of his authority , because his children lay not within the walls of his house . but if suarez will allow all adam's children to be of his family , howsoever they were separate in dwellings ; if their ha●itations were either contiguous , or ●t such distance , as might easily receive ●is fatherly commands . and that all ●hat were under his commands , were ●f his family , although they had many children or servants married , having temselves also children . then i see no reason , but that we may call adam's family a commonwealth , except we will wrangle about words : for adam living 930 years , and seeing 7 or 8 descents from himself , he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger , than many commonwealths and kingdoms . ( 3. ) i know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family , and bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a house ; yet in his definition , he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family ; and he approves better of the propriety of the hebrew word for a family , which is derived from a word that signifies a head , a prince , or lord , than the greek word for a family , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a house . no● doth aristotle confine a family to one house ; but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together whereas before him , charondas called family homosypioi , those that feed together out of one common pannier . and epimenides the cretian , terms a family homocapnoi , those that sit by a common fire , or smoak . but let suarez understand what he please by adam's family ; if he will but confess , as he needs must , that adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , of peace and war , and the like , within their houses or families ; he must give us leave at least , to call them kings of their houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of nature , what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ? aristotle gives the lie to plato , and ●hose that say political and oeconomical ●ocieties are all one , and do not differ ●pecie , but only multitudine & pauci●te ; as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city . all the argument i find he brings against them in this . the community of man and wise , ●iffers from the community of master and servant , because they have several ends. the intention of nature by conjunction of male and female , is generation ; but the scope of master and servant , is preservation : so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished , because nature does not work like the cutlers of delphos , for she makes but one thing for one use . if we allow this argument to be sound , nothing doth follow but only this , that conjugal and despotical communities do differ . but it is no consequence , that therefore , oeconomical and political societies do the like : for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities , yet it follows not , that a family and a commonwealth are distinct because , as well in the commonwealth as in the families , both these communities are found . and as this argument comes not home to our point , so it is not able to prove that title which it shews for● for if it should be granted ( which ye● is false ) that generation and preservation differ about the individuum , ye● they agree in the general , and serv● both for the conservation of mankind even as several servants differ in the particular ends or offices ; as one t● brew , and another to bake ; yet they agree in the general preservation of th● family . besides , aristotle confesses , that amongst the barbarians ( as he calls all them that are not grecians ) a wife and a servant are the same , because by nature , no barbarian is fit to govern ; it is fit the grecians should rule over the barbarians ; for by nature a servant and a barbarian is all one : their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant , and a wife for a maid ; so they are fit only to rule their wives and their beasts . lastly , aristotle ( if it had pleased him ) might have remembred , that nature doth not always make one thing but for one use : he knows , the tongue serves both to speak , and to taste . ( 4. ) but to leave aristotle , and return to suarez ; he saith that adam had fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free. here i could wish that the jesuite had taught as , how and when sons become free : ● know no means by the law of nature . it is the favour i think of the parents only , who when their children are of age and discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care , are then content to remit some part of their fatherly authority ; therefore the custom of some countreys doth in some cases enfranchise the children of inferiour parents , but many nations have no such custome , but on the contrary have strict laws for the obedience of children : the judicial law of moses giveth full power to the father to stone his disobedient son , so it be done in presence of a magistrate : and yet it did not belong to the magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the cause : but it was so decreed , lest the father should in his anger , suddenly , or secretly kill his son. also by the laws of the persians , and of the people of the upper asia , and of the gaules , and by the laws of the west-indies , the parents have power of life and death over their children . the romans , even in their most popular estate , had this law in force , and this power of parents was ratified and amplified by the laws of the twelve tables , to the enabling of parents to sell their children two or three times over . by the help of the fatherly power , rome long flourished , and oftentimes was freed from great dangers . the fathers have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons ; when being tribunes , they have published laws tending to sedition . memorable is the example of cassius , who threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria , for the division of lands , in the behoof of the people ; and afterwards , by his own private judgment put him to death , by throwing him down from the tarpeian rock ; the magistrates and people standing thereat amazed , and not daring to resist his fatherly authority , although they would with all their hearts , have had that law for the division of land : by which it appears , it was lawful for the father to dispose of the life of his child , contrary to the will of the magistrates or people . the romans also had a law , that what the children got , was not their own , but their fathers ; although solon made a law , which acquitted the son from nourishing of his father , if his father had taught him no trade , whereby to get his living . suarez proceeds , and tells us , that in process of time , adam had compleat oeconomical power . i know not what this compleat oeconomical power is , nor how , or what it doth really and essentially differ from political : if adam did , or might exercise the same jurisdiction , which a king doth now in a commonwealth , then the kinds of power are not distinct ; and though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude , or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other ; yet since the like difference is also found in political estates , it follows that oeconomical and political power , differ no otherwise , than a little commonweal differs from a great one. next , saith suarez , commnnity did not begin at the creation of adam . it is true , because he had no body to communicate with ; yet community did presently follow his creation , and that by his will alone : for it was in his power only , ( who was lord of all ) to appoint what his sons should have in proper , and what in common ; so that propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him ; and it is the duty of a father , to provide as well for the common good of his children , as the particular . lastly , suarez concludes , that by the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . this assertion is confuted point-blank by bellarmine , who expresly affirmeth , that the first patents ought to have been princes of their posterity . and untill suarez bring some reason for what he saith : i shall trust more to bellarmine's proofs , than to his denials . ( 5. ) but let us condescend a while to the opinion of bellarmine and suarez , and all those , who place supreme power in the whole people ; and ask them of their meaning be , that there is but one and the same power in all the people of the world ; so that no power can be granted , except all the men upon the earth meet and agree , to choose a governour . an answer is here given by suarez , that it is scarce possible , nor yet expedient , that all men in the world should be gathered together into one community : it is likelier , that either never , o● for a very short time , that this power was in this manner , in the whole multitude of men collected ; but a little after the creation , men began to be divided into several commonwealths ; and this distinct power was in each o● them . this answer of scarce possible , no● yet expedient : — it is likelier bege●● a new doubt , how this distinct power comes to each particular community when god gave it to the whole multitude only , and not to any particular assembly of men. can they shew , o● prove , that ever the whole multitude met , and divided this power which god gave them in gross , by breaking into parcels , and by appointing a distinct power to each several common-wealth ? without such a compact i cannot see ( according to their own principles ) how there can be any election of a magistrate by any commonwealth but by a meer usurpation upon the privilege of the whole world. if any think●s that particular multitudes at their own discretion , had power to divide themselves into several commonwealths ; ●hose that think so , have neither reason nor proof for so thinking : and ●hereby a gap is opened for every petty factious multitude , to raise a new commonwealth , and to make more commonweals than there be families in the world. but let this also be yielded them , that in each particular commonwealth , there is a distinct power in the multitude . was a general meeting of a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince ? is there any example of it ever found in the whole world ? to conceit such a thing , is to ●magine little less than an impossibility . and so by consequence , no one form of government , or king , was ever established according to this supposed law of nature . ( 6. ) it may be answered by some , that if either the greatest part of a kingdom , or if a smaller part only by themselves , and all the rest by proxy , or if the part not concurring in election , do after , by a tacit assent ratifie the act of others , that in all thes● cases , it may be said to be the world of the whole multitude . as to the acts of the major part o● a multitude , it is true , that by politic● humane constitutions , it is oft ordained , that the voices of the most shall over-rule the b●est ; and such ordinances bind , because , where men are assembled by an humane power ; that power that doth assemble them , can also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that power , and by such derivative power , made known by law or custom , either the greater part or two thirds , or three parts of five or the like , have power to oversway the liberty of their opposits . but in assemblies that take their authority from the law of nature , it cannot be so : for what freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of nature , no inferiour power can alter , limit or diminish● no one man , nor a multitude , can give away the natural right of another . the law of nature is unchangeable , and howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural right , yet thereby no man ●oseth the right of it self ; for the right ●nd the use of the right may be distinguished , as right and possession are ●oft distinct . therefore , unless it can be proved by the law of nature , that the major , or some other part , have power ●o over-rule the rest of the multitude ; ●t must follow , that the acts of multitudes not entire , are not binding to all , but only to such as consent unto them . ( 7. ) as to the point of proxy ; it cannot be shewed or proved , that all those that have been absent from popular elections , did ever give their voices to some of their fellows . i ask but one example out of the history of the whole world , let the commonweal be but named , wherever the multitude , or so much as the greatest part of it consented , either by voice or by procuration , to the election of a prince . the ambition sometimes of one man , sometimes of many , or the faction of a city or citizens , or the mutiny of an army , hath set up or put down princes ; but they have never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the whole multitude . lastly , if the silent acceptation o● a governour by part of the people , be an argument of their concurring i● the election of him ; by the same reason , the tacit assent of the whole commonwealth may be maintained : from whence it follows , that every prince that comes to a crown , either by succession , conquest , or usurpation may be said to be elected by the people ; which inference is too ridiculous for in such cases , the people are so far from the liberty of specification , that they want even that of contradiction . ( 8. ) but it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the people in the election of kings , as long as men are perswaded , that examples of it are to be found in scripture . it is fit therefore , to discover the grounds of this errour : it is plain by an evident text that it is one thing to choose a king , and another thing to set up a king over the people ; this latter power the children of israel had , but not the former . this distinction is found most eviden● in deut. 17. 15. where the law of god saith , him shalt thou set king over thee , whom ●●e lord shall choose ; so god must eli●e , and the people only do constitu●e . mr. hooker in his eighth book ●f ecclesiastical policy , clearly expounds ●is distinction ; the words are worthy ●●e citing : heaps of scripture ( saith he ) ●e alledged , concerning the solemn coro●●tion or inauguration of saul , david , so●mon and others , by nobles , ancients , and the people of the commonwealth of isr●el ; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed , whereby the right of dominion is given ; which strange , untrue , and unnatural conceits , are set abroad by ●ed-men of rebellion , only to animate ●nquiet spirits , and to feed them with ●ossibilities of aspiring unto the thrones , they can win the hearts of the people ; whatsoever hereditary title any other before them may have . i say these ●njust and insolent positions , i would ●ot mention , were it not thereby to make the countenance of ●ruth more orient . for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all ●aw , equity and reason , we must ( for ●here is no other remedy ) acknowledg , that in kingdoms hereditary , birth-right giveth right unto sovereign dominion , and the death of the predecesso● putteth the successor by blood in s●sin . those publick solemnities before mentioned , do either serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right or belong to the form of induci●● of him into possession of that thing ●● hath right unto . this is mr. hooker judgment of the israelites power t● set a king over themselves . no doubt but if the people of israel had had power to choose their king , they would never have made choice of joas , a child but of seven years old , nor of manases a boy of twelve ; since ( as solomon saith ) wo to the land whose king a child : nor is it probable they would have elected josias , but a very child and a son to so wicked and ido●trous a father , as that his own servants murthered him ; and yet all th● people set up this young josias , an● slew the conspirators of the death o● ammon his father ; which justice of the people , god rewarded , by making this josias the most religious king , tha● ever that nation enjoyed . ( 9. ) because it is affirmed , that ●e people have power to choose , as ●ell what form of government , as ●hat governours they please ; of which mind is bellarmine , in those ●aces we cited at first . therefore it necessary to examine the strength ● what is said in defence of popular commonweals , against this natural form of kingdoms , which i maintain'd . here i must first put the ●ardinal in mind of what he affirms cold blood , in other places ; where saith , god when he made all man●d of one man , did seem openly to ●●nifie , that he rather approved the go●●rnment of one man , than of many . ●●ain , god shewed his opinion , ●●en he endued not only men , but creatures with a natural propensi●● to monarchy ; neither can it be ●●ubted , but a natural propensity is be referred to god , who is au●●or of nature . and again ; in a ●●ird place , what form of government god confirmed by his authori●● may be gathered by that common●al , which he instituted amongst the hebrews , which was not aristocratical ( as calvin saith ) but plainly monarchichal . ( 10. ) now if god , ( as bellarmie saith ) hath taught us by natural instinct , signified to us by the creation and confirmed by his own example the excellency of monarchy , why should bellarmine or we doubt , but that it is natural ? do we not find that in every family , the government of one alone , is most natural god did always govern his own people by monarchy only . the patriarchs , dukes , judges and kings we●● all monarchs . there is not in all the scripture , mention or approbation o● any other form of government . a● the time when scripture saith , th● was no king in israel , but that eve● man did that which was right in ●● own eyes ; even then , the israelit●● were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families for in the consultation , after the be● jamitical war , for providing wives f●● the benjamites , we find , the elders ●● the congregation bare only swa●● judges 21. 16. to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse 22. and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text plainly expounds it self in 2. chron. 1. 2. where solomon speaks ●nto all israel , to the captains , the judges , and to every governour the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel . 1 kings 8. 12. 2 chron. 5. 2. at that time also , when the people of israel beg'd a king of samuel , they were governed by kingly power . god out of a special love and care to the house of israel , did choose to be their king himself , and did govern them at that time by his viceroy samuel , and his ●ons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee but me , that ● should not reign over them . it seems ●hey did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election : for we do not find the israelites prayed , that they themselves might choose their own king ; they dream of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together . if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having of a king. aristotle in his book of politicks when he comes to compare the several kinds of government , he is very reserved in discoursing what form h● thinks best : he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points , and judiciously of many errours , but concludes nothing himself . in all those books i find little commendation of monarchy . it was his hap to live in those times when the grecians abounded with several commonwealths , who had then learning enough to make them seditious . yet in his ethicks , he hath so much good manners , as to confess in right down words , that monarchy is the best form of government , and a popular estate the worst . and though he be not so free in his politicks , yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him , that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy ; he confesseth it to be first , the natural , and the divinest form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy . what can a heathen say more ? indeed , the world for a long time ●new no other sort of government , out only monarchy . the best order , the greatest strength , the most stability and easiest government , are to be found all in monarchy , and in to other form of government . the new platforms of commonweals , were first hatched in a corner of the world , amongst a few cities of greece , which have been imitated by very ●ew other laces . those very cities were first , for many years , governed by kings , untill wantonness , ambition or faction of the people , made them attempt new kinds of regiment ; all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them ; happy in nothing , but that they continued but a small time . ( 11. ) a little to manifest the imperfection of popular government , let us but examine the most flourishing democratie that the world hath ever known ; i mean that of rome . first , for the durability ; at the most , it lasted but 480 years ( for so long it was from the expulsion of tarquin , to julius caesar . ) whereas both the assyrian monarchy lasted , without interruption , at the least twelve hundred years , and the empire of the east continued 1495 years . 2. for the order of it , during these 480 years , there was not any one settled form of government in rome : for after they had once lost the natural power of kings , they could not find upon what form of government to rest : their fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in every change. at the first they chose two annual consuls instead of kings . secondly , those did not please them long , but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their liberty . thirdly , they leave tribunes and consuls , and choose them ten men to make them laws . fourthly , they call for consuls and tribunes again : sometimes they choose dictators , which were temporary kings , and sometimes military tribunes , who had consular power . all these shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government , as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regiment in so much confusion : one while the senate made laws , another while the people . the dissentions which were daily between the nobles and the commons , bred those memorable seditions about usury , about marriages , and about magistracy . also the graecian , the apulian , and the drusian seditions , filled the market-places , the temples , and the capitol it self , with blood of the citizens ; the social war was plainly civil ; the wars of the slaves , and the other of the fencers ; the civil wars of marius and sylla , of cataline , of caesar and pompey the triumvirate , of augustus , lepidus and antonius : all these shed an ocean of blood within italy and the streets of rome . thirdly , for their government , let it be allowed , that for some part of this time it was popular , yet it was popular as to the city of rome only , and not as to the dominions , or whole empire of rome ; for no democratie can extend further than to one city . it is impossible to govern a kingdom , much less many kingdoms by the whole people , or by the greatest part of them . ( 12. ) but you will say , yet the roman empire grew all up under this kind of popular government , and the city became mistress of the world. it is not so ; for rome began her empire under kings , and did perfect it under emperours ; it did only encrease under that popularity : her ●reatest exaltation was under trajan , ●s her longest peace had been under augustus . even at those times , when the roman victories abroad , did amaze the world , then the tragical slaughter of citizens at home , deserved commiseration from their vanquished enemies . what though in that age of her popularity , she bred many admired captains and commanders ( each of which was able to lead an army , ●ough many of them were but ill re●●ited by the people ? ) yet all of them ●ere not able to support her in times 〈◊〉 danger ; but she was forced in her ●●eatest troubles to create a dictator who was a king for a time ) thereby giving this honourable testimony of monarchy , that the last refuge in perils of states , is to fly to regal authority . and though romes popular estate for a while was miraculou●●●● upheld in glory by a greater prud●nce than her own ; yet in a short time , after manifold alterations , she was ruined by her own hands . suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit : for the arms she had prepared to conquer other nations , were turned upon her self , and civil contentions at last settled the government again into a monarchy . ( 13. ) the vulgar opinion is , tha● the first cause why the democratical government was brought in , was to curb the tyranny of monarchies . but the falshood of this doth best appear by the first flourishing popular estate of athens which was founded , not because o● the vices of their last king , but that his vertuous deserts were such as th● people thought no man worthy ●nough to succeed him ; a pretty wa●ton quarrel to monarchy ! for whe● their king codrus understood by th● oracle , that his country could not be saved , unless the king were slain i● the battel : he in disguise entered hi● enemies camp , and provoked a common souldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom , and with his death ended the royal government ; for after him was never and more kings of athens . as athens thus or love of her codrus , changed the government , so rome on the contrary , out of hatred to her tarquin , ●d the like . and though these two famous commonweals did for contrary ●uses abolish monarchy , yet they both agreed in this , that neither of them thought it fit to change their state to a democratie : but the one chose ●●chontes , and the other consuls to ● their governours ; both which did ●ost resemble kings , and continued , ●●till the people by lessening the authority of these their magistrates , did ● degrees and stealth bring in their ●opular government . and i verily be●●●ve , never any democratical state ●ewed it self at first fairly to the ●orld by any elective entrance , but ●ey all secretly crept in by the back●●or of sedition and faction . ( 14. ) if we will listen to the judgment of those who should best know ●e nature of popular government , ● shall find no reason for good men desire or choose it . zenophon that brave scholar and souldier disallowed the athenian commonweal , for that they followed that form of government wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit , and vertuous men kept under . they expelled a●ristides the just ; themistocles died i● banishment ; meltiades in prison phocion the most virtuous and just man of his age , though he had been chosen forty five times to be their general , yet he was put to death with all his friends , kindred and servants , by the fury of the people , without sentence , accusation , or any cause at all . nor were the people of rome much more favourable to their worthies ; they banished rutilius , metellus , coriolanus , the two scipio's and tully● the worst men sped best ; for as znophon saith of athens , so rome was a sanctuary for all turbulent , discontented and seditious spirits . the impunity of wicked men was such , that upon pain of death , it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn to death , or banish any citizen , o● to deprive him of his liberty , or so much as to whip him for what offence ever he had committed , either against ●e gods or men. the athenians sold justice as they ●d other merchandise ; which made ●lato call a popular estate a fair , here every thing is to be sold . the ●fficers when they entered upon their ●harge , would brag , they went to a ●olden harvest . the corruption of ●ome was such , that marius and pompey durst carry bushels of silver to the assemblies , to purchase the ●oices of the people . many citizens ●der their grave gowns , came arm● into the publick meetings , as if ●●ey went to war. often contrary ●ctions fell to blows , sometimes with ●ones , and sometimes with swords ; ●e blood hath been suckt up in the ●arket places with spunges ; the ri●●r tiber hath been filled with the ●ead bodies of the citizens , and the ●●mmon privies stuffed full with them . if any man think these disorders popular states were but casual , such as might happen under any ●nd of government , he must know , that such mischiefs are unavoidable , and of necessity do follow a●● democratical regiments ; and the reason is given , because the nature of all people is , to desire liberty without restraint , which cannot b● but where the wicked bear rule● and if the people should be so indiscreet , as to advance vertuous men they lose their power : for that good men would favour none but the good , which are always the fewer in number ; and the wicked and vitious ( which is still the greate● part of the people ) should be excluded from all preferment , and i● the end , by little and little , wise men should seize upon the state , and take it from the people . i know not how to give a better character of the people , than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or near the popular states ; thucydides , zenophon , liv●● tacitus , cicero , and salust , have set them out in their colours . i will borrow some of their sentences : there is nothing more uncertain than the people ; their opinions are as variable and suddain as tempests ; there is neither truth nor judgment in them ; they are not led by wisdom to judg of any thing , but by violence and rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true and false . after the manner of cattel , they follow the herd that goes before ; they have a custom always to favour the worst and weakest ; they are most prone to suspitions , and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false suggestion ; they are apt to believe all news , especially if it be sorrowful ; and like fame , they make it more in the believing ; when there is no author , they fear those evils which themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new stirrs and changes , and are enemies to qui●et and rest ; whatsoever is giddy or head-strong , they account manlike and couragious ; but whatsoever is modest or provident , seems sluggish ; each man hath a care of his particular , and thinks basely ●● the common good ; they look upon approaching mischiefs as the● do upon thunder , only every ma● wisheth it may not touch his own person ; it is the nature of the● they must serve basely , or dom●neer proudly ; for they know ●● mean. thus do they paint to the life this beast with many head● let me give you the cypher ●● their form of government ; as it ●● begot by sedition , so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars , either with an enemy abroad or with friends at home . the only means to preserve it , is , to have some powerful enemies near , who ma● serve instead of a king to govern it , that so , though they have not king amongst them , yet they may have as good as a king over them : for the common danger of an enem● keeps them in better unity , tha● the laws they make themselves . ( 15 ) many have exercised their wits in parallelling the inconveniences ●f regal and popular government , but we will trust experience before speculations philosophical , it cannot be ●nyed but this one mischief of sedition ●hich necessarily waits upon all populari●● , weighes down all the inconveniences ●●at can be found in monarchy , though ●●ey were never so many . it is said , ●●in for skin , yea , all that a man hath ●ill he give for his life ; and a man ●ill give his riches for the ransome of ●s life . the way then to examine what ●roportion the mischiefs of sedition ●nd tyranny have one to another , is ●● enquire in what kind of government ●ost subjects have lost their lives : ●et rome which is magnified for her popularity , and vilified for the tyrannical monsters the emperours , furnish us with examples . consider-whether the ●ruelty of all the tyrannical emperours ●●at ever ruled in this city did ever ●ill a quarter of the blood that was pour● out in the last hundred years of her ●orious common wealth . the murthers by tyberius , domitian , and commodus , ●ut all together , cannot match that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between marius and sylla , nay , even by sylla's part alone ( not to mention the acts of marius ) were fourscore and ten senators put to death , fifteen consuls , two thousand and six hundred gentlemen , and a hundred thousand others . this was the heighth of the roman liberty : any man might be killed that would . a favour not fit to be granted under a royal government . the miseries of those licentious times are briefly touched by plutarch in these words . sylla ( saith he ) fell to sheding of bloud , and filled all rome with infinite and unspeakable murthers — this was not only done in rome , but in all the cities of italy throughout , there was no temple of any god whatsoever , n● altar in any bodies house , no liberty of hospital , no fathers house , which was not embrewed with blood , and horrible murthers , the husbands were slain in the wives armes , and the children i● the mothers laps ; and yet they tha● were slain for private malice were no nothing in respect of those that were murthered only for their goods — ●e openly sold their goods by the ●ryer , sitting so proudly in his chair of ●ate , that it grieved the people more see their goods packt up by them to ●hom he gave , or disposed them , than see them taken away . sometimes he ●ould give a whole countrey , or the ●hole revenues of certain cities , unto ●omen for their beauties , or to plea●t jeasters , minstrels , or wicked ●ves , made free . and to some he ●ould give other mens vvives by force , ●d make them be married against their ●lls . now let tacitus and suetonius be ●rched , and see if all their cruel em●rours can match this popular villa●● in such an universal slaughter of ci●ens , or civil butchery . god only ●s able to match him , and over-match●him , by fitting him with a most re●●rkable death , just answerable to his ●●e , for as he had been the death of ●ny thousands of his country-men , so many thousands of his own kindred the flesh were the death of him , for ●died of an impostume , which corrupt●● his flesh in such sort , that it turned to lice , he had many about him to shift him continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him , were nothing to them that multiplied upon him , there was neither apparel , linnen , bathes , vvashings , nor meat it self , but was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermine . i cite not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical princes , nor will i plead in defence of their cruelties : only in the comparative , i maintain the mischiefs to a state to be less universal under a tyrant king ; for the cruelty of such tyrants extends ordinarily no further then to some particular men that offend him and not to the whole kingdome : it is truly said by his late majesty king james , a king can never be so notoriously vitious , but he will generally favour justice , and maintain some order except in the particulars wherein his i● ordinate lust carries him away . eve● cruel domitian , dionysius the tyrant , an● many others , are commended by historians for great observers of justice : ● natural reason is to be rendered for i● it is the multitude of people , and the abundance of their riches , which are th●● only strength and glory of eve● prince : the bodies of his subjects do him service in vvar , and their goods supply his present wants , therefore if not out of affection to his people , yet out of natural love to himself , every tyrant desires to preserve the lives , and protect the goods of his subjects , which cannot be done but by justice , and if it be not done , the princes loss is the greatest ; on the contrary , in a popular state , every man knows the publick good doth not depend wholly on his care , but the common-wealth may well enough be governed by others though he tend only his private benefit , ●he never takes the publick to be his own business ; thus as in a family , where one office is to be done by many servants , one looks upon another , and every one leaves the business for his fellow , until it is quite neglected by all ; nor are they much to be blamed for their negligence , since it is an even wager , their ignorance is as great : for magistrates among the people , being for the most part annual , do always lay down their office before they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understanding , by use and experience must needs excell them ; again , there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked , but his own reason and sense will tell him , that though he be a god , yet he must dye like a man ; and that there is not the meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge himself of the injustice that is offered him : hence it is that great tyrants live continually in base fears , as did dionysius the elder ; tiberius , caligula , and nero are noted by suetonius to have been frighted with panick fears . but it is not so , where wrong is done to any particular person by a multitude , he knows not who hurt him , or who to complain of , or to whom to address himself for reparation . any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all popular assemblies . there is no tyranny to be compared to the tyranny of a multitude . ( 16 ) what though the government of the people be a thing not to be endured , much less defended , yet many men please themselves with an opininion , that though the people may not govern ; yet they may partake and joyn with a king in the government , and so make a state mixed of popular and regal power , which they take to be the best tempered and equallest form of government . but the vanity of this fancy is too evident , it is a meer impossibility or contradiction , for if a king but once admit the people to be his companions , he leaves to be a king , and the state becomes a democracy ; at least , he is but a titular and no real king , that hath not the soveraignty to himself ; for the having of this alone , and nothing but this makes a king to be a king. as for that shew of popularity which is found in such kingdoms ●s have general assemblies for consultation about making publick laws : it must be remembred that such meetings ●o not share or divide the soveraignty with the prince : but do only deliberate and advise their supreme head , who ●ill reserves the absolute power in ●imself ; for if in such assemblies , the ●ing , the nobility , and people have ●ual shares in the soveraignty , then ●e king hath but one voice , the no●lity likewise one , and the people one , ●●d then any two of these voices should have power to over-rule the third ; thus the nobility and commons together should have power to make a law to bind the king , which was never yet seen in any kingdom , but if it could , the state must needs be popular and not regal . ( 17 ) if it be unnatural for the multitude to chuse their governours , or to govern , or to partake in the government , what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many , that the multitude may correct , or depose their prince , if need be surely the unnaturalness , and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed : for admit that a king make a contract or paction with his people , either originally in his ancestors , or personally at his coronation ( for both these pactions some dream of , but cannot offer any proof for either ) yet by no law of any nation can a contract be thought broken , except that first a lawful tryal be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof , or else every man may be both party and judge i● his own case , which is absur'd once to be thought , for then it will lye in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to cast off the yoke of government ( that god hath laid upon them ) to judge and punish him , by whom they should be judged and punished themselves . aristotle can tell us , what judges the multitude are in their own case , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the judgment of the multitude in disposing of the soveraignty may be seen in the roman history , where we may find many good emperours murthered by the people , and many bad elected by them : nero , heliogabalus , otho , vitellius , and such other monsters of nature , were the minions of the multitude , and set up by them : pertinax , alexander , severus , gordianus , gallus emilianus , quintilius , aurelianus , tacitus , probus , and numerianus ; all of them good emperours in the judgment of all historians , yet murthered by the multitude . ( 18 ) whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the insolencies of tyrants ; wherein they propound a remedy far worse than the disease , neither is the disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think , let us be judged by the history even of our own nation : we have enjoyed a succession of kings from the conquest now for above 600 years ( a time far longer than ever yet any popular state could continue ) we reckon to the number of twenty six of these princes since the norman race , and yet not one of these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government . it is true , two of these kings have been deposed by the people , and barbarously murthered , but neither of them for tyranny : for as a learned historian of our age saith , edward the second and richard the second were not insupportable either in their nature or rule , and yet the people , more upon wantonness than for any want , did take an unbridled course against them . edward the second , by many of our historians is reported to be of a good and vertuous nature , and not unlearned : they impute his defects rather to fortune than either to council or carriage of his affairs , the deposition of him was a violent fury , led by a wife both cruel and unchast , and can with no better countenance of right be justifyed , than may his lamentable both indignities and death it self . likewise the deposition of king richard ii , was a tempestuous rage , neither led or restrained by any rules of reason or of state — examin his actions without a distempered judgment , and you will not condemne him to be exceeding either insufficient or evil ; weigh the imputations that were objected against him , and you shall find nothing ●●ither of any truth or of great moment ; hollingshed writeth , that he was most unthankfully used by his subjects ; for although , through the frailty of his youth , he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate , yet in no kings days were the commons in greater wealth , the nobility more honoured , and the clergy less wronged ; who notwithstanding , in the evil guided strength of their will , took head against him , to their own headlong destruction afterwards ; partly during the reign of henry , his next successor , whose greatest atchievements were against his own people , in executing those who conspired with him against king richard : but more especially in succeeding times , when , upon occasion of this disorder , more english blood was spent , than was in all the foreign wars together which have been since the conquest . twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with civil war , but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny of any prince . the cause of the baron's wars is by good historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility , as the bloody variance of the houses of york and lancaster , and the late rebellion , sprung from the wantonness of the people . these three unnatural wars have dishonoured our nation amongst strangers , so that in the censures of kingdoms , the king of spain is said to be the king of men , because of his subjects willing obedience ; the king of france king of asses , because of their infinite taxes and impositions ; but the king of england is said to be the king of devils , because of his subjects often insurrections against , and depositions of their princes . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( 1. ) regal authority not subject to the positive laws , kings before laws ; the king of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( 2. ) of samuel 's description of a king , 1 sam. 8. ( 3. ) the power ascribed unto kings in the new testament . ( 4. ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( 5. ) the benefit of laws . ( 6. ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( 7. ) of the oathes of kings . ( 8. ) of the benefit of the king's prerogative over laws . ( 9. ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector , of the common laws . ( 10. ) the king , judge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( 11. ) the king and his council have anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( 12. ) of parliaments . ( 13. ) when the people were first called to parliament . ( 14. ) the liberty of parliaments , not from nature , but from grace of the princes . ( 15. ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( 16. ) governs both houses as head by himself . ( 17. ) by his council . ( 18. ) by his judges . ( 1. ) hitherto i have endeavour'd to shew the natural institution of regal authority , and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people : it is necessary also to enquire whether humane laws have a superiority over princes ; because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people , do subject the exercise of it to positive laws . but in this also they erre , for as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferiour law to limit it . the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will ; not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants . there is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet or all this every father is bound by the ●aw of nature to do his best for the pre●ervation of his family ; but much more ● a king always tyed by the same law of nature to keep this general ground , that the safety of the kingdom be his ●hief law : he must remember , that he profit of every man in particular , and of all together in general , is not always one and the same ; and that the publick is to be preferred before the private ; ●nd that the force of laws must not be ● great as natural equity it self , which ●nnot fully be comprised in any laws ●hatsoever , but is to be left to the re●●gious atchievement of those who ●●ow how to manage the affaires of ●tate , and wisely to ballance the particular profit with the counterpoize of ●e publick , according to the infinite va●ety of times , places , persons ; a proof ●nanswerable , for the superiority of princes above laws , is this , that there were ●ings long before there were any laws : or a long time the word of a king ●as the only law ; and if practice ( as ●●th sir walter raleigh ) declare the ●eatness of authority , even the best kings of judah and israel were not tyed to any law ; but they did what-soever they pleased , in the greatest matters . ( 2 ) the unlimitted jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by samuel , that it hath given occasion to some to imagine , that it was , but either a plot or trick of samuel to keep the government himself and family , by frighting the israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy , or else a prophetical description only of the future iii government of saul : but the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free monarchy ; wherein it is evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient ; for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant , for patient obedience is due to both ; ●ho remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying and praying unto god in that day . but howsoever in a rigorous construction samuel's description be applyed to a tyrant ; yet the words by a benigne interpretation may agree with the manners of a just king ; and the scope and coherence of the text doth best imply the more moderate , or qualified sense of the words ; for as sir w. raleigh confesses , all those inconveniences and miseries which are reckon●ed by samuel as belonging to kingly government were not intollerable , but such as have been born , and are still born , by free consent of subjects towards their princes ; nay at this day , and in this land , many tenants by their tenures and services are tyed to the same subjection , even to subordinate and ●nferior lords : to serve the king in his wars , and to till his ground , is not only agreeable to the nature of subjects , but much desired by them ; according to their several births , and conditions : the like may be said for the offices of women-servants , confectioners , cooks , and bakers , for we cannot think that the king would use their labours without giving them wages , since the text it self mentions a liberal reward of his servants . as for the taking of the tenth of their seed , of their vines , and of their sheep , it might be a necessary provision for their kings household , and so belong to the right of tribute : for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth it cannot agree well to a tyrant , who observes no proportion , in fleecing his people . lastly , the taking of their fields vineyards , and olive-trees , if it be by force or fraud , or without just recompence , to the dammage of private persons only , it is not to be defended but if it be upon the publick charge and general consent , it might be justifyed , as necessary at the first erects on of a kingdome ; for those who wi●● have a king , are bound to allow hi● royal maintenance , by providing revenues for the crown , since it both for the honour , profit and safety too of the people to have their king glorious , powerful , and abounding in ●iches , besides we all know the lands ●nd goods of many subjects may be oft●mes legally taken by the king , either ●y forfeitures , escheat , attainder , out●wry , confiscation , or the like . ●hus we see samuel's character of a ●ng may literally well bear a mild ●nse , for greater probability there is at samuel so meant , and the israelites understood it ; to which this may be ●ded , that samuel tells the israelites , ●s will be the manner of the king that ●ll reign over you : and ye shall ●● because of your king which ye shall ●e chosen you ; that is to say : thus ●●ll be the common custom or fashi● or proceeding of saul your king ; as the vulgar latine renders it , this ●l be the right or law of your king ; ● meaning as some expound it , the ●●al event , or act of some individu●●agum , or indefinite king , that might ●en one day to tyrannise over them . ●hat saul , and the constant practice saul , doth best agree with the lite● sense of the text. now that saul ●no tyrant , we may note that the ●le asked a king , as all nations had . god answers , and bids samuel to hear the voice of the people , in all things which they spake , and appoint them a king. they did not ask a tyrant , and to give them a tyrant , when they asked a king , had not been to hear their voice in all things but rather when they asked an egge , to have given them a scorpion : unless we will say , that all nations had tyrant● besides , we do not find in all scripture that saul was punished , or so much a● blamed , for committing any of tho●● acts which samuel describes : and if s●muel's drift had been only to terrifie th● people , he would not have forgott● to foretell saul's bloody cruelty , ●● murthering 85 innocent priests , a● smiteing with the edge of the swo● the city of nob , both man , woman and child . again , the israelites ne● shrank at these conditions proposed b● samuel , but accepted of them , as such ●● all other nations were bound u●● for their conclusion is , nay , but we ●● have a king over us , that we also may ●● like all the nations , and that our k●●● may judge us , and go out before us to ●● our battels . meaning he should ●● his privileges , by doing the work ●● them , by judging them , and fighting for them . lastly , whereas the mention of the peoples crying unto the lord , argues they should be under some tyrannical oppression ; we may remember , that the peoples complaints and cries are not always an argument ●f their living under a tyrant . no man can say king solomon was a tyrant , yet all the congregation of israel complain'd that solomon made their yoke grievous , and therefore their prayer to ●ehoboam is , make thou the grievous ser●ice of thy father solomon , and his hea●y yoke which he put upon us , lighter , and ●e will serve thee . to conclude , it is ●rue , saul lost his kingdom , but not ●or being too cruel or tyrannical to his ●ubjects , but by being too merciful to ●is enemies ; his sparing agag when he ●hould have slain him , was the cause why the kingdom was torn from him . ( 3. ) if any desire the direction of the new testament , he may find our saviour limiting and distinguishing royal ●ower , by giving to caesar those things ●at were caesar 's , and to god those things that were god's . obediendum est in quibus mandatum dei non impeditur . we must obey where the commandment of god is not hindred ; there is no other law but gods law to hinder our obedience . it was the answer of a christian to the emperour , we only worship god , in other things we gladly serve you and it seems tertullian thought whatsoever was not god's was the emperours when he saith , bene opposuit caesari pecuniam , te ipsum deo , alioqui quid erit deisi omnia caesaris . our saviour hath well apportioned our money for coesar and our selves for god , for otherwise what shall god's share be , if all be coesar's the fathers mention no reservation of any power to the laws of the land , or to the people . s. ambrose , in his apologie for david , expresly saith he was a king , and therefore bound to no laws , because kings are free from the bonds of any fault . s. augustine also resolves , imperator non est subjectus leg● bus , qui habet in potestate alias leges ferr● the emperour is not subject to laws who hath power to make other laws for indeed , it is the rule of solomon , that we must keep the king's commandment and not to say , what dost thou ? because where the word of a king is , there is power , and all that he pleaseth , he will do . if any mislike this divinity in england , let him but hearken to bracton , chief justice in henry the third's days , which was since the institution of parliaments , his words are , speaking of the ●ing , omnes sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , ●●si tantum sub deo , &c. all are under ●m , and he under none , but god on●● : if he offend , since no writ can go ●ainst him , their remedy is by peti●ning him to amend his fault , which he shall not do , it will be punishment sufficient for him to expect god as revenger : let none presume to search to his deeds , much less to oppose ●●em . when the jews asked our blessed sa●ur , whether they should pay tri●e ? he did not first demand what the ●w of the land was , or whether there ●● any statute against it , nor enquired ●ether the tribute were given by ●●nsent of the people , nor advised ●● to stay their payment till they should grant it ; he did no more but look upon the superscription , and concluded , this image you say is caesar's , therefore give it to caesar . nor must it here be said , that christ taught this lesson only to the conquered jews , for in this he gave direction for all nations , who are bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings , as to any conquerour or usurper whatsoever . whereas being subject to the higher powers , some have strained these word to signifie the laws of the land , or else to mean the highest power , as well aristocratical and democratical , as regal it seems s. paul looked for such interpretation , and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor , and to let it be known , that by power he understood monarch that carryed a sword : wi●● thou not be afraid of the power ? that i● the ruler that carryeth the sword , fo● he is the minister of god to thee — ●● he beareth not the sword in vain . it not the law that is the minister of god or that carries the sword , but the r●ler or magistrate ; so they that say th●● law governs the kingdom , may as we●● say that the carpenters rule builds an house , and not the carpenter ; for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler . and s. paul concludes ; for this cause pay you tribute also , for they are gods ministers attending continually upon this very thing . render therefore tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom . he doth not say , give as a gift to gods minister . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , render or restore tribute , as a due . also st. peter doth most clearly expound this place of st. paul , where he saith , submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him . here the very self same word ( supreme , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which st. paul coupleth with power , st. peter conjoineth with the king , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to maniest that king and power are both one . also st. peter expounds his own words of humane ordinance , to be the king , who is the lex loquens , a speaking law ; he cannot mean that kings themselves are an human ordinance , since st. paul calls the supreme power , the ordinance of god ; and the wisdom of god saith , by me kings reign : but his meaning must be , that the laws of kings are human ordinances . next , the governours that are sent by him ; that is by the king , not by god , as some corruptly would wrest the text , to justifie popular governours as authorized by god , whereas in gramatical construction [ him ] the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is king ; besides , the antithesis between supreme and sent , proves plainly that the governours were sent by kings ; for if the governours were sent by god , and the king be an humane ordinance , then it follows , that the governours were supreme , and not the king ; or if it be said , that both king and governours are sent by god , then they are both equal , and so neither of them supreme . therefore st. peter's meaning is in short , obey the laws of the king , or of his ministers . by which it is evident , that neither st. peter , nor s. paul , intended other-form of government than only monarchical , much less any subjecton of princes to humane laws . that familiar distinction of the schoolmen , whereby they subject kings to the directive , but not to the coactive power of laws , is a confession that kings are not bound by the positive laws of any nation : since the compulsory power of laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws ; by binding men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas the direction of the law , is but like the advice and direction which the kings council gives the king , which no man says is a law to the king. ( 4 ) there want not those who believe that the first invention of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power of kings ; but the truth is , the original of laws was for the keeping of the multitude in order : popular estates could not subsist at all without laws ; whereas kingdoms were govern'd many ages without them . the people of athens , as soon as they gave over kings , were forced to give power to draco first , then to solon , to make them laws , not to bridle kings , but themselves ; and though many of their laws were very severe and bloody , yet for the reverence they bare to their law-makers they willingly submitted to them . nor did the people give any limited power to solon , but an absolute jurisdiction , at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what he thought fit ; the people never challenging any such power to themselves : so the people of rome gave to the ten men , who were to chuse and correct their laws for the twelve tables , an absolute power , without any appeal to the people . ( 5. ) the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this , when kings were either busyed with wars , or distracted with publick cares , so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure ; then of necessity were laws invented , that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure decyphered unto him in the tables of his laws , that so there might be no need to resort to the king ; but either for the interpretation or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws , or else in new cases , for a supplement where the law was defective . by this means both king and people were in many things ●eased : first , the king by giving laws doth free himself of great and intolerable troubles , as moses did himself by chusing elders . secondly , the people have the law as a familiar admonisher and interpreter of the king's pleasure , which being published throughout the kingdom , doth represent the presence and majesty of the king : also the judges and magistrates , ( whose help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to use ) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using their own liberty to the injury of others , since they are to judge according to the laws , and not follow their own opinions . ( 6. ) now albeit kings , who make the laws , be ( as king james teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful , he may mitigate and interpret . general laws made in parliament , may , upon known respects to the king , by his authority be mitigated or suspended , upon causes only known to him . and although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weale doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . by this means are all kings , even tyrants and conquerours , bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipial law of the land , so much as the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore-fathers and predecessors , in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . ( 7. ) others there be that affirm , that ●lthough laws of themselves do not ●ind kings , yet the oaths of kings at ●heir coronations tye them to keep all ●he laws of their kingdoms . how far this is true , let us but examine the oath of ●he kings of england at their coronation ; ●he words whereof are these , art thou ●leased to cause to be administred in all thy ●udgments indifferent and upright justice , ●nd to use discretion with mercy and ve●ity ? art thou pleased that our upright laws and customs be observed , and dost thou promise that those shall be protected ●nd maintained by thee ? these two are ●he articles of the king's oath , which concern the laity or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively . being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury , pleaseth it ●ou to confirm and observe the laws and ●ustoms of ancient times , granted from ●od , by just and devout kings , unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people . especially the laws , liberties , and customs granted unto the clergy and laity ●y the famous king edward . we may observe , in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes , set forth in henry the eighth's days , the king is to swear wholly to put out evil laws ; which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws now what laws are upright and what evil , who shall judge but the king since he swears to administer upright justice with discretion and mercy ( o● as bracton hath it ) oequitatem proecipia● & misericordiam . so that in effect , the king doth swear to keep no laws , but such as in his judgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to equity of his conscience , join'd with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellour rather than of judge ; and if a king did strictly sweat to observe all the laws , he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing or abrogating of any st●tute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievable to the ●tate . but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws ●f their kingdoms , yet no man can ●hink it reason that kings should be ●ore bound by their voluntary oaths ●han common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a con●ract , either with oath or without oath , he is no further bound than the ●quity and justice of the contract ties ●im ; for a man may have relief against ●n unreasonable and unjust promise , if ●ther deceit , or errour , or force , or ●ear induced him thereunto : or if it be ●urtful or grievous in the performance . ●ince the laws in many cases give the ●ing a prerogative above common per●ons , i see no reason why he should be ●enyed the priviledge which the meanst of his subjects doth enjoy . here is a fit place to examine a question which some have moved , whe●●er it be a sin for a subject to disobey ●e king , if he command any thing contrary to his laws ? for satisfaction in this point , we must resolve , that not only in human laws , but even in divine , a● thing may be commanded contrary to law , and yet obedience to such a command is necessary . the sanctifying of the sabbath is a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to go to church upon a sabbath-day , that best divines teach us , that the servant must obey this command , though it may be sinful and unlawful in the master because the servant hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether his master sin or no in so commanding ; for there may be a just cause for a master to keep his servant from church , as appears luke 14. 5. yet it i● not fit to tye the master to acquaint hi● servant with his secret counsels , or present necessity : and in such cases , th● servants not going to church , become the sin of the master , and not of th● servant . the like may be said of th● king's commanding a man to serve his in the wars , he may not examine whether the war be just or unjust , but mu●● obey , since he hath no commission ● judge of the titles of kingdoms , cau●es of war ; nor hath any subje●● power to condemn his king for breach of his own laws . ( 8. ) many will be ready to say , it is a slavish and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man , who is not subject to the laws . but ●uch men consider not , 1. that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , ●or the good only of them that are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right : howsoever some ●re afraid of the name of prerogative , ●et they may assure themselves , the case ●f subjects would be desperately miserable without it . the court of chancery ●t self is but a branch of the kings prerogative , to relieve men against the in●xorable rigour of the law , which without it is no better than a tyrant , since ●ummum jus , is summa injuria . general ●ardons , at the coronation and in parliaments , are but the bounty of the prerogative . 2. there can be no laws without a supreme power to command or ●ake them . in all aristocraties the no●es are above the laws , and in all democraties the people . by the like reason , in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them ; that which giveth the very being to a king is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an● equivocal king. it skills not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means ; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns neither doth the diversity of laws nor contrary customs , whereby each kingdom differs from another , make the forms of common-weal different unless the power of making laws be in several subjects . for the confirmation of this point aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all thing according to his own will , for he that is called a king according to the law● makes no kind of kingdom at all . th●● it seems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for though they were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessity of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute power over himself and over the laws , to do what he pleased , and ●eave undone what he list , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find , that ulpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps , le●ibus solutus est . the prince is not bound ●y the laws . ( 9 ) if the nature of laws be advi●edly weighed , the necessity of the princes being above them may more manifest it self ; we all know that a law in general is the command of a superior ●ower . laws are divided ( as bellermine ●ivides the word of god ) into written and unwritten , not for that it is not written at all , but because it was not written by the first devisers or makers of it . the common law ( as the lord chancellor egerton teacheth us ) is the common custom of the realm . now concerning customs , this must be considered , ●hat for every custom there was a time ●hen it was no custom ; and the first president we now have , had no president when it began ; when every custom began , there was something else than custom that made it lawful , or else the beginning of all customs were unlawful . customs at first became lawful only by some superiour , which did either command or consent unto their beginning . and the first power which we find ( as it is confessed by all men ) is the kingly power , which was both in this and in all other nations of the world , long before any laws , or any other kind of government was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer , that the common law it self , or common customs of this land , were originally the laws and commands o● kings at first unwritten . nor must we think the commen customs ( which are the principles o● the common law , and are but few ) to be such , or so many , as are able to give special rules to determine every particular cause . diversity of cases are infinite , and impossible to be regulated by any law ; and therefore we find , even in the divine laws which are delivere● by moses , there be only certain principal laws , which did not determine but only direct the high-priest or magistrate , whose judgment in special cases ●id determine , what the general law intended . it is so with the common law , for when there is no perfect rule , ●udges do resort to those principles , or common law axiomes , whereupon former judgments , in cases some-what ●ike , have been delivered by former ●udges , who all receive authority from the king , in his right and name to give sentence according to the rules and presidents of antient times : and where presidents have failed , the judges have resorted to the general law of reason , and accordingly given judgment , without any common law to direct them . nay , many times , where ●here have been presidents to direct , ●hey , upon better reason only , have changed the law , both in causes crimical and civil , and have not insisted so much on the examples of former judges , as examined and corrected their ●easons ; thence it is that some laws are ●ow obsolete and out of use , and the ●ractice quite contrary to what it was in former times , as the lord chancellor egerton proves , by several instances . nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law , for the case standeth so with the laws of all nations , although some of them have their laws and principles written and established : for witnesse to this , we have aristotle his testimony in his ethiques , and in several places in his politiques ; i will cite some of them . every law ( saith he ) is in the general , but of some things there can be no general law — when therefore the law sqeaks in general , and something falls out after besides the general rule : then it is fit that what the law-maker hath omitted or where he hath erred by speaking generally , it should be corrected or supplyed as if the law-maker himself were present to ordain it . the governour , whether h● be one man , or more , ought to be lord ●ver all those things whereof it was impossible the law should exactly speak , because it is not easie to comprehend all things under general rules — whatsoever the law cannot determine , it leaves to the governours to give judgment therein , and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon tryal they find to be better than the written laws . besides , all laws are of themselves dumb , and some or other must be trusted with the application of them to particulars , by examining all circumstances , to pronounce when they are broken , or by whom . this work of right application of laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities ; but requires profound abilities of nature , for the beating out of the truth , witness the diversity , and sometimes the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges , in some difficult points . ( 10 ) since this is the common condition of laws , it is also most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws ; and for this cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally in courts of judicature , and are still representatively present in all courts ; the judges are but substituted , and called the kings justices , and their power ceaseth when the king is in place . to this purpose , bracton , that learned chief justice in the reign of henry the third , saith in express terms ; in doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of our lord the king is to be expected ; since it is his part to interpret , who made the law ; for as he saith in another place , rex , & non alius debet judicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , &c. the king , and no body else , ought to give judgment , if he were able , since by vertue of his oath he is bound to it ; therefore the king ought to exercise power as the vicar or minister of god , but if our lord the king be not able to determine every cause , to ease part of his pains by distributing the burthen to more persons , he ought to chuse wise men fearing god , &c , and make justices of them : much to the same purpose are the words of edward the first , in the beginning of his book of laws , written by his appointment by john briton , bishop of hereford , we will ( saith he ) that our own jurisdiction be above all the jurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions , personal , or real , we have power to yield such judgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as judges . neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary presence of the king's person in his courts , because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts ; but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining in the king 's royal person . and that this then was no new-made law , or first brought in by the norman conquests , appears by a saxon law made by king edgar , in these words , as i find them in mr. lambert , nemo in lite regem appellato , nisi quidem domi justitiam consequi , aut impetrare non poterit , sin summo jure domi urgeatur , ad regem , ut is onus aliqua ex parte allevet , provocato . let no man in suit appeal to the king , unless he may not get right at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . as the judicial power of kings was exercised before the conquest , so in those setled times after the conquest , wherein parliaments were much in use , there was a high-court following the king , which was the place of soveraign justice , both for matter of law and conscience , as may appear by a parliament in edward the first 's time , taking order , that the chancellour and the justices of the bench should follow the king , to the end that he might have always at hand able men for his direction in suits that came before him : and this was after the time that the court of common-pleas was made stationary , which is an evidence that the king reserved a soveraign power , by which he did supply the want , or correct the rigour of the common law ; because the positive law , being grounded upon that which happens for the most part , cannot foresee every particular which time and experience brings forth . ( 12. ) therefore though the common law be generally good and just , yet in some special case it may need correction , by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out , which at the time of the law-making was not thought of . also sundry things do fall out , both in war and peace , that require extraordinary help , and cannot wait for the usual care of common law , the which is not performed , but altogether after one sort , and that not without delay of help and expence of time ; so that although all causes are , and ought to be referred to the ordinary processe of common law , yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet , for just reasons , to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority of the prince ; and the statute of magna charta hath been understood of the institution then made of the ordinary jurisdiction in common causes , and not for restraint of the absolute authority , serving only in a few rare and singular cases , for though the subjects were put to great dammage by false accusations and malitious suggestions made to the king and his council , especially during the time of king edward the third , whilst he was absent in the wars in france , insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made , that provided none should be put to answer before the king and his council without due processe ; yet it is apparent the necessity of such proceedings was so great , that both before edward the third's days , and in his time , and after his death , several statutes were made , to help and order the proceedings of the king and his council . as the parliament in 28. edw. 1. cap. 5. did provide , that the chancellour and justices of the king's bench should follow the king ; that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the laws , which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the court , at all times when need shall require . by the statute of 37. edw. 3. cap. 18. taliation was ordained , in case the suggestion to the king proved untrue . then 38. edw. 3. cap. 9. takes away taliation , and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved be satisfied . in the statutes of 17. ric. 2. cap. 6. and 15. hen. 6. cap. 4. dammages and expences are awarded in such cases . in all these statutes it is necessarily implyed , that complaints upon just causes might be moved before the king and his council . at a parliament at glocester , 2. ric. 2. when the commons made petition , that none might be forced by writ out of chancery , or by privy seal , to appear before the king and his council , to answer touching free-hold . the king's answer was he thought it not reasonable that he should be constrained to send for his leiges upon causes reasonable : and albeit he did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer [ finalment ] peremptorily touching their free-hold , but should be remanded for tryal thereof , as law required : provided always , ( saith he ) that at the suit of the party , where the king and his council shall be credibly informed , that because of maintenance , oppression , or other out-rages , the common law cannot have duly her course , in such case the council for the party . also in the 13th year of his reign , when the commons did pray , that upon pain of forfeiture , the chancellour or council of the king , should not after the end of the parliament make any ordinance against the common law ; the king answered , let it le used as it hath been used before this time , so as the rega●lity of the king be saved , for the king will save his regalities as his progeni●tors have done . again , in the 4th year of henry the fourth , when the commons complained against subpoena's , and other writs , grounded upon false suggestions ; the king answered , that he would give in charge to his officers , that they should abstain more than before time they had , to send for his subjects in that manner . but yet ( saith he ) it is not our intention , that our officers shall so abstain , that they may not send for our subjects in matters and causes necessary , as it hath been used in the time of our good progenitors . likewise when for the same cause complaint was made by the commons , anno 3. hen. 5. the king's answer was , le roy s'advisera , the king will be advised ; which amounts to a denyal for the present , by a phrase peculiar for the kings denying to pass any bill that hath passed the lords and commons . these complaints of the commons , and the answers of the king , discover , that such moderation should be used , that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained , lest subjects be convented before the king and his council without just cause , that the proceedings of the council-table be not upon every slight suggestion , nor to determine finally concerning free ●old of inheritance . and yet that upon ●ause reasonable , upon credible information , in matters of weight , the king's ●egallity or prerogative in sending for ●is subjects be maintain'd , as of right ought , and in former times hath been ●onstantly used . king edward the first , finding that ●ogo de clare was discharged of an ac●usation brought against him in parliament , for that some formal imperfections ●ere found in the complaint , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his council , ad faciendum , & ●cipiendum quod per regem & ejus conci●●m fuerit faciendum ; and so proceeded ●● an examination of the whole cause . ●● edw. 1. edward the third , in the star-cham●●r ( which was the ancient council-cham●●r at westminster ) upon the complaint ●● elizabeth audley , commanded james ●udley to appear before him and his ●ouncil , and determin'd a controversie between them , touching lands contain'd the covenants of her joynture . rot : ●aus . de an . 41. ed. 3 : henry the fifth , in a suit before him and his council for the titles of the mannors of seere and s. laurence , in the isle of thenet , in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tryed , as well for avoiding the breach of the peace , as for prevention of waste and spoil . rot. patin . anno 6 hen. 5. henry the sixth commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney of london , till they had other commandment from him an● his council , because verney , being indebted to the king and others , practised t● be indicted of felony , wherein he might have his clergy , and make his purgation of intent to defraud his creditors . 3. hen. 6. rot. 37. in banco regis . edward the fourth and his council , 〈◊〉 the star-chamber , heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of s. leonard in york , complaining , that sir hugh ha●ings , and others , withdrew from them great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of thrave of corn of every p●ough-land within the counties of york , westmer●nd , cumberland , and lancashire . rot. ●aten . de anno 8. ed. 4. part 3. memb. 14. henry the seventh and his council , in ●●e star-chamber , decreed , that margery ●nd florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley , ●idow , for lands in wolwich and plum●ad in kent ; for as much as the matter ●d been heardfirst before the council of ●ng ed. 4. after that before the presi●●nt of the requests of that king , hen. and then lastly , before the council of said king. 1. hen. 7. what is hitherto affirmed of the de●dency and subjection of the com●on law to the soveraign prince , the ●e may be said as well of all statute ●●ws ; for the king is the sole immedi● author , corrector , and moderator them also ; so that neither of these ● kinds of laws are or can be any ●inution of that natural power ●●ch kings have over their people , by ●t of father-hood , but rather are an ●ument to strengthen the truth of it ; for evidence whereof , we may in some points consider the nature of parliaments , because in them only all statutes are made . ( 12. ) though the name of parliament ( as mr. cambden saith ) be of no great antiquity , but brought in out of france yet our ancestors , the english saxons had a meeting , which they called , the assembly of the wise ; termed in latine conventum magnatum , or , proesentia regis , procerumque prelaterumque collector●● the meeting of the nobility , or the presence of the king , prelates , an● peers assembled ; or in general , magnu● concilium , or commune concilium ; an● many of our kings in elder times mad● use of such great assemblies for to consult of important affaires of state ; a● which meetings , in a general sense , ma● be termed parliaments . great are the advantages which b●● the king and people may receive by well-ordered parliament ; there is n●thing more expresseth the majesty a supreme power of a king , than such assembly , wherein all his people knowledge him for soveraign lord , and make all their addresses to him by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent and approbation do strengthen all the laws , which the king , ●●at their request and by their advice and ministry , shall ordain . thus they facilitate the government of the king , by making the laws unquestionable , either to the subordinate magistrates , or ●refractory multitude . the benefit which ●●crews to the subject by parliaments , is , that by their prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress their just grievances , and are overcome by their importunity to grant many ●hings which otherwise they would not ●ield unto ; for the voice of a multitude is easilier heard . many vexations of the people are without the knowledge of the king ; who in parliament seeth ●nd heareth his people himself ; whereas ● other times he commonly useth the ●yes and ears of other men . against the antiquity of parliaments ●e need not dispute , since the more an●ent they be , the more they make for ●e honour of monarchy ; yet there be certain circumstances touching the forms of parliaments , which are fit to be considered . first , we are to remember , that until about the time of the conquest , there could be no parliaments assembled of the general states of the whole kingdom of england , because till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one kingdom ; but it was either divided into several kingdoms , or governed by several laws . when julius coesar landed he found 4 kings in kent ; and the british names of dammonii , durotriges , belgae● attrebatii , trinobantes , iceni , silures and the rest , are plentiful testimonies o● the several kingdoms of brittains , whe● the romans left us . the saxons divide us into 7 kingdoms : when these saxon● were united all into a monarchy , they had always the danes their companions , or their masters in the empire , ti● edward the confessors days , since who● time the kingdom of england hath continued united , as now it doth : but for a thousand years before we cannot fin● it was entirely setled , during the tim● of any one kings reign . as under th● mercian law : the west saxons were confined to the saxon laws ; essex , norfolk , suffolk , and some other places , were vexed with danish laws ; the northumbrians also had their laws apart . and until edward the confessors reign , who was next but one before the conquerour , the laws of the kingdom were so several and uncertain , that he was forced to cull a few of the most indifferent and best of them , which were from him called st. edwards laws : yet some say that eadgar made those laws , and that the confessor did but restore and mend them . alfred also gathered out of mulmutius laws , such as he translated into the saxon tongue . thus during the time of the saxons , the laws were so variable , that there is little or no likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the whole kingdom . ( 13 ) a second point considerable is , whether in such parliaments , as was ●n the saxon's times , the nobility ●nd clergy only were of those assem●lies , or whether the commons were also called ; some are of opinion , that ●hough none of the saxon laws do mention the commons , yet it may be gathered by the word wisemen , the commons are intended to be of those assemblies , and they bring ( as they conceive ) probable arguments to prove it , from the antiquity of some burroughs that do yet send burgesses , and from the proscription of those in antient demesne , not to send burgesses to parliament . if it be true , that the west-saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of their towns , yet it may be doubted , whether other kingdoms had the same usage ; but sure it is , that during the heptarchy , the people could not elect any knights of the shire , because england was not then divided into shires . on the contrary , there be of our historians who do affirm , that henry the first caused the commons first to be assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appointment , for before his time only certain of the nobility and prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of state. if this assertion be true it seems a meer matter of grace of this king , and proves not any natural right of the people , originally to be admitted to chuse their knights and burgesses of parliament , though it had been more for the honour of parliaments , if a king , whose title to the crown had been better , had been author of the form of it ; because he made use of it for his unjust ends. for thereby he secured himself against his competitor and elder brother , by taking the oaths of the nobility in parliament ; and getting the crown to be setled upon his children . and as the king made use of the people , so they , by colour of parliament , served their own turns ; for after the establishment of parliaments by strong hand , and by the sword , they drew from him the great charter , which he granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people , as sir walter raleigh in his dialogue of parliaments doth affirm , in these words . the great charter was not originally granted legally and freely ; for henry the first did but usurp the kingdom , and therefore , the better to assure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the nobility and people with their charters ; yea , king john , that confirmed them , had the like respect , for arthur duke of brittain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom king john usurped , and so to conclude , these charters had their original from kings de facto , but not de jure — the great charter had first an obscure birth by usurpation , and was secondly sostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . ( 15. ) a third consideration must be , that in the former parliaments , instituted and continued since king henry the first 's time , is not to be found the usage of any natural liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king , and not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty were natural , it would give power to the multitude to assemble themselves when and where they please , to bestow soveraignty , and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise of it . whereas , the liberties of favour and grace , which are claimed in parliaments , are restrained both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances , to the sole pleasure of the king. the people can not assemble themselves , but the king , by his writs , calls them to what place he pleases ; and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant , without any other cause shewed than his will. neither is the whole summoned , but only so many as the kings writs appoint . the prudent king edward the first , summoned always those barons of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament , but omited their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights of the shire or burgesses , but only free-holders in the counties , and freemen in the cities and burroughs ; yet in the city of westminster all the house-holders , though they be neither free-men nor free-holders , have voices in their election of burgesses . also during the time of parliament , those priviledges of the house of commons , of freedom of speech , power to punish their own members , to examine the proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers , to have access to the king's person , and the like , are not due by any natural right , but are derived from the bounty or indulgence of the king , as appears by a solemn recognition of the house ; for at the opening of the parliament , when the speaker is presented to the king , he , in the behalf and name of the whole house of commons , humbly craves of his majesty , that he would be pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties of freedom of speech , of access to his person , and the rest . these priviledges are granted with a condition implyed , that they keep themselves within the bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why do the house of commons inflict punishment themselves upon their own members for transgressing in some of these points ; and the king , as head , hath many times punished the members for the like offences . the power which the king giveth , in all his courts , to his judges or others to punish , doth not exclude him from doing the like , by way of prevention , concurrence , or evocation , even in the same point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power ; for they who give authority by commission , do always retain more than they grant : neither of the two houses claim an infallibility of not erring , no more than a general council can . it is not impossible but that the greatest may be in fault , or at least interested or engaged in the delinquency of one particular member . in such cases it is most proper for the head to correct , and not to expect the consent of the members , or for the parties peccant to be their own judges . nor is it needful to confine the king , in such cases , within the circle of any one court of justice , who is supreme judge in all courts . and in rare and new cases rare and new remedies must be sought out ; for it is a rule of the common law , in novo casu , novum remedium est apponendum : and the statute of westminst . 2. cap. 24. giveth power , even to the clarks of the chancery , to make new forms of writs in new cases , lest any man that came to the king's court of chancery for help , should be sent away without remedy : a president cannot be found in every case ; and of things that happen seldom , and are not common , there cannot be a common custom . though crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding a president for a condigne punishment , yet they must not therefore pass unpunished . i have not heard that the people , by whose voices the knights and burgesses are chosen , did ever call to an account those whom they had elected ; they neither give them instructions or directions what to say , or what to do in parliament , therefore they cannot punish them when they come home for doing amiss : if the people had any such power over their burgesses , then we might call it , the natural liberty of the people , with a mischief . but they are so far from punishing , that they may be punished themselves for intermedling with parliamentary business ; they must only chuse , and trust those whom they chuse to do what they list ; and that is as much liberty as many of us deserve , for our irregular elections of burgesses . ( 15 ) a fourth point to be consider'd , is , that in parliament all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone , at the rogation of the people , as his majesty king james , of happy memory , affirms in his true law of free monarchy ; and as hooker teacheth us , that laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them , but from the power that doth give them the strength of laws : le roy le veult , the king will have it so , is the interpretive phrase pronounced at the king 's passing of every act of parliament : and it was the ancient custom for a long time , till the days of henry the fifth , that the kings , when any bill was brought unto them , that had passed both houses , to take and pick out what they liked not , and so much as they chose was enacted for a law : but the custom of the later kings hath been so gracious , as to allow always of the entire bill as it hath passed both houses . ( 16 ) the parliament is the king's court , for so all the oldest statutes call it , the king in his parliament : but neither of the two houses are that supreme court , nor yet both of them together ; they are only members , and a part of the body , whereof the king is the head and ruler . the king 's governing of this body of the parliament we may find most significantly proved both by the statutes themselves , as also by such presidents as expresly shew us , how the king , sometimes by himself , sometimes by his council , and othertimes by his judges , hath over-ruled and directed the judgments of the houses of parliament ; for the king , we find that magna charta , and the charter of forrests , and many other statutes about those times , had only the form of the kings letters-patents , or grants , under the great seal , testifying those great liberties to be the sole act and bounty of the king : the words of magna charta begin thus ; henry , by the grace of god , &c. to all our arch-bishops , &c. and our faithful subjects , greeting . know ye , that we , of our meer free-will , have granted to all free-men these liberties . in the same style goeth the charter of forrests , and other statutes . statutum hibernioe , made at westminster , 9. februarii 14. hen. 3. is but a letter of the king to gerrard , son of maurice , justice of ireland . the statute de anno bissextili begins thus , the king to his justices of the bench , greeting , &c. explanationes statuti glocestrioe , made by the king and his justices only , were received always as statutes , and ●re still printed amongst them . the statute made for correction ●f the 12 th chapter of the statute of ●locester , was signed under the great ●eal , and sent to the justices of the ●ench , after the manner of a writ pa●●nt , with a certain writ closed , dated ●y the kings hand at westminster , re●iring that they should do , and execute ●● and every thing contained in it , although the same do not accord with the ●atute of glocester in all things . the statute of rutland , is the kings ●tters to his treasurer and barons of his ●cchequer , and to his chamberlain . the statute of circumspecte agis ●●s , the king to his judges sendeth ●eeting . there are many other statutes of the ●he form , and some of them which ● only in the majestique terms of , the ●g commands , or , the king wills , or , ● lord the king hath established , or , our lord the king hath ordained : or his especial grace hath granted : without mention of consent of the commons or people ; insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclamations than acts of parliament : and indeed some of them were no other than mee● proclamations ; as the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly o● the prelates and nobility , for the cornation of the king and his queen eleano● which begins , provisum est in c●ria domini regis apud merton . also a provision was made 19. hen. 3. de assisa ultimoe pr●sentationis , which was continued and allowed for law , until tit. west . 2. an . 13. e●● 1. cap. 5. which provides the contrary i● express words : this provision begins , pr●visum fuit coram dom. rege , archiepiscopi● episcopis , & baronibus , quod , &c. it see● originally the difference was not gre●● between a proclamation and a statut● this latter the king made by comm●● council of the kingdom . in the form he had but the advice only of his gre●● council of the peers , or of his priv●●● council only . for that the king had great council , besides his parliament , a●pears by a record of 5. hen. 4. abo●● an exchange between the king and the earl of northumberland : whereby the king promiseth to deliver to the earl lands to the value , by the advice of parliament , or otherwise by the advice of his grand council , and other estates of the realm , which the king will assemble , in case the parliament do not meet . we may find what judgment in later times parliaments have had of proclamations , by the statute of 31. of hen. cap. 8. in these words , forasmuch as the king , by the advice of his council , hath set forth proclamations , which obstinate persons have contemned ; not considering what a king by his royal power may do : considering that sudden causes and occasions fortune many times , which do require speedy remedies , and that by abiding for a parliament , in the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the realm : and weighing also , that his majesty , which by the kingly and re●al power given him by god , may do many things in such cases , should not be dri●en to extend the liberties , and supre●ity of his regal power , and dignity , by willfulness of froward subjects : it is therefore thought fit , that the king with the advice of his honourable council should set forth proclamations for the good of the people , and defence of his royal dignity as necessity shall require . this opinion of a house of parliament was confirmed afterwards by a second parliament , and the statute made proclamations of as great validity , as if they had been made in parliament . this law continued until the government of the state came to be under a● protector , during the minority of edward the sixth , and in his first year it was repealed . i find also , that a parliament in the 11th year of henry the seventh , did so great reverence to the actions , or ordinances of the king , that by statut● they provided a remedy or means to levy a benevolence granted to the king although by a statute made not long before all benevolences were damne● and annulled for ever . mr. fuller , in his arguments against the proceedings of the high-commission court , affirms , that the statute of 2. h. 4. cap. 15. which giveth power to ordinaries to imprison and set fines on subjects , was made without the assent of the commons , because they are not mentioned in the act. if this argument be good , we shall find very many statutes of the same kind , for the assent of the commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parliaments . the most usual title of parliaments in edward the 3d , rich. 2. the three henries 4. 5. 6. in edw. 4. and rich. 3. days , was : the king and his parliament , with the assent of the prelates , earles , and barons , and at the petition , or at the special instance of the commons , doth ordain . the same mr. fuller saith , that the statute made against lollards , was without the assent of the commons , as appears by their petition in these words , the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented nor granted ●y the commons , but that which was done ●herein , was done without their assent . ( 17. ) how far the kings council hath directed and swayed in parliament , hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced . for further evidence , we may add the statute of westminster : the first which saith , these be the acts of king edward 1. made at his first parliament general , by his council , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earles , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm , &c. the statute of bygamy saith , in presence of certain reverend fathers , bishops of england , and others of the kings council , for as much as all the king's council , as well justices as others , did agree , that they should be put in writing , and observed . the statute of acton burnell saith , the king , for himself , and by his council , hath ordained and established . in articuli super chartas ; when the great charter was confirmed , at the request of his prelates , earls and barons we find these passages . 1. nevertheless the king and his council do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the king right , &c. 2. and notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them ; both the king and his council , and all they that were present at the making of this ordinance , will and intend that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . here we may see in the same parliament the charter of the liberties of the subjects confirmed , and a saving of the kings prerogative : those times neither stumbled at the name , nor conceived any such antipathy between the terms , as should make them incompatible . the statute of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our soveraign lord the king , by his council it was agreed , and also by the king himself commanded . and the ordinance of inquest goeth thus , it is agreed and ordained by the king himself , and all his council . the statute made at york , 9. ed. 3. saith , whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our soveraign lord the king in his parliament , by their petition , that for his profit , and the commodity of his prelates , earls , barons , and commons , it may please him to provide remedy ; our soveraign lord the king desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his prelates , earles , barons , and other nobles of his council being there , hath ordained . in the parliament primo edwardi the third , where magna charta was confirmed , i find this preamble , at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king and his council in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earles , barons , and other great men assembled , it was granted . the commons presenting a petition unto the king , which the king's council did mislike , were content thereupon to mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition is in these words , to their most redoubted soveraign lord the king , praying the said commons , that whereas they have pray'd him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his council to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown , if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , which should fall in disinherison of him or his crown perpetually , as of escheators , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , and ignorances , &c. in the time of henry the third , an order or provision was made by the king's council , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower . the plantiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the judgment was ideo ●sine die . it seems in those days an order of the council-board was either parcel of the common-law or above it . the reverend judges have had regard in their proceedings , that before they would resolve or give judgment in new cases , they consulted with the king 's privy council . in the case of adam brabson , who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the justices of assize at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings council : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed in an inquest against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the council that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by judges of the bench to the kings council , to demand of them whether by the statute of 14. ed. 3. cap. 16. a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered , that a word may well be amended , although the statute speak but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir tho. oghtred , knight , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court , whereupon judgment was stayed ; and thorp said , that in the like case of giles blacket , it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded , that when any like case should come , we should not go to judgment without good advice : therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counseil , & comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire , nous volume faire , & auterment nient en cest case . sue to the council , and as they will have us to do , we will ; and otherwise not in this case . ( 18. ) in the last place , we may consider how much hath been attributed to the opinions of the kings judges by parliaments , and so find , that the kings council hath guided and ruled the judges , and the judges guided the parliament . in the parliament of 28. hen. 6. the commons made suit , that william de la poole , d. of suffolke , should be committed to prison , for many treasons and other crimes . the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give , the opinion of the judges was demanded . their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders . this opinion was allowed . in another parliament , 31. hen. 6. ( which was prorogued ) in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pound dammages , in an action of trespass , and was committed to prison in execution for the same . when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made suit to the king and lords to have their speaker delivered ; the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by priviledge of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should still remain in prison , according to the law , notwithstanding the priviledge of parliament , and that he was the speaker : which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle , the king's serjeant at law ; and the commons were commanded in the kings name , by the bishop of lincolne , ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellour ) to chuse another speaker . in septimo of hen. 8. a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal judges for criminal causes . there sir john fineux , and the other judges , delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be : and their opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden it ; the same opinion was delivered from the bishops . if a writ of errour be sued in parliament upon a judgment given in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours ; the lords are to proceed according to law , and for their judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and so to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own opinions or discretions otherwise . so it was in a writ of errour brought in parliament by the dean and chapter of lichfield , against the prior and covent of newton-panel , as appeareth by record . see flower dew's case , p. 1. h. 7. fol. 19. finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a41310-e1510 1 kings 20. 16. gen. 27 ▪ 29. notes for div a41310-e4040 arist . pol. lib. 1. c. 2. patriarcha, or, the natural power of kings by the learned sir robert filmer. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. 1680 approx. 165 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 78 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a41308 wing f922 estc r29832 11209688 ocm 11209688 46808 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a41308) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 46808) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1441:70) patriarcha, or, the natural power of kings by the learned sir robert filmer. filmer, robert, sir, d. 1653. [12], 141 p. : port. printed and are to be sold by walter davis ..., london : 1680. frontispiece: engraved portrait of charles ii. errata on p. [12]. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. monarchy. 2000-00 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2001-08 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2001-09 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2001-09 tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited 2001-11 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion carolus secundus dei gratia , angliae , scotiae , franciae , et hiberniae rex , fidei defensor etc. patriarcha : or the natural power of kings . by the learned sir robert filmer , baronet . lucan . lib. 3. libertas — populi , quem regna coercent libertate perit — claudian . fallitur , egregio quisquis sub principe oredit servitium ; nusquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio — . london , printed , and are to be sold by walter davis book-binder , in amen-corner , near pater-noster-row , 1680. the copy of a letter written by the late learned dr. peter heylyn , to sir edward filmer , son of the worthy author , concerning this book and his other political discourses . sir , how great a loss i had in the death of my most dear and honoured friend , your deceased father , no man is able to conjecture , but he that hath suffered in the like . so affable was his conversation , his discourse so rational , his judgment so exact in most parts of learning , and his affections to the church so exemplary in him , that i never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living , than i did in his : in which respects i may affirm both with safety and modesty , that we did not only take sweet counsel together , but walked in the house of god as friends : i must needs say , i was prepared for that great blow , by the loss of my preferment in the church of westminster , which gave me the opportunity of so dear and beloved a neighbourhood ; so that i lost him partly before he died , which made the misery the more supportable , when i was deprived of him for altogether . but i was never more sensible of the infelicity , than i am at this present , in reference to that satisfaction , which i am sure he could have given the gentleman whom i am to deal with : his eminent abilities in these political disputes , exemplified in his judicious observations upon aristotles politiques ; as also in some passages on grotius , hunton , hobbs , and other of our late discoursers about forms of government , declare abundantly how fit a man he might have been to have dealt in this cause , which i would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling : and had he pleased to have suffered his excellent discourse called patriarcha to appear in publick , it would have given such satisfaction to all our great masters in the schools of politie , that all other tractates in that kind , had been found unnecessary . vide certamen epistolare . 386. the contents . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( 1 ) the tenent of the natural liberty of the people , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( 2 ) the question stated out of bellarmine , and some contradictions of his noted . ( 3 ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( 4 ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( 5 ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( 6 ) and from them all kings descended . ( 7 ) all kings are either fathers of their people : ( 8 ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( 9 ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( 10 ) of regal and paternal power and of their agreement . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( 1 ) aristotle examined about the fredom of the people , and justisied . ( 2 ) suarez disputes against the regality of adam . ( 3 ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin , and others . ( 4 ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( 5 ) of election of kings , ( 6 ) by the major part of the people , ( 7 ) by proxie , and by silent acceptation . ( 8 ) no example in scripture of the peoples choosing their king. mr. hookers judgement therein . ( 9 ) god governed alwayes by monarchy . ( 10 ) bellarmine and aristotles judgement of monarchy . ( 11 ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( 12 ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected it under emperours . in danger the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( 13 ) vvhether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or whether they crept in by stealth . ( 14 ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( 15 ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( 16 ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( 17 ) the people may not judge nor correct their king. ( 18 ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( 1 ) regal authority not subject to positive laws . kings were before laws . the kings of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( 2 ) of samuel's description of a king. ( 3 ) the power ascribed to kings in the new testament . ( 4 ) vvhether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( 5 ) the benefit of laws . ( 6 ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( 7 ) of the oaths of kings . ( 8 ) of the benefit of the kings prerogative over laws . ( 9 ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector of the common laws . ( 10 ) the king iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( 11 ) the king and his councel anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( 12 ) of parliaments . ( 13 ) vvhen the people were first called to parliaments . ( 14 ) the liberty of parliaments not from nature , but from the grace of princes . ( 15 ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( 16 ) he governs both houses by himselfe , ( 17 ) or by his councel , ( 18 ) or by his iudges . errata . page 4. line 3. for calume read calvin . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( 1 ) the tenent of the natural liberty of mankind , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( 2 ) the question stated out of bellarmine : some contradictions of his noted . ( 3 ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( 4 ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( 5 ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( 6 ) and from them all kings descended . ( 7 ) all kings are either fathers of their people , ( 8 ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( 9 ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( 10 ) of regal and paternal power , and their agreement . since the time that school-divinity began to flourish , there hath been a common opinion maintained , as well by divines , as by divers other learned men , which affirms , mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection , and at liberty to choose what form of government it please : and that the power which any one man hath over others , was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude . this tenent was first hatched in the schools , and hath been fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity . the divines also of the reformed churches have entertained it , and the common people every where tenderly embrace it , as being most plausible to flesh and blood , for that it prodigally destributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude , who magnifie liberty , as if the height of humane felicity were only to be found in it , never remembring that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of adam . but howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation , yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive church : it contradicts the doctrine and history of the holy scriptures , the constant practice of all ancient monarchies , and the very principles of the law of nature . it is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity , or dangerous in policy . yet upon the ground of this doctrine both iesuites , and some other zealous favourers of the geneva discipline , have built a perillous conclusion , which is , that the people or multitude have power to punish , or deprive the prince , if he transgress the laws of the kingdom ; witness parsons and buchanan : the first under the name of dolman , in the third chapter of his first book labours to prove , that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths : the latter in his book de jure regni apud scotos , maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince . cardinal bellarmine and calume , both look asquint this way . this desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects , follows ( as the authors of it conceive ) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind , and liberty to choose what form of government it please . and though sir iohn heyward , adam blackwood , iohn barclay , and some others have learnedly confuted both buchanan and parsons , and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , yet all of them , when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind , do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable , not so much as once denying or opposing it ; whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of it self . the rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it ; much hath been said , and by many , for the affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative . in this discourse i shall give my self these cautions : first , i have nothing to do to medle with mysteries of state , such arcana imperii , or cabinet-councels , the vulgar may not pry into . an implicite faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft , how much more is it then due to a prince in the profound secrets of government ? the causes and ends of the greatest politique actions and motions of state dazle the eyes , and exceed the capacities of all men , save only those that are hourly versed in the managing publique affairs : yet since the rule for each men to know in what to obey his prince , cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command , it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiours come abroad and call for an obedience , that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings ; for according to the quality of the thing commanded , an active or passive obedience is to be yielded ; and this is not to limit the princes power , but the extent of the subjects obedience , by giving to caesar the things that are caesar's , &c. secondly , i am not to question , or quarrel at the rights or liberties of this or any other nation ; my task is chiefly to enquire from whom these first came , not to dispute what , or how many these are ; but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty , or from the grace and bounty of princes . my desire and hope is , that the people of england may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world ( if it be duely considered ) is for a people to live under a monarch . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews or pretexts of liberty , are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . if such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind , take offence at the liberty i take to examine it , they must take heed that they do not deny by retail , that liberty which they affirm by whole-sale : for , if the thesis be true , the hypothesis will follow , that all men may examine their own charters , deeds , or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties . thirdly , i must not detract from the worth of all those learned men , who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty : the profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable ; neither aristotle in philosophy , nor hooker in divinity . they are but men , yet i reverence their judgements in most points , and confess my self beholding to their errors too in this ; something that i found amiss in their opinions , guided me in the discovery of that truth which ( i perswade my self ) they missed . a dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilest one truth is curiously searched after , another must necessarily be neglected . late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile school-men , who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope , thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king , that so the papal power might take place of the regal . thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith , that a man may become a martyr for his countrey , by being a traytor to his prince ; whereas the new-coyned distinction of subjects into royallists and patriots , is most unnatural , since the relation between king and people is so great , that their well-being is so reciprocal . ( 2 ) to make evident the grounds of this question , about the natural liberty of mankind , i will lay down some passages of cardinal bellarmine , that may best unfold the state of this controversie . secular or civil power ( saith he ) is instituted by men ; it is in the people , unless they bestow it on a prince . this power is immediately in the whole multitude , as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine law , but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man — if the positive law be taken away , there is left no reason , why amongst a multitude ( who are equal ) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest . — power is given by the multitude to one man , or to more , by the same law of nature ; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power , therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man , or some few . — it depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king , or consul , or other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy . thus far bellarmine ; in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever i have read , or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject . before i examine or refute these doctrines , i must a little make some observations upon his words . first , he saith , that by the law of god , power is immediately in the people ; hereby he makes god to be the immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democracy is nothing else but the power of the multitude . if this be true , not only aristocracies , but all monarchies are altogether unlawful , as being ordained ( as he thinks ) by men , whenas god himself hath chosen a democracy . secondly , he holds , that although a democracy be the ordinance of god , yet the people have no power to use the power which god hath given them , but only power to give away their power ; whereby it followeth , that there can be no democratical government , because he saith , the people must give their power to one man , or to some few ; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate ; which the multitude is tyed to do , even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power : and why then doth he say , the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy ? thirdly , he concludes , that if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom . here i would fain know who shall judge of this lawful cause ? if the multitude ( for i see no body else can ) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion . ( 3 ) i come now to examine that argument which is used by bellarmine , and is the one and only argument i can find produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people . it is thus framed : that god hath given or ordained power , is evident by scripture ; but god hath given it to no particular person , because by nature all men are equal ; therefore he hath given power to the people , or multitude . to answer this reason , drawn from the equality of mankind by nature , i will first use the help of bellarmine himself , whose very words are these : if many men had been together created out of the earth , they all ought to have been princes over their posterity . in these words we have an evident confession , that creation made man prince of his posterity . and indeed not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs had , by right of father-hood , royal authority over their children . nor dares bellarmine deny this also . that the patriarchs ( saith he ) were endowed with kingly power , their deeds do testifie ; for as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a command and power over their own children ; but still with subordination to the first parent , who is lord-paramout over his childrens children to all generations , as being the grand-father of his people . ( 4 ) i see not then how the children of adam , or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents : and this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows , that civil power not only in general is by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , which quite takes away that new and common distinction , which refers only power universal and absolute to god ; but power respective , in regard of the special form of government , to the choice of the people . this lordship which adam by command had over the whole world , and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy , was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation : for dominion of life and death , we find that iudah the father pronounced sentence of death against thamar his daughter-in-law , for playing the harlot ; bring her forth ( saith he ) that she may be burnt . touching war , we see that abram commanded an army of 318 souldiers of his own family . and esau met his brother iacob with 400 men at arms. for matter of peace , abraham made a league with abimelech , and ratified the articles with an oath . these acts of judging in capital crimes , of making war , and concluding peace , are the chiefest marks of sovereignty that are found in any monarch . ( 5 ) not only until the flood , but after it , this patriarchal power did continue , as the very name patriarch doth in part prove . the three sons of noah had the whole world divided amongst them by their father ; for of them was the whole world over-spread , according to the benediction given to him and his sons , be fruitful and multiply , and replenish the earth . most of the civilest nations of the earth labour to fetch their original from some one of the sons or nephews of noah , which were scattered abroad after the confusion of babel : in this dispersion we must certainly find the establishment of regal power throughout the kingdoms of the world. it is a common opinion , that at the confusion of tongues there were 72 distinct nations erected , all which were not confused multitudes , without heads or governours , and at liberty to choose what governours or government they pleased ; but they were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears that even in the confusion god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families ; for so plainly it appears by the text : first , after the enumeration of the sons of iaphet , the conclusion is , by these were the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families , in their nations ; so it is said : these are the sons of ham after their families , after their tongues , in their countreys , and in their nations . the like we read , these are the sons of shem after their families , after their tongues , in their lands , after their nations . these are the families of the sons of noah after their generations in their nations ; and by these were these nations divided in the earth , after the flood . in this division of the world , some are of opinion that noah used lots for the distribution of it ; others affirm he sayled about the mediterranean sea in ten years , and as he went about , appointed to each son his part , and so made the division of the then known world into asia , africa , and europe , ( according to the number of his sons ) the limits of which three parts are all found in that midland sea. ( 6 ) but howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes . amongst these was nimrod , who no doubt ( as sir walter raleigh affirms ) was , by good right , lord or king over his family ; yet against right did he enlarge his empire , by seizing violently on the rights of other lords of families : and in this sense he may be said to be the author and first founder of monarchy . and all those that do attribute unto him the original regal power , do hold he got it by tyranny or usurpation , and not by any due election of the people or multitude , or by any faction with them . as this patriarchal power continued in abraham , isaac , and iacob , even until the egyptian bondage ; so we find it amongst the sons of ismael and esau. it is said , these are the sons of ismael , and these are their names by their castles and towns , twelve princes of their tribes and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families & their places by their nations . ( 7 ) some perhaps may think that these princes and dukes of families were but some petty lords under some greater kings , because the number of them are so many , that their particular territories could be but small , and not worthy the title of kingdoms ; but they must consider , that at first , kings had no such large dominions as they have now adays ; we find in the time of abraham , which was about 300 years after the flood , that in a little corner of asia , 9 kings at once met in batail , most of which were but kings of cities apiece , with the adjacent territories , as of sodom , gomorrah , shinar , &c. in the same chapter is mention of melchisedeck king of salem , which was but the city of ierusalem . and in the catalogue of the kings of edom , the names of each king's city is recorded , as the only mark to distinguish their dominions . in the land of canaan , which was but a small circuit , ioshuah destroyed thirty one kings ; and about the same time , adonibeseck had 70 kings , whose hands and toes he had cut off , and made them feed under his table . a few years after this , 32 kings came to benhadad king of syria , and about seventy kings of greece went to the wars of troy. caesar found more kings in france , than there be now princes there , and at his sailing over into this island , he found four kings in our county of kent . these heaps of kings in each nation , are an argument their territories were but small , and strongly confirms our assertion , that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction of families . by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into aegypt , where the exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince . after the return of these israelites out of bondage , god out of a special care of them , chose moses and iosuah successively to govern as princes in the place and stead of the supreme fathers : and after them likewise for a time , he raised up iudges , to defend his people in time of peril . but when god gave the israelites kings , he reestablished the antient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , although the father only was named in the graunt . ( 8. ) it may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme iurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers : and therefore we find , that god told cain of his brother abel , his desires shall be subject unto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . accordingly , when iacob bought his brother's birth-right , isaac blessed him thus , be lord over thy brethren , and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee . as long as the first fathers of families lived , the name of patriarchs did aptly belong unto them ; but after a few descents , when the true fatherhood it self was extinct , and only the right of the father descends to the true heir , then the title of prince or king was more significant , to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy ; by this means it comes to pass , that many a child , by succeeding a king , hath the right of a father over many a gray-headed multitude , and hath the title of pater patriae . ( 9. ) it may be demanded what becomes of the right of fatherhood , in case the crown does escheate for want of an heir ? whether doth it not then devolve to the people ? the answer is , it is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to die , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir , although the knowledge who should be that one one man be quite lost . 2. this ignorance of the people being admitted , it doth not by any means follow ; that for want of heirs the supreme power is devolved to the multitude , and that they have power to rule , and chose what rulers they please . no , the kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and independent heads of families : for every kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made . by the uniting of great families or petty kingdoms , we find the greater monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again , as into their first matter many times they return again . and because the dependencie of ancient families is oft obscure or worn out of knowledge ; therefore the wisdom of all or most princes have thought sit to adopt many times those for heads of families , and princes of provinces , whose merits , abilities , or fortunes , have enobled them , or made them fit and capable of such regal favours . all such prime heads and fathers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please : and he that is so elected , claims not his power as a donative from the people ; but as being substituted properly by god , from whom he receives his royal charter of an vniversal father , though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people . if it please god , for the correction of the prince , or punishment of the people , to suffer princes to be removed , and others to be placed in their rooms , either by the factions of the nobility , or rebellion of the people ; in all such cases , the judgment of god , who hath power to give and to take away kingdoms , is most just : yet the ministry of men who execute god's judgments without commission , is sinful and damnable . god doth but use and turn mens vnrighteous acts to the performance of his righteous decrees . ( 10. ) in all kingdoms or common-wealths in the world , whether the prince be the supreme father of the people , or but the true heir of such a father , or whether he come to the crown by usurpation , or by election of the nobles , or of the people , or by any other way whatsoever ; or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth : yet still the authority that is in any one , or in many , or in all these , is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father . there is and always shall be continued to the end of the world , a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude , although by the secret will of god , many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it . to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which enjoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms of honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . if obedience to parents be immediately due by a natural law , and subjection to princes , but by the mediation of an humane ordinance ; what reason is there that the laws of nature should give place to the laws of men ? as we see the power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . if we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king , we find them all one , without any difference at all , but only in the latitude or extent of them : as the father over one family , so the king as father over many families extends his care to preserve , feed , cloth , instruct and defend the whole commonwealth . his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour father , and to their children , their rights and privileges ; so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( 1. ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people , and justified . ( 2. ) suarez disputing against the regality of adam . ( 3. ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin and others . ( 4. ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( 5. ) of election of kings . ( 6. ) by the major part of the people . ( 7. ) by proxy , and by silent acceptation . ( 8. ) no example in scripture of the peoples chosing their king , mr. hooker's iudgment therein . ( 9. ) god governed always by monarchy . ( 10. ) bellarmine and aristotle's iudgment of monarchy . ( 11. ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( 12. ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected under emperours . in danger , the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( 13. ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or rather that they came in by stealth . ( 14. ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( 15. ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( 16. ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( 17. ) the people may not judge or correct their king. ( 18. ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . ( 1. ) by conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture , it appears little less than a paradox which bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude , to chose what rulers they please . had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children ? bellarmine does not say it , but the contrary : if then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature , when was it lost , or when forfeited , or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude ? because the scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people ; therefore many fly to natural reason , and to the authority of aristotle . i must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ; but briefly , i find this sentence in the third of his politiques . cap. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens , since a city consists of equals . d. lambine in his latine interpretation of this text , hath omitted the translation of this word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of aristotle , which aristotle alleadgeth to be the opinion but of some . this negligence , or wilful escape of lambine , in not translating a word so material , hath been an occasion to deceive many , who looking no farther than this latine translation , have concluded , and made the world now of late believe , that aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men ; and not only our english translator of aristotle's politiques is in this place misled by following lambine ; but even the learned monsieur duvall in his synopsis bears them company : and yet this version of lambine's is esteemed the best , and printed at paris with causabon's corrected greek copy , though in the rendring of this place , the elder translations have been more faithful ; and he that shall compare the greek text with the latine , shall find that causabon had just cause in his preface to aristotle's works , to complain that the best translations of aristotle did need correction : to prove that in these words which seem to favour the equality of mankind , aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment , but recites only the opinion of others ; we find him clearly deliver his own opinion , that the power of government did originally arise from the right of fatherhood , which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of : for in the first of his politiques he agrees exactly with the scripture , and lays this foundation of government , the first society ( saith he ) made of many houses is a village , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at the beginning , cities were under the government of kings , for the eldest in every house is king : and so for kindred-sake it is in colonies . and in the fourth of his politiques , cap. 2 , he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings , by defining tyranny to be a digression from the first and divinest . whosoever weighs advisedly these passages , will find little hope of natural reason in aristotle to prove the natural liberty of the multitude . also before him the divine plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large family . i know for this position aristotle quarrels with his master , but most unjustly , for therein he contradicts his own principles : for they both agree to fetch the original of civil government from the prime government . no doubt but moses's history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection , deduced from the laws of the first parents , according to that rule of st. chrysostom , god made all mankind of one man , that he might teach the world to be governed by a king , and not by a multitude . the ignorance of the creation , occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers . polybius , though otherwise a most profound philosopher , and judicious historian , yet here he stumbles ; for in searching out the original of civil societies , he conceited , that multitudes of men after a deluge , a famine , or a pestilence , met together like herds of cattel without any dependency , untill the strongest bodies and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows ; even as it is ( saith he ) among bulls , bears and cocks . and aristotle himself , forgetting his first doctrine , tells us , the first heroical kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude ; either by teaching them some new arts , or by warring for them , or by gathering them together , or by dividing land amongst them ; also aristotle had another fancy , that those men who prove wise of mind , were by nature intended to be lords , and govern , and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey , and to be servants . but this is a dangerous and uncertain rule , and not without some folly ; for if a man prove both wise and strong , what will aristotle have done with him ? as he was wise , he could be no servant , and as he had strength , he could not be a master ; besides , to speak like a philosopher , nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength . the folly or imbecillity proceeds from some errour in generation or education ; for nature aims at perfection in all her works . ( 2 ) suarez the jesuite riseth up against the royal authority of adam , in defence of the freedom and liberty of the people ; and thus argues . by right of creation ( saith he ) adam had only oeconomical power , but not political ; he had a power over his wife , and a fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free : he might also in process of time have servants and a compleat family ; and in that family he might have compleat oeconomical power . but after that families began to be multiplied , and men to be separated , and become the heads of several families ; they had the same power over their families . but political power did not begin , until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community ; wherefore as the community did not begin by the creation of adam , nor by his will alone , but of all them which did agree in this community : so we cannot say that adam naturally had political primacy in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles , because by the force of the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . and if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature , we cannot say , god by a special gift or providence gave him this power ; for there is no revelation of this , nor testimony of scripture . hitherto suarez . whereas he makes adam to have a fatherly power over his sons , and yet shuts up this power within one family , he seems either to imagine , that all adam's children lived within one house , and under one roof with their father ; or else , as soon as any of his children lived out of his house , they ceased to be subject , and did thereby become free. for my part , i cannot believe that adam ( although he were sole monarch of the world ) had any such spacious palace , as might contain any such considerable part of his children . it is likelier , that some mean cottage or tent did serve him to keep his court in . it were hard he should lose part of his authority , because his children lay not within the walls of his house . but if suarez will allow all adam's children to be of his family , howsoever they were separate in dwellings ; if their habitations were either contiguous , or at such distance , as might easily receive his fatherly commands . and that all that were under his commands , were of his family , although they had many children or servants married , having themselves also children . then i see no reason , but that we may call adam's family a commonwealth , except we will wrangle about words : for adam living 930 years , and seeing 7 or 8 descents from himself , he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger , than many commonwealths and kingdoms . ( 3. ) i know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family , and bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a house ; yet in his definition , he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family ; and he approves better of the propriety of the hebrew word for a family , which is derived from a word that signifies a head , a prince , or lord , than the greek word for a family , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a house . nor doth aristotle confine a family to one house ; but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together : whereas before him , charondas called a family homosypioi , those that feed together out of one common pannier . and epimenides the cretian , terms a family homocapnoi , those that sit by a common fire , or smoak . but let suarez understand what he please by adam's family ; if he will but confess , as he needs must , that adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , of peace and war , and the like , within their houses or families ; he must give , us leave at least , to call them kings of their houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of nature , what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ? aristotle gives the lie to plato , and those that say political and oeconomical societies are all one , and do not differ specie , but only multitudine & paucitate ; as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city . all the argument i find he brings against them in this . the community of man and wife , differs from the community of master and servant , because they have several ends. the intention of nature by conjunction of male and female , is generation ; but the scope of master and servant , is preservation : so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished , because nature does not work like the cutlers of delphos , for she makes but one thing for one use. if we allow this argument to be sound , nothing doth follow but only this , that conjugal and despotical communities do differ . but it is no consequence , that therefore , oeconomical and political societies do the like : for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities , yet it follows not , that a family and a commonwealth are distinct ; because , as well in the commonweal , as in the families , both these communities are found . and as this argument comes not home to our point , so it is not able to prove that title which it shews for ; for if it should be granted ( which yet is false ) that generation and preservation differ about the individuum , yet they agree in the general , and serve both for the conservation of mankind ; even as several servants differ in the particular ends or offices ; as one to brew , and another to bake ; yet they agree in the general preservation of the family . besides , aristotle confesses , that amongst the barbarians ( as he calls all them that are not grecians ) a wife and a servant are the same , because by nature , no barbarian is fit to govern ; it is fit the grecians should rule over the barbarians ; for by nature a servant and a barbarian is all one : their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant , and a wife for a maid ; so they are fit only to rule their wives and their beasts . lastly , aristotle ( if it had pleased him ) might have remembred , that nature doth not always make one thing but for one use : he knows , the tongue serves both to speak , and to taste . ( 4. ) but to leave aristotle , and return to suarez ; he saith that adam had fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free. here i could wish that the jesuite had taught us , how and when sons become free : i know no means by the law of nature . it is the favour i think of the parents only , who when their children are of age and discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care , are then content to remit some part of their fatherly authority ; therefore the custom of some countreys doth in some cases enfranchise the children of inferiour parents , but many nations have no such custome , but on the contrary have strict laws for the obedience of children : the judicial law of moses giveth full power to the father to stone his disobedient son , so it be done in presence of a magistrate : and yet it did not belong to the magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the cause ; but it was so decreed , lest the father should in his anger , suddenly , or secretly kill his son. also by the laws of the persians , and of the people of the upper asia , and of the gaules , and by the laws of the west-indies , the parents have power of life and death over their children . the romans , even in their most popular estate , had this law in force , and this power of parents was ratified and amplified by the laws of the twelve tables , to the enabling of parents to sell their children two or three times over . by the help of the fatherly power , rome long flourished , and oftentimes was freed from great dangers . the fathers have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons ; when being tribunes , they have published laws tending to sedition . memorable is the example of cassius , who threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria , for the division of lands , in the behoof of the people ; and afterwards , by his own private judgment put him to death , by throwing him down from the tarpeian rock ; the magistrates and people standing thereat amazed , and not daring to resist his fatherly authority , although they would with all their hearts , have had that law for the division of land : by which it appears , it was lawful for the father to dispose of the life of his child , contrary to the will of the magistrates or people . the romans also had a law , that what the children got , was not their own , but their fathers ; although solon made a law , which acquitted the son from nourishing of his father , if his father had taught him no trade , whereby to get his living . suarez proceeds , and tells us , that in process of time , adam had compleat oeconomical power . i know not what this compleat oeconomical power is , nor how , or what it doth really and essentially differ from political : if adam did , or might exercise the same jurisdiction , which a king doth now in a commonwealth , then the kinds of power are not distinct ; and though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude , or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other ; yet since the like difference is also found in political estates , it follows that oeconomical and political power , differ no otherwise , than a little commonweal differs from a great one. next , saith suarez , commnnity did not begin at the creation of adam . it is true , because he had no body to communicate with ; yet community did presently follow his creation , and that by his will alone : for it was in his power only , ( who was lord of all ) to appoint what his sons should have in proper , and what in common ; so that propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him ; and it is the duty of a father , to provide as well for the common good of his children , as the particular . lastly , suarez concludes , that by the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . this assertion is confuted point-blank by bellarmine , who expresly affirmeth , that the first parents ought to have been princes of their posterity . and untill suarez bring some reason for what he saith : i shall trust more to bellarmine's proofs , than to his denials . ( 5. ) but let us condescend a while to the opinion of bellarmine and suarez , and all those , who place supreme power in the whole people ; and ask them if their meaning be , that there is but one and the same power in all the people of the world ; so that no power can be granted , except all the men upon the earth meet and agree , to choose a governour . an answer is here given by suarez , that it is scarce possible , nor yet expedient , that all men in the world should be gathered together into one community : it is likelier , that either never , or for a very short time , that this power was in this manner , in the whole multitude of men collected ; but a little after the creation , men began to be divided into several commonwealths ; and this distinct power was in each of them . this answer of scarce possible , nor yet expedient : — it is likelier begets a new doubt , how this distinct power comes to each particular community , when god gave it to the whole multitude only , and not to any particular assembly of men. can they shew , or prove , that ever the whole multitude met , and divided this power which god gave them in gross , by breaking into parcels , and by appointing a distinct power to each several common-wealth ? without such a compact i cannot see ( according to their own principles ) how there can be any election of a magistrate by any commonwealth , but by a meer usurpation upon the privilege of the whole world. if any think that particular multitudes at their own discretion , had power to divide themselves into several commonwealths ; those that think so , have neither reason nor proof for so thinking : and thereby a gap is opened for every petty factious multitude , to raise a new commonwealth , and to make more commonweals than there be families in the world. but let this also be yielded them , that in each particular commonwealth , there is a distinct power in the multitude . was a general meeting of a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince ? is there any example of it ever found in the whole world ? to conceit such a thing , is to imagine little less than an impossibility . and so by consequence , no one form of government , or king , was ever established according to this supposed law of nature . ( 6. ) it may be answered by some , that if either the greatest part of a kingdom , or if a smaller part only by themselves , and all the rest by proxy , or if the part not concurring in election , do after , by a tacit assent ratifie the act of others , that in all these cases , it may be said to be the work of the whole multitude . as to the acts of the major part of a multitude , it is true , that by politick humane constitutions , it is oft ordained , that the voices of the most shall over-rule the rest ; and such ordinances bind , because , where men are assembled by an humane power ; that power that doth assemble them , can also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that power , and by such derivative power , made known by law or custom , either the greater part , or two thirds , or three parts of five , or the like , have power to oversway the liberty of their opposits . but in assemblies that take their authority from the law of nature , it cannot be so : for what freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of nature , no inferiour power can alter , limit or diminish ; no one man , nor a multitude , can give away the natural right of another . the law of nature is unchangeable , and howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural right , yet thereby no man loseth the right of it self ; for the right and the use of the right may be distinguished , as right and possession are oft distinct . therefore , unless it can be proved by the law of nature , that the major , or some other part , have power to over-rule the rest of the multitude ; it must follow , that the acts of multitudes not entire , are not binding to all , but only to such as consent unto them . ( 7. ) as to the point of proxy ; it cannot be shewed or proved , that all those that have been absent from popular elections , did ever give their voices to some of their fellows . i ask but one example out of the history of the whole world , let the commonweal be but named , wherever the multitude , or so much as the greatest part of it consented , either by voice or by procuration , to the election of a prince . the ambition sometimes of one man , sometimes of many , or the faction of a city or citizens , or the mutiny of an army , hath set up or put down princes ; but they have never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the whole multitude . lastly , if the silent acceptation of a governour by part of the people , be an argument of their concurring in the election of him ; by the same reason , the tacit assent of the whole commonwealth may be maintained : from whence it follows , that every prince that comes to a crown , either by succession , conquest , or vsurpation , may be said to be elected by the people ; which inference is too ridiculous ; for in such cases , the people are so far from the liberty of specification , that they want even that of contradiction . ( 8. ) but it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the people in the election of kings , as long as men are perswaded , that examples of it are to be found in scripture . it is fit therefore , to discover the grounds of this errour : it is plain by an evident text , that it is one thing to choose a king , and another thing to set up a king over the people ; this latter power the children of israel had , but not the former . this distinction is found most evident in deut. 17. 15. where the law of god saith , him shalt thou set king over thee , whom the lord shall choose ; so god must eligere , and the people only do constituere . mr. hooker in his eighth book of ecclesiastical policy , clearly expounds this distinction ; the words are worthy the citing : heaps of scripture ( saith he ) are alledged , concerning the solemn coronation or inauguration of saul , david , solomon and others , by nobles , ancients , and the people of the commonwealth of israel ; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed , whereby the right of dominion is given ; which strange , untrue , and unnatural conceits , are set abroad by seed-men of rebellion , only to animate unquiet spirits , and to feed them with possibilities of aspiring unto the thrones , if they can win the hearts of the people ; whatsoever hereditary title any other before them may have . i say these unjust and insolent positions , i would not mention , were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient . for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law , equity and reason , we must ( for there is no other remedy ) acknowledg , that in kingdoms hereditary , birth-right giveth right unto sovereign dominion , and the death of the predecessor , putteth the successor by blood in seisin . those publick solemnities before-mentioned , do either serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right , or belong to the form of inducing of him into possession of that thing he hath right unto . this is mr. hooker's judgment of the israelites power to set a king over themselves . no doubt , but if the people of israel had had power to choose their king , they would never have made choice of ioas , a child but of seven years old , nor of manasses a boy of twelve ; since ( as solomon saith ) wo to the land whose king is a child : nor is it probable they would have elected iosias , but a very child , and a son to so wicked and idolatrous a father , as that his own servants murthered him ; and yet all the people set up this young iosias , and flew the conspirators of the death of ammon his father ; which justice of the people , god rewarded , by making this iosias the most religious king , that ever that nation enjoyed . ( 9. ) because it is affirmed , that the people have power to choose , as well what form of government , as what governours they please ; of which mind is bellarmine , in those places we cited at first . therefore it is necessary to examine the strength of what is said in defence of popular commonweals , against this natural form of kingdoms , which i maintain'd . here i must first put the cardinal in mind of what he affirms in cold blood , in other places ; where he saith , god when he made all mankind of one man , did seem openly to signifie , that he rather approved the government of one man , than of many . again , god shewed his opinion , when he endued not only men , but all creatures with a natural propensity to monarchy ; neither can it be doubted , but a natural propensity is to be referred to god , who is author of nature . and again ; in a third place , what form of government god confirmed by his authority , may be gathered by that common-weal , which he instituted amongst the hebrews , which was not aristocratical , ( as calvin saith ) but plainly monarchichal . ( 10. ) now if god , ( as bellarmine saith ) hath taught us by natural instinct , signified to us by the creation , and confirmed by his own example the excellency of monarchy , why should bellarmine or we doubt , but that it is natural ? do we not find , that in every family , the government of one alone , is most natural ? god did always govern his own people by monarchy only . the patriarchs , dukes , iudges and kings were all monarchs . there is not in all the scripture , mention or approbation of any other form of government . at the time when scripture saith , there was no king in israel , but that every man did that which was right in his own eyes ; even then , the israelites were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families : for in the consultation , after the benjamitical war , for providing wives for the benjamites , we find , the elders of the congregation bare only sway. iudges 21. 16. to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse 22. and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text plainly expounds it self in 2. chron. 1. 2. where solomon speaks unto all israel , to the captains , the iudges , and to every governour the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel . 1 kings 8. 12. 2 chron. 5. 2. at that time also , when the people of israel beg'd a king of samuel , they were governed by kingly power . god out of a special love and care to the house of israel , did choose to be their king himself , and did govern them at that time by his viceroy samuel , and his sons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee but me , that i should not reign over them . it seems they did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election : for we do not find the israelites prayed , that they themselves might choose their own king ; they dream of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together . if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having of a king. aristotle in his book of politicks , when he comes to compare the several kinds of government , he is very reserved in discoursing what form he thinks best : he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points , and judiciously of many errours , but concludes nothing himself . in all those books , i find little commendation of monarchy . it was his hap to live in those times when the grecians abounded with several commonwealths , who had then learning enough to make them seditious . yet in his ethicks , he hath so much good manners , as to confess in right down words , that monarchy is the best form of government , and a popular estate the worst . and though he be not so free in his politicks , yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him , that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy ; he confesseth it to be first , the natural , and the divinest form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy . what can a heathen say more ? indeed , the world for a long time knew no other sort of government , but only monarchy . the best order , the greatest strength , the most stability and easiest government , are to be found all in monarchy , and in no other form of government . the new platforms of commonweals , were first hatched in a corner of the world , amongst a few cities of greece , which have been imitated by very few other laces . those very cities were first , for many years , governed by kings , untill wantonness , ambition or faction of the people , made them attempt new kinds of regiment ; all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them ; happy in nothing , but that they continued but a small time . ( 11. ) a little to manifest the imperfection of popular government , let us but examine the most flourishing democratie that the world hath ever known ; i mean that of rome . first , for the durability ; at the most , it lasted but 480 years ( for so long it was from the expulsion of tarquin , to iulius caesar. ) whereas both the assyrian monarchy lasted , without interruption , at the least twelve hundred years , and the empire of the east continued 1495 years . 2. for the order of it , during these 480 years , there was not any one settled form of government in rome : for after they had once lost the natural power of kings , they could not find upon what form of government to rest : their fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in every change. at the first they chose two annual consuls instead of kings . secondly , those did not please them long , but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their liberty . thirdly , they leave tribunes and consuls , and choose them ten men to make them laws . fourthly , they call for consuls and tribunes again : sometimes they choose dictators , which were temporary kings , and sometimes military tribunes , who had consular power . all these shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government , as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regiment in so much confusion : one while the senate made laws , another while the people . the dissentions which were daily between the nobles and the commons , bred those memorable seditions about vsury , about marriages , and about magistracy . also the graecian , the apulian , and the drusian seditions , filled the market-places , the temples , and the capitol it self , with blood of the citizens ; the social war was plainly civil ; the wars of the slaves , and the other of the fencers ; the civil wars of marius and sylla , of cataline , of caesar and pompey the triumvirate , of augustus , lepidus and antonius : all these shed an ocean of blood within italy and the streets of rome . thirdly , for their government , let it be allowed , that for some part of this time it was popular , yet it was popular as to the city of rome only , and not as to the dominions , or whole empire of rome ; for no democratie can extend further than to one city . it is impossible to govern a kingdom , much less many kingdoms by the whole people , or by the greatest part of them . ( 12. ) but you will say , yet the roman empire grew all up under this kind of popular government , and the city became mistress of the world. it is not so ; for rome began her empire under kings , and did perfect it under emperours ; it did only encrease under that popularity : her greatest exaltation was under trajan , as her longest peace had been under augustus . even at those times , when the roman victories abroad , did amaze the world , then the tragical slaughter of citizens at home , deserved commiseration from their vanquished enemies . what though in that age of her popularity , she bred many admired captains and commanders ( each of which was able to lead an army , though many of them were but ill requited by the people ? ) yet all of them were not able to support her in times of danger ; but she was forced in her greatest troubles to create a dictator ( who was a king for a time ) thereby giving this honourable testimony of monarchy , that the last refuge in perils of states , is to fly to regal authority . and though romes popular estate for a while was miraculously upheld in glory by a greater prudence than her own ; yet in a short time , after manifold alterations , she was ruined by her own hands . suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit : for the arms she had prepared to conquer other nations , were turned upon her self , and civil contentions at last settled the government again into a monarchy . ( 13. ) the vulgar opinion is , that the first cause why the democratical government was brought in , was to curb the tyranny of monarchies . but the falshood of this doth best appear by the first flourishing popular estate of athens , which was founded , not because of the vices of their last king , but that his vertuous deserts were such as the people thought no man worthy enough to succeed him ; a pretty wanton quarrel to monarchy ! for when their king codrus understood by the oracle , that his country could not be saved , unless the king were slain in the battel : he in disguise entered his enemies camp , and provoked a common souldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom , and with his death ended the royal government ; for after him was never any more kings of athens . as athens thus for love of her codrus , changed the government , so rome on the contrary , out of hatred to her tarquin , did the like . and though these two famous commonweals did for contrary causes abolish monarchy , yet they both agreed in this , that neither of them thought it fit to change their state into a democratie : but the one chose archontes , and the other consuls to be their governours ; both which did most resemble kings , and continued , untill the people by lessening the authority of these their magistrates , did by degrees and stealth bring in their popular government . and i verily believe , never any democratical state shewed it self at first fairly to the world by any elective entrance , but they all secretly crept in by the back-door of sedition and faction . ( 14. ) if we will listen to the judgment of those who should best know the nature of popular government , we shall find no reason for good men to desire or choose it . zenophon that brave scholar and souldier disallowed the athenian commonweal , for that they followed that form of government wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit , and vertuous men kept under . they expelled aristides the just ; themistocles died in banishment ; meltiades in prison ; phocion the most virtuous and just man of his age , though he had been chosen forty five times to be their general , yet he was put to death with all his friends , kindred and servants , by the fury of the people , without sentence , accusation , or any cause at all . nor were the people of rome much more favourable to their worthies ; they banished rutilius , metellus , coriolanus , the two scipio's and tully : the worst men sped best ; for as zenophon saith of athens , so rome was a sanctuary for all turbulent , discontented and seditious spirits . the impunity of wicked men was such , that upon pain of death , it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn to death , or banish any citizen , or to deprive him of his liberty , or so much as to whip him for what offence soever he had committed , either against the gods or men. the athenians sold justice as they did other merchandise ; which made plato call a popular estate a fair , where every thing is to be sold. the officers when they entered upon their charge , would brag , they went to a golden harvest . the corruption of rome was such , that marius and pompey durst carry bushels of silver into the assemblies , to purchase the voices of the people . many citizens under their grave gowns , came armed into the publick meetings , as if they went to war. often contrary factions fell to blows , sometimes with stones , and sometimes with swords ; the blood hath been suckt up in the market places with spunges ; the river tiber hath been filled with the dead bodies of the citizens , and the common privies stuffed full with them . if any man think these disorders in popular states were but casual , or such as might happen under any kind of government , he must know , that such mischiefs are unavoidable , and of necessity do follow all democratical regiments ; and the reason is given , because the nature of all people is , to desire liberty without restraint , which cannot be but where the wicked bear rule ; and if the people should be so indiscreet , as to advance vertuous men , they lose their power : for that , good men would favour none but the good , which are always the fewer in number ; and the wicked and vitious ( which is still the greatest part of the people ) should be excluded from all preferment , and in the end , by little and little , wise men should seize upon the state , and take it from the people . i know not how to give a better character of the people , than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or near the popular states ; thucydides , zenophon , livie , tacitus , cicero , and salust , have set them out in their colours . i will borrow some of their sentences : there is nothing more uncertain than the people ; their opinions are as variable and suddain as tempests ; there is neither truth nor judgment in them ; they are not led by wisdom to judg of any thing , but by violence and rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true and false . after the manner of cattel , they follow the herd that goes before ; they have a custom always to favour the worst and weakest ; they are most prone to suspitions , and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false suggestion ; they are apt to believe all news , especially if it be sorrowful ; and like fame , they make it more in the believing ; when there is no author , they fear those evils which themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new stirrs and changes , and are enemies to quiet and rest ; whatsoever is giddy or head-strong , they account manlike and couragious ; but whatsoever is modest or provident , seems sluggish ; each man hath a care of his particular , and thinks basely of the common good ; they look upon approaching mischiefs as they do upon thunder , only every man wisheth it may not touch his own person ; it is the nature of them , they must serve basely , or domineer proudly ; for they know no mean. thus do they paint to the life this beast with many heads . let me give you the cypher of their form of government ; as it is begot by sedition , so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars , either with an enemy abroad , or with friends at home . the only means to preserve it , is , to have some powerful enemies near , who may serve instead of a king to govern it , that so , though they have not a king amongst them , yet they may have as good as a king over them : for the common danger of an enemy keeps them in better unity , than the laws they make themselves . ( 15 ) many have exercised their wits in parallelling the inconveniences of regal and popular government , but if we will trust experience before speculations philosophical , it cannot be denyed but this one mischief of sedition which necessarily waits upon all popularity , weighes down all the inconveniences that can be found in monarchy , though they were never so many . itis said , skin for skin , yea , all that a man hath will he give for his life ; and a man will give his riches for the ransome of his life . the way then to examine what proportion the mischiefs of sedition and tyranny have one to another , is to enquire in what kind of government most subjects have lost their lives : let rome which is magnified for her popularity , and vilified for the tyrannical monsters the emperours , furnish us with examples . consider-whether the cruelty of all the tyrannical emperours that ever ruled in this city did ever spill a quarter of the blood that was poured out in the last hundred years of her glorious common wealth . the murthers by tyberius , domitian , and commodus , put all together , cannot match that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between marius and sylla , nay , even by sylla's part alone ( not to mention the acts of marius ) were fourscore and ten senators put to death , fifteen consuls , two thousand and six hundred gentlemen , and a hundred thousand others . this was the heighth of the roman liberty : any man might be killed that would . a favour not fit to be granted under a royal government . the miseries of those licentious times are briefly touched by plutarch in these words . sylla ( saith he ) fell to sheding of bloud , and filled all rome with infinite and unspeakable murthers — this was not only done in rome , but in all the cities of italy throughout , there was no temple of any god whatsoever , no altar in any bodies house , no liberty of hospital , no fathers house , which was not embrewed with blood , and horrible murthers , the husbands were slain in the wives armes , and the children in the mothers laps ; and yet they that were slain for private malice were no-nothing in respect of those that were murthered only for their goods — he openly sold their goods by the cryer , sitting so proudly in his chair of state , that it grieved the people more to see their goods packt up by them to whom he gave , or disposed them , than to see them taken away . sometimes he would give a whole countrey , or the whole revenues of certain cities , unto women for their beauties , or to pleasant jeasters , minstrels , or wicked slaves , made free . and to some he would give other mens vvives by force , and make them be married against their wills . now let tacitus and suetonius be searched , and see if all their cruel emperours can match this popular villany , in such an universal slaughter of citizens , or civil butchery . god only was able to match him , and over-matched him , by fitting him with a most remarkable death , just answerable to his life , for as he had been the death of many thousands of his country-men , so as many thousands of his own kindred in the flesh were the death of him , for he died of an impostume , which corrupted his flesh in such sort , that it turned all to lice , he had many about him to shift him continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him , were nothing to them that multiplied upon him , there was neither apparel , linnen , bathes , vvashings , nor meat it self , but was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermine . i cite not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical princes , nor will i plead in defence of their cruelties : only in the comparative , i maintain the mischiefs to a state to be less universal under a tyrant king ; for the cruelty of such tyrants extends ordinarily no further then to some particular men that offend him , and not to the whole kingdome : it is truly said by his late majesty king iames , a king can never be so notoriously vitious , but he will generally favour justice , and maintain some order ; except in the particulars wherein his inordinate lust carries him away . even cruel domitian , dionysius the tyrant , and many others , are commended by historians for great observers of justice : a natural reason is to be rendered for it ; it is the multitude of people , and the abundance of their riches , which are the only strength and glory of every prince : the bodies of his subjects do him service in vvar , and their goods supply his present wants , therefore if not out of affection to his people , yet out of natural love to himself , every tyrant desires to preserve the lives , and protect the goods of his subjects , which cannot be done but by justice , and if it be not done , the princes loss is the greatest ; on the contrary , in a popular state , every man knows the publick good doth not depend wholly on his care , but the common-wealth may well enough be governed by others though he tend only his private benefit , he never takes the publick to be his own business ; thus as in a family , where one office is to be done by many servants , one looks upon another , and every one leaves the business for his fellow , until it is quite neglected by all ; nor are they much to be blamed for their negligence , since it is an even wager , their ignorance is as great : for magistrates among the people , being for the most part annual , do always lay down their office before they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understanding , by use and experience must needs excell them ; again , there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked , but his own reason and sense will tell him , that though he be a god , yet he must dye like a man ; and that there is not the meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge himself of the injustice that is offered him : hence it is that great tyrants live continually in base fears , as did dionysius the elder ; tiberius , caligula , and nero are noted by suctonius to have been frighted with panick fears . but it is not so , where wrong is done to any particular person by a multitude , he knows not who hurt him , or who to complain of , or to whom to address himself for reparation . any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all popular assemblies . there is no tyranny to be compared to the tyranny of a multitude . ( 16 ) what though the government of the people be a thing not to be endured , much less defended , yet many men please themselves with an opininion , that though the people may not govern ; yet they may partake and joyn with a king in the government , and so make a state mixed of popular and regal power , which they take to be the best tempered and equallest form of government . but the vanity of this fancy is too evident , it is a meer impossibility or contradiction , for if a king but once admit the people to be his companions , he leaves to be a king , and the state becomes a democracy ; at least , he is but a titular and no real king , that hath not the soveraignty to himself ; for the having of this alone , and nothing but this makes a king to be a king. as for that shew of popularity which is found in such kingdoms as have general assemblies for consultation about making publick laws : it must be remembred that such meetings do not share or divide the soveraignty with the prince : but do only deliberate and advise their supreme head , who still reserves the absolute power in himself ; for if in such assemblies , the king , the nobility , and people have equal shares in the soveraignty , then the king hath but one voice , the nobility likewise one , and the people one , and then any two of these voices should have power to over-rule the third ; thus the nobility and commons together should have power to make a law to bind the king , which was never yet seen in any kingdom , but if it could , the state must needs be popular and not regal . ( 17 ) if it be unnatural for the multitude to chuse their governours , or to govern , or to partake in the government , what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many , that the multitude may correct , or depose their prince , if need be ? surely the unnaturalness , and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed : for admit that a king make a contract or paction with his people , either originally in his ancestors , or personally at his coronation ( for both these pactions some dream of , but cannot offer any proof for either ) yet by no law of any nation can a contract be thought broken , except that first a lawful tryal be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof , or else every man may be both party and judge in his own case , which is absur'd once to be thought , for then it will lye in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to cast off the yoke of government ( that god hath laid upon them ) to judge and punish him , by whom they should be judged and punished themselves . aristotle can tell us , what judges the multitude are in their own case , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the judgment of the multitude in disposing of the soveraignty may be seen in the roman history , where we may find many good emperours murthered by the people , and many bad elected by them : nero , heliogabalus , otho , vitellius , and such other monsters of nature , were the minions of the multitude , and set up by them : pertinax , alexander , severus , gordianus , gallus emilianus , quintilius , aurelianus , tacitus , probus , and numerianus ; all of them good emperours in the judgment of all historians , yet murthered by the multitude . ( 18 ) whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the insolencies of tyrants ; wherein they propound a remedy far worse than the disease , neither is the disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think , let us be jugded by the history even of our own nation : we have enjoyed a succession of kings from the conquest now for above 600 years ( a time far longer than ever yet any popular state could continue ) we reckon to the number of twenty six of these princes since the norman race , and yet not one of these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government . it is true , two of these kings have been deposed by the people , and barbarously murthered , but neither of them for tyranny : for as a learned historian of our age saith , edward the second and richard the second were not insupportable either in their nature or rule , and yet the people , more upon wantonness than for any want , did take an unbridled course against them . edward the second , by many of our historians is reported to be of a good and vertuous nature , and not unlearned : they impute his defects rather to fortune than either to council or carriage of his afsairs , the deposition of him was a violent fury , led by a wife both cruel and unchast , and can with no better countenance of right be justifyed , than may his lamentable both indignities and death it self . likewise the deposition of king richard ii , was a tempestuous rage , neither led or restrained by any rules of reason or of state — examin his actions without a distempered judgment , and you will not condemne him to be exceeding either insufficient or evil ; weigh the imputations that were objected against him , and you shall find nothing either of any truth or of great moment ; hollingshed writeth , that he was most unthankfully used by his subjects ; for although , through the frailty of his youth , he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate , yet in no kings days were the commons in greater wealth , the nobility more honoured , and the clergy less wronged ; who notwithstanding , in the evil guided strength of their will , took head against him , to their own headlong destruction afterwards ; partly during the reign of henry , his next successor , whose greatest atchievements were against his own people , in executing those who conspired with him against king richard : but more especially in succeeding times , when , upon occasion of this disorder , more english blood was spent , than was in all the foreign wars together which have been since the conquest . twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with civil war , but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny of any prince . the cause of the baron's wars is by good historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility , as the bloody variance of the houses of york and lancaster , and the late rebellion , sprung from the wantonness of the people . these three unnatural wars have dishonoured our nation amongst strangers , so that in the censures of kingdoms , the king of spain is said to be the king of men , because of his subjects willing obedience ; the king of france king of asses , because of their infinite taxes and impositions ; but the king of england is said to be the king of devils , because of his subjects often insurrections against , and depositions of their princes . chap. iii positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( 1. ) regal authority not subject to the positive laws , kings before laws ; the king of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( 2. ) of samuel 's description of a king , 1 sam. 8. ( 3. ) the power ascribed unto kings in the new testament . ( 4. ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( 5. ) the benefit of laws . ( 6. ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( 7. ) of the oathes of kings . ( 8. ) of the benefit of the king's prerogative over laws . ( 9. ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector , of the common laws . ( 10. ) the king , iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( 11. ) the king and his council have anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( 12. ) of parliaments . ( 13. ) when the people were first called to parliament . ( 14. ) the liberty of parliaments , not from nature , but from grace of the princes . ( 15. ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( 16. ) governs both houses as head by himself . ( 17. ) by his council . ( 18. ) by his iudges . ( 1. ) hitherto i have endeavour'd to shew the natural institution of regal authority , and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people : it is necessary also to enquire whether humane laws have a superiority over princes ; because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people , do subject the exercise of it to positive laws . but in this also they erre , for as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferiour law to limit it . the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will ; not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants . there is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet for all this every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his family ; but much more is a king always tyed by the same law of nature to keep this general ground , that the safety of the kingdom be his chief law : he must remember , that the profit of every man in particular , and of all together in general , is not always one and the same ; and that the publick is to be preferred before the private ; and that the force of laws must not be so great as natural equity it self , which cannot fully be comprised in any laws whatsoever , but is to be left to the religious atchievement of those who know how to manage the affaires of state , and wisely to ballance the particular profit with the counterpoize of the publick , according to the infinite variety of times , places , persons ; a proof unanswerable , for the superiority of princes above laws , is this , that there were kings long before there were any laws : for a long time the word of a king was the only law ; and if practice ( as saith sir walter raleigh ) declare the greatness of authority , even the best kings of iudah and israel were not tyed to any law ; but they did what-soever they pleased , in the greatest matters . ( 2 ) the unlimitted jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by samuel , that it hath given occasion to some to imagine , that it was , but either a plot or trick of samuel to keep the government himself and family , by frighting the israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy , or else a prophetical description only of the future ill government of saul : but the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free monarchy ; wherein it is evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient ; for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant , for patient obedience is due to both ; no remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying and praying unto god in that day . but howsoever in a rigorous construction samuel's description be applyed to a tyrant ; yet the words by a benigne interpretation may agree with the manners of a just king ; and the scope and coherence of the text doth best imply the more moderate , or qualified sense of the words ; for as sir w. raleigh confesses , all those inconveniences and miseries which are reckoned by samuel as belonging to kingly government were not intollerable , but such as have been born , and are still born , by free consent of subjects towards their princes ; nay at this day , and in this land , many tenants by their tenures and services are tyed to the same subjection , even to subordinate and inferior lords : to serve the king in his wars , and to till his ground , is not only agreeable to the nature of subjects , but much desired by them ; according to their several births , and conditions : the like may be said for the offices of women-servants , confectioners , cooks , and bakers , for we cannot think that the king would use their labours without giving them wages , since the text it self mentions a liberal reward of his servants . as for the taking of the tenth of their seed , of their vines , and of their sheep , it might be a necessary provision for their kings household , and so belong to the right of tribute : for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth ; it cannot agree well to a tyrant , who observes no proportion , in fleecing his people . lastly , the taking of their fields , vineyards , and olive-trees , if it be by force or fraud , or without just recompence , to the dammage of private persons only , it is not to be defended ; but if it be upon the publick charge and general consent , it might be justifyed , as necessary at the first erection of a kingdome ; for those who will have a king , are bound to allow him royal maintenance , by providing revenues for the crown , since it is both for the honour , profit and safety too of the people to have their king glorious , powerful , and abounding in riches , besides we all know the lands and goods of many subjects may be oft-times legally taken by the king , either by forfeitures , escheat , attainder , outlawry , confiscation , or the like . thus we see samuel's character of a king may literally well bear a mild sense , for greater probability there is that samuel so meant , and the israelites so understood it ; to which this may be added , that samuel tells the israelites , this will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you : and ye shall cry because of your king which ye shall have chosen you ; that is to say : thus shall be the common custom or fashion , or proceeding of saul your king ; or as the vulgar latine renders it , this shall be the right or law of your king ; not meaning as some expound it , the casual event , or act of some individuum vagum , or indefinite king , that might happen one day to tyrannise over them . so that saul , and the constant practice of saul , doth best agree with the liteteral sense of the text. now that saul was no tyrant , we may note that the people asked a king , as all nations had . god answers , and bids samuel to hear the voice of the people , in all things which they spake , and appoint them a king. they did not ask a tyrant , and to give them a tyrant , when they asked a king , had not been to hear their voice in all things , but rather when they asked an egge , to have given them a scorpion : unless we will say , that all nations had tyrants . besides , we do not find in all scripture , that saul was punished , or so much as blamed , for committing any of those acts which samuel describes : and if samuel's drift had been only to terrifie the people , he would not have forgotten to foretell saul's bloody cruelty , in murthering 85 innocent priests , and smiteing with the edge of the sword the city of nob , both man , woman , and child . again , the israelites never shrank at these conditions proposed by samuel , but accepted of them , as such as all other nations were bound unto . for their conclusion is , nay , but we will have a king over vs , that we also may be like all the nations , and that our king may iudge us , and go out before us to fight our battels . meaning he should earn his privileges , by doing the work for them , by judging them , and fighting for them . lastly , whereas the mention of the peoples crying unto the lord , argues they should be under some tyrannical oppression ; we may remember , that the peoples complaints and cries are not always an argument of their living under a tyrant . no man can say king solomon was a tyrant , yet all the congregation of israel complain'd that solomon made their yoke grievous , and therefore their prayer to rehoboam is , make thou the grievous service of thy father solomon , and his heavy yoke which he put upon us , lighter , and we will serve thee . to conclude , it is true , saul lost his kingdom , but not for being too cruel or tyrannical to his subjects , but by being too merciful to his enemies ; his sparing agag when he should have slain him , was the cause why the kingdom was torn from him . ( 3. ) if any desire the direction of the new testament , he may find our saviour limiting and distinguishing royal power , by giving to caesar those things that were caesar 's , and to god those things that were god's . obediendum est in quibus mandatum dei non impeditur . we must obey where the commandment of god is not hindred ; there is no other law but gods law to hinder our obedience . it was the answer of a christian to the emperour , we only worship god , in other things we gladly serve you . and it seems tertullian thought whatfoever was not god's was the emperours , when he saith , bene opposuit caesari pecuniam , te ipsum deo , alioqui quid erit dei , si omnia caesaris . our saviour hath well apportioned our money for caesar , and our selves for god , for otherwise what shall god's share be , if all be caesar's . the fathers mention no reservation of any power to the laws of the land , or to the people . s. ambrose , in his apologie for david , expresly saith , he was a king , and therefore bound to no laws , because kings are free from the bonds of any fault . s. augustine also resolves , imperator non est subjectus legibus , qui habet in potestate alias leges ferre . the emperour is not subject to laws , who hath power to make other laws . for indeed , it is the rule of solomon , that we must keep the king's commandment , and not to say , what dost thou ? because where the word of a king is , there is power , and all that he pleaseth , he will do . if any mislike this divinity in england , let him but hearken to bracton , chief justice in henry the third's days , which was since the institution of parliaments , his words are , speaking of the king , omnes sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , nisi tantum sub deo , &c. all are under him , and he under none , but god only : if he offend , since no writ can go against him , their remedy is by petitioning him to amend his fault , which if he shall not do , it will be punishment sufficient for him to expect god as a revenger : let none presume to search into his deeds , much less to oppose them . when the iews asked our blessed saviour , whether they should pay tribute ? he did not first demand what the law of the land was , or whether there was any statute against it , nor enquired whether the tribute were given by consent of the people , nor advised them to stay their payment till they should grant it ; he did no more but look upon the superscription , and concluded , this image you say is caesar's , therefore give it to caesar. nor must it here be said , that christ taught this lesson only to the conquered iews , for in this he gave direction for all nations , who are bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings , as to any conquerour or vsurper whatsoever . whereas being subject to the higher powers , some have strained these words to signifie the laws of the land , or else to mean the highest power , as well aristocratical and democratical , as regal : it seems s. paul looked for such interpretation , and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor , and to let it be known , that by power he understood a monarch that carryed a sword : wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? that is , the ruler that carryeth the sword , for he is the minister of god to thee — for he beareth not the sword in vain . it is not the law that is the minister of god , or that carries the sword , but the ruler or magistrate ; so they that say the law governs the kingdom , may as well say that the carpenters rule builds an house , and not the carpenter ; for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler . and s. paul concludes ; for this cause pay you tribute also , for they are gods ministers attending continually upon this very thing . render therefore tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom . he doth not say , give as a gift to gods minister . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , render or restore tribute , as a due . also st. peter doth most clearly expound this place of st. paul , where he saith , submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him . here the very self same word ( supreme , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which st. paul coupleth with power , st. peter conjoineth with the king , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to maniest that king and power are both one . also st. peter expounds his own words of humane ordinance , to be the king , who is the lex loquens , a speaking law ; he cannot mean that kings themselves are an human ordinance , since st. paul calls the supreme power , the ordinance of god ; and the wisdom of god saith , by me kings reign : but his meaning must be , that the laws of kings are human ordinances . next , the governours that are sent by him ; that is by the king , not by god , as some corruptly would wrest the text , to justifie popular governours as authorized by god , whereas in gramatical construction [ him ] the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is king ; besides , the antithesis between supreme and sent , proves plainly that the governours were sent by kings ; for if the governours were sent by god , and the king be an humane ordinance , then it follows , that the governours were supreme , and not the king ; or if it be said , that both king and governours are sent by god , then they are both equal , and so neither of them supreme . therefore st. peter's meaning is in short , obey the laws of the king , or of his ministers . by which it is evident , that neither st. peter , nor s. paul , intended other-form of government than only monarchical , much less any subjecton of princes to humane laws . that familiar distinction of the schoolmen , whereby they subject kings to the directive , but not to the coactive power of laws , is a confession that kings are not bound by the positive laws of any nation : since the compulsory power of laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws ; by binding men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas the direction of the law , is but like the advice and direction which the kings council gives the king , which no man says is a law to the king. ( 4 ) there want not those who believe that the first invention of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power of kings ; but the truth is , the original of laws was for the keeping of the multitude in order : popular estates could not subsist at all without laws ; whereas kingdoms were govern'd many ages without them . the people of athens , as soon as they gave over kings , were forced to give power to draco first , then to solon , to make them laws , not to bridle kings , but themselves ; and though many of their laws were very severe and bloody , yet for the reverence they bare to their law-makers they willingly submitted to them . nor did the people give any limited power to solon , but an absolute jurisdiction , at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what he thought fit ; the people never challenging any such power to themselves : so the people of rome gave to the ten men , who were to chuse and correct their laws for the twelve tables , an absolute power , without any appeal to the people . ( 5. ) the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this , when kings were either busyed with wars , or distracted with publick cares , so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure ; then of necessity were laws invented , that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure decyphered unto him in the tables of his laws , that so there might be no need to resort to the king ; but either for the interpretation or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws , or else in new cases , for a supplement where the law was defective . by this means both king and people were in many things eased : first , the king by giving laws doth free himself of great and intolerable troubles , as moses did himself by chusing elders . secondly , the people have the law as a familiar admonisher and interpreter of the king's pleasure , which being published throughout the kingdom , doth represent the presence and majesty of the king : also the judges and magistrates , ( whose help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to use ) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using their own liberty to the injury of others , since they are to judge according to the laws , and not follow their own opinions . ( 6. ) now albeit kings , who make the laws , be ( as king iames teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful , he may mitigate and interpret . general laws made in parliament , may , upon known respects to the king , by his authority be mitigated or suspended , upon causes only known to him . and although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weale doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . by this means are all kings , even tyrants and conquerours , bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipial law of the land , so much as the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore-fathers and predecessors , in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . ( 7. ) others there be that affirm , that although laws of themselves do not bind kings , yet the oaths of kings at their coronations tye them to keep all the laws of their kingdoms . how far this is true , let us but examine the oath of the kings of england at their coronation ; the words whereof are these , art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy iudgments indifferent and upright iustice , and to use discretion with mercy and verity ? art thou pleased that our upright laws and customs be observed , and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee ? these two are the articles of the king's oath , which concern the laity or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively . being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury , pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the laws and customs of ancient times , granted from god , by just and devout kings , unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people . especially the laws , liberties , and customs granted unto the clergy and laity by the famous king edward . we may observe , in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes , set forth in henry the eighth's days , the king is to swear wholly to put out evil laws ; which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws . now what laws are upright and what evil , who shall judge but the king , since he swears to administer upright justice with discretion and mercy ( or as bracton hath it ) aequitatem praecipiat , & misericordiam . so that in effect , the king doth swear to keep no laws , but such as in his iudgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to equity of his conscience , join'd with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellour rather than of a judge ; and if a king did strictly swear to observe all the laws , he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing or abrogating of any statute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievable to the state. but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws of their kingdoms , yet no man can think it reason that kings should be more bound by their voluntary oaths than common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a contract , either with oath or without oath , he is no further bound than the equity and justice of the contract ties him ; for a man may have relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise , if either deceit , or errour , or force , or fear induced him thereunto : or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance . since the laws in many cases give the king a prerogative above common persons , i see no reason why he should be denyed the priviledge which the meanest of his subjects doth enjoy . here is a fit place to examine a question which some have moved , whether it be a sin for a subject to disobey the king , if he command any thing contrary to his laws ? for satisfaction in this point , we must resolve , that not only in human laws , but even in divine , a thing may be commanded contrary to law , and yet obedience to such a command is necessary . the sanctifying of the sabbath is a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to go to church upon a sabbath-day , the best divines teach us , that the servant must obey this command , though it may be sinful and unlawful in the master ; because the servant hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether his master sin or no in so commanding ; for there may be a just cause for a master to keep his servant from church , as appears luke 14. 5. yet it is not fit to tye the master to acquaint his servant with his secret counsels , or present necessity : and in such cases , the servants not going to church , becomes the sin of the master , and not of the servant . the like may be said of the king 's commanding a man to serve him in the wars , he may not examine whether the war be just or unjust , but must obey , since he hath no commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms , or causes of war ; nor hath any subject power to condemn his king for breach of his own laws . ( 8. ) many will be ready to say , it is a slavish and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man , who is not subject to the laws . but such men consider not , 1. that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , for the good only of them that are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right : howsoever some are afraid of the name of prerogative , yet they may assure themselves the case of subjects would be desperately miserable without it . the court of chancery it self is but a branch of the kings prerogative , to relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the law , which without it is no better than a tyrant , since summum ius , is summa injuria . general pardons , at the coronation and in parliaments ; are but the bounty of the prerogative . 2. there can be no laws without a supreme power to command or make them . in all aristocraties the nobles are above the laws , and in all democraties the people . by the like reason , in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them ; that which giveth the very being to a king is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an equivocal king. it skills not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means ; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns . neither doth the diversity of laws , nor contrary customs , whereby each kingdom differs from another , make the forms of common-weal different , unless the power of making laws be in several subjects . for the confirmation of this point , aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will , for he that is called a king according to the law , makes no kind of kingdom at all . this it seems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for though they were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessity of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute power over himself and over the laws , to do what he pleased , and leave undone what he list , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find , that vlpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps , legibus solutus est . the prince is not bound by the laws . ( 9 ) if the nature of laws be advisedly weighed , the necessity of the princes being above them may more manifest it self ; we all know that a law in general is the command of a superior power . laws are divided ( as bellermine divides the word of god ) into written and unwritten , not for that it is not written at all , but because it was not written by the first devisers or makers of it . the common law ( as the lord chancellor egerton teacheth us ) is the common custom of the realm . now concerning customs , this must be considered , that for every custom there was a time when it was no custom ; and the first president we now have , had no president when it began ; when every custom began , there was something else than custom that made it lawful , or else the beginning of all customs were unlawful . customs at first became lawful only by some superiour , which did either command or consent unto their beginning . and the first power which we find ( as it is confessed by all men ) is the kingly power , which was both in this and in all other nations of the world , long before any laws , or any other kind of government was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer , that the common law it self , or common customs of this land , were originally the laws and commands of kings at first unwritten . nor must we think the common customs ( which are the principles of the common law , and are but few ) to be such , or so many , as are able to give special rules to determine every particular cause . diversity of cases are infinite , and impossible to be regulated by any law ; and therefore we find , even in the divine laws which are delivered by moses , there be only certain principal laws , which did not determine out only direct the high-priest or . magistrate , whose judgment in special cases did determine , what the general law intended . it is so with the common law , for when there is no perfect rule , judges do resort to those principles , or common law axiomes , whereupon former judgments , in cases some-what like , have been delivered by former judges , who all receive authority from the king , in his right and name to give sentence according to the rules and presidents of antient times : and where presidents have failed , the judges have resorted to the general law of reason , and accordingly given judgment , without any common law to direct them . nay , many times , where there have been presidents to direct , they , upon better reason only , have changed the law , both in causes criminal and civil , and have not insisted so much on the examples of former judges , as examined and corrected their reasons ; thence it is that so no laws are now obsolete and out of use , and the practice quite contrary to what it was in former times , as the lord chancellor egerton proves , by several instances . nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law , for the case standeth so with the laws of all nations , although some of them have their laws and principles written and established : for witnesse to this , we have aristotle his testimony in his ethiques , and in several places in his politiques ; i will cite some of them . every law ( saith he ) is in the general , but of some things there can be no general law — when therefore the law sqeaks in general , and something falls out after besides the general rule : then it is fit that what the law-maker hath omitted , or where he hath erred by speaking generally , it should be corrected or supplyed , as if the law-maker himself were present to ordain it . the governour , whether he be one man , or more , ought to be lord over all those things whereof it was impossible the law should exactly speak , because it is not easie to comprehend all things under general rules — whatsoever the law cannot determine , it leaves to the governours to give iudgment therein , and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon tryal they find to be better than the written laws . besides , all laws are of themselves dumb , and some or other must be trusted with the application of them to particulars , by examining all circumstances , to pronounce when they are broken , or by whom . this work of right application of laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities ; but requires profound abilities of nature , for the beating out of the truth , witness the diversity , and sometimes the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges , in some difficult points . ( 10 ) since this is the common condition of laws , it is also most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws ; and for this cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally in courts of judicature , and are still representatively present in all courts ; the judges are but substituted , and called the kings justices , and their power ceaseth when the king is in place . to this purpose , bracton , that learned chief justice in the reign of henry the third , saith in express terms ; in doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of our lord the king is to be expected ; since it is his part to interpret , who made the law ; for as he saith in another place , rex , & non alius debet iudicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , &c. the king , and no body else , ought to give iudgment , if he were able , since by vertue of his oath he is bound to it ; therefore the king ought to exercise power as the vicar or minister of god , but if our lord the king be not able to determine every cause , to ease part of his pains by distributing the burthen to more persons , he ought to chuse wise men fearing god , &c , and make iustices of them : much to the same purpose are the words of edward the first , in the beginning of his book of laws , written by his appointment by iohn briton , bishop of hereford . we will ( saith he ) that our own iurisdiction be above all the iurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions , personal , or real , we have power to yield such iudgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as iudges . neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary presence of the king's person in his courts , because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts ; but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining in the king 's royal person . and that this then was no new-made law , or first brought in by the norman conquests , appears by a saxon law made by king edgar , in these words , as i find them in mr. lambert , nemo in lite regem appellato , nisi quidem domi iustitiam consequi , aut impetrare non poterit , sin summo jure domi urgeatur , ad regem , ut is onus aliqua ex parte allevet , provocato . let no man in suit appeal to the king , unless he may not get right at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . as the judicial power of kings was exercised before the conquest , so in those setled times after the conquest , wherein parliaments were much in use , there was a high-court following the king , which was the place of soveraign justice , both for matter of law and conscience , as may appear by a parliament in edward the first 's time , taking order , that the chancellour and the iustices of the bench should follow the king , to the end that he might have always at hand able men for his direction in suits that came before him : and this was after the time that the court of common-pleas was made stationary , which is an evidence that the king reserved a soveraign power , by which he did supply the want , or correct the rigour of the common law ; because the positive law , being grounded upon that which happens for the most part , cannot foresee every particular which time and experience brings forth . ( 12. ) therefore though the common law be generally good and just , yet in some special case it may need correction , by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out , which at the time of the law-making was not thought of . also sundry things do fall out , both in war and peace , that require extraordinary help , and cannot wait for the usual care of common law , the which is not performed , but altogether after one sort , and that not without delay of help and expence of time ; so that although all causes are , and ought to be referred to the ordinary processe of common law , yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet , for just reasons , to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority of the prince ; and the statute of magna charta hath been understood of the institution then made of the ordinary jurisdiction in common causes , and not for restraint of the absolute authority , serving only in a few rare and singular cases , for though the subjects were put to great dammage by false accusations and malitious suggestions made to the king and his council , especially during the time of king edward the third , whilst he was absent in the wars in france , insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made , that provided none should be put to answer before the king and his council without due processe ; yet it is apparent the necessity of such proceedings was so great , that both before edward the third's days , and in his time , and after his death , several statutes were made , to help and order the proceedings of the king and his council . as the parliament in 28. edw. 1. cap. 5. did provide , that the chancellour and iustices of the king's bench should follow the king ; that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the laws , which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the court , at all times when need shall require . by the statute of 37. edw. 3. cap. 18. taliation was ordained , in case the suggestion to the king proved untrue . then 38. edw. 3. cap. 9. takes away taliation , and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved be satisfied . in the statutes of 17. ric. 2. cap. 6. and 15. hen. 6. cap. 4. dammages and expences are awarded in such cases . in all these statutes it is necessarily implyed , that complaints upon just causes might be moved before the king and his council . at a parliament at glocester , 2. ric. 2. when the commons made petition , that none might be forced by writ out of chancery , or by privy seal , to appear before the king and his council , to answer touching free-hold . the king's answer was , he thought it not reasonable that he should be constrained to send for his leiges upon causes reasonable : and albeit he did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer [ finalment ] peremptorily touching their free-hold , but should be remanded for tryal thereof , as law required : provided always , ( saith he ) that at the suit of the party , where the king and his council shall be credibly informed , that because of maintenance , oppression , or other out-rages , the common law cannot have duly her course , in such case the council for the party . also in the 13 th year of his reign , when the commons did pray , that upon pain of forfeiture , the chancellour or council of the king , should not after the end of the parliament make any ordinance against the common law ; the king answered , let it be used as it hath been used before this time , so as the regality of the king be saved , for the king will save his regalities as his progenitors have done . again , in the 4 th year of henry the fourth , when the commons complained against subpoena's , and other writs , grounded upon false suggestions ; the king answered , that he would give in charge to his officers , that they should abstain more than before time they had , to send for his subjects in that manner . but yet ( saith he ) it is not our intention , that our officers shall so abstain , that they may not send for our subjects in matters and causes necessary , as it hath been used in the time of our good progenitors . likewise when for the same cause complaint was made by the commons ; anno 3. hen. 5. the king's answer was , le roy s'advisera , the king will be advised ; which amounts to a denyal for the present , by a phrase peculiar for the kings denying to pass any bill that hath passed the lords and commons . these complaints of the commons , and the answers of the king , discover , that such moderation should be used , that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained , lest subjects be convented before the king and his council without just cause , that the proceedings of the council-table be not upon every slight suggestion , nor to determine finally concerning free hold of inheritance . and yet that upon cause reasonable , upon credible information , in matters of weight , the king's regallity or prerogative in sending for his subjects be maintain'd , as of right it ought , and in former times hath been constantly used . king edward the first , finding that bogo de clare was discharged of an accusation brought against him in parliament , for that some formal imperfections were found in the complaint , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his council , ad faciendum , & recipiendum quod per regem & ejus concilium fuerit faciendum ; and so proceeded to an examination of the whole cause . 8. edw. 1. edward the third , in the star-chamber ( which was the ancient council-chamber at westminster ) upon the complaint of elizabeth audley , commanded iames audley to appear before him and his council , and determin'd a controversie between them , touching lands contain'd in the covenants of her joynture . rot. claus. de an . 41. ed. 3. henry the fifth , in a suit before him and his council for the titles of the mannors of seere and s. laurence , in the isle of thenet , in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tryed , as well for avoiding the breach of the peace , as for prevention of waste and spoil . rot. patin . anno 6. hen. 5. henry the sixth commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney of london , till they had other commandment from him and his council , because verney , being indebted to the king and others , practised to be indicted of felony , wherein he might have his clergy , and make his purgation , of intent to defraud his creditors . 34. hen. 6. rot. 37. in banco regis . edward the fourth and his council , in the star-chamber , heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of s. leonards in york , complaining , that sir hugh hastings , and others , withdrew from them a great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every plough-land within the counties of york , westmerland , cumberland , and lancashire . rot. paten . de anno 8. ed. 4. part 3. memb. 14. henry the seventh and his council , in the star-chamber , decreed , that margery and florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley , widow , for lands in wolwich and plumstead in kent ; for as much as the matter had been heard first before the council of king ed. 4. after that before the president of the requests of that king , hen. 7. and then lastly , before the council of the said king. 1. hen. 7. what is hitherto affirmed of the dependency and subjection of the common law to the soveraign prince , the same may be said as well of all statute laws ; for the king is the sole immediate author , corrector , and moderator of them also ; so that neither of these two kinds of laws are or can be any diminution of that natural power which kings have over their people , by right of father-hood , but rather are an argument to strengthen the truth of it ; for evidence whereof , we may in some points consider the nature of parliaments , because in them only all statutes are made . ( 12. ) though the name of parliament ( as mr. cambden saith ) be of no great antiquity , but brought in out of france , yet our ancestors , the english saxons , had a meeting , which they called , the assembly of the wise ; termed in latine , conventum magnatum , or , praesentia regis , procerumque prelaterumque collectorum . the meeting of the nobility , or the presence of the king , prelates , and peers assembled ; or in general , magnum concilium , or commune concilium ; and many of our kings in elder times made use of such great assemblies for to consult of important affaires of state ; all which meetings , in a general sense , may be termed parliaments . great are the advantages which both the king and people may receive by a well-ordered parliament ; there is nothing more expresseth the majesty and supreme power of a king , than such an assembly , wherein all his people acknowledge him for soveraign lord , and make all their addresses to him by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent and approbation do strengthen all the laws , which the king , at their request and by their advice and ministry , shall ordain . thus they facilitate the government of the king , by making the laws unquestionable , either to the subordinate magistrates , or refractory multitude . the benefit which accrews to the subject by parliaments , is . that by their prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress their just grievances , and are overcome by their importunity to grant many things which otherwise they would not yield unto ; for the voice of a multitude is easilier heard . many vexations of the people are without the knowledge of the king ; who in parliament seeth and heareth his people himself ; whereas at other times he commonly useth the eyes and ears of other men . against the antiquity of parliaments we need not dispute , since the more ancient they be , the more they make for the honour of monarchy ; yet there be certain circumstances touching the forms of parliaments , which are fit to be considered . first , we are to rememember , that until about the time of the conquest , there could be no parliaments assembled of the general states of the whole kingdom of england , because till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one kingdom ; but it was either divided into several kingdoms , or governed by several laws . when iulius caesar landed he found 4 kings in kent ; and the british names of dammonii , durotriges , belgae , attrebatii , trinobantes , iceni , silures , and the rest , are plentiful testimonies of the several kingdoms of brittains , when the romans left us . the saxons divided us into 7 kingdoms : when these saxons were united all into a monarchy , they had always the danes their companions , or their masters in the empire , till edward the confessors days , since whose time the kingdom of england hath continued united , as now it doth : but for a thousand years before we cannot find it was entirely setled , during the time of any one kings reign . as under the mercian law : the west saxons were confined to the saxon laws ; essex , norfolk , suffolk , and some other places , were vexed with danish laws ; the northumbrians also had their laws apart . and until edward the confessors reign , who was next but one before the conquerour , the laws of the kingdom were so several and uncertain , that he was forced to cull a few of the most indifferent and best of them , which were from him called st. edwards laws : yet some say that eadgar made those laws , and that the confessor did but restore and mend them . alfred also gathered out of mulmutius laws , such as he translated into the saxon tongue . thus during the time of the saxons , the laws were so variable , that there is little or no likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the whole kingdom . ( 13 ) a second point considerable is , whether in such parliaments , as was in the saxon's times , the nobility and clergy only were of those assemblies , or whether the commons were also called ; some are of opinion , that though none of the saxon laws do mention the commons , yet it may be gathered by the word wisemen , the commons are intended to be of those assemblies , and they bring ( as they conceive ) probable arguments to prove it , from the antiquity of some burroughs that do yet send burgesses , and from the proscription of those in antient demesne , not to send burgesses to parliament . if it be true , that the west-saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of their towns , yet it may be doubted , whether other kingdoms had the same usage ; but sure it is , that during the heptarchy , the people could not elect any knights of the shire , because england was not then divided into shires . on the contrary , there be of our historians who do affirm , that henry the first caused the commons first to be assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appointment , for before his time only certain of the nobility and prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of state. if this assertion be true , it seems a meer matter of grace of this king , and proves not any natural right of the people , originally to be admitted to chuse their knights and burgesses of parliament , though it had been more for the honour of parliaments , if a king , whose title to the crown had been better , had been author of the form of it ; because he made use of it for his unjust ends. for thereby he secured himself against his competitor and elder brother , by taking the oaths of the nobility in parliament ; and getting the crown to be setled upon his children . and as the king made use of the people , so they , by colour of parliament , served their own turns ; for after the establishment of parliaments by strong hand , and by the sword , they drew from him the great charter , which he granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people , as sir walter raleigh in his dialogue of parliaments doth affirm , in these words . the great charter was not originally granted legally and freely ; for henry the first did but vsurp the kingdom , and therefore , the better to assure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the nobility and people with their charters ; yea , king john , that confirmed them , had the like respect , for arthur duke of brittain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom king john vsurped , and so to conclude , these charters had their original from kings de facto , but not de jure — the great charter had first an obscure birth by vsurpation , and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . ( 15. ) a third consideration must be , that in the former parliaments , instituted and continued since king henry the first 's time , is not to be found the usage of any natural liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king , and not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty were natural , it would give power to the multitude to assemble themselves when and where they please , to bestow soveraignty , and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise of it . whereas , the liberties of favour and grace , which are claimed in parliaments , are restrained both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances , to the sole pleasure of the king. the people cannot assemble themselves , but the king , by his writs , calls them to what place he pleases ; and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant , without any other cause shewed than his will. neither is the whole summoned , but only so many as the kings writs appoint . the prudent king edward the first , summoned always those barons of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament , but omited their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights of the shire or burgesses , but only free-holders in the counties , and freemen in the cities and burroughs ; yet in the city of westminster all the house-holders , though they be neither free-men nor free-holders , have voices in their election of burgesses . also during the time of parliament , those priviledges of the house of commons , of freedom of speech , power to punish their own members , to examine the proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers , to have access to the king's person , and the like , are not due by any natural right , but are derived from the bounty or indulgence of the king , as appears by a solemn recognition of the house ; for at the opening of the parliament , when the speaker is presented to the king , he , in the behalf and name of the whole house of commons , humbly craves of his majesty , that he would be pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties of freedom of speech , of access to his person , and the rest . these priviledges are granted with a condition implyed , that they keep themselves within the bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why do the house of commons inflict punishment themselves upon their own members for transgressing in some of these points ; and the king , as head , hath many times punished the members for the like offences . the power which the king giveth , in all his courts , to his judges or others to punish , doth not exclude him from doing the like , by way of prevention , concurrence , or evocation , even in the same point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power ; for they who give authority by commission , do always retain more than they grant : neither of the two houses claim an infallibility of not erring , no more than a general council can . it is not impossible but that the greatest may be in fault , or at least interested or engaged in the delinquency of one particular member . in such cases it is most proper for the head to correct , and not to expect the consent of the members , or for the parties peccant to be their own judges . nor is it needful to confine the king , in such cases , within the circle of any one court of justice , who is supreme judge in all courts . and in rare and new cases rare and new remedies must be sought out ; for it is a rule of the common law , in novo casu , novum remedium est apponendum : and the statute of westminst . 2. cap. 24. giveth power , even to the clarks of the chancery , to make new forms of writs in new cases , lest any man that came to the king's court of chancery for help , should be sent away without remedy : a president cannot be found in every case ; and of things that happen seldom , and are not common , there cannot be a common custom . though crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding a president for a condigne punishment , yet they must not therefore pass unpunished . i have not heard that the people , by whose voices the knights and burgesses are chosen , did ever call to an account those whom they had elected ; they neither give them instructions or directions what to say , or what to do in parliament , therefore they cannot punish them when they come home for doing amiss : if the people had any such power over their burgesses , then we might call it , the natural liberty of the people , with a mischief . but they are so far from punishing , that they may be punished themselves for intermedling with parliamentary business ; they must only chuse , and trust those whom they chuse to do what they list ; and that is as much liberty as many of us deserve , for our irregular elections of burgesses . ( 15 ) a fourth point to be consider'd , is , that in parliament all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone , at the rogation of the people , as his majesty king iames , of happy memory , affirms in his true law of free monarchy ; and as hooker teacheth us , that laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them , but from the power that doth give them the strength of laws : le roy le veult , the king will have it so , is the interpretive phrase pronounced at the king 's passing of every act of parliament : and it was the ancient custom for a long time , till the days of henry the fifth , that the kings , when any bill was brought unto them , that had passed both houses , to take and pick out what they liked not , and so much as they chose was enacted for a law : but the custom of the later kings hath been so gracious , as to allow always of the entire bill as it hath passed both houses . ( 16 ) the parliament is the king's court , for so all the oldest statutes call it , the king in his parliament : but neither of the two houses are that supreme court , nor yet both of them together ; they are only members , and a part of the body , whereof the king is the head and ruler . the king 's governing of this body of the parliament we may find most significantly proved both by the statutes themselves , as also by such presidents as expresly shew us , how the king , sometimes by himself , sometimes by his council , and other-times by his judges , hath over-ruled and directed the judgments of the houses of parliament ; for the king , we find that magna charta , and the charter of forrests , and many other statutes about those times , had only the form of the kings letters-patents , or grants , under the great seal , testifying those great liberties to be the sole act and bounty of the king : the words of magna charta begin thus ; henry , by the grace of god , &c. to all our arch-bishops , &c. and our faithful subjects , greeting . know ye , that we , of our meer free-will , have granted to all free-men these liberties . in the same style goeth the charter of forrests , and other statutes . statutum hiberniae , made at westminster , 9. februarii 14. hen. 3. is but a letter of the king to gerrard , son of maurice , justice of ireland . the statute de anno bissextili begins thus , the king to his iustices of the bench , greeting , &c. explanationes statuti glocestriae , made by the king and his iustices only , were received always as statutes , and are still printed amongst them . the statute made for correction of the 12th chapter of the statute of glocester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the justices of the bench , after the manner of a writ patent , with a certain writ closed , dated by the kings hand at westminster , requiring that they should do , and execute all and every thing contained in it , although the same do not accord with the statute of glocester in all things . the statute of rutland , is the kings letters to his treasurer and barons of his exchequer , and to his chamberlain . the statute of circumspecte agis runs , the king to his iudges sendeth greeting . there are many other statutes of the same form , and some of them which run only in the majestique terms of , the king commands , or , the king wills , or , our lord the king hath established , or , our lord the king hath ordained : or , his especial grace hath granted : without mention of consent of the commons or people ; insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclamations , than acts of parliament : and indeed some of them were no other than meer proclamations ; as the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly of the prelates and nobility , for the coronation of the king and his queen eleanor , which begins , provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton . also a provision was made 19. hen. 3. de assisa ultimae praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for law , until tit. west . 2. an . 13. ed. 1. cap. 5. which provides the contrary in express words : this provision begins , provisum fuit coram dom. rege , archiepiscopis , episcopis , & baronibus , quod , &c. it seems originally the difference was not great between a proclamation and a statute ; this latter the king made by common council of the kingdom . in the former he had but the advice only of his great council of the peers , or of his privy council only . for that the king had a great council , besides his parliament , appears by a record of 5. hen. 4. about an exchange between the king and the earl of northumberland : whereby the king promiseth to deliver to the earl lands to the value , by the advice of parliament , or otherwise by the advice of his grand council , and other estates of the realm , which the king will assemble , in case the parliament do not meet . we may find what judgment in later times parliaments have had of proclamations , by the statute of 31. of hen. cap. 8. in these words , forasmuch as the king , by the advice of his council , hath set forth proclamations , which obstinate persons have contemned ; not considering what a king by his royal power may do : considering that sudden causes and occasions fortune many times , which do require speedy remedies , and that by abiding for a parliament , in the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the realm : and weighing also , that his majesty , which by the kingly and regal power given him by god , may do many things in such cases , should not be driven to extend the liberties , and supremity of his regal power , and dignity , by willfulness of froward subjects : it is therefore thought fit , that the king with the advice of his honourable council should set forth proclamations for the good of the people , and defence of his royal dignity as necessity shall require . this opinion of a house of parliament was confirmed afterwards by a second parliament , and the statute made proclamations of as great validity , as if they had been made in parliament . this law continued until the government of the state came to be under a protector , during the minority of edward the sixth , and in his first year it was repealed . i find also , that a parliament in the 11th year of henry the seventh , did so great reverence to the actions , or ordinances of the king , that by statute they provided a remedy or means to levy a benevolence granted to the king , although by a statute made not long before all benevolences were damned and annulled for ever . mr. fuller , in his arguments against the proceedings of the high-commission court , affirms , that the statute of 2. h. 4. cap. 15. which giveth power to ordinaries to imprison and set fines on subjects , was made without the assent of the commons , because they are not mentioned in the act. if this argument be good , we shall find very many statutes of the same kind , for the assent of the commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parliaments . the most usual title of parliaments in edward the 3d , rich. 2. the three henries 4. 5. 6. in edw. 4. and rich. 3. days , was : the king and his parliament , with the assent of the prelates , earles , and barons , and at the petition , or at the special instance of the commons , doth ordain . the same mr. fuller saith , that the statute made against lollards , was without the assent of the commons , as appears by their petition in these words , the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented nor granted by the commons , but that which was done therein , was done without their assent . ( 17. ) how far the kings council hath directed and swayed in parliament , hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced . for further evidence , we may add the statute of westminster : the first which saith , these be the acts of king edward 1. made at his first parliament general , by his council , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earles , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm , &c. the statute of bygamy saith , in presence of certain reverend fathers , bishops of england , and others of the kings council , for as much as all the king's council , as well iustices as others , did agree , that they should be put in writing , and observed . the statute of acton burnell saith , the king , for himself , and by his council , hath ordained and established . in articuli super chartas ; when the great charter was confirmed , at the request of his prelates , earls and barons , we find these passages . 1. nevertheless the king and his council do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the kings right , &c. 2. and notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them ; both the king and his council , and all they that were present at the making of this ordinance , will and intend that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . here we may see in the same parliament the charter of the liberties of the subjects confirmed , and a saving of the kings prerogative : those times neither stumbled at the name , nor conceived any such antipathy between the terms , as should make them incompatible . the statute of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our soveraign lord the king , by his council it was agreed ; and also by the king himself commanded . and the ordinance of inquest goeth thus , it is agreed and ordained by the king himself , and all his council . the statute made at york , 9. ed. 3. saith , whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our soveraign lord the king in his parliament , by their petition , that for his profit , and the commodity of his prelates , earls , barons , and commons , it may please him to provide remedy ; our soveraign lord the king desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his prelates , earles , barons , and other nobles of his council being there , hath ordained . in the parliament primo edwardi the third , where magna charta was confirmed , i find this preamble , at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king and his council in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earles , barons , and other great men assembled , it was granted . the commons presenting a petition unto the king , which the king's council did mislike , were content thereupon to mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition is in these words , to their most redoubted soveraign lord the king , praying the said commons , that whereas they have pray'd him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his council to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown , if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , which should fall in disinherison of him or his crown perpetually , as of escheators , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , and ignorances , &c. in the time of henry the third , an order or provision was made by the king's council , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower . the plantiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the iudgment was ideo sine die . it seems in those days an order of the council-board was either parcel of the common-law or above it . the reverend judges have had regard in their proceedings , that before they would resolve or give iudgment in new cases , they consulted with the king 's privy council . in the case of adam brabson , who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the iustices of assize at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings council : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed in an inquest against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the council that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by judges of the bench to the kings council , to demand of them whether by the statute of 14. ed. 3. cap. 16. a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered , that a word may well be amended , although the statute speak but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir tho. oghtred , knight , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court , whereupon iudgment was stayed ; and thorp said , that in the like case of giles blacket , it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded , that when any like case should come , we should not go to iudgment without good advice : therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counseil , & comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire , nous volume faire , & auterment nient en cest case . sue to the council , and as they will have us to do , we will ; and otherwise not in this case . ( 18. ) in the last place , we may consider how much hath been attributed to the opinions of the kings iudges by parliaments , and so find , that the kings council hath guided and ruled the iudges , and the iudges guided the parliament . in the parliament of 28. hen. 6. the commons made suit , that william de la poole , d. of suffolke , should be committed to prison , for many treasons and other crimes . the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give , the opinion of the iudges was demanded . their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders . this opinion was allowed . in another parliament , 31. hen. 6. ( which was prorogued ) in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pound dammages , in an action of trespass , and was committed to prison in execution for the same . when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made suit to the king and lords to have their speaker delivered ; the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by priviledge of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should still remain in prison , according to the law , notwithstanding the priviledge of parliament , and that he was the speaker : which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle , the king's serjeant at law ; and the commons were commanded in the kings name , by the bishop of lincolne , ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellour ) to chuse another speaker . in septimo of hen. 8. a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal iudges for criminal causes . there sir iohn fineux , and the other judges , delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be : and their opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden it ; the same opinion was delivered from the bishops . if a writ of errour be sued in parliament upon a judgment given in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours ; the lords are to proceed according to law , and for their judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and so to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own opinions or discretions otherwise . so it was in a writ of errour brought in parliament by the dean and chapter of lichfield , against the prior and covent of newton-panel , as appeareth by record . see flower dew's case , p. 1. h. 7. fol. 19. finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a41308-e900 1 kings 20. 16. gen. 27 , 29. notes for div a41308-e3340 arist. pol. lib. 1. c. 2. the modern states-man. by g.w. esq wither, george, 1588-1667. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a66762 of text r218029 in the english short title catalog (wing w3172). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 208 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 138 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a66762 wing w3172 estc r218029 99829655 99829655 34098 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a66762) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 34098) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1981:13) the modern states-man. by g.w. esq wither, george, 1588-1667. [10], 263, [1] p. printed, by henry hills, and are to be sold at his house at the sign of sir john old castle in py-corner, london : mdcliii. [1653] g.w. = george wither. includes a table of contents. reproduction of the original in the british library. eng political science -early works to 1800. great britain -politics and government -1649-1660 -early works to 1800. a66762 r218029 (wing w3172). civilwar no the modern states-man. by g.w. esq; wither, george 1653 34414 31 335 0 0 0 0 106 f the rate of 106 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2005-07 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-08 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2005-12 judith siefring sampled and proofread 2005-12 judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited 2006-01 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the modern states-man . by g. w. esq {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . plutarch . in hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis virtus populi romani . haec omnia strata humi erexit , ac sustulit . livie . london , printed , by henry hills , and are to be sold at his house at the sign of sir john old castle in py-corner , mdcliii . to the reader . reader , i here present thee with a few conceptions and observations hudled together during my confinement to my chamber by an arrest from heaven ; my nobler part being then unwilling to ly idle , when the other was denyed the liberty of action : if i have not observed so exact a methode as thou mightst expect , let the distraction of my mind by bodily pains and weakness plead my excuse . thou mayest wonder perhaps to meet me walking abroad without a support , which was not from any overweening confidence in my own ability , but because i was ignorant where to find such an one as might lend me an hand ; and this , not that i could not have pick'd out one sufficient in my own apprehension , but in thine : for when i considered our divisions , what animosities , what parties , what factions are amongst us , i knew not where to elect the man might please all , and so rather would have none , than one that might creat a prejudice , or hinder any from looking into this little treatise of so publick concernment . we are all passengers in the publick vessel , therefore as wise mariners diligently observe the heavens , that they may not be taken unprovided by tempests : so ought we to enquire what may betide the publike , whereon our private quiet , and happiness depends . foresight is an half-prevention , and though it may not totally defend , yet will it take off the edge so far , that the evil shall not be able to pierce to the heart : let this then suffice to move thee to read on , whereby thou shalt be enabled to make a perfect judgement , whether happiness , or calamity attends the nation wherof thou art a member . sol et homo generant hominem , say the naturalists , and providence , and vertue concur in the begetting of a perfect and durable commonwealth , for divine influence , and humane activity are equally necessary to the generation of the politick , as well as natural body , and heaven and earth must join to make up an absolute compositum . observe then both god , and man , the actings of providence towards , and of vertue in a nation , and thou mayest foretell whether it will be well or ill with them , without going to a conjuror , or any star-gazing mountebank . farewell . the contents . chap 1. that there is by nature in all men an inquisitive desire after the knowledge of futurity ▪ the reason of this ; the means by which they have attempted it . chap. 2. that there is a way leads to this knowledge , and what it is . chap. 3. this may confirmed by reason and examples . chap. 4. an admonition to some amongst us . chap. 5. how england became a commonwealth , and what may be expected from such a beginning . chap. 6. the beginning of the commonwealth of rome , and the causes of its growth . chap. 7. a parallel . chap. 8. of providence , and vertue , and the concurrence of second causes . chap. 9. of the roman piety , the evil and danger of mock thansgivings . chap. 10. piety and valour not inconsistent ; piety rewarded in heathens , impiety punished . chap. 11. religion ingrafted in mans heart by nature . chap. 12. the outward means to be used ; ministers incouraged and maintained ; the christian magistrates duty . chap. 13. religion not to be made a stalking horse to ambition or avarice . chap. 14. the benefit of humane learning , and some objections answered . chap. 15. an answer to some objections in a book entituled , the saints guide . chap. 16. the abuse of learning no argument against the use of it . chap. 17. the mischief of ignorance . chap. 18. of moral vertue in general . chap. 19. of probity , and the practice of it among the romans . chap. 20. of prudence . chap. 21. of natural parts , experience , learning , and travel . chap. 22. of the prudence of the romans . chap. 23. of justice , and the roman practice of it . chap. 24. of laws , and the english laws . chap. 25. of fortitude . chap. 26. of temperance . the modern states-man . chap. i. that there is by nature in all men an inquisitive desire after the knowledge of futurity ; the reason of this ; the means by which they have attempted to attain this in all ages . there is , and hath alwayes been , in the generality of mankind , an itching desire , and ●ankering after the knowledge of future events , the sonnes of adam reaching out their hands to the forbidden tree , and catching at the fruit of it ; yea , this off-spring of eve longing for the greenest apples , the precocious knowledge of events , before they come to their just ripeness and maturity . and to say truth , the tree of knowledge is fair to the eye , and pleasant to the taste ; for as all notional dainties are delightful , so especially these prenotions and anticipations of things are the more sweet and delicious to the palates of men , because most of their being is treasured up in their future condition . they can find no satisfaction , no sabbath , no quiet in their present state , and therefore they would fain know what the next day , what the next year , what the next age will bring forth ; in the highest prosperity they fear a mutation , in the lowest adversity they are impatient for a change ; and hence it comes to passe , that futurity is the mark at which all levell the arrows of their counsels , their endeavours , their hopes , their desires , and their prayers . this hath caused them in all ages to have a sacred esteem of those who pretended skil in divination , as the honour conferred upon joseph by pharaoh , and the advancement of daniel by the chaldean and persian monarchs recorded in sacred writ undoubtedly makesout , to let passe the honours which the magi enjoyed among them , which are set down by those that wrote their histories . thus the jews who had the vrim and thummim , and prophets from god to enquire of , yet ranne a madding after wizzards , and such as had familiar spirits , had their false prophets by hundreds , yea , and sent to baalzebub the god of ekron , an oracle of the devils , to enquire , as in the life of ahaziah will appear . with how frequent , and costly sacrifices did the graecians adore their oracle-giving deities , purchasing an answer with a hecatomb , and with the bloud of a hundred dumb beasts conjuring their dumb devils , before the sullen fiends would vouchsafe to answer them ? and of what esteem were the sybills books among the romans , who with all other heathens were so inquisitive after the future , that they left no stone unrol'd to attain the knowledge of their fates ? there could not a bird chatter , but there was an augur to comment on , and expound its language . there could not a bird flye , but there was an auspex to watch it ; nor light , but he was ready to observe , and by its motions in the ayr interpret the revolutions of states and persons . there could not a sacrifice fall , but there was an aruspex to behold the posture of it , and by the quietnesse or strugling of the sensitive creature , to foretell the facilities or reluctancies in the affairs of rational beings ; and an exspex to consult the entrails , and by the colour of the inwards tell the complexion of outward affairs . there could not a line seem to be scribled on the hand , but there was a chiromancer to read them , and with his interlineary glosses expound them , giving a short synopsis of the future passages of this present life out of that enchiridion ( as they would have it ) of natures penning . the interpreter of dreames was set to judge in the horny and ivory gates of fancy , and as if the day were to receive light from the night , to regulate its walking motions , by th others slumbring intimations . to passe by those severall kinds of the same madnesse expressed in geomancy , by circles in the earth ; pyromancy , by fire ; hydromancy , by water ; necromancy , by the ghosts of the dead , &c. of which the nations were enamoured , the heaven it self could not escape them , but the astrologer with his key was to unlock the starry charracters , and out of them spell the fate of sublunary things . and here let me not be mistaken , for i am not of opinion that those glorious bodies were created only to twinckle in a clear night , i do believe them to have an influence on sublunary bodies , and see the moon empire it over the waters , & the humors increase , and decrease , as it fills , or is in the wane , yet are they not , i conceiv , so easie to be read as some pretend , if certainly to be known by any ; for i find the prince of the power of the air himself at loss in his conjectures , which made him so cautelous in his oraculous responsals , as plutarch in many places observes . and aquinas will have the crows , cranes , & swallows , those flying almanacks , more happy and successeful in their predictions , than our anni specula , which become often crack't & broken in their guessings at the weather and truly the giving such unequal representations of things most obvious , is a very bad into create a belief of their ability to foretell things far more imperceptible , and immaterial , that depend upon the will and decrees of god , and upon the motions of most free and indifferent agents ; yea , such as are confessed on all hands so able to oppose , that they cannot be compelled , for sapiens dominabitur astris , & it is related of socrates , that of a crabbed and dissolute disposition by nature , he became the most accomplished in his time by philosophy . but i shall not set bounds to other mens knowledge , nor circumscribe them within the circle of my own ignorance , they may have dawnings where i perceive no star-light ; yet take this along with you , that god often in text-hand declares his mind , in a comet , a blazing-star , and other fiery apparitions , as he did before the last destruction of jerusalem . and as the jews and heathens , so many christians have been tampering about futurities , how lawfully i cannot say , for i am persuaded we ought to acquiesc in gods revealed will ; god will have his children in some sense in diem vivere entertain fortune by the day , and he doth choose gradually and leasurely {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to discover the thoughts he hath concerning them , that he might keep them in a waiting and obedient posture , in a posture of dependance , and expectation ; not that i would have them with anacreon cry out , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , give me to day , let who will take care for to morrow ; or with the stoicks lazily expect the blind-stroak of a conceited unavoidable fate ; but using all lawful and probable means , endeavour their countries , and in it their own future good . i confesse with that kingly prophet , that gods wayes are unsearchable , and his paths past finding out , that is in the hidden and secret bringing of things about , yet in his out-goings he will be observed , that his glory , his power , his justice , and his mercy may be made manifest unto the children of men ; thus we find his mighty works of creation , and redemption , of preservation , and castigation , all along recorded in the sacred registers of the old and new testaments ; and that for the comfort as well as instruction of his people ; in the writings of those glorious stars , the sacred pen-men , may the saints read their fortunes , and with comfort apply unto themselves the divine dispensations of god to his people . hath god brought england through a red sea of war out of egyptian bondage , and will he not perfect his work ? is the mighty hand of omnipotencie shortned that it cannot save ? or the loving kindnesse of the immutable deity changed that he will not save ? though the murmurers ( those repiners at gods hand , who would upon beds of down , with all ease and plenty be carried through the wildernesse ) may be cut off , and those low soules whom the height of the sons of anak hath caused to rebell against the most high be consumed ; and who knows whether for their sakes he hath not deferred to settle us in the promised land ? yet shal the caleb's and joshua's who have followed god fully be brought into it , and their seed shal possesse it ; though god may defer his mercies because of some mens infidelity , yet in his good time he will accomplish them , if his people walk worthy of them . let us not then despair , nor be impatient , but endeavour to fit our selves to receive them ; for the wise god , and our merciful father knows better what is good for us than our selves , his time is best , but let us from the bottom of our hearts eccho to that petition in the gospel , thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven . but i shal not insist further in applying scripture , and i could wish some ( i am persuaded godly persons ) had not been ( i fear ) to adventurous in misapplying it ; for surely if we warily look into those prophecies in daniel , we shall hardly find them calculated for the meridian of great britain , and ireland ; were not some peremptorily concerning the return of the jews out of the babylonish captivity , as in 9. chap. 24. verse ! the comming of christ , and the destruction of jerusalem , as in 25 , 26 , 27. &c. verses others concerning the four monarchies in 2. chap. the division of alexanders kingdome , in 8. chap. and the empire of rome , in the 11. chap. so if we behold the book of the apocalyps , it rather seems to hold forth the actions of a world than an island , and the great concernments of the rational species than of a few english individuums . i hope i shal be allowed liberty of conscience in so intricate a case , especialy being no fundamental point of salvation , and if god shal be pleased to use england as the primary instrument in my dayes for the destruction of that romish kingdome of antichrist , and the exaltation of the lord jesus blessed for ever on the throne , i shal endeavor to praise him both in word and deed , and humbly to prostrate my life and fortunes at his feet , as ready to wait upon him in what part of that work he shall be pleased to make me though never so meanly instrumental . chap. ii. that there is a way which leads to this knowledge , and what it is . and now setting aside the before rehearsed follies of the besotted world , i shall attempt by a new way of conjecture to guesse at the fortune of the common-wealth ; reason shal be the jacobs-staff by which i shall take its height , and in that true glasse shew you its futureface , that i may have few , and those inconsiderable opponents . i know that discourse which is most filled with reason must needs be most victorious and triumphant , the weapons of it are general , and there is none of the sonnes of men able to oppose its force , the unjust infidel must believe it , or deny his essence , and the atheist must subscribe upon perill of his being , for the creator , or as they , nature it self gave it an imprimatur & {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the eternal being graved it on immortal soules , as philo very excellently declares , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . it is essential , & so must be universal to the species of mankind ; and as aristotle saith , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , what soever is natural , is immovable , and perpetually in the same manner energetical ; it constantly and continually commands obedience , and none but a monster , an heteroclite in nature , as the philosopher speaks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , will dare to resist it ; but to our purpose . there is not , i confesse , enough light in any c●eated reason to give a bright displaying of fate , nor is there vigour enough in any created eye to pierce into the marrow and pith , into the depth and secresie of the eternal decree ; yet can it discover such objects as are within its own sphere with a sufficient certainty . the actings of providence are so fairly printed , and the letters of it so visible , and capital , that we may read them , though some perverse beings , unworthy the name of men , slight all its workings , upon this account , that they are rolling , and fluctuating ; who with the old scepticks by a kind of strange hypocrisie , and in an unusual way of affectation , pretend to more ignorance than they have , nay than they are capable of , or with socrates cry , hoc tantum scire , se nihil scire ; he only knows this , that he knoweth nothing ; and with the academicks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . i cannot comprehend . but let me tel such dubious , if not lazy , gentlemen , that it is an error very derogatory to the plenitude and exuberancy of the divine actings , which stream out in a clear cognoscibility , and no lesse injurious to their own natural capacities , which were not made so streight and narrow-mouth'd , as not to receive those lessons that continually drop from providence upon the world . it is an unquestionable rule , omne quod est , quando est , necesse est esse , a contingency , when 't is extra suas causas , when it is actually produced , having a determinatum esse , it may then also have a determinate cognoscibility ; for entity is the root and bottome of intelligibility ; a common-wealth in its growth is uncertain , and the means whereby it shal acquire strength lie hid in the eternal decree , until by the working of providence they are presented to publick view , and then we know how it attained to maturity , chap , iii. this way confirmed by reason , and examples . now this ordinary working of providence hath so often shown it selfe in the adadvancement of states , that with a little industry we may track it , and by its leadings may conjecture how good a progress such or such a state shall have ; for matters in fact are as certain in being and reality , as demonstrations . and this may be enlightned by a simile fetch 't from vegetables , which we see thrive by the alternat help of heat and moisture , moderately and in their seasons shining , and showring down upon them ; yet either of these in excesse , much enfeebles , or totally destroys them : hence without a witch wil your countrey man foretel plenty or scarcity , and indeed all such effects as lurk in probable causes , that seem to promise very fairly , may be known also in an answerable , and proportionable manner , by strong , and shrewd conjectures : thus the physician knows the disease , the mariner forsees a storm , & the shepherd provides for the security of his flock . thus by an intermingled influence of peace and war , nations have grown renowned , whereas , either alone depresses or extinguishes them ; and for this we can give good reason . for warre files off that rust that is apt to canker and eat into the bowels of states ; it opens the veins , purifies the bloud , and makes it lively , and generous ; it raiseth and quickneth the spirits , and makes the members active and prompt for the highest and noblest atchievments . and peace it fills the barns , is the nurse of trade , from whence grow the golden sinnews that strengthen the arms , and makes them able to wield their weapons in the time of war ; is the patronesse of learning , the mistresse of art , the parent of good and wholesome laws ; needs then must that nation vigorously encrease , on which both these have a joynt and happy influence . but if any should ask how it is possible to enjoy both ? let them go and see how one spring is made happy by both show'rs and sun-shine ; nay they may be both at once , there may be a forein war , yet peace at home , it may rain and shine , and that together . yet let the drums bellow too long , and people will eccho to them , and become brutish , savage and barbarous ; let war break in on all sides , and like a deluge it sweeps all before it , and if any thing be left , it is but mud and dirt . or let a long calm come what sloath , what luxury , what effeminatness and cowardice doth it create ? how doth it enervate the members , clog the spirits , cause the blood to putrifie , and corrupt , and beget that lazy and scurvy disease which makes the whole body to draw a faint , sickly , inglorious , yea , a noisom breath ? thus we see the standing waters to corrupt , and naturall bodies craz'd , and resolv'd to their first earth , as much by plurisies as consumptions , by surfeits as famine ; and soules as oft forced by a disease to take their flight , as a sword , and by an inward malady not seldomer than an outward enemie compell'd to quit their beloved mansions . and as reason , so examples , and those in all ages , may be brought to back our assertions . the assyrian , caldaean , and persian monarchies by arms got footing , and became powerfull , by a mixt peace , they grew into a form of government , & whilst these walked hand in hand , they continued both formidable , and lovely , and to use the scripture expression , they were fair as the moon , bright as the sun , and terrible as an army with banners . this temperature of beauty and terror , order and strength , is the happy crasis of a state ; these in their true proportions make up the perfect symetry , and from these discords springs the sweetest harmony in state musick . and now , when all their sayls were fill'd with the prosperous gales of fortune , and there was none but vail'd and stoopt unto them , on a sudden being becalm'd , an effeminate sardanapalus , a drunken belshazzar , and a luxurious darius , put a period to their greatnesss ; so easie it is to tumble down hill . thus the roman monarchy fell to pieces , and became a prey to barbarous nations , yet out of its ashes arose a phenix , a maiden cōmon-wealth , which hath preserv'd her beauty as well as virginity for twelve hundred years without wrinckle or blemish , and hath so often foild the ottoman forces , to whom the grecian empire became a prey with little difficulty ; so potent is vertue even in the least bodies , and of such advantage is situation , and bad neighbours too sometimes which will not suffer her antient vertue to be cankered , or eaten with rust . thus a few fisher-towns among the batavers became a common-wealth in despight of spain , and flanders to boot , and from poor distressed states are grown hogen-mogens with the help of england , for which they have since well rewarded us . but let them take heed lest their high and mightinesses be not brought as low as their situation , being grown resty with their former little successes , peace , and plenty , and by their treacherous ingratitude made their best friend their enemy , to whom they are as much inferior in true valour , as they surpasse in pride , arrogancy , trechery , and cruelty . yea , to come home , how illustrious , and famous did this nation grow in the dayes of queen elizabeth ? what noble acts ? what generous spirits did it bring forth ? what supplies did it afford the netherlands ? what an help was it to france , and what a scourge and terror to the usurping spaniards ? whose armado stiled invincible it not onely sent home wel beaten , but with fire and sword took revenge in their havens and on their coasts ; and yet into how contemptible a condition it did relapse by a long sloath , and how it hath been undervalued , our own eyes can witnesse unto us , if we look a little back , even to the sadning of our friends , and rejoycing of our enemies . thus the best made clocks by long being unwound up gather rust , and become unfit for the least motion . and this that politick law-giver perceiving , gave it in command to the spartans , not to wage war often with one and the same enemy ; which when agesilaus one of their kings had neglected to their losse , and his own smart , he was flouted , returning wounded , by antalcidas , with , the thebans have well rewarded thee , o king , whom , unwilling and ignorant , thou hast compeld and taught to conquer . chap. iiii. an admonition to many amongst us . what then may we think of some lately appearing amongst us , who neither minding their own good , not their masters businesse , have been bold in the sight of the sun to upbraid those in power with these latter wars , as fomented and raised for their lusts , and our pressure , which by the good hand of providence hitherto have turned to our honour , and advantage , and it may be have been a means to prevent our ruin ; the common enemy keeping us from quarrelling among our selves , and as it were binding up our hands from intestine slaughter : for so many and so great divisions there were amongst us , such animosities and heart-burnings in one party against the other , as in that unsetled estate we were in at first , in sua victrices vertentes viscera dextras , might have turned our weapons into our own bowels , had not heaven in mercy cut out work for us elsewhere , until we were a little ▪ better come to our selves what means then the bleatings , and lowings of these cattel , which are driven like beasts to the slaughter ? for alas fond youths , though your noddles are not full enough to render you suspected of design , yet undoubtedly have you been set a going by some well practiz'd in the art of sedition , and whose concernments and inclinations prodigiously meet in that fatal point , to whom it may seem as natural to live in the fire of contention , as profitable to fish in troubled waters ; consider but the bottom , and you will abhor the broachers of this design , who under the pretence of crying down forein , would stir up a civill war ; and of advancing peace , and freedom , raise rebellion and confusion , which would inevitably ruin your selves , trades , and countrey . let not any of these flie sinons make you break down your own walls , to bring in so fatal an engine , a second trojan-horse , which will powrforth armed tyrants in the dead of night upon you , whose understandings they have charmd asleep with their false & counterfeit pretences . timete danaos et dona ferentes : you cannot be too mistrustfull of your old enemy , of whom this design smels rank ; take heed , i say , you lose not your liberty in the noise you make for freedom , and whil'st you crowd out authority , you bring not tyranny in on pick-back ; which your enemies of themselves despair ever to accomplish . thus have i seen full-grown fruit which hath withstood the assaults of outward storms , rot with superfluity of innate moysture , and the double-armed nut resolv'd to dust by a worm bred in its own kernel . or what shall we say to a second sort , those sons of sloath , those dregs of a lazy and luxurious peace , who as if their souls lay in their bellies , find no content but in ease and riot ? whose whole note is , where are those golden dayes we once had ? where are our court-revellings and masques ? where our lord-maiors feasts and shews , and all those joviall sports gone , in which england was wont to pride herself and triumph ? not a wake , not a morrice-dance now to be feen , are these the effects of a parliament ? and is this that we have got by fighting ? alas poor souls ! you dream't ( i 'le warrant ) a parliament would have made the thames flow custard , and turn'd the pebbles on the shore into garoway-comfits ; have caused bag-pudding to grow on every bush , and each pond abound with beef and brewis ; have commanded the conduits to run sack and clarret , and the rivers and brooks ale and strong beer ; and welladay , your houses are not wall'd with hasty pudding , neither do pigs ready roasted come and cry come eat me ; lubberland is as far off now as ever , and you deceived of all your goodly expectations ; but peace , put fingers out of neyes , and i will tell you what ; yea , what your countrey , your mammee ( if she be not ashamed to own you ) hath got ; she hath gained her freedom , and regain'd her reputation ; of a baffel'd , scorn'd , and despised kingdom , she is become a victorious , dreadfull , and renowned common-wealth ; she that was contemned by a spain , cudgel'd by b france , brav'd by c holland , affronted by d irelād , & baffe'ld by e scotla . hath made those with whom she hath grappell'd feel the force of her arms , and taught the rest to observe their due distance ; yea she hath done more in four years , than your monarchs could do in four hundred ; having quell'd ireland , subdued scotland , cudgel'd holland , and with a navy of near two hundred sayl scoured her narrow seas , and swept her enemies coasts , notwithstanding her strugglings at home with such undutifull sons as your selves , who have layd all the stumbling-blocks in her way they either could or durst . but your purses pay for this you cry , i warrant you , and so they did for the puppets and pageants , the hobby-horses and bells , and all the rest of the trumperies your souls so much delighted in ; as i conceive too you were wont to pay subsidies for your charters , and your petition of right , which you hung by and gaz'd on with as much benefit to your selves then , as now on your scotch covenant ; as also ship-mony , knighthood-mony , coat and conduct-mony , and now and then you received a privy-seal ; your carts now and then did attend the court , and your oxen , sheep , horses , hay , straw , oats , &c. were taken up at the kings price , and that payd too , when you could get it ; there were slavish tenures , and a court of wards , a star-chamber , and an high-commission court with its appurtenances in each diocesse ; justices in eire , and forrest laws , &c. which cost you something ; but you will be wiser upon second thoughts , put on your considering caps than , for you know not what you may come too ; what though you are out of hopes of being courtiers you may be patriots , and instead of being slaves to flattery , become patrones of liberty ; what though you cannot buy knight-hoods , and lordships , yet may you purchase never-dying honour to your names by faithfully serving your god , and countrey . act then vertuously , and let posterity find your names in the van of good common-wealths-men , among the first ranks of the assertors of liberty . which of you , were you to choose , would not rather be read in history a brutus , than a tarquin ; an aristogiton , than a pisistratus ; a pelopidas , than an archas ; a timoleon , than a dionysius ? whether doth the name of lancaster , or gaveston , hereford , or spencer , make the pleasinger found in english ears ? and which were accounted martyrs , which traitor , in the thoughts of your generous ancestors ? and if all this will not prevail with you , if duty and honour appear small in your eyes , yet profit sure will do much ; it is the way to thrive ; for it is more than probable that the common-wealth will survive its enemies , and there are certain symptomes of its welfare . that providence which hath hitherto brooded upon it , and hatcht it into this perfection , that hand of omnipotency which hath given assured tokens of assistance from heaven , hath in text-letters written its fortune on its forehead , so that the least read in physiognomy may spell it out . the schoolmen observe , divina voluntas , licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra , ex suppositione tamen unius actus liberi , potest necessitari ad alium . we shall not go so high , but this we shall say , that where god hath so visibly owned a nation , he will never draw back his hand unlesse upon some notorious provocation . lift up your eyes then , os homini sublime dedit , coelumque videre jussit , & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus , which were given you to this end , and contemplate the works of your gracious creator , it is your duty so to do , and he expects it at your hands ; be not rebels to nature , nor make frustrate the admirable frame of your creation , wch wil argue you not only ingrate , but worse than brutish , yea put you in the lower form , to the beasts that perish , for as the heathen satyrist , sensum è coelesti demissum traximus arce , cujus egent prona , & terram spectantia ; mundi principio indulsit communis conditor illis tantùm animas , nobis animum quoque . but lest there should be some so ignorant that they cannot , others so lazy that they will not take the pains to read this hand-writing from heaven , i will endeavour so plainly to set it before them , that fronaque si spectent animalia , if they look but downwards , will they , nill they , they shal perceive it , unles they blindfold themselves , and wink out of design ; and for such moles , let them enjoy their dark caverns , and there delve and dig untill they have laid themselves as low as they desire , or deserve ; let their affected shades envelope them , and not the smallest star disturb their cimmaerian enjoyments ; let the nights black quiristers , ravens and scrich-owls , sing anthems and requiems to their souls , and no sun arise to disturb the musick , and dissolve the lucky consort . chap. v. how england became a common-wealth , and what may be expected from such a beginning . the english nation by a long and bloody civill war being awak't out of that sleep which had almost brought a lethargy upon her , ( like an angry lion rows'd and enrag'd with the smart of his wounds ) resolutely , and with a courage not unworthy the nobility of her stock , sets upon the foe that had so gall'd her , and soon brought him under her feet ; then disdaining to wear the fetters of a conquered enemy , assumes the power god then , and nature at first had invested her with , and assumes her pristine freedom . thus bellona was the midwife which brought england to bed of the common-wealth , which was no sooner born , but she swadled her in ensigns torn from her proudest foes , and adorned her cradle with trophies of victory ! o sacred and happy birth ! what triumphs attend thy youth , and what lawrells shall encircle thy manly front ? thou that hast strangled serpents in thy cradle , givest us hopes , that the seaven-headed hydra shall fall by thee when thou hast attained thy full strength ; and who hast made it as it were thy sport to pull down petty tyrants , wilt make it thy businesse to destroy the grand impostor ; that as with thy fist thou hast given him a box on the ear , so with thy sword thou wilt divide his head from his shoulders ; for what lesse than a triple crown can attend thy chariot , whose go-cart is lackied on by crowns in couples ? for great , even for so great things sure hath providence reserv'd thee , whom she hath so carefully tended in thy infancy ; for though she hath suffered thine enemies to rise against thee , yet so tender a regard hath she had of thy youth , that she put hooks as it were in their nostrils , and restrained them from uniting , whom single she knew thee able to grapple with ; so that their malice hath augmented thy glory , and by their endeavouring to ruin thee , they have encreased thy power , making themselves but touchstones to convince the world of the purity of thy metal , and on their own shoulders advancing thee above an ordinary height , that the world might take notice of thy growth , and stature ; and as with thee , so hath she done with others , even with all all those whom she intended to advance ; examples of which , both divine , and humane histories abundantly offer to our veiw . thus was it with israel in their conquering the promised land , sihon king of the amorites first sets upon them , then og king of baashan came out against them , &c. thus we find it with divers others in other authors , which to avoid prolixity i shall passe by , instancing in one and that so well known , that few , if any therebe , but have heard thereof , and that the common-wealth of rome , which from a small beginning grew up into so vast a body , that her eagles-wings spread over the greatest part of the then known world . chap. vi . the beginning of the common-wealth of rome , and the causes of its growth . this city , or rather town of rome , being founded by romulus , and inhabitants gathered together from divers places , was no sooner built , but it was threatned with ruin in its very infancy , and the best it could expect was but an ages duration ; for the greatest part of the inhabitants being single , all hope of issue was cut off , which onely could afford it a longer life : wives thus wanting , and none to be obtained by consent , so contemptible were they in the eyes of their neighbours , they attempt what craft and force would do ; and their plot succeeded to their minds ; for having proclaimed publick plays , and invited their neighbours , they suddenly provided themselves wives of the sabine virgins , which came with their parents to be spectators . yet this remedy seemed as dangerous as the disease ; for the sabines were a great and war-like nation , and a colony of the spartans , after whose manner they lived in towns without walls , reputing themselves safe in their own valour , and the romans could not but expect they would resent the affront . but see how fortune ( which we christians truly tearm providence ) gave them assistance , by giving let to the conjunction of their enemies , though of one nation , and alike interessed in the quarrell . first , the caeninenses come against them , whose king being slain by romulus in fight hand to hand , and their army defeated , were compelled to leave their old habitations , and go and dwell at rome by the conqueror , who by this means encreased his strength as well as reputation , and became the better able to deal with the rest . this war done , the fidenates , crustimini and antenates begin another , and run the same fortune , and likewise being incorporated with the victors still encrease the roman stock . the rest grown wise by these examples unite , and put the romans to such a plunge , that it was easie to conjecture what have would have been the issue , had they taken this course at first ; but by the intercession of the women running in between the armies , a peace was made , and both nations joyned in one , the city keeping its old name of rome from romulus , the people being called quirites from the chief tribe of the sabines , the roman and sabine kings jointly reigning . now could the wisest among the sons of mē have judged that a rape should have begot an union ? but there is an hand above disposes of things above our suppositions , which continued its favour till rome grew of perfect strength . this was he that withdrew porsenna , and changed his enmity into love , and admiration ; that restrained any warlike marcian or lucan , any mulius , silo , or telesinus with the joint forces of italy from falling upon her , untill she was able to bear the storm ; that out supplies off from hannibal when he had almost born down all before him , and made the envy of his own citizens instrumental to their own ruin ; that made antiochus sit still until philip was brought under , and tigranes look on until mithridates was beaten out of his kingdom , yea that provided work by the sarmatians for mithridates till the marsian war was over ; that divided the cimbri and teutones so , that marius when he had overthrown one party , had time to joyn with the other consull to help destroy the other , and suffered not three hundred thousand fighting men in one body to attempt italy ; and in like manner the slaves , and fencers , giving crassus opportunity to defeat them , who had ranged italy , and oft put the roman armies to rout ; that by a few geese saved the capitol , and caused the unjust banishment of camillus to be a means to preserve rome . chap. vii . a parallel . and hath not providence in the same manner dealt with this common-wealth ? which was no sooner established in england , but it was threatned from ireland , where dublin , derry , and a few forces under generall monk were onely left us , two being besieged , and the third in an incapacity to afford them relief ; when things were thus desperate , god divided the rebels , and made o neal instrumental in the relief of derry , neither could they be pieced untill ormond was totally broke , and the other party under the popish bishop of clogher , fought and routed . the irish cloud almost dissolved , a scotch storm threatens us , which yet came not on so suddenly , but that we had time to provide shelter , ( providence causing them to trifle away much time in their treaties , and other mockeries ) insomuch that the greatest part of it fell in their own nation , the tayl only besprinkling some parts of this , where it totally vanished . and here we can never sufficiently admire gods goodnesse to this common-wealth , who when the enemy had given our army the slip , and left them so far behind them , suffered them not to march up to london , but to empound themselves at worcester , and so over-ruled the hearts of this nation , that notwithstanding the malice and hatred of many to the present government , yet not any considerable person , or number , joyned with the enemy , even marching through the most discontented and disaffected counties . the north being cleared , the dutch jealous of our encrease , who have found the sweetnesse of a state government , endeavour to clip our wings , and to usurp our long held soveraignty of the seas , having undermined our trading a long while before ; but they may put what they have got by it in their eyes without any danger , unlesse of making themselves weep , notwithstanding their treacherous and base attempt upon a small squadron with one of our generals in the time of ttreaty , and before denouncing a war , and that even upon our own coast ; whilst we besides the honour , and repute gained abroad , are grown more potent at sea in one year , than we had like to have been in many ages , had they let us been at quiet ; and even thus the carthaginians compell'd the romans to become masters at sea , by their injuries provoking that stout nation to adventure a sea fight , though so ignorant , that the consull taught them to row by sitting , and beating poles on the sand ; and truely little better sea-men were our redcoats at first . chap. viii . of providence , and vertue , and the concurrence of second causes . and sure now no christian but will acknowledge a divine hand over-ruling in these actings for englands preservation , which even the heathen observ'd by their dim light , in romes advancement . thus we find that ingenuous moralist plutarch affirming , that though there hath been a great and continual war , and feud between fortune and vertue , yet it is probable , they made a truce , and united their forces for romes assistance . again , as they report venus passing over the river eurotas laid aside her looking-glasse , attire , and girdle , and took a spear and a shield to accompany lyeurgus ; so fortune having deserted the assyrians , and persians , hovered over macedon , suddenly shook off alexander , view'd egypt and syria , seemingly advanc'd carthage , at last past tiber , laid aside her wings , and set up her residence in the capitol . and as he , so the romans themselves were sensible of this divine aid , as the multitude of temples dedicated to fortune may demonstrate ; there was the temple of fortunae virilis : fortunae muliebris : fortunae primogeniae & obsequentis : fortunae privatae & viscatricis : fortunae virginis : fortunae bonae spei : fortunae masculae : fortis fortunae , &c. yet did they not attribute all to fortune , and neglect vertue , of which they were as great admirers , and honourers , as they were adorers of the other ; and plutarch gives it a due place : rome was ( saith he ) conducted and encompassed with whole troops of citizens , brandishing bloody weapons , enobled with scars received before , bedewed with blood and sweat , and leaning on half-broken trophies , such as her fabricii , cimilli , cincinnati , fabii , aemillii , marcelli , scipiones , &c. and let us but consider , and we shall see that providence works by instruments , and god expects the use of means ; we cannot suppose a victory without a fight ; lying still , and wishing will do nothing , d●i munerasua laboribus vendunt , it was not hid from the heathen , that the active onely were to expect a blessing ; the hand of the diligent makes rich , and vertuous actions advance states and persons to honour and dignity . for though scientia dei , the knowledg of god be the cause of things , yet being but the remote cause it takes not away contingency : god himself perceives that some things will evenire contingenter , for he doth not onely cognoscere res , sed ordinem et modum rerum , know things , but the order and manner how they shall come to passe ; he knows there are causae intermediae , which are impedibiles et defectibiles ( as the schoolmen say ) and from the wavering of these second causes the whole rise of contingency flowes ; thus in a syllogism , let the major be necessary , if the minor be contingent , the conclusion will be so too ; though the first cause be certain , yet if there be obstructions in the second , no man can assure himself what will be the effect ; though the spring of motion cannot fail , yet if the wheels break , the progresse will be very uncertain to all but god , who knows whether they will break or no ; he knows whether such a nation will use the means or no ; whether it will improve his blessings , or abuse them ; whether it will imploy the peace , plenty , wealth , power , and strength it hath received for his glory , and the common good , or for pride , luxury , and riot : so that we only are in the dark ; yet not altogether are we blind , but where we see vertue on the throne in a nation , there we may foretel a blessing to that people , and where vice predominant , that its attendant ruin is not far off ; and for this the before-mentioned common-wealth of rome affords us an example in both kinds ; which as it grew up by vertue to an unparallel'd height , so by vice was its strength broken , and its renown turned into shame , that dalilah betraying this mighty sampson into the hands of his enemies , who have fettered him , and pulled out his eyes : it will not therefore i suppose be a work unworthy our labour to take a veiw of those vertues , by which , that , as other nations have become renowned , and set them for our example ; for though heathens , they attained to a great height of morality , yea such an one as may put most that wear the stile of christians to the blush . chap. ix . of the piety of the romans , the evill and danger of mock-thanksgivings . and first let us behold their piety , which is not onely the cheif , but the file-leader , and indeed the ground of all the rest ; this is that which bridles the most unruly , and strikes an aw where reason cannot persuade ; let this be taken away , and with it all fidelity , justice , purity vanish , yea humane society cannot subsist without it , as cicero observes in his first book de nat. deor. never did they begin any businesse without frequent supplications . civitas religiosa in principiis maximè novornm bellorum , supplicationibus habitis , & obsecratione circa omnia pulvinaria facta , ludos jovi , donumqui vovere consulem jussit . livie dec . 4. l. 1. supplicatio ▪ à consulibus in triduum ex senatus-consulto indicta est , obsecratique circa omnia pulvinaria dii , quod bellum populus jussisset , id bene , ac foeliciter eviniret . idem in eodem . never did they obtain a victory , or receive a deliverance , but publick thanksgivings were decreed , and those for one , three , or more dayes , according to the greatnesse of the benefit ; magna victoria loetitiaque romae fuit literis allatis , supplicatio in triduum decreta est , & 40. majores hostiae immiolari juss● . livy . thus when hannibal was forced to leave italy after sixteen years war , they no sooner heard of it , but they ordered solemn and publick thanks . decretum ut quinque dies circa omnia pulvinaria supplicaretur , victimaeque majores immolarentur centum & viginti . never shall we find them mocking heaven , giving thanks for a victory , when they had received a losse . a practice so superlatively impious , that any lesse than an atheist must tremble but to think on ; for what is this but to abuse god , that man may be deceived , making the divine power ( may it be spoken with reverence ) as it were a stalking-horse to drive the befool'd people into their nets ? what is this other than a profest declaration that their sole confidence is in the arm of flesh , not caring how they undervalew gods glory , so they may maintain their own reputation , how they provoke him , so they may but keep up the spirits of their own party ? flectere si nequeunt superos acheronta monebunt , sith god hath forsaken them , they will try what the devill will do ; sith heaven refuses , they will try what help hel will afford them ; poor wretches , not at all considering , that whilst they endeavour to rally , and patch together a poor , routed and broken party of frail men , they make omnipotency their foe , defying the almighty himself in so publick a manner , that he is engaged by that which is most dear to him , his own glory , to revenge the affront ; it is evident then how good a match they are like to have of it . neither doth their wickednesse stop here ; t is not against god only they sin , but men also ; they are not only traytours against the majesty of heaven , but their trust on earth , betraying their own poor people which repose their confidence in them , by rendring them obstinate and proud upon hopes of false successe , which knew they but the truth , and their own weakness , might make their peace to the preservation of many of their lives , and much of their fortunes ; and drawing the blood and miseries of their neighbour-nations upon their own heads , falsely seduced to embarque with them in their ill-thriving quarrel , wherein unawares they often are opprest when they foolishly supposed all cock-sure . yet hath this impious and treacherous piece of policy been acted again and again in our eyes , with horrour and amazement may we speak it , even by those who would be thought christians : yea may not this clothe many of the oxford-thanksgiving dayes in red , and put our dutch foes , if they have any ingenuity , to the blush , who not coutent by their emissaries abroad to abuse all europe with brags and lyes , have of late ordered a day of publick thanksgiving at home to gull their own people into conceit of victory , not without a piaculum , which may cost them dear before it be expiated . for he that is high and mighty indeed , neither can be deceived , nor will be out-faced by any impudency whatsoever , and they had best consider whether they are able to engage with him too , whom they dare affront in the sight of angels and men . courage then brave englishmen , you see what shifts your enemies are put to , you have beaten them out of their confidence in the rock of ages , and forced them to make lyes their refuge , a wretched defence , and such as cannot long protect thē ; behold what low-spirited foes you have to deal with , even such as dare not take notice of a losse ; alas how far short come these of the roman fortitude as well as piety , whom you shall see according to that of their own virgil , tu ne cede malis , sed contrà audentior ito , so far from being basely dejected by losses , though comming one on the back of another , that their courage rather encreased , being prick't on with shame and a desire to regain their lost honour , which stil buoied them up when in greatest danger of sinking ? this is that true sober valour grounded on a right sense of honour , and due love to the publick , which needed neither gunpowder nor brand-wine to make them fight lustick ; this is that which rendred them victorious and triumphant , and which will enable , you if you imbrace it . but we shall have occasion to speak of this more hereafter ; let us return therfore to our generous romans , whom we find ( i say ) so far from this impious mocking of heaven , that on the contrary , upon the least sense or apprehension of their gods displeasure , they sought by all humble and publick addresses to pacifie and appease their incensed dieties : for this we may see their frequent lustrations and deprecations , the first to purge and cleanse themselves , the second to avert and turn away their gods anger . horum prodigiorum causa decemviri libris adire jussi , et novēdiale sacrum factum , & supplicatio indicta est , atque urbs lustrata . liv. dec. 4. l. 6. lastly , besieging an enemies city , they would invoke the gods of that place , imploring their aid , and deprecating their anger , by inviting them to go with them to rome with the promise of more magnificent temples , and a more splendid adoration : so great a care had they not to provoke heaven , and so fearfull were they to engage against it . chap. x. piety and valour not inconsistent ' piety rewarded in heathens , and impiety punished . and here by the way may be observed , that piety and valour are not inconsistent , and that religion maketh not men cowards . what nation ever was more valiant , and what more religious than the roman ? who were so strict in their divine worship , that they would choose rather to lay themselves open to their enemies arms , than by omitting the least part of it , to their gods displeasure : an eminent example of which we have in that war of the gauls which succeeded the first punick , in which when flaminius and furius the consuls were gone against the enemy with great forces , the augurs having found that some things were omitted in their election , they were commanded by letters from the senate to return presently and abjure their offices , which letters flaminius not opening until he had fought and routed the enemy , and made a memorable invasion of their countrey , though he returned crowned with victory , and laden with spoil , not one went out to meet him , nay he had much ado to obtain a triumph , ( which was no sooner past , but both he and his collegue were constrained to lay aside their consulships ) because he seemed to have contemned & made slight of their holy rites ; they esteeming it more conducing to the common safety that their gods should be observed , than their enemies overcome , and rather choosing to leave their armies without commanders , though in a war reputed so dangerous as that of the gauls , in which their priests were not exempted from bearing arms , than omit the least punctilio in their worship , so zealous and tender were they in matters concerning their religion . thus when they were besieged by the gauls in the capitol , and the day approached wherein their solemn sacrifice was to be performed in colle quirinali , the hill so called , rather than to omit their duty to heaven , they ventured through the very midst of their enemies camp , and having performed their rites , returned with safety , their enemies either being amazed at the boldnesse of the attempt , or mooved with respect to religion , which present death could not deter them from performing . and though their religion were idolatrous , yet according to their light being zealous they reaped the reward of a temporal prosperity : which some among them despising , smarted for to the purpose , in their own ruin reaping the reward of their impiety and contempt of religion : thus we shall see crassus who slighting the curses and execrations of the tribune ateius , would make war upon the parthians , where he lost his own and his sons life , with most of his army , the poor remainder escaping by a dishonourable flight : and thus pompey the great , who would , notwithstanding the intreaties and diswafions of the high-priest , enter the holy of holies in the temple of jerusalem , in his comming out fell down , and never after prospered , but being overthrown by caesar , and flying into aegypt , lost his head , his body being left unburied on the sands : and though he were no jew , yet being a roman by religion he was bound to reverence all deities , as the {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the temple of all the gods at rome may demonstrate . neither need we wonder to see even a superstitious and idolatrous worship in the heathens who knew no better , rewarded with outward blessings : sith whatsoever is lovely in nature is acceptable even to god himself , for 't is a print of himself , and he doth proportion some temporal rewards unto it ; the courage of romulus , the devotion of numa , the integrity of fabritius , the temperance , and justice , and publick spiritednesse of the rest , had all some rewards scatter'd amongst them , and can we think their piety had no share ? which is so agreeable to nature , and so deeply imprinted by it on mans heart , that man , even the stubbornest , and most unwilling otherwise to submit , yet will fall down and worship a stock or stone rather than be without a deity , will devise a religion rather than be without one ; but more of this in the next . chap. xi . religion ingrafted in mans haart by nature . vve hear the philosopher thus reasoning , do not the imperfect serve the more perfect , as the elements mixt bodies , mixt bodies plants , plants living creatures , living creatures and all the rest man , nay hath not the soul a master like rule over the body , and the understanding an empire over the appetite , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and now when by nature it is thought convenient for the inferiour to serve the superiour , ought not man to judge it best for him to serve the most wise and good god ? cicero saith we cannot be just , unlesse we be religious , fietas justitia quaedam est adversus deos , lib. 1. de nat. deor. epictetus , if i were a nightingale , i would do as a nightingale , but being a man what shall i do ? i will praise god ; and that without ceasing . nay epicurus himself though he taught that god {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; neither did any thing himself , nor commanded others to do , yet affirmed that his nature was so excellent and glorious , that it alone was sufficient to allure a wiseman to adore him . could the heathen grope thus far , and shall we that have the name to be christians lagge behind them , could they perceive thus much by the glimmering light of nature , and shall we be blind in the glorious sun-shine of the gospel ? for shame let us open our eyes , lest they rise in judgement , and condemn us , and it be more tollerable for them than us in that great day , when the lord shall appear with thousands and ten thousands of saints and angels . behold o england to be religious is the way to thrive , godlinesse will be thy gain both here and hereafter . chap. xii . the outward means to be used ; ministers to be incouraged , and maintained ; the christian magistrates duty . now that we may be so , we are to use all means god hath appointed for the obtaining the true knowledge of him , and his will , which is the ground of religion ; for as our knowledge is true or false , so will our religion be too ; and the ordinary means are the reading and hearing of the sacred scriptures , for faith comes by hearing , and how shall we hear unlesse we are taught , and how shall we be taught without a teacher ? in the first place therefore as we ought to have a holy esteem of his word , so ought we to have a reverent esteem of the faithfull and able dispencers of it , giving them all due incouragement and maintenance , that they may be the better enabled cheerfully to follow that work whereunto they are called , of winning souls unto christ . and this is a duty incumbent on the christian magistrate , who is to use all lawful means to promote religion , and to restrain prophanesse , for he beareth not the sword in vain , but for terrour of evill doers , and encouragement of those that do well . and here let me not be mistaken , for though i believe it is their duty to punish those grand traytours against the majesty of heaven , blasphemers i mean , and all other publick disturbers of the civill peace and quiet of the nation ; yet on the otherside to force all men to submit to one form , or to be of such or such a general received opinion in every tittle , under penalty of censures civil and ecclesiastical , i conceive a tyranny as little to be suffered by the magistrate , as it had been for saul to have suffered nahash the ammonite to put out the right eyes of the gilcadites , for indeed this were to put out both our eyes . for it is god and none but god that can assure us of his own mind , though he do reveal his mind by a creature , there wil be some tremblings , and waverings in the soul , unlesse he doth withall satisfie the soul that such a creature doth communicate his mind truely and really as it is , so that ultimately the certainty is resolved into the voice of god , who is onely to rule his church {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by a determining and legislative power ; men that are fitted by god are to guide and direct {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , in way of subserviency to him , and by an explication of his mind , yet so that every one may judge of this {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by acts of their own understanding illuminated by the spirit of god , for there are no representatives in spirituals , men may represent the bodies of others in civil and temporal affairs , and thus a bodily obedience is due to a just authority , but there is none can alwayes represent the mind and judgement of another in the vitals and inwards of religion ; for as a late bishop of our own , ad nudam praescriptionem , aut determinationem alterius sine lumine privati judicii nemo est qui credere potest etiamsi cupiat maximè ; no man let him desire it never so much can believe the bare determination of another unlesse his own judgement concur ; a truth that condemns the antichristian practices of the rest that were of that order , and mirandula gives the reason of it , for says he , nemo credit aliquid verum praecisè quia vult credere illud esse verum , non est enim in potentia hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum , quando ipse voluerit : no man believes a thing because he will believe it , for it is not in the power of man to make a thing appear what he wil to his understanding ; and indeed , before there can be faith there must not only be a knowledg of the thing to be believed ; but an inclination also of the understanding to assent to it when known ; should we not judge that man a tyrant that should command us to renounce our sense , to believe that to be white that we see to be black , to believe that to be sweeter than honey , that we taste to be bitterer than gaul ? what are those then that would force us to disclaim our understandings , and make us believe that to be true , wch we conceive or know to be false ? and yet what cruelty in this kind hath been practized by the papists ? what by the prelates ? what by some that succeeded them , and yet de-cryed it in them ? yea what by some of those who will cry out for liberty of conscience too ? chap. xiii . religion not to be made a stalking-horse to ambition , or avarice . if any shall but question in the least , these mens jus divinum , presently they are hereticks , schismaticks , sectaries , &c. if any man shall not have the same whirligiggs in their pates as the other , or will not assent in an instant to what ever chymaera their rambling fancies produce , let them be what they will , parliament or city , magistrates or private persons , teachers or hearers , presently pray them down , purge them , they are self-seekers , tyrants , enemies to the saints , antichristian , and baals priests , and what not , yea such as are to be destroyed . yet by yout leave furious saint , you must excuse our diffidence of your tenents , yea and of your saint-ship too , until we perceive more ground for thē , and find a better temper in you ; our lord and master i am sure hath given us ground to doubt you , and i hope the servant is not above the lord , it will be best for us then to observe him , when his disciples would have had fire commanded from heaven , he tels them , ye know not what manner of spirit you are of , for the son of man is not come to destroy souls but to save them ; we know who is abaddon , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the destroyer , and it is his badg to be spitting of fire ; why is it not as lawfull for us to question an opinion though it have your stamp and superscription upon it , as it was for the bereans to bring even apostolical words to the touch-stone ? yet were they rewarded by saint paul with the title of {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , more noble , an epithite we canot find in your catalogue . but you will say , they believed , they did indeed , but not hand over head , and so may we when we find the same spirit bearing witnesse to your doctrine which did to the apostles . but through all your cantinglanguage we do discover your aimes , indeed out of the abundance of the heart your tongues tell us , you would be popular , great and powerfull , and injoy the fat things of the earth , these only belong to you and your tribe , you are to rule the nations , to bind their kings in chains , and their nobles with fetters of iron ; the old itch of temporal lordship is wretchedly broke out upon you , your hands are the hands of esau , though your voice be the voice of jacob , your practices are unchristian , though yout profession be sanctity ; christ he promises to make his disciples fishers of men , but you fish for honour , worldly power , and riches for your followers , a bewitching bait to catch poor mortals : we read of the devil tempting our head with the kingdoms of the world , and the glory of them , but from whom have you commission thus to tempt his members ? who gave you authority to dispose of worldly powers ? is your masters kingdom of this world ? if it be , we must rank you with those antichristian usurpers , who arrogate to themselves a power above all that is called god : what more doth that man of rome ? whom we find bestowing the kingdoms of the world on those that will bow down and worship him , but cursing , deposing , and turning out of office all that refuse to subscribe to his fopperies . thus we see mahomet not with this loadstone drawing men , but with his sword conquering them , he drawes his sword , bids them deliver up their souls , and upon this condition he will spare their lives : signailla quae tyrannis et latronibus non desunt , what more do tyrants and thieves ? but sure the christian religion stands not in need of such helps , whose principles in themselves are attractive and magnetical , enamouring souls , and leading them captive in the silken bonds of love with the cords of a man . chap. xiv . the benefit of humane learning , with an answer to some objections made against it . another sort there is wriggled in amongst us , who even in print and pulpits publickly bray against learning , endeavouring to seduce people into a belief that humane learning as they call it , is in no measure to be tolerated in a gospel-teacher , most wretchedly wresting scripture to apply those texts against preaching themselves to overthrow it ; a fallacie so base that they had need to cry up ignorance lest the cheat should be descried : as if learning and preaching themselves were termini convertibiles , the one necessarily implying the other ; whereas it is commonly quite contrary ; it is your sciolist , your fellow that hath scarce wet his lips in that sacred fountain , who will be dabling and patching that he may be thought a scholer , when as the most learned men , who are conscious of their own sufficiency , seldome or never , unless upon just , and necessary occasions make the least shew of it in their publick teaching . the truth of this is verified dayly in our eyes by the continual practice of many learned men amongst us . where shall we find more powerfull plainness , than in the works of the learned bolton , to omit the names of the rest , which are so well known to all ? thus shall we see your coward , the common braggadochio , and those the greatest boasters who have the least in them ; for such being conscious off their own baseness , endeavour to make others believe them to be brave fellows , which they know themselves not to be , and to make up in shew what they want in reality ; whereas your valiant man is still silent , and lets his acts speak for him , knowing according to the proverb , that good wine needs no bush , and that worth will be taken notice of without proclaiming it at the market cross . 2. but the apostles were poor fishrmen , and the like , altogether unlearned , and therefore the gospel ministers ought to be so too . o horrid , jesuitical , nay diabolical sophistry ! we acknowledge that the only wise god in the carrying on of his great and glorious works usually makes use of such instruments , as seem despicable , and contemptible in the eyes of men , yea such as are altogether unable and unfit to hatch and carry on defigns of their own , the more to manifest that it is his work , and to shew his strength in their weakness , which , unless supported by omnipotency , would sink under it , as also to leave the obstinate without excuse : but though these may seem weak , yet are they made mighty through the power of god that strengthens them , and are abundantly supplyed from above with what gifts and graces soever are necessary for them : thus the apostles being poor unlearned fishermen , and the like , once called , and invested with the apostleship , were endued from above , had the gift of tongues , immediately were taught by the holy ghost : and who dares affirm them unlearned then ? or deny skill in the tongues necessary for the office of a teacher , which god , who doth nothing in vain , by miracle bestowed upon them ? and what now though they wanted acquired learning , so they had it infused ? and god was pleased in that extraordinary time , in an extraordinary manner to endow them , must we therefore now neglect the ordinary means , and tempt god to work a miracle to be able to answer a gainsayer ? but let us but consider how faithful an handmaid learning hath been to religion ; how the armor-bearer hath helped jonathan to destroy the philistimes ; how necessary it hath been to maintain religion , and oppose idolatry ; by the help of learning have the ministery of england been enabled to defend the truth , and oppose errour , to ward off , and put by the blowes and thrusts of their antichristian adversaries , and to strike with the edge , and give them the true point , to the wounding & destroying of their superstitious tenents . thus we see the learned whitacre disarm their goliah , confute their bellarmine , foyl their chosen champion , unwind the subtil jesuite , trace him through all his maeanders , meet him at every turn , beat him from outwork to out-work , from sconce to sconce , till he hath driven him out of all his strengths , and left him not a lurking hole to hide his head in ; when the most that we could expect from a dean of dunstable could be bellarmine thou lyest , neither shewing sense or reason , but his say so . but it may be said , thank a good cause : yet may the best cause be spoiled by an evil mannaging , and the most bright and shining truths be obscured in a dark lanthorn , yea let them be whiter than snow , they may be sullied by dirty fingers , and more transparent than glass , yet may be cracked when clumsie fists shall come to handle them . this the jesuites know , which hath been the cause of this strange attempt , for it is most plain by the poyson now vomited , that some of those serpents are wriggled in amongst us ; they have tryed our weapons , and to their smart know the sharpness of them , no marvel then they endeavour to disarm us ; learning hath kept them out , no wonder then they attempt to introduce ignorance the mother , which could they effect , they are assured popish devotion the daughter would not be long kept out . neither can this seem strange unto us , if we but consider their practice in the lutheran church , where it hath been usual with the iesuites to seem to become proselites , to heighten and continue the division between them and the calvinists ; or what a late author of our own , who seems not to be unacquainted of their practices , writes of them , the jesuit reckons it in the number of his merits , if he may by any sinister wayes ruffle and disorder heretical kingdomes ( so he calls them ) encourage weak and unstable minds to slight magistracy , irritate divisions , tumults , rebellions , absolve from oaths , and all sacred tyes ; so that its hard to find any tragical scene , or bloody theatre , into which the jesuite hath not intruded , and been as busie as davus in the comedy , contributing in a very high measure to every fanatick insolence , justifying the old lemma of loyola's picture , cavete vobis principes : these are the firebrands of europe , the forge , and bellows of sedition , infernal emissaries , the pests of the age , men that live as if huge sins would merit heaven by an antiperistasis . concutiunt populos , vexant regna , solicitant bella , diruunt ecclesias . and it is for certain written from beyond the seas , that the english colleges are emptyed , and all those emissaries sent abroad , whither , unless amongst ●s ? chap. xv . an answer to some objections against learning , in a book entituled , the saints guide . and the same author goes on , nor is any nation without some turbulent spirits of its own , the dishonour of the gown , and pulpit , the shame , and sometimes ruin of their countrey ; one of which hath late started this question , whether or not all that much magnifyed natural reason ( which we think dignifieth us above , and distinguisheth us from brutes ) and all that humane learning ( which we conceive exalts and rectifyeth reason ) be the fruit of the forbidden tree , and is a spurious and adventious faculty , which man wanted in his innocency , and was instilled into him by satan in the fall ? a quaery satan himself might blush to put , and yet the book stuffed with this and the like doctrine , is cloathed with the specious title of the saints guide ; the wolf adorns himself with the lambs skinne , the fiend transforms himself into an angel of light : it is not amisse to mark the phrase he reproaches learning in , then how he coucheth his doctrine , lastly his divinity in these words , which man wanted in his innocency . indeed the old serpent told eve that the fruit of the forbidden tree would encrease their knowledge , but except him , and this disciple of his , i never found any affirming that man wanted any thing in his innocency : but suppose this diabolical doctrine true , if man wanted learning before , he much more wāts it since the fall ; the author of such stuff may well cry out against reason and learning . but to the question , that reason was depraved and darkned by the fall , we allow , and that by the help of learning it is in some measure restored , we affirm , and so consequently that there had been no need of acquired learning had man stood , no more would there of repentance : but doth it follow therefore , that now vve are fallen , vve should not labour for repentance ? let this fellow go and try whether he can perswade a man that is fallen into a pit not to endeavour to get out , because getting out is a fruit , and effect of his falling in . truly such arguing is instilled by satan , and such sophistry is a bastardly faculty which ingenuity , much more innocency , is so far from wanting , that it abhors and detests it . the fellow seems to be a scholer , i shall ask him therefore one question . is not reason the specifical difference of a man from a beast ? and was man distinguished from a beast by the fall , or the creation ? did the devil or god make him a rational creature ? behold then the horrid blasphemy couched in this query , which would insinuate the rational soul to be the product of the devil ; if this be not a doctrine of devils i know not what is . then for his parenthesis , ( which we think dignifieth us above , and distinguisheth us from brutes ) if reason doth not , what doth ? shape cannot , for so one beast differs from another : neither is it grace , for then all but beasts must have grace : and for his other ( which we conceive exalts , and rectifies reason ) hath not learning exalted and rectified his reason so far as to enable him from such and such premisses to draw such a and such a conclusion , to frame his syllogisms , to write and utter these words , positions , consectaries , quaeries , responsions , cognition , which his illiterate auditors and readers understand no more , than they do him and his drifts ? what but learning hath set his understanding above theirs , and enabled him to talk at a rate his ignorant followers onely can admire ? behold then you misled wretches what a guide you have got , who when all his sophistry , and abuse of his own reason and learning , all his logick and syllogisms are unable to overthrow reason and learning , goes about by his queries to undermine them ; who , when all his impudency dares not affirm , and all his ability cannot prove , endeavors by way off doubt to instill his poison , upon hopes that you will swallow & take for granted whatever drops from him : what is it you admire in this fellow , is it his railing against learning in others ? doth he not make use of it himself ? he disputes syllogistically , he is frequent in division , abounds in subtill and sophistical distinctions , talks hard words , rattles out latine , nay there is not one arrow in his quiver but is feathered with feathers plucked from learnings wing , nor is he able to speak or write , or you to read or understand one syllable , word or sentence against learning , but by its assistance . could you have read , could you have wrote , could you have understood one word had you not been taught ? why these are degrees of learning ; awake and behold the cheat , which would make you enemies even to that image of god which is imprinted on you , level you with brutes nay make you such : you see it is reason that distinguisheth a man from a beast , it is learning that improves reason , be not afraid of being rational ; this caytiff would deprive you of your humanity , that he might the easier destroy your christianity ; rob you of your reason , to bob you of your religion : for if he be not a very jesuite , yet is he the likest one that ever i met with ; if the tree may be judged by the fruits , his acts will a loud proclaim him a notorious juggler : and first behold how he cheats you in stating the question , for it is not whether by the help of humane learning a man may attain a saving knowledge to himself , whether he can save his own soul ; but whether he may not attain to such a knowledge as may enable him to hold out the way of salvation unto others : and that a man may do this , not only too too frequent examples do make out , but the apostle himself tells us in the 1 cor. 9. 27. but i keep under my body , and keep it in subjection ; lest that by any means , when i have preached unto others , i my self should be a cast away ; a man may preach to others , and yet be himself a cast away : for this wretch dares not affirm that the apostle inspired by the spirit of god would suppose an impossibility : and the example of iudas clearly shewes that a man may have an outward call to teach , and yet be a reprobate ; was not he one of the twelve that was sent to preach the kingdome of god , and to heal the sick ? luk. 9. 1 , 2. also the apostle in the 2 tim. 3. 5. speaks of some , having a form of godliness , creeping into houses , leading captive silly women laden with infirmities : these hypocrites by the help of learning and parts could pray as devoutly , talk as holily , wrest the scriptures as dexterously , cogging the dy , making the word speak what they list , craftily applying it , having all the arts and methodes of consenage , even as he himself ; yet were they not taught of god ; it is cleer therfore that learning and parts perse ex propria natura can understand and so apprehend the mystery of the gospel , as to hold it out so to others , that the hearers cannot discern by the teaching an hypocrite from a true believer , notwithstanding all his positions . you may behold also how finely the holy text is wrested by him to no purpose in his following arguments , for unless he prove that a man by the help of learning cannot attain to such a knowledge as to be able to make an outward profession , he proves nothing . and that this sophistry is malicious , not ignorant , his answering two objections will fully clear . object . 1. that though humane learning be an enemy to the law of god while it is in an unsanctified heart , yet when the heart is truly turned to god , then it becomes a sanctifyed instrument , and a good hundmaid to theology . solution . to this he answers , that though the heart be truly sanctified , in which humane learning doth inhere as in its subject , yet doth it not follow that learning it self is , no more than sin can be said to be sanctified , though the heart of a sinful man may be truly said to be sanctifyed : for acquired learning of it self , and of its own nature , is nothing else but sin , and therefore remains so still , and cannot be truly nor properly said to be sanctifyed , no more than sin . but if by being sanctified , they mean that the providential wisdome of god doth order it , or make use of it for the good of his people , i oppose it not , so that it be understood , that that good flowes not from the nature of acquired knowledge it self , but from the wisdome and goodness of the spirit of god , who maketh all things work together for the benefit of those that love him , who are called according to his purpose , and so no more can properly in this respect be predicated of it than of sin it self , which in that case ( though not as an entity , for non entia ad modum entium concipiuntur ) is said also to work for the good of gods saints . first to this we say , that the habit of sin is destroyed , there is a mortification of sin , as well as a vivification of grace , as rom. 6. 2. how shall we that are dead to sin , live any longer therein ? and ephes. 2. 1. you hath he quickned who were dead in trespasses and sins . now the habit of learning is not in the least diminished , much less destroyed . secondly , that the whole man with all his endowments is sanctified , as 1 thes. 5. 23 , 24. and the very god of peace sanctify you wholly , and i pray god your whole spirit , and soul , and body , be preserved blameless unto the comming of our lord jesus christ . faithful is he that calleth you , who also will do it . now then , either learning must be sanctified , or something remains unsanctified . thirdly , that acquired learning , of it self , and of its own nature is not sin , for sin is a transgression of the law , 1 iohn 3. 4. verse , for sin is the transgression of the law , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . now what law forbiddeth learning ? where is it written thou shalt not be learned ? and sure were learning either in it self sin , or left unsanctified in a sanctified heart , we should not find the ●●●stle paul giving thanks for it in 1 cor. 14. 18. i thank my god i speak with tongues more than you all : and the holy ghost describing apollos leaves him upon record to be an eloquent man {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the word usually is taken for a learned man ; and see what followes , he helped them much which believed , for he mightily convinced the iewes , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which the learned beza in his annotations renders , magna cum contentione , and he gives the reason of it , vti volui hac perphrasi ut graeci vocabuli emphasin servarem , quo significatur eloquentem hunc hominem omnes ( quod aiunt ) nervos revincendis iudaeis contendisse , i have used this periphrasis , that i might preserve the emphasis of the greek word , by ●●ich is signified that this eloquent man employed the utmost of his abilities to convince the jews . behold then what divinity your doctor teaches , who is not onely content to bely learning , but sanctification , making the holy spirit work by halves ; and as he plaies the knave here , so in the latter part he plaies the fool , fighting with his own shadow , and keeping a coil about nothing , for the very objection , as he himself hath put it , asserts the good to flow from the sanctification of learning , not from its own nature , it makes it a handmaid , and so does he ; untill he comes to his conclusion , which how true it is , as it sufficiently appears by what is said , yet will be more manifest if we consider learning in it self to be indifferent either good or evil , according as it is used or abused , now is sin so ? suppose a man shall make the glory of god his onely end in his attaining learning , that thereby he may be better enabled to read , converse , dispute , and speak concerning the mysteries of salvation ( for could he have written or spoken as he doth without it , unless by help of a miracle ? ) will he affirm this learning to be sin ? is the physical act sinful , or doth the moral circumstance cloath it with good or evil ? something more then may be predicated of learning than of sinne , which cannot be conceived in any other notion than of sin . object . 2. again , if it be objected , that though learning be not effectual to the understanding of the mystery of the gospel , yet it is prealent to the compleating of the literal and historical knowledge thereof : take this here , that these objections are of his own cloathing , the terms are his own . solution . to this he answers . though it may conduce to the gaining of literal , and historicall knowledge , yet this is not ad idem , because it profiteth nothing ; for truth it self bears record , it is the spirit that quickneth , the flesh profitteth nothing ; and men are made able ministers of the new testament , not of the letter , but of the spirit ; for the letter killeth , but the spirit giveth life . so that all literal and historical knowledge gained by mans power , is but like the principle from whence it slowed , fleshly , earthly , deadly , and destructive . to this we say , that what he saith here against learning , may as well be said against reading , teaching , and hearing , there must be fit and outward organs , there must be eyes , a tongue , and eares , and these must have a body to subsist ; is all reading , hearing , and teaching therefore like the principle from whence they flow , fleshly , earthly , deadly , and destructive ? behold then whether these scriptures are wrested or no ? do you think they are to be understood to condemn all outward means , or onely to shew that outward means without the inward assistance and operation of the spirit cooperating with them were unable to beget saving grace in a soul ? do you conceive the spirit of god in them disallowes all reading , teaching , hearing , or only forbid to put such a confidence in them as to esteem them able in themselves to confer eternal life upon us ? besides , i that place in the corinths , the letter signifies the law , of which moses was a minister , the spirit the gospell , which christ brought and delivered to his apostles and ministers ; for look but into the chapter and you shall see the scope of the apostle is to advance the ministery of the gospel above the ministery of the law : was not this rightly applied then against learning ? can you imagine he himself can th●●k them to mean what he puts upon them ? but i leave him , and so i hope will you ; yet i could wish some able pen would take him task , and 〈…〉 the impostor . chap. xvi . the abuse of learning no argument against the use of it . but as this fellow cries down , so are there others which too much cry up learning , who will entail the ●ift of teaching upon it , and allow none to teach but an vniversity graduate ; which is no other than put bounds to god , to limit the holy spirit , hither and no farther shalt thou go ; but because these men idolize it , must we execrate and abhor it ? because the persians adored the sun , must we christians refuse the comfort of its light and heat ? in thus doing we run as far out of the way on the one hand , as they do on the other . let them consider how many under the light of the gospel furnish'd with the helps of humane learning are strangely unacquainted with the knowledg of christ crucified ; a plain experienced christian ( notwithstanding their auxiliary forces ) only by the help of a bible , will put a whole army to flight ; surgunt indocti et rapiunt coelum , when they in the mean time do but , as he speaks , ornare diabolum ; they become learned spoiles , sapienter descendunt in infernum , they go cunningly to hell . and then on the other side let not us be so silly and malicious as to put the fault in learning , whereas there is no greater vicinity than between truth and goodness ; heaven is full of knowledge , as it is of holiness ; and it is brimfull of both : if some will not make a right use , or will abuse their learning , must learning suffer ? can there be a more gross abuse than , as , isocrates speaks , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to lay the blame on the thing , not the man ? some men with weapons commit murders and outrages , shall not others therefore have any for their own necessary and just defence ? some make themselves drunk , may not others therefore drink to maintain life , and to comfort and chear the heart ? noah was drunk with wine , shall not timothy therefore drink a little for his stomachs sake , and his often infirmities ? 1 tim. 5. 23. a subtil jesuiticall knave wrests scripture , may not a minister of the gospel therefore quote it ? the first abuses his learning to pervert , and destroy , shall not the second make use of his to instruct , and edifie ? upon this account all things might be condemned , even profession it self , and all religious duties , which have been by some abused , and prophaned . chap. xvii . the mischief of ignorance . these things thus weighed , will not the improvement of nature beautified & adorned with supernatural grace make men more serviceable , and instrumental for gods glory ? when the strength of learning , and the power of godliness unite and concentricate their forces , will they not make up the finest and purest complexion , the soundest and bravest constitution , like a sparkling and vigorous soul , quickning and informing a beautiful body ? can religion desire to shine with greater gloss and lustre , can it desire to ride among men in greater pomp and solemnity , in a more tryumphant charriot than in a soul of vast intellectualls ? let us but consider our poor ignorant and unlearned ancestors , with yellings , and howlings , with the horrid noise of brazen and copper pans and bazons hammered on and beaten , endeavouring to help the moon in the ecclipse , whom they thought they did great service to ; and whence proceeded this but from ignorance of the natural cause ? what prayers , what sacrifices did an ecclipse of the sun produce ? all presently supposing he hid his face for anger , as the poets report he did at atreus his banquet , — verterit cursus licet sibi ipse titan , obvium ducens iter , tenebrisque facinus obruit tetrum novis , nox missa ab ort u tempore alieno gravis . seneca , thyestes , and they in danger of an eternal night , and not only be , as one speaks notably of the suns adorers , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , without their god by night , but for ever : and indeed what advantage did the devill make of ignorance in the time of popery ? what a quarter did he keep with his hobgoblins , and fairies ? o , darkness is his delight in the understanding as well as in the air , and doth it not lay men more open to his temptations ? what a tryumph would the prince of darkness lead could he get us all into his livery ? this plutarch an heathen could perceive , knowledge , saith he , frees men from that superstition , which frights , disturbs , and entangles with sinister conceits of the deity , others , who are ignorant of the natural causes of things , and in its place induces a secure piety , and holy confidence in the divine power ; and he instances in the head of a ram with one horn growing in the midst of the front brought to pericles , which when the southsayers converted to an omen , anaxagoras the philosopher dissecting the scull shewed it empty on the sides , and the brains lying in the midst in an oval form just where the horn took root , cleerly convincing them of the natural cause . let us consider how a poor bishop was degraded by a whole council , and the popes infallible worship too boot , for writing and maintaining that there were antipodes , people inhabiting the other side of the worldly globe , a thing known to every ship-boy in wapping : and what will nothign serve our turns but a herd of such teachers ? a drove of such doctors that may bring us in one age to a degree above bleating to be as far from understanding , as they from being able to speak sense ? when a dutch sophister with this doughty fallacy , the scripture commands us to reverence and obey our elders , but the dutch state is the elder state , therefore the scripture commands the english state to reverence and obey the dutch ; or , asses have eares , englishmen have eares , therefore englishmen are asses , shall puzzle our whole nation , and none be able to answer him , unless by down-right telling him he lyes , & so instead of confuting , confirm him in his wild assertions . lastly , let us consider with what impatience we would hear a man that went about to perswade us to burn our ships , break our guns , destroy all our arms and weapons , and lay our selves naked to the invasion and rapine of any forein enemy ; and shall we not with the same disdain and abhorrency behold these pedling truckers under satan , who would disarm our souls , prostitute our understandings to the lust of every subtill sophister , make us like to the horse and mule which want understanding , ready to take the bit into our mouths to be rid by each deceiver , and to crowch down under the burdens which every sly and cunning knave shall please to load us with ? do we so much detest the slavery of our bodies , and shall we not abhor to see our souls led captive , our understandings drawn in shackles after the triumphant chariot of every impostor ? our lord and savior teaches us , that though a man both strong and armed keep the house , yet if a stronger than he come , he will enter and take possession ; these imps of the destroyer suggest , that the lame and blind are only fit garrison souldiers for the strong holds of the new jerusalem , as if religion were the capitol that onely geese must defend ; alas , had there not been a manlius and other valiant and armed romans , the gauls could not have been kept out by their cackling . thus much for learning , as it is useful in religion , what advantage it is of to the civil state shall be discoursed of hereafter in its proper place . chap. xviii . of moral vertue in general . before we proceed further , it will not be amiss to consider moral vertue in the general , as of good conducement to our better understanding of the particular vertues which follow in order to be treated of in our subsequent discourse , and to our easier attaining and imbracing them in our future practice . and first of the name ; the greeks according to some denominated it {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from mars their god of war , because in war the efficacy of vertue seemed most perspicuous . others fetch its derivation {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from choosing , because vertue is above all things to be chosen . the latines called it virtus a vir which antiently was solie applyed to a valiant man ; thus cicero in offic. nomen virtutis , inquit , antiquitus solius fuit fortitudinis , vertue , saith he , was the badge heretofore onely of fortitude . but since experience teaching that man was not only to strive with man , to combate the common enemy , but also with his own disorderly affections easily misled by the allurements of riches , delights , and preferment , it became the tryumphant ornament of those that were victorious over themselves and these temptations , which indeed is the more noble conquest , and most manly , as performed by the force of reason , the weapon only man can use . lastly there are some , who not unpleasantly alluding will have it tearmed virtus , quasi viri artus , as it were the joints and lineaments of the mind . now , as the name hath been diversly derived , so hath the thing been variously applyed . as first , to signify in general the power and perfection of any thing , hence we often meet with these and the like phrases in english , by vertue of gods power , wisdome , omniscience ; by vertue of the soul , of the heavens , of the elements , of such or such a plant , mineral , or living creature . secondly , to denote promiscuously all habits as well infused as acquired , thus we say by vertue of grace , faith , &c. thirdly , it is taken for a natural inclination or disposition : thus aristotle in 6 ethic. cap. ult. we possess vertue by nature , and by nature we are temperate and valiant . lastly , it is most properly taken for an habit of the mind , acquired by use and frequent exercise , and thus we are to accept it as an habit ruling the will and appetite of man , and conforming and composing his manners for the help and ornament of humane society . and now having viewed it in the gross , let us a little descend to take it in pieces , wherby the true nature of it will be more plainly understood . the nus is an habit , and we prove its lineage by its coat armour . plutarch de virtut . moral . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . there are , saith he , three things in the mind , the faculty , the affection , and the habit ; the faculty is the principle and matter of the affection ; the affection is a certain motion of the faculty : but the habit is the strength and conformity of the faculty gotten by custome . now vertue being to be reduced under one of these heads , we must examin to which it doth conform it self . by vertue men are accounted good , as by vice bad ; but by the faculties which are natural and bear themselves in an indifferent posture to this or that ; and by the affections by which we are only moved , and become not , neither are accounted such or such , we can neither be termed good or bad ; it remains then that the habit gives the denomination , and that vertue is an habit , and so aristotle l. 2. ethike. . cap. 6. defines it to be {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the difference must be fetched from the matter and form ; now the matter is the subject and object , for no other ▪ matter can be attributed to accidents ; the subject is the will and appetite , the internal object , are the affections , and actions springing from those affections ; the external objects are the persons toward which , and the things in which vertue is exercised . the form is a mediocrity or mean to be observed in all our affections and actions which exces renders violent , defect lame and imperfect . now vertue consists in indivisibili medio , in an individual mediocrity ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for there is but one path leads to vertue , but to vice many . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} for good is single , evill of many shapes ; yet is this indivisibility not to be taken in a mathematical , but a moral construction , which admits of some latitude , for its the prudent admonition of some eminent moralists , parum deflectere à medio in excedendo , vel deficiendo , non est vitium semper existimandum ; cum medii quaedam sit latitudo , intra quamse continentes bene agunt , a small declining from the mean either on the right or left is not alwaies to be accounted vice , sith there is a certain latitude in mediocritie , within the limits of which , men containing themselves act well . thus a valiant man by the smart and sight of his wounds may be transported with anger and thirst of revenge , yet it being in the lawfull and just defence of himself and countrey , a resolute and eager charge will be no excess from true fortitude , and for the other extreme we have a noble example in the roman consul catulus , who when he could not perswade the greatest part of his army to abide in their camp , being terrified with the approach of the cimbrians , commanded the eagle , the roman standart , to be advanced , and marcht away himself in the head of them , that they might appear rather to follow than desert their general . here he forsook his camp , and those resolute souldiers that staid to defend it , for fear lest the body of his army who would go should be utterly disheartned , and being publickly branded with deserting the consul , might set light by their fame already blasted , and so the commonwealth then threatned might be greatly endangered by the loss of such an army , which would either have disbanded , or fought untowardly . and to come closer , vertue is not {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , an absolute calm without the least perturbation , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a symmetry of the affections regulated by measure , squared by the golden rule of mediocrity . and as there is a latiude to be considered , so is the proportion which is geometrical , not arithmetical ; it is medium rationis , non rei : for vertue doth not equally differ from its extremes , as six doth from two and ten , as for example , liberality comes nearer to prodigality than covetousness . yet the attaining this mediocrity being a thing of the greatest difficulty , for as it is easie to be angry , so is it hard to be angry with these necessary circumstances , with whom , how far , when , wherefore , and in what manner we ought , it will much avail us to take these helps , laid down by all or the most experienced moralists . first , let us endeavour to shun that extreme which seems most contrary to vertue ; yet here must be care taken lest by endeavouring to avoid one we run into the other extremity according to that , dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt . and , incidit in scyllam cupiens vitare charybdim . thus as the nymph calypso instructs vlisses being to sail between scylla and charybdis , two dangerous rocks in the sicilian sea , rather to avoid charybdis as the more dangerous , but yet still to have an eye to scylla : homer 12. odyss. so we must avoid that extreme which is most opposit to vertue as more destructive , yet with care of the other too : superstition is liker piety than atheism , we had better therefore be a little too tender , than to make no scruple , a little too formal , than openly prophane , here the excess is less contrary ; but here again the defect , for abstemionsness altogether to forbear wine is more like temperance then drunkennes , and this our reason will instruct us to judge of . yet the prudent perswade for the most part to avoid the excess , as of more difficulty to be shaken off : and indeed it would be more facile to bring an abstemious person to a moderate use of wine for his health sake , than to disswade a drunkard from his tipple though his health , nay life lay at stake ; and of this opinion is cicero in i ▪ de orat suus cuique modus est , inquit , tamen magis offendit nimium , quam parum . there is a measure to be had in every thing , saith he , yet excess is the greater offender of the two : and where we find one voluntarily starving himself , we shall meet with thousands destroyed by surfetting . secondly , let us strive to avoid that extreme which we are most enclined to by our natural temper ; as if we are covetously enclind , let us endeavour rather to be a little too profuse , and so by degrees we may become liberal . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . this aristotle illustrates by an apt simile of streightning a stick : for he that will make a stick streight must do it by bending it to the contrary side . thirdly , we must in every action be very suspicious of that which seems to entice with the alluring bait of pleasure , and this aristotle confirms by an argument drawn from the pernicious effect of pleasure . and thus cicero in catone . impedit consilium volupt as rationi inimica et mentis oculos perstringit . pleasure , saith he , that foe to reason , lays a bar in judgements way , and dazzles the eye of the understanding : and again in 2. lib. offic. voluptates blandissimae dominae saepe majores partes animae à virtute detorquent ; those flattering mistresses , pleasures , do often enveagle and draw the nobler parts of the soul from the practise of vertue , and seneca in epist. 28. quis hostis in quenquam ita contumeliosus fuit , quam in quosdam voluptates suae ? no professed enemy hath been so injurious and spitefull , hath wrought a man so much disgrace , as their own pleasures , their bosom delights have done too many , one dalilah hath been more powerful to captivate a sampson , than all the lords , than all the thousands among the philistimes . and as a help we shall adde this , that proposing the most sublime , and heroical patterns of vertue for our imitation , we shall the less square our actions by the crooked and deceitful rule of pleasure . he that shall make cicero his example shall never become a cataline : nor shall the admirer of a studious and contemplative athenian , of a couragious and active lacaedemonian , incur the infamy and effeminacie of a delicate sybarite , or a dissolved persian : thus when the glory of miltiades once disturbed the sleep of themistocles , when his victory at marathon had made a conquest also over the others debauchery at athens ; you see how soon he broke those silken cords of pleasure , wherein he was noos'd , and the sense of honour having set an edge upon his affections , he soon cut that gordion knot , whereby he became first victorious over himself , and after over asia ; i mean the numerous persian with the strength of asia then invading greece , and of a dissolute young man , became the most famous captain in his time greece could boast of ; of such efficacy is a noble example . whereas on the contrary , as cicero in laelio , nihilaltum , nihil magnificum , nihil divinum suscipere possunt , qui suas cogitationes abjecerunt in rem humilem et abjectam . the latter phrase is very emphatical ; he that trifles away his thoughts in a low , and abject contemplation , shall never come to be fit for any high , any noble , any heroick undertaking . thus the muck worm that pores upon the ground continually will never arrive to the liberal science of astronomy ; and we cannot but suppose that he shall shoot neerer heaven who takes his aim at a star , than he that levels at a gloworm . the efficient cause of vertue is custome ; which is the genuine parent of an habit ; thus when we see a man wallow in vice , we say he is habituated to it , yet have there been some who have endeavoured to alter this pedegree , and to engraft this excellent cien on another stock . gallen a physician , would bring it under his cure , and place it within the verge of his art , and could he do it , it would be no smal addition to his calling , both in respect of honour , and profit ; which would abound in admirers , and never want patients : how necessary would the physician be to the body politick as well as natural , could he rectify and purge the manners , as well as the humours , and not only help men to live , but to live well ? o the sacred power of that physick , which could purge out vice , and be a cordiall to vertue ! thou hast a fragrancy beyond the ointment of the apothecary ; whose shop alas cannot be the cradle of vertue , neither can all his compounds compose the affections , all his distillations instill vertue , all his essences and spirits quicken that noble heat in the soul , it is beyond the power of chymistry to extract this habit , or to resolve corrupted nature into its first principle of purity . shew me that doctor that can by his physiek make the cholerike man meek , the coward , valiant , or the corrupt , just ; and let him enjoy the deity of aesculapius , and his ruined shrines be repaired for his service . i confess they can make the miser open his fist , and scatter his angells , when he is terrifyed with the dreadful apparition of death . this wretch , contrary to all others , who hold fastest when in danger of drowning , unclutching his gripe when he is sinking into the grave , and parting with his mammon , his beloved deity so long adored by him , when the devil appears ready to ceize him . but this is but like the cowards winking and laying about him when there is no remedy but fight or dy , like damaetas in the noble and ingenuous sydney , who when the sea would let him run no further , turnd , & had the hap to have his adversary cry quarter first ; and the one is as far from being liberal , as the other valiant . thus it seems , making for his profession , gallen attempts to cry up his own diana , and on nature beget a sire for vertue , for he will have it spring from a temperament of the body ; but though this may encline , yet doth it not necessarily draw men to vertue . 1. for we often see manners changed , the temperament remaining the same , as in the example of themistocles ; and the temper changed , the manners continuing , for in the life of marius we read , that though he was both old , gross , and corpulent , yet did he daily in publick exercise himself in arms among the young men , endeavoring to make his body active and nimble whether nature would or no : yea so fiery and young was his ambition that the i hill froast of age which had made his head hoary could not nip it , and such a thirst after honour burned within him , that six consulships adorn'd with the most-splendid tryumphs could not quench it , but his aspiring soul would have drawn his unweldie body craz'd with age , and loaden with honour , after it into pontus , whether he eagerly sought to be sent commander in chief against mithridates ; yea upon his death bed when he was light headed , fancying he was warring against mithridates , he would often use such postures , and motions of the body , as became a general , backed with a loud , and military clamour : alas poor man ! as if one sprig of laurel could have given thee content , which in a whole grove thou couldst not find , though springing from thine own conquests . 2. again the temper is not in our power , manners are , for if they were not , to what purpose would deliberation , counsel , exhortation , praise , reproof , laws , rewards , punishments be ? it is evident then that the temperament is not the proximate and chief cause of vertue . secondly , and as gallen , so the stoicks make nature the cause of vertue , which they hold born with man , but vice contrary to nature and acquired by evil custom . so that they themselves will have custome the cause of the acquired habit of vice , which grants our tenent , for having proved vertue to be a habit acquired , not an innate faculty , it must be the product of custome . besides , whatever is natural is immoveable , but manners are mutable , as in the before recited example of themistocles , and how often have our eyes seen young men of very promising beginnings debauched by evil company , to fall from that bright orb of vertue , in which had they been placed by nature they would have been fixed stars ? thirdly , some there are that ascribe vertues original to education , and breeding , and indeed this is very much conducing to beget the first acts of vertue , and to put youth in the right road to come to it , but it is not of force to creat the habit : for how many do we behold excellently initiated in this sacred mystery by a good tutorage , which when they come to have the reigns layd in their necks , gallop down hill , and break the neck of all those goodly expectations ? for the best instilled precepts though they may sometimes check , yet are they not of force to stop the carreer of the headstrong affections , and many are there , who can give good counsel to others , which they cannot or will not follow themselves . but let me not be misunderstood , for though we do not allow education to be the proximate and adaequate , yet shall we not deny it to be a remote cause , which by entering men in vertues path , which gon on in will bring to the habit , may be said to lay the foundation to this glorious fabrick . and thus though we cannot in justice conferre the crown as to have reached the goal , yet let it carry the prize for the first start ; though we must deny it the tryumph due to an absolute victory , yet shall we put the murall crown on its head , for having first mounted the wall , and first erected vertues ensign upon the battlements . let it then not be neglected , but of all receive its due esteem , as the most excellent trayner up of youth , the most noble file-leader , who well followed conducts to victory , that happy victory which will render us invincible , place us above the reach of any enemy , carry us out of fortunes gun-shot . now the rest enjoying what is their own , let us give custom its due , which is to be the efficient cause of vertue , enabling men by an often repetition of such or such a vertuous action , to a ready and unperturbed performing it upon occasion ; for to descend a little in a simile , how come your artificers to become excellent , unless by often practice , or your souldier to be expert , but by exercise ? and it is a maxim amongst military men , that a man never so well versed in speculation , who hath all the arts and stratagems of the most renowned captains at his fingers ends , yet at the first skirmish will be to seek ; and can we think the repugnancies within are less disturbing than enemies without , and require not a mind as well experienced to resist and quell them ? to sum up all the etymon of the word {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} moral , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , derived from the word which signifieth custome , may confirm us that it hath its original from the thing from whose name it derives its denomination . for it would be no more a soloecism in speech to call the son of van trump an english man , than that moral or customary vertue , which is sprung from the loins of temperament , nature or education . but now to prescribe a set number , to tell how many acts go to the making up an habit , is impossible ; for 1. fewer or more are requisite , accordingly as the mind is less or more enclin'd to vertue . 2. some acts are more powerful , others less valid . 3. attention makes large amends for number , whose worth , by way of exchange , may viewith hundreds , and , when put in the scale , far outweigh them . neither let any of us fear to overdo , to act vertuously too often . the external causes of vertue are the examples of others , as in the before-named example of miltiades and themistocles ; and rewards and punishments , as we shall shew more fully in their proper-place . the end of vertue , is bonum civile , the common good , the general interest of mankind , and this must needs be lovely in all our eyes , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , saith the philosopher , it is honourable to do good to one , to a nation heroical ; it is neer of kin to divinity for a man to be able to contribute towards the welfare of his whole species : and magistrates , men in publick place , of whom it is spoken , i have said ye are gods , are placed by god for the common good ; those that are set to rule , like the sun should be full of light , and heat , visible in example , and powerful influence . chap. xix . of probity , and the practice of it among the romans . the external object , as it relates to the persons towards whom vertue bends its eie , delivers it janus-like , looking forward by piety upon god , backward by probity upon man , providing a well-being both for soul and body , and directing us for the benefit of our selves and others . of the first , piety , we have aready spoken , the other , probity , is therefore that which remains for the subject of our persent discourse , and this meets us well accompanyed , noblie followed , as having all those vertues in her train , which are necessary to enable us in performing our duties as we stand in all relations . for its denomination , we find it termed by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and by the latines honestas , from honos honour ; so ingenuously provident were the antients that it might not be so much as mentioned without its due , honour . and indeed it is the very abstract of the other vertues ; it is the ci●cle from whence those noble lines are drawn , and the center in which they meet ; it is the salt that seasons them , and the soul that informs them , that bestowes their glorious being . without this , prudence would be but cunning . justice , in execution , but a more specious and reserved kind of revenge ; in distribution , but a keeping of credit to maintain our trade ; in rewarding , but a bribery to gain affection , and encrease our dependancies . fortitude , but a brutish audacity , and daring rashness to render our selves terrible , and gain domination . temperance , but a kind of senslesnes and stupidity , a stoical piece of tyranny over our bodies . hence grew its esteem among the moralists , which generally make the other vertues spring from the pregnant womb of probitie ; and hence came it to be honored among the romans , which they beheld blessed with so glorious and numerous a progeny , attended by so beautifull a company of daughters . this was it set numa on the throne , and made them with one consent call him from a private country life to govern rome , passing by the most noble among both romans and sabines . it was this fetched serranus from the plough , and adorned him with the absolute & uncontrollable power of dictator . this encouraged them to elect cato to be censor , and pass by the noblest competitors , when instead of courting the people , he seemed to threaten them , proclaming , that by choosing him and valerius flaccus , whom they also made his collegue , the city might be purged of its new corruptions , and antient probity of manners restored . this made fabritius , when the physician sent him word , that if he pleased he would poison pyrrhus , return the letter to pyrrhus with this exprobration , that he was most unfortunate in his choice of friends , as well as enemies ; which when pyrrhus had received , and hanging his physician , returned the roman captives without ransom , fabritius sent as many captives of his with this admonition , that he discovered the treason not for any favour or respect he bore to him , but to let him know that the romans abhorred by treachery to destroy their enemies . pyrrhus had then invaded italy , had overthrown the consul laevinus , and was grown numerous by the revolt of many of the people of italy who lackied to his fortune ; his physician unsought to , even of his own accord , offers to rid them of this danger , yet so great was their love to honesty , they chose to undergo any hazard , rather than to connive at a dishonest act , or in the least to bear with it though in a stranger . behold o matchivilian , this is that which truly establishes a state , when thy unworthy policies , though they may be prosperous for a while , are never long-lived , and thy rotten props will in the close fail thee , and bury thee in the ruins of that thou buildest upon them . produce me an example , where although prosperity might lead the van , reproach and ruine did not bring up the rear ? where thy villanies flourishing for a day , were not frost-nipt at night ? where though they might bud in the morning , and blow at noon , they were not blasted in the evening , and their purple changed into sables , their rosie-tinctured mantles into nights black livery , double dy'd in infamy and horror ? whereas vertuous honesty renders states and persons stable like it self , whose glorious edifices in the roughest and most boysterous storms stand unshaken like their foundation : yea and alwaies cloathes them with the tryumphant roabs of success , who in its armour of proof have combated their foes . this was it set rome aloft in spight of all opposition , and raised her on her feet , when ready to be trampled on by her fiercest foes . this was it upheld her courage in the midst of the greatest losses , and made her enemies tremble in the height of their victories , as accounting her invincible in her vertue , which would make all force stoop and vaile bonnet in the end . thus may we see pyrrhus even reeking with a bloody victory , dispatch away his ambassadour , and stretch out his victorious arms to implore a peace , whilest the beaten roman disdains to treat , and can hardly be brought to give any terms to the conqueror ▪ rejecting his profered friendship , as much as his gold and bribes . for his ambassadour could not fasten the least gift on any private person , nor obtain any other answer from the senate , than a command to leave italy , and that the consul was comming , and in the head of the roman legions should deliver their terms . this made fabritius contemn his profered gold , deride his stratagem of the elephant , which was suddenly brought upon him to try if they could terrifie him ; refuse his profer of being next the king ▪ if he would continue with him ; and return this brief answer , i am no more moved at your beast , than i was with your gold , and for me to live with thee would be perillous , o king , for should thy subjects once come to know me , they would choose rather to serve me than thee ; account fabritius more worthy of the throne , than pyrrhus . this was it carried cato the elder through the greatest oppositions of the roman nobility , and set him above the reach of their envy and malice : this gave him the suffrages from all his competitors , the antient and noblest roman bloud backt with all its factions and dependancies being unable to stand in competition with a plebeian probitie , or the whole patrician order to put stop to his being chosen censor , yea and whom he pleased to be joined with him . this was it , not affection or money , yea that in despight of favour and bribery brought him off in all his accusations ; so that he never was once condemned though fifty times impeached , but in every action had the day ; yea this gave him the confidence to demand his greatest adversary to be judge at his last tryal , who also gave sentence for him . so potent is honesty , that malice it self cannot but yield , and either openly acknowledge , or tacitly confess , that her roughest and best-edg'd files can't touch it . who would not then imbrace this so potent , and excellen vertue ? which even wrests encomiums out of the mouths of enemies : which could make pyrrhus with admiration cry out , that it was easier to turn the sun from its course , than fabritius from his integrity . and his ambassadour cyneas return this answer , when askt what he though of rome . that it was a city of kings , and a senate of gods ; every private person vertuously commanding his affections , and the magistrates divinely influential for the publike honor and safety . and now comming to handle the particular vertues , we shall follow cicero l. 1. offic. in his division of them into prudence , justice , portitude , and temperance , under which all necessary honest actions may be reduced ; and these are commonly called the cardinal vertues . prudence that directs our reason , the other govern our appetites , as fortitude and temperance in adverse and prosperous affairs concerning our selves , justice in that which pertains to others . chap. xx . of prudence . this vertue is called by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from the mind , whose chief ornament it is : by the latines prudentia , quasi providentia à providendo , it foreseeing what is to be avoided , what to be chosen , as most apposit for the wel-being of our selves and others , it being also its special employment to provide for the future , and we are only to look upon it in its politick capacity , as it is reduced under moral philosophy : for though it may be accounted an intellectual vertue in regard of its subject and efficient cause , as having its dependancy on the understanding and judgement : yet in respect of its object and end it becomes also moral , as which leads not only to contemplative but practical felicity , and beholds civil good as its most lovely object . and indeed prudence is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the master workman , the principal agent in the raising and composing of the noble frame of vertue , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : for as this directs , so do the vertues , and vertuous men act : this draws the lines of election , in whose rectitude the main force of vertue lies ; this squares and contrives by deliberation , making the timbers fit , and the whole structure decent and usefull : yea so necessary an ingredient is it in morality , that aristotle and with him all the moralists have concluded , first , that a man cannot be vertuous , unless he be prudent ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : for vertue is not only an habit consonant to , but joined with right reason . secondly , that a man cannot be prudent , unless he be vertuous : for he must have a right end in all his actions , which is inconsistent with crooked manners . qualis vita , finis ita , may be well enough apply'd here ; besides , vice perverts the judgement , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and like a cheating trades-man shews colors by a false light . it is therefore affirmed on all hands , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that by prudence and vertue , every work is made absolute , vertue setting up a right end , and prudence making choice of apt means to bring us to that end . prudence thus comming within our verge , let us inquire what it is : and first we find cicero in l. ● . de invent . thus telling us , that prudence is an exact knowledge of what is both good and evill , prudentia est rerum bonarum , malarum , utrarumque peritia . and lipsius makes it , notitia rerum eventuumque , et judicium in iis rectum , an ability in knowing , and judging a right of things and events . aristotle defines it , l. 6. eth. c. 5. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , an habit conjoined with right reason , conversant and operative in those things which bring good or evil unto man . and now having viewed its essence , let us a little consider its operation , and we find its employment to consist in a solid deliberation of those things which are good and profitable , not particularly onely to health & strength , but which generally conduce to a vertuous and happy life , lib. 6. ethike. . e. 5. and this not by deliberating of the general precepts , and lawes of living , which are certainly defined , but by consulting how to square each single act by the streight rule of vertue ; for in the variety of circumstances upon which the rectitude or pravity of action depends consists the obscurity , and in this consultation is solely requisite : and now counsel being taken , prudence decrees that good is to be chosen before evil , the greater good before the lesser , and the lesser evil before the greater ; yet this onely in malo tristi , non turpi ; for the prudent man alwaies shuns the least baseness ; therefore the philosopher tells us that there are some things which are to be abhorr'd above torments , or death it self ; thus pericles being intreated by a friend to give a false testimony , returned this answer , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , i 'm only to help my friends in such things as offend not the gods ; and the french history affords a memorable example of this in the prince of conde , who being trecherously surprised by charles the 9th . and word sent him that he must choose either to go to mass , to dy , or to be perpetually imprisoned , nobly answered , for the first , by gods assistance , i will never do it , for the other two let the king do as he please , yet i doubt not but god by his fatherly providence will turn all to the best : he refuses the crime , neither would be choose the punishment , lest he might seem to disavow his own innocency : whereas david , convinced of his guilt in numbering the people , by choosing the pestilence , before sword or famine , as a more mild and fatherly punishment , acted the part of a prudent man , 2 sam. 24. chap. xxi . of the causes of prudence , natural parts , experience , learning , travel , &c. the chief causes of prudence may be reduced under three heads , nature , vse , learning . first , there must be some foundation in nature , some ground whereon to build , ex quovis ligno non fit mercurius , every block will not make a mercury , it is in vain to wash an aethiopian , and though a fool be brayed in a morter he will never become wise : therefore the moralists generally hold these three things requisite to the acquiring of prudence , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a cleer judgement , a quick apprehension , and a strong memory ; the two first being necessary to a right judging , and readily applying apt means for gaining our end . thus thucydides in lib. 1. gives us an eminent example in the person of themistocles , who without long warning or tedious consultation , by the very acuteness of his understanding gave the best counsel : in future things he could exactly conjecture what would happen ; in present affairs he was quick of dispatch ; he was most dexterous at discovery in unknown , and in obscure things above all men could foresee what might be for the better , and what for the worse : to sum up all , what by the strength of nature , and help of deliberation , he became so exact , as he seldome or never missed his mark . and livie in 4. dec . lib. 9. shews another in cato major , in hoc viro tanta vis animi , ingeniique fuit , ut quocunque loco natus esset , fortunam sibi ipse facturus fuisse videretur : nulla ars neque privatae , neque publicae rei gerendae ei defuit , urbanas , rusticasque res pariter callebat : ad summos honores alios scientia juris , alios eloquentia , alios gloria militaris provexit ; huic versatile ingenium sic pariter ad omnia fuit , ut natum ad id unum diceres , quodcunque ageret . the last which is memorie furnishes us with examples and presidents by which we are taught both by other mens losses or advantages , what course , and how we should steer in all our affairs . thus the philosopher in his little book of the vertues stiles memory the cause , and that known verse , usus me genuit , mater peperit memoria , makes vse the father , and memory the mother of prudence . demosthenes saith it is required in a prudent man to remember what is past , to dispatch and mind what 's present , and to provide for what may happen . and isocrates gives this rule , that when we deliberate , we ought to consider of past examples , for by calling to mind things that are gone , we shall be better enabled to make provision for things that are to come . we shall sum up this with that of strada in his prolus. academ. qui memoria prae aliis valet , glorietur tanquam excellenti vitae bono , tanquam thesauro , et penu disciplinarum , germana literaturae , musarum parente , altrice sapientiae , insigni demum argumento divinitatis ; as was observably eminent in those prudent men homer , aristotle , seneca , and especially julius caesar , who is reported never to have forgotten any thing , but an injury . the second help is use or experience , which furnish us with an insight in single actions , which are most necessary the prudent mans knowledge ; natural abilities , and learning do often make men opiniative , and to presume themselves knowing and wise : but it is experience that brings solidity . the greatest clerks are not alwaies the wisest men ; therfore theognis concludes {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , opinion to be of evil consequence , but use of the best concernment ; to which lipsius assents , especially in those that are are to sit at the helm in a state : indeed this is it which in every art makes a man his crafts-master ; and there is both a civill and military art requisite to the well-governing of a state : therefore your experienced soldier is chosen to command , and men most versed in state affairs held fittest for counsel , and government . suppose we were to perform a far voyage , or to enter an unknown and dangerous harbour , would we not choose him for a pilot who had oftenest steered it , who was best acquainted with the passage ? truly let us consider and we shall find a common-wealth may properly enough be likened to a ship , and the mannagement of affairs to steerage ; thus horace ode 14. o navis , referent in mare te novi fluctus : and the ingenuous and learned johnson in his catiline brings cato thus speaking to the then chosen consul cicero . — each petty hand can steer a ship becalm'd : but he that will govern , and carry her to her ends , must know his tides , his currents , how to shift his sails ; what she will bear in foul , what in fair weather ; where her springs are , her leaks and how to stop them ; what sands , what shelves , what rocks do threaten her , the forces , and the natures of all winds , gusts , storms , and tempests . when her keel ploughs hell , and deck knocks heaven , then to mannage her becomes the name , and office of a pilot. thus the prudent man must not onely be well acquainted with his own strengths , the ability of the means he hath chosen as fit to bring him to his proposed end , but with the vigor and force of whatsoever is likely to oppose him : he must provide for open assaults , and countermine against underhand practices , for should he depend onely upon his own power , he will be at loss upon every opposition ; he will bowl short of his mark , unless he allow for rubs , which may be in the way . and hence it is that the moralists generally exclude young men as incapable of prudence , who by the natural heat and vigor of youth are too fiery , apt to presume and run headlong into action without any deliberation ; whereas grave men , through use , and experience are made wary and provident ; they will look before they leap , consider whether they shall be able to carry on such or such a design , maugre all opposition , before they imbark themselves in it : therefore homer being to present a prudent counseller under the person of nestor , makes him 300 years of age ; a man of the greatest experience , who had waded through the employments of three ages . the third help is learning ; for there being so great a variety , such nooks , and corners in action , that light is necessary on all sides to further us in our search , it will be need full for us that would be prudent to fly to learning for aid , which can afford us noble and copious assistance . as first history , which is as it were another use , but of a more vigorous capacity . man clog'd with matter can move but slowly , and by his birth and outward concernments is commonly circumscribed within some narrow nook or angle of the world , where he is constrain'd to spend that shorttime of life which nature allowes : so that let him employ his utmost diligence in observation , and most strictly take notes , his knowledge can arrive but to the half of one ages experience , and that too but of a few nations actions ; whereas history layes before us all mankind in all ages acting in whatever as yet hath happened , and providing for ▪ and against whatever could fall under humane consideration , so that we shall not meet with any affair which may not be paralleld , and which we may not find mannaged by others , even to our hands , in the large volume of history . this is that which can make a young man prudent , and exalt his experience above the oldest he that shall stand on tip to upon his own observation : this is that upon whose shoulders a dwarf in years setting his feet , shall see further than a nestor , than the tallest gyant standing on the ground of his own experience . this is that , which not only enriches the memory with variety and plenty of actions and examples , but also enobles the mind with excellent and choise precepts , with good and wholsome admonitions ; for wise and prudent men generally being the penmen to history , have flourished her about , and embroidered the edges of her garments with rich and precious maxims , costly and curious observations of their own . we will conclude histories character with heinsius , est certissima divinae erga homines benignitatis obses , veritatis mater , vitae norma , actionum propagatrix vera , prudentiae ( ut quidam apud graecos loquitur ) metropolis . haec aetatem nostram cum aetate aequat universi ; haec imaginem , non corporis , sed vitae , sed consiliorum , sed animi ad posteros transfundit , et expressam non in aere , aut ferro , non picturae beneficio aut plasticae , immortali rerum ac verborum copia delineatam omnibus spectandam exhibet . and it is reported of lucius lucullus , who conquered two great kings , mithridates and tigranes , that by history he was trayned up to that skill in martial affairs , which rendred him both an able and victorious general , one who with 12000 foot , and 3000 horse , besieged the great city tigranocerta , and beat tigranes comming to relieve it with 20000 darts and slings , 150000 foot , and 55000 horse , 17000 of which were armed cappa●pe . secondly , as history , so philosophy , as first moral , confers much help in attaining of prudence . as 1. in teaching those peculiar rules of life , and canons , according to which the prudent man governs his counsels ▪ and actions ; besides , it is generally held that a man cannot be prudent unless he be vertuous , now the readiest way to become so is to know what vertue is , and wherein it consists , which moral philosophy teaches , together with the means to attain it . to sum up all , prudence it self , with all its precepts , and rules , is here handled ; whether then should we go for water but to the fountain , where it is most pleasant , dulcius ex ipso fonte bibuntur aquae , most abundant , and most easie to come by ? secondly , speculative philosophy is a great help ; this confers sapience , a dear friend , and support to prudence , upon whose precepts prudence builds , and laies the foundation of its rules ; as for example , upon the doctrine of the rational soul , the doctrine of the will , and of the affections : neither can any man be prudent , unless he be able to discern those various circumstances of persons , places , and times , all which are distinctly handled in speculative philosophy . thus aristotle affirms sapience to be marvellously profitable for the solid understanding of humane felicity , ( which is the end prudence proposes ) both because the operations of the will have their dependency upon the operations of the understanding , for we will after the same rate as we understand ; as also because many arguments may be drawn from speculative philosophy which may much conduce to the exercise of vertue ; as an insight into the temper of our bodies may perswade us to temperance . and lipsius commends both moral and speculative philosophy ; duae istae partes formant hominis animum , vel ad virtutis amorem , & pretium , vel ad notitiam caelestium , & terrestrium , è quibus magnitudo animi oritur , & simul modestia , collatione utrorumque , because both of them create in the mind of man as well a love and esteem of vertue , as a knowledge of the nature of caelestial and earthly things , from which springs magnanimity , and modesty too by comparing each with other . to sum up all with that known saying of divine plato , then commonwealths shall become happy , when philosophers are made magistrates , or magistrates addict themselves to the study of philosophy . thirdly , philology , a skill in languages is of much importance to a prudent man , by which he is made able not onely to converse with , but to dive into the actions of foreiners ; indeed all commerce , all correspondences , all leagues are beholding to this , without which nation could not discourse with nation but by signs , by mopping and mowing as monkies do : and it would be as possible for us to understand the cats wawling in our gutters , as an ambassadour , or merchant which could not speak english . lastly , both geometry , and geography are of no small use to advance prudence ; and aristotle is bold to affirm it impossible for a young man to be prudent without skill in the mathematikes , 6. eth. 8. c. but to these three , to wit , natural parts , vse , learning , we may adde as instrumental causes both a careful observation of examples , and also travail ; thus we shall find demosthenes affirming {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and terence , hoc vero est sapere , in aliorum vitam tanquam in speculum intueri , et ex illis exemplum capere tibi quod ex usu siet . the wise man dresses himself in the glass of other mens actions , in which he may discover what is comely and fit for him : and homer gives travail for a chief cause of prudence in his vlysses , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . and now i shall sum up all with a few examples , which are held by many more prevalent in perswasion than advice or instruction . and first , solon the athenian law-maker was not onely endowed with parts , exercised in affairs , improved by travail , but excellently learned , as many of his writings testify ; yea so desirous was he of knowledge , that upon his death-bed being visited by some friends , he lifted up his head , and listned to their discourse , and when asked for what end he was so attentive , returned this answer , that knowing this , i may dy more learned . thus epimanondas , the glory of thebes , is reported by thucydides to have studied much , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , without effeminacy . thus philip , thus alexander , thus philopomen , cato the younger , julius and augustus caesar were learned , the latter of which discharged a consular legat , as rude , unlearned , and unfit for imployment , because he had writen ixi for ipsi . thus marcus antonius the good emperor was called the philosopher , and that famous lady isabella of spain , and the incomparable elizabeth of england were studious and learned . chap. xxii . of the prudence of the romans . this victorious and fortunate common-wealth was so sensible of the necessity of this vertue to the wel-being of a state , that they took the greatest care to provide that able and prudent persons should only be admitted to the mannagement of affairs : as for example , they had their lex annalis , the law that provided , that none should bear office before such and such an age , because they would not have unexperienced , rash and imprudent young men trusted at the helm of state . thus latinus pacatus in laudat . theodosii . annorum , inquit , ita cura fuit majoribus , ut non solum in amplissimis magistratibus adipiscendis , sed in praeturis quoque aut aedilitatibus capessendis aetas sit spectanda petitorum ; neque quisquam tantum valuerit nobilitate , vel gratia , qui annos comitiali lege praescriptos , festinatis honoribus occuparit . thus cicero philip . 5. legibus annalibus cum grandiorem aetatem ad consulatam constituebant , temeritatem adolescentiae verebantur . thus ovid 5. fast . — finitaque certis legibus est aetas , unde petatur honos . and we find that those that set the fewest will have 25 years of age the time wherin the first office to wit of quaestor could be born ; for that of aedilis , and tribune 27 or 28. for praetor 35. for consul 42 , or 43. as cicero plainly tells us in phil. 5. quid alexander macedo , qui cum ab ineunte aetate res maximas gerère caepisset , trigesimo tertio anno mortem obiit ? quae aetas nostris legibus decem annis minor quam consularis . and though this law might now and then be dispensed with in some extraordinary danger , and for some more than ordinary worth and vertue in some single person , as scipio africanus , scipio aemilianus , and pompeius magnus : as there can be no general rule but may admit of some exception , especially where the reason of the law pleads against the letter , which taken strictly would deprive the state of the service of such eminent citizens when her dangers would admit of no delay : yet for the general it was inviolably observed until the unruly and tyrannous monarchs turned this topsie turvy , together with all other their most sacred laws and liberties . thus also we shall find lycurgus that wise lawgiver among the spartans , ( who so long as they observed his rules were the most eminent state among the greeks ) would admit none into the senate , unless he were sixty years of age . but we shall conclude this with some few examples which may convince us throughly of the benefit of prudence . cato the elder being consul , had spain alotted for his province , which was then near to a total revolt ; coming thither the celtiberians , a warlike and populous nation , offered to aid him for 2000 talents ; this proposition was generally disliked by the romans , as a thing unworthy the roman magnaminity , by money to buy aid or friendship , until the consul convinc'd them how small a thing the celtiberians demanded , without whose aid there was no hopes of victory ; for should we overcome by their assistance , we will pay them out of the enemies spoils , said he , but should we and they be beaten , neither will they be alive to demand , nor shall we be left to pay . scipio africanus , being about to invade afrike , and carry the war to the gates of carthage , prudently seeing that a state which warred by mercinaries , would be weakest at home , selected 300 able and resolute young men out of the roman legions , whom he kept about him , none knowing to what end , and being arrived in sicily , he commanded 300 of the noblest and wealthiest sicilian young gentlemen to appear such a day with their horse and arms . the time being come , he demanded whether they were willing to go with him , or no ? for he had rather they should now tell the truth , than afterwards be unprofitable , and unactive , as such would be . wherupon one of them answered , that if he were put to his choice he should rather stay at home ; scipio commending him for his ingenuity , and calling one of the 300 hundred roman young men , this youth , saith he , shall serve in your stead upon condition you will furnish him with horse and arms , and take him home , and exercise and teach him ; which he joyfully consenting to , all the rest presently desired a dismission upon the same terms : thus raised he a gallant troop , which did him great service , without charge to the common-wealth , whose treasury was emptyed by a long and chargeable war : and obliged the sicilians and their friends , by dismissing their persons from a dangerous war upon so small and inconsiderable a condition as that seemed to them , who would have given far more had they been put to their own choice . and indeed it is not so much the tax , as the manner of laying and levying it , that begets distastes , tumults , insurrections , and revolts . had scipio laid this charge of providing horse and arms , &c. upon these sicilian gentlemen , without any other circumstance , what mutterings would there have been ? why should we above all others be thus used ? and what hatred would it have procured him ? whereas doing as he did , first he seem'd to have a great confidence in their worth and valour , to choose them out of the thousands of sicily ; then a great regard of and civility to their persons , by enquiring whether they were willing to serve or no ; lastly a greater respect to their contentment than his own , by so gentle and easie a dismission of them whom he had honoured above others , and who by refusing to engage with him , disappointed his hopes , & made void the great expectations he had of them : and so by this means imposed an obligation upon them , who in another way would have looked on it as a great discourtesie . and as we find the benefit of prudence in these , so may we see the mischiefs which improvident rashness wrought in other examples . as in coriolanus , who by his stubborn and harsh carriage brought banishment on himself , a miserable war and disgrace upon his countrey , which at last caused his death . thus terentius varro by rashness and imprudency had almost ruined his country in that fatal and bloody battail at cannae . and multitudes of other examples we shall meet with in all histories , yea and in our own dayly experience and observation . chap. xxiii . of justice , and the roman practice of it . it would be a thing of the smallest concernment both to know and choose what is good and to accomodate our actions to the exact circumstances of place , time , and persons , unless we should acknowledge our selves obliged to vertuous actions , and to a total obedience of all her lawes , which is justices part to teach , whose praise were more proper for a prolix oration than the narrow limits of our discourse . aristotle in brief calls it , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the best of the vertues , and plato {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that neither the morning nor evening star are so admirable . cicero in l. 3. offic. justitia est virtus excellentissima , & splendidissima , omnium virtutum regina , ac domina . and scalig. exercit. 307. sect. 3. justitia est conservatrix conjunctionis humanae , quae conjunctio ad beatitudinem magna v●a est . indeed it is the use of other vertues towards others ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for as the philosopher , there are many that can be vertuous for their own concernment , who in other mens will faulter . therefore as cicero , justitia foras spectat , totamque se ad alienas utilitates porrigit ▪ atque explicat . justice will teach them to act vertuously towards others . it is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a good to others , and indeed the most beautiful , perfect , and best vertue . for he is the most vertuous {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , who is good to others ; here lies the point ; hic labor hoc opus est , to make profit , pleasure , revenge , &c. give the way to vertue , to right and equity . it is called by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by the latines justitia , and it is either general which consists in a vertuous obedience of all lawes tending to the preservation of humane society , and this is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} an universall vertue , according to that of the proverb , — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} or particular , which is a keeping a mean and aequality in all those things in which adversity or prosperity hath to do , or wherein fortune rules ; to give the definition of both according to aristotle , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , it is an habit apting men to just actions , whereby they are enabled to do , and will just things . nowfor to handle this at large , i suppose would be to little purpose , there being none that perceive not that it is the chief duty , as being of general concernment , of the magistrate to look well to the exercise of this vertue : i shall onely therefore hint in some cases which are essentiall to the welbeing of a state . as first in cases of publick danger , the particular members of a state are bound in justice to help the publick with their private stocks , thus we shall find in the roman state ▪ liv. dec . 3. l. 6. they brought in all their gold , silver , and coined brass , reserving only enough for an ornament of distinction , and for the publick service of their gods , into the common treasury , and you shall have a motive , respublicaincolumis & privatas res facile salvas praestet : publica prodendo tua nequicquam serves . secondly , the magistrate , after the danger is past , is in justice bound to see these publick debts sati●fyed , there being nothing more to be preserved inviolable than the publick faith : besides prudence teaches this , for if the people perceive them negligent in their publick trust , it will make them refractory , and careless in their private duties . we shall instance no further than in trading , a man once breaking his word , will never be trusted upon his bond , and it would be a sad plunge to put a state to get another state to be bound for them , and an impossibilty to find any private security for such large sums . the third thing required by justice is , that the magistrate ought not in the least to incroach upon the right of particular persons , further than the common necessity or good requires : thus in the beforementioned place we shall find , that first the consuls , then the senate , then the roman knights brought in their gold , &c. they were examples to the people , not exactors upon them . and to say the truth , the magistrate is intrusted for the publick good , and it is not in his power to do a private injury , they are gods substitutes , whose glorious attribute it is , that he cannot do injustice and the peoples trustees , to rule for their good : now grant that they may extrajudicially take away one mans right , and it will follow that they may take away any mans , and all mens . the fourth thing is , inviolably to observe all leagues , treaties , and publick promises with foreiners : this will make them be believ'd , lov'd , and honored abroad . thus we shall see that the romans in defence of , and revenge for their allyes of saguntum , undertook that long , bloody , and almost fatal second punick war ; nay and when hannibal was in the heart of italy , yet sent they armies into spain , and upon the first opportunity restored that city , gathered the scattered inhabitants , bought those that were slaves , and took a sharp revenge upō their borderers , even to the final ruin of the nation which had been instrumental in their miseries . thus shall we see them restore the kingdom of egypt to ptolomy their ally , when driven out by a popular insurrection , nay and preserve it in his sons , whom he by will left to their protection , in spight of the force and ambition of the great antiochus . thus made them honourable , and procured them fast friends , and so it will any state that practises after their copy . the fifth thing is , to have a sacred respect to the persons of ambassadours , and agents ; who are indeed the ministers of peace ; and indeed there can be nothing more brutish , and lesse manly , than to affront and violate these doves which bring olive branches in their mouthes , whom the law of nations gives protection to : thus shall we find the romans taking no where so sharp a revenge as upon corinth , which had abused their ambassadors : and when they for respect to ambustius ( who being an ambassador to the gauls , had contrary to the law of nations taken arms and fought against them ) denyed to deliver him up as the faeciales their heralds a arms had counsel'd , in the sack of their city they paid the reward of slighting this sacred law , and had neer lost all by the unjust endeavoring to preserve one offender from justice . the sixth thing is , to endeavour first by fair means for satisfaction , and if these will not prevail , then to send them a publick defiance : this the romans constantly practised , as to instance once for all , liv. d. 4. l. 6. consul deinde m. acilius ex s. c. ad collegium faecialium retulit , ipsine utique regi antiocho indiceretur bellum ? an satis esset ad praesidium aliquod ejus nunciare ? et num aetolis quoque separatim indici juberunt bellum ? et num prius societas eis et amicitia renuncianda esset , quam bellum indicendum ? faeciales responderunt , jam ante sese , cum de philippo consulerentur , decrevisse nihil referre ipsi coram an ad praesidium nunciaretur , amicitiam renunciatam videri , cum legatis toties repetentibus res , nec reddi , nec satisfieri aequum censuissent ; aetolos ultro sibi bellum indixisse , cum demetriadem sociorum urbem per vim occupassent , &c. the seventh is , honourably to reward their own citizens who deserve well . and there can be ●o greater spur to vertue , nor a better way to propagate and increase it . thus we shall see what tryumphs , what ovations , what crowns were conferred on victorious generalls , and valiant souldiers ; as he that preserved the life of a citizen had an oaken crown , and he that first gain'd the top of the wall , a mural one , by the roman state . the eight is , duly and justly to pay those that serve them . and this will render them well-beloved , and well followed ; and though they make use onely of their own citizens , yet ought these to be well paid who gallantly venture their lives ; shall they be liberal of their blood , and shall others be niggardly of their purses ? besides , they leave their callings , and all other means of providing maintenance . thus was their a constant provision of lands among the romans for those that had fulfilled their time of warfare , neither shall we ever find a mutiny for want of pay ; and our saviour tells us , no man goeth to a warfare on his own charge . the ninth is , to have a tender regard of their widdowes and orphans , who have nobly lost their lives in their countrey's defence . shall we enjoy rest , and abundance , & see theirs perishing for want by whose valour we have been preserved ? besides , it is a great discouragement to others to venture their lives for us , when they shall see such a calamity in their deaths ready to cease the dearest pledges of their souls . thus the romans provided them portions out of the publick stock . the tenth is , to have the like regard of such men and their families , who have liberally layd out their own estates in the publick service , or have been so publickly minded , as that they have not regarded their private benefit . thus did the romans often bury great and noble captains , who di'd poor , on the public charge , and bestow their daughters according to their qualities . the eleventh is , to crown the memories of those who had done publick service , with statues , and tryumphant arches , which was every where to be seen in that noble and grateful city of rome . and as these are just , necessary , of good concernment for the nourishing of noble spirits , and producing brave actions , so on the other side it will be the same . twelfly , severely to punish all incendaries , seditious , trayterous , and cowardly persons , and that first to amend such , secondly to keep the publick authority from contempt , thirdly to terrifie others by their examples . thus seneca , ni mia enim licentia adversus malos , crudelitas est adversus bonos . and cicero , quare ita probanda est mansuetudo , ut adhibeatur reipublicae causa severitas , sine qua administrari civitas non potest . and indeed obsta principiis , to nip such practices in the bud , is the safest way , which by connivency may grow to such an height as it will be hard to resist : a small spark unregarded may kindle a flame that shall burn a city : and the romans were so careful in this , that the greatest services , and noblest extraction could not turn the scale of justice , as in manlius capitolinus , saturninus , tiberius and caius gracchus , catiline , lentulus , cethegus , &c. lastly , to take an exact account of those that shall embeazle or purloin the publick treasure ; tyrannize and oppresse the people under their charge . for connivency in such cases will be of very bad consequence , both in keeping the publick poor and behind-hand , in making officers knaves , and wicked , and in undoing , disheartning and enraging the people : therefore we shall find the romans very strict in this point , often calling to account and condemning , even some very eminent for other deserts , as in scipio asiaticus , marcellus , and those noble orations of tully against verres . and indeed this is the onely means to preserve peace and plenty ; for a poor people will be alwaies busling , and an oppressed careless to gather , or play the good husbands , not knowing how long they shall enjoy their own . therefore boaetius excellently saies , annuum bonum , non tam de magnis fructibus , quam de juste regnantibus existimandum , the one will quickly be devoured without the other . chap. xxiv . of laws , and the english laws . it followes now therefore , offenders being to be restrained , to shew what that is which must do it , and that is law , which is the proper medicine for a commonwealth in time of peace , in war there must be a sharper and quicker course taken : and indeed this is so necessary , that as livy saith , multitudo coalescere in vuius populi corpus , nulla re , quam legibus , potest , there can be no communion , no society without laws ; these preserve property , and encourage industry , whereas should men be left at uncertainties , they would like wild and ravenous beasts , wander , ceasing upon their prey where they met with any weaker than themselves : but this general assertion is taken for granted on all hands , we shall only therefore endeavor to give our thoughts in some paticulars , which seem to concern the laws of england . as first that our generous and knowing ancestors plainly perceiving that there could be no liberty where there was no law , were very careful to bring all things to a certainty , so that the very judges are obliged to take notice of it as well as the people , and are bound up to observe the law as much as plantiff or defendant : and this , because to set up arbitrary courts or judges were to leave the people to their will , and in a mist to grope after surmizes what such or such persons would determine ; and indeed until men were omniscient , or could prophetically foretel the imaginations of the rulers or judges hearts , it were the highest piece of injustice to call men to account for a thing committed against no law , and a thing not to be named to condemn them . what could a man call his own , unless there were tenures warranted and confirmed by law ? and to bring a criminal process for a thing no where declared a crime , would be a tyranny our monarchs in the worst ages would have blusht at . but it may be said , what need there so many ? these engender but strife and vexation ; truly for strife it s the effect of peoples perverseness , not the law : and should those actions of battery , actions upon the case for words , and actions of trespass be taken away , we should quickly see the people make themselves judges , and by revenging themselves fall together by the ears : our wise ancestors being aware of such a mischief thought it better to let them vent their petty animosities in a sute where some small matter of money might be thrown away , and spend their spleen in opening each others purse , than to fall into deadly fewds , wherein kinred on both fides would engage , and so print their revenges in murder and ruin , as we have heard practised in the northern parts of this island , and our forefathers saw , and provided against . for let us assure our selves , to provide no remedy by law against these injuries , which are the main beginnings of all quarrels , would not only make mem more ready to provoke , but others as apt to revenge themselves being provoked , and of what consequence this will be to the endangering the civil peace , good , and quiet of a nation , i leave to the world to judge . to conclude , as the law of england gives rules , and teaches men their duties , so is it the most careful and provident for their tryals ; it so abhors arbitrariness ( as the enemy of liberty , and father of injustice ) that it will not trust the matter of fact , and of law in one hand , but sets twelve men of the neighbourhood to give their verdict for fact ; against whom it allowes an attaint , and being found guilty inflicts on them a dreadful punishment ; so careful is it of the lives and liberties of particular persons , and so provident that justice should be impartially administred ; and now if any by his living in turky is become enamoured of slavery , let him choose arbitrary courts , for my part i desire a rule to teach me what may be an offence , and iudges who are bound by oath to observe that rule to give sentence , and twelve of the neighbourhood to enquire of the fact , and against whom their lies an attaint , and upon eviction a dreadful punishment , before an arbitrary court , though never so carefully picked , and so i am sure do all understanding english men , who any whit prize and value their liberties . another objection there is against the iudges , that they are for life ; and that such a continuance may make them remiss and sloathful , and that by a continual use they become less reverent of justice , as a work which dayly use makes tedious and clogging : not omitting that it may create faction and combination , as livy notes of the carthaginians , qui unum ejus ordinis , idem adversos omnes habebat ; as lastly that it may beget corruption by taking away fear of calling to account : and therefore the romans decurias iudicum scribebant , ex honestissimis , & ex censu ( ne paupertas ad culpam impelleret ) : sed non eas omnes assidue judicare vole bant , duntaxat quotannis certum & necessarium numerum sorte legebant , reliquis tunc feriatis . all this we allow in arbitrary judges , who cannot be too short a time limitted ; but where there are lawes according to which they are to judge , there they ought to have experience and knowledge , which must of necessity encrease by practice and continuance . thus the romans whilest they were poor and in continual war , there was no great cause of strife , wealth being wanting , and the war employing them and keeping them busie , so that they had little leisure for private brawls : but when they began to enjoy peace and plenty , they had their decemviri , which were of continuance , and still provided by new lawes to bridle new enormities . so that take away law and continuance will be as dangerous , as the loss of liberty and right will be inevitable ; for we must hold all at will , and have no rule to call judges to account by , whose will must be our final determination , and as they think so must the bell tink . chap. xxv . of fortitude , and the roman practice of it . this vertue by the greeks is stiled {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from a man , because it is peculiar to that sex , and is seldome found in women , and that in regard of the temperament , which must be hot and dry , and in a heart which is well compact , solid , and full of spirit : therefore cicero 2. tuscul. viri propria maximè est fortitudo , cujus munera duo sunt , nempe mortis & doloris contemptio . we find it defined by the philosopher , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to be a vertue keeping a mean in fear and confidence . and it is divided into publick and private . private is a noble and patient undergoing of adversity , as cicero 4. tuscul. fortitudo est scientia perferendarum rerum , vel affectio animi in patiendo , et ferendo , summae legi parens sine timore : et in l. 1. offic. fortis & constantis animi est , non perturbari in rebus asperis , nec tumultuantem dejici de gradu , ut dicitur , sed praesenti animo uti , et nec à consilio , nec à ratione discedere ; and horace l. 2. od. 10. rebus angustis animosus , atque fortis apparet — publick is a fearless under taking , and constant wading through such perils , wherein our deeds and examples may bring benefit to our countrey , and honour and renown to our selves ; and this where , when , and how we ought , as l. 3 eth. c. 7. by this then we may behold , first ▪ that self murder is no fortitude , for as curtius saith , non fortium virorum est odisse vitam , sed contemnere mortem , but rather a cowardice that makes them fling themselves into the arms of death to avoid some more threatning evil . besides , they are injurious to the common wealth , which they deprive of a member ; yet here for a sea captain to blow up his ship rather than let her be taken by the enemy , is no point of self-murder ; for the aiming at his countreys good , and her enemies loss and ruine , acts the part of a valiant and faithful citizen . secondly , that duels are no effect of true valour , they being injurious to the common wealth . thirdly , sturdy theeves or robbers , which are not only injurious , and mischievous , but such as fight directly against the laws of humane society ▪ and they are so far from being truly valiant , that they are wicked and impudent : and therefore we shall find some of the antients define fortitude {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; fear of reproof ▪ and dread of infamy ; and it is commonly seen that those that most dread the lawes , least fear the enemy , and who are most quiet in peace , are most valiant in war , as plutarch in the life of agis , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . they are least fearful of suffering , who stand most in aw of doing evil . much more might be said of this manly vertue , which for brevity we omit , and shall refer those that desire further information , to that masculine discourse of aristotle in l. 3. eth. cap. 6. for the roman practice of this vertue , it is so obvious in their histories , as we shall hardly find the least foot-step of cowardice in that gallant and victorious commonwealth , whose noble citizens in all occasions were most ready to devote their lives for their countrie , and sacrifise their rags of mortality , to immortal fame and renown . and indeed the love of our countrey , and noble thirst after honour , are the great agents in this glorious production : for what man that is fully perswaded of his duty to the first , and the reward he shall receive from the last , can be faint-hearted or cowardly ? — fax mentis honestae gloria , saith the poet , and as velleius , nec potest quidquam abjectum , & humile cogitare , qui scit de se semper loquendum , a man will hardly be brought to act basely , who shall consider he shall stand on record , either infamous or renowned ; yea such a record , as time every day more and more publishes , as lipsius , vt sol in aurora tenuior , assurgit , & inclarescit ; sic ex virtute , & meritis fama cum aevo ipso augetur , & crescit . what man in flight comming to a bridge , and remembring horatius cocles , would not make a noble stand , and either live with him , or dying live his equal in history ? i shall sum up all with that of polybius , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , riches are common , but bravery of mind , and the glory and renown that springs from it , is peculiar to the gods , or such men as come neer them . chap. xxvi . of temperance , and he roman practice of it . this vertue by the greeks is called {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , quasi {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , as it were the preserver of prudence : for pleasure and grief corrupt {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , those faculties which are to consider of action : and a mind taken up with either of these cannot well intend the end for which {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , all things ought to be chosen or dore . now temperance moderating these passions keeps the mind undisturbed , and deservedly is stiled , the conservatrix of prudence . we shall define it , a vertue preserving a just decorum in the desiring and enjoying sensual delights : for grief , which comes within its verge , that only arises from want of fruition . it is therefore the duty of a temperat man to abhor dishonest , moderately to desire , and enjoy lawful pleasures , and not immoderately to grieve when deprived of them . now lawful-pleasures are such as first {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , conduce to bodily health , or as {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , exceed not our estates , and misbecom the rank and quality we live in . and of what avail this vertue is to the preservation and growth of a state , history and observation every where , and every day , may clearly make out unto us . this was it set rome upon her legs ; this is it that made her citizens able of body , both to fight , and endure the field ; this made her captains contemn bribes ; and her generals in the height of , military heat , and success , slight pleasure , and constantly keep the publick good , and their own honour in their eye . thus shall we see the noble curius , when the conquered samnites profered him gold , shew them his dinner ( for he was at their coming cooking it himself ) which was a few rape roots in a pipkin , telling them there was no great need of gold to furnish his table , and that he had rather command over such as had gold , than possess it himself . and when some complained that he had assigned too little of the conquered lands to private men , and too much to the publick , he told them , he hoped that there was never a roman citizen which would count that land too little which was sufficient to maintain him . thus shall we see scipio africanus , when the souldiers brought him a most beautiful damosel , taken in the sack of new carthage in spain , and hearing she was betroathed to allucius a young prince of the celtiberians , he sent for him , and not only bestowed on him his beautiful bride , but a great sum of gold as her portion , which her parents brought for her ransome . let us behold the event , this young prince goes home rapt with joy , filling every place with the praise and merit of scipio , telling his countrymen , venisse diis simillimum juvenem , vincentem omnia cum armis , tum benignitate , ac beneficiis , there was a godlike young man arrived , conquering all both by force and bounty : and within a few daies returned with 1400 horse to scipio's camp . thus by his temperance he advanced the roman cause , which he prefer'd above all private pleasure , and gave carthage a greater blow in this victory over himself , than in that other of taking their city , though the most considerable they had in spain ▪ i shall conclude all with that speech of asdruball surnamed the kid , the carthaginian legat to the roman senate , raro simul hominibus bonam fortunam , bonamque mentem dari : populum romanum eo invictum esse quod in secundis rebus sapere , & consulere meminerit : & hercle mirandum fuisse , si aliter facerent : ex insolentia , quibus nova bona fortuna sit , impotentes laetitiae insauire : populo romano usitate , ac prope jam obsoleta ex victoria gaudia esse , ac plus pene parcendo victis , quam vincendo imperium auxisse . god hath given england her share of success , we have not of late known what it is to be conquered , but as if we had been the adopted sons of victory , she hath perch'd upon our conquering ensigns , and pitch'd her pavilion among our tents . o let us then endeavour not to be transported with any unbecoming passions , which may force this glorious virgin to blush , to hide her head , and be ashamed to keep us company any further ; but as we increase in power , let us grow in vertue ; thus shall we be established , and to our wreaths of palm and laurel shall the olive chaplet be added , and we enjoy the pleasant fruits of peace at home as well as honourable esteem of valour abroad . — sic , sic juvat ire — per altos virtutum gradus patet ascensus ad aeternitatem . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a66762e-2480 a gales . b ree . c the downs . d rebellion . e the first invasion . a comparatiue discourse of the bodies natural and politique vvherein out of the principles of nature, is set forth the true forme of a commonweale, with the dutie of subiects, and right of soueraigne: together with many good points of politicall learning, mentioned in a briefe after the preface. by edvvard forset. forset, edward, 1553?-1630. 1606 approx. 211 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 58 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2004-05 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a01075 stc 11188 estc s102531 99838308 99838308 2682 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a01075) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 2682) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1475-1640 ; 957:09) a comparatiue discourse of the bodies natural and politique vvherein out of the principles of nature, is set forth the true forme of a commonweale, with the dutie of subiects, and right of soueraigne: together with many good points of politicall learning, mentioned in a briefe after the preface. by edvvard forset. forset, edward, 1553?-1630. [16], 100 p. printed [by eliot's court press] for iohn bill, london : 1606. identification of printer from stc. the first leaf is blank. reproduction of the original in the henry e. huntington library and art gallery. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 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reviewed and edited 2004-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a comparative discovrse of the bodies natvral and politiqve . wherein out of the principles of nature , is set forth the true forme of a commonweale , with the dutie of subiects , and the right of the soueraigne : together with many good points of politicall learning , mentioned in a briefe after the preface . by edvvard forset . london , printed for iohn bill . 1606. to the reader . the commonweale with all her parts , orders , qualities , and requisites whatsoeuer , is ( for better apprehension & illustration ) set forth by sundry fit resemblances , as by the architecture of an house , by the swarming and cohabiting of bees in an hiue , by a ship floating on the sea , and such like ; but by none more properly than eyther by the vniuersall masse of the whole world , ( consisting of all the seuerall subsistances in that great frame by the high wisdome and might of god compact and vnited ) or else by the body of man , being the lesser world , euen the diminitiue and modell of that wide extending vniuersall . and ( by the way ) it were a paynes well bestowed , to obserue the good correspondence betweene euery the particular parts or faculties in man , and the other distinct parts , powers , and operations of that bigger bulke : which seemeth to haue beene both sweetly and soundly conceaued by that thrice renowmed philosopher trismegistus , when he imagined an huge and mightie gyant , whose head was aboue the firmament , his necke , shoulders , and vpper parts in the heauens , his armes and hands reaching to east and west , his belly in the whole spaciousnesse vnder the moone , his legges and feet within the earth . but for that the discourse or discouery of this secret , with the agreeable references to arise therof , falleth not within the line wherwith i haue listed and bounded this treatise ; i wil only from this obseruation of gods owne imitating of himselfe in the likenesse of the lesse with the greater , gather and infer that which giueth groundworke vnto my purpose : that the incōprehensible wisdome of god , in the composing & ordering of his works in nature , hath so dignified them with all perfection , as that they be left vnto vs as eminent and exemplary patterns , as well for the consolidating , as for the beautifying of that wee worke by arte or policie ; as well for conioyning of all discordances into firmenesse , as also for the applyablenesse of particulars in their many seruices , for the vse and benifit of the whole . it is beyond the compasse of any contradiction , that in the morall vertues christes actions are our instructions ; and no lesse may the like rule hold , that in the contriuing of a prudent gouernment , the impressions and footsteps of gods wisdome ( which in things naturall wee contemplate by study ) be in the poynt of regiment , our directories for imitation . wherefore seeing that the vttermost extent of mans vnderstanding , can shape no better forme of ordering the affayres of a state , than by marking and matching of the workes of the finger of god , eyther in the larger volume of the vniuersall , or in the abridgement thereof , the body of man : i account these two to be the two great lights for enquiry and meditation concerning this businesse , and doe worthily omit all other worthlesse presidents , as inferiour starrelights , which oftentimes seduceth by their dimnesse , and at their best are but deriuatiue and subalterne vnto these . and of these two also ( as not daring to gaze too much vpon the sunne , and vnable in mine own weakenesse to run the round of such a large cōpasse ) i haue made my choyce to pursue only those applyances , which from the so skilfull workemanship of god in man , may bee well apted to the ciuill gouernment of the assemblies of men : which being of more facilitie to bee vnderstood ( as deduced from a more familiar example ) and equalling the other both in dignitie ( hauing the same authour ) and in certayntie ( respecting the fitnesse of their relation ) may also sort both agreeably with other mens likings ( as bred in their bosomes ) and with mine intentions , which seeketh wholy a demonstratiue plainenesse . this similitude was both fitly and fortunatly enforced by menenius agrippa , who being imployed in the appeasing and persuading of the seditious reuoulting commons of rome , did by a very tale of this proportionable respectiuenes of the parts in mans body , and the mutualitie of kindnes and ayd afforded from each to other , so sensibly shew them their errour , that surseasing their malignant enuy wherewith they were inraged against their rulers ( whom they accounted as the idle belly that swallowed the labors of their hands ) they discerned at the last , that their repining against , and their pining of that belly , whence was distributed vnto them their bloud and nourishment , necessarily tended to their owne destruction ; and were thereuppon forthwith reclaymed into their bounds of obedience . the like comparison is most diuinely enlarged by a much better orator , and in a much more important poynt of the vnseparable vnion of the members of christ with their head , and of the necessary communion of their distinct gifts and works amongst themselues ; yea , it hath pleased god himselfe for the manifestation in some measure of his vnmeasurable infinitenesse , & the incomprehensible nature of his dietie , to vouchsafe vnto vs as it were some glimse thereof , by this selfe same well agreeing semblance , drawne and borrowed from our weak , mortall , and sinfull bodies . his omni-science is set forth by an all-seeing eye , his omnipotencie by a mightie and outstretched arme , his mercy by the cheerefulnesse of a louing countenance , his bountie by the opening of his hand , and filling of all things with his blessings : by which so apt tipes he openeth for our more easie vnderstanding , the profoundnesse of his attributes , and ( as i may say ) the mysteries of his essence . i need not spend any speech in the praise of such familiar and well pleasing illustrations : looke but vpon that exsuperant and not attainable by humane powers wisdome of salomon , is not the brightest apparance thereof in comparatiue parables ? but behold a greater than salomon , who without parables spake nothing to them ; as if both the depth and delicacie of wits inuention for either prouing or persuading , consisted chiefely in such equipolling and parabolicall applications . it remayneth that before i proceed to the producing or presenting vpon the stage of state the similitudes themselues , to be scanned and considered of , ( which i wish may proue themselues right paralele ) i do for aduantage enterline first a caution , then a limitation : my caution is , that no man in streyning too hard , do force the bloud , where he is offered milke . it is easie for a curious obiector , euen in the fittest comparisons to make disseuerance by inferring different respects and inequallitie . the dissimilitudes of things be infinite , and rometh with errour in the circumference , where the well apted likenesse setleth in the center of truth , and is compacted closely in one onely point of good congruitie , from the which it may neither be drawne awry without wrongfull wresting , nor enlarged too far without extreame torturing . it is the greatest miracle of gods powerfull wisdome , in the innumerable formes of things , to make so infinite variation ; then it must needs be a great worke of the wit of man , in such multiplicitie of disference to find out the well agreeing semblances , to knit and match together sundry things by an aptnesse of application , is the proper effect of vnion ; but to disioyne the well coupled from their louely analogie of each to other , is a violent diuorce and distraction : therefore let such makebates ( if any be ) abate their humor of crossing with dissimilitudes , & content their conceits with that which they shall discerne to be matched with a right mirror , and representingly expressed by the shew of a good concordance . my limitation is , that it be not exacted or expected of me , so mincingly to manage this matter , as that vnto euery particuler part or facultie of our humane nature , i must needs find out in the states bodie some seuerall members or braunches entirely matchable to the same ; like a picture to be newly drawne by a former patterne , conforming therewith in euery line , shape , or shadow . we vse to say that one man is like an other , if but the faces , yea the colours or figures , yea the frownes or smyles , yea the casting of the eyes , or any other shewes in their visages doe seeme to agree , though in other respects or parts there be betwixt them rather apparant repugnances , than any right resemblances ; then let no man think that i will so be put to my shifts , or that i will impose my selfe so hard a taske , as ( by descending to each singuler or indiuiduall ) to find for it an euen yoak-fellow , or well matching companion , that may serue as a relatiue or representatiue vnto it , by the aptnesse of propriety : the which labour as it would be endlesse in toile , so would it be no lesse needlesse in vse ; and i hope it will suffice , so to compare or make parity betweene the bodies naturall and politique , that each part may be brought in rather easilie entreated , than streiningly intruded ; and rather agreeing naturally , than forced violently . therefore omitting all industrious curiousity , and friuolous affectation of following too far ( where yet i must needs fall short ; ) i onely desire , that where i shall shew a reciprocall likenesse of habitude , affection , or disposition ; there the similitude may passe approued , and induce assent : and that where these may not readily be had , there i may find such curteous construction , as that i may neither be charged with partiality of concealing ( where it is meet i should be mute ) nor be suspected of vnsufficiencie for not pursuing where i can find no footing . it is vnfallable what i propound for my first principle , that in euery particular person , there is both the seed and similitude of a state incorporat , yet to imagine or seeke for in each seuered or subdeuided parts , such affinitie and fitnesse betwixt them , as may mutually illustrate each other ; were not to tune but to crack the strings , and to make quidlibet ex quodlibet , or , ex quouis ligno mercurium . modestie and discretion bindeth vs to a stint , beyond the which if we shall stretch or streine , we may iustly be said to haue borrowed of the wyer-drawers : we must not compell our applications there to shake hands and embrace , where discrepance of nature hath estranged and set apart . were it not ridiculous for absurditie , and blasphemous for impietie , if in that serious similitude of christs comming to iudgement like a theefe in the night , we should ( beyond the ge●●inall agreeablenesse of their vnlooked for stealing vpon vs ) in other most vngodly sences linke in christ in likenesse with a theefe ? or if that other notable parable of the vniust steward , were ( from the commendation of his prouident preuention ) racked with other references , to make his deceiptfulnesse also praise-worthy ; who would not conuince such vnfit and lefthanded handling , both of wildnesse in wit , and wickednesse of hart ? to conclude , i will knit vp this point thus , that in the knitting and according of things diuers into one point of agreement , ( making by such their enterchangeable lendings of like reason and respect , a lightsomnesse of proofe and vnderstanding ) we must auoid their diuersities as sands and rocks , and keep the right channell of an allowed likenesse ; which will conduct vs both safely and delightsomly in this course of comparing . farewell . ¶ a briefe of such points as are comparatiuely handled in the discourse following . what is meant in the saying of pithagoras , that man is the measure of all things , and how this measure may serue in the matching of the state thereunto . folio 1. in euery state , soueraigntie the soule , alleageance the bodie . 3. in euerie ciuill state there must be the ruling , and the ruled . ibid. impugners of magistracie refuted . ibid. of the good that subiects haue by gouernment , with the end thereof . 3. mutuall offices betweene soueraigne and subiect . ibid. good gouernment the states happinesse . 4. no gouernment without law . ibid. soueraignes loue to their subiects . 5. soueraignes care of their subiects well doing . ibid. the excellencie of soueraigntie , and how they be ordained of god , and what thereof is inferred . 5. & 6. against ambition . 7. soueraignes haue a waightie charge full of labours and cares . 8. they deuide part of their care and worke to inferiour magistrats , and be wronged by their negligence . 8. all commaund and power in the state deriued from the soueraigne . 8. supremacie is maintained against the pope , or any other without or within the realme . 9. the rights of soueraignes not too far to bee extended , nor too much to be restrained . 10. of soueraigntie . 11 the soule set forth in his seuerall powers , and then the soueraignty compared to the same . ibid. soueraigntie in his vegetable powers . 13. soueraigntie in his sensitiue and intellectuall parts . 14. councellors . 15. fauorites . ibidem . whether the soueraignes will may stand for law . 16. misinforming of soueraignes . 17. the soueraignes yeelding to the customes and inclinations of the people . ibid. the soueraigne may not admit different sects of resolution . ibid. the soueraigne helped or wronged by obedience or disobedience of the people . ibid. soueraignes sometimes suppressed by rebels . 18. the soueraigne troubled with courtiers suits . 19. the soueraigne troubled with male contents . ibid. all offenders haue their pretences ; especially traytors . ibid. the soueraignes records ; and of the embezilling or falsifying of them . 20. soueraignes prerogatiues . ibid. soueraignes not to be euill spoken of vppon supposall of any faults in them . 21. soueraignes called gods , and what thereof inferred . 23. the large extent of soueraigntie , by comparison thereof to god and the soule . ibid. whether it is better for the soueraigne to be much or seldome seene of the people . 25. soueraignes compared to the head . 26. in the plantation of ciuill people , the head the root . 27. the excellencie of the head ; it dearely loueth all the parts ; and it againe 〈…〉 . ibid. the diseases of the head caused from the bodie , therefore to be borne with . 28. no repugnancie of the parts against the head . ibid. how there should be no opposing , nor deposing of soueraignes . ibid. good subiects oft take vpon them the faults committed by their soueraigne . ibid. soueraignes , in what sence they be likened to the hart . 29. their commaund and force . ibid. their bountie and benefits , binding subiects to all dutie . 30. their loue of vertue . ibid. soueraignes to looke well to them that be neare about them . 31. how factions and sides do grow ; and how they be preuented . ibid. the soueraignes sports and recreations not to be grudged at . ibid. the soueraigne wronged , when his officers , iudges , and councellors be wronged . 32. the person of the soueraigne full of maiestie . ibid. diuersitie of respects in the soueraigne , touching his person and soueraigntie ; the worke thereof sheweth the maiestie of it . 33. the soueraigne may not do wrong to his subiects . 34. of certaine essentiall orders in the state . 35. the gifts of statesmen to be well disposed of . 36. the chiefe officers or nobles to be well fafegarded . ibid. of the body politique , and the foure elements whereof it is compounded . 37. & 38. how the vneuen mixture of these elements maketh abounding of humours , and difference of complexions . 38. the necessitie of keeping these elements in concord , there is oft discord in the parts of one and the same element . 39. sundry formes of bodies politike arising from vnequall mixture . 40. the harme which commeth by distemper , which conuerteth that to hurt which otherwise were good . 41. the beginnings , increasings , and endings of commonwealths , with all their alterations , chiefly of god. 41. & 42. the peoples different dispositions , and the right ruling of them all to the publike good , by the example of the body in the dieting thereof , in exercise , and in other sundrie tendances . 43. & 44. equalitie how to be obserued in the distribution of the profits of the commonweale . 45. against paritie , prouing difference in dignitie and riches . ibid. not to reward , worse than not to punish . 46. difference of dignities and degrees , 47. dignities not to be basely bestowed . 48. why the bodie politike is called a commonweale . ibid. the mutualitie of helps in the members . ibid. greatest respect to be had of the chiefe parts , against whom the enemies bend most . 49. each part to bee allotted to his owne worke . 50. parts disordred maketh the body monstrous . 50. against conspiracies , and of the late intended treasons . 51. against idle vagrant and vnprofitable people . 54. against ingrossing of many offices into one mans hands . ibid. of many well agreeing in one worke . 56. in the worke of ruling no more heads but one . 57. britania one bodie needing but one head . 58. inducements for vnion . ibid. the bodie politique may haue many imperfections , and yet remayne a bodie . 59. shifts vsed for supply of defects , as to entertayne straungers , to take mercenaries , and to enter leagues with other realmes . 60 and what successe such shifts vsually haue . ibid. what perfection may be looked for in the commonweale . ibid. signes of health in the state . 61. signes inferre no certaintie , but often deceaue . ibid. health how necessarie . 62. a griefe in part putteth the whole out of health . 63. of discontentednesse . ibid. the obseruing of originall orders preserueth health . ibid. alterations daungerous . ibid. nature best liketh that whereto it hath bene accustomed . 64. alterations must not bee sodayne , or of the whole , but by leasure and degrees . ibid. cases of alteration . 65. better keepe health than recouer it . ibid. of prouiding in prosperitie for aduersitie . ibid. timely preuentions very requisite , because of small beginnings great mischiefes often ensue . 66. of tolleration of euils in the state . 67. cases for sufferance of euill . 68. wee may hurt to heale , and take phisicke to preuent diseases . 70. of the diseases of the state , and how they arise . 71. difference in faults . 72. against equalitie of sinne , and how punishment must be proportionable to the offence . 72. outward euils not so dangerous as inward . ibid. lawes compared to phisicke , and the soueraigne the chiefe phisicion , and vnder him magistrats , their great charge . 73. & 74. the cause why their authoritie is so repined at . 74. the necessitie of magistracie . ibid. magistrats not to bee discouraged by the repugnancie of the people . 75. magistrats workes agreeth with the phisicions works . ibid. sundry sorts of medicines for the state . ibid. whether the magistrat may be trusted in altering the punishment by law appointed by increasing or mitigating of the same . 77. as the faults be not equall , no more must be the punishment . ibid. points to be obserued of the states phisicion . 78. & 79. the phisicions of the state , are to tend all that be diseased , especially great men , whose faults are most perilous , and why they bee so . 80. diuers requisites in the phisicions of the bodie politique , and sundry positions touching the diseases of the state , and their cure . 81. against vnskilfull pragmatikes . 85. the learned fittest for gouernment . 86. the harme of vnperfect curing . ibid. discretion in ordering of state businesse , or in any other learning . 87. of seueritie . ibid. of lenitie . ibid. the same disease may be cured by contrary wayes . 87. & 88. repealing of old , and making of new lawes . 88. magistrats may make vse of the wicked . 89. the praise of good magistrats . ibid. qualities requisite in the phisicion . ibid. his loue towards the people . 90. not to be couetous . ibid. greedinesse of gayne in some lawyers . 91. a miserie neuer to be out of law . ibid. magistrates may haue priuate faults , and yet bee good magistrats . ibid. skill in gouerning his chiefest vertue . 91. rather to be natiues than straungers . 92. their good example of great force . 92. they must not defist from their duties for any abuses offered . ibid. the ought not to haue too many offices or imployments . ibid. compared to a surgion in three properties . 93. they sometimes offend the law , and are then to be punished by other magistrats . 93. their faults no preence for any to disobey them . 93. their deseruings soone forgotten , and often not recompenced sufficiently . 94. their good endeuors often censured by the euents . 94. the lawmakers abused and discouraged for want of execution of their lawes ; and how great an injurie that is . 94. lawes often by cauils illuded to the wrong of magistracie and iustice . 95. obedience the chiefe vertue of subiects . 95. a knitting the subiect and the soueraigne in mutuall loue , making the commonweale blessed thereby . 95. in the conclusion . politicall gouernours made famous by the praises of the learned . 96. the benefit which soueraignes may haue by reading of politicall books . 97 the dedicattion of such works , due to the gouernors of the state . 97. against curiositie in priuat persons , of looking into state businesse . 98. sobrietie to be vsed in inquisitiuenesse , the highest degree whereof is to prie into princes dealings and dispositions . 99. the hainousnesse of that fault . 99. a caueat against it by a comparison of the soueraigne to the soule . 99. soueraigntie as great a mysterie in policie , as the soule in the body . 100. finis . a comparatiue discourse of the bodies naturall and politique . it was pithily spoken of pithagoras , that man is the measure of al things : importing thereby , that man by the ampliation and application of his powers apprehensiue , discerneth , discusseth , and confineth the seuerall works of nature : with his sences hee measureth things sensible , with his vnderstanding he perceiueth things intellectuall , with his illuminate & inspired knowledge , he comprehendeth things diuine and supernaturall ; yea more , by this so large and vnmeasured measure , all things are made sutable to the esteeme of man , and be either great or small , light or heauy , faire or illfauored , desireable or auoydable , as by mans well or ill conceauing the same bee valued . but beyond all this , the meaning of that sage sentence extendeth yet farther , that in the very composure of man , there is manifestly discouered a summary abstract of absolute perfection , by the which as by an excellent idea , or an exact rule , we may examine and exemplifie all other things . the mathematicians haue found out by their obseruance of the beautious and vniforme proportion of the body of man , and by the symetrie of the parts therof , their true scantlines and dimensions ; yea by the laying of it in his full length , & then spreading the armes and legges to their widest compasse , they haue contriued both the perfect square , and the exact circle : the square , by foure right lines at the foure vttermost points of the hands and feet ; the circle , by rounding a line about those points , placing the center of their compasse vpon the nauell . the naturall philosophers reduceth the vastnesse of the vniuersal ( comprehending all things that hath either being , or vegitation , or sence , or reason ) vnto this same well compacted epitome of mans fabrifacture . then much more may the politique philosopher , hauing for his proper subiect the compound of men ciuilly assembled and associate , make man the obiect of his discourse and contemplation , to fit his treatise with good fashion to so imitable a patterne . therefore this measure ( thus induced thereto ) i haue made my choice of , to trie thereby the forme of a commonweale , what therein is right or wrye , what redundant or defectiue , what orderly or disproportionable ; the helpe of such a briefe , and the trueth of such a standerd , may serue to ballance the matters of deliberation , fitly accommodating and rectifying all designements and proceedings . and sith i doe find this lyne of likenesse to bee chalked out vnto vs in gods works , i will there begin my applying , where that profound wisdom hath begun his framing . as in the creating of man god conioined a soule for action , in a body passiue : so in his ordinance of mans sociable conuersing ( to make the vnion of a body politike ) he hath knit together a passiue subiection to an actiue superoiritie : and as in euery man there is both a quickning & ruling soule , and a liuing and ruled bodie ; so in euery ciuill state , there is a directing & commaunding power , & an obeying and subiected alleageance , for as neither the soule alone , nor body alone ( if they should be seuered ) can be a man , so not the ruler alone , nor the subiects alone , can be a commonweale . where all will rule , there is no rule , and where none doeth rule , there is all misrule : but to rule well , and to bee well ruled , is the surest bond of humane societie . such vnruly routs , as ( humourously led in dislikes ) denyeth the lawfulnesse of magistrats , may well bee likened to certayne peeuish male-contents , who ouertoyled with the tediousnesse of life ( and that often without any apparant cause ) wisheth that they had no soules , it being all one to want in the body a soule , and in the state a gouernour : yet as the body sustayneth no harme or wrong , yea is infinitly benefited and graced by the powerfull working of the soule in his organs ; so the people guided by a iust gouernmēt , not only are not therby iniured , hindered or abased , but much enabled , enobled , and aduanced euen to the highest pitch of a welthie and safe repose . then as the soule is the forme which to the body giueth being , and essence ; and the body is the matter which desiringly affecteth his forme : so both the ruler should wholy indeuour the welfare of his people , and the subiect ought ( as in loue to his owne soule ) to conforme vnto his soueraigne ; that both of them mutually like twinnes of one wombe , may in the neere and deare nature of relatiues , maintaine vnuiolate that compound of concordance , in which and for which they were first combined . as the coupling of the soule and bodie , tendeth not onely to giue life , but also to the attayning of a perfect and happy life : so the right temper of soueraigntie and obedience , intendeth end effecteth not only the being , but also the florishing and felicitie of a commonweale . for the gayning of which propounded happinesse , as the soule is the worthier agent , taking the greatest care , and deseruing the chiefest commendation , in so much as a man is not said to be happie for any his strength , his bignes , propernesse , or comely feature of body , but for the goodnesse , noblenesse , and vertuous endowements of his soule : so for the acquiring or framing of any perfection in the commonweale , we are not so much to behold the largenesse , the power , or the well shewing composure thereof , as the prudencie , justice , and other vertuous sinceritie of a rightful gouernment . in man the soule ruleth by reason , and in the state the soueraigne gouerneth by lawes ; which may no lesse aptly be termed the soule of soueraignty , than reason is said to be the soule of the soule . it can neuer bee so much as conceaued , that the soule should be without reason , though by the vnaptnes or repugnancie of the organs , his power in working is either interrupted or impugned : so gouernment may not bee so much as imagined to be without law , though the force and life of the law , through the waywardnesse of the subiects , cannot alwayes alike be shewed or seene in his due effects : no not the soueraigne will infringe lawes , no more than the soule will renounce reason . herewith the fiction of the poets and the paynters well agreeth , which in the description and portraiture of iupiter adioined iustice sitting on his right hand ; howsoeuer it pleased anaxarchus gybingly to tell alexander , that iupiter was not bound thereby to doe iustly , but that the people were thereof to conceiue , that whatsoeuer iupiter did was iust . it is worthie the noting , that albeit the bodie doeth often vnthankefully rebell against the soule , yet the soule euer loueth the body , still seeking to reduce it to the better , euen as a workeman mendeth his tooles , or a musician his instruments : whereof good rulers doe make to themselues this rule , that notwithstanding the subiects by their misbehauiour do often cause an incitation to wrath in their soueraign against them , yet in the punishing of such offenders , he will discouer no hatred to their persons , but to their faults , shewing himselfe grieued and vnwilling to afflict them , seeking rather their chasticement with pitie , than their destruction with crueltie , and rather to hold a coniunction with them by the mutualitie of louing offices , than to weaken his owne strength by the losse and cutting off the imployable parts of the state publike . the welfare and prosperitie of the bodie giueth to the soule sweet contentment , as secured thereby from the cares , perplexities , and griefes which want occasioneth : so the plentifull and abundant estate of the subiects , is by a good soueraigne both maintayned and reioyced at , sith it giueth to him assurance of supply and comfort in all necessities . in the creating of man , god is said to haue breathed into him the soule , whereby the puritie and dignitie thereof is much extolled aboue that lump of mowlded earth his body : so is the place of preheminence of an high maiestie , & of a more choice and better esteemed worth , as being more to the image of god , & participating more aptly with his greatnes , his power , his iustice , his mercie , his wisdome , his goodnes and bountie , and whatsoeuer els vnspeakable perfection in his vnsearchable essence ; for if mans gouerning of the creatures be to the image of god , then the gouerning of men is much more to that image . it was not in the power of the body either to chuse or refuse the soule , but his right of admission depended only on the pleasure of his imediate maker . i forbeare to force the consequence so farre , as wholy to debarre the peoples liking or electing of their gouernors : yet somewhat to temper the harshnesse , and to restrain the rashnesse of some peremptorie pragmatikes , i may be bold from that auerment of the soules imbreathing , to propound this application comparatiuely from thence inferred , that in this high poynt of principalitie , god hath reserued to himselfe this prerogatiue ofbestowing that dignitie , according to his owne most vnscrutable counsell : by me ( saith he ) kings do raigne . and saint paul auoucheth , that there is no power but of god : yea homer produceth graue nestor , reproouing of achilles for his obstinate withdrawing from agamemnons regiment , and his ouerbold contending with the king , sith his imperie was of god. true it is , that euen in the same phrases all things may be sayd to bee of god , and from god , as the authour , creator , preseruer , and disposer thereof : yet when we find him to single out and appropriat any onething more especially vnto his owne designements , wee are there to take notice of his greater respectiuenesse , and his ouerswaying greatnesse in the disposing and ordering of that matter beyond the orders and limitations of lawes or customes ; yea in such a case he conformeth the secundarie causes , to cooperate with him to his owne ends : as when he framed the peoples hearts , and the concurrance of their consents in the electing of saul and dauid vnto the kingly office , whom notwithstanding he had before himselfe appointed and anointed to that function . wherefore as the soule notwithstanding the mediate meanes of procreation , is vsually sayd to bee infused from aboue into the body : so the soueraigne euen in his particular parson , but much more the soueraigne authoritie may notwithstanding the approbation of men , or any other assisting helps in the establishing thereof , be rightly auouched to bee ordained and designed by god himselfe . as the soule ( in imitation of that infinitenesse from which it was first breathed ) spendeth all his powers with an insatiate desire in the search and inquisition of more and more knowledge , endeuouring therby a further dilatation or extention of his nature ( as to bee like vnto god himselfe : ) so doeth oft times a soueraigne ( haughtily conceyted of the likenesse he hath with his ordainer ) striue with all restlesse thoughts and deare aduentures , to inlarge the amplitude of his dominion , reckoning it the absolutenesse of perfection to bee extended beyond the compasse of any limitation , and then wishing the subduing of many worlds , that hee might more neerely resemble the highest god , that made and ruleth all the world . but vnto them both ( out of sorrowfull experience ) i may adde this correcting caueat , that such ambitious affectation , as it brought vppon the one the depriuation of his former blessednesse , so is it commonly punished in the other by the downefall and dissipation of his so exalted state . and as the one hath euer since beene stinted at a measure of vnderstanding acquirable by the organs of the body ( the which to seeke to exceed is a renouncing of humilitie , yea a forgetting of our humane imbecilitie , & a curiositie beyond sobrietie : ) so is each soueraigne power listed & confined to his owne territories , maynteinable by the strength therof , the which who so is not cōtented with , is accoūted blamable of a presumptuous & vniust vsurpation beyond the boūds to him assigned . in that the soule is authour of action and motion in the body passiue , himselfe being neuer idle , it sheweth by similitude , that the soueraigne doth vncessantly care and labour for the publike good , and that his place is not ( as some vayne heads imagine ) the seat of idlenesse and pleasure , but that his crowne is accompanied , and euen encompassed with so many restlesse thoughts , and stinging cares , as affoordeth him but small respit of ease , no not in the night season , as homer describeth his agamemnon . howsoeuer the body be termed passiue , in regard of the soules working in and by his instruments , yet vnto it also the soule imparteth his power of mouing and acting , and the more noble parts thereof bee the more indued and inabled with the soules best and worthiest faculties . so is all superioritie and commaund in the state , deriuatiuely branching from the supreme principalitie ; and the subiects of best sort , & fittest for vse and imploiments do share the greatest portion of such their soueraignes subdiuided authoritie : the remembrance & meditation whereof cannot but adde vnto such designed and deriued magistrats a spurre of quickening incouragement , more watchfully to attend so waightie a charge , least through their fayntnesse and dulnesse there be procured to their soueraigne a distayning disgrace or imputation of disabilitie . for as when the sences and powers of the bodie bee fallen asleepe , the soule also ( as not shewing himselfe in the life of his actions ) may be thought to be fast bound & surprised with the same slumbers : so when the substituted and authorized officers do desist from their indeuours and vigilancie in the tendance of the charge or businesse to them credited ; the soule of soueraignetie is in such their slacknesse or sleepinesse greatly discredited , as if it were wholy depriued of his power , yea of the very apparance of his gouerning vertue . i● i● not impossible & vnsensible , that a body should liue or moue by any other soule , than that wherunto by nature it is vnited . and is it not as absurd in any mans vnderstanding , and as preposterous by vsurpation , that any forraine power should intrude to rule and exercise iurisdiction in any other kingdom entire within it selfe , and of absolute supremacie & sufficiencie to gouerneal persons & causes within the dominions therof . surely , as in euery indiuiduall body , the owne soule thereof sufficeth for all naturall workes requisite to be effected therein : so in euery soueraigne state , the ruling authoritie thereof is of it selfe competent and compleate , for the wel gouerning and ordering of all the affaires , needfull or behouable to be attended vnto , in that entire territorie : and it may in no wise be contradicted , but that in any countrey , the commaunding , summoning , and censuring of subiects , together with the sentensing of causes , hath his whole dependance & deriuation from the right and preheminence of the soueraignetie and that the duties stile and intitelings vsual and belonging , ought with all submissiue acknowledgement and respectiue reference , to be rendered thereunto : which points of high regalitie , whē any subiect shall either deny vnto his soueraigne , or take vnto himselfe , what is it els , than as if an inferiour and ministeriall spirit , who hath no other function in the body , but as an agent or deputie for the soule in the workes to him assigned , shall intrudingly vsurpe , arrogate , and possesse the place , name and office of the soule it selfe ? except wee should witlessely imagine two soules in one body , like two sunnes in one firmament . the soule and the body are so firmely and intirely vnited in nature , that the philosophers found it no easie worke to bound each from other with iust distinguishment , or proportionable partition . tullie desirous to hold an equal or middle course , blameth as well aristippus , for affecting the body too much , as if there were no soule : as also zeno , for forgetting that we haue also bodies , when he referreth all vnto the soule . such good respect is obserued to haue beene had in equalling the rights of the realme and soueraigne : for such as extendeth preheminence too farre , may bee likened to such philosophers , as sayd , that man was all soule , and nothing but the soule : and such on the other side which kirbeth too much the awfull authoritie of high supremacie , with an enterpose of any popular or mediate force to restraine or resist it , agreeth with that philosophie , that darkeneth , drowneth and imprisoneth the soule within the body , as if it were rather subdued by the bodie , than the bodie endued with his gifts . to be sure to deale indifferently on each part , it is not amisse to consider of them sundred and apart . to begin with the soule : if wee should gather and bind together all his distinguished parts , and essentiall faculties , into one as himselfe is one , we shal readily find what in proprietie of interest to him belongeth . it fareth with the soule in the body , as it did amongst the poets with iupiter in the heauens , who notwithstanding that he did all in all , and was the vnlimitted transcendence aboue al , yet what euer he did in the skyes , in the ayre , and windes , in the earth , in the sea , or places subterraniall , by nature , by force , by arte , by wisdome , by persuasion , by curious workemanship , by profitable inuentions , by extraordinarie instincts of the mind , or by any other meanes whatsoeuer , for gouerning of the world , or the good of man , and the commodity of this life , was attributed vnto some other fayned gods , so as in very trueth , the multitude of gods in those times , was but the multiplicitie of power in one god : the soule likewise in the body being but one , and the same , operating diuersly according to the disposition and aptnes of the instruments , is to challenge to himselfe as the rightfull owner or authour , whatsoeuer life , sence , motion , discerning , health , strength , beautie , abilities , actions , graces , or gifts inherent or appertayning vnto the body , howsoeuer the same ( by a change or new purchase of their names ) seemeth to disauow their proceding from his essence . euen that facultie of vegetation ( which seemeth so base and drossie , and to hold most of the earthlinesse of the body ) hath yet his originall root and plantation in the soule , whether wee consider the same in the power nutritiue for preseruation , or in the augmentatiue for perfection , or in the generatiue for multiplication , we shall find it wholy to flow from this fountain : with the nutritiue power must concurre appetition , digestion , retention , and expulsion : in digestion is required an immutation , a formation , and an assimilation ; in all which so necessarie and fundamentall functions of life , the soule euidently blazeth foorth his effecting force , sith neyther without a soule , nor with any more soules than one , the bodie of it selfe could possibly , either so orderly and concordantly contriue his owne good by so helpfull meanes , or performe such worthy actions by any natiue vigor . the sensitiue facultie is much more sensibly discerned to take discent from the soule . the sences are as the dores and windowes through and forth of the which he maketh his prospects and passages ; yea their attendance is so vnseparablie annexed vnto the soule , that where he diuerteth himselfe , and giueth no attention , there the eye seeing seeth not , the eare hearing heareth not , and all other acts of any sences , be voyd of perceiuing or apprehending . to discourse at large , with full sailes , how the sences do recommend their conceiuing vnto the fantasie ; how the fantasie deliuereth them ouer vnto the vnderstanding ; how the vnderstanding either absolutely iudgeth them by reason , or erroniously mistaketh them by opinion ; how either reason or opinion , exciteth affections ; how affections either aduised by deliberation , or passionate by humors , induceth the assent of the will ; and how the will commaundeth & enforceth motion and prosecution in all or any parts of the bobie : howsoeuer it might amplie and excellently illustrate the powerfull operations of the soule , so orderly lincked , cheyned , and wrapped one within another : yet lest the delightsomnesse of following the tract of so well pleasing a theame , should draw me too far out of my way , i will wynd about againe , by making a second suruey thereof , in the matching to the same of mine applications . the gouerning preeminence of the estate , though it be somtimes in like maner obscured , and wronged by inferior deriuations ; yet such as can surmount the vulgar thoughts , in reducing vnto one glorious and potent head of maiestie , all the seuerall branchings and subalternations thereof , shall easily find how agreeablie it holdeth semblance with the soule , in this respect also , as to be but one , yet effecting all , yea , to be all in all , and all in euery part of the bodie politique . there is not in the commonwealth , any the least synew for mocion , the least vaine for norishment , the least spirite for life and action , the least strength for defence , or offence , the least member for vse and benefit , which is not replenished with this power , and sucketh from this ouerflowing cesterne , all his subsistance and performance . ( and if i thought it not vnfit to be ouer-curious in fitting exactly the particulers of each ) i would not pretermit a more large comparing of them , euen in their alike forces of vegetation also . who seeth not , that it belongeth to the office of soueraignitie , to prouide for the nourishing and mainteining of the state with necessaries , to amplifie the dominions thereof , for profit and dignitie , to spread abroad the encrease of the people by colonies , in the nature of generating or propagating , to cherish in the subiects an appetite of acquiring of commodities , to graunt to them places of mart and market for the digesting of the same vnto all parts of the realme , and so to change forme and assimulate them to their most behoofe : to giue order for the holding and retaining of that which is become their well agreeing and naturall sustenance , and for the expelling as well of the hurtfull ouercharge , as the vnprofitable excrements of the weale publique . will you yet see farther the soueraigne vertue of the soueraigne power , in all and euerie the parts of the state ? produce me any ( though a person altogether priuate , occupying but a roome or drawing breath in the common wealth ) that is not enforced both by foreseeing reason , and after-prouing euents , to acknowledge all his good whatsoeuer , to be first giuen , and then secured vnto him , by the force of a well ordered gouernment , out of the circle whereof there can be neither welfare , nor safetie , but contrariwise , all confusion , slaughter , rapine , and vniust bereauing of him of all that is or can be deare vnto him . but who so listeth to behold this politicall soule of the state in his full royaltie and amplitude , let him looke vpon his more noble parts , the sensuall and intellectuall ; the according and conforming whereof to his important vses , maketh the gordian knot of a powerfull and peacefull blessednes . then the soueraignitie ( mouing , working , & ruling in his three estates ) matcheth well the three headed gerion , whom iustine interpreteth to signifie the vnion of three louing brethren ; then it seeth more than the hundreth eyes of argus , and acteth more than the hundreth handes of briareus . all subiects will , as the sences , play the espials and intelligencers ; as the members , be stirred and commaunded in cases of imployment ; and as the spirits imaginatiue , propose for apprehension , the true shapes and formes of things , either pleasing and eligible , or hurtfull and auoydable . the councellors of state like the vnderstanding facultie , applye all their endeuours to aduance the glorie , and further the enterprises of this their ruling soule , being themselues also by his supreame reason to be ordered , or iudged in their right or wrong conceiuings . the fauorites of a prince may be resembled to the fantasies of the soule , wherewith he sporteth and delighteth himselfe ; which to doe ( so the integritie of iudgement , and maiestie of state be reteyned ) is in neither of both reproueable . which of vs is there that doth not ( especially in matters rather pleasing than important ) follow and feed his fantasies , giue scope vnto them , suffer them to preuaile with him , reckoning it a great part of his contentment to haue them satisfied ? i will refraine to presse the application farther than the well taught subiects will of themselues conceiue . there must be no despitefull enuying at the soueraignes fauorites : as they be to him the recreating comforts choicely selected ; acceptablie to consort withall ; so their enriching , aduauncing , and gracing , with the cleerest signes of their soueraignes loue , is not onely allowable , but plainely necessarie , sith they cannot walke continually in the sunne , but they must needs be coloured . the will of the soueraigne in the decreeing or enacting of lawes , holdeth the like right as the will of the soule doth in the perfourming the resolues of reason . allow that the soule were now in his first cleere sighted innocencie , it could not will or affect any thing that were not absolute reason : so were soueraignes vncorrupted with that all-taynting canker of sinne , and free from euery humane infirmitie , their will alone were vndoubted law & iustice ; but on the other side , when reason ( whose office it is to shew the right ) is vanquished by the errours of misconceiuing , then the will by such bad direction is driuen to sinne in his designed works : so where the iudgement of the soueraigne swarueth from sinceritie of true discerning , there his will and all decrees , or executions following the same , must of necessitie be culpable and turne to wrong . wherefore sith it will not be gainsaid , but that soueraignes through their naturall frailties , are subiect as well to the imbecillitie of iudgement , as also to sensuall and irrationall mocions , rising out of the infectious mudd of flesh and bloud , ( the obseruance of which tainte in mans nature , caused plato to say , that the bodie was more in the soule , than the soule in the bodie ) and that such their defects may well disable them , from either attayning vnto , or retayning firmely the precise points of perfect iustice : how both prudently and louingly do those soueraignes gouerne , who neither taking to themselues that absolutenes of sole power in law-giuing , which by some ( being indeed of too hard a temper ) is colourably , claymed to be originall and hereditarie to their places ; neither trusting too much to their owne sufficiencies , either of wisedome or vprightnes , ( which seldome be without some admixture of imperfections ) do at the making of statutes and ordinances , assemble for consultation and consent , a full assistance of the noblest and choisest aduisours that the state affourdeth : thereby drawing supplies out of their politicall bodie , to make good what wanteth in their naturall ? from the errors of inferior sences , the conceit of the common sence receiueth much misinforming , which in the end and by degrees reacheth a seducement to the soule it selfe : so may the soueraigne vnwittingly by wrong reports of some neer about him , be misled from the knowledge of the trueth , into many misbeleeuings . the humors of the bodie do often forciblie preuaile in the working and stirring of the mind ; whereupon some philosophers haue tyed the soule vnto the temperature of the bodie : so the customes and inclinations of the people in each countrie , hath otherwhile no smal force in the inclyning of the soueraignes disposition , if not to approue , yet to tollerate some imperfections . the mind must not suffer it selfe , for want of resolution , to be distracted by diuersitie of vndiscussed opinions , as wauering and wandering without iudgement , hauing warre within it selfe : so the gouernour may not well admit or harken vnto different and factious sectes , tending to the disturbing and instabilitie of his gouernment . the affections so long as they be obedient vnto reason , standeth the soule in great steede ; but if they become violent and vnrulie , then ( of their disordering , and disturbing of the minds tranquillitie ) they be rightly tearmed perturbations . such is the soueraignes case ; if the people be tractable , and truely seruiceable , with all dutious subiection , in the nature of right alleagiance , then as louing subiects , by their forwardnesse in cooperating with him , they giue strength and stay vnto his gouernment : but if they turne mutinous and tumultuous , troubling the gouernour and state with seditious disorders , then be they as rebels by the iustice of the law to be suppressed , euen as the perturbations of the mind must be subdued by reason , which alone is that powerfull pallas that bestoweth her golden bridle vpon bellorophon , to rule therewith that fierce and haughtie pegasus . the force of these headie and giddie perturbations is tyrannously extreame , and that not onelie in the common sort of men , ( whom like to a heard of swine , they whirle headlong into a sea of vices ) but also in persons of the best qualitie , whose resistance proueth oft too faint to escape , or keepe off such violent inuasions as suppresseth and vanquisheth euen reason it selfe : so is the soueraigne sometimes by traytors and reuolters surprised and constrained vnnaturally and vnlawfully , to the interruption of his gouernment , and ruinating of the state. opinion is the forerunner ( if not the father ) of affections , himselfe a verie misbegotten , between selfe-loue the mother , and supposall the sire , which ( like an amorous make-loue ) woeth at once both the virgin truth , and the harlot errour , yet affianced to neither , hath but vnperfect notions betwixt both ; from which notions notwithstanding , as the same shall apprehend a conceit of good or euill , the affections taking motion , do start forth , putting themselues in readines , to repell the imagined euill , and to embrace the seeming good . vpon the surmise of good , appetites are excited : these be the attendants , and as it were the courtiers of the soule , who immoderately seeking to satisfie their own desires , giueth the soule no rest , till he bestow all his faculties of vnderstanding wit , and deuise , to accomplish their requests : princes seldome want the apes of such appetites , that is to say , begging and flattering petitioners , pleasing and applauding parasites , who vsing all cunning insinuating , are neuer without their varietie of sutes , to aduance their owne good , howsoeuer their soueraigne be thereby either impouerished or dishonored . vpon the opinion of euill ariseth that hidious & snakie head of medusa , fearfull , fretfull , greeuing , carefull , repining , and dispairing thoughts , filling the soule with the horror of much discomfiture ; such malecontents and froward cinicks the soueraigne oft is pestered with , who neuer well pleased with the aucthorized proceedings , ( though most approueable ) doe still feed vpon their owne disliking conceits , and will alwaies with the keistrell , flie against the winde , making their opposicion ( by clamorous complaints ) against aucthoritie . these affections of both sorts , being in their originall altogether oppinionat , will sometimes ( by reason of the neerenesse that opinion hath vnto reason ) make bold to alleage reason for themselues , and will seeme to be iudicious & iust in their intendements . this wanteth not his semblance ( as in the natures before described ) so chiefely in some traitors of better place , who knowing their dignities in neernesse to the prince , and of commaund in their countries , will take vpon them ( though intending their owne end ) to pretend equitie & honestie , yea , and the soueraignes aucthoritie also , giuing out a populer pretext of publique good , onely to make way thereby to their foule treasons . the mind hath yet one endowment more , which almost equalleth all the rest ; which is a faithfull memorie of his fore-attainted knowledges , in whose good trust and custodie , he treasureth vp all his rich acquirings : what semblance there is thereof also in the soule of state , it cannot be obscure . the soueraigne is well stored with remembrancers , nothing passeth from him , or setleth in him but by record ; all his seates of iudgement entereth and preserueth the proceedings in causes ; and to forge , corrupt , or embezill the recordes ( whereof any good gouernment hath a tender and strict regard ) what is it else , than as if the memorie should be cleane taken from the mind , to the which it is vnseperable , or should become a lying misreporter ; which nor his nature , nor his office can endure . these faculties the soule doth shew and exercise , in and with the organs of the body , but he hath a farther and more inlarged force , beyond & without the compasse of any concreat or materiall substance , as abstracting and segregating himselfe to his owne puritie , and aduaunced thereby to a more neere resemblanee of the diuine nature . for as we rightly conceiue of god , that albeit he worketh efficiently , and ( if i may so say ) naturally , by the mediate causes , yet his potencie is not so by them tied or confined , but that he often performeth his owne pleasure by extraordinarie meanes , drawne out of his absolute power , both preter & contra naturam : so the soule , besides his vsuall & functionarie operations , in and by the ministerial abilities of the body , hath other peculiar motions and actions of his owne , neither aided nor impeached by any corporiall assistance or resistance . to this likenesse of god and the soule , let vs also shape our soueraigntie : which ( besides that which is regular in regiment , and from his power and goodnes imparted vnto the people ) hath still , and reteineth to it selfe certaine prerogatiue rights of most ample extentions , and most free exemptions , whereof true reuerence ( filled with all submissiue acknowledgements , and contented with that portion and interest which it receiueth from regalitie ) admitteth no questioning disputes , and whereof iust gouernours do not so farre inlarge the lists , as to do what they lust , but do so moderate the vse ( as god in the world , and the soule in the body ) not to the impeach , but to the support of iustice ; not to the hurt , but to the good of subiects . thus hauing perused the seuerall parts and properties of the soule , together with the likenesse and correspondēce of soueraigntie therto ; not without touching also the dangers and declinations whereunto they both are subiect : i should ( if i were not tied within a teather , and thereby restrained from al affectionate discoursing or dilating ) frame vnto them both some hortatorie admonition vnto circumspect demeanure , for the preuenting of ensnaring euils , and reprochfull obloquies . o let not the pure substance of the soule , for some few his imperfections be vnpurely censured : so neither the deare reputation of anointed maiestie maliciously traduced by some slender imputations . if vppon some displeasing occasions his anger be enkindled , shall any zeno dare to say of him ( as of the soule ) that hee is all fire ? if he should bee thought somewhat to offend in softlinesse and effeminatnes , will the philosopher hippias ( as he defined the soule ) so slaunder him to be but water ? if he could be noted for a little leuitie and vnconstancie , must there needs bee found out straight some anaximenes , to terme him as he conceiued of the soule , to bee wauering and fleeting ayre ? if caringly he regard the support of his high port , by attending his profits , and looking to his prouisions , is hee to be concluded and pronounced , as zenophantes thought the soule , to be concreat of earth ? how much better were it rather to apply vnto the soueraigne the opinion which aristotle held of the soule , that he consisteth of the pure and excellentest essence , being to be accounted scant any humane creature , but wholy of a celestiall temper , as from thence both originally ordained , & daily gouerned ? or to make him hold comparison with the soule , in that supremest title ( which euripides durst bestow vppon the soule ) euen to be a god. for which appellation to bee bestowed vppon the soueraigne , the god of gods hath giuen vs a warrant beyond all warrants , the manifold and mightie effects , which in , and for the body politique , this states soule performeth , doth ratifie the same by reason also . is not the body of it selfe a confused lump , vnformed , sencelesse , witlesse , and destitute of all helping meanes to mayntaine it selfe from perishing and vtter dissoluing ? and doth not this soule ( setting to worke all his assisting powers ) quicken it , moue it , care for it , prouide for it , cherish it with his loue , furnish it with his gifts , gouerne it with his wisdome , establish it with his iustice , & protect it with his puissance ? if then he bee the deriuatiue , and ( as it were ) a diminitiue of the mightie god , shall not his vassals ( both respectiuely to his so high entitelings , & gratefully for his great deseruings ) refraine their rashnesse of deeming and dooming in his doings ? and rather reuerently recognize the blessed benefits that bindeth them to loue , than with a gyant-like presumption seeke to depraue his sacred estimation ? to accumilate calumnies and detractions against the soueraigne ( so to abase and pull downe maiestie ) is like to the pyling vp of hill vppon hill , to warre with heauen : and it may be better called petit blasphemie , for a subiect to blemish the soueraigne with soule aspersions , than it is called petit treason for a seruant to slay his master ; sith the dutie and priuitie betweene them is more astringent , and the offences against a dietie hath an infinitie of sinne . there is a question amongst the philosophers , where and in what part of the body the soule should bee seated ; some place it in the head , as in the highest towre , with his chiefe informers , aduisors and assistants round about him ; some in the heart , as the middest of his kingdome , from thence to spread and distribute life and spirit more readily to all the parts ; and others alotting to it no chiefe seat at all , extendeth it equally vnto all , though it shew it selfe in each member differently as their capacities or abilities will permit , as if it therein also were in similitude with god himselfe , who being by the infinitie of his essence , euery where , yet is no where circumscribed , bounded with no including limits , or more certainly in one place than in another : but as god is sayd to haue his center euery where , his circumference no where ; to be in all places , yet not placed ; and with euery thing , yet mixed with nothing : so the soule communicating to all the parts his essentiall nature , is not encompassed by any part , nor is not more present in any one than in all . and as god ( notwithstanding such his vnmeasureable infinitenes of being euery where ) is often said possitiuely , & namely there to be , wher he maketh the more apparance of his presence : so the soule may be said there to be resiant , where his force and efficiencies be most discerned ; when he attendeth the discussing of intelligence and reason , then is his chaire of estate placed in the vpper house , and so seemeth to dwell in the head . when he betaketh himselfe to matter of action , or followeth the feruencie of affections , then he is thought to be conteined within the irascible part enwalled in the breast , and issuing chiefely from the hart ; when he falleth lower to the place of bestiall concupiscence , then he there also discouereth his presence in those inferior parts . and ( in a word ) according to the aptnesse or appliablenesse of any part , wheresoeuer he acteth , there he is : because ( as aristotle teacheth ) the efficient must conioyne vnto the effect , & the mouer to the moued . if any desire to vnderstand how this discourse of the soules either larger dilatation of himselfe throughout the whole bodie , or of his more especiall appropriating of his presence and worke vnto particuler parts , will accord by comparison with soueraigntie in a state ciuill ; let him in like sort examine how fitly the name of the head agreeth with the nature of a soueraigne ; and how properly the heart patterneth the preeminence , and how he doth seuerally conuey and impart to any part of his dominions , the verie essentiall faculties of his gouernment ; without the which no people can euer as subiects raunge themselues into the order , and communitie of humane societie , howsoeuer , as men , or rather as wild sauages , they may perhaps breath a while vpon the earth . it is a truth , that as the soule , so the power of principalitie in gouernment , ( though shewing it selfe in diuerse manner , as the varietie of euents ministreth occasion ) yet in all points , and all parts is all one . and that a righteous soueraigne ( as the soule doth in defending and succouring any the least member from destruction and harme ) hath an vnpartiall and most respectiue care , which extendeth it selfe ( as god and the soule doth ) vniuersally to the whole , and particulerly to each member indiuiduall . the which point of so large dilating his force , ( to the resemblance of such two patterns in a manner secresed and vnseene ) if i might haue leaue to straine a little farther , i could haue it serue me also thus far , as ( at the least ) to make a shew in that question propounded by some great clerks in policie , touching the princes ouer prodigall imparting of his presence amongst his people : for seeing that both god and the soule , working so vnlimitably , be yet vndiscerned , in their essence , as hidden and concealed from the eyes of men ; it may seeme to stand more with maiestie , and to work more regarding , more admiring , and more adoring , if ( howsoeuer their power in operating doth shew it selfe ) yet their presence be more sparingly & lesse familiarly vouchsafed . what is become ordinarie , that we vse either neglectingly to contemne , or fastidiously to dislike ; as on the other side , what hath for strangenesse a noueltie , for worth a dignitie , and for attayning a difficultie , is more desiringly , and more admiringly esteemed . hence ariseth in the minds of subiects such egernesse and longing to satisfie their sences in the seeing , hearing , and well knowing of their soueraigne , as if they were to seeke after the head of nilus , which sendeth them the ouerflow of their plentie ; or after the primum mobile of the world , which gouerneth the conuersions and fortunes of their life . it is herof concluded , that a soueraigne the lesse he is exposed to publique obseruance , the more he is presupposed to excell in amplitude of glorie : neuerthelesse it being so commendable a vertue in a gouernour to haue such a facilitie and goodnesse of nature , as ( remitting the high cariage of his greatnesse ) yeeldeth to his people with an affable gentlenesse easie approach for enterlocution . i cannot tell whether the contrarie sternenesse ( in haughtily shunning or repulsing their aspect ) will not haue ( in the euen eye of a well regarding policie ) the greater disallowing . now let vs passe on to peruse the comparisons , taken from the head . plato imagined man to be an heauenlie plant ; his head to be the roote ; his bulke , the stocke ; his armes and leggs the branches ; and his root to draw his sapp from the heauens to feede therewith the vnder parts , spreading downeward towardes the earth . such a plantation do i conceiue in the institution of a state politique : the soueraign head to be designed , inspired , depending , and protected from aboue ; and the body with the out-growing parts thereof , to receiue nourishment , strength , florishing , and fruitfulnes from that root of a rightfull regiment . if the root thriue , sucking abundantly of his heauenlie nutriment , the plant must needes prosper , and cannot do amisse : but if the root be destitute of grace , as depriued of his sapp , it induceth vpon the whole stocke of the state , a withering decay and pining barrennesse . in the head is the first wheele & string of motion , giuing force and order to the whole frame , the first fountaine of sence streaming from thence to the other cesterns , and the high erected pallace , where the mind keepeth his court , shining in his greatest maiestie . the head is by the order and instinct of nature , so dearely esteemed and honored of the bodie , as that euery part will not onely seek his ease and health , but euen expose it selfe to any perils for his sake and safetie : the inferior parts do susteine and beare him vp , mouing at his beck , and fast bound when he taketh rest : the hands and armes , do readily receiue vpon themselues the strokes and wounds , intended against the head ; yea , any part doth endure paine , by incision , scarifying , ligature , or issue , to remedie the greeuances of the head . these good duties of kindly subiection , to kingly power , i leaue to the consideration and conscience of euery true subiect , wishing him to make his best vse thereof by contemplating and applying of the same in the performance of like offices of alleagiance , loue , and loyaltie . we see the head naturally endued with a fellow feeling of any the griefes in the whole bodie , in so much as there is scant any disease so weake or small in any part , as doth not affect and disturbe the head also ; yea , it holdeth such a sympathie with the verie foot , as that a little wet or cold taken in that remotest place , hath forthwith a readie passage to the head . gracious soueraignes haue the like compassions and compunctions in the distresses of their subiects , and be in the same sort deeply peirced & perplexed with any wrong or distemperatures , hapning to the meanest of their people . i haue learned of the phisitions , that most of the diseases of the head , are originally arising and caused from the bodie : and i think that i may thus thereof infer ; that many the escapes of soueraignes by omission or comission , may thus far by this excuse be extenuated , as more imputable to the people than to them . therefore when from the head a fluxe of humours shall annoy and enfeeble the whole , or any part , i wish it should be remembred , that such as is our offering , such should be our suffering . many and verie dangerous be the euils , that from a distempered heat be distilled into the bodie . i might laboriously enlarge what harmes he may do to his subiected members , by his seuerall excesses or defects , the disorder and vneuen cariage wherof filleth the whole with remedilesse mischiefes . yet let vs marke this withall , that in the naturall bodie , there was neuer any parts so far digressing from their natiue nature of alleageance , and their indissolluble band of obedience , forgetting as well the good which they otherwise receiue , as the wrong whereby they continually infest him , as did once presume to oppose , or but repine against their head , much lesse seeke or attempt to shake him off the shoulders . how much more kind be those subiects , who out of their owne dutious loue , be content to haue the blame of the faults , or ouersights , likely to blemmish their soueraigne , transferred & imposed vpon themselues ? it may seeme by a drunkard in plautus , that the head thought himselfe priuiledged , as it were with a point of prerogatiue , to charge the inferior parts with the shame of his owne distemper ; siccine fit hoc pedes ? statin an non ? nam hercle si cecidero vestrum erit flagitium . here leauing the head in his vnresistable right of ruling ouer the bodie , i will to the soule againe , taking a farther view thereof , as sitting in his other principall seat the hart : when i behold the intricate net or curious web of vaines , spread from it ouer all the bodie ; me thinketh i may well liken it to a little spyder , placed in the middest of her work , where she so caringly and cunningly ordereth the matter , that she presently feeleth the least shake or touch in any though the farthest part of her webb . no lesse feelingly doth the hart perceiue , and partake , with any iniurie done vnto his veines . sometimes hee sendeth forth the bloud and spirits with a full flush , replenishing all parts plentiously , other while he rerireth them home with all speed to his little sconce , to comfort and fortifie it selfe . it is admirable to see the swift and sudden recourse of bloud , now stirred outwardly at a start like lightning , and anon posting backe in feare of daunger to the hearts succour , leauing a palenesse and trembling in the outward parts . the heart is the well of life , the furnace of heat , the center of bloud , the first liuing and the last dying part . agreeably to these vertues or efficacies of the heart , let it be confessed , that euerie commonweale acknowiedgeth a soueraigne power , from the which it drew his first beginning , of which it receiueth his dearest life bloud , with which it is quickened as with a liuing fire , to the which it wholy trusteth , and returneth for refuge , by which it is imployed and directed in all intentions , and without which it fayleth of continuance , and is incontinently dissolued . then to such a gouernour which both imparteth to al parts the vaines and artiries of their surest welfare , and hath a sence of any their griefs and wrongs , as of his owne ; what and how regardant thankfulnesse , seruice , and obseruance is deseruedly due by the faythfull performance ( with the vttermost strayne of the very heart-strings ) of all obedience to his commaunds and authoritie . the heart is of all other the firmest flesh , yet not fed with bloud by any vaynes ; and from it all other flesh deriueth by veynes his borrowed liuing . i haue heard it argued , that a king in like sort is alone firmely and absolute stated , in and to the lands of his realme , and that all other owners take from him by the veynes and conueyances which he passeth to them . that which aristotle saith of the heart , that it giueth and imparteth to euerie member , but it selfe receiueth or taketh not from any ; is a good pattern of regall magnificence and bountie , seeing that nothing more aptly representeth the nature of the soule , or commeth neerer to god himselfe than to do good , and extend reliefs to others , with free heart and open hand , himselfe in the meane while hauing no need of any . the figure of the hart is shaped sharpe poynted at the lower end , and vpward it is more widely spread abroad : to this forme the best princes doe conforme , they open their hearts with a full spread towards vertue , goodnesse , and heauenly things , but do make narrow and close the same against all base appetites of this vnhallowed flesh . the heart is the dwelling place of the affections and inclinations of the mind , whereof ( as of his owne trayne , family , or houshold , he alone is to haue the gouernment ) if they bee let loose with scope to follow their disordered desires , not only the heart it selfe is subdued and trampled vpon by their turbulent passions , but the whole bodie also fareth the worse , and taketh no small harme thereby . right wisely doe soueraignes hereof take this instruction , to vphold their gouernment in a strict steadinesse , tempering all extremities with an euennesse of moderation , that none about them grow too violent or headstrong , which cannot but worke as a disturbance to their persons , so a disproportion to their states . where any affection predominantly reigneth , it draweth thither such humors of the bodie , as are likest and best consorteth to it selfe : as anger calleth to him choller , to further his fiercenesse ; mirth cheareth it selfe with the freshest bloud ; and sorrow will not bee without the company of sower and dumpish melancholike : so if the soueraigne in the precincts of his regiment , shall suffer an ouergrowing inequalltie of greatnesse to get an head , it will quickly gather to it selfe a syding faction of like disposed disturbers , which will make a shrewd aduenture , both of ouertopping him , and ouerturning of his state . there is nothing that is either more gracefull for seemelinesse of shew , or more auaileable to any man for his health , than to haue alwayes a light and chearfull heart : and it was yet neuer seene that any part of the body euer grudged at or repugned , but rather willingly furthered the well-pleasing delights of the heart . from hence good people will learne this well-resembling inference , that the recreating sports and pleasures of soueraignes ( in whom is the heart bloud of the ciuill bodie ) be not dislikingly crossed or repyned at , but rather entertainingly allowed , and comfortably affoorded vnto them ; yea though some occasions of dislike should worke a distaste , and harder censure thereof . we doe account as the head , so the heart to receiue hurt two waies , primarily , or imediatly ; and by consent which it hath with other more choicely affected and much agrieued parts : so may wee reckon offences or misdemeanors to tend to the impugning of the prince , not onely when they directly concerne his owne person , state , or dignitie , but also when they bee committed against his councell , iudges , or chiefe officers , in whom their soueraigne hath ingrauen his own image or character , imparting vnto them a portion of his owne authoritie , and with whom hee maintayneth a mutualitie of all ayding kindnesse , and honourable respectiuenesse . admit that the heart or the brayne were so layd open to ouraspects , that wee might attentiuely behold the substance , the shape , the verie life and actions therof ; would not the consideration of the dignitie of the soule , there resiant and working , worke an impression in our thoughts , to regard , esteeme , and admire those parts , as excelling and surpassing all the rest ? so when the person of a prince is looked vpon ( wheron we doe seldome gaze enough ) our inward cogitations filled with a reuerence of the regall maiestie seated in that flesh ( otherwise as infirme and full of imperfe●●●ons as other is ) ought to surmount all sensuall conceits ( scant thinking of any humane nature ) but making an infinit difference betweene that body , so ( as it were ) glorified with the presence , representation & in dwelling of that supreme or exalted eminencie , and other ordinarie persons , which yet doeth consist materially of the same substance , and perhaps endued by nature with equall graces . doe you desire a brighter displaying of the illustrious maiestie shining in soueraigntie ? doe but obserue how much it surmounteth the person it selfe thereof possessed , like a brittle glasse all illightened with the glorious blaze of the sunne . the soueraigne as in his personall respects , hath his childhood and his impotencie of minoritie , but his soueraigntie is like hercules the sonne of iupiter , that in his verie cradle could gripe snakes to death , being at no time abridged or enfeebled , but to be supposed euer of a full strength , age , and power . in his personall respects he may partake of the mixture of bloud and kindred with the subiects , but soueraigntie admitteth no termes or titles of consanguinitie . in his personall respects hee is as one man , single and indiuiduall , yet as in the right of soueraigntie , he gayneth the appellation and capacities of a corporation : in his personall respects death maketh an end of his life and glorie all at once , but soueraigntie neuer faileth ( not by the space of one moment still liuing in a successiue continuatiō : ) and as the consideration of the excellēcie of the soule ( wherunto the soueraigntie , as in these respects also is agreeably patterned ) caused the old philosophers ( not able by their sharpe inquirings to penetrat into the deep profoūdnes therof ) admiringly to proclayme , that man was magnū naturae miraculum . so the resplendence and power of soueraigntie in the royall person of a soueraigne , shewing it selfe both in so great maiestie , as dazleth the eyes of all beholders , and in so admirable effects , as to transforme sauagenesse into ciuilitie , repugnances into concords , vices into vertues , procuring loue , yet implying feare ; compelling obedience , yet with yeeld of highest honour ; holding towards all , the proportion of iustice , yet extending withall the remorse of mercie , doeth in like sort ( by such the conuersion of the body naturall , into a body politicall ) beget thereunto a more admired glory , and a more deere esteeme . let me yet proceed a little farther in the discerning of the wisdome and goodnesse of the creator , in the ordeining and enduing with propertie of these principall receptacles of the soule , the head , and the heart : we doe not find that either of them is naturally enabled to offer any wrong by any meanes vnto the body , or once to encline by any so much as imagination of mischiefe therunto ; but contrariwise , fully furnished and accomplished with store of helping reliefs , to nourish and preserue the same . for as in god himselfe ( if it were possible that he should doe any vniustice ) it would make a greater proofe of his impotencie , than shew foorth his power : so if he had giuen vnto the soule , or to these parts most replenished with the powers thereof , any such naturall abilitie or qualitie , as might inferre an iniury and preiudice to the rest of the bodie ; it might rightlyer bee termed a disabling than an enabling , and no way conforming to his image : for what a confusion or rather destruction would ensue , if the head should shrinke vp his sinewes that conueieth his vigor and spirits vnto the members ? or if the heart should at his pleasure withhold or take away the nourishment of bloud , that giueth sustenance & substāce to the whole body ? if the application hereof to our states soule : how comfortably may we conceiue , & euen glory in our happinesse , that stand vndubitably assured of our soueraigns goodnesse ( which limitteth or rather much exceedeth his power ) that the sinewes of law & iustice knitting all subiection to soueraignetie , shall still from him receiue an increase of strength and firmenesse : and that this politicall soule ( in the very tendernesse of his soule ) will be so farre from depriuing and impayring of our necessarie nutriments , as that he will rather draine his owne heart bloud drie , than the wealth of the land should either be wastfully exhausted , or not suffisingly maintained ? the soule also hath made choice of some other principall parts in the body , which he needfully vseth & imployeth in the ministeriall functions of life ; which if they once eyther fayle in their offices , or decay in their essence , the body can neither continue liuing , nor performe his actions : of which sort may bee reckoned , first the lungs and lights , ordeined for the alaying of the heat in the heart , and the necessitie of respiration : then the liuer , which beginneth the concoction of our susteinance , and the same so prepared , doth recommend ouer to the hearts more perfect conuerting and accommodating : lastly , the milt , the gall , and the kidnies , euerie whereof is alotted to some good worke of disseuering the refuse and drossie remnants from the selected and purified nutriment . but for that in these the soule sheweth his weakest and meanest vertue , which is of vegitation onely , whereas in the head , or heart , he displaieth all his glorie , conuersing with them as with the darlings of his loue , i esteem it of no great merit , to meditate too much of their worth , or to labour the likening of them ( which to do were easie and obuious ) vnto certaine necessarie and essentiall orders or powers in the state . only two considerations i haue conceiued , which mee thinketh may not bee omitted . the first , that as these bee placed so helpfully in the body , with such succeeding each other in their works , as accordeth to an accomplishment of health and perfection in the whole : so there must bee in the publike weale , a wise and politicall ordering of the good gifts and imployments of the chiefe statesmen , that their endeuours be discreetly sorted to the generall good , and not suffered out of course either promiscuously to intrude , or disorderedly to cause dissentions . the second , that as these parts of chiefe vse for the preseruation of life , be by the prouidence of nature strongly sauegarded within an enclosed wall , as more cared for than the rest ; so such as be the more noble and more necessarie members of the commonweale , ought to bee attended on with the more tender regard of their safetie , and well prouided for against perilles , least in their ruyne or subuersion , the whole state also receiue a deadly stroke . the mentioning of these partes of the bodie ( though vpon occasion of setting forth the operations of the soule , in and by them ) hath put me in mind of my fore-intended method ; which after a matching of the ruling preeminence to the nature of the soule , calleth me to a suruey or recounting of such obserueable respects , as may make the like correspondence betweene the subiects of a state , and the condition of a bodie : wherein i must be faine to deale with the bodie of the state , as minerua did with the bodie of vlisses , who in the safe conducting , and reducing of him to his true penelope , did transforme him into diuers shapes , sometimes putting vpon him the shew of a rimpled and withered age , and anone againe restoring him to his freshest hew , and lustiest strength : so will i also ( holding my intention to make at last an euerlasting vnion of the obeying bodie to the soueraigne aucthoritie ) turne the same , as i treat thereof , into different formes , diuersities , and altering respects , according as any varietie of consideration shall afford . and i must also further entreat the good patience & licence of my frendly readers , for affording vnto me such libertie , as my selfe scantly liketh of ; which is of inserting and giuing a place in the contexrure of this treatise , vnto some such comparisons , as by there frequent vse in good authours may seeme to be ouer vulgar , which i could haue been well content to haue auoyded , had they not pressed vpon me with some shew of necessitie , sith the more notoriously their likenesse hath bin discouered & allowed , the more might i be noted either of ignorance in not discerning so publike proofs for my purpose , or of an affected singularitie , in contemningly omitting what the worthiest writers haue chosen as diamonds and precious stones to enrich and garnish their works withall . and thus much perhaps i may performe in part of amends , that by such ( as it were ) my new setting thereof , the same shall be more lightsomly refreshed , and emblazoned with a more orient lustre . in the composition of the bodie politique ( as of the naturall ) there is required a concurrance or euen mixture of foure elements , which i do reckon to be these following : first , the generous , to aduance and mainteine the state with their well deseruing actions : then the learned , to instruct and direct with skill in cases of consultation : thirdly , yeomen with their labour to produce and worke the commodities of the land : and lastly trafiquers which may both vent out by exportation what may be spared , & bring in the necessaries that shall be wanting . within these foure sorts , all subiects compacted into a ciuill state , may well be raunged and reckoned . how these state-elements may seuerally hold similitude , with either the fire , or the aire , or the earth , or the water , i leaue to be conceiued and disscussed of such as haue good leasure to be idle , or like well to be somewhat curious . this i think not impertinēt to propound , that where any of these do exceed , or ouer sway the rest , there such distemper ( as in the bodilie mixture ) inclineth the state to be ruled by that ouer-ruling force . and as in our bodies by the vnequall temper of the elements the humors get masterie each ouer other ( of which humors the diuersities of complexions do arise : ) so in the bodie politique , according as either the baser and passiue elements do preuaile to popularitie , or as the other more worthie and actiue , do reduce to the power of a few ; thereof the humor , complexion , condition , and disposition of the state is discouered : in so much as ( if the soule or superioritie of gouerning be not strong enough to hold his owne ) the exsuperance of the humour predominant , hauing altered the complexion of the bodie , will also violently draw the soule to follow the forme of his temperature : wherefore right needfull it is in any commonweale , to contriue the true and proportionable mixture of these foure elements , lest when they be put at odds , reuerting to the originall repugnances of their nature , they do fill the state with hatefull strifes , in the steed of blessefull peace . for as in the bodie naturall , if the wisdome of the creator had not composed into a concord the contrarieties of the first elements , it had ( as still sticking in the confusion of the first chaos ) neuer attained the strength , beautie , & order , which we now admire : so in the ciuill bodie , if prudent policie by aduised tempering of the disparitie of the people , should not conioyne them to a well agreeing consent , how could any hope be conceiued , but that the difference of poore and rich , vulgar & noble , ignorant and learned , fearfull and valiant , industrious and such as take their ease , must needs by their opposite quallities , not onely deface the dignitie , but also subuert the stabilitie of the state ? yea the differences of such as be all of one element , through a naturall emulation , ( each part seeking to attaine neerest to the center and perfection of that whereunto he is incircled ) proueth oft spitefully troublesome , and must come vnder the care of a well disposing prudencie . for as the more trafiquing maketh the greater merchants , the happier husbanding the richer yeomen ; so the more vertuous may stand vpon it to be reckoned , the more generous . and each exsuperance will disturbe the temper , if for the gouerning of such inequalities , and preuention of strife amongst themselues , the wisdome of the state ( taught by natures example ) did not vse a correspondent cariage . from the discrepance of vnequall temperature , ariseth so sundrie formes and shapes of bodies politique . some are hugely big , and their verie greatnes rendreth them vnwildie , hauing their armes and their legs too far a sunder ; some verie little , yet well compact , actiue and strongly set to saue themselues ; some carie a goodly shew on their outside , yet inwardly looked into , haue great defects , as either a foule soule in so faire a bodie , or some deadly wringes tormenting their verie bowels ; some not so well fauoured or pleasingly shaped , yet are sound enough , and in good health ; some be so fat and ouer fed with wealth , as their neighbours be therby tempted to make attempts against them : some so lean and forlorne , as that their pouertie is their best safetie : some all sluggish and sottish , can scant attend their owne defence , but do so long praie aide of others , till they be made a prey to all ; some haughtie and fierce are neuer out of quarrels making , and taking occasions , through the flames of ambition , and the gall of reuengefulnesse , to exercise a continuall enmitie . thus we see how ( after the example of the bodie naturall ) the state ciuill also , is diuersly figured , and varieth his formes , whereof ( were i not bound to breuitie ) i could of each sort make instance and demonstrance in particuler , but it liketh me better , to hold my accustomed course , by speaking in generalitie : for that i may so hope to instruct some , and be sure to offend none . where the humors are in good harmonie of good agreement , & the bodie thereby in good health , there we doe not dislike to haue flesh and fat enough , but if they be peccant , and so the bodie crasie , then the more liberally we feede , the more dangerouslie wee doe offend . so in a state , when each degree conformeth it selfe to his owne duties , makng in the whole a perfection of loue and obedience , then the abundance of riches , the multitude of people , the titles of honor , the encrease of power , are both auailable & commendable : but when any part becommeth outragious or exorbitant , whereby the body is in a distemper , and getteth an euill habite , then what was otherwise comely and comfortable , will turne cumbersome and dangerous , working a cleane contrarie effect , of a greater endamagement , if not of an vtter diuastation . the naturall body hath his infancy , his youthfulnes , his confirmed , declyning , and decrepid age : so hath each commonwealth , his beginning , his enlarg●●ing , his puissance , his drowping , his decay and downfall . the philosophers , for the reason of alterations in both the bodies , direct vs to their principals of generation and corruption , telleth vs of the imbecillitie and mutabilitie of things compounded , of the difficultie of persisting in perfectnes , of the easie declination into the worse , and of their foreframed connexion of effecting causes . the astronomers haue also alike fitted them both with certaine climatericall changes , appointed periodes , and fatall reuolutions : yea they teach vs , that the influence of superior planets do forcibly preuaile ( as in and ouer priuate persons ) so also ouer whole regions and kingdomes , changing and inuerting them at their pleasures . i will yeeld vnto the philosophers their consequences and dependancie of causes , touching the many variable euents in both bodies , yet with this prouision , that the first cause , combyning and causing all causes be not forgotten , who alone hath all life and death , beginnings and endings at his dispose . neither will i sticke with the astronomers to acknowledge their stinted times , and prefixed points , beyond the which neither of the said bodies can passe or prolong themselues one instant : but to attribute that to the starres , which the god ( which holdeth all the starres in his hands ) challengeth to himselfe , and his owne foredecreeing councels , were to refuse the sunne , and be guided by a star-light : he it is that raiseth and strengthneth some mightier ( like to superior planets ) to subdue the worthlesse , whom he hath refused ; and his inclining of harts is the right powerfull influence , that effecteth these great chaunges . then ( leauing this humane wisdome fast tied vp within these limitations , as in the iron net of vulcan ) i will onely make this gaine of that first comparison , that sith the said two bodies are so fitly and fully conioined in semblance by their whole course , euen from the cradle to the graue ; i shall not need to feare blame , for fashioning of their agreeablenes in other also more particuler considerations . in the commonwealth ( as in the bodie ) some parts seeme chiefely vegetable , caring for nothing more than to mainteine their growth , by their sucking from all the vaines of the land , the nutriment and prouisions of this life . some liue all sensually , giuing no rest or contentednesse to themselues , but by pleasing of their sences , feeding of their affections , and fulfilling of their desires ; be it of reuenge in the course of wrath , and quarelling , or of haughtines to aspire , or of lust to sensualitie . othersome moderated with staiednes in both the former , shape their liues after the powers rationall and intellectuall , disposing themselues by the rules of reason , to vertuous actions , and to studious cogitations , indeuoring chiefely to deserue well of their countrie , and to vphold the frame of ciuill policie . the naturall body for the preseruing of health , vseth the helpe of a good diet , whereby the humours are kept in their equalitie of temper : so must the state also be dieted , neither glutted with excesse , nor scanted with penurie : howbeit sith it is more dangerous , from fulnesse to fall away to leannesse , than from leannesse to spread and grow fat ; i wish such fore-sight and forecast , rather to leaue than to lacke , to rise than to fal , & to amend than to paire , the defect being euer worse than the excesse , as nearer to a nullitie . as the regiment of health in our bodies may fayle or offend , in either of the extremities of being either too carelesse by licencious aduentures , or else too precise & strict by needlesse restraints : so the gouernance of the states welfare may fall into the like opposite disorderings by either too much remissenes and loosenes for want of hard holding of the reines of well-ruling , or else by ouer seuere debarring of such lawfull liberty as both nature requireth , and reason denieth not . it is hard to define which of these is worse or more hurtfull . the stirring nature of man , is like the quicknesse and slipperines of the eele , si laxes erepit , but si string as erumpit : so that ( though he be hardly by either way detayned in steaddinesse ) yet by the feeling of himselfe to be too much griped , hee the more enforceth all his strength and motion for his enlargement : for my part i professe , that i had rather ( as taking it to be lesse to my harme ) go slackly girt , yea quite loose & male cinctus , than to bee straightly pinched with tying or swadling too hard : and it is but too often found by experience , that the straight laced men , whether so held in by any compelling authoritie , or thereunto fashioned by a voluntary imposition , from their owne austeritie , doe breake forth more outragiously , and shake off the cords of obedience more desperatly , when occasion shall moue them to streine and striue for a pretenced libertie , by a course of commotion ; opinionat wilfulnesse , the more check and stop it findeth , the more violently it will seeke to make his way forth , vt exeat in ingenuum suum . the bodie also must haue moderate exercise for the encrease of heat , the digesting of crudities , and the acquiring of a more actiue strength . the like benefit will ensue to the commonweale , if publike occasion doe hold the people in imployment , their spirits are therby enkindled , their superfluous vanities laid away , and their valour & ablenesse to atchieue high attempts much confirmed . aristotle hath a true obseruation , that that which moueth doth not so soone putrifie as that which resteth . and the wisest commonweales haue euen purposedly made and procured to themselues great busines , that their men should rather be refreshed & purified by action , than be either consumed with ease & voluptuousnes , or eaten into with the rust of a reuolting disobedience . both the bodies doe also herein agree , as to be tended and ordered as seuerall respects shal giue occasion : nor wee nor our iudgement is the same when we bee children and when we be elder , when we bee full and when we be fasting , when we be sicke and when we be sound , when we be free and when we be bound ; wee doe suffer more at one time than we will do at another , we be able to performe more in our good plight and strength than we dare so much as hope of in our feeblenesse , wee bee more circumspect in our feares than carefull in prosperities , and we bee often so much distracted with discrepant conditions as wee bee not alwaies alike our selues : such interchangeable times and dispositions being in the same sort incident vnto the state , there is good heeld to be taken thereof , that the counsels and prouisions bee answerable to the necessities or conueniences that ought to be regarded . in the bodie naturall the sustenance is not all caried to one side , or to one part , to the pining and beguiling of the rest : so in the state , the nobilitie is so to bee maintayned , as that the commons bee not wronged ; and the clergie so to be cherished , as the laytie be not ouerlayd , but each part must be fed competently with a proportionable partition of the profits , alotting the same with such indifferencie , as the plentie of some be not the cause of penurie vnto others , nor that the euersucking veynes of some do draw drie the poorer that be in want . neither yet must wee hereuppon induce any paritie or equallitie , which nature herselfe abandoneth : for howsoeuer ( like a wise oeconomicall gouernor ) she susteineth euerie part of the body with a sufficiencie , yet doth she giue ( in her intentions ) to some more worthie and principall than the rest , a precedence to bee chiefly prouided for . the bloud ( vnto the which the turke compared his tribute and treasure , inferring therby the moderat expending thereof ) though it be deriued and dispersed to all parts , yet is it more abundantly bestowed in the gracing of the face . the heart though it spredeth his arteries all ouer the bodie , yet hee beateth and worketh more strongly with his pulses in one place than in another . not so much as our garments but must be fitted to our bignesse or smallnesse , obseruing therein such difference as ariseth by the diuersities of our bodies : why then should it be grudged at , if the nobilitie and gentrie of the land ( in whom the dignitie and the well-shewing countenance of the state consisteth ) be better stored and furnished than the meaner of the people ? why should any bodie enuie at the glorie of some selected persons , in and by whom the soueraigne doth more manifestly discouer his purposes , make shew of his force , and expresse his affections ? or why should it be disliked , that honours and fauours , riches , and preferments bee bestowed , or rather fitted ( regardingly vnto the merits of the vertuous ) by taking knowledge ( and as it were taking measure ) of their good seruice and honorable deseruings ? and ( to wade yet further ) i will confidently make good thus much more , that as in the bodie it is a greater mischiefe not to nourish and sustaine the sound and seruiceable parts , than not to cut off the diseased and corrupted : so in the commonweale , not to reward and aduaunce the worthie , is more pernicious and of more dangerous consequence , than not to afflict , punish , or pare away the hurtfull and infectious : for where the one is but spared awhile by lenitie and impunitie in some hope of amendment , the other vnrespected in his goodnesse , is so pinched by that coldnesse of entertaynment , as hee seldome or neuer can come forward and put forth any shoots of vertue . thence will it fall out , that as in the bodie the decay or corruption of any part , is but the want of that health , soundnesse , or good temper which it ought to haue had , and imployed to the helpe and not to the hurt of the whole : so in the bodie politique , if in the better part thereof ( by occasion of such discouragement , & the pronenesse of men vnto naughtinesse more than vnto goodnesse ) there bee a want of honestie or vertuous performances , must it not necessarily effect a generall declination from all true duties ? diuerting that to the harme that should haue ben conuerted to the benefit of the state , and introducing thereby , an ouerswelling tide of sinne , corrupting and confounding all , and that meerely by the neglect of desert and vertue . if there bee any not yet persuaded of this different respectiuenesse to be had of men in the state , according as they differ in esteeme and worthinesse ; let him yet farther bethinke himselfe of his owne different vsage of the seuerall parts of his owne bodie : doth hee not adorne some of them with silkes , veluets , purple , and cloth of gold , and yet leaueth others wholy naked , or but homely and coursely attired ? he hath for the head and necke , garlands , chaynes , and iewels of rich value ; where for the feet ( though they do bear vp the whole ) he hath but leather onely . what artificiall deuices will hee not find out , and that with his extremest cost , to grace and set forth the comlinesse of his face ? and yet hideth for verie shame some other parts vnfit and vnworthie of producing to open aspect ? and were it not as vnfitting , that the dignities and degrees of reputation , should be promiscuously cast abroad amongst the meaner sort of mechanicall tradesmen , as for the ornaments and dressings prouided for the better parts , to be bestowed so low as vppon the feet ? hereof my inference is , that as in our priuat , so in our publique bodie , difference of regard maketh difference of aduauncement , by a distributing iustice , which yeeldeth to euerie one ( though not the same ) yet his fit proportion . it is not therefore called a commonwealth , that all the wealth should bee common ; but because the whole wealth , wit , power , and goodnesse whatsoeuer , of euery particular person , must be conferred and reduced to the common good : and that in the same sort and semblance , as the distinct members of the bodie , being ordained to different vses , do yet concurre in this consonance of intention , as to impart and referre all their helps and indeuours ( to the vttermost reach of their abilities ) for the procuring and preseruing of the comfort and continuance of this one bodie . all the members ioine their assisting aid , and effect their whole force according to their diuers functions , as well for the vpholding of the whole and euerie part in soundnesse , as also against a common enemie : and whatsoeuer presseth nature with any griefe , is repelled by the consent of a generall resistance . if but a thorne haue pricked the foot , how doth the eye seeke to spie it out ? how doth the hand bestirre him to draw it out ? how doth the head contriue to worke it out ? and each part as his power permitteth him , doth thinke to procure his owne ease by remedying the disease in another : but in case any the principall or vitall parts bee much distressed , or in great danger , then ( as ouermatched with a mountayne of miserie ) the care , the feare , the sorrow is so farre increased , as that remedilesse of helpe , and languishing in despaire , they doe all yeeld themselues vanquished , as partakers also of that calamitie so vncurable . this fellow suffering , this strong vnion , and enterchanged kindnesse , shewed so louingly in the parts of the bodie , instructeth all true subiects of any countrie to the mutuall performance of all friendly offices , and to the firmest adherence against all opposing enmities , or in all perilous necessities ; remembring that a common daunger alike distresseth the lesse as the greatest ; but especially , to bee tenderly affected in the losse or harme likely to befall their choicest statesmen of the best account and qualitie , against whom the enemies of the state doe chiefly bend their malignant intentions , euen as in our priuat combats & affraies , the deadly minded foe watcheth to wound the dearest and vitall parts . from this founteine of natures so wise distribution and distinguishment of the parts , in sorting them so orderly to their seuerall functions , this consideration also floweth and offereth it selfe ; that as there must be a proportionablenesse and a kind of vnanimitie of the members , for the aiding and adorning of the publike comprehending all : so that foule daughter of darknesse and chaos confused and all disturbing anarchie , is to be exiled , or rather excluded out of this compaction of the bodie politique each part is to know and administer his owne proper worke , without entermixing or entermedling in the offices of any other . shall the foot be permitted to partake in the point of preeminence with the head ? or were it seemlie for the head , leauing his state , to abase himselfe to a toyle manibus pedibusque in the trading businesses ? for each member to take vpon him all works , as it hath in nature an impossibilitie , so hath it in gouernance as great an incongruitie . and for any part to neglect the duties properly to it alotted , or to run forth of the circle within the which it is fixed ( as quartering it selfe into a new diuision , by vndertaking dispatches of another nature ) as it agreeth not with that so well parted , yet vniforme frame of gods workmanship , so is it not to be suffered neither in any well contriued policie of the gouerning wisdome . the eye is nor ordeined nor apted to any other worke , than to make vse of the light by seeing ; and to euery singled part there is assigned some more peculier operation or administration , from the which as if in possessionem suam venerit excludit alios . to the like confusion it tendeth if the parts be prodigiously dislocated or transferred from their proper to other vnfitting places , whereof oftentimes the whole bodie getteth the name of a monster mishapen and distorted . the sences must hold their station like to sentinels , and attend their generall in and about the head , where they be setled . and in briefe , no parts inward or outward can either do duties , or be indured elswhere , than where both for comlinesse and vse they be by natures order placed . the ciuill bodie may hereby be admonished how to dispose of the seuerall conditions and degrees of the people , according to the difference of their breed , education , conuersation , or habitation ; that imployments or aduancements be not vnmeet or preposterous , but properly and aduantagiously accommodated . but of all other the loathed impes of tumult and disorder , let this be taken for the deadliest and most detestable ; if any parts disdeining the rule of their soule , and disliking their subiected condition , shall not onely neglect their dutious performances , but also conspiringly complot against the head , hart , and other the noblest viols of life , to the vtter destruction of the whole bodie , by such their horrible commotions and violent conuulsions : which if it were neuer yet attempted , or once intended by any naturall members ruled by the law of their creation , how commeth it to passe , that any parts of the politicall bodie should so outragiously and sediciously betake themselues to an anarchie , most vnnaturall and rebellious ? i could exhibit vnto the well discerning eyes of all loiall subiects , a right representing patterne hereof , by relating the true historicall narration of the late most execrable enterprise and cunningly contriued treacherie , that euer any subiects , of any nation , though neuer so heathen or barbarous ; of any age , though neuer so earthly or ironlike ; of any religion , though neuer so erronious or scismaticall ; vpon any occasion , though neuer so extreamlie mouing , did against their soueraigne and rulers , once imagine , much lesse with enuenomed and obdurate minds intend & vndertake : which neuerthelesse i rather chuse to leaue naked and vndilated to the readers well appliing meditations , as well because i refraine to vse any vnnecessarie excursions , as also because i do find any my facultie much too feeble to expresse ( of so inhumane and bloudie a proiect ) the right shape or substance : for where hell it selfe hath imployed an whole councell of diuels to deuise an hatefull and vnheard-of villanie ; there vnlesse heauen should afford the toung of angels to declare and paint out the abomination thereof , all the oratorie of man must needs faile and be defectiue . what ( though neuer so passionate ) exclamations can raise sufficient admiration of treasons so damnable ? what contestations or accusations by streining all the strings of art , can reach the height of so heinous and most abhorred conspiracies ? what vse can there be of any aggrauating or amplifying , when the plainest tale that can be told , may be thought to be but an hyperbole beyond beliefe ? my conceit telleth me , that ( notwithstanding any the best sinceritie or integritie not possible to be controlled ) the report thereof to forrein countries , or after ages , will seeme vncredible , and that it will require a great dexteritie and perfection of art , so to deliuer it ouer , as not to haue it censured rather a malicious fiction , than a true storie . i must confesse that it is not for euery vulgar verbalist to handle or set forth such a damnable purpose of murthering a king , and that by such a murther , and such a king , and so accompanied with his decrest queene , sweet prince , and his whole state of nobilitie ; the verie relating or mentioning whereof , affrighteth and dawnteth my hart with horror , euen shaking the verie pen in my hand , whilest i think what a shake , what a blast , or what a storme ( as they tearmed it ) they ment so suddeinly to haue raised for the blowing vp , shiuering into peeces , and whirling about of those honorable , annointed , and sacred bodies , which the lord would not haue to be so much as touched . i haue heard of one so far affected to pouertie , as that he wished all the treasure and iewels of the world in one roome , that he might at once set tehm all on fire : such a wish had these men so deuoted to poperie , that they would in an instant , and in one roome , haue destroied the true riches , iewels , the maiestie and glorie of our whole state at one clap . it was a memorable crueltie of that tyrannous emperour , that wished all the romans to haue had but one head , that he might with one stroke haue chopped it off . their purpose was full of the like heathenish immanitie , that hauing all the heads of this nation assembled in honorable consultation into one place , would euen then and there haue as it were beheaded the whole realme , and so haue induced vpon the land a miserable desolation . the tyrannous massacre of france , ( being an elder issue of that same mother church the harlot of rome ) was inferior in furie & wickednesse to this plot : they had an excuse from the warrant of aucthoritie ; these out of their priuat dislikes , conspired the ouerthrow of all aucthoritie : they designed those onely to the slaughter whom they accounted and condemned as offendors in their state , these bundled vp into their butcherie the innocent , and some of their own friends also , whom they could haue no colour so to confound and ruinate : they ment the mending of their state present , and the securing of their future ; these not onely the subuersion of that which now is flourishing , both in riches ●●rituousnesse , but also a future precipitation into a swelling surge of ensuing and vnauoydable calamities . i cannot tell whether their obdurate harts and brazen foreheds will not contradict my position , if do but say this their designement to be a sinne : this in despite of them all i will mainteine , that the verie nature of man , not seduced by the man of sinne ( who by his aucthorizing dispensations , and pickpurse pardons hath made himselfe the great patron of sinne ) acknowledgeth the same to be a foule and vnexcusable , a cursed & most shamefull sinne : a sinne and shame that will for euer cleaue to their religion , euen as close as the venomed shirt of hercules , till it eate and consume the same to the hard bones : a sinne and shame that no conscience ( though steeled ouer with the romish mettall ) can make so much as any colourable defence for : a sinne and shame that god himselfe of his miraculous mercie , for the honour of his name , and the loue of his truth , so happily discouered , that they might not say , where is now their god : a sinne and shame , that we shall not need to call diuines by any their disputings to conuince them of ; but which the verie humanists and moralists out of the grounds of reason and learning , will make the whole world to wonder , hisse , and gnash their teeth at . and which my poore selfe ( as the meanesse of my wit and erudition affordeth ) euen by the comparatiue respects of the parts in the bodie , which i haue vndertaken to set forth , do condemne to the deepest dongion of hell , whence the fathers and factors of the romish faith hath first fetched it . in the bodie there is not any part so weake , so little , or so base , which god hath not framed and appointed to some good vse ; and shall there in the state bee cherished , or suffered , any so loose , idle , vagrant , and vnprofitable people , as that no vse can bee made of them for the publique behoofe ? nay , that bee noysome , pernitious , combersome , and contrarious thereunto ? let vs but obserue nature , who because shee would be sure to make nothing in vaine ( thereby teaching vs in the order of gouernment , to allow no needlesse or fruitles parts ) hath endued and designed some one part vnto many vses . i will propound onely one instance of the hand , which serueth for so many purposes , as i thinke to resemble therunto , sometimes the souldier that fighteth , sometimes the husbandman that laboureth , sometimes the marchant that reacheth and fetcheth far and neere , sometimes the artificer , who wholy practiseth the handiecraft , sometimes the purueiour , that feedeth and releeueth our liues with needfull nutriment . this so prouident accommodating of the parts vnto many imployments , disproueth our heedlesse tollerating of these begging and shifting mates , who swarming euery where , bee so farre from doing any good in the state , as that they will doe nothing for their owne liuing . neuerthelesse , i would not be so mistaken , as if by this president of natures worke in bestowing of manifold abilities vppon one part , i should make way or proofe for the ouer-greedie ingrossing of too many offices into the hands of some one man ; which neyther the businesse of the state may well beare , nor the stomakes of other men with contentednesse endure , nor himselfe perhaps with sufficiencie vndergoe . therefore i must crosse any such conclusion with an apparant difference , disauow the similitude in that poynt , sith in the larger bodie politique there is greater store and choice of well-fitting seruitors for the many diuersities of affayres , that there is no need to huddle or heap too much vppon any one man : wherein it seemeth that nature hath trodden vs a path for our practise , and that way also hath for our imitation manifested her intention . wee doe find , that the most industrious and instrumentall parts are giuen vs by couples , as if one ( though for one worke ) would not serue the turne : for example , she hath giuen vs two hands , & each of them diuided & adorned with seuerall fingers ; as if she ment in so narrow a compasse to couch and compact a varietie of helps , for the more easie and certaine dispatch of so diuersly occurring works . this allotting of two parts to one function might cause in our so little bodies a great factiō , if the foreseeing care of nature had not also conioined them in consent , as well as in operation . wee see both the eyes to looke both one way , the eares to conceiue alike one and the same sound , the nostrils to bee affected alike with one and the same smell , the hands ioyntly labouring at one worke , and the feet by equall paces locally mouing the body by euen length & strength vprightly supporting it , and by their good agreement ioyntly acting and louingly ayding one the other : the two sides , and the two shoulders , which beare vp the high castle of the head , doe with the like matchable equalitie , and the like willing agreeablenesse entertaine their taske . i wish from my heart ( though i shew but by a simily ) that in the realm likewise by such concordance of the parts in each degree , might fasten so their fayth each to other , as that the disposing of many to one seruice , did tend to a more full & more sure performance of the same : so should both the ciuill and the spirituall side , together with the honourable shoulders on both sides , equally part betweene them the common care , and much importing worke of vpholding the maiestie of supreme authoritie , without any fainting or interruption : so should the eies of the wise , and the sences of the learned bee bent all one way , for discerning and increasing of truth and goodnesse , without any erronious mistaking , or wilfull reluctations : so should the meaner and ministring sort , like to the feet and hands runne the race , and catch the goale to them proposed , in making a happie kingdome through an happy people , without any either rubbes in their way by vnrulines , or desisting from their duties by a retrogradation : and so should euerie part become plyant and apt to their places and callings ( receiuing like waxe from a seale the impressions of the gouernour ) to execute his designements , without either distraction by iarres , or peruersnes of opposition , or the carelesnes of a neglecting sloth . i must yet inferre one obseruation more of natures prouidence , whereupon i will set my marke as chiefly to bee remembred : that albeit for the ordering and effecting of other businesses concerning the body , she hath assigned and conioyned more parts vnto one worke : yet for the supremacie of gouerning ouer all , she hath but one head ; as if it were vtterly vnpossible , or vnsufferablie mischeeuous , to admit any partnership in the regall dignitie . let vs imagine a bodie so monstrous , as whereunto two heads were at once affixed , shall not that bodie receiue much damage by the diuision and confusion of those two heads ? must not the bodie in that case either be diuided by alotting of one side to the one , and the other side to the other head ? or else be wholy disseuered by a promiscuous and contentious shufling of the seuerall sinewes , forces , and operations from each head proceeding ? what we as by fiction doe imagine might bee done in the naturall bodie : man ( that imagineth nothing but euill ) and therefore can produce more prodigious errours than nature in her escapes hath euer patterned , hath indeed often brought to passe ( though with most cursed successe ) in the bodie politique . haue we not had within this one land of england , the hideous heptarchie of seuen heads at once ? nay hath not the whole iland of britania , being a bodie perfectly shaped , rounded , and bounded with an inuironing sea , beene a long time thus disseuered , and disfigured by that vnluckie dualitie the authour of diuision ? vntill at the last the mightie and onely wonder working hand of god , wyping away the deformitie ( not by any violent cutting off , but by a new moulding as it were of the two heads into one ) hath restored it againe to his first right , imperiall , and most monarchiall greatnesse . here i find the matter of vnion to lye so full in my way , that euen it stoppeth my passage , forcing me ( notwithstanding the exact handling thereof by others ) to giue it some little touch by the addition of proofe from these my comparisons also : for doubtlesse , if in the former times two heads caused the diuiding and halfeing of the bodie ; the same reason now requireth , that this one so vertuous and powerfull head should reunite and draw againe into one , the distracted and long repugning parts . and can any of this entire and compleat body bee either so vnnaturally hard harted , or so vnconsiderat of his owne good , as finding this so happie and long desired reducement thereof vnto one head , will not seeke to be conioyned ( euen in all the offices of kindnesse and releefe ) rather with the whole bodie , than with the parts of one side onely ? or is it fit that there should be any disseuering , siding , or disuniting by different orders , lawes , customs , and other such poynts of gouernment , where necessitie of communion in all the parts , inforceth a firmnesse of loue , a likenesse of life , and an equalitie of condition ? surely such as doe not gladly entertaine this good opportunitie to reunite that which hath so long beene sundred , seemeth to bee better pleased with the imperfection , the weaknesse and misshapen forme of the bodie vnder two heads , and with disagreeing parts , than that the whole strengthening of it selfe with a comely concordance , and vniforme subiection , should bee brought vnder the righteous gouernment of one onely soueraigne head . therefore if they will not bee thought to dislike , that one head should rule all ; let not this offend them neither , that all bee collected and incorporate into one and the same politicall gouernment . the bodie may haue many imperfections and deformities , yea may be bereaued of whole parts , and yet retaine still the name and nature of a bodie : and sundrie shifts be deuised ( though not to cure ) yet to couer such defects . in the steed of the naturall leg , or arme , wee stick not to fashion and affixe a wooden arme , or leg , verie necessitie constreineth vs to make that simple supplie , when we find not otherwise any substantiall remedie . the commonwealth likewise , may ( by the losse or want of her true subiects ) become stark lame , or by some foule disorders made deformed and mishapen ; yet hold still the style and rights of a commonweale . howbeit to redresse such abuses , blemishes , impotencies , or enormities , she is lightly driuen to betake her selfe vnto some mercenarie helpes , as to her crowches ; yea to take vnto her new lymbs , and lynages of strangers , like woodden legs to be planted amongst her owne people . the bodie when vpon any quarrell it is to combat with his enemie , vseth for more aduantage to combine with a friend : so when one kingdome is at variance with an other , it seemeth a wisdome not to be neglected , to enter leagues , aliances , and confederacies , with some other well chosen nation ; though it often commeth to passe , as in particuler bodies : so in whole realmes , that as well the friendship begun for such purposes , doth proue but feeble and fickle , as also those other additaments of forrain aide , do in the end by their failing falshood giue the fall to them that trust entirely to them . there is a time when the bodies constitution is thought perfect and at the height , as setled in the middle point betweene redundacies , and deficiencies , hauing neither any distemper within it selfe , nor disturbance by outward wrongs : which soundnes of welfare , is manifested in externall seemings also ; as in a liuely cheerfulnesse , a fresh colour , an actiue lustinesse , and such like faire blossomes of a prospering plant : the state also hath such a time , of his good estate ; the absolute happinesse whereof requireth an happier wit than mind , for the exact describing of it in all his complements : nor plato ; his imagined idea , nor aristotles sharpe discussings doth fully discouer so much thereof , to my apprehension , but my wishes may exceed the same , by addition of some further good . when i speak of perfection , i would patterne it by paradise , or the ierusalem of god ; but we must be faine now to account that perfect , which bewraieth least imperfection , and commeth neerest to that goodnesse which may receiue allowance . therefore without reducing our conceits to any exquisite perfectnes , ( imitating the phisitions , who will neuer yeeld the bodie to be in perfect health ) we may with them take our coniectures , from the signes of health : so as where we see publique concordant ioying , peace , and plentie kissing each other , sumptuous shewes , triumphant exercises , magnificent solemnities , and such other apparances of good liking ; there it seemeth that health and good temper hath attained the golden meane , preuailing against all , either homebred or forrain iniuries . but as that rule in phisick is not to be lightly regarded , though it be not generally beleeued , that when health is at his height , then is the bodie neerest to decline into diseases : so lightly when any kingdome is in his flowing , and flourishing fortunes , and in the pride of his prosperitie , then the more eminent is his happines , the more imminent is his danger , and such his fulnesse is fuller of feare than it can giue securitie . and againe , as the phisitions ( notwithstanding ) do confesse good signes to be deceiuable , and that themselues be often illuded by the imposture of such beguiling shewes : so let it also be acknowledged , and considered , that in the state , there may be somtimes a well carying or setting of a face vpon the matter , where inwardly it is fretted with the festring of some swelling and foule impostume . now ( me thinketh ) i haue opened a fit passage for my pen into a discourse very large , and scantly to bee limitted ; of the health requisite , the diseases incident , and the remedies , applyable to a commonweale , that herein also , i may make good my comparison thereof to the body naturall . there is none either so witlesse , or so carelesse , that considereth not of the necessitie of health , which where it wanteth , there can neither be fore-thinking of affayres , nor courage to attempt , nor strength to persorme , nor cheerfulnesse in shew , nor manfulnes in deed ; but in the steede of these a drowping dismaiednsse , deiected weaknes , and a yeedling faintnesse , deliuereth ouer the bodie into a verie euill , if not forlorne condition . and surely where the bodie politique hath not his health , as being either tainted with infectious corruptions , or infested with publique greuances , there all things quickly runneth awrie , for want both of councell to contriue , and power to doe , what in such cases is behoueable : the haughtynes of valour is turned all to timerousnes the care of the common good , to a heedlesse negligence ; the forwarding of iust actions , to a languishing in his owne afflictions ; and his ioint force of peace & loue , into a disseuering and tearing a sunder of all his ioints . then herein let both the bodies agree , that without health , they haue neither mind of their businesses , nor vse of their abundance , nor meanes of well doing , nor ioy of themselues . the bodie is not said to be in health , if any part thereof be greeued ; in so much that somtimes a paine in the finger , or toe , so outragiously disquieteth the whole bodie , as that we could be content to forgo all the wealth or ioyes we haue , to be freed from that one torment . this may giue proofe vnto the state , not to neglect , but rather to redeeme by the dearest meanes , the welfare of his members , lest in the anguish of them , it selfe do feelingly fare the worse . chyron that wise centaure , ouercome with the paine of an vlcer , ( renouncing immortalitie ) wished rather to die than to endure , in subiectes such an vlcer is discontentednesse , the sting whereof is so sharpe , as pricking them on in perplexities and despaires , maketh them vtterly carelesse of life or lyuing , and so to attempt the recouerie of their comforts , though it be with hazard of a vniuersall ruine . that health which the bodie hath by the strength and goodnes of nature , is firmer and to be preferred before that , which by a shift of art is peeced and procured : so each kingdom is in better case when it holdeth his originall constitutions by his owne lawes and customes , than when by the swaruing from them it is corrupted , and then constrained by extremitie vnto new prouisions . hence it is that all alterations ( especially in the chiefe and substanciall points ) be accounted verie perilous , because the imutation of that which is inate and primatiue , is intended to tend to the decay and destruction of nature . how full of daunger changes be , may bee shewed by the difference we doe find in our diet ; the meat , drinke , and ayre , whereunto we haue not bene vsed , offendeth our bodies , and subuerteth our health . those things whereunto we haue bene most accustomed do lesse harme , and are not to be exchanged , no not for the better ; daily vsage agreeably apting the one vnto our likings ( though not of so commendable a qualitie ) where the other ( though in reason it may seeme more applyable ) yet is both distrustfully entertayned as vnacquainted , and hazerdable to disturbe by his newnesse : whereof the phisicions haue made this rule , si assuetis mederi possis non tentanda noua . and the reason why the seasons of the spring and fall are aptest to bring sicknesse , is onely the interchangeable varietie of weather then working vpon our tendernesse and chilnesse . there must be a leasurely and aduised proceeding in euery alteration : nature hath left vs a patterne thereof in the whole course of our life , who from infancie to strength , and from thencè againe to feeblenesse & age , and from one complexion to another , doe proceed by softly steps , and so stealingly , as the change cannot presently be discerned : admonishing vs , that when we be disposed to alter any thing , wee must let it grow by degrees , and not hast it on too suddenly . it is well noted of some philosophers , that if a scythian were in an instant transported into india , he could not possiblie liue : so if without an orderlie passing by a meane , the state from on extremitie should be altered to another , it would certeinly infer a dissolution and dissipation of that it was before : wherein the proportion of the perils that may befall , suiteth with the proportion and degrees of the alteration ; in so much , as the more or lesse violent and vnnaturall the change is , the more or lesse the danger thereof is to be misdoubted ; euen as the taking of the more or lesse cold , after more or lesse heat , doth more or lesse endaunger our health . the mutabilitie of this earthly state stirred by the diuersitie of causes , admitteth no such certeintie or stabilitie in either of the said bodies , as can quite keepe off or exclude alterations . let vs then as in the naturall , so in the politicall bodie gouerne the question of change with such choice & discretion , as vnlesse either vrgent necessitie constraine , or euident vtilitie do entise our assent , we may still retaine our wonted orders and vsages with all permanent firmenesse , not affecting or enduring any nouelties : which besides their misdoubted harmefulnesse at their first entring , will aske a continued time of triall , for their gaining of aucthority and acceptation . but where these respectes of an enforced compulsion , or of a gainfull consideration shall preuaile ; how can it be gainsaid , that the feare of the one , or the loue of the other , ( euen of a tender sence in nature ) should not persuade a voluntarie condescending to so well warranted immutations ? i hold it better phisick to preserue health , than to restore it ; and a more commendable care to preuent , than to cure diseases : so it is a greater wisdome to keep a kingdome in his good gouernment , than to amend it when it is out of order ; and to prouide aforehand against mischiefes , than to redresse what is become amisse . we do vsualy account it good wisdome in our health to prouide for sicknes ; and then to furnish our selues with all such necessaries as may best besteed vs , when we shall be either threatned or assaulted therwith . hereof also the ciuill bodie doth make this vse , as in the seasons of the plentie , to store vp against scarcitie , and in the times of peace to get and gather together more plentifully the many preparations of warre . to discerne an approching euill betimes , and to stop the spread thereof before it become through continuance vncureable , is a like in either of the said bodies , a foresight most necessarie . we see that a verie whelke doth often breed into a great sore , a small bruze into a greeuous fistula , and a little distemperature into an extreame feuer : such shaking fits and horrible commotions haue bin felt in the bodie of the realme , and haue risen from contemptible beginnings , to vncorrigible confusions ; which who so well weyeth , must be forced to conclude a necessitie of timely care and circumspect preuention , for auoiding or resisting thereof . he that neglecteth dangers , because the means that importeth or threatneth the same be but small , forgetteth what great plagues , the frogs , lice , flies , and grashoppers , brought vpon the land of aegypt ; nay , let him not account so slightlie of any euill ( though neuer so little in shew ) as not to watch it well , for feare of the worst . we haue a common saying , that an euill weed groweth apace , and as vsuall a practise to roote it out as soone as it sheweth : when one is out of the way , if he be not streight reduced , it is hard to say how far he will straggle ; and when the bodie is but a little crazie , if help be not sought , who can tell what extreamitie may ensue . such petite euils ( reckoned of as scant regardable ) do often ( because their venemous qualitie is not presently perceiued ) aduantage themselues by the foolish sufferance of such as should suppresse them ; whereby the way hath bin made for the introducing of the tolleration of them , euen when they haue growen more vntollerable : for , such their vnderpropping patrons , as in their first springing , and ( as it were ) in the supposed harmlesnesse thereof , afforded them perhaps some little countenancing fauour , will still be presumed of to beare towards them a certaine tender and relenting fancie , tending to their defence . and in verie deed , such as compassionatly do encline their affectiōs to beare with euils , cannot readily find a degree of stay ; but are likely enough to hold on with them , as well in their offensiue and excessiue , as in their vnespied or neglected naughtinesse ; like to milo that had caried the calfe so long , as that he still caried it when it was become an oxe . i know it to be propounded by some polititians , that some euils must be tollerated in the state , like as dregs and grosse humors be entermixed with the bloud , which they affirme to be better for health , than if the bloud were all pure and clean without them . but ( by their good leaue ) this their instance is idle and impertinent ; for if it be better for the bloud so to be , then it is no euill , but meerely good : and so out of this question of tolleration , i will fetch my ground from a far more aucthorized principle , which is : tollite malum e vobis , and libera nos a malo , and will confesse my selfe in this point a stoycall statesman , by auouching no euill to be so small , ( cloak it or extenuate it neuer so much ) but that the ( tollite ) barreth it of tolleration ; and the ( libera ) setteth vs at libertie , to haue nothing to doe therewith . i know not what nice mitigations , or constructions ( by their fauours ) they may applie to this word ( euill ) but well i wot , that in the prescribed praier taught vs by christ , in that verie tearme of ( euill ) is included and conteined the diuell himselfe : and therefore whatsoeuer we assuredlie resolue to be euill , is as absolutely vnsufferable , as any the limbs or deriued issues of the diuell . now ( lest i should be charged by following of a by-path ) to haue digressed and raunged from my theame , i will reuert to the proofs and appliances borrowed from the bodie . let me know of them , whether their stomacks be so strong , as when they be clogged with heauie meats which they cannot digest , yet will hold and still deteine the same , neuer once striuing to cast them vp ? or is there any of them , that in his owne bodie will with his tollerating patience endure a disease or griefe , if it lyeth in his power to remedie and rid the same ? nay more , admit he be thereby but a little troubled , and not endamaged at all , yet will he not ( for that trouble onely ) seek redresse thereof ? let it be but the itching of some salt humour , or a fleabyting ( by a sleight touch of the skin , starting all the spirits ) can he be so contented , as not to attempt to ease himselfe of such disquieting ? then , from the warrant of god , the sence of nature , the directions of wisdome , the necessitie & dignitie of the state , ( which is not only to remoue his opposites , but to aduance it selfe to all perfection ) let vs abandon all such party-coloured and ambodexter tollerations , not fitting the iustice or dignitie , or good of the commonwealth . neuerthelesse , lest i should too much lay open my weaknesse , both in discretion by a presumptuous asseueration , and in iudgement by propounding that for absolute , which may perhaps be thought to accept of some exceptions and conditions ; i must annex hereunto unto some respectiue mitigation , if not a seeming retractation . it cannot be obscure , but that in a case of vnauoydable necessitie , to auoide thereby the extreamitie of a greater euill , the lesser may ( though not likingly yet permittingly , though not absolutely yet in some manner , though not perpetuallie yet for a season ) receiue a bearing or forbearing conueiance , though not an authorizing approbation . and i must impute it wholy to our impotency , that is so ouerladen with the manifold cumber of euils , and those often of opposite natures , as that we be forced by the repulsing of the worst , to make a seeming shew of electing of lesser ; scant reckoning that to be any euill at all , which by freeing of vs from a deadlyer mischiefe , may bee deemed to haue wrought vnto vs our wel-accepted good . and sith i haue reduced my reason to this degree of relenting , i must seeke to make some probabilitie of farther prouing this point , by the looking also vpon my first propounded patterne : our naturall bodies doe willingly and with a kind of chosing , endure some diseases , because they find the same to free them from other more extremely daungerous . the opening of an issue stoppeth the entrance and breed of many grieuous sicknesses : and nature seemeth oft pleased to suffer , yea and to entertayne some enemies contentedly , for the obtayning and purchasing of an ensuing founder welfare . therefore for a resoluing conclusion whereuppon to insist , i will reconcile any my surmised repugnances with this explayning distinction : such euils , as either through an impossibilitie of remouing are growne necessarie , and so require rather fortitude to indure them , than any prudencie to make choice of them , or that by any helpfull vse whereunto they serue , doe seeme to haue put off their former nature , as becomming phisicke vnto vs , partly may , and partly will haue our sufferance . but as i take it , in the very terme of tolleration , is meant and implyed , a dispensing with and vpholding of such euils , as being confessed to bee meerely and altogether of that qualitie , yet neither so forceth vs by the restreint of our power , but that wee may suppresse them ; neither induceth vs by the apparance of any behoofe or helpfulnesse , to yeeld them fauour . the discerning of which differences in any particular instances , is fitlier recommended to the aduisednesse of the discreet gouernours , than to bee left to the temeritie of any ouer venturous and peremptorie preiudicator . to conclude this point of health : it is so precious and of so vnualuable a worth , as that when it is not so perfect as wee would haue it , or when it is somewhat impaired , we do not sticke willingly to do to our selues farther hurt , to the end to heale our infirmities the more soundly . yea , when wee haue no cause at all to cōplaine , as being of a constitution not to be disliked , yet doe we then take phisicke for a purpose to preuent sicknesse that may ensue , and to confirme the continuance of our health : so in our bodie of the common-weale it is not to be disliked , that ( though there be no great fault found , and all things seeme to stand in good order ) yet now and then physicall courses be vsed , by opening some veine , by purging of superfluities , and putting to payne some part thereof , for the more certeintie of the generall good : that not onely diseases themselues be auoided , but euen all feare and suspition may be preuented to the preseruing and assuring of an inuiolable stabititie of the publique quietnesse . neuerthelesse as in the bodie it is a safe regard not otherwise to moue the humours , than there is likelihood to rid and conquer them : so in the state it requireth a iudicious and ponderous consulting when and how to stirre and atempt such medicinall trialls . aduisednesse aduentureth not without aduantage , knowing that the awaked dog ( not well awed or ouermatched ) will the more insultingly be enraged . the diseases that may annoy or indaunger the state , are more than i am able to recount , much lesse can tell how to cure ; neither would i ( by a more single comparing thereof to the diseases of the bodie ) giue cause to bee censured , as either superstitiously curious , or superfluously busie-headed . this field is spacious , and incloseth a large circuit of plentifull matter for discourse : and i take it to be no lesse difficultie succinctly to comprehend , vnder any heads of diuision , the discrepant multiplicitie of diseases in the politique , than it is in the naturall bodie ; wherein ( as daily experience propoundeth it vnto vs ) notwithstanding the almost innumerable and most industrious discoueries of the learned , in so many reuolutions of ages , yet still more and more diuersities doe start vp and occurre to consideration . i see the pathway and method for an orderly entrance into a treatise of that nature , by the distinct rehersall of euerie the seuerall diseases , either generall to the whole , or proper to any part : but as i must confesse my feeblenesse , standing confounded by the verie sight of the immensitie thereof , so do i humblie yeeld my meannesse to be farre vnapt to intermeddle , where the paines and exquisitnes of some greater patriot may be well bestowed . so much onely ( as in passage ) must needs bee mentioned , as may serue for a conductor or leader to helpe the rest forward . diseases arise as in the body naturall by distemper of humours ; so in the politicall , by disorder of manners : and as in the bodie naturall they doe hinder , peruert , and corrupt the orderly actions of nature ; so in the politicall they do impeach , infringe , and resist the proceedings and regiment of a iust gouernance . but as all diseases are not alike either for sharpnesse of payne , or likelihood of danger : so neither are all offences equall , either for the hainousnesse of crime , or for the harme that can thereof ensue ; a stitch in the side , a pricking in the eye , or a shooting in the sinewes , are eager and extreame griefes , yet not so dangerous as the dropsies , palsies , or appoplexies : so be the fierce and smart contentions of the learned ( in matters not of greatest moment ) exceeding troublesome to the state ; yet no way comparable for danger to atheisme , popery , and disloyaltie . the inequalitie of diseases condemneth the stoicks equalitie of sinne , and where the faults be not equall , it seemeth reasonable , that the magistrat also must proportion his corrections with like inequalitie , euen as the phisicion must varie his cure according to the greatnesse or smalnesse of the griefe . the diseases of the skinne though they require remedie ( because they be diseases ) yet they need not so much tendance , plying , or looking vnto , as the gnawing and tearing pangs of the heart . the hurts or diseases which the body receiueth by any outward meanes , as by heat , or cold , by wounds or bruises , or by ouerheauie loadings , or labouring , and such like ; as they may more easily be before auoyded , so they may more readily be after cured ; likewise hath each kingdome against forraine daungers , both better prouision to preuent them , and more aduantages to repell them : but griefes springing , spreading , and ranckling within , being both long in growing , as hidden and vnespied , and also setled in the entrailes and vitall parts , surpriseth more suddenly , vanquisheth more violently , and tormenteth more vntollerably . as against all diseases of the naturall bodie the skill and application of phisicke is ordained ; so against the corruption of manners in the politicall bodie , wholesome lawes be prouided : whereof where the more bee made , the more it argueth the sinfulnesse of that people , as the vse of much phisicke argueth much distemper . and as phisicke rightly vsed is but an assistant , or coadiutor vnto nature , by the stirring vp and strengthning of the oparatiue vigor and powers of the soule , who then hauing his potentiall faculties so helped and releeued , digesteth , repulseth , and ouercommeth his annoying foe , performing the cure and conquest himselfe : so the lawes and prouisions against offences in the state ( like to a well directed phisicke ) are to range vnder the regiment of the soueraigne with a seruiceable subalternation , recognizing him as the principall phisicion for the redressing or remedying the maladies of the bodie politique . neuerthelesse nature , reason , and all good order admitteth or rather enioyneth all the parts , as well by their duties , as by a certaine tendernesse and sympathie , to conioine any their kindest and soundest aydes both for the repelling of all impediments or oppositions against authoritie , and for the adding of strength thereunto , to perfect the worke of suppressing vice , and of aduauncing the iustice , the safetie and preseruation of the commonweale . let it then bee allowed , that all lawes , as well in their first enacting , as in their daily execution ; and all magistracie , as well in decreeing as in gouerning , is dependant and secondarie to the soueraigntie . such vndergouernours or subphisicions of the commonweale , hauing vnder their charge so worthy a subiect as the states happinesse , and enabled by their soueraigne with a portion of his power , to reforme disorders , and rectifie what is peruerted ; ought regardantly to their place of so great a trust , to be the more painfull , faithfull , & carefull in their cures . not so much as the meanest ministers and seruitors vnder authoritie , no not the constables , bailifes , iurors , and such like ( being smaller sprigs and twigs in the stocke of iustice , and vsed for the inquirie , attaching , presenting , and conuicting , in tryall of transgressours and malefactours ) but bee to know , that their imployment in their seuerall attendances , tendeth to the necessarie amending , purging , phisiking , and reforming of the ciuill bodie , and that therefore they are to make a conscience , & to stand vpright in their diligence and dutie . the negligence , naughtinesse , and vnskilfulnesse of some phisicions occasioneth many to be both afraid to deale with them , & to condemne their profession and practise , as vnnecessarie : so , manie there bee that taking offence at the vnsufficiencie or corruptions of some magistrats and officers of iustice , either vtterly denie the lawfulnesse of their calling , or at the least spurne and repine at their administration ; in so much as the recipe of the phisicion , and the precipe of the magistrat , bee lightly alike irkesome and displeasing . howbeit , as hee that loketh into naturall philosophie must needs find pregnant proofes for the vpholding of phisike , so he that studieth morall phllosophie , will acknowledge his verie alpha and omega , to be the setting vp of magistracie . and as it is but the peeuishnes and queasinesse of the diseased that will abide no phisike , so is it the wilfulnesse and malecontencie of the wicked , that will not come vnder lawes . but the phisicions do not therefore giue ouer their patient because hee is vnruly , but rather handleth him more roughly : so magistrats must not desist from the duties of their offices for the waywardnesse and vnaptnesse of the people , but the more stir vp their spirits & forces against them with all austeritie . the whole worke of phisike is either to continue health when wee haue it , or to restore it when it is wanting : so the magistrats function is either to hold all vpright when the state is in a good case , or to recouer and recure that which shall become vnsound . they both in each of their professions , and in euerie of their particular practises , doe ( consonantly to natures rule ) prescribe as well the hurtfull to bee eschewed , as the helpefull to be taken ; and they both bee furnished at all points with good choice and varietie of medicines applyable occasionally to the sundrie sorts of griefes . they haue some that be panchresta , generall for all assayes , accommodable to any disease ; they haue some that be meerely peculier for one or verie few infirmities , and bee respectiue to some one part ; they haue some , which for their as well safenesse as vertue bee termed benedicta by the helpe wherof they both conceiue hope of helpefull successe , and assurance from all endangerings : they haue some extremely forcible , euen eradicatiua , pulling vp by the roots the firmely implanted , and predominantly preuayling humours : they haue some which be preparatiues , seruing but to make way , and worke an aptnesse for the stronger ensuing remedies : they haue some comfortatiue and cordiall , to assist the softnesse of nature against ouercharging assaults : they haue some restoratiue , to repaire the decaies , and raise againe the deiected estate of health : they haue some consuming corrosiues , to eate out what is become dead and vnsensible : they haue some soporiferous to enduce a sleeping dulnesse and stupiditie , whilest cures of great aduenture must be effected : they haue some lenetiue , to asswage excessiue and raging paines : they haue some exasperating heaters , to digest and draw out the cores of corruption : they haue some drying consumers , to waste away the superfluous confluence of any annoying matter : they haue some attractiue openers , to loose and draw forth any inwardly infixed festerings : they haue dispersers & dissoluers of any gathered together or swelling putrifactions : they haue repercussiues , to suppresse and repell all beginning outrages : they haue expellers of all that is hurtfull and burdenous , cleansing the verie fountaynes of euill : they haue preseruatiues against all venemous and infectious contagious : they haue substantiall consolidators of the dissolued and apostumed parts , reducing all agayne to the health and vnitie of nature ; and they both do enterchangingly vse or administer all or any of these , according to the many different qualities , malice , degrees , disposition , state , and condition of diseases . the phisition is not so strictlie tied to the vsuall forme or composure of his receits and prescriptions , but that he doth often alter the same in particuler persons , as he is induced by the obseruation of sundrie circumstances , signes , and accidents : such a discretion ( some thinketh ) the magistrat might be trusted with , that all offences comming vnder one head of law , should not receiue alike the same vnalterable censuring ; but that vpon aduised consideration of diuersities , sometimes there be vsed quallifications , dispensations , and mitigations , and somtimes againe an encrease and addition of paine should be deuised , as the quallitie or manner of the fault shall deseruedly giue occasion : for example , doth not iustice require that where one felonie is of a more hainous nature than an other , or one treason more foule and horrible than another , the same should be condignly rewarded with an extraordinarie seueritie , beyond the letter of the law ? except we should respectiuely to such inequallitie make more , and these different lawes , which should distinguishingly set forth diuersities of punishment , as the hainousnes of desert shall giue cause , and not wrap vp all alike vnder one generall title , binding them to one and the same recompensing condemnation . but whether is the better to make more choice of prescribed phisicke , ( which by the multiplicitie of diuers respects might grow too infinite ) or to allow more libertie to the phisitions in sorting their appliances to the inequallities aforesaid , id deus aliquis viderit , this is proponed for a truth perpetuall , vniuersall , and vnresistable , that where difference of considerations maketh a maius and minus in any fault , the punishment also should be proportionable by the intention or remission of lenitie or austeritie . the states phisitions after the order and skill of phisick naturall , be diligently to obserue , in what manner each disease taketh or setleth , and how the same may be particularly encountred ; that he may the better ( for militat omnis medicus ) so with ambuscadoes beset the way , and prepare resistance to intercept or interrupt it in his courses , that in what sort soeuer it shall approch , or giue the onset , it may be strongly met withall , and fitly confronted with his contrarie : for right sagely doth their wisdomes discerne , that as in the naturall , so in the politike bodie , the remediyng of any maladies is the more readily performed , by the repelling thereof with their directest opposites . but for as much as without a discouerie of the right cause of any disease , it cannot be well discerned or resolued , where or how to set foot to make head against it ; it is behoueable studiously to find out the beginnings , the entrings , the breedings , and the first occasioning causes of each sicknesse , that in the contriuing of the cure thereof , it may be combatted correspondently . neither is it to be thought lesse necessarie , exactly to know the constitution and complexion of the bodie politique , that in the right applying of remedies , it may vndeceiueably be conceiued how ( according to the diuersities therof ) medicines may be ministred either stronger , or weaker , speedier or flower , oftner or seldomer , for the aduantage of preuailing . yea it seemeth also requisite that the be well seen in the obseruation of times and seasons , for the more fortunate effecting of his intended cures : for like as in priuat , so in publike grieuances there is a certaine point of opportunitie to be watched , and taken hold on , sorting more fittingly to the furtherance of such good indeuours . besides i do not see but ( for the manner of his ministring ) it may vnto him as vnto the phisition be allowed to vse ( to gaine an acceptation of his receipt ) a kind of beguiling loue , by sweetning and giuing of a more pleasing reliefe to his remedies , that the same so kindlie accomodated , may haue rather the welcome of a friend , than be abhorred as an enemy . one skill more he is yet to borrow of the phisition , which is , the diligent noting and distinguishing of each part from other , by the extent of their nature , by their proper place , by their different workings , by their adherence and mutuall respects , or by any other their discrepant proprieties ; lest he do through such ignorant mistaking vnaptly misapplie , to the hurt of one , what he had consideratly prepared for the good of another : he is to haue as penetrating an insight , as carefull an ouerlooking , and as particuler a knowledge of each thing considerable in the ciuill bodie , as the anatomist hath in the serching and seuering of euery veine , arterie , or synew , or in the describing and bounding out of euerie the parts , passages , offices , or actions , in the bodie naturall . in his tendance and care though hee be to haue the whole in a generall suruey , espying and amending whatsoeuer requireth the correction of any remedies ; yet is he more circumspectly , and with all watchfulnesse , to looke vnto such diseases which harmeth and distresseth the best and vitall , yea those roiall parts of nobilitie and magistracie , ( where the soule in sort seateth and sheweth it selfe ) not onely because the in-dwelling ( as it were ) of so great a guest , deserueth a well clensed puritie and soundnes ; but for other also no lesse remarkable respects , of the consequentiall mischiefes thereof , arising to the residue of the bodie , ( sith when any tender or noble part is ill affected , or out of order ) all the rest be therewithall afflicted ; as both partaking heauily with the vnrest , grieuances , and passions thereof , and also filled with the annoying fluxes vpon them vnburdned . let vs for the cleerer demonstrance of this matter ; cast our eyes and imaginations yet more markingly , vpon the bodie naturall , wherein when the distemperature of vnequally sorted humours haue inuaded and possessed any chiefe part , the disease therein bred , or setled , becommeth generall , extending a touch and taint ouer all ; the helping functions thereof be withheld , as restrained by such obstructions . in the steed whereof his infection is sucked and deriued all abroad , to the corrupting and peruerting of whatsoeuer hath any dependancie or affinitie therewith ; yea so far forth , as not onely the common sence by such disturbance misconceiueth his apprehensions , but also that reason it selfe is wholy beguiled and misled ; with some rauing error , allowing the furmised , in steed of the reall good : so as the whole bodie therby is vexed with giddinesse and tumults : so when great men of a better condition , and higher degree , shall grow humerous , opinionate , and factious , ( besides their withdrawing of their faith , alleageance , and former good seruices ) they doe not only seduce the vnskilfull and vnruly commons , but also traine on with their suggestion of colourable causes , some officers of publique trust ( as parts of the reasonable power ) to adhere vnto them in their misconceiuing aduentures , till all be endaungered by such mutinous confusion . but hauing dwelt too long in the description of this disease ( for the remedying whereof , preuention is the best prescription ) what i haue farther to deliuer touching the diseases of the state , or the likenes which they haue with them of the bodie , or how to carrie or direct the manner of tendance or ordering of them ; i must be faile more compendiously to couch the infinitenes thereof within the compasse of some short positions , lest raunging too far , i be offensiuelie tedious , orseeking to match all , i mar all by making more a doo than i need . 1 the forenoted diseases setled in the nobler parts , are the more principally to be prouided for , and it is ordinarie to withdraw the anguish thereof , to some of the lesse principall , yea though it should be with torments of incision , burning , or ligature . 2 where the greife is outward , and the cause inward , it is the surest course of curing to begin at the remouing of the inward cause , whereby the fountaines of supplie may be dried vp , 3 and the braunching euill more easelie withered away . when the disease proceedeth from vnknowen causes , it is more to be suspected and feared , because it mateth and amazeth the phisition himselfe , finding either no apparance of reason , 4 how to make resistance or applying hazardably with likelyhood of as well hurting as helping . it is vsuall that a disease setled in one part , feedeth it selfe by sucking the corruption from other parts adioyning ; wherein for the timely cutting off of such a confluence , to make a strong faction , it is likewise vsuall to comfort and make good the parts adiacent , that the griefe more singly accompanied , may the more soundly be encountred . the diseases that be inueterate & oflong continuance asketh a long healing , 5 and be seldome so soundly remedied , but they will reuert , and ioyne with any new grieuance , and be lightly then more exasperate and cumbersome than before , or than the new it selfe . the relaps into a disease from which wee haue been lately recouered , 6 doubleth the perill of the first sicknesse , being aduantaged by the weaknesse and poore case which it had formerly brought vs vnto . some diseases taken in time are easily helped , 7 which if they be suffered to run on , and through our heedlesnesse confirme themselues , do as easilie grow vncureable ; and where a small matter at the first might restore health , there after some continuance the medicine will come too late . such diseases as be infectious , 8 and do spread far and neer , are to be auoyded by all meanes , as scant to be helped by any meanes , seeing that they force the phisitions themselues to flight , not daring to entrude venterously into the thickest daunger , and when they be chased away , or hide themselues , vpon whom our hope of help relyeth , what can be expected but remedilesse miserie ? the diseases that bring with them a depriuation of sence , 9 without any feeling or acknowledging of sicknesse , argueth a great vnlikelyhood of recouerie , because nature yeeldeth her selfe as contented , 10 and no wayes opposing thereunto . when sicknesse commeth suddenly and vnexpected , the verie violence of that surprise so daunteth the hart , as that the fort will be lost before the forces be assembled . the disease that haunteth vs , and whereunto we be accustomed , 11 we do watch and obserue verie diligently , that we may meet with it at euery turne , and turne away his rigor , before it can get the masterie , and against it we be better prepared , with vsuall applications . the disease that is vniuersall , affecting the whole bodie , 12 awaketh & stirreth all the parts to bring together their concordant aide , and is the more caringly to be withstood , because it aduentureth the whole at one stake . where the diseases seemeth remedylesse , and of desperat condition , 13 there it is permitted and aduised to minister desperat medicines . vncureable diseases shame and foile the phisitions , and then doth it go hard with them , 14 when the patient wholy depending vpon their help , iaieth the blame vpon their vnsufficiencie ; where contrarywise , if they help at a pinch ( all seeming past help ) then doe they ( as it were ) play their prizes , & make themselues well esteemed , and much renowmed . in the diseases of great men , 15 and those grieuous and daungerous , the whole colledge of phisitions is consulted with ; for the greater the cause or person is , the more will the attendance and assistance of councell , iudges , and magistrates concur for the suppressing of such raging fits , by timely remedies . many diseases haue an eager appetite to those meats which are fittest to encrease their force , 16 and it is a part of the cure appertaining thereunto , to restraine the patient from the vse of such hurtfull food ; as if a mad man were to bee kept from a sword , he that is aguish from wine , the seditious from seducing books , and traiterous complottors , and the vngouerned from riches and honour . such diseases as detecteth and discouereth themseluesby some certaine signes whereby they may be knowne , 17 may be sooner suppressed ; and the verie assuaging or altering of those signes , doth often weaken , vanquish , and driue away the disease it selfe . where a disease is particular only to one part , 18 as to the eye , the hand , foot , or such like , the losse wherof inferreth not the destruction of the whole ; there , rather than a continuall molesting & annoying grieuance should encumber the ioyes of life , the part wherunto such paine sticketh & is so affixed , as that it cannot be remoued or remedied , were better to be pulled out , cut of , & disseuered frō the bodie : howbeit much extremitie is to be abidden , and many waies for healing are to be tried befor it com to so hard a passe , as to harden the hart to endure such violence . manie diseases are dissolued and ouercome meerly by the strength of nature , 19 that the phisicions ayd is not implored at all : and many againe because their nature hath beene too much trusted vnto , and phisicke hath bene neglected or loathed , maketh a conquest ouer both . the excesse of humours , will seeke either to settle in some principall part , 20 as in a fortified place , entrenching the same with strong obstructiōs ; or els outwardly to get an head , which ( if they cannot by scattering bee dispatched ) are to beeforced to breake out rather than to fester within . some diseases haue a propertie like the adder that turneth to be a serpent , being chaunged after a while from being the same it was into an other new and different worser than it selfe . 21 most diseases haue certaine degrees & standing points of either encrease or declination , and according as nature is comforted and seconded by the helpes of phisicke , so they eyther slacke their sharpnesse , 22 or become outragious , after they haue once touched and attained to those poynts . yet there resteth one rule that ruleth all the rest , which is , that euery disease desireth his proper cure ; 23 wherein if there bee any missing or mistaking , the mischiefe will bee this , that the weakening of nature by that which is wrong applyed ( for such phisicke not fitting the disease , worketh vpon nature ) must necessarily augment the power and perill of the sicknesse . this position is of a much importing consequence , and ( howsoeuer i leaue all the former to the applying and moralizing of the reader ) this i may not so suddēly forsake , or lightly passe ouer : it cōcerneth the skil of the phisiciō , who hath our liues in his hands . there bee sometimes such nimble headed pragmatickes , that taking vpon them to be great entermedlers in state affaires , do for want of grounded knowledge in the politicall science , make many foule escapes : whom i may resemble to the empericke phisicions , who hauing bene brought vp onely in an experimentall prentiship , do seldome apply that which is proper , but wholy trusting to their ordinarie receipts , & not able to looke into the right nature of the disease , or the diuers variations therof , or the complexion & strength of the patient , or the fitnesse of the season for ministring , or the proportion of the medicine to the qualitie of the sicknesse , and thereunto ignorant also of the methode for orderly proceeding , or iudiciously to marke or obserue the right prognostica ; do daily by their desperate dealings endamage and weaken , if not cast away such as be so hazarded vnder their charge . such blind aduēturing without rule or arte to be vsed in the needfull occasions of the commonweale , who seeth not how hurtfull and pernicious it may proue ? and therfore forbearing ( as i haue bound my selfe to doe ) to inlarge this discourse out of other learning , i will onely serue my turne with stretching of this one comparison thus farre farther : that as the profound and rationall phisicion is for certaintie of cure , and direction in the regiment of health , to bee chosen and vsed before the rash vnskilfull empiricke : so the learned and well seene in the principles of politicall doctrine , is fitter to bee imployed and trusted with the publike dispatches and affaires , tending to the preseruation and amendment of the state , than any bold busie bodies that either creepe in at vnwares , or thrust in by shouing and shouldring ; their agencies being too daungerous , where the bodie of the realme must become their patient : for where their skill is all but by tradition , and not attayned by the studie and enquirie after causes and reasons , how be they able in the middest of so manie deceauable differences to find for each particular occurrance , the proper and right requisite application , without the which whatsoeuer is or seemeth remedied , breaketh foorth anew , waxing raw and sore againe . thenceit commeth , that oftentimes the medicine is worse than the disease , and the phisicion becommeth the heire vnto his patient ; because where wee most repose our selues in a confidence of helpe , there through an vnaduised cariage in the partie trusted ( affecting his owne end ) and wandering from his right way , wee be most seduced and left succourlesse , exposed to all calamities . discretion is the limbecke that extracteth to his right vse all kind of learning , without it nor the phisicion in his manyfold varietie of diseases and medicines , nor the politician in his multiplicitie of causes and cases , can affect any thing , either with certaintie to good , or laudably to reputation . if this be not his best guide , like the threed of ariadne , to lead him through the laberinth of so many intricat diuersities , how shall hee be able to rule the matter , when hee standeth enwrapped , and euen ouer-matched with the contrarietie of rules ? one rule telleth him that nulla remedia tam sunt salutaria , quam quae faciunt dolorem : the best medicines doe most payne vs : by the imitation whereof the state phisicion will perhaps trust most to his sharpe and austere remedies . another rule aduiseth such application as is secundū naturam , et quod cuiusque natura desiderat . hereof it cōmeth , that what delighteth and pleaseth ( though it be not for goodnes comparable ) yet for his familiar agreeablenesse to our stomack and nature , is to be preferred vnto that which is offensiue , vnsauorie , or churlish . this consideration preuaileth in gouernment also , to haue all the businesse of correction and reformation transacted quietly without contrarious conflicting ; and by such meanes as may rather giue contentment , than make conquest : because what is loathed or not brooked , may more hurt or molest in recoyling , than auaile by an vnwilling and painfull retention . aristotle propoundeth as a probleame , that the selfe fame inflammations by some be cured with cooling , and by others are ripened and digested by heating . this phisicke hath also bene wisely put in practise in the tendance of the raging vlcers and impostumations of the bodie politique , when the hote humour of haughtinesse in great men hath sometimes by gentlenesse and counsell bene allayd , and other sometimes by vrging and more heating brought to a rupture & running out . what encumbreth or annoyeth nature , is sometimes at his first gathering ( before it getteth an head ) dissolued and dispersed , and sometimes againe is suffered , yea and forced to shew his vttermost virulence , and to get vnto him his full strength , before it be once medled with . the same medicines that easeth vs of griefe in one part , may annoy vs in another , that help at one time , may hurt at another , or that heale one may dispatch another : wee vse not the same course in summer as we doe in winter , nor the same when the bodie is too full , as when it is brought low , nor the same to children and old folks , as to men of confirmed strength ; nor the same in the height or amendment , which wee doe at the beginning of the disease . such respectiuenesse we may expect from the political phisicion , that he be not pragmatically tied to the idem , or eodem modo , but that from the axiomes & conclusions of learning , he doe so aplie his cogitations to the discrepancie of occasions , as that ( being vsque quaque sapiens ) he accomodate his cures rather by certeinty than at aduenture , and euen therein to shew himselfe regular , by varying of his proceedings frō his rules , as the variablenesse of condicions , circumstances , and considerations shall with reason ouerrule him . and he doth oftentimes ( as a well skilled phisicion doth ) finding any imperfection or vnaptnesse in the first remedies repeale and cast aside them by prouiding and ordeining new . yet in one point more let vs note the effects of skill in a phisicion , who is able to make euen poysons medicinable ; which sheweth , that when magistrats shall vppon occasion make vse of wicked men , we should bee so farre from charging them with the obiection of vngodly policie , as that we should rather for such their property & power liken them vnto god , who himselfe infinitly good , extracteth good out of euill . such expert phisicions of the realme , doe ( like far darting apollo ) spread abroad their golden rayes and happie influence , as well for preseruing of publique health and prosperitie , as also for the subduing of all poysoned pithons , and miscompounded monsters , that infect the ayre , or defile the land of the common-weale . some other good requisits in our state-phisicions may not be pretermitted . it is needfull , that they bee of a graue stayednesse , and free from ficklenesse or flexibilitie . i yeeld , that a phisicion may by occasions and circumstances bee moued to dispose himselfe to change both his opinion and his practise : yet i hold it requisite that such his change may appeare to proceed rather from deliberation than lightnesse , from iudicious discerning of right causes , rather than from a vayne affectation of new courses ; so hee be constant to his propounded end of effecting the saftie & health of the bodie , resting vppon his skill and best endeuour , to make tryall of sundrie different meanes likely , and seruing thereunto , is no vnconstancie at all . the same may bee affirmed of gouernours : it cannot but bee hatefull and scandalous to any magistrate , to play the light headed temporizer , by the exchange and oft shifting of his opinion , still to conforme to euerie accidentall alteration in the state : for howsoeuer it may bee allowed vnto him ( vppon preuayling considerations ) to change his medicines rather than his mind , retayning stil his integritie and constancie towards the state : yet is it made a note of common obseruance , that such as be either caried about by euerie tempest of the time , or be swayed by their owne leuitie to entertaine diuersities in the order of gouernment ; as they do but affect latebram male fidei , so they giue place and passage to euery stirring & vpstart spirit ( as the heedlesnes or giddinesse of the bodies phisicion oft doth ) with force & furie to conquer all . i know that a remedilesse necessitie may constrayne the skilfullest pilot ( being beaten from his intended hauen ) to take into the next harbor that fortune shall offer , rather than with extreme perill to contend with the storme : such a kind of compelled alteration no indifferent obseruer will debarre any prouident polititian of , that whensoeuer he shall varie from his first well grounded resolution , his relinquishing of the former , or his pursuing of any new intention , may be iudged rather necessarie than voluntarie , more reasonable than fashionable , and for the performing of farther good rather than to follow the inclination of his owne vnsteady humours . they must be louing and compassionate , the proofe and demonstrance wherof maketh their patients comfortably and readily to swallow any their prescribed receits , and it is one step towards cure , when the sick holdeth a good thought of his phisicion , persuading himselfe , that his labours are vndertaken out of an honest and heartie desire of doing good , rather than to inrich himselfe by vndeserued gettings . the ouermuch regard of fees or gaynes in some phisicions , maketh good the saying of philemon an old poet , o quam male medicus se habet , cum neminem male sese habere contigit , medicus valere amicos ne suos quidem cupit : which ( howsoeuer perhaps it may be touchingly applied to some lawiers also , whose profession is to find phisicke to redresse particular wrongs , and therefore that they may bee set a worke with the case , wisheth their friends sometimes in an ill case ) yet farre bee it that any the higher magistrats of iustice and gouernment , should bee shamefully stained with the blacke note of so foule an imputation , as out of the diseases , sores , and corruptions of the people , to enrich and aduaunce his owne estate . and against that sort of lawyers which shall seeke to make vs such fooles , as by continuall lawing to keepe vs still to that play at foyles , to fill them thereby with fees , let vs learne this phisicall lesson , that as medice viuere , est misere viuere , so to be neuer out of law , is neuer to know any happie dayes : for as too much phisicke weakeneth and wasteth health ; so to be ouerlaid with law , is the vtter losse and confounding of all comforts of life . but leauing such purse-purging lawyers , i must returne to the pursuite of considerable respects , for the phisicions of the ciuill bodie . as one may bee a good phisicion though an euill man ; so may he be a good commonwealths man , though otherwise for his priuat faults reproueable . as in chusing a phisicion , we take not the wealthiest , or that can make best friends , but him that is best skilled , and likeliest to cure : so magistracie and offices of iustice bee not to be bestowed vppon the richest or most fauoured , but vppon the wisest and worthiest . as we like better a phisicion that is our owne countreyman , or of some neerenesse in bloud vnto vs , than a forraine borne , or nothing alied vnto vs : so is it well and louingly prouided for , where the soueraigne ( according to such desire ) ordereth each people to bee gouerned by their owne natiues . as the phisicions to encourage and induce their patients to take more cheerefully their prescriptions , doe readily foretast the same themselues : so the magistrats for the drawing of the people to the more willing obseruance of the lawes , ought to make themselues examples of integritie in the outward shew of a iust conuersation . besides , as the phisicion though hee bee oft times by the waiward demeanure of the patient , much abused , yet doeth hee persist in his purpose of performing of the best helpe by any course that his skill affoordeth : so the magistrat , albeit in the execution of so busy , enuious , and troublesome a charge , he must often meet with mischieuous intentions against him , be thwarted with oppositions , and indure indignities , yet must he with a manly and vertuous constancy consecrate his whole endeuours to the resolute following of his necessarie function . further , as the phisicion too much set a worke or called vppon , cannot giue to each patient a sufficing attendance : so where there be too many busie imployments cast vppon one magistrat or officer ( or too many clyents cloying of one lawyer ) the verie distraction or diuiding of his paines amongst so manie , applyeth against him the prouerbiall verse : ad plura intentus minor est ad singula sensus . lastly , i will bestow vpon our politicall phisition that complement of qualities , which we vsually look for in a surgion ; that is an hawks eye , a ladies hand , and a lions hart : his eye must piercingly spie into all sores and disorders reformable , his hand must not be caried too heauy , but rather tenderly and mercifully ; and his hart is to be held vp vndaunted , and vnflexible , when it hath vprightly conceiued of the right , reiecting from him all remisnes , or timorousnes of execution . the phisition doth not alwaies follow the precisenes of his owne rules , he doth often offend against his owne health , ( as others doe ) and then is disdainfully mocked with curate ipsum . i would not aduise any man to be so saucy , as to bid the magistrat look to his owne faults ; but it must be confessed , that such as be seated in places of aucthoritie , may as basely and as badly misgouerne themselues as inferior persons , and thereby not vndeseruedly fitted with that frumpe , that the greater theefes hang vp the lesser . yet when the phisition is sick , other phisitions are prouided to minister vnto him ; so the vices of the magistrats , must vndergo the censure of other magistrats , to be delt withall as the quallitie thereof requireth . neuerthelesse , as the phisitions misdieting of himselfe , is no good pretence for the diseased to refuse to be healed by his endeuour : so the obiection of the magistrats misbehauiour or reproach must not withdraw our subiection from abyding and yeelding to any his orders or iudgements concerning our emendation . it is obserued in the nature of man , that when he is pressed by sicknesse to pray aide of the phisition , he holdeth nothing too deare for him , rewarding him with rich recompence ; but when he findeth himselfe recouered , and no more to need him , he will scant afford him any his least fauours ; as if he had concluded , that as god created him , so he would honor him , onely for necessities sake . such also is the fortune of those , who spend their spirits , cares , and industries , in the attendance of the states health ; when it is discerned , that they haue aduised , procured , and ministred the good of the weale publike , then be they extolled by applause , aduanced to honor , and rewarded with bounties ; but if the occasion of their meritings be cut off , then forgetting the forepassed helpes , aesculapius must thence forth loose his sacrifice of cocks . nay , their case is somewhat worse , for if that which by them is contriued and intended rightly , faileth of effect , or falleth out sinisterly ; then as if the phisition had either mistaken his cure , or misbehaued himselfe , he maketh a purchase of blame and shame , loosing both the kirnell for which he took paines , and the credit of his art , which notwithstanding he exactly followed . further than this , he findeth one other greeuance much exceeding the former , which is , that when he hath with his earnest studie and best circumspection decreed and enacted what is to be done , his prescriptions will not be receiued , nor his directions followed ; without the vse and applying whereof , the making of such receipt was a bootlesse labour . he that will see the right image of that wrong offered to the state-phisitions , let him but search into his owne hart , where when reason hath assembled the senat of his best vnderstandings , and hath by their discussings resolued what is best to be done , if there then should want a will to obey and performe such decrees , might not reason and his fellowes as well haue been a sleepe : so verilie when wholsome lawes are deuised and enacted , for the generall benefit of an whole realme , it is an vntollerable abuse offered to the law-makers , when for lacke of due administration , to concomitate the consulting power , the same shall not haue their execution . yet were it the shamfullest iniurie of all , and that no waies standeth with the patients owne safetie , if the receipts or prescriptions of the phisition , should be illuded by shifts and cauilled at , of purpose to mistake and peruert the true meaning thereof : so standeth the case with good statutes , when ill disposed people , will by subtill scanning seek euasions , and alter the sinceritie of them by wrested interpretations . but vertuous subiects holding obedience to be their essentiall and habituall propertie , and hauing such phisitions as both zealously loueth them , and are best acquainted with the state of their bodie , will hartily abhor and abandon such miscreant corrupters of the gouerning iustice. it is now time to find some meanes for the obseruing of a meane , lest tediousnes banish delightsomnesse : i haue reserued yet one comparison more , wherwith at the last to close vp all , and to reduce this discourse to my promised period , of the entire embracements betweene soueraigne and subiect . the bodies hoping after health , or affecting of felicitie , is no other , or to any other end , than to reioice the soule with fulnesse of comfort and satisfiyng pleasures ; so let the desires and endeuours of the bodie politique , and each part thereof , in the acquiring for the state any supposed or desireable good , bee directed and tend to the making happie of their soueraigne , by working on all sides his abundant contentation . then ( sith at their first meeting they began with a profession and coniunction of loue ) their departure shall not want a recyprocall kindnesse , with the exchange of all mutuall offices of faith and assurednesse . the princes contentment must be the happinesse of the subiect , & the subiects welfare the securitie of the prince : and so shall the commonwealth be compleatly blessed , by the firmnesse of that concording vnion , hauing mentem sanam in corpore sano , the tranquillitie of the mind , with indolence of the bodie . thus hauing aduentured to propound vnto publique view ( like as appelles did his picture ) this portracture of the bodie politique , though not so compleatly shaped in all the lyneaments , as may either allure the lookers on to liking , or may suffice to equall the dignitie and maiestie of the matter represented : i must entreat of the wise and expert polititians , their fauourable interpreting , and encouraging entertainments thereof ; vnto whom i haue reason ( with all reuerent regard ) to dedicate these endeuors ; them hath the coniunction of learning and acting , well entermixed , exactly accomplished ; and from the obseruance of their good labours , hath been bred the collection of booke lessons : what they broyling in the heat of affaires , and euen sun-burned with the businesse of the state , doe daily effect for the publique benefit ; that we ( the contemplators of their merits ) in our solitarie priuatnesse at our vnimployed leasures , and from our shadie studies , ought gladly , for the establishing of their aucthoritie , and for the eternizing of their glorie , to recount & recommend to the vndecaying succession of future times . it was right worthy councell which demetrius gaue vnto ptolemie , aduising him diligentlie to reade the bookes written of politicall gouerment : but his reason is sharpe pointed and toucheth to the verie quick ; for ( saith he ) there shall you find that which none dare or will tell you . to say the truth , such works aduisedly & faithfully compiled , be vnpartiall informers , and vncorrupted councellours , acquainting their readers with the generallitie of right and reason , to be applied to vse in particuler considerations . from thence may all gouernours draw their directions , for the framing and plotting of their most important purposes : and what they thence shall suck will be simple and sincere , without admixture of either deceiptfull drifts , or affectionat inclinations . as in the act or abilitie of right vnderstanding , the soule doth manifest his greatest force and goodnesse : so in the multitude of them that can giue councell , is strength . to such atlas-like gouernours , that be the supporting arches of a ciuill state , all politicall learning , and whatsoeuer industrie or discoueries , in that subiect doth properly belong , and ought in them to be treasured vp for store at all times to besteed the state ; euen as the light created on the first day , was after transferred into the bodies of the sun , moone , and starres of the firmament , to illighten the whole world . the view of my weaknesse and vnworthinesse , together with the awful respectiuenes wherto i stand bound in all dutie , stayeth me from presumptuous assuming to my selfe of any such clearenesse of conceipt or iudgement , as may any whit encrease the fulnesse of vnderstanding in our great and superiour lights . yet if by the propounding of this paire of bodies , so equally matching in fashion and liknesse , ciuill consultations vpon any occurrance may ( by such correspondence ) receiue helpe , i hope it will not be disliked , that i haue endeuoured to set open for their light a broader and larger passage . i may not make my selfe ignorant , that it is easie to offend in the curiositie of inquiring into state-secrets ; there is euen in that kind also a forbidden apple . and it hath euer been reckoned an audaciousnes not to be digested , to intrude with timeritie , where restraint hath placed a crosse barre . if euery bodie must know all , counsell were no counsell . the bodie politique as the naturall , is whole and close chested , there is not in his brest ( no more than in the others ) any glasse windowes or casements placed , for medling momus to look into the reserued occultanda of the heart . such as haue an itching desire to peere within the curtaine of those vndiscouerable secrets , besides their offensiue and vnmannerly sawcinesse , against the reuerend and sage senators of the state , do apparantly detect themselues to be but babling and seducing newes tellers . cato censureth fitly of them percunctatores garruli , and plautus amplie describeth their natures , terming them by an old but significant name of famigeratores , as filled both in the eares and in the mouth , with a certaine saleable windy matter of rumors and reports . there is a sobrietie to be obserued in the gayning of knowledge by inquisitiuenesse ; for such as ouerfill themselues , and doe drinke too deepe of harkening and hearesayes , will likewise incurre the other extremities , both of reeling as disied by vntruthes ; and of casting vp againe , by the publishing of all they heare . but when this searching and piercing presumption shall get vp to the highest step , and fall to prie into the prince himselfe , to make discoueries and dinulgings of his dispositions , intentions , affections , qualities , waightie businesses , and serious actions ; then it hath the resemblance , and is a verie spice of the heat of phaeton , of the lightnesse of icarus , of the treacherie of tantalus , of the blabbing of sisiphus , of the lust of ixion , of the immodestie of acteon , and of the slie surreption of prometheus , and is worthily punishable with some of their tortures . salomon compareth the vnsearchable heart of the king , to the height of heauen , and the depth of the earth ; arguing thereby as well the presumption as the impossibilitie of discouering the same , pro. 25. against this odious iniury of the subiects ouermuch enquiring and spying into their soueraigne , i haue one arrow or argument left me , to be taken out of the same quiuer : nature hath so prouided , that no sences of the bodie doeth penetrate into the essence or inwardnesse of the soule ; they bee espials for him , not spyers into him : for animus oculorum effugit obtutum . then in the same sort , as well for a warning to my selfe , as for a reproofe to any other that way offending , let mee set it downe for a positiue trueth , that euen heerein also our manners and dutie should contemplate and imitate nature , as with a modest reuerence to forbeare to intromit our animaduerting curiositie into the bosome of sacred and vnsearchable maiestie : which who so doth with an humbled spirit well vnderstand what it is in his verie altitude and latitude , shall certainly find it to be as great an arcanum in policie , as the soule can bee in nature : so ( with all beseeming reseruation of my dutious submission to superiour powers ) i doe to the residue of readers offer a petition of indifferencie , that if they shall light of any thing defectiue or wanting waight , i may bee bold to borrow some few graynes of their good fauour , wherwith perhaps the scales may be held vpright . if they meet with any matter seeming an vlcer , tender of touch , and subiect to construction ; i may onely chalenge them to be charitable , than which ( i hope ) there will need no other healing . finally , if to the daintie eare of this all-scanning age , my simple and vnpolished worke shall giue no satisfaction , yet the scope of my honest intentions , and the loyaltie of my well meaning , may at the least acquite me of blame , if not merit acceptation . finis . errata . in the first page of the briefe , line penult . leaue out ( of resolution . ) in the next page , line 16. for , loueth all , read , loued of all . folio 22. line 15. for excellentest , read excellent fift . f. 28. l. 15. for heat , t. head . f. 33. l. 4. for if , r. of . f. 61. l. 2. for mind , r. mine . f. 69. l. 7. for conueiance , r. conniuance . f. 76. l. 1. for proponed , r. propounded . f. 87. l. 5. for affect , read effect . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a01075-e50 the aptest resemblances of a commonweale . the greater and lesser world . trismegistus his great giant . gods imitating of himselfe , a direction for our imitating of him man the fittest patterne to imitate in the forming of a ciuill state . agrippa his tale of the parts of the body . liuius lib. 2. the like comparisons vsed in the scriptures . 1. cor. 12. in praise of such comparisons . a caution against crossing with dissimilitudes . a limitation not to striue too far . of enforcing a similitude beyond his agreeablenesse . notes for div a01075-e3530 homo monsura rerum omnium . soueraigntie the soule , alleagiance the body . in euery ciuill state there must be the ruling , and the ruled . impugners of magistracie . magistracie worketh the good of the people . mutual offices between soueraigne and subiect . the end of gouernment , to make the state happie . all gouernment by law . the soueraigns loue to their subiects . the soueraigns care of their subiects welfare . the excellencie of soueraigntie . soueraignes ordained by god. rom. 13. against ambition . soueraignes haue a waightie charge . soueraignes impart to inferior magistrats a part of their power . all command in the state deriued from the soueraigne . soueraignes wrōged by the negligence of vnder officers . against forrain supremacy the rights of soueraigntie not to be to far extended , nor too much restreyned . first of soueraigntie . the powers of the soule set forth . the matching of the powers of soueraignty to the powers of the soule . soueraigntie in his vegetable power . in the sensitiue and intellectuall . councellours . fauorites . the soueraignes will , and whether it alone may stand for law . plato soueraignes often misinformed . customes and inclinations of the people oft preuaile with the soueraign . resolution in the soueraign . obedience in the people . rebels . opinion . sutors in court like appetites . malecontents . pretenses in treason . records and their imbeziling or falsifying . prerogatiue royall . soueraignes not to be euill spoken of . cicero . the soueraigne a god. the large extent of soueraigntie , by cōparison with god and the soule . of the soueraignes shewing himself to the people . philip comm. plato . mans head his root . the excellencie of the head or soueraigne . the head loued of the bodie . soueraignes haue a sympathie with subiects . how to think of soueraignes faults . subiects haue a cause to beare with soueraignes faults . no opposition to the soueraigne , much lesse no deposing of them . kind subiects take vpon themselues the blame imputed to the soueraigne . in pseud. the soueraign likened to the heart . the cōmaund and force of soueraigntie . of the soueraigne all hold what they haue . bountie in a soueraigne . soueraignes loue of vertue . soueraigns to looke well to them that be neer about thē how factions grow ▪ the soueraignes sports not to be grudged at . two wayes to wrong the soueraigne . maiestie in a soueraigne . a soueraigne how to bee respected . diuersities of respects in the soueraign touching his person and his soueraigntie . man the great miracle of nature . nor head nor heart haue any power to doe wrong . certaine essentiall orders in the state . the gifts of statesmen to be wel disposed of . chiefe officers or nobles to be well safgarded . the fower elements of the bodie politique . the well mixing of the elements . the predominance of the elements actiue or passiue , maketh the complexion of the bodie politique . the elements to be held in concord . discords in the parts of one and the same elemēts . sundry formes of bodies politique . in a distemper all turneth to hurt , euen that which otherwise were good enough . the degrees of growth in the bodie politike . philosophers . the causes o change in the bodie politique . astronomers . god in alterations worketh the causes , and oft without causes . difference of parts in the common-wealth vegetable . sensitiue . rationall . dieting of the bodie . too precise or too careles of health . exercise of the bodie . tendance of the body politike according to different respects . equalitie to be obserued . against paritie to proue differences of dignitie & riches . not to reward worse than not to punish . difference of dignities and degrees . dignities ill bestowed . why the body politique is called a common wealth . mutualitie of helpe in the members . more respect of the chiefe members . the enemies bend most against the best . each part to be appointed to his owne workes . parts disordered , maketh the bodie to seeme monstrous . against conspiracie of the parts in the state ciuill . of the late intended treason . against idle , vagrant , or vnptofitable people . against ingrossing of offices . no need to put many offices vpon one man. a concordāce of the parts of the body politike in their cōmon works . in the worke of ruling , but one head . britania one body needing but one head . proofes for vnion . imperfections in the body politike , yet a bodie . shifts to supplie defects . mercenarie souldiers and straungers . the vse of leagues betwixt differēt countries . perfection in the state. signes of being in good estate . the best plight most to be mistursted . signes infer no certeintie . health , how necessarie in both bodies . griefe in any one part , putteth the whole out of health . aristotle ethic. lib. 3. discontentednesse . originall orders , the best preseruatiues of health in the state. alterations , how daungerous . nature best brooketh things accustomed . alterations must not be suddē or wholy , but by degrees and by parts . cases of alteration . better keep health , than recouer it . to prouide in prosperitie , for aduersitie . time preuention . of small beginnings , great mischiefes . against tolleration . cases admitting some sufferance of euill . we may hurt to heale . the diseases of the state. how they doe arise . differences in faults . against equalitie of sinne . punishment must bee proportionable to the offence . outward euils not so dangerous as inward laws the phisicke of the state , & dependeth of the soueraigne authoritie . the meanest officers do minister phisicke to the state . the cause why magistracy is oft repugned at . necessitie of magistracie . magistrats not to be discouraged , or giue ouer their cure . the likenes of the worke of magistrats and of phisicions . sundrie sorts of medicines in the state ciuill . in altering of punishment , what may be left to the magistrat . points to be obserued of the states phisition , and first of the manner of the disease . curing by contrarie . the cause must be first knowne . the complexion to be knowne . seasons to be obserued . to minister the medicines in pleasing manner . to know perfectly the bodie and all the parts . to haue greatest care of the best parts . great mens faults most perilous , and most to be respected . 1 1 diseases in the nobler parts most to be looked to . 2 2 where the cause is inward . 3 3 where the cause is vnknowne . 4 4 where the disease feedeth it selfe from other parts adioyning . 5 5 diseases inueterate . 6 6 relaps into any disease . 7 7 to applie cure in time . 8 8 infectious diseases . 9 9 diseases depriuing sence . 10 10 diseases comming suddenlie . 11 11 diseases wherunto we be accustomed . 12 12 diseases of the whole bodie . 13 13 diseases desperate . 14 14 diseases vncurable . 15 15 diseases of great men require more help and aduise . 16 16 diseases made worse by feeding on that they desire . 17 17 diseases discouered in their signes . 18 18 destruction of members in any disease , when to be vsed . 19 19 diseases oft dissolued by nature . 20 20 diseases to be forced to break outwardly . 21 21 diseases growing to a worse nature than they were . 22 22 the state or standing point of a disease . 23 23 euerie disease must haue his proper cure . against vnskilfull pragmatickes the learned fitter for gouernmēt than the vnlearned . vnperfect curing . discretion in state busines . seueritie . lenitie . contrarie waies to cure the same disease . diuersities in curing , vppon diuers respects repealing of some , and making of new lawes . magistrats may make vse of the wicked . good magistrats praised . the phisicions louing of the patient . couetousnesse in getting of fees . desire of gaine in some lawiers to be neuer out of law , a great miserie . magistrats may haue priuat faults , yet good magistrats . magistrats to be chosen for their skill in gouernment . magistrats rather to be natiue than forraine . magistrats must not desist frō their duties for abuses offred vnto them magistrats must giue good example . magistrats not to haue too many offices or imploiments . compared to a surgion in three properties . magistrats do sometimes offend the law themselues . magistrats offending , to be punished by other magistrats . magistrats faults no pretence to disobey them . magistrats deseruings soone forgotten . magistrats care and wisdome is iudged of by the euents . magistrats discouragement for the want of execution of lawes by them made . reasons resolue vaine , if there be no will to performe ▪ lawes often by cauils illuded . obedience the chiefe vertue of subiects . the subiects chiefe care to content the soueraigne . politicall gouernors are to be made famous by the prayses of the learned . the benefit which a soueraigne shall haue by the studying of politicall books . prouerb . 24. the dedication of politicall works due to the gouernors of the state. curiositie of looking into state businesse . in trinumo . inquisitiuenes . to prie into the princes dealings or dispositions , how dangerous it is . a caueat from natures work . in soueraignty a great mistery the secrets of government and misteries of state plainly laid open, in all the several forms of government in the christian world / published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. 1697 approx. 250 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 124 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a57590 wing r187 estc r226476 12383192 ocm 12383192 60793 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57590) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 60793) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 224:28) the secrets of government and misteries of state plainly laid open, in all the several forms of government in the christian world / published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. milton, john, 1608-1674. [9], 238 p. s.n.], [london : 1697. written by walter raleigh. cf. nuc pre-1956. first published in 1658 as: the cabinet-council: containing the cheif arts of empire, and mysteries of state. place of publication from wing. advertisement: p. [9]. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. monarchy -early works to 1800. 2000-00 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2001-08 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2001-09 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2001-10 tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited 2001-11 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the secrets of government , and misteries of state , plainly laid open , in all the several forms of government in the christian world . published by john milton , esq printed in the year , 1697. to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kind of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in 〈◊〉 to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such pieces . john milton . the principal contents . chap. i. the desinition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds page 1 chap. 2. of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks and specifical differences p. 3 chap. 3. of monarchies seignioril , exemplisied in the turkish and west-indian empire p. 6 chap. 4. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them p. 8 chap. 5. of monarchies tyrannical p. 11 chap. 6. of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to 〈◊〉 them p. 12 chap. 7. of councils and counsellors in general p. 17 chap. 8. of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties p. 18 chap. 9. of officers and commissioners , with their respective distinctions p. 21 chap. 10. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections p. 22 chap. 11. observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war p. 24 chap. 12. extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments p. 30 chap. 13. observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor p. 35 chap. 14. of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites p. 41 chap. 15. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment p. 48 chap. 16 of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated p. 51 chap. 17. of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained p. 53 chap. 18. of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes , and ways of prevention or discovery p. 55 chap. 19. of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it p. 58 chap. 20. of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs p. 67 chap. 21. of war defensive and invasive ; with iustructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline p. 70 chap. 22. of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions p. 83 chap. 23. of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace p. 87 chap. 24. of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof p. 97 chap. 25. a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events p. 107 chap. 26. maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels p. 184 advertisement . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites . printed for j. watts . the secrets of government , and misteries of state , plainly laid open . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain sovereign govornment of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , aristocraties , or democraties . a monarchy is that state where the sovereignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocraty , is where some small part of the people have in them as a body corporate , the sovereignty and supreme power of the whole state. a democraty , is where all the people have power and authority sovereign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the sovereignty resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchy , an aristocraty , or popular government . chap. ii. of sovereign of monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power in every publick state , and he is properly and only a sovereign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword. the first mark of sovereignty , is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to beslow all honors and chief offices at his pleasure . the fourth mark of sovereignty is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise , condemned in life , lands , goods or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the prince's absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts , signioril , royal and tyrannical . the diversity of monarchies doth not proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that govern ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the commonwealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to govern popularly . and that monarchy may be said to be governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be sound in states aristocratical and popular ; for the one and the other may be both signioril or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a family governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchy signioril , exemplisied in the turkisn and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince , and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission , but by ancient 〈◊〉 or custom , have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people do not acknowledge any superior but the prince , nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without property in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west-indies . the provinces of this monarchy are allotted to sundry magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchy royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords . and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants , who may not , without just cause , be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain natural love and dutiful respect ; whoso therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficulty , but being conquered , it may easily be maintained ; for the difficulty to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault all the people , and rather trust in his own strength than the aid of the country . but if he can prevail , then one only fear remaineth , which is the prince's posterity , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the prince's race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aid of some mean lords to take his part , and prepare the place where he is to arrive . chap. iv. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . monarchies royal are for the most part ancient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen : such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force , and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchy newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly ancient , then it is with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation , are easily induced to take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact as well upon those subjects that joyned with him , as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england , sicilia and naples to spain . the means to maintain such a monarchy , is , first , to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all laws and customs in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented ; and the rather if that new monarchy , and the ancient dominion of the prince , be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industry and fortune ; in that case the best way is , that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is , to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince . as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend ; for in that case , this rule or maxim shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated , or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppression they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all , to take order that no forreign prince or power do enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or fear , will be ever ready to bring in strangers : and to conclude this matter of principality annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent nighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never to permit any forreign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his chief habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither do they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of war , or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all ways either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meal , then will the prince's fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such , that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending : example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi. of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are , that from private estate have aspired to sovereignty , not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired , have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince : but here is to be noted , that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldom work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aid of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten ; because he is forced to introduce new laws and new orders of government differing from the old , as well for his own security , as confirmation of the government ; for avoiding of which dangers , he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his subjects to obey , or must pray in aid of others : if he can do the first , he needeth not doubt , but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continu ; for albeit a matter of no difficulty , it is to perswade a people ; yet to make them constant , is a work well near impossible . example , theseus , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate , must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other ; which may be done by this means : first , to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbors as possibly he may . thirdly , to compass all designs tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pass either by fraud or force . fourthly , to make himself honored and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly , to be obsequious and liberal to friends , magnanimous and terrible to foes . seventhly , to cass all old and unfaithful bands , and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amity with kings and princes , as they ought reasonably to favor him , or else they would offend ; easily they cannot . example , giovannio , torrigiani , caesar , borgi . the third and last means whereby private persons do aspire to principalities , is not force and violence , but meer good will and favor of men. the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness , because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobility ; for these contrary humors are in all common-wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed , viz. principality , liberty , or licentious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men ; for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforza , alessandro de medici . a prince in this sort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced ; for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great quality , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth : but if the prince be advanced by the people , few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude , is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth ; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men do study not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are principalities . but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors , to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweale power sovereign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they , or the greater part of them had been young men , then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependence of any other prince or commonweale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have been ever most precise , and for that reason , do not admit any cardinal or other clergy-man to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian senate is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the door , cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest. note also that in every state , of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spain , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils , ( viz. ) the council of the indies , the council of spain , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils , ( viz. ) the council srivy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conceliers de parlament , and the great council , which they call assemblies du troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in venice , beside the senate and great council , are four councils , ( viz. ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the council of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to one hundred and twenty persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of sixty persons , and hath another privy council of twelve . of councils in democraties . genoua hath three councils : the great council of two hundred , the senate which consisteth of sixty , and the privy council which hath twenty six counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states . the council-privy is most necessary , and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations fit to be published , are in a monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the council privy , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted , that albeit the use and authority of every senate a privy council is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the sovereignty resteth : for if counsellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be sovereigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majesty , which is a thing so sovereign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law. a commissioner is also a person publick , but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two sorts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates : the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces , in war , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the sovereign , magistrates and commissioners . and here is to be noted , that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equal to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making officers of and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz. ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the form and manner how they are made . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to him or them in whom the sovereignty resteth ; the second also belongeth to majesty ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the form and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that do not obey what sovereignty commandeth : for all force of commandment lieth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts ; the one may be called sovereign and absolute , above laws , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to sovereignty and law. here is to be noted , that every magistrate may recall his own commandment , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in the presence of the sovereign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war. the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the managing of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war. matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deal with neighbors . the diligence to vent their designs . the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administration of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldom or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that do front upon other princes , or were lately 〈◊〉 hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oft-tentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority do include equity , and from their censure be no appeal ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the rince ; for as to call the judges into question , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seat ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject : in this case therefore the prince cannot do more than by his wisdom to make choice of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly , he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supreme power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and do confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to levy treasure are four. first , the customs and impositions upon all forts of merchandize and traffick is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all supersluous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be exammed . touching the matter of custom and impost thereof , assuredly a great prosit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the traffick into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainments and donaries , with small difficulty to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people do think to increase his treasure or revenue , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching war. whatsoever prince or common-weale is neighbour to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are sudden and unlook'd for ; yea , the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other ways imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war. chap xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decipher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . is he do desire to live peaceably withal , then he is to observe these rules ( viz ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations . secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well believed with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and chiefly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise so require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elsewhere , which oft-times hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like occasion . how to prevent their designs . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle war is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a princes profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithful , the other not so assured . these matters are well to be considered ; for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbors . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the ways to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happeneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation , by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and believe that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despair by famine , or extream dearth of victual , chiefly for want of corn , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supreme governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facilede credenza , desioso de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale che vorra governare , e non esser governato da altro ; he della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive of them election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better : minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam quaeritur . tac. the chief and only endeavour of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects , as contrariwise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people : civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz. ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to govern his life : rex eris si recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed : facile imperium in bonos . plaut . subjects are made good by two means ( viz. ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined : quicquid faciunt principes , praecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemency are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth : this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : jus & aequit as vincula civitatum . cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also , to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind of men which in ages more ancient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis foelices olim fuere futuraeque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained : qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani bonum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed , as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a quality not common in fortunate folk , and most rare in princes : superbia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be known of princes , and all others whom favor or fortune have advanced : impone faelicitati tua fraenos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the majesty appertaining to their supreme honor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no less beseeming a prince than vertue it self ; for neither over-much famili-arity , nor too great austerity , ought to be used by princes : facilit as autoritatem , severit as amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; thereby also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a prince's nature than bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality : perdere multi sciunt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also , among other vertues , necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiesly in matters of state and government : prudentia imperant is propria & unica virtus . arist. the success of all worldly proceedings , doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more than force of arms or other power : mens una 〈◊〉 plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for whoso can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others inform , ought to be accounted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta videbit , sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti hesiod . chap. xiv . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest commendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behoveth princes to be assisted : magna negotia , adjutoribus egent . tac. the assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for experience hath proved , that common-weales have prospered so long as good counsel did govern , but when favor , fear or voluptuousness entered , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or common-wealths , as well in peace as in war ; the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledge ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequently fit for counsel : prudentis proprium munus recte consulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . plato . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceit as is more apt for innovation than orderly government : hebetiores quam acutiores melius remp. administrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our counsellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech , and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion , either for fear or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will , so secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is pertinacy or opiniativeness ; a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceits , as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly , affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be 〈◊〉 or considerately done . lastly , 〈◊〉 seemeth a vice worthy to be 〈◊〉 of all counsellors , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 away both fidelity and 〈◊〉 the principal pillars of all good counsel : pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum , utilitas . tac. to good counsel other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tuto aggredi . pub. another lett to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain : 〈◊〉 pauca recte siunt , circumspectione plurima . thucyd. thirdly , haste is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance : scelera impetu , bona consilia mora valescunt . tac. of ministers of state. having already spoken of counsellors , somewhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had ; first , that they be persons honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue : optimus quisque nobilissimus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good fame ; for that common-weale is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , than is that where his ministers are evil. it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blameless : emitur sola virtute potestas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness , for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms. also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereunto he is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state. wise men have therefore resolved , that those wits which are neither over-haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull , are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nescio quomodo aulica haec comitia affectus dirigit , & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , ita principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently , forgetting the dutiful endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto honoribus & opibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit , and behave himself rather boldly than bashfully : malus minister regii imperii pudor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions , is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledge all to proceed from the prince's bounty and goodness , by which means envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor : haec est conditio regum , casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behoveth all ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of sew words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to govern , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two special things are to be considered ( viz. ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state ; but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived : noscenda natura vulgi , & quibus modis temperanter habeatur . tac. the disposition of men is divers ; some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behoveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kings are not only accompanied with fortune , but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continual diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable , rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and arms are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and arms which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortisication and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbours : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a virtue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceeding of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captibis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum consortibus , sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — meritis . sen. by indulgence likewise , and pricely affability , the love of men is gain'd ; for the multitude desire no more than necessary food and liberty , to use ordinary recreations : vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes virtue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and fear : ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things : ( viz. ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom , and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and security resteth : majest as imperii , salutis tutela . curt. whoso desireth to govern well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as cannot be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris 〈◊〉 as vinicit inanem speciem 〈◊〉 cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desparation : paena ad paucos , metus ad omnes 〈◊〉 cic. to govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient laws in force without change or innovation unless exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needful : nocet interdum prisucs rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity and worthy a wise prince ; else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosum privati hominis nomen supra ( immo & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should belong ; for thereby oft-tentimes they are made insolent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna custodia est , si magna imperio 〈◊〉 esse non sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and strength is attained by these five ways , money , arms , counsel , friends and fortune : but of these the first and most sorcible is money : nihil tam 〈◊〉 quod non expugnari pecunia possit . cic. next to money arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , and to conquer ; for oft-tentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere private est domus , de 〈◊〉 certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsel , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperanda . tac. likewise friends and consederates do greatly increase the virtue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina . adri. the last , yet not the least part of power consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune than virtue : omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal , and partly extenal : by the one i mean the virtues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comely gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a prince venerable , and like unto god : oportet principem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjectures of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly , it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentia tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason , with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed against his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of srength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed ; for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est . salust . the danger of conspiracy proceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and corruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evil affection of men may be oft-tentimes discovered : 1. for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speechees of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oft-tentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds : quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt . lips. 2. punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciatu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly : quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. 3. the third and likeliest desence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; sor never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him : fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia . plin. 4. the last and best bulward to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which proceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good princes : ille erit a latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private prosit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes . hom. to these offenders no punishment is equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friends as foes : proditores etiam in quos anteponunt , invisi sunt . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the virtues and means whereby princes are maintained in authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the chief whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of fear , which the more common it is , the more dangerous : nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae premente metu possit esse diuturna . cic. the causes of fear are punishments , impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behoveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonable incur their suspision : sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint , non minus opinione & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment , imposition and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subjects , unless they be discreetly and modesty used ; for extream and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts favor of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigour in these matters ; therefore it behoveth the prince to be moderate and 〈◊〉 chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice : sit apud 〈◊〉 parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis . sen. but if for security sake the prince be forced to 〈◊〉 let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 nocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . sen. let all punishments also be slowly executed ; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake : non tam ut ipsi pareant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a specil respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein : forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing , equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom : nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem . cic. but in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not : frequens vindicta paucorum odium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at . sen. another means to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions , under which word is comprehended all levies of money , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equal to their own lives : pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut . first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt . tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be sleeced not slead : qui nimis emungit , elicit 〈◊〉 . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people , it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remain them but to use them as spunges : exprimendi post quam biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better than to proceed moderately , and without extremity : ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant . tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude : magnae opes non tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaeruntur . maecaenas . the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people : populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued , or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evil manners and disorders , as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & modestiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lawdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of censors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . universa plebs habeat negotia sua , quibus a malo publico detineatur . salust . excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal house-keeping , banquetting and superfluity in apparel , which things are the mothers of many mischiefs . it also seemeth in some sort perilous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming : nemo nimis excedat , sive amicorum copia , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either 〈◊〉 or pecuniary punishments : censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest means to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . vit 〈◊〉 principis censura perpetua . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered . vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps , si eorum sit patiens . sen. these are the chiefest rules whereby to esehew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk , if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded ; because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing : odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruel , that for love to vertue useth austerity ; which will appear , when he bestoweth bountifully on the good : praemio & poena respublica continetur . solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceit , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proccedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the pland , the feet , the eyes , do by 〈◊〉 obey : vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt . livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the prince's manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince , desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pitifully than justly ; which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in lieu thereof , entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend : facultas faciendi quod euilibet visum , non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible : qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longius consultat . arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those friends do fail , who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to esehew contempt : fato obnoxia virius . plaut . the prince's manners do breed contempt , when he yieldeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth : common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like : mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere . tac. chap. xx. of dissidence and dissimulation in the management of state assairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiesly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed , it behoveth wise men and princes , above others , at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and believing , haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error than a fault , yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be desended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cavendo . cic. notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man : multi fallere docuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by dissidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity , as moved the emperor tiberius to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissimulare the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be used with strangers and enemies ; it also sheweth a certain discretion in magistrates , sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow : doli non sunt doli , nisi astu colas . plaut . this kind of craft , albeit in every mans conceit not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and maglstrates ( the same being used to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used ; neither dare i commend adulation and corruption , though they be often used in court , and are of some learned writers allowed : decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtilty and frauds , contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves , by cavillations and sophistications , to excuse the impiety of their false oaths ; as it is written of lysander , 〈◊〉 talis , viros jurament is circumvenire 〈◊〉 plut. chap. xxi . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes , for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom : duo sunt quibus resp . servatur ; in hostes sortitudo , & domi 〈◊〉 . tac. military knowledge concerneth war , and every war is either forreign or domestical . touching forreign , it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into : sunt enim & belli 〈◊〉 pacis jura , justeque ea non 〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉 gerere debes . livi. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed ; for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , than that all nations should without mercy murder one another : barbaro ritu coedem coede , & sanguinem sanguine expiare . sal. no war therefore is to be made , but such as is just ; and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz. ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the sovereignty resteth , are the just authors of war ; others have no such authority : si quis privatim sine publico scito , pacem bejumve fecerit , capitale esto . plato . wars are of two sortt ; defensive and offensive ; the one to resist , the other to invade ; against desence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sed 〈◊〉 necessariam cum vi vis illat a desenditur . cic. defensive war is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth ; and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents and friends : nullum bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro side aut pro salute . cic. the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends ; for the common obligation of humanc society doth so require : qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in vitio , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for whoso hath been robbed , or spoiled of his lands or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force ; yet so as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein is justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : justum bellum quibus necessarium ; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawsul against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiesly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such war is compulsion and suppression of evil : cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of invasion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of honor or empire , are any lawful causes of war ; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to defence and security : for wise men do take arms to win peace , and in hope of rest they endure travel : it a bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesita videatur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust war , let us speak of temerity and unadvised war , an enterprise worthy discommendation : omnes bellum sumunt facile , oegerrime desinunt ; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & sinis est . sal. a wise 〈◊〉 rince theresore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion , nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any war , as he that is unwilling to oftend , yet of courage enough to desend : nec provoces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war three things are required , money , men and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council , are needsul : theresore a wise prince , before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth : diu apparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , care must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it neither victory nor life can be looked for : qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat , vincitur sine ferro . vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may add hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince sormidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people , where preparation is ever ready to revenge : que desider at pacem , praeparat bellum . cass. by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to desend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horse-men ; the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortisied most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur . tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most meet , and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed : nevertheless the actions of foot-men do seem most certainly executed , chiesly if they be well armed , and skilfully lead ; for so experience hath of late time proved ; besides , that they are of less expence and of greater number : in universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur . tac. having thus proved , that both horse and foot be necessary , let us remember , that unless they be serviceable , great numbers are to small purpose : manibus opus est bello , non mult is nominibus . livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth in good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded : emunt militem , non legunt . livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies , and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken , for commonly they are purgamenta urbium suarum . curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages soldiers endeavored to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot than in martial knowledge : exercitus lingua quam manu promptior , praedator est sociis , & ipsa praeda hostiam . sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make election ; yet will we add , that they must be chosen of natural subjects , for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : their custom likewise is to rob , burn and spoil both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure : ossa vides regum vacuis exsuct a medullis . juven . but the native soldier is faithful and obedient , resolute in fight , loving to his country , and loyal to his prince : gentes quae sub regibus sunt , pro deo colunt . curt. native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do not withstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary : in pace decus , in bello praesidium . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to eschew disordor , as also to save expences . the second kind of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens : odio praesentium & non cupidine mut ationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on horse-back is to them only proper : alas rusticis non tribuo ; in nobilitatem & in divites haec a pauperibus oner a inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five , the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of mind , and their faculty . touching , first , their country , it is a thing apparently proved , that mountainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations , do breed wits well disposed to the war : locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used : facilius est ad virtutem inslraere novos milites , quaem revocare praeteritos . veget. thirdly , the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength than stature : 〈◊〉 est fortes milites esse quam grandes . veget. fourthly , the mind or spirit of a soldier ought to be considered , for that mind which is quick , nimble , bold and confident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope , that loveth honor more than ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred ; for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and orthers trained up in esseminate arts , are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were , in respect of their trade , thought unmeet , so in old time , slaves and masterless-men were repulsed from arms , as persons infamous : sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales domini habere fastidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may suffice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service : paucos viros fortes natura procrear , bona institutione plures reddat industria . veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen , ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word 〈◊〉 importeth nothing else : exercitus dicitur , quod melius fit exercitando varro . order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly on all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct : this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , dela nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers ; for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest and abstinent ; for continency is chiesly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires : degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac. the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vam-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent : viri militiae nati , factis magni , ad verborum linguaeque certamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity : horridum militem esse decet , non coelatum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstincnce is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they ferve , and likewise in their lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage : vivaut cum provincialibus jure civili , nec insolescat animus qui se sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called 〈◊〉 under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches : and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging : necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so pumshment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly ; for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline : milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent . veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice , we will now speak of what quality chieftains and leaders ought to be , for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies : militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine spiritu . curt. a chief or general in war , is either of his own authority chief , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lieutenants , colonels , and indeed all general commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lieutenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise : dubiis bellorum exemplis summae rerum & imperii seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to perform that office ; but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be , ( for plurality of chieftains doth rarely or never work any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise : in bellica praesectura major 〈◊〉 habendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum . arist. the qualities required in a chieftain are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority and fortune : by skill we mean he should be of great knowledge , and long experience , or to make a suffieient captain ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough : qui norit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploandi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus . cic. military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and mind to exercise soldiers as well in fained war as to sight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeris in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdom , they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune than necessity shall inforce ; yet true it is , fools and vulgar folks , that commend or discommend actions according to success , were wont to say , cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think , temerit as praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed , yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have been in their actions unlucky , when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with cic. quod olim maximo , marcello , scipioni , mario & ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem , sed etiam propter fortunam soepius imperia mandata , atque exercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in chieftains , for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceit the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him ; but the chief and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror : dux authoritatem maximam severitate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus 〈◊〉 nulli errantium credatur ignoscere . veget. also experience hath proved , that such chieftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt ; but on the other side , those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will , yet were they ever obeyed : dux sacilis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick , with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed sit for the war , to small or no purpose shall they serve , unles , they be 〈◊〉 by wisdom or good council : mon minus est imperatoris consilio quam vi persicere . tac. council in war is of two sorts , direct council and indirect ; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding , as to lay hold on occasion ; for as in all other humane actions occasion 〈◊〉 of great force : occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success , so fame worketh 〈◊〉 effects in the wars , therefore it 〈◊〉 a captain to be constant , and not 〈◊〉 to believe the vain rumors and report , of men : male imperatur , cum regit vulgus 〈◊〉 suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed , for no man is sooner surprised , than he who feareth least ; also contempt of the enemy hath been occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy : nimia fiducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtful , so doth it import every good captain to be well informed , not only of his own forces but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behoveth him to know the situation of the country , and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known , with the condition and nature of the enemy : impetus acres cunctatione languescunt , aut in persidiam mutantur . tac. temerity in war is also dangerous , sor wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced : in rebus asperis & tenui spe , fortissima quaque consilia tulissima sunt . livi. some wise men , not superstitiously but discreetly , do think prodigious signs from heaven , or on earth , are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned : nam amat benignit as numinis , seu quod merentur homines , seu quod tangitur eorum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait opportunities , and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages , with many other , are gained chiesly by observing of time : quia si in occasionis momento , cujus 〈◊〉 opportunit as , cunct at us paulum fueris , nequicquam mox omissam querare . livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies : amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus . veget. thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadvantages , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horse-back or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible ; likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army : milites vanis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one country or nations , should be ranged together , and above all , to foresee that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the chief slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries : ingens victoriae decus , citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers , as a contrary 〈◊〉 or appearance of fear , will exceedingly amaze and daunt : necesse estad fugam parati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage , that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight : plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty , but proceed moderately , for it shall suffice the victory is thine : clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma fermido . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pillage : saepe obstitit vincentibus pravum inter ipsos certamen , 〈◊〉 hoste spolia consectanda . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been , in times past , of divers grave writers condemned : vir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & clanculum velit oscidere hoslem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable , that stratagems and subtilties may be used in the war , yet with such caution , as the same may stand with fidelity and honor ; for fraud being used , contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is mere treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety : faederatum injuste fallere , impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all crast , cunning and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers : cum justum 〈◊〉 suscipitur , ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit : consice sive dolo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cominus euse . the same is also 〈◊〉 by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used , for the end of every good war is peace ; to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success : res secundae negligentiam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough : and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate : gravissime morsus irritate necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also and honorable quality in him that conquereth ; for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them : in rebus secundis etiam 〈◊〉 duces insolescunt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not only sweet , but also comfortable : pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored : pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tully's advice to be followed : bellum gerendum est ; si bellum omittemus , pace nunquam fruemur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable . to condescend to any base conditions , is unto a princely mind not only great indignity , but also intolerable : cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum . plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true and unseigned ; for all seigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted : pace suspecta tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the ship-master , who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessitati pare , quam ne dil quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy : victores secundae res in miserationem ex ira vertunt . livi. now for as as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may add thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor , profit and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope of great success , yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to listen to peace : decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat , pacem non abnuere , ut sciant omnes te & suscipere juste bellum , & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended : pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , pacem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desparation and peril cometh : maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured than any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : add thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions : in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbe ac violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quid vesper seral , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello bene mutatur . sen. chap. xxiv . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most grievous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable than can be described . non aet as , non dignit as quenquam protegit , quo minus stupra caedibus , & caedes stupris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civil war proceedeth of destiny , for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in se magna 〈◊〉 laetis hinc numinarebus crescendi posuere modum / s / lucan . the second cause is , excess , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparel , banquetting and prodigal spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means are men brought into desperation . rapacissimo cuique ac perditiffimo , non agri aut 〈◊〉 sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise , being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . 〈◊〉 eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it proceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quos vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicis . sen. 1. factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of foreign forces . 2. the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perilous and bloody . nobilium factiones trahunt ad se , & in partes , universum etiam populum . arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon consines , and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in his private family used . semper contentiunculas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inter servos callide serebat , suspectum habens nimiam concordiam orum , metuensque . plut. factions against the nobility , are sometimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown bagdes to be worn , also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecaenas counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a sudden commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculocum remedium , ipsa pericula arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over great mildness in government . non miseriis licentia sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , lascivire magis plebem quam saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitate , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invidem , vetera odere , nova expetunt , odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ring-leaders of the people ; for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculorum , quam ipsis periculis loeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambiguae ancipitia maelunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facile opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oft-tentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiesly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autorit as principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use , art and cunning , either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and promise plausibly . verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceediug the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrific those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate . auferre , trucidare , rapere , falsis nominibus imperium , atque ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promoters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and virtuous men. nobilitas , opes , amissi gestique honores , pro crimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae professores , & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their doininions to their children and postority : so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . adgenerum cereris sine coede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca morte tyranni . juvin . the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of sach a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to dye , than endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration , the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not only perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for therefore present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinotis ejus ultor est , quisquis successerit . tac. the murther of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse than civil war it self . principes bont , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to find faults in the long reign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . proesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orderly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone susficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoined . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed fit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious than presumptuous , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the favor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oft-tentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unsortnately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick , and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what would ; yer who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth . to these we add others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incur danger nor envy : for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms , laws and religion , may not in any well governed state be disjoined ; every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the virtues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of ancient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common than to believe the estate of one man to be better than another ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , than to enjoy his own with rest . the state of princes is good , being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and virtuous , then they incur the backbiting of lewd persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that pallas the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and virtue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men find justice , evil men are punish'd , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschew many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and oft-tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the chief reasons to move war , are , the sustice of the cause , the facillity of success and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men , having escaped one extreme , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extreme , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean. the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror ; yet unless these perils , by some new accident , be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous minds , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , chiefly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddenly executed , are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings , resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to hate the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue ; as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived , if in the election of ministers , they more respect their own particular affection , than the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen , that a principality , by ill means gotten , hath been long enjoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body , soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behoveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites , as for the most part private men can ; for they being always honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good , when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evil. but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment ; the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evil. a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extreme awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him . to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience ; for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governor's will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent and disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equal to the rich ; but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do endeavor to aspire to equal authority . a prince that desireth , by means of his ambassador , to deceive any other price , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestenss , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple , which happily would not , were he privy that his prince's meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those , that by imployment of a third person , would perswade any thing feigned or false . for the performance of conditions of treaty of peace , or league of amity , the promises , vows and oaths of princes are of great effect ; and because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good , as to stand so prepared , as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtful , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delays prolong the time , and so in effect , afford good expectation . the old proverb faith , magistratus virum ostendit ; which is no less true than ancient ; for men in such fortune , are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable , yet is there nothing more dangerous , than overmuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtful , it is always wisdom to feign ignorance , or at least alledge that we believe them not ; for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other than vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success ; attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow resolutions ; and many times account those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented ; for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they endeavor with all hazard ; the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice , because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , chiefly if the benefit be given at such time as no mere motion , but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired , which removed suspition , which assureth us from peril , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences ; but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war , covered with the name of deceitful trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome medicine . the effect of things , and not external show , or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is credible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability ; the reason whereof is , as i suppose , that every man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured , whensoever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly , either in presence or absence , to utter displeasing speech , unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof counsellors are chiesly to consider , are five , the prince's revenue , peace and war , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance : first , it behoveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take counsel be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather incline to that which his own fancy affecteth , because the want of judgment draweth him to take i leasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side , if he that giveth counsel be not faithful , then will he a thousand ways disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled ; yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world , are so variable , and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best ; therefore experience informeth , that the conjectures of the most wise , prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for fear of a future evil , notwithstanding it be greater unless the evil be very near at hand , or certain . for if that do not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived , of the singular vertue and knowledge of any man , although he be indeed ignorant , and far unworthy that account , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceit : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression , as afterwards , without great difficulty , cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition and money , may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find money and meat ; but money and meat cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise general having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed , than twenty commanders of equal authority ; for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely , what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force , ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one days fight ; for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory ; but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained ; yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and find done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion , or order and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such , as will not endeavor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto ; for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed , that hunger and poverty make men industrious ; but good laws inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtle malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no farther design , than a respect or fear to offend ; whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person slattered , is always superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred , that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise , magnanimous and fortunate folk , proud men , and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose , that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shall be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is , in the mean time so to entertain them , as when those storms arise , he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself , by present benefits , to gain the good will of men , when perils are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont , when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or feign occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men , to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise politicians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every common-weal , it behoveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be , when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lye hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience , was not found , until time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it offendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak , not being defended , holdeth himself offended ; the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the same falleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being 〈◊〉 and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find , that in eschewing one inconvenience , we presently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behoveth to have the same fully replenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therewith so weak , that it can neither increase the bounds thereof , nor defend it self . it is therefore necessary , in all our deliberations , to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that as the best ; for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , is he deny both , incurreth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall account him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected , will not acknowledge his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such , as without cause or desert , are aspired to dignity thereby encouraged , they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments they do not a little repent their overweening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think , that the vertue or sufficiency of any man without the favor of the heavens , can advance him ; for as the poet saith , nec velle juvat , potiusve nocet , si fat a repugnant . whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that , the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of wordly things doth daily alter . also to serve aloof , is a thing full of danger and far from reward ; which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his prince's person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this worldly life is like to a voiage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly , learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and virtue . whosoever taketh in hand to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himself of those persons that are enimies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate , as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man , great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom , it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oft-tentimes offend him that heareth it . for self-love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoined . the power of ambition which possesseth the minds of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater than our power , therefore following discontenr and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they had gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one country is ruined , and another inlarged . princes of great power , and chiesly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend little ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consistetd in fonr things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credibe occurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , chiesly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own virtue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each man's troceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of great importance sooner than they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one only man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid , he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated , he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by whose help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles , are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the multitude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles only hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all commonwealths by continual punishing , to hold the minds of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save them selves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant , so to assure the minds of men from furher molestations . the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or country . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , than he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie than is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the , laws and customs , which are 〈◊〉 have been long time obeyed by the to people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , than them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding , is always as much or more than the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , than to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , oft-tentimes becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arrive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therefore desiring to eschew danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken than that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the counsel . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose virtue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what virtue he is ; and not to enterprise any general adventnre , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enter prises commendible and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended than he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter loss of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be followed which defended the lives and liberties of men. whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter , let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever been in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore , and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a sudden answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resolve presently , giving him to understand that denial or delays may breed a perilous and sudden indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous than to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor knowledge so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with theordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the less , and will be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , so shall the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , than doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other men. for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more than himself can learn. among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledge , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two means ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses , to the end he may imitate the one , and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril than preservation ; for whoso laboureth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil. a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to librality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the means to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty , they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamy of opperession ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much considence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that man offended , less respect him whom they love , than him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evil , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the field an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruel : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judge by their eyes , than by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves : it behoveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrifie the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules , which are the cause that men be accounted good ; be being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behoveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil , if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick , in respect of subjects ; the other extrinsick , in respect of forreign potentates , from whom he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well , so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favoured of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrary wise , where the people is generally discontented and hareth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend . when any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof ; for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side , if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou mayest ; for time may occasion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubteth the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth foreign force more than his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valour . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is also to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavour to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa , & it tempole governa . some men have not only desired , but also compassed honour and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfied , as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned , that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of suture gain . therefore merchants , during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domestical expences , but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceit , and 〈◊〉 envy , there is nothing better than a life retired from daily conversation , and chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia 〈◊〉 the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the euemy : neither is victory desired for other purpose than thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak : consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou pass or undergo that 〈◊〉 whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory 〈◊〉 that can 〈◊〉 the enemies power , and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy , notwithstanding he be victored , can still maintain himself , and the spolis and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own losing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he endure the osfence by foes : and being victorious shall be 〈◊〉 to abide the wrong offered by friends ; which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable , because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof may be inferred . that the prince , having in him any generosity , cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subject to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he , to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless , with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labour , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is persuaded that any common-weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same . they which do harm , are such as with sects and partakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and partakings , be maintained . a wise governour therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battle , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage deligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favour to this or that man , and protecting them from magistrates , giving them mony , advancing them unworthily to honour and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , sects , factions and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavouring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labout to be advanced . to persuade or dissuade particular persons , is a matter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevail : but hard and perilous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein fair speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope ; which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valour of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is natural , but the affection we bear to the captain , proceedeth rather from his vertue , than the benefits he hath bestowed . necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choice is left , but either overcome by arms or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an army united , as the reputation os the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valour can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paid ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is paid , and not punished ( offending ) then will he , without respect , become insolent towards his captain ; whereof ensue mutinies , discord , and utter ruin. it is a custom , very honourable , not to promise more than thou wilt assuredly perform : yet true it is , that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest ill-contented ; for men indeed are . not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth ; and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance : besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that fair words alone have power to abuse them , chiefly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way , therefore , is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers . general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humours , the one labouring to command , the other endeavouring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every common-weal , do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions than laws , so soon as one faction is become strong , and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to endure any discommodity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the fear of war draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that peril being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many offend , few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected , but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injurics universal , are with more patience than particular offences endured . all , or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he , that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is , that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine than honest industry , and more subject to bad than good endeavours : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth another , and he that is weakest must always go to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises peril is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , always end with honour , or reward ; also from one peril there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that country where men have more authority than laws : for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for fear to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeal or ignorance take a course of rigour , which being for the present favoured , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto arms , as their uttermost refuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is sorc'd to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envy , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must refrain to enterprise great matters : for great honours being desired of many , it behoveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority , albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envy ( persuading themselves it might be better handled ) endeavour to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of common weals , ambition and desperation are chief ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion , desperation will not , as that cannot endure delays . historians desiring to write the actions of men , onght to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time. in commending or disallowing the actions of men , it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only ; which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , do he well or ill , all isill-taken . the custom of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes than by their ears : which is the cause they allow more of external shew than inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity , deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are ost born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes , or great personages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men , therefore seemeth incorrupt , and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men account worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons , who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is , that the most part of men believe that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction , though it happeneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firm an impression , as albeit many other fail , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of sudden mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevail on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leisure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used ; but when arms are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that euterprise is sit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect ; others projecting for time to come , do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and direct must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet always worthy the noting , that any exterior behaviour , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune no where so much as in those we have known in equal degree with our selves . in all enterprises of war ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , to take the advantage of other mens solly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweal , honourable to themselves , and easie to be effected ; or at least not greatly difficult . also he that persuadeth , is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will 〈◊〉 his own peril ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompany private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will : but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service , assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience ; for the base people are learned in no lesson , only without difference of truth or falshood to slatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious ; for albeit consultation ought to forego action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( which in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great diseretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made prcos of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travel ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is , that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure : for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take part of the peril . in common-wealths where sects or partialities be , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , than of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favour , as persuaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms , nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for 〈◊〉 is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils than blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the. first is , occasion ; the second , the intentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion , nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more 〈◊〉 than our own immoderate 〈◊〉 it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by arislocracies and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to desend themselves with silver and gold. how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparently in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honoured ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the sanctity of their lives failing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war chiefly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the sidelity of the people decayeth , and their mony to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrarywise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valour : yet true it is , that for the most part they account them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humour . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of mony , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or free-will . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honourable fame of his former life : for to be transported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more than great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of crast and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of human actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number , the end and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous than to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular persuasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courage quaileth , as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , chiefly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less than is fit of things present : also to make small account of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the minds of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required : also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but ost-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it sitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedsul , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behaviour shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behaviour appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely 〈◊〉 yet not always proceeding to punishing , but ost contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men , and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend , than to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where mens minds are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honour , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honourable ; but those that are done in countries remote , are more praiseable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to atchieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accounted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make profession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others ; taking that advantage of their ill success : yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , for human imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither counsel nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military , without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily , where mens actions are precisely sitted , there do they live in over-great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each man's power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever , aster mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent , or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigour of the mind , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . young men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honourable than severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe , rather than those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruin and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honour ; yet a modest resusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the prince's strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honours ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other than they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune ( or rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our country , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebus motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness ; yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform , that much better it is , chiefly in arms , to be governed by reason than by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security than victory hoped or expected melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria . liv. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of 〈◊〉 we should thereby judge not only of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such , as the weaker faction doth ever chuse 〈◊〉 to call for aid of strangers , than yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiery : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired , lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , than that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , than to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men only , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he only is to be reputed a man , whose mind cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , not to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he only knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands . and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state. when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous minds do not account of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavours to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of force , worketh his own undoing . all common-wealths alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil ; and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruin ; likewise ruin order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wise men have observed that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that country which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his country . common wealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein he use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them only . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honour , men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , than by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely persormed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , than to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it sollows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and well-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the common-wealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothful , unless by good laws they be forced to labour , so barrenness compels them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragusa and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times , according to such accidents as befel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginnig by lycurgus , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that the policy of sparta continued 800 years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by solon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governed ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offered , that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honours of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority than either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rome expulsed , forthwith arose much mutiny , and could not be suppress'd till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavour to enlarge their dominions , and some others labor only to maintain that estate they antiently possessed . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offendeth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first , that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly , by liberty of accusing , every man hath means to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or calling in foreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucanncve at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . as accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesles to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret , and places of repair , without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitolinus . the only means to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute , to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example , manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violence or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well-disposed , but prefers those persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable : not withstanding for that well-near all men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honourable which in truth is otherwise ; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merits rather infamy than commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon , or agesilaus , rather than dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , than caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellors , than were they that entertained many legions and men of war. example , of all those emperours which reigned after caesar until maximiinus , the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted , who were good emperours . a prince of great knowledge both in arms and wisdom , so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue , yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first than the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valour of romulus was the cause that numa might govern safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he been unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperour of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet , and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grand father than to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , chiefly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies and popular states , where the governours successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state , where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governours . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlike exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlike nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopidas & epaminondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used the exercise of arms. no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valour of some few persons , nor ought to strength of strait places , where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , and metius king of alba , condescended that three of their nobility for either side , chosen should enter combate , and that nation which was victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevailed . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought not withstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatto that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregious act and the fresh memory thereof , called into trial of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitol from the galleys , had no greater reward than a little measure of meal . ingratitude is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousness or suspition are there with infected . example , vespasian proclaimed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his help prevailed against vitellius , in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army , and gave that honour to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first removed from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain , where in disgrace he ended his life . collatinus tarquinius who with the aid of brutus suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub. valerius were banish'd for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , the other because he 〈◊〉 a house upon mount caelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilful or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honour suffer nought by the infamy which evil service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously , if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and virginius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cannae , he was nevertheless pardoned and honourably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , than to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medioes having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosme , being the stronger , as they sorced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar , endeavouring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , chiefly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the romans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirate , by suffering appius claudius to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humour doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honour and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agaria , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man , who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were persuaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be ; yet they were content that certain tribunes should command with like authority ; so was nothing altered in the government , but the governors title , which alone did courent them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honour ; in so much as men of honest minds and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavoured the factions of great men. likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius's self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they stand silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacro , and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the people , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerons it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the decemviri being opprest , the tribunes authorized in their place , endeavoured daily to call in question the most part of the decemviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear , upon other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or to be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavoured to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong , laboured to oppress the people : which humours were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined , that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest numbers , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavour to obtain that honour ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude only one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to persuade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is persuaded , doth promise either profit or honour ; yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loss or disadvantage . example , the romans persuading themselves that the slow proceeding of fabius maximus in the war , was both chargeable and cowardly , required , that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise , when hannibal had divers years reigned in italy , one m. centenius penuta , a man of base birth , yet a soldier of some repute , undertook that if he with such voluntiers as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , than if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , persuading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the frateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . franciso soderini , bishop of voterra , in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont , by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in autwerp , between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some prince's power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the vrienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispense with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less than the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make mony for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the mony into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvelous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrificed ; which done , they vanish'd : which vision , as they divined , prognosticated the general 's death : likewise f. savanarola foretold the coming of king charles viii . into italy : and m. sedigitus , when the gauls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much louder than any man's , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans , when their city was taken and sack'd by the gauls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded , that upon great pain every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for young men having made trial of their valour , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect . example , valerius corvinus , with others , made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well-advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the saguntines . entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the hediai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus 〈◊〉 occasioned charles the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or desaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding . to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courtcously : so as rome grew to such greatness , that the city only could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , than it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred than honoured or inriched the state. a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign war 's with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . example , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent only to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavoured to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not dispossess the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the goths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria , now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is , that mony makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander king of macedon , a multitude of gauls went into greece , and being there arrived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the gauls , before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of mony. likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his mony have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame than effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king ; who being far distant , could not in time succour them : and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnites , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well arm'd and train'd , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , than by invasion to assault his country : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war. example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintus after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassius , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. aemylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his prince's commission , 〈◊〉 and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , than the valour of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the 〈◊〉 of that honour proved his great glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud be come thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft-times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of 〈◊〉 john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracuse died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt they continued until apollonides , a chief captain of syracusa , laid before them , that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the florentines being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon an answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favour full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not to offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favours , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valour of camillus overcome , yielded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome , to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si poenam remittimus ? qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the privernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not only pardoned , but also honoured and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , forcresses , and places of strength , be made for defence , either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject , when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men. example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco sforza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the cause that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , than the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succoured . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologm , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they there with grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelsth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for sight as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen months the french were sorced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates , albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castle , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not only forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their chief city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification is only upon frontiers , or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforza or france . guido ubaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his country , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience be found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him than for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which unieth , is fear war. example , the 〈◊〉 and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a sit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all do mestick anger , and by the valour of their arms , conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurp an estate 〈◊〉 is , first before arms be taken , to become , as it were , an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other ; yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and sometimes the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yielded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the florentines , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation . a great wisdom it is to resrain opprobrious and injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides , a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly 〈◊〉 gabides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within 〈◊〉 days won the city . tiberius gracchus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclaimed in his camp , that no man , upon pain of death , should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest. nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem suimem riam 〈◊〉 likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexander's fury , offered upon honourable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four months alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador , who arriving at tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler , and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword. a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance than himself , ought not to refuse any honourable compositions , chiefly when they are offered ; for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some 〈◊〉 turn to advantage and honour of him that accepts them . example , 〈◊〉 1512. certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banish'd , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniences . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state ; for that the party injured doth oft by indirect means , though with hazard of his country and himself , seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favour of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king. whoso endeavours the alteration of any state must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impugn the ordinance of government newly setled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valour banish'd the traquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever reign in rome ; within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus's son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands . legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and sirm ; so fortifications and frontier-desences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into italy , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians well near without resistance ; his army march'd to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontiers , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno 1513. they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as ost before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approach'd rome , the better they found the country armed and defended . the desire to command sovereignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of tarquinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possess his kingdom , as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a queen than to be the daughter of a king. the violation of ancient laws , orders and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief and only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example , albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the romans to take arms against tarquin ; for he having before that fact of sextus his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility and people , who finding themselves well-governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great riches and honors , than those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want means to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it : example , perrenius the prime favorite of commodus the emperor , conspired his death . plautianus did the like to severus , and sejanus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches and offices , as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their sovereigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared ; neither ought an army of well-train'd soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia 〈◊〉 ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to pharsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad ducem sine exercitu . a captain general commanding an army ought rather to govern with curtesie and mildness , than with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war. to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium valet . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to extream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise ; yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonourable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or ever kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonourable peace with the samnites , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arrived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be only his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonour at all : and fortune so much favoured posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , than was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed , that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at first . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever been noted for their avarice , pride , fury and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not only in ancient times , but also in the time of charles viii . who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa , but having divers times received mony , held them not with standing in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains ; for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof , he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arrived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona he devised cavillations of unkindness whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example , pope julio endeavoured to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli , in which action he thought the aid of the french recessary , and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neutial ; and by divers 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉 them to that 〈◊〉 but not 〈◊〉 any resolute an 〈◊〉 he though 〈◊〉 with those sew 〈◊〉 he had to take his journey to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the venetians 〈◊〉 him they would remain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the french king forthwith sent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as searing the popes 〈◊〉 likewise the tuscans having for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aid of the samnites against the romens , took arms suddenly and 〈◊〉 their request which the samnites 〈◊〉 before denied . when a multitude 〈◊〉 all may not be 〈◊〉 because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest 〈◊〉 were injury to the suflerers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eshew all extremity , mean courses have been anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them wero punisht , and the rest suffered to pass likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot , although the ossence were general ; by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complain'd on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in fear , that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in arms ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince ; otherwise the general incurs great danger . example , 〈◊〉 the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having sought without his 〈◊〉 adthough he had in battle slain 20000 enemies without loss of 200 of his own : and caesar commended his captain 〈◊〉 for having refrain'd to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occasion of utter ruin . example , hieron the first king of sicily in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace ; but his grand-child succeeding , refusing all counsel lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privy-council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a castellan , a captain , or such a one as hath been ambassador : and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes. the two cadelesquires , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three , or four at most , to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maecenas and agrippa ; julius caesar , q. paedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws , or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governours to decree , that ancient laws once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice , where no petition is preferred to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the loerians the custom was , that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his laws , did swear the people of sparta to observe them untilhis return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to return . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue 700 years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , 〈◊〉 all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made ; which suddain and violent proceeding proved so 〈◊〉 that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was disposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the 〈◊〉 not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke . but after his death , and 〈◊〉 the election of 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 new ordinances 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ducal authority . whoso hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for arms , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honoured by the soldiers , sound means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorrain of the crown , being right heir by descent from charlemain . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcan . be of the blood royal and right 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 empire , when the 〈◊〉 line shall fail ; yet it is like that 〈◊〉 chief bassa having the love of the 〈◊〉 will usurp the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in arms , ought upon pain of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer than the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life ; which was the cause of his usurpation of the state. also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer than the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath been in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with consiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banish'd for envy or fear , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banish'd syracusa by dionysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honourable and magnanimous men were wont not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently all injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaining to persons vertuous : example , after the defeat of the roman army upon the river allia , the 〈◊〉 persued the victory even to 〈◊〉 walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any sign of resistance they entred the streets , where all honourable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chair of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli , not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to osfer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , chiesly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking 〈◊〉 disdain struck him with his rod , in requital whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necesssary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses most seasonably be soreseen and rernoved . example , when deognis and 〈◊〉 two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the rommans , many of the nobility that besore disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvelous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of arms , turned their endeavours to the study of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honour due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrariwise all irreverent and undutisul behaviour with great severity punish'd . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field , for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him . it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the sarjeans assraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , sound no means so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own chief minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his favourite seianus : nero , tigellinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george 〈◊〉 caracalla caused all his flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his brother . the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against 〈◊〉 therefore wise princes have not only lest such services quite 〈◊〉 but also most severely punished them . example , the emperor severus put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , not withstanding he were an enemy . likewise vitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forthwith all the princes , nobles , nobility and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is , to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of human glory worketh in the minds not only of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honour and pleasure , to embrace the con templative retired life . example , ramirus king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath king of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57590-e1010 * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . * so henry the fourth of france by putting his courtiers to board-wages was said to make money with his teeth . * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchess of suffolk , prefix'd to mr. latimer's sermons , saith , that lawyers covetousness hath almost devoured england . discipline . tam bene quam male facta praemunt . mart. the arts of empire and mysteries of state discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, grounded on authority and experience, and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. 1692 approx. 253 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 125 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-01 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a57355 wing r155 estc r20812 12404703 ocm 12404703 61345 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57355) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 61345) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 289:11) the arts of empire and mysteries of state discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, grounded on authority and experience, and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. milton, john, 1608-1674. [9], 238, [3] p. printed by g. croom for joseph watts ..., london : 1692. first ed. published in 1658 as: the cabinet-council, containing the chief arts of empire and mysteries of state. cf. bm. advertisements: p. [9] at beginning and p. [1]-[2] at end. reproduction of original in university of michigan libraries. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. monarchy. 2002-01 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2002-01 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2002-04 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2002-04 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2002-05 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the arts of empire , and mysteries of state discabineted . in political and polemical aphorisms , grounded on authority and experience . and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations . by the ever-renowned knight sir walter raleigh , published by john milton esq quis martem tunica tectum , adamantina digne scripserit ? london , printed by g. croom , for joseph watts at the angel in st. paul's church-yard , 1692. to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kind of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in stile to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such pieces . john milton , the principal contents . chap. 1. the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds page 1 chap. 2. of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks and specifical differences p. 3 chap. 3. of monarchies seignioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire p. 6 chap. 4. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them p. 8 chap. 5. of monarchies tyrannical p. 11 chap. 6. of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them p. 12 chap. 7. of councils and counsellors in general p. 17 chap. 8. of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties p. 18 chap. 9. of officers and commissioners , with their respective distinctions p. 21 chap. 10. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections p. 22 chap. 11. observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war p. 24 chap. 12. extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments p. 30 chap. 13. observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor p. 35 chap. 14. of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites p. 41 chap. 15. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment p. 48 chap. 16. of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated p. 51 chap. 17. of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained p. 53 chap. 18. of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes , and ways of prevention or discovery p. 55 chap. 19. of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it p. 58 chap. 20. of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs p. 67 chap. 21. of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline p. 70 chap. 22. of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions p. 83 chap. 23. of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace p. 87 chap. 24. of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof p. 97 chap. 25. a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events p. 107 chap. 26. maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels p. 184 advertisement . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites , printed for j. watts . the arts of empire , and mysteries of state. chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain sovereign government of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , or all common-wealths are either aristocraties , or all common-wealths are either democraties . or a monarchy is that state where the sovereignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocraty , is where some small part of the people have in them as a body corporate , the sovereignty and supreme power of the whole state. a democraty , is where all the people have power and authority sovereign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the sovereignty resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchy , an aristocraty , or popular government . chap. ii. of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power in every publick state , and he is properly and only a sovereign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword. the first mark of sovereignty , is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to bestow all honors and chief offices at his pleasure . the fourth mark of sovereignty is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise , condemned in life , lands , goods or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the prince's absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts , signioril , royal and tyrannical . the diversity of monarchies doth not proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that govern ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the commonwealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to govern popularly . and that monarchy may be said to be governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be found in states aristocratical and popular ; for the one and the other may be both signioril or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a family governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , and the monarch himself obeyeth the laws of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchy signioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince , and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission , but by ancient laws or custom , have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people do not acknowledge any superior but the prince , nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without property in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west-indies . the provinces of this monarchy are allotted to sundry magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchy royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords . and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants , who may not , without just cause , be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain natural love and dutiful respect ; whoso therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficulty , but being conquered , it may easily be maintained ; for the difficulty to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault all the people , and rather trust in his own strength than the aid of the country . but if he can prevail , then one only fear remaineth , which is the prince's posterity , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the prince's race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aid of some mean lords to take his part , and prepare the place where he is to arrive . chap. iv. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . monarchies royal are for the most part ancient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen : such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force , and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchy newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly ancient , then it is with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation , are easily induced to take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact as well upon those subjects that joyned with him , as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england , sicilia and naples to spain . the means to maintain such a monarchy , is , first , to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all laws and customs in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented ; and the rather if that new monarchy , and the ancient dominion of the prince , be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industry and fortune ; in that case the best way is , that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is , to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince . as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend ; for in that case , this rule or maxim shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated , or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppression they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all , to take order that no forreign prince or power do enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or fear , will be ever ready to bring in strangers : and to conclude this matter of principality annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent nighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never to permit any forreign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his chief habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither do they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of war , or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all ways either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meal , then will the prince's fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such , that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending : example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi. of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are , that from private estate have aspired to sovereignty , not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired , have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince : but here is to be noted , that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldom work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aid of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten ; because he is forced to introduce new laws and new orders of government differing from the old , as well for his own security , as confirmation of the government ; for avoiding of which dangers , he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his subjects to obey , or must pray in aid of others : if he can do the first , he needeth not doubt , but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continue ; for albeit a matter of no difficulty , it is to perswade a people ; yet to make them constant , is a work well near impossible . example , theseus , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate , must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other ; which may be done by this means : first , to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbors as possibly he may . thirdly , to compass all designs tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pass either by fraud or force . fourthly , to make himself honored and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly , to be obsequious and liberal to friends , magnanimous and terrible to foes . seventhly , to cass all old and unfaithful bands , and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amity with kings and princes , as they ought reasonably to favor him , or else they would offend ; easily they cannot . example , giovannio , torrigiani , caesar , borgi . the third and last means whereby private persons do aspire to principalities , is not force and violence , but meer good will and favor of men. the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness , because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobility ; for these contrary humors are in all common-wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed , viz. principality , liberty , or licentious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men ; for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforza , alessandro de medici . a prince in this sort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced ; for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great quality , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth : but if the prince be advanced by the people , few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude , is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth ; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men do study not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are principalities . but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors , to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweale power sovereign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they , or the greater part of them had been young men , then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependence of any other prince or commonweale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have been ever most precise , and for that reason , do not admit any cardinal or other clergy-man to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian senate is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the door , cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest. note also that in every state , of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spain , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils , ( viz. ) the council of the indies , the council of spain , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils , ( viz. ) the council privy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conceliers de parlament , and the great council , which they call assemblies du troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in venice , beside the senate and great council , are four councils , ( viz. ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the council of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to one hundred and twenty persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of sixty persons , and hath another privy council of twelve . of councils in democraties . genoua hath three councils : the great council of two hundred , the senate which consisteth of sixty , and the privy council which hath twenty six counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states . the council-privy is most necessary , and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations fit to be published , are in a monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the council privy , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted , that albeit the use and authority of every senate a privy council is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the sovereignty resteth : for if counsellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be sovereigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majesty , which is a thing so sovereign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law. a commissioner is also a person publick , but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two sorts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates : the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces , in war , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the sovereign , magistrates and commissioners . and here is to be noted , that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equal to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making officers of and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz. ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the form and manner how they are made . the first appertaineth to him or them in whom the sovereignty resteth ; the second also belongeth to majesty ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the form and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that do not obey what sovereignty commandeth : for all force of commandment lieth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts ; the one may be called sovereign and absolute , above laws , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to sovereignty and law. here is to be noted , that every magistrate may recall his own commandment , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in the presence of the sovereign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war. the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the managing of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war. matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deal with neighbors . the diligence to vent their designs . the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administration of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldom or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that do front upon other princes , or were lately conquered : hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oft-tentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority do include equity , and from their censure be no appeal ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the prince ; for as to call the judges into question , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seat ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject : in this case therefore the prince cannot do more than by his wisdom to make choice of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly , he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supreme power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and do confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to levy treasure are four. first , the customs and impositions upon all forts of merchandize and traffick is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all superfluous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be examined . touching the matter of custom and impost thereof , assuredly a great profit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the traffick into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainments and donaries , with small difficulty to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people do think to increase his treasure or revenue , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching war. whatsoever prince or common-weale is neighbour to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are sudden and unlook'd for ; yea , the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other ways imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war. chap xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decipher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . if he do desire to live peaceably withal , then he is to observe these rules ( viz. ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations . secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well believed with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and chiefly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise so require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elsewhere , which oft-times hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like occasion . how to prevent their designs . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle war is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a princes profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithful , the other not so assured . these matters are well to be considered ; for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbors . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the ways to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happeneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation , by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and believe that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despair by famine , or extream dearth of victual , and chiefly for want of corn , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supreme governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facile de credenza , desioso de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale chevorra governare , e non esser governato da altro ; he della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive : of them election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better : minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam quaeritur . tac. the chief and only endeavor of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects , as contrariwise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people : civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz. ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to govern his life : rex eris si recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed : facile imperium in bonos . plaut . subjects are made good by two means ( viz. ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined : quicquid faciunt principes , praecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemency are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth : this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : jus & acquit as vincula civitatum . cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also , to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind of men which in ages more ancient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis foelices olim fuere futur acque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained : qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani bonum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed , as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a quality not common in fortunate folk , and most rare in princes : superbia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be known of princes , and all others whom favor or fortune have advanced : impone foelicitati tua fraenos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the majesty appertaining to their supreme honor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no less beseeming a prince than vertue it self ; for neither over-much familiarity , nor too great austerity , ought to be used by princes : facilitas autoritatem , severitas amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; thereby also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a prince's nature than bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality : perdere multi sciunt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also , among other vertues , necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiefly in matters of state and government : prudentia imperantis propria & unica virtus . arist. the success of all worldly proceedings , doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more than force of arms or other power : mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for whoso can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others inform , ought to be accounted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta videbit , sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti . hesiod . chap. xiv . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministres of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest commendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behoveth princes to be assisted : magna negotia , adjutoribus egent . tac. the assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for experience hath proved , that common-weales have prospered so long as good counsel did govern , but when favor , fear or voluptuousness entered , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or common-wealths , as well in peace as in war ; the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledge ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequently fit for counsel : prudentis proprium munus recte consulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . plato . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceit as is more apt for innovation than orderly government : hebetiores quam acutiores melius remp. administrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our counsellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech , and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion , either for fear or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will , so secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is pertinacy or opiniativeness ; a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceits , as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly , affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done . lastly , avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all counsellors , because it driveth away both fidelity and honesty , the principal pillars of all good counsel : pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum , utilit as . tac. to good counsel other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tuto aggredi . pub. another lett to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain : cupiditate pauca recte fiunt , circumspectione plurima . thucyd. thirdly , haste is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance : scelera impetu , bona consilia mora valescunt . tac. of ministers of state. having already spoken of counsellors , somewhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had ; first , that they be persons honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue : optimus quisque nobilissimus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good fame ; for that common-weale is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , than is that where his ministers are evil. it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blameless : emitur sola virtute potestas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness , for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms. also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereunto he is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state. wise men have therefore resolved , that those wits which are neither over-haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull , are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nescio quomodo aulica haec comitia affectus dirigit , & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , ita principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently , forgetting the dutiful endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto honoribus & opibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit , and behave himself rather boldly than bashfully : malus minister regii imperii pudor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions , is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledge all to proceed from the prince's bounty and goodness , by which means envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor : haec est conditio regum , casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behoveth all ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of few words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to govern , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two special things are to be considered ( viz. ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state ; but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived : noscenda natura vulgi , & quibus modis temperanter habeatur . tac. the disposition of men is divers ; some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behoveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kingsare not only accompanied with fortune , but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continual diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable , rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and arms are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and arms which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortification and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbors : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a virtue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceeding of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captibis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum consortibus , sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — meritis . sen. by indulgence likewise , and princely affability , the love of men is gain'd ; for the multitude desire no more than necessary food and liberty , to use ordinary recreations : vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes virtue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and fear : ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things ; ( viz. ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom , and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and security resteth : majest as imperii , salutis tutela . curt. whoso desireth to govern well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as cannot be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris severit as vincit inanem speciem clementiae . cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desparation : poena ad paucos , metus ad omnes perveniat . cic. to govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient laws in force without change or innovation unless exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needful : nocet interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity and worthy a wise prince ; else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosam privati hominis nomen supra ( immo & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should belong ; for thereby oft-tentimes they are made insolent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna custodia est , si magna imperio diuturna esse non sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and strength is attained by these five ways , money , arms , counsel , friends and fortune ; but of these the first and most forcible is money : nihil tam munitum quod non expugnari pecunia possit . cic. next to money arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , and to conquer ; for oft-tentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere privatae est domus , de alienis certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsel , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperanda . tac. likewise friends and confederates do greatly increase the virtue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina . adri. the last , yet not the least part of power consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune than virtue : omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal , and partly external : by the one i mean the virtues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comely gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a prince venerable , and like unto god : oportet principem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjectures of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly , it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentia tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason , with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed against his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of srength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed ; for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est . salust . the danger of conspiracy proceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and corruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evil affection of men may be oft-tentimes discovered : 1. for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speechees of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oft-tentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds : quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt . lips. 2. punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciatu aut praemio cunct a pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly : quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. 3. the third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; for never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him : fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia . plin. 4. the last and best bulward to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which proceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good princes : ille erit a latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes . hom. to these offenders no punishment is equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friends as foes : proditores etiam in quos anteponunt , invisi sunt . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the virtues and means whereby princes are maintained in authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the chief whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of fear , which the more common it is , the more dangerous : nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae premente metu possit esse diuturna . cic. the causes of fear are punishments , impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behoveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonable incur their suspision : sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint , non minus opinione & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment , imposition and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subjects , unless they be discreetly and modestly used ; for extream and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts savor of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigour in these matters ; therefore it behoveth the prince to be moderate and cautelous , chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice : sit apud principem parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis . sen. but if for security sake the prince be forced to punish , let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . sen. let all punishments also be slowly executed ; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake : non tam ut ipsi pareant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a specil respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein : forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing , equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom : nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem . cic. but in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not : frequens vindict a paucorum odium reprimit ; omnium irritat . sen. another means to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions , under which word is comprehended all levies of money , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equal to their own lives : pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut . first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt . tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be fleeced not flead : qui nimis emungit , elicit sanguinem . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people , it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remain them but to use them as spunges : exprimendi post quam biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better than to proceed moderately , and without extremity : ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant . tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude : magnae opes non tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaeruntur . maecaenas . the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner fort of people : populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued , or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evil manners and disorders , as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & modestiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lewdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of censors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . universa plebs habeat negotia sua , quibus a malo publico detineatur . salust . excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal house-keeping , banquetting and superfluity in apparel , which things are the mothers of many mischiefs . it also seemeth in some sort perilous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming : nemo nimis excedat , five amicorum copia , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either ignominy , or pecuniary punishments : censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest means to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . vita principis censura perpetua . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered . vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps , si eorum sit patiens . sen. these are the chiefest rules whereby to eschew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk , if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded ; because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing : odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruel , that for love to vertue useth austerity ; which will appear , when he bestoweth bountifully on the good : praemio & poena respublica continetur . solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceit , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proceedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the hands , the feet , the eyes , do by consent obey : vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt . livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the prince's manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince , desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pitifully than justly ; which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in lieu thereof , entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend : facult as faciendi quod cuilibet visum , non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible : qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longius consultat . arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those friends do fail , who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to eschew contempt : fato obnoxia virtus . plaut . the prince's manners do breed contempt , when he yieldeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth : common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like : mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere . tac. chap. xx. of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiefly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed , it behoveth wise men and princes , above others , at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and believing , haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error than a fault , yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cavendo . cic. notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man : multi fallere docuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity , as moved the emperor tiberius to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissimulare . the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be used with strangers and enemies ; it also sheweth a certain discretion in magistrates , sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow : doli non sunt doli , nisi astu colas . plaut . this kind of craft , albeit in every mans conceit not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and magistrates ( the same being used to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used ; neither dare i commend adulation and corruption , though they be often used in court , and are of some learned writers allowed : decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtilty and frauds , contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves , by cavillations and sophistications , to excuse the impiety of their false oaths ; as it is written of lysander , pueros talis , viros juramentis circumvenire solebat . plut. chap. xxi . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes , for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom : duo sunt quibus resp . servatur ; in hostes fortitudo , & domi concordia . tac. military knowledge concerneth war , and every war is either forreign or domestical . touching forreign , it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into : sunt enim & belli sicut pacis jura , justeque ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes . livi. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed ; for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , than that all nations should without mercy murder one another : barbaro ritu coedem coede , & sanguinem sanguine expiare . sal. no war therefore is to be made , but such as is just ; and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz. ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the sovereignty resteth , are the just authors of war ; others have no such authority : si quis privatim sine publico scito , pacem bejumve fecerit , capitale esto . plato . wars are of two sortt ; defensive and offensive ; the one to resist , the other to invade ; against defence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sed etiam necessarium cum vi vis illat a defenditur . cic. defensive war is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth ; and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents and friends : nullum bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute . cic. the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends ; for the common obligation of humane society doth so require : qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in vitio , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for whoso hath been robbed , or spoiled of his lands or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force ; yet so as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein if justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : justum bellum quibus necessarium ; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawful against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such war is compulsion and suppression of evil : cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of invasion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of honor or empire , are any lawful causes of war ; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to defence and security : for wise men do take arms to win peace , and in hope of rest they endure travel : it a bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesit a videatur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust war , let us speak of temerity and unadvised war , an enterprise worthy discommendation : omnes bellum sumunt facile , agerrime desinunt ; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est . sal. a wise i rince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion , nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any war , as he that is unwilling to offend , yet of courage enough to defend : nec provoces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war three things are required , money , men and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council , are needful : therefore a wise prince , before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth : diu apparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , care must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it neither victory nor life can be looked for : qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat , vincitur sine ferro . vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may add hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince formidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people , where preparation is ever ready to revenge : qui desiderat pacem , praeparat bellum . cass. by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to defend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horse-men ; the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortified most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur . tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most meet , and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed : nevertheless the actions of foot-men do seem most certainly executed , chiefly if they be well armed , and skilfully lead ; for so experience hath of late time proved ; besides , that they are of less expence and of greater number : in universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur . tac. having thus proved , that both horse and foot be necessary , let us remember , that unless they be serviceable , great numbers are to small purpose : manibus opus est bello , non multis nominibus . livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth in good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded : emunt militem , non legunt . livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies , and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken , for commonly they are purgament a urbium suarum . curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages soldiers endeavored to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot than in martial knowledge : exercitus lingua quam manu promptior , praedator est sociis , & ipsa praeda hostiam . sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make election ; yet will we add , that they must be chosen of natural subjects , for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : their custom likewise is to rob , burn and spoil both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure : ossa vides regum vacuis exsucta medullis . juven . but the native soldier is faithful and obedient , resolute in fight , loving to his country , and loyal to his prince : gentes quae sub regibus sunt , pro deo colunt . curt. native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary : in pace decus , in bello praesidium . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to eschew disorder , as also to save expences . the second kind of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens : odio praesentium & non cupidine mutationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on horse-back is to them only proper : alas rusticis non tribuo ; in nobilitatem & in divites haeo a pauperibus onera inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five , the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of mind , and their faculty . touching , first , their country , it is a thing apparently proved , that mountainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations , do breed wits well disposed to the war : locorum asperit as hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used : facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites , quaem revocare praeteritos . veget. thirdly , the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength than stature : utilius est fortes milites esse quam grandes . veget. fourthly , the mind or spirit of a soldier ought to be considered , for that mind which is quick , nimble , bold and confident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope , that loveth honor more than ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred ; for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and others trained up in effeminate arts , are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were , in respect of their trade , thought unmeet , so in old time , slaves and masterless-men were repulsed from arms , as persons infamous : sed nunc tales sociantur armis quaeles domini habere fastidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may suffice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service : paucos viros fortes natura procreat , bona institutione plures reddat industria . veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word exercitium importeth nothing else : exercitus dicitur , quod melius fit exercitando varro . order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly on all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct : this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , de la nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers ; for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest and abstinent ; for continency is chiefly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires : degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac. the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vain-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent : viri militiae nati , factis magni , ad verborum linguaeque certamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity : horridum militem esse decet , non coelatum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstinence is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they serve , and likewise in their lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage : vivant cum provincialibus jure civili , nec insolescat animus qui se sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called example , under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches : and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging : necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so punishment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly ; for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline : milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent . veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice , we will now speak of what quality chieftains and leaders ought to be , for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies : militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine spiritu . curt. a chief or general in war , is either of his own authority chief , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lieutenants , colonels , and indeed all general commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lieutenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise : dubiis bellorum exemplis summae rerum & imperii seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to perform that office ; but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be , ( for plurality of chieftains doth rarely or never work any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise : in bellica praefectura major aspectus habendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum . arist. the qualities required in a chiestain are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority and fortune : by skill we mean he should be of great knowledge , and long experience , or to make a sufficient captain ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough : qui norit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploandi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus . cic. military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and mind to exercise soldiers as well in fained war as to fight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeris in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdom , they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune than necessity shall inforce ; yet true it is , fools and vulgar folks , that commend or discommend actions according to success , were wont to say , cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think , temeritas praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed , yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have been in their actions unlucky , when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with cic. quod olim maximo , marcello , scipioni , mario & ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem , sed etiam propter fortunam soepius imperia mandata , atque exercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in chieftains , for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceit the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him ; but the chief and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror : dux authoritatem maximam severitate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet , nulli errantium credatur ignoscere . veget. also experience hath proved , that such chieftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt ; but on the other side , those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will , yet were they ever obeyed : dux facitis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick , with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed fit for the war , to small or no purpose shall they serve , unless they be imployed by wisdom or good council : mon minus est imperatoris consilio quam vi persicere . tac. council in war is of two sorts , direct council and indirect ; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding , as to lay hold on occasion ; for as in all other humane actions occasion is of great force : occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success , so fame worketh great effects in the wars , therefore it behoveth a captain to be constant , and not apt to believe the vain rumors and reports of men : male imperatur , cum regit vulgus duces suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed , for no man is sooner surprised , than he who feareth least ; also contempt of the enemy hath been occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy : nimia fiducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtful , so doth it import every good captain to be well informed , not only of his own forces but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behoveth him to know the situation of the country , and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known , with the condition and nature of the enemy : impetus acres cunctatione languescunt , aut in perfidiam mutantur . tac. temerity in war is also dangerous , for wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced : in rehus asperis & tenui spe , fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt . livi. some wise men , not superstitiously but discreetly , do think prodigious signs from heaven , or on earth , are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned : nam amat benignitas numinis , seu quod merentur homines , seu quod tangitur eorum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait opportunities , and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages , with many other , are gained chiefly by observing of time : quia si in occasionis momento , cujus praetervolat opportunitas , cunctatus paulum fueris , nequicquam mox omissam querare . livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies : amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus . veget. thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadvantages , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horse-back or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible ; likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army : milites vanis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one country or nations , should be ranged together , and above all , to foresee that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the chief slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries : ingens victoriae decus , citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers , as a contrary countenance or appearance of fear , will exceedingly amaze and daunt : necesse estad fugam parati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage , that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight : plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty , but proceed moderately , for it shall suffice the victory is thine : clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma fermido . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pillage : saepe obstitit vincentibus pravum inter ipsos certamen , omisso hoste spolia consectanda . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been , in times past , of divers grave writers condemned : vir nemo mentis altae clanculum velit occidere hostem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable , that stratagems and subtilties may be used in the war , yet with such caution , as the same may stand with fidelity and honor ; for fraud being used , contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is mere treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety : faederatum injuste fallere , impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all craft , cunning and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers : cum justum bellum suscipitur , ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit : confice sive dolo seu stricto cominus euse . the same is also affirmed by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used , for the end of every good war is peace ; to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success : res secundae negligentiam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough : and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate : gravissime mor sus irritate necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also an honorable quality in him that conquereth ; for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them : in rebus secundis etiam egregii duces insolescunt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not only sweet , but also comfortable : pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored : pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tully's advice to be followed : bellum gerendum est ; si bellum omittemus , pace nunquam fruemur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable . to condescend to any base conditions , is unto a princely mind not only great indignity , but also intolerable : cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum . plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true and unfeigned ; for all feigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted : pace suspect a tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the ship-master , who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessitati pare , quam ne dii quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy : victores secundae res in miserationem ex ira vertunt . livi. now for as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may add thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor , profit and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope of great success , yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to listen to peace : decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat , pacem non abnuere , ut sciant omnes te & suscipere juste bellum , & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended : pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , pacem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desparation and peril cometh : maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured than any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : add thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions : in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbe ac violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quid vesper ferat , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello bene mutatur . sen. chap. xxiv . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most grievous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable than can be described . non aetas , non dignitas quenquam protegit , quo minus stuprà caedibus , & caedes stupris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civil war proceedeth of destiny , for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in se magna ruunt : laetis hinc numina rebus crescendi posuere modum — lucan . the second cause is , excess , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparel , banquetting and prodigal spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means are men brought into desperation . rapacissimo cuique ac perditiffimo , non agri aut faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise , being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . certis eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it proceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quos vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicis . sen. 1. factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of foreign forces . 2. the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perilous and bloody . nobilium factiones trahunt ad se , & in partes , universum etiam populum . arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon confines , and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in his private family used . semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callide serebat , suspectum habens nimiam concordiam orum , metuensque . plut. factions against the nobility , are sometimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown bagdes to be worn , also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecaenas counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a sudden commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculocum remedium , ipsa pericula arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over great mildness in government . non miseriis licentia sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , lascivire magis plebem quam saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitate , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invidem , vetera odere , nova expetunt , odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ring-leaders of the people ; for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculorum , quam ipsis periculis loeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambiguae ancipitia maelunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facile opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oft-tentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autorit as principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use , art and cunning , either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and promise plausibly . verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceediug the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate . auferre , trucidare , rapere , falsis nominibus imperium , at que ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promoters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious . persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and virtuous men. nobilitas , opes , amissi gestique honores , procrimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae professores , & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their dominions to their children and posterity : so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . adgenerum cereris sine ceede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca morte tyranni . juvin . the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to dye , than endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration , the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not only perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for therefore present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinoris ejus ultor est , quisquis successerit . tac. the murther of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse than civil war it self . principes boni , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to find faults in the long reign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . praesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orderly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone sufficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoined . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed sit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious than presumptuous , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the favor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oft-tentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unfortnately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick , and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what would ; yer who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth . to these we add others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incur danger nor envy : for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms , laws and religion , may not in any well governed state be disjoined ; every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the virtues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of ancient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common than to believe the estate of one man to be better than another ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , than to enjoy his own with rest . the state of princes is good , being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and virtuous , then they incur the backbiting of lewd persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that pallas the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and virtue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men find justice , evil men are punish'd , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschew many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and oft-tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the chief reasons to move war , are , the justice of the cause , the facillity of success , and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men , having escaped one extreme , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extreme , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean. the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror ; yet unless these perils , by some new accident , be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous minds , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , chiefly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddenly executed , are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings , resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to hate the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue ; as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived , if in the election of ministers , they more respect their own particular affection , than the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen , that a principality , by ill means gotten , hath been long enjoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body , soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behoveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites , as for the most part private men can ; for they being always honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good , when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evil. but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment ; the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evil. a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extreme awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him . to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience ; for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governor's will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent and disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equal to the rich ; but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do endeavor to aspire to equal authority . a prince that desireth , by means of his ambassador , to deceive any other prince , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple , which happily would not , were he privy that his prince's meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those , that by imployment of a third person , would perswade any thing feigned or false . for the performance of conditions of treaty of peace , or league of amity , the promises , vows and oaths of princes are of great effect ; and because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good , as to stand so prepared , as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtful , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delays prolong the time , and so in effect , afford good expectation . the old proverb saith , magistratus virum ostendit ; which is no less true than ancient ; for men in such fortune , are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable , yet is there nothing more dangerous , than overmuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtful , it is always wisdom to feign ignorance , or at least alledge that we believe them not ; for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other than vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success ; attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow resolutions ; and many times account those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented ; for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they endeavor with all hazard ; the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice , because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , chiefly if the benefit be given at such time as no mere motion , but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired , which removed suspition , which assureth us from peril , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences ; but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war , covered with the name of deceitful trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome medicine . the effect of things , and not external show , or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is credible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability ; the reason whereof is , as i suppose , that every man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured , whensoever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly , either in presence or absence , to utter displeasing speech , unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof counsellors are chiefly to consider , are five , the prince's revenue , peace and war , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance : first , it behoveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take counsel be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather incline to that which his own fancy affecteth , because the want of judgment draweth him to take pleasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side , if he that giveth counsel be not faithful , then will he a thousand ways disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled ; yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world , are so variable , and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best ; theresore experience informeth , that the conjectures of the most wise , prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for fear of a future evil , notwithstanding it be greater unless the evil be very near at hand , or certain . for if that do not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived , of the singular vertue and knowledge of any man , although he be indeed ignorant , and far unworthy that account , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceit : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression , as afterwards , without great difficulty , cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition and money , may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find money and meat ; but money and meat cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise general having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed , than twenty commanders of equal authority ; for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely , what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force , ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one days fight ; for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory ; but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained ; yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and find done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion , or order and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such , as will not endeavor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto ; for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed , that hunger and poverty make men industrious ; but good laws inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtle malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no farther design , than a respect or fear to offend ; whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person flattered , is always superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred , that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise , magnanimous and fortunate folk , proud men , and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose , that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shall be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is , in the mean time so to entertain them , as when those storms arise , he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself , by present benefits , to gain the good will of men , when perils are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont , when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or feign occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men , to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise politicians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every common-weal , it behoveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be , when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lye hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience , was not found , until time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it offendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak , not being defended , holdeth himself offended ; the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the same falleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being spent , and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find , that in eschewing one inconvenience , we presently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behoveth to have the same fully replenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therewith so weak , that it can neither increase the bounds thereof , nor defend it self . it is therefore necessary , in all our deliberations , to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that as the best ; for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , if he deny both , incurreth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall account him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected , will not acknowledge his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such , as without cause or desert , are aspired to dignity thereby encouraged , they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments they do not a little repent their overweening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think , that the vertue or sufficiency of any man without the favor of the heavens , can advance him ; for as the poet saith , nec velle javat , potiusve nocet , si fata repugnant . whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that , the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of wordly things doth daily alter . also to serve aloof , is a thing full of danger and far from reward ; which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his prince's person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this worldly life is like to a voiage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly , learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and virtue . whosoever taketh in hand to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himself of those persons that are enimies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate , as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man , great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oft-ten-times offend him that heareth it . for self-love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoined . the power of ambition which possesseth the minds of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater than our power , therefore following discontent and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they had gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one country is ruined , and another inlarged . princes of great power , and chiefly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend little ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consistetd in fonr things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credibe occurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , chiefly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own virtue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each man's proceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of great importance sooner than they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one only man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid , he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated , he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by whose help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles , are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the multitude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles only hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all commonwealths by continual punishing , to hold the minds of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save themselves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant , so to assure the minds of men from further molestations . the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or country . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , than he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie than is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the laws and customs , which are ancient and have been long time obeyed by the people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , than them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding , is always as much or more than the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , than to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , oft-tentimes becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arrive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therefore desiring to eschew danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken than that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the counsel . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose virtue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what virtue he is ; and not to enterprise any general adventure , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enterprises commendible and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended than he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter loss of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be followed which defended the lives and liberties of men. whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter , let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever been in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore , and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a sudden answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resolve presently , giving him to understand that denial or delays may breed a perilous and sudden indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous than to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor knowledge so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with the ordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the less , and will be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , so shall the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , than doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other men. for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more than himself can learn. among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledge , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two means ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses , to the end he may imitate the one , and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril than preservation ; for whoso laboureth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil. a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to librality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the means to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty , they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamy of oppression ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that man offended , less respect him whom they love , than him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evil , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the field an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruel : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judge by their eyes , than by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves : it behoveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrifie the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules , which are the cause that men be accounted good ; he being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behoveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil , if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick , in respect of subjects ; the other extrinsick , in respect of forreign potentates , from whom he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well , so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favoured of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrary wise , where the people is generally discontented and hateth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend . when any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof ; for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side , if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou mayest ; for time may occasion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubteth the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth foreign force more than his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valour . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is also to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavour to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa , & il tempole governa . some men have not only desired , but also compassed honour and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfied , as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned , that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of future gain . therefore merchants , during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domestical expences , but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceit , and eschew envy , there is nothing better than a life retired from daily conversation , and chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi . the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory desired for other purpose than thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak : consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou pass or undergo that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory enriched , that can oppress the enemies power , and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy , notwithstanding he be victored , can still maintain himself , and the spoils and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own losing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he endure the offence by foes : and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by friends ; which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable , because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof may be inferred , that the prince , having in him any generosity , cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subject to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he , to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless , with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labour , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is persuaded that any common weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same . they which do harm , are such as with sects and partakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and partakings , be maintained . a wise governour therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battle , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage diligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favour to this or that man , and protecting them from magistrates , giving them mony , advancing them unworthily to honour and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , sects , factions and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavouring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labour to be advanced . to persuade or dissuade particular persons , is a matter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevail : but hard and perilous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein fair speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope ; which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valour of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is natural , but the affection we bear to the captain , proceedeth rather from his vertue , than the benefits he hath bestowed . necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choice is left , but either overcome by arms or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an army united , as the reputation of the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valour can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paid ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is paid , and not punished ( offending ) then will he , without respect , become insolent towards his captain ; whereof ensue mutinies , discord , and utter ruin. it is a custom , very honourable , not to promise more than thou wilt assuredly perform : yet true it is , that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest ill-contented ; for men indeed are not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth ; and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance : besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that fair words alone have power to abuse them , chiefly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way , therefore , is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humours , the one labouring to command , the other endeavouring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every common-weal , do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions than laws , so soon as one faction is become strong , and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to endure any discommodity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the fear of war draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that peril being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many offend , few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected , but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injuries universal , are with more patience than particular offences endured . all , or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he , that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is , that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine than honest industry , and more subject to bad than good endeavours : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth another , and he that is weakest must always go to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises peril is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , always end with honour , or reward ; also from one peril there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that country where men have more authority than laws : for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for fear to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeal or ignorance take a course of rigour , which being for the present favoured , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto arms , as their uttermost resuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is forc'd to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envy , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must refrain to enterprise great matters : for great honours being desired of many , it behoveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority , albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envy ( persuading themselves it might be better handled ) endeavour to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of common weals , ambition and desperation are chief ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion , desperation will not , as that cannot endure delays . historians desiring to write the actions of men , onght to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time. in commending or disallowing the actions of men , it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only ; which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , do he well or ill , all isill-taken . the custom of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes than by their ears : which is the cause they allow more of external shew than inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity , deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are oft born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes , or great personages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men , therefore seemeth incorrupt , and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men account worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons , who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is , that the most part of men believe that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction , though it happeneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firm an impression , as albeit many other fail , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of sudden mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevail on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leisure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used ; but when arms are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect ; others projecting for time to come , do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and direct must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet always worthy the noting , that any exterior behaviour , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune no where so much as in those we have known in equal degree with our selves . in all enterprises of war ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , to take the advantage of other mens folly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweal , honourable to themselves , and easie to be effected ; or at least not greatly difficult . also he that persuadeth , is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will joyn his own peril ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompany private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will : but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service , assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience ; for the base people are learned in no lesson , only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious ; for albeit consultation ought to forego action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( which in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great discretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made proof of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travel ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is , that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure . for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take part of the peril . in common-wealths where sects or partialities be , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , than of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favour , as persuaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms , nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for seldom is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils than blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the first is , occasion ; the second , the intentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion , nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more nocent than our own immoderate desires . it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by aristocracies and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to defend themselves with silver and gold. how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparently in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honoured ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the sanctity of their lives failing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war chiefly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth , and their mony to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrarywise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valour : yet true it is , that for the most part they account them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humour . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of mony , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or free-will . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honourable fame of his former life : for to be transported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more than great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of human actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number , the end and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous than to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular persuasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courage quaileth , as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , chiefly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less than is fit of things present : also to make small account of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the minds of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required : also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but oft-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it fitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedful , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behaviour shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behaviour appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely corrected ; yet not always proceeding to punishing , but oft contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men , and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend , than to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where mens minds are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honour , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honourable ; but those that are done in countries remote , are more praiseable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to archieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accounted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make profession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others ; taking that advantage of their ill success : yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , nor human imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither counsel nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military , without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily , where mens actions are precisely fitted , there do they live in over-great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each man's power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever , after mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent , or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigour of the mind , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . young men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honourable than severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe , rather than those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruin and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honour ; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the prince's strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honours ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other than they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune ( or rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our country , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebus motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness ; yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform , that much better it is , chiefly in arms , to be governed by reason than by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security than victory hoped or expected . melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria . liv. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of wisdom , we should thereby judge not only of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such , as the weaker faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers , than yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiety : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired , lest over-much familiarity should derract from the reverencc due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , than that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , than to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men only , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he only is to be reputed a man , whose mind cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , not to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he only knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands , and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state. when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous minds do not account of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavours to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of force , worketh his own undoing . all common-wealths alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil ; and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruin ; likewise ruin order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wisemen have observed that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that country which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his country . common-wealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein he use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them only . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honour , men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , than by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely performed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , than to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it follows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and well-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the common-wealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothful , unless by good laws they be forced to labour , so barrenness compels them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragusa and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times , according to such accidents as besel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginning by lycurgus , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that the policy of sparta continued 800 years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by solon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governed ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offered , that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honours of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority than either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rome expulsed , forth with arose much mutiny , and could not be suppress'd till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavour to enlarge their dominions , and some others labor only to maintain that estate they antiently possessed . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offend eth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first , that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly , by liberty of accusing , every man hath means to utter the offence where with he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or calling in foreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucanncve at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . as accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret , and places of repair , without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitolinus . the only means to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute , to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example , manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violence or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well-disposed , but prefers those persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable : notwithstanding for that well-near all men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honourable which in truth is otherwise : they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merits rather infamy than commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon , or agesilaus , rather than dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , than caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellors , than were they that entertained many legions and men of war. example , of all those emperours which reigned after caesar until maximiinus , the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted , who were good emperours . a prince of great knowledge both in arms and wisdom , so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue , yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first than the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valour of romulus was the cause that numa might govern safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he been unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperour of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet , and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grand father than to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , chiesly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies and popular states , where the governours successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state , where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governours . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlike exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlike nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopidas & epaminondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used the exercise of arms. no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valour of some few persons , nor ought to strength of strait places , where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , and metius king of alba , condescended that three of their nobility for either side , chosen should enter combate , and that nation which was victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevailed . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought not withstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatio that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregious act and the fresh memory thereof , called into trial of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitol from the galleys , had no greater reward than a little measure of meal . ingratitude is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousness or suspition are therewith infected . example , vespasian proclaimed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his help prevailed against vitellius , in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army , and gave that honour to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first removed from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain , where in disgrace he ended his life . collatinus tarquinius who with the aid of brutus suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub. valerius were banish'd for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , the other because he built a house upon mount coelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilful or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honour suffer nought by the infamy which evil service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously , if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and virginius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cannae , he was nevertheless pardoned and honourably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , than to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medices having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosme , being the stronger , as they forced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar , endeavouring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , chiefly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the romans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirate , by suffering appius claudius to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humour doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honour and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agaria , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man , who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were persuaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be ; yet they were content that certain tribunes should command with like authority ; so was nothing altered in the government , but the governors title , which alone did content them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honour ; in so much as men of honest minds and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavoured the factions of great men. likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius's self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they stand silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacro , and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the people , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerons it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the decemviri being opprest , the tribunes authorized in their place , endeavoured daily to call in question the most part of the decemviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear , upon other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or to be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavoured to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong , laboured to oppress the people : which humours were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined , that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest number , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavour to obtain that honour ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude only one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to persuade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is persuaded , doth promise either profit or honour ; yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loss or disadvantage . example , the romans persuading themselves that the slow proceedings of fabius maximus in the war , was both chargeable and cowardly , required , that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise , when hannibal had divers years reigned in italy , one m. centenius penula , a man of base birth , yet a soldier of some repute , undertook that if he with such voluntiers as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , than if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , persuading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the frateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . francisco soderini , bishop of voterra , in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont , by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in antwerp , between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some prince's power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the urienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispense with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less than the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make mony for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the mony into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvelous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrificed ; which done , they vanish'd : which vision , as they divined , prognosticated the general 's death : likewise f. savanarola foretold the coming of king charles viii . into italy : and m. sedigitus , when the gauls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much louder than any man's , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans , when their city was taken and sack'd by the gauls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded , that upon great pain every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for young men having made trial of their valour , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well-governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect . example , valerius corvinus , with others , made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well-advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate . to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the saguntines entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the hediai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus sforza occasioned charles the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or defaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding . to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously : so as rome grew to such greatness , that the city only could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , than it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred than honoured or inriched the state. a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign wars with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . example , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent only to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavoured to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not disposses the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the goths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria , now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is , that mony makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander king of macedon , a multitude of gauls went into greece , and being there arrived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the gauls , before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of mony. likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his mony have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame than effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king ; who being far distant , could not in time succour them : and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnites , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well arm'd and train'd , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , than by invasion to assault his country : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war. example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintus after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassius , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. aemylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his prince's commission , counsel , and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , than the valour of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the refusal of that honour proved his great glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud be come thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft-times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of syracusa ; john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracuse died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt they continued until apollondies , a chief captain of syracusa , laid before them , that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the flcrentines being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon an answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favour full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not to offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favours , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valour of camillus overcome , yielded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome , to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si poenam remittimus ? qualem nos patem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the privernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not only pardoned , but also honoured and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , fortresses , and places of strength , be made for defence , either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject , when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men. example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco sforza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the cause that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , than the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succoured . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologna , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they therewith grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelfth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for sight as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen months the french were forced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates , albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castle , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not only forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their chief city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification is only upon frontiers , or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforza or france . guido ubaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his country , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience he found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him than for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which uniteth , is fear and war. example , the vejenti and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a fit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all domestick anger , and by the valour of their arms , conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius , defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurp an estate disjoynted is , first before arms be taken , to become , as it were , an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other ; yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and sometimes the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yielded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the florentines , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation . a great wisdom it is to refrain opprobrious and injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides , a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly offended gabides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within few days won the city . tiberius gracchus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclaimed in his camp , that no man , upon pain of death , should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest. nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinquunt . likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexander's fury , offered upon honourable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four months alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador , who arriving at tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler , and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword. a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance than himself , ought not to refuse any honourable compositions , chiefly when they are offered ; for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some sort turn to advantage and honour of him that accepts them . example , anno 1512. certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banish'd , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniences . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state ; for that the party injured doth oft by indirect means , though with hazard of his country and himself , seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favour of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king. whoso endeavours the alteration of any state must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impugn the ordinance of government newly setled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valour banish'd the tarquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever reign in rome ; within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus's son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands , legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm ; so fortifications and frontier-defences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into italy , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians well near without resistance ; his army march'd to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontiers , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno 1513. they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as oft before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approach'd rome , the better they found the country armed and defended . the desire to command sovereignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of tarquinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possess his kingdom , as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a queen than to be the daughter of a king. the violation of ancient laws , orders and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief and only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example , albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the romans to take arms against tarquin ; for he having before that fact of sextus his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility and people , who finding themselves well-governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great riches and honors , than those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want means to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it : example , perrenius the prime favorite of commodus the emperor , conspired his death . plautianus did the like to severus , and sejanus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches and offices , as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their sovereigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared ; neither ought an army of well-train'd soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to pharsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad ducem fine exercitu . a captain-general commanding an army ought rather to govern with curtesie and mildness , than with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war. to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium valet . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to extream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise ; yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonourable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or ever kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonourable peace with the samnites , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arrived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be only his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonour at all : and fortune so much favoured posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , than was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed , that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at first . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever been noted for their avarice , pride , fury and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not only in ancient times , but also in the time of charles viii . who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa , but having divers times received mony , held them notwithstanding in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains ; for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof , he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arrived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona he devised cavillations of unkindness whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example , pope julio endeavoured to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli , in which action he thought the aid of the french necessary , and that the venetians should stand neutral ; and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect ; but not receiving any resolute answer , he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to bologna , whereupon the venetians advertised him they would remain neutral , and the french king forthwith sent him forces , as fearing the popes indignation ; likewise the tuscans having formerly desired aid of the samnites against the romans , took arms suddenly and obtained their request which the samnites had before denied . when a multitude offendeth , all may not be punish'd , because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest unpunish'd , were injury to the sufferers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eschew all extremity , mean courses have been anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them were punisht , and the rest suffered to pass : likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot , although the offence were general ; by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complain'd on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in fear , that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in arms ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince ; otherwise the general incurs great danger . example , papyrius the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having fought without his consent , although he had in battle slain 20000 enemies without loss of 200 of his own ; and caesar commended his captain silanus for having refrain'd to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occasion of utter ruin . example , hieron the first king of sicily in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace ; but his grand-child succeeding , refusing all counsel lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privv-council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a castellan , a captain , or such a one as hath been ambassador : and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes. the two cadelesquires , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three , or four at most , to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maecenas and agrippa ; julius caesar , q. paedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws , or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governours to decree , that ancient laws once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice , where no petition is preferred to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the locrians the custom was , that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his laws , did swear the people of sparta to observe them untilhis return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to return . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue 700 years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made ; which suddain and violent proceeding proved so fatal , that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was disposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the venetians not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke : but after his death , and before the election of lovedono , the signiory publisht new ordinances detractive from the ducal authority . whose hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for arms , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honoured by the soldiers , found means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorrain of the crown , being right heir by descent from charlemain . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcani be of the blood royal and right heirs to the turkish empire , when the ottoman line shall fail ; yet it is like that the chief bassa having the love of the janisaries will usurp the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in arms , ought upon pain of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer than the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life ; which was the cause of his usurpation of the state. also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer than the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath been in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with confiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banish'd for envy or fear , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banish'd syracusa by dionysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honourable and magnanimous men were wont not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently all injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaining to persons vertuous : example , after the defeat of the roman army upon the river allia , the galli persued the victory even to rome's walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any sign of resistance they entred the streets , where all honourable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chair of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli , not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , chiefly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking great disdain struck him with his rod , in requital whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necesssary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses most seasonably be foreseen and removed . example , when deognis and carneades , two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the romans , many of the nobility that before disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvelous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of arms , turned their endeavours to the study of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honour due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrariwise all irreverent and undutiful behaviour with great severity punish'd . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field , for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him . it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the serjeans affraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , found no means so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own chief minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his fa vourite seianus : nero , tigellinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george preston ; caracalla caused all his flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his brother . the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself . therefore wise princes have not only left such services quite unrecompenced , but also most severely punished them . example , the emperor sever●● put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , notwithstanding he were an enemy . likewise uitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forth with all the princes , nobles , nobility and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is , to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of human glory worketh in the minds not only of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honour and pleasure , to embrace the con templative retired life . example , ramirus king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath king of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . books printed for , and sold by joseph watts at the angel in st. paul's church-yard , viz. the history of ireland from the conquest thereof by the english to this present time , in two parts : by the honourable richard cox , esq one of the present judges for that kingdom . folio . the right honourable the marquis of carmarthen's state of his case . folio . his answer to the examination of the state of his case . folio . his answer to sir robert howard's book . folio . his reply to some libels lately printed . folio . tryal of the lord russel . folio . character of a popish successor . folio . the world's mistake in oliver cromwel : by sl. bethel , esq quarto . satyr against hypocrites . quarto . no protestant plot , 1st . 2d . and 3d. parts . quarto . diarry of his majesty's expedition into england . quarto . hunton's treatise of monarchy , in two parts . quarto . the earl of rochester's funeral sermon . quarto . the present settlement vindicated , and the late mis-government proved . quarto . rushworth's historical collections from 1618. to 1629. james's corruption of popish father's counsels , &c. octavo . the true nature of the divine law , &c. octavo . reformed devotions , in meditations , hymns and petitions , for every day in the week . twelves . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites . octavo . an earnest invitation to the sacrament : by dr. glanvill . twelves . at which place may be had acts of parliament , proclamations , declarations , orders of king and council , speeches in parliament ; choice pamphlets , both ancient and new ; tryals , narratives and gazzetts . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57355-e1080 * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . * so henry the fourth of france by putting his courtiers to board-wages was said to make money with his teeth . * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchess of suffolk , prefix'd to mr. latimer's sermons , saith , that lawyers covetousness hath almost devoured england . discipline . tam bene quam male facta praemunt . mart. the cabinet-council containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire and mysteries of state : discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms grounded on authority, and experience : and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a57360 of text r8392 in the english short title catalog (wing r156). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 262 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 105 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a57360 wing r156 estc r8392 12381382 ocm 12381382 60768 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57360) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 60768) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 224:20) the cabinet-council containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire and mysteries of state : discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms grounded on authority, and experience : and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. milton, john, 1608-1674. [9], 199 p. : port. printed by tho. newcomb for tho. johnson ..., london : 1658. first ed., with "to the reader" signed: john milton. cf. nuc pre-1956. published in 1661 as: aphorisms of state, grounded on authority and experience; in 1692 as: the arts of empire, and mysteries of state discabineted; in 1697 as: the secrets of government, and misteries of state. for other issues under different titles see: brushfield, t.n. bibliography of sir walter raleigh, 1908, [no.] 268. reproduction of original in yale university library. eng political science -early works to 1800. monarchy -early works to 1800. a57360 r8392 (wing r156). civilwar no the cabinet-council: containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire, and mysteries of state; discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, g raleigh, walter, sir 1658 44499 652 0 0 0 0 0 147 f the rate of 147 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2005-10 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2005-11 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2006-01 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2006-01 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2006-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion tam marti , quam mercurio . the true and lively portraiture of the hoble. and learned knight sr. walter ralegh . ro : vaughan sculp : the cabinet-council : containing the cheif arts of empire , and mysteries of state ; discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms , grounded on authority , and experience ; and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations . by the ever-renowned knight , sir walter raleigh , published by john milton , esq ; quis martem tunicâ tectum adamantinâ dignè scripserit ? london , printed by tho. newcomb for tho. johnson at the sign of the key in st. pauls churchyard , near the west-end . 1658. to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kinde of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in stile to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such peices . john milton . the principal contents . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weals and soveraign states , according to their several species or kindes . pag. 1. chap. 2. of soveraign or monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . pag. 2. chap. 3. of monarchies seigniorile , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . pag. 5. chap. 4. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . pag. 7. chap. 5. of monarchies tyrannical . pag. 9. chap. 6. of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . pag. 10. chap. 7. of councils and counsellors in general . pag. 14. chap. 8. of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties . pag. 15. chap. 9. of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . pag. 17. chap. 10. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . pag. 18. chap. 11. observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure , and war . p. 20. chap. 12. extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments . pag. 24. chap. 13. observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . pag. 28. chap. 14. of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . pag. 32. chap. 15. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . pag. 38. chap. 16. of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . pag. 40. chap. 17. of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . p. 42. chap. 18. of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . pag. 44. chap. 19. of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . pag. 47. chap. 20. of diffidence and dissimulation in the mannage of state affairs . pag. 54. chap. 21. of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers , and military discipline . pag. 56. chap. 22. of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . pag. 67. chap. 23. of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace . pag. 71. chap. 24. of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . pag. 80. chap. 25. a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . pag. 88. chap. 26. maximes of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels . pag. 153. the cabinet council : containing the chief arts of empire , and mysteries of state . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and soveraign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain soveraign government of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , aristocraties , democraties . a monarchie is that state where the soveraignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocratie , is where some small part of the people have in the● as a body corporate , the soveraignty and supream power of the whole state . a democrati● , is where all the people have power and authority soveraign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the soveraigntie resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchie , an aristocratie , or popular government . chap. ii. of soveraign or monarchick government , with its essential markes , and specifical differences . soveraigntie is an absolute and perpetual power in every publike state and he is properly and only a soveraign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword . the first mark of soveraigntie is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to bestow all honors and cheif offices at his pleasure . the fourth marke of soveraigntie is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise condemned in life , lands , goods , or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the princes absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts signioril , royal , tyrannical . the diver●●tie of monarchies doth no● proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that governe ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the common wealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies , honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to governe popularly . and that monarchy may be said to b● governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be found in states aristocratical and popular : for the one and the other may be both signioril , or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a familie governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , and the monarch himself obeyeth the lawes of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves , and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchie signioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission but by antient lawes or custom have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law , or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people doe not acknowledg any superior but the prince● nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without propertie in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west indies . the provinces of this monarchie are allotted to sundrie magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchie royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords● and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants who may not without just cause be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain naturall love and dutifull respect : who so therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficultie ; but being conquered , it may easily be maintained for the difficultie to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault , all the people , and rather trust in his own strength then the aide of the country . but if he can prevaile , then one only feare remaineth , which is the princes posteritie , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the princes race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aide of some mean lords to take his part , and prepar the place where he is to arrive . chap. iiii. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintaine them . monarchies royal , are for the most part antient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , ●and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen● such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force ; and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchie newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly antient , then is it with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation are easily induced ●o take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact aswell upon those subjects that joyned with him as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england : sicilia and naples to spain● . the means to maintain such a monarchie ; is● first to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all lawes and customes in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented : and the rather if that new monarchie and the antient dominion of the prince be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industrie and fortune : in that case the best way is that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince : as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend : for in that case , this rule or maxime shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated● or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppre●●ion they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all to take order that no forraign prince or power doe enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or feare , will be ever readie to bring in strangers ; and to conclude this matter of principalitie annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent neighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never , to permit any forraign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his cheif habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither doe they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of warr , or else by some other indirect meanes do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all wayes either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be exe●nted at leasure and by piece-meale , then will the princes fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending ; example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi . of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are that from private estate have aspired to soveraignty not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince ; but here is to be noted that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldome work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aide of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten : because he is forced to introduce new lawes and new orders of government differing from the old , aswell for his own security , as confirmation of the government : for avoiding of which dangers he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compell his subjects to obey , or must pray in aide of others ; if he can doe the first , he needeth not doubt ; but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continue● for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people , yet to make them constant , is a work well neer impossible . example , thes●us , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate● must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other : which may be done by this means ; first ; to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may . thirdly to compass all designes tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pas● either by fraud or force : fourthly , to make himself honoured and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly to be obsequious & liberal to frinds , magnanimous & terrible to foes . seventhly , to c●sse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amitie with kings and princes , as they ought reasonablie to favor him● or else they would offend ; easily they cannot● example , giovannie , torrigiani , caesar borgi● . the third and last meanes whereby private persons doe aspire to principalities , is not force and violence● but meer good-will and favor of men . the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue , or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness ; because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobilitie ; for these contrary humors are in all common wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three ef●ects doe proceed , viz. principalitie , ●iberty , or licencious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men : for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforz● , alessandro de medici . a prince in this ●ort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced : for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great qualitie , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth ; but if the prince be advanced by the people● few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the nobilitie preferreth : for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men doe studie not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are p●incipalities , but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon weale power soveraign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed the●● councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men , then might the council have more properly bin called a juvenate then a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependance of any other prince or common-weale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have bin ever most precise , and for that reason , doe not admit any cardinal or other clergieman to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian sena●e is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the dore cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest . ] note also that in every state of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spaine , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils ( viz ) the council of the indies , the council of spaine , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils ( viz ) the council privy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conc●liers de parlament , and the great council which they call assemblei d● troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in v●nice beside the senate and great council are four councils ( viz ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the co●ncil of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to 120 persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of 60 persons , and hath another privie council of 12. of councils in democraties . genoua hath 3 councils● the great council of 200 , the senate which consisteth of 60 , and the privie council which hath 26 counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states , the council-privie is most necessarie and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations ●it ●o be published , are in a monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the council privie , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted that albeit the use an● authorit● of ever● senate and privie councel is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the soveraignty resteth ; for if councellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be soveraigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majestie , which is a thing so soveraign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law . a commissioner is also a person publick● but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two ●orts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates ; the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces● in warr , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the soveraign , magistrates , and commissioners . and here is to be noted that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equall to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making of officers and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the forme and manner how they are made . the first appertaineth to him or them in whom the soveraigntie resteth ; the second also belongeth to majestie ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the forme and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that doe not obey what soveraigntie commandeth : for all force of commandment lyeth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts : the one may be called soveraign and absolute , above lawes , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to soveraignty and law . here is to be noted that every magistrate may recall his own commandement , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in presence of the soveraign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equall cannot doe any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure , and warr . the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the mannaging of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war . matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deale with neighbours . the diligence to vent their designes● the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administratio● of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldome or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that doe front upon other princes , or were lately conquered : hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oftentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority doe include equity , and from their censure be no appeale ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the prince ; for as to call the judges into q●estion , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seate ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject ; in this case therefore the prince cannot doe more then by his wisdom to make choise of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supream power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and doe confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to leavie treasure are four . first , the customs and impositions upon all sorts of merchandize and traffique is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all super●luous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be examined . touching the matter of custom and impost , thereof assuredly a great profit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the trafficke into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing then a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainmens and donaries , with small difficultie to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people doe think to increase his treasure or revenew , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazzard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching warr . whatsoever prince or common weale is neighbor to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are suddain and unlookt for ; yea the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other waies imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war . chap. xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deale with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designes , and decypher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be diverse according to the diversitie of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise ●e is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . if he do desire to live peaceably with all , then he is to observe these rules ( viz. ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well bele●ved with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and cheifly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding , and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise s● require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elswhere , which ofttimes hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like ●ccasion . how to prevent their designes . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle warr is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a prin●●s profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithfull , the other not so assured these matters are well to be considered● for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more then curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbours . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the waies to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and beleive that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despaire by famine or extream dearth of victual , and chiefly for want of corne , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supream governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facil●de credenz● , desi●s● de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale chevorra governare , e non e●●er governato da altr● ; ●e della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive : of them , election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better ; minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam qu●eritur . tac. the chief and only endeavor of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects ; as contrarywise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people . civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to governe his life●rex eris●●i recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed ; facile imperium in bonos . plaut. subjects are made good by two meanes ( viz ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined ; quiquid faciunt principes , pr●ecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemencie are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth ; this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : ●us & ●equitas vincula civitatum : cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind ●f men which in ages more antient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis ●oelices olim fuer● futur●eque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained ; qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani ●onum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed● as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a qualitie not common in fortunate folk ; and most rare in princes . super●ia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride , and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be ●nown of princes , and all others whom ●avor or fortune have advanced : impone ●oelicitati t●●e fr●enos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the the majesty appertaining to their supream ●onor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no lesse beseeming a ●rince then vertue it self ; for neither overmuch familiarity , nor too great austeritie ●ought to be used by princes : facilitas ●ntoritatem , severitas amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; there●y also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a princes nature then bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality ; perdere multi sci●nt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also among other vertues necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiefly in matters of state and government . prudentia imperantis propria et unica virtus . arist. the success of all wordly proceeding● doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more then force of arms or other power●mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for who so can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others informe , ought to be accompted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta vid●bit , sed laudandus est is qui paret rectè monenti . hesiod . chap. xiiii . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest ●ommendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behooveth princes to be assisted : magna negocia , adjutoribus egent . tac. these assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for , experience hath proved that common weals have prospered so long as good counsell did governe , but when favor , fear , or voluptuosness entred , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or commonwealths , as well in peace as in war : the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledg ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequen●●y fit for counsel ; prudentis proprium m●nus rectè con●ulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience , and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . pla●● . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceipt as is more apt for innovation then orderly government . hebet ●ores quàm acutiores meliùs remp. a●ministrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our councellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty , and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech and magnanimus uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to varie in opinion , either for feare or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will ; so secrecy is the best and most secure meanes to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab ●o qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is ●ertinacy or opiniativeness , a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceipts as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done . lastly avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all counsellors because it driveth away both fidelity and honesty , the principall pillars of all good counsell : pessimum veri affectus et judicii venenum● utilitas . tac. to good counsell other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsells do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behovefull to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tutò aggredi . pub. an other let to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain . cupiditate pauca rectè fiunt , circumspectione plurima : thucyd. thirdly haste , is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance . scelera impetu , bona consilia morâ vales●unt . tac. of ministers of state . having already spoken of counsellors , somwhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had , first that they be person honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue ; optimus quisque nobilismus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good ●ame ; for that common-weal is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , then is that where his ministers are evill . it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blamelesse . emitur sola virtute p●testas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms . also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereuntoh e is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state . vvise men have therefore resolved that those witts which are neither over haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nesci● quomodo aulica hae● comitia affect us dirigit , et fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , it a principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently forgetting the dutifull endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto ●onoribus et ●pibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit and behave himself rather boldly then bashfully : malus minister regi● imperii p●dor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions ; is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledg all to proceed from the princes bounty and goodness , by which meanes envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor . haec est conditio regum , casus tantum advers●s hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behooveth a●l ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of few words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv . the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to governe , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two speciall things are to be considered ( viz ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state● but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived ; noscenda natura vulgi , et quibus modis temperanter hab●atur . tac. the disposition of divers men is , some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behooveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kings are not only accompanied with fortune● but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continuall diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusq●e dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable● rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and armes are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and armes which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortification and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbors : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a vertue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceedi●g of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captabis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum c●n●ortibus , sive de te ben● ac fortiter — meritis . sen. by ●ndulgence likewise and princely affability the love of men is gained ; for the multitude desire no more then necessary food , and liberty to use ordinary recreation●●vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes vertue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and ●ear●ingenita quibusdam gentibus ergareges ●uos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things ; ( viz ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom● and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and ●ecurity resteth : majest as imperii , salut●s ●utela . curt. whoso desireth to governe well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy , and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as canno● be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris s●veritas vincit inanem speciem clementiae . cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desperation : poena ad paucos , metus ad omnes perveniat . cic. to governe constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and antient laws in force without change or innovation unles exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needfull ; nocet interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity ●nd worthy a wise prince● else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosum privati hominis nomen supra ( immó & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should be long● for thereby oftentimes they are made in●olent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna imperia diuturna sse n● sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and stength is attained by these ●ive ways , mony , armes , counsell , friends and fortune ; but of these the first and most ' forcible is mony : nihil tam munitum quod non exp●gnari pecuni● possit . cic. next to mony armes are of most use , as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , as to conquer ; for oftentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere privatae est domus , de alie●is certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsell , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperan●a . tac. likewise friends and confederates do greatly increase the vertue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina : adri . the last , yet not the least part of power , consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune then vertue . omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal● and partly external ; by the one i mean the vertues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comly gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a princk venerable , and like unto god ; oportet principem res divinas videri curare seri● & ant● omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjecture of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly ; it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentiâ tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed again●t his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of strength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed● for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula n●que praevidere n q●e vitare in promptu ●st . salust . the danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and coruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evill affection of men may be oftentimes discovered : 1. for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speeches of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oftentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds . quoniam raro nisi male loqunti male faciunt . lips . 2. punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciaiu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly . quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. 3. the third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; for never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewde as will endeavor to hurt him . fidelissima custodia principis ipsius in●ocentia . pli● . 4. the last and best bulwark to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which preceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good pri●ces . ille erit à latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum n● capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men , dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava strue●tes . hom. to these offenders no punishment as equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friend as foes : proditores etiam in quos antepo●unt , invisi s●●t . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the vertues and means whereby princes are maintained ●n authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the cheif whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of feare , which the more common it is , the more dangerous●nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae prement● met● possit esse di●turna● cic. the causes of feare are punishments impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behooveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonably incur their suspition . sentias enim homines ut metuant a●t oderint , ●non minus opinio●e & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment● imposition , and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subiects , unless they be discreetly and modestly used ; for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts ●avour of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigor in these matters ; therefore it behooveth the prince to be moderate and cautelous , chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice . sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis . sen. but if for securitie sake the prince be forced to punish , let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . s●n . let all punishments also be slowly executed● for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital● punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake . non ●am ut ipsi pereant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a special respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein . formarabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom . nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem● cic. but in punishing publick offences wherei● a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not . frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit , omnium irritat . sen. another meanes to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions under which word is comprehended all levies of mony , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equall to their own lives . pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut. first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt , tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be fleeced not flead . qui nimis emungit , elicit sanguin●m . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remaine them but to use them as spunges , exprimendi post qu●m biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better then to proceed moderately , and without extremity . ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremò corpora servitio aut poenae tradant , tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude . magnae opes no● tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaerunt●r . maecaenas● the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people . populus maximam fidem rerum suarum hab●t . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued● or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evill manners , and disorders as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & mod●stiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lewdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of ●ensors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . vniversa plebs habeat neg●tia sua , quibus àmal● publico detineatur . salust excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal housekeeping , banqueting , and superfluitie in apparrel , which things are the mothers of many mischeifs . it also seemeth in some sort perillous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming . nemo nimis excedat , sive amicorum copiâ , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either ignom●ny , or pecuniarie punishments , censoris judicium d●mnato nihil affert nis● ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest meanes to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . ●ita principis censura perpetu● . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures doe proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered●vitia quaedam tol●it facilius princeps , si eorum sit p● ti●n● . sen. these are the cheifest rules whereby to eschew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk : if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded : because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing . odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruell that for love to vertue useth austeritie : which wil appear when he bestoweth bountif●lly on the good . praemio & ●oena respublica continetur solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceipt , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proceedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the hands , the feet , the eyes , do by consent obey . vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the princes manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pittifully then justly : which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in liew thereof entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend ; facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum , non p●test comprimere ingenitam si●gulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible ; qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longi●s consultat● arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those fri●nds do fail who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to eschew contempt . fato obnoxia virtus . pl●ut . the princes manners do breed contempt , when he yeildeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth● common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like . mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahe●e . tac. chap. xx . of diffidence and dissimulation in the mannage of state affairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiefly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed it behooveth wise men and princes above others at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and beleiving haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error then a fault ; yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cav●ndo . ci● . notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man . multi faller● d●cuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity as moved the emperor tiberi●● to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissim●lare . the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be u●ed with strangers and enemies : it also sheweth a certain di●cretion in magistrates sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow . do●i non sunt d●li , nisi ast● colas . plaut. this kind of craf● albeit in every mans conceipt not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and magistrates ( the same being ●sed to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used : neither dare i commend adulation and corruption ; though they be often used in court and are of some learned writers allowed . decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtiltie and frauds contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves by cavillations and sophistications to excuse the impiety o● their false oathes : as it is written of lysander , pueros ●●lis , viros juramentis circumvenire solebat . plut. chap. xxi . of warr defensive and invasive : with instructions touching laws of armes , soldiers , and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes ; for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom . duo sunt quibus resp● servatur ; in hostes fortitudo , & domi concordia . tac. military knowledge concerneth warr , and every warr is either forreign or domestical . touching forriegn it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is , to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into . sunt enim & belli sicut pacis jura , j●st●que ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes . liv. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed : for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , then that all nations should without mercy murder one another ; barbarority coe●em coede , & sanguinem sangnine expiare . sal● no warr therefore is to be made but such as is just . and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the soveraignty resteth , are the just author● of warr : others have no such authority . si quis privatim si●e public● s●ito , pacem bellumve feceri● , capitale esto . plat● . warrs are of two sorts : defensive and offensive● the one to resist , the other to invade● against defence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sedetiam nec●ssarium cum vi vis illata defendi●ur . cic. defensive warr is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth : and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents , and friends . nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fid● aut pro salute . c●c . the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends : for the common obligation of humane society doth so require . qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in viti● , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for who so hath bin robbed , or spoiled of his lands , or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force : yet so● as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein if justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : ●ustum bellum quib●s necessarium ; & pia arm● quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawfull against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such warr is compulsion and suppression of evil . cui lioenti● iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of in●asion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of ●onor or empire , are any lawful causes of ●ar ; but the intent thereof ought to be ●irected onely to def●nce and security : for ●ise men do take arms to win peace , and ●n hope of rest they endure travel . ita bil●um suscipiatur u● nihil aliud quam pax ●uaesita vid●atur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust ●ar , let us speak of temerity and unad●ised war , an enterprise worthy discom●endation . omnes bellum sumunt facil● , ●gerrimè de●inunt : n●c in ejusdem pot●state in●tium & finis est . sal. a wise prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion nor without sober and mature deliberation enter ●nto any war , as he that is unwilling to offend , yet of courage e●ough to defend . nec pr●voces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war , three things are required . money , men , and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council are needful : therefore a wise prince before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth . diu ●pparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , car● must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it , neither victory nor life can be looked for . qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praepar●t , vincitur sine ferro● vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may adde hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince formidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge . qui de●iderat pacem , praeparat bellum● ca●● . by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to defend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horsemen● the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortified most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur , tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most ●eet , and the execution of any enterprise ●s by them most speedily performed : ne●ertheless the actions of ●ootmen do seem more certainly executed , chiefly if they be well armed , and skilfully led ; for so ex●erience hath of late time proved ; be●ides , ●hat they are of less expence and of greater ●umber . in universum aestimanti plus in ●edite robur● tac. having thus proved , that both horse and ●oot be necessary ; let us remember , that ●nless they be serviceable● great numbers ●re to small purpose . manibus opus est bello , ●on multis nominibus , livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth ●n good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded . emunt mili●em , non legunt , livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies ; and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken ; for commonly they are purgamenta urbium suarum , curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages , soldiers endeavoured to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot , then in martial knowledge . ex●ercitus lingua quam manu promptior● praedator est sociis , & ipse praeda hostium● sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment o● those that have authority to make election ; yet will we adde , that they must be chosen of natural subjects● for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : thei● custom likewise is to rob , burn , and spoyl both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure . ossa vides regum vacui● ex●ucta medullis● juven. but the native soldier is faithful and obedient● resolute in fight , loving to his countrey , and loyal to his prince . gent●● quae sub regibus s●nt , pro deo col●nt . curt● native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary . in pace decus , in bello prae●idiu● . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to ●schew disorder , as also to save expences . the second kinde of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens . odio praesentium & non cupidine mutationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on hors-back is to them onely proper . alas rusticis non tribu● ; in nobilitatem & in divites haec à pauperibus onera inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five . the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of minde , and their faculty . touching first , the countrey , it is a thing apparently proved , that mouutainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations do breed wits well disposed to the war . locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used . facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites , quàm revocare pr●eteritos . veget. thirdly● the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength then stature : ●t●lius est fo●tes milites ●sse quàm grande● . veget. fourthly , the minde or spirit of a soldier ought to be enosidered ; for that minde which is quick , nimble , bold , and con●ident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope● that loveth honor more then ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turp●m ●amam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred : for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and others trained up in effeminate arts are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were in respect of their trade thought unme●t so in old time , slaves and masterless men were repulsed from arms , as persons in●amous . sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales domini haber●●astidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may su●fice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service . paucos viros fortes natura procreat , b●na institutione plures redda● indu●●ria : veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion , and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen , ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word exerciti●m impor●eth nothing else . exercit●● dic●tur quod melius fit exercitando . varro order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly at all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct . this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , de la nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers : for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest , and abstinent ; for continency is cheifly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires . degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac● the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel , and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vain-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent●viri militiae nati , ●actis magni● ad verborum linguaeque ce●tamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity . horriaum militem esse decet , non cae●atum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstinence is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence , and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they serve , and likewise in ●heir lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage . vivant cum provincialibus ●ure civili● ne● insolescat animus quise sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called example , under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded when●oever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches . and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging . necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium c●nsuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so punishment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly● for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline . milites impe●atorem potius quam hostem metuere debent● veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice● we will now speak of what quality cheiftants and leaders ought to be● for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies . militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine sp●●itu . curte. a ●heif or general in warr , is either of his own authority cheif , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings , and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lievtenants , collonels , and indeed all generall commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lievtenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise . dubiis bellorum ex●mplis summae r●rum & imperi● seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to performe that office : but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be ; ( for plurality of cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise . in b●●lica praefectura major asp●ctus habendus peritiae quam virtutis a●t morum● arist. the quali●ies required in a cheiftaine are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority , and fortune by skill we meane he should be of great knowledge , and long experience or to make a sufficient captai●e ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough . qui ●orit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploa ndi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus● cic● military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exercise soldiers aswell in fained war as to fight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeri● in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdome they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then necessity shal inforce ; yet true it is● fools and vulger● folks that commend or discommend actions according to succeess , were wont to say : cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think ; temeritas praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed ; yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have bin in their actions unlucky ; when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with , cic. quod olim maxmo , marcello , scipi●ni , mari● & ceteris m gnis imperatoribus non solum propter virt●t●m , sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata , atque excercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in cheiftains ; for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him : but the cheif and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror . dux authoritatem maximam ●●veritate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet , nulli errantium credatur ignoscere● v●get . also experience hath proved that such cheiftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt : but on the otherside those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will● yet were they ever obeyed : dux facilis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactik and stratagematik : with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed fit for the warr , to small or no purpose shall they ●erve , unless they be imployed by wisdom or good council . mon minus est imperator is consili● quam vi perficere . tac. council in war is of two sorts ; direct council and indirect ; the f●rst sheweth a plain and orderly course for ●roceeding , as to lay hold on occasion : for as in all other human actions occasion is of great force ; occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success ; so fame worketh great effects in the wars ; therefore it behooveth a captain to be constant , and not apt to beleive the vain rumors and reports of men . mal● imperatur , cum regit vulgus duces suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed ; for no man is sooner surprised , then he who ●eareth le●t : also contempt of the enemy hath bin occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy . nimia ●●ducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull : so doth it import every good captain to be well informed not only of his own forces , but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the country and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the enemy . impetus acres c●nctatione languescunt , aut in perfidiam mutantur . tac. tem●●ty in war is also dangerous ; for wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced . in rebus asperis & tenuispe , fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt . livi. some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from heaven or on earth are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned . nam amat benignitas numini● , seu quod merent●r homine● , seu quod tangitur ●orum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait oportunities and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages with many other , are gained chiefly by observing of time ; quia si in occasionis momento , cuj●s praetervolat o●p●rtunitas● cunctat●s paulum ●●eris , nequicquam mox omissam querare● livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies . amplius prodest locus ●aepè quàm virtus . veget● thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadventures , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horsback or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible : likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army . milites v●nis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one cou●try or nations , should be ranged together , and above all to foresee , that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries . ingens victoriae dec●s , citra domesticum sanguinem ●ellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers ; as a contrary countenance or appearance of fear , will exceedingly maze and dant . necesse estad ●ugam p●rati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage● that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight . plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extteam cruelty , but proceed moderately ; for it shall suffice the victory is thine . ●lausis ex d●speratione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma f●rmid● . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pil●age . saepe obstitit vincentibus ●ravum inter ipsos certamen , omisso hoste spolia consectandi . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been in times past of divers grave writers condemned . vir nemo mentis altae clanculum velit occidere hostem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable : that stratagems and subtilt●es may be used in the war , yet with such caution as the same may stand with fidelity and honor : for fraud being used contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is meer treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety . faederatum injustè fallere impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all craft , cunning , and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers . cum justum bellum suscipitur , ut apertè pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit . confice ●ive dolo seu stricto cominus euse . the same is also affirmed by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used ; for the end of every good war is peace : to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy , and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success . res se●und●● neglig●n●iam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough . and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate . gravissime morsus irrita●ae necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also an honorable quality in him that conquereth : for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them . in rebus secundis etiam ●gregii d●ces insolesc●nt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not onely sweet , but also comfortable , pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored . pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tullies advice to be followed . bellum gerendum est ; ●i bellum omitt●mus , pace n●nquam fr●emur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable● to condiscend to any base conditions , is unto a princely minde not onely great indignity , but also intolerable . cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true , and unfeigned ; for all feigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted . pace suspecta tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the shipmaster , who to save himsel● doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessiiati pare , quam ne dii quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy . victores secundae res in miserationem ex ir● vertunt . livi. now for as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may adde thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor● profit , and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope o● greater success yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to lis●en to peace . decorum principi est cum victoriam propè i● manibus habeat , p●cem no● ab●●ere● ut sciant omnes te & suscipere ju●●è bellum & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended●pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , ●acem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desperation and peril cometh . maximi & mortiferi morsu● esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured then any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : adde thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions . in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbè a● violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quià v●sper ferat , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonable and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello benè mutatur . sen. chap. xxiiii . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most greivous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable then can be described . non at as , non dignitas quenquam protegit , quo minus ●l●pra caedibus , & caedes st●pris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civ●l war proceedeth of destiny for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in s●●agna ruunt : laetis hi●c numina rebus cresen●● p●suere modum — lucan . the second cause is , excesse , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparell● banquetting and prodigall spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means ●re men brought into desperation . rapacissimo ●uique ac perditissim● , non agri aut faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise ; being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loc● stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . certi● eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it preceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quo● vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicit . sen. 1. factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of forrain forces . 2. the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perillous and bloody . n●bilium factiones trah●nt adse , & in partes , universum etiam populum● arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon confines and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in hisprivate family used . semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callidè serebat , s●●pectam habens nimiam c●ncordiam ●rum , m●tuensque . plut. factions amongst the nobility , are somtimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown badges to be worn ; also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecae●as counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & part●s etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a suddain commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculorum remedium , ipsa peric●la arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over-great mildness in government . non ●iseriis sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , las●ivire magis plebem quàm saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitat● , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invident , veter● odere , n●va expetunt , odio rerum suarum m●tari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculor●m , quàm ipsis periculis laeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambigua , ancipitia malunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facilè opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take this office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use art and cunning either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and ●romise plausibly : verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms are laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceeding the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate : auferre , trucidare , raper● , falsis nominibus imperium , atque ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promooters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and vertuous men . nobilitas , opes , amissi g●stique honores , pro crimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all good arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae prof●ssores , & omnes ●onas artes in exiliu● ag●nt . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their dominions to their children● and posterity ; so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . ad generum cereris ●ine ●oede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca ●orte tyranni . juven. the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to die , then endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci ●omines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not onely perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for thereof present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinoris ●jus ultor est , quis●uis successerit . tac. the murder of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse then civil war it self . principes boni , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to finde faults in the long raign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . praesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture , and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness , and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orde●ly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone sufficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoyned . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed fit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious then presumptious , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the ●avor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oftentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unfortunately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what we would ; yet who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over-great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the minde so as it cannot conceive more then that which presently presseth . to these we adde others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incu● danger nor envy ; for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms● laws , and religion , may not in any well governed state be dis-joyned ; for every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the vertues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of antient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common then to believe the estate of one man to be better then an other ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , then to enjoy his own with rest . the state of pri●ces is good● being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich-man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschue the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and vertuous , then they incur the backbiting of leud persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed , is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that palla● the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and vertue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men finde justice , evil men are punished , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschue many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and o●tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the cheif reasons to move war , are , the justice of the cause , the facillity of success , and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to a●commodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men having escaped one extream , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extream , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean . the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror● yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous mindes , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , cheifly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddainly executed are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to ha●e the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue : as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived if in the election of ministers they more respect their own particular affection , then the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incombred then strengthned , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen that a principality by ill means gotten , hath bin long injoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behooveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites● as for the most part private men can : for they being alwaies honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evill . but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment : the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evill . a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extream awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they ne●ther know nor can attempt any thing against him to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience : for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich : but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do indeavor to aspire to equall authority . a prince that desireth by means of his ambassador to deceive an other prince , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple which happily would not , were he privy that his princes meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false . for the performance of conditions in treaty of peace or league of amity , the promises , vowes , and oathes of princes are of great effect ; yet because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good as to stand so prepared as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtfull , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delaies prolong the time and so in place of effect , afford good expectation . the old proverbe ●aith : magistratus virum ostendit : which is no less true then ancient : for men in such fortune are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable ; yet is there nothing more dangerous , then ouermuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtfull , it is alwaies wisdom to fain ignorance , or at least alledge that we beleive then not : for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other then vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success : attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with suddain then slow resolutions ; and many times accompt those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsideratly attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented : for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they indeavor with all hazard : the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice● because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , cheifly if the benefit be given at such time as no meer motion but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired which removeth suspition , which assureth us from perill , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences : but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsom medicine . the effect of things , and not externall show or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is incredible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability : the reason whereof is as i suppose that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured when soever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to doe or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly either in presence or absence to utter displeasing speech unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof councellors are cheifly to consider , be five . the princes revenue , peace and warr , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance . first , it behooveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing council is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take council be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather ●ncline to that which his own fancie affecteth because the want of judgement draweth him to take pleasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side if he that giveth council be not faithfull , then will he a thousand waies disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled : yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world are so variable and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best : therefore experience enformeth , that the conjectures of the most wise prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for feare of a future evill , notwithstanding it be greater , unless the evill be very near at hand , or certain . for if that doe not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived of the singular vertue and knowledge of any●man , although he be indeed ignorant and far unworthy that accompt , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceipt : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression as afterwards without great difficulty cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition , and mony may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find mony and meate : but mony and meate cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise generall having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed then twenty commanders of equall authority : for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one daies fight : for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory : but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained : yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and finde done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion or order , and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such as will not endevor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto : for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed that hunger and poverty make men industrious : but good lawes inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtil malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no further design then a respect or fear to offend . whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person flattered is alwaies superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise magnanimous and fortunate folke , proud men and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shal be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is in the mean time so to entertain them as when those storms arise he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself by present benefits to gain the good will of men , when perills are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or fain occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more carefull of their own weldoing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise polititians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every commonweal it behooveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lie hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience was not found untill time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it oftendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak not being defended , holdeth himself offended : the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the samefalleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being spent , and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find that in eschewing one inconvenience , wepresently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behooveth to have the same fully r●plenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therwith so weake that it can neither increase the bounds therof , nor defend it selfe . it is therfore necessary in all our deliberations to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that , as the best : for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , if he deny both incureth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall accompt him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected will not acknowledg his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such as without cause or desert are aspired to dignity thereby uncouraged they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments , they do not a little repent their over-weening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think th●t the vertue or sufficiencie of any man without the favor of the heavens can advance him ; for as the poet saith , ne● velle juvat , potiúsue nocet , si fata repugnant whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of worldly things doth daily alter . also to serve alooffe , is a thing full of danger and far from reward : which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his princes person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this wordly life is like to a voyage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed passe securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and vertue . whosoever taketh in hand to governe a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himse●f of those persons that are enemies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate● as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it . for self love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow● offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoyned . the power of ambition which possesseth the mindes of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater then our power , thereof followeth discontent and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they have gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one countrey is ruined , and an other inlarged . princes of great power , and cheifly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oftentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in their opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend litle ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consisteth in four things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is a matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credible accurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , cheifly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own vertue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each mans proceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of importance sooner then they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one onely man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid● he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated● he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by wh●se help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles● are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the mul●itude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles onely hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all common-wealths by continual punishing , to hold the mindes of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save themselves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant● so to assure the mindes of men from further molestation●● the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or countrey . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , then he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie then is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the laws and customs , which are antient , and have been long time obeyed by the people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , then them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding● is always as much or more then the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , then to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , often times becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken then that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the council . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose vertue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he is● and not to enterprise any general adventure , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enterprises commendable and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended then he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter losse of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men . whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever bin in in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore and things past or present are no other then such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a suddain answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resove presently , giving him to understand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and suddain indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous then to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to beleeve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor other knowledg so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with the ordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the lesse , and wil be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , ●o shal the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more then a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , then doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discont ntment of other men . for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more then he himself can learn . among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledg , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behooveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two meanes ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses to the end he may imitate the one● and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril then preservation for whoso laboreth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil . a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to liberality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the meanes to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamie of oppression ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that men offended , less respect him whom they love , then him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evill , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the fi●ld an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruell : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judg ; by their eyes , then by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves , it behooveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrify the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules which are the cause that men be accompted good ; he being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behooveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick in respect of subjects , the other extrinsick in respect of forraine potentates , from whom ●he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favored of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrariwise where the people is generally discontented , and hateth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend , w●en any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof : for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou maist ; for time may occ●sion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubtech the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth forreign force more then his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valor . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is al●o to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavor to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa & il tempole governa . some men have not onely desired , but also compassed honor and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfyed as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of future gain . therefore merchants during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domesticall expences● but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy , there is nothing better then a life retired from daily conversation , & chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi● the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neit her is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak ; consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory enriched , that can oppress the enemies power and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself , and the spoyls and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he indure the offence by foes ; and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by friends : which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable ; because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof m●y be inferred , that the prince having in him any generosity cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subjects to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labor , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is perswaded that any common-weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same they which do harm , are such as with sects and pertakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and pertakings be maintained . a wise governor therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battel , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage d●ligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and protecting them from magistrates , giving them money , advancing them unworthily to honor and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , se●●s , factions , and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavoring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labor to be advanced . to perswade or disswade particular persons , is a ma●ter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevaile : but hard and perillous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein faire speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope , which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valor of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is naturall , but the aff●ction we bear to the captain proceedeth rather from his vertue , then the benefits he hath be●●owed● necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choise is left , but either overcome by armes , or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an armie united , as the reputation of the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valor can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paied ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is payed , and not punished ( offending ) then will he without respect become insolent towards his captain● whereof insue mutinies , discord , and utter ruine it is a custom very honorable not to promise more then thou wilt assuredly performe : yet true it is that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest illcontented ; for men indeed are not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth : and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance ; besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that faire words alone have power to abuse them , cheifly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way therefore is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humors , the one laboring to command , the other endevoring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every commonweale do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions then lawes , so soon as one faction is become strong and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to indure any discom●odity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the feare of warr draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that perill being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many of●end few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected● but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injuries universal , are with more patience then particular offences endured . all or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine then honest industrie , and more subject to bad then good endeavors : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth an other , and he that is weakest must alwaies goe to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises perill is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , alwaies end with honor , or reward ; also from one perill there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that county where men have more authority then lawes . for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for feare to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeale or ignorance take a course of rigor , which being for the present favored , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto armes , as their uttermost refuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is forced to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envie , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must re●rain to enterprise great matters : for great honors being desired of many , it behooveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envie ( perswading themselves it might be better handled ) indeavor to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of commonweales , ambition and desperation are cheif ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion ; desperation will not , as that cannot endure delaies . historians desiring to write the actions of men , ought to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time . in commending or disallowing the actions of men it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only , which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , doe he well or ill , all is ill taken . the custome of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes then by their eares : which is the cause they allow more of external shew then inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens è corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are oft born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes or great parsonages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men ; therefore seemeth incorrupt and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men acco●pt worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is that the most part of men beleive that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction though it hapneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firme an impression , as albeit many other faile , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of suddain mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevaile on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leasure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used , but when armes are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect : others projecting for time to come do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders direc●ions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and dsrect must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet alwaies worthy the noting , that any exterior behavior , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves in all enterprises of warr , ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , ●o take the advantage of other mens folly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweale , honorable to themselves , and easy to be effected : or at least not greatly difficult . also he that perswadeth● is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will joyn his own perill ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompanie private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will ; but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph● as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience : for the base people are learned in no lesson● only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious : for albeit consultation ought to foregoe action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( whith in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great discretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made proof of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travell ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure : for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take par● of the peril . in commonwealths where sects or partialities he , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , then of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favor , as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms ; nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for seldom is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the first is , occasion ; the second , the ●ntentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion ; nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate desires . it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by aristocraties and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to defend themselves with silver and gold . how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparantly in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honored ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the ●anctity of their lives ●ailing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war cheifly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth , and their money to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrariwise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valor : yet true it is , that for the most part , they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of money , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or freewil . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honorable fame of his former life : for to be t●ansported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more then great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number● the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous then to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular perswasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courageth quaileth● as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , cheifly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less then is fit of things present : also to make small accompt of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the mindes of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required ; also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but oft-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it fitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedful , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behavior shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behavior appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely corrected ; yet not always proceeding to punishing , but oft contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men ; and be perswaded that it is more honest to offend , then to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be danted with any passed misadventure ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to passwhere mens mindes are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honor , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honorable ; but those that are done in countreys remote , are more praisable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to atchieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accompted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make pro●ession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others , taking that advantage of their ill success ; yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , nor humane imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither council nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily where mens actions are precisely fitted , there do they live in over great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each mans power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever after mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigor of the minde , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . yong men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honorable then severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe rather then those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruine and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honor ; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the princes strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honors ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other then they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune or ( rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our countrey , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired , nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebu● motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness , yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform that much better it is , cheifly in arms , to be governed by reason then by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security then victory hoped or expected . melior tutiorqu●●●rta pax quàm sperata victoria . livi. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of wisdom , we should thereby judge not onely of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such as the weaker faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers , then yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiety : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired● le●t over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , then that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , then to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men onely , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he onely is to be reputed a man , whose minde cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , hot to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most certain it is , that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he onely knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands , and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his milde spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state . when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous mindes do not accompt of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavors to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labor to pull down , of force worketh his own undoing . all commonwealth● alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil , and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruine ; likewise ruine order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wise men have observed , that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that countrey which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon then embrace his countrey . commonwealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein be use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them onely . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honor , men may be reasonably perswaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , then by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so perswades himself to be no less esteemed in evil then good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely performed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to inrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , then to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it follows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and wel-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the commonwealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maximes ●f state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policie in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narations , and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are b●ilded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothfull , unless by good laws they be forced to labor , so barrenness compells them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragus● and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times according to such accidents as befel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginning lycurgu● , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that t●e policy of sparta continued ●00 years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by s●lon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governd ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offerd that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honors of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority then either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rom● expulsed , forthwith arose much mutiny , and could not be supprest till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavor to enlarge their dominions , and some others labour only to maintain that estate they antiently possest . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offendeth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly by liberty of accusing , every man hath meanes to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawfull to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or callingin forreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucannone at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . a accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and places of repair without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitoliuus . the only meanes to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violenc or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well disposed , but prefers those persons that are praisable , before those that are blamable : notwithstanding for that well near all men are beguiled in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwise ; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merrits rather infamy then commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon or agesilaus , rather then dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , then caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellers , then were they that entertained many legions and men of war . example , of all those emperors which raigned after c●esar untill maximi●us the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted who were good emperors . a prince of great knowledge both in armes and wisdom so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue ; yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first then the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valor of romulus was the cause that numa might governe safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he bin unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperor of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grandfather then to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , cheifly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies or popular states , where the governors successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governors . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlick exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlick nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopida● & epa●i●ondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used exercise of armes . no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valor of some few persons , nor ought to strength of straight places where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , & metius king of alba , condiscended that three of their nobility for either side chosen should enter combate , and that nation which were victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevaild . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought notwithstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatio that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregiou● act and the fresh memory thereof , called into triall of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitoh from the galleys , had no greater reward then a little measure of meale . ingratitnde is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousnes or suspition are therewith infected . example , vespasian proclamed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his helpe prevailed against vitellius ; in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army and gave that honor to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first remov'd from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain where in disgrace he ended his life collatinus tarquinius who with the aide of bru●us suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub●valerius were banisht for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , theother because he built a house upon mount coelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilfull or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity then the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honor suffer nought by the infamy which evill service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously if he stand in daily doubt to be punisht for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and vi●gi●ius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and ●onsequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cann● , he was nevertheless pardoned and honorably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , then to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medices having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase , was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosm● , being the stronger , as they forced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared● and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar● endeavoring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , cheifly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the r●mans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirat● , by suffering appius claudiu● to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humor doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honor and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agragia , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were perswaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be● yet were they content that certain tribunes should command with like authority , so was nothing altered in the government but the governors title , which alone did content them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honor● in so much as men of honest mindes and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavored the factions of great men . likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they ●●and silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacr● and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the p●ople , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerous it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the dec●mviri being opprest , the tribunes authorised in their place , endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the dec●mviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear u●on other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavored to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being perswaded they were strong , labored to oppress the people : which humors were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined● that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest number , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude onel● one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to perswade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is perswaded , doth promise either profit or honor ; yet oft under that external apparence li●s hid loss or disadvantage● example , the romans perswading themselves that the slow proceeding of f●bius maximus in the war , was both chargable and cowardly , required● that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise when hannibal had divers years raigned in ital● , one m. centenius penula , a man of base birth , yet a soldier o● some repute , undertook that if he with such volunti●rs as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , then if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , perswading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the ●rateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . francisco soderini bishop of v●terra in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in antwerp between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some princes power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the urienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispence with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less then the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make money for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the money into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvellous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrified ; which done , they vanished : which vision as they divined , prognosticated the generals death : likewise f. savanar●la foretold the coming of king charls the eight into italy : and m. sedigitus when the galls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans when their city was taken and sackt by the galls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded that upon great pain , every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for yong men having made tryal of their valor , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well-governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect● . example , valerius g●rvinus with others made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the sagu●tines entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the h●diai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus sforza occasioned charls the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavor to be fully furnished with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or defaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding , to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously : so as rome grew to such greatness● that the city onely could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , then it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the state . a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver , and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign wars with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . examples , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent onely to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavored to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not dispossess the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation● inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the g●ths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is● that money makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander , king of macedon , a mul●itude of galls went into greece , and being there arived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the galls before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of money● likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his money have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame then effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king , who being far distant , could not in time succor them ; and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnits , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well armed and trained , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , then by invasion to assault his countrey : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war . example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintu● after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassus , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. ae●ylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his princes commission , counsel , and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , then the valor of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the refusal of that honor proved his greater glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud become thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of syracusa ; john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracusa died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt , they continued until apollonides a chief captain of syracusa laid before them● that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the florentin●s being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favor full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favors , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valor of camillus overcome , yeelded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si p●enam remittimus ? qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the p●ivernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidel●m & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not onely pardoned , but also honored and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , fortresses , and places of strength , be made for defence either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject● when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men . example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco ●●orza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the caus● that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , then the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succored . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologna , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they therewith grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelfth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for site as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen moneths the french were forced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates ; albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castles , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not onely forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their cheif city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification , is onely upon frontires or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforzi or france . guido vbaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his countrey , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience he found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him then for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which uniteth , is fear and war . example , the vejenti and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a fit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all domestick anger , and by the valor of their arms conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurpe an estate disjoynted is first before arms be taken , to become as it were an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other , yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and some times the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yeilded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the fl●rentin●● , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation a great wisdom it is to refrain opprobriousand injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can an● whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly offended g●bides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within few daies wun the city . tiberi●s grac●hus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclamed in his camp , that no man upon pain of death should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest . nam fac●tiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinquunt . likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexanders fury , offered upon honorable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four moneths alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador who arriving in tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword . a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance then himself , ought not to refuse any honorahle compositions , chiefly when they are offered● for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some sort turn to the advantage and honor of him that accepts them . example , anno 1512. certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banisht , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniencies . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state , for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favor of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king . whoso endeavors the alteration of any state , must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impunge the ordinance of government newly settled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valor banisht the tarquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever raign in rome : within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands , legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm ; so fortifications and frontier-defences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into ●tal● , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians welnear without ressistance ; his army marcht to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontires , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno 1513 they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as oft before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approacht rome , the better they found the countrey armed and defended . the desire to command soveraignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of ta●quinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possesse his kingdom , as b●ing perswaded it were much more honorable to be a queen then to be the daughter of a king . the violation of ancient laws , orders , and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief an● only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the ●omans to take arms against tarquin ; for he h●ving before that fact of sex●us his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility , and people , who finding themselves well governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors , then those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want meanes to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it . example , perennius the prime favorite of ●ommodus the emperor conspired his death●plantianus did the like to s●verus , and s●janus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches , and offices as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their soveraigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared● neither ought an army of well traind soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to p●arsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad duce● sine exercitu . a captain-general commanding an army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness , then with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war . to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium val●t . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to e●tream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise● yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or never kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonorable peace with the samnits , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all : and fortune so much favored posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , then was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed● that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at ●irst . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever bin noted for their avarice , pride , fury , and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not onely in ancient times , but also in the time of charls the eighth , who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa● but having divers tim●● received money , held them notwithstanding in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains● for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof● he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona , he devised cavillations of unkindness , whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example ▪ pope julio endeavored to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli in which action he thought the aid of the french necessary , and that the venetians should stand neutral ; and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect ; but not receiving any resolute answer , he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to bol●gna , whereupon the venetians advertised him they would remain neutral , and the french king forthwith sent him forces as fearing the popes indignation ; likewise the tuscans having formerly desired aid of the samnites against the romans , took armes suddenly and obtained their request which the samintes had before denied . when a multitude offendeth , all may not be punisht , because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest unpunisht , were injurie to the sufferers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eschew all extremity , mean courses have bin anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them were punisht , and the rest suffered to pass ▪ likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot ; although the offence were general , by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complaind on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in feare that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in armes ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince , otherwise the general incurs great danger , example ▪ papyrius the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having fought without his consent , although he had in battaile slain 20000 enemies without loss of 200 of his own , and caesar commended his captain silanus for having refrained to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occas●on of utter ruine . example , hieron the first king of sicile in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace , but his grandchild succeding , refusing all counsell lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privycouncil is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a c●st●llan , a captain , or such a one as hath bin ambassador ▪ and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes . the two cad●lesquir●s , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were● a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three or four at most to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maec●nas and agrippa , julius caesar , q ●aedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governors to decree , that ancient lawes once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice where no petition is prefered to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the locrians the custom was that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his lawes , did sweare the people of sparta to observe them untill his return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to returne . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees then suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue 700 years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made , which suddain and violent proceeding proved so fatal , that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was deposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the venetians not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke : but after his death , and before the election of lovedono , the signiory publisht new ordinances detractive from the ducal anthority . whoso hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for armes , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honored by the soldiers , found means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorraine of the crown , being right heire by descent from charlemaine . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcani be of the blood royall and right heires to the turkish empire , when the ottaman line shall faile ; yet it is like that the cheif bassa having the love of the janisaries will usurpe the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in armes , ought upon paine of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life : which was the cause of his usurpation of the state . also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath bin in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with confiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banisht for envy or feare , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer then ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banisht syracusa by dyonysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honorable and magnanimous men were wont , not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently al injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaing to persons vertuous : example . after the defeat of the r●man army upon the river a●●ia , the galli persued the victory even to romes walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any signe of resistance they entred the streets , where all honorable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chaire of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , cheifly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking great disdain struk him with his rod , in requitall whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necessary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses must seasonably be foreseen and removed . example , when diogenes and carneades two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the romans , many of the nobility that before disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvellous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of armes , turned their endeavors to the studie of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honor due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrarywise all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great severity punisht . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the serjeants affraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , found no meanes so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his favorite seianus : nero , tig●llinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george preston ; caracaella caused all his flatterers to be slain that had perswaded him to kill his brother● the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself therefore wise princes have not only left such services quite unrecompenced , but also most severely punished them . example . the emperor severus put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , notwithstanding he were an enemy . likewise uitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forthwith all the princes , nobles , nobility , and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness . the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honor , and pleasure , to embrace the contemplative retired life . example , rami●us king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath k. of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57360e-2360 * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . notes for div a57360e-2530 * so henry the 4 of france by puting his courtiers to boordwages was said to make mony with his teeth . notes for div a57360e-3170 * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchesse of suffolk , prefixt to mr. latimer sermons , ●aith that lawyer● cove●ousness hath almost devoured england . notes for div a57360e-5610 discipline . notes for div a57360e-8310 tam bené quam malé facta premunt . mart. de corpore politico, or, the elements of law, moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads, as of [brace] the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions of them / by tho. hobbs of malmsbury. hobbes, thomas, 1588-1679. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a43978 of text r41339 in the english short title catalog (wing h2221). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 247 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 95 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a43978 wing h2221 estc r41339 31355044 ocm 31355044 110315 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a43978) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 110315) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1740:5) de corpore politico, or, the elements of law, moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads, as of [brace] the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions of them / by tho. hobbs of malmsbury. hobbes, thomas, 1588-1679. [8], 183 p. printed by t.r. for j. ridley, and are to be sold at the castle in fleetstreet ..., london : 1652. imperfect: tightly bound with loss of text. reproduction of original in the bodleian library. eng natural law. political science -early works to 1800. oaths. a43978 r41339 (wing h2221). civilwar no de corpore politico. or the elements of law, moral & politick. with discourses upon severall heads; as of the law of nature. oathes and cove hobbes, thomas 1652 48730 180 30 0 0 1 2 168 f the rate of 168 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the f category of texts with 100 or more defects per 10,000 words. 2004-09 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-10 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2004-11 ben griffin sampled and proofread 2004-11 ben griffin text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-01 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion de corpore politico . or the elements of law , moral & politick . with discourses upon severall heads ; as of the law of nature . oathes and covenants . several kinds of government . with the changes and revolutions of them . by tho. hobbs of malmsbury . london , printed by t. r. for j. ridley , and are to be sold at the castle in fleetstreet , by ram-alley . 1652. to the reader . reader , you may be pleased to take notice , that the first part of the work depends upon a former treatise of humane nature written by mr. hobbs , and by a friend of his committed to the press for the benefit of mankind . it was thought fit , that nothing of so worthy an author should be left unprinted , especially considering , that this piece is most usefull for the society of reasona●le creatures , being the grounds and principles of policy , without which there would be nothing but confusion in the world . i am confident , if mens minds were but truly fixt upon the center of this discourse , they would not prove such weather-cocks , to be turned about with the wind of every false doctrine , and vain opinion . vve should then be free from those disorders which threaten distraction to the soul , and destruction to the common vvealth . but let others write never so well , if our practise doe not second their instructions , we may bee wise enough to foresee our misery , but never know how to prevent it . what pitty is it , that such rare conclusions as these are , should produce no other effect , but to informe our knowledg , and confute our conversation ; whilest we neglect the truth that is apprehended . yet there is some hope , that such observers , whose vvisdome hath received the stamp of goodnesse , will improve their skill to a reall advancement of those benefits , which lye horded up in this curious cabinet , to whose use and behoof , these excellent notions are commended , as the best that ever were writ in this kind , and may serve for a generall ground and foundation to all regular conceptions , that concern the essence and existence of man , the government of kingdoms and common-vvealths , and by consequence our eternall salvation . de corpore politico . chap. i. 1.2 . men by nature equall . 3. by vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves , to others . 4. apt to provoke another by comparisons . 5. apt to incroach one upon another . 6. right defined . 7. right to the end , implyeth right to the means . 8 every man his own judge by nature . 9. every mans strength and knowledge for his owne use . 10. every man by nature hath right to all things . 11. warr and peace defined . 12. men by noture in the state of warr . 13. in manifest inequality , might is right . 14. reason dictateth peace . in a former treatise of humane nature already printed , hath beene set forth the whole nature of man , consisting in the powers naturall of his body and mind , and may all be comprehended in these four , strength of body , experinece , reason , and passion . 2. in this , it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our nature hath placed us , and what probability it hath left us , of continuing and preserving our selves against the violence of one another . and first , if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge , between men of mature age , and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength , or in wit , or in both , may utterly destroy the power of the stronger ; since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a mans life , we may conclude that men , considered in meer nature , ought to admit amongst themselves equality ; and that he that claimeth no more , may be esteemed moderate . 3. on the other side , considering the great difference there is in men , from the diversity of their passions , how some are vainly glorious , and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows , not only when they are equall in power , but also when they are inferiour ; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow , that those men who are moderate , and look for no more but equality of nature , shall be obnoxious to the force of others , that will attempt to subdue them . and from hence shall proceed a generall diffidence in mankind , and mutuall fear one of another . 4. farther , since men by natural passion are divers wayes offensive one to another , every man thinking well of himself , and hating to see the same in others , they must needs provoke one another by words , and other signes of contempt and hatred , which are incident to all comparison , till at last , they must determine the preheminence by strength and force of body . 5. moreover , considering that many mens appetites carry them to one and the same end ; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common , nor divided , it followeth , that the stronger must enjoy it alone and that it be decided by battell who is the stronger . and thus the greatest part of men , upon no assurance of odds , do neverthelesse through vanity , or comparison , or appetite , provoke the rest , that otherwise would be contented with equality . 6. and forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire bonum sibi , that which is good for themselves , and to avoid that which is hurtfull ; but most of all , the terrible enemy of nature , death , from whom we expect both the losse of all power , and also the greatest of bodily paines in the losing : it is not against reason , that a man doth all he can , to preserve his owne body and limbs , both from death and paine . and that which is not against reason , men call right , or jus , or blame●esse liberty , of using our own naturall power and ability . it is therefore ● right of nature , that every man may preserve his owne life and limbs , with all the power he hath . 7. and because where a man hath right to the end , and the end cannot be attained without the meanes ; that is , without such things as are necessary to the end , it is consequent that it is not against reason , and therefore right for a man to use all meanes , and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body . 8. also every man by right of nature , is judge himself of the necessity of the means , and of the greatnesse of the danger . for if it be against reason , that i be judge of mine owne danger my self , then it is reason , that another man be judge thereof . but the same reason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern me , maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him . and therefore i have reason to judge of his sentence , whether it be for my benefit , or not . 9. as a mans judgment in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit , so also the strength , knowledg , and art , of every man is then rightly imployed , when he useth it for himselfe ; else must not a man have right to preserve himselfe . 10. every man by nature hath right to all things , that is to say , to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth , to possesse , use , and enjoy all things he will and can . for seeing all things he willeth , must therfore be good unto him in his own judgment , because he willeth them , and may tend to his preservation some time or other , or he may judg so , and we have made him judg thereof , sect. 8. it followeth , that all things may rightly also be done by him . and for this cause it is rightly sayd , natura dedil omnia omnibus , that nature hath given all things to all men ; insomuch that jus & utile , right and profit , is the same thing . but that right of all men to all things , is in effect no better than if no man had right to any thing . for there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath , when another as strong , or stronger then himselfe hath right to the same . 11. seeing then to the offensivenesse of mans nature one to another , there is added a right of every man to every thing , whereby one man invadeth with right , and another man with right resisteth , and men live thereby in perpetuall diffidence , and study how to p●eoccupate each other : the estate of men in this naturall liberty , is the estate of warr . for warr is nothing else but that time wherein the will and contention of contending by force , is either by words or actions sufficiently declared ; and the time which is not warr , is peace . 12. the estate of hostility and war being such , as thereby nature it selfe is destroyed , and men kil one another : ( as we know also that it is , both by the experience of salvage nations that live at this day , and by the histories of our ancestors , the old inhabitants of germany , and other now civill countries , where we find the people few , and short-lived , and without the ornaments and comforts of life , which by peace and society are usually invented and procured ) he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all , contradicteth himselfe . for every man by natural necessity desireth his own good , to which this estate is contrary , wherin we suppose contention between men by nature equal , and able to destroy one another . 13. seeing this right of protecting our selves by our own discretion and force proceedeth from danger , and that danger from the fquality between mens forces , much more reason is there , that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh , and before the necessity of battell . a man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule or govern , to do good to , or harm , hath right , by the advantage of this his present power , to take caution at his pleasure , for his security against that other in time to come . he therefore that hath already subdued his adversary , or gotten into his power any other , that either by infancy , or weaknesse , is unable to resist him , by right of nature may take the best caution , that such infant , or such feeble and subdued person can give him , of being ruled and governed by him for the time to come . for seeing we intend allwaies our one safety and preservation , we manifestly contradict that our intention , if we willingly dismiss such a one , and suffer him at once to gather strength and be our enemy . out of which may also be collected , that inresistable might in the state of nature is right . 14. but since it is supposed by the equality of strength and other natural faculties of men , that no man is of might sufficient , to assure himselfe for any long time , of preserving himself therby , whiles he remaineth in the state of hostility and war ; reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good , to seek after peace , as far forth as there is hope to attain the same : and strengthen himselfe with all the help he can procure , for his own defence against those , from whom such peace cannot be obtained : and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto . chap. ii. 1. the law of nature consisteth not in consent of men , but reason . 2. that every man devests himself of the right he hath to all things is one precept of nature . 3. what it is to relinquish and transferr ones right . 4. the will to transfer , and the will to accept , both necessary to the passing away of right . 5. right not transferred by words , de futuro , onely . 6. words de futuro , together with other signes of the will , may transferr right . 7. free gift defined 8. contract , and the sorts of it . 9. covenant defined . 10. contract of mutuall trust , is of no validity in the estate of hostility . 11. no covenant of men but with one another . 12. covenant how dissolved . 13. covenant extorted by feare , in the law of nature , valid . 14. covenant contrary to former covenant , voyd . 15. an oath defined . 16. oath to be administred to every man in his own religion . 17. oath addeth not to the obligation . 18. covenants binde but to endeavour . what it is we call the law of nature , is not agreed upon by those , that have hitherto wtitten . for the most part such writets as have occasion to affirm , that any thing is against the law of nature , do alledge no more than this , that it is against the consent of all nations , or the wisest and most civill nations . but it is not agreed upon , who shall judge which nations are the wisest . others make that against the law of nature , which is contrary to the consent of all mankind , which definition cannot be allowed , because then no man could offend against the law of nature ; for the nature of every man is contained under the nature of mankind . but forasmuch as all men are carried away by the violence of their passion , and by evill customes , do those things which are commonly said to be against the law of nature ; it is not the consent of passion , or consent in some errour gotten by custome , that makes the law of nature . reason is no less of the nature of man then passion , and is the same in all men , because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain , namely , their own good which is the work of reason , there can therefore be no other law of nature then reason , nor no other precepts of natural law , then those which declare unto us the wayes of peace , where the same may be obtained , and of defence where it may not . 2. one precept of the law of nature therefore this is , that every man devest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature . for when divers men having right not only to all things else , but to one anothers persons , if they use the same , there ariseth thereby invasion on the one part , and resistance on the other , which is war , and therefore contrary to the law of nature , the sum whereof consisteth in making peace . 3. wen a man devesteth and putteth from his right , he either simply relinquisheth it , or transferreth the same to another man . to relinquish it , is by sufficient signs to declare , that it is his will no more to doe that action , which of right he might have done before . to transferre right to another , is by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof , that it is his will not to resist , or hinder him , according to that right he had thereto before he transferred it . for seeing that by nature every man hath right to every thing , it is impossible for a man to transfer unto another any right that he had not before . and therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right , is no more but a declaring of the will , to suffer him to whom he hath so transferred his right , to make benefit of the same , without molestation . as for example , when a man giveth his lands or goods to another , he taketh from himself the right to enter into , and make use of the said lands or goods , or otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given . 4. in transferring of right , two things therefore are required , one on the part of him that transferreth , which is a sufficient signification of his will therein : the other , on the part of him to whom it is transferred which is a sufficient signification of his acceptation thereof . either of these failing the right remaineth where it was : nor is it to be supposed , that he which giveth his right to one that accepteth it not , doth thereby simply relinquish it , and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it : in as much as the cause of transferring the same to one , rather then to another , is in the one , rather then in the rest . 5. when there appeare no other signes that a man hath relinquished , or transferred his right , but only words , it behoveth that the same be done in words , that signifie the present time , or the time past , and not only the time to come . for he that saith of the time to come ( as for example ) to morrow , i will give , declareth evidently , that he hath not yet given . the right therefore remaineth in him to day , and so continues , till he have given actually . but he that saith , i give , presently , or have given to another any thing , to have and enjoy the same to morrow , or any other time future , hath now actually transferred the sayd right , which otherwise he should have had at the time that the other is to enjoy it . 6. but because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the mind , as hath been shewed , chap. 13. sect. 8 words spoken , de futuro , when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by other signs , may be taken very often , as if they were meant de praesenti . for when it appeareth , that he that giveth , would have his words so understood by him to whom he giveth , as if he did actually transfe●r his right , then he must needs be understood to will all that is necessary to the same . 7. when a man transferreth any right of his to another , without consideration of reciprocal benefit past , present , or to come , this is called free gift . and in free gift , no other words can be binding , but those which are de praesenti , or de praeterito . for being de futuro only , they transfer nothing , nor can they be understood , as if they proceeded from the will of the giver ; because being a free gift , it carryeth with it no obligation greater then that which is inforced by the words . for he that promiseth to give , without any other consideration but his own affection , so long as he hath not given , deliberateth still , according as the causes of the affections continue , or diminish : and he that deliberateth , hath not yet willed , because the will is the last act of his deliberation . he that promiseth therefore , is not thereby a donor , but doson ; which name was given to that antiochus , that promised often , but seldome gave . 8. when a man transferreth his right upon consideration of reciprocal benefit , this is not free gift , but mutual donation , and is called contract . and in all contracts , either both parties presently perform , and put each other into a certainty and assurance of enjoying what they contract for . as when men buy or sell , or barter : or one party performeth presently , and the other promiseth , as when one selleth upon trust : or else neither party performeth presently , but trust one another . and it is impossible there should be any kind of contract besides these three . for either both the contractors trust , or neither , or else one trusteth , and the other not . 9. in all contracts where there is trust , the promise of him that is trusted , is called a covenant . and this though it be a promise , and of the time to come , yet doth it transfer the right , when that time cometh , no lesse then an actuall donation . for it is a manifest signe , that he which did perform , understood it was the will of him that was trusted , to performe also . promises therefore , upon consideration of reciprocal benefit , are covenants and signes of the will , or last act of deliberation , whereby the liberty of performing , or not performing , is taken away , and consequently are obligatory . for where liberty ceaseth , there beginneth obligation . 10. neverthelesse , in contracts that consist of such mutual trust , as that nothing be by either party performed for the present , when the contract is between such as are not compellable , he that performeth first , considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every thing for their benefit , doth but betray himself thereby to the covetousnesse or other passion of him with whom he contracteth . and therefore such covenants are of none effect . for there is no reason why the one should performe first , if the other be likely not to performe afterward . and whether he be likely or not , he that doubteth shall be judge himself , as hath been sayd , chap. 1. sect. 8. as long as they remaine in the estate and liberty of nature . but when there shall be such power coercive over both the parties , as shall deprive them of their private judgements in this point , then may such covenants be effectuall , seeing he that performeth first shal have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other , that may be compelled thereunto . 11. and forasmuch as in all covenants , and contracts , and donations , the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred , is necessary to the essence of those covenants , donations , &c. it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any , that by nature , or absence , are unable ; or if able , do not actualty declare their acceptation of the same . first of all therefore , it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with god almighty , farther then it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name . also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures , of whose wils we have no sufficient signe , for want of common language . 12. a covenant to do any action at a certain time and place , is then dissolved by the covenantor , when that time cometh , either by the performance , or by the violation . for a covenant is void that is once impossible . but a covenant not to do without time limited , which is as much as to say , a covenant never to do , is dissolved by the covenantor then only , when he violateth it or dyeth . and generally , all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee , to whose benefit , and by whose right , he that maketh the covenant is obliged . this right therefore of the covenantee relinquished , is a release of the covenant . and universally , for the same reason , all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger . 13. it is a question often moved , whether such covenants oblige , as are extorted from men by fear . as for example , whether if a man for feare of death , hath promised to give a theef an hundred pounds the next day , and not discover him , whether such covenant be obligatory , or not . and though in some cases such covenant may be void , yet it is not therefore void , because extorted by fear . for there appeareth no reason , why that which we do upon fear , should be lesse firme then that which we do for covetousnesse . for both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary . and if no covenant should be good , that proceedeth from feare of death , no conditions of peace betweene enemies , nor any laws , could be of force , which are all consented to from that fear . for who would lose the liberty that nature hath given him , of governing himselfe by his own will and power , if they feared not death in the retaining of it ? what prisoner in war might be trusted to seek his ransome , and ought not rather to be killed , if he were not tyed by the grant of his life , to perform his promise ? but after the introduction of policy and laws , the case may alter , for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden , then he that promiseth any thing to a theif , not only may , but must refuse to perform it . but if the law forbid not the performance , but leave it to the will of the promiser , then is the performance still lawfull ; and the covenant of things lawfull is obligatory , even towards a theif . 14. he that giveth , promiseth , or covenanteth to one , and after giveth , promiseth , or covenanteth the same to another , maketh void the later act. for it is impossible for a man to transfer that right which he himselfe hath not ; and that right he hath not , which he himself hath before transferred . 15. an oath is a clause annexed to a promise , containing a renuntiation of gods mercy by him that promiseth , in case he perform not as far as is lawfull and possible for him to doe . and this appeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath , so helpe me god . so also was it amongst the heathen . and the forme of the romans was , thou jupiter kill him that breaketh , as i kill this beast . the intention therefore of an oath being to provoke vengeance upon the breakers of covenant ; it is to no purpose to sweare by men , be they never so great , because their punishment by divers accidents may be avoided , whether they will or no , but gods punishment not . though it were a custome of many nations , to sweare by the life of their princes ; yet those princes being ambitious of divine honour , give sufficient testimony , that they beleeved , nothing ought to be sworne by , but the deity . 16. and seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they beleeve not , and an oath is to no purpose , without fear of him they swear by , it is necessary that he that sweareth , doe it in that forme which himself admitteth in his owne religion , and not in that forme which he useth , that putteth him to the oath . for though all men may know by nature , that there is an almighty power , neverthelesse they beleeve not , that they sweare by him in any other form or name , then what their own ( which they think the true ) religion teacheth them . 17. and by the definition of an oath , it appeareth , that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworne , then the covenant carryeth in it self , but it putteth a man into greater danger , and of greater punishment . 18 covenants and oaths are de voluntariis , that is , de possibilibus . nor can the covenantee understand the covenantor to promise impossibles ; for they fall not under deliberation : and consequently ( by chap. 13. sect. 10. which maketh the covenanter interpreter ) no covenant is understood to bind further , then to our best endervour , either in performance of the thing promised , or in something equivalent . chap. iii. 1. that men stand to their covenants . 2. injury defined . 3. that iniury is done onely to the covenantee . 4. the signification of those names , just , uniust . 5. justice not rightly divided into commutative , and distributive . 6. it is a law of nature , that he that is trusted , turn not that trust to the damage of him that trusteth . 7. ingratitude defined . 8. it is a law of nature , to endeavour to accommodate one another . 9. and that man forgive upon caution for the future . 10. and that revenge ought to respect the future onely . 11. that reproach and contempt declared , is against the law of nature . 12. that indifference of commerce is of the law of nature . 13. that messengers imployed to procure or maintaine peace , ought to be safe by the law of nature . it is a common saying , that nature maketh nothing in vain . and it is most certaine , that as the truth of a conclusion , is no more but the truth of the premises that make it , so the force of the command , or law of nature , is no more then the force of the reasons inducing thereunto . therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter , sect. 2. namely , that every man should devest himself of the right , &c. were utterly vaine , and of none effect , if this also were not a law of the same nature , that every man is obliged to stand to , and perform , those covenants he maketh . for what benefit is it to a man that any thing be promised , or given unto him , if he that giveth , or promiseth , performeth not , or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given ? 2. the breach or violation of covenant , is that which men call iniury , consisting in some action or omission , which is therefore called uniust . for it is action or omission without jus , or right , which was transferred or relinquish before . there is a great similitude between that we call iniury , or iniustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world , and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the schools . for as he which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained , is sayd to be reduced to an absurdity ; so he that through passion doth , or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised to doe , or not to omit , is sayd to commit injustice : and there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called . for he that covenanteth , willeth to do , or omit , in the time to come . and he that doth any action , willeth it in that present , which is part of the future time contained in the covenant . and therefore he that violateth a covenant , willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing , at the same time , which is a plaine contradiction . and so iniury is an absurdity of conversation , as absurdity is a kind of iniustice in disputation . 3. in all violation of covenant ( to whom soever accrueth the damage ) the iniury is done onely to him to whom the covenant was made . for example , if a man covenant to obey his master , and the master command him to give money to a third , which he promiseth to doe , and doth not , though this be to the damage of the third , yet the iniury is done to the master onely . for he could violate no covenant with him with whom none was made , and therefore doth him no iniury . for iniury consisteth in violation of covenant , by the definition thereof . 4. the name of just , uniust , justice , iniustice ; are equivocall , and signifie diversly . for justice and iniustice , when they be attributed to actions , signifie the same thing with no iniury , and iniury , and denominate the action just , or uniust , but not the man so . for they denominate him guilty or not guilty . but when justice or iniustice , are attributed to men , they signifie pronenesse , and affection , and inclination of nature , that is to say , passions of the minde , apt to produce just and uniust actions . so that when a man is sayd to be just , or uniust ; not the action , but the passion and aptitude , to do such actions , is considered . and therefore a just man may have committed an uniust act ; and an uniust man may have done iustly , not only one , but most of his actions . for there ts an oderunt peccare in the uniust as well as in the just , but from different causes . for the uniust man who abstaineth from iniuries for fear of punishment , declareth plainly , that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civill constitution , from whence punishments proceed , which would otherwise in the estate of nature be uniust , according to the fountaine from whence they spring . this distinction therefore of justice and iniustice , ought to be remembred , that when iniustice is taken for guilty , the action is uniust , but not therefore the man ; and when justice is taken for guiltlesness , the actions are iust , and yet not alwayes the man . likewise when justice and iniustice are taken for habits of the mind , the man may be iust , or uniust , and yet not all his actions so . 5. concerning the justice of actions , the same is usually divided into two kinds , wherof men call the one commutative , and the other distributive ; and are sayd to consist , the one in proportion arithmetical , the other in geometrical : and commutative justice , they place in permutation , as buying , seling , and barter ; distributive , in giving to every man according to their deserts . which distinction is not well made , in as much as iniury , which is the iniustice of action , consisteth not in the inequality of the things changed , or distributed , but in the inequality that men ( contrary to nature and reason ) assume unto themselves above their fellowes . of which inequality , shall be spoken hereafter . and for commutative justice placed in buying and selling , though the thing bought be unequall to the price given for it ; yet for as much as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of 〈◊〉 value , and are thereby both satisfied , there can be no iniury done on either side , neither party having trusted , or covenanted with the other . and for distributive justice , which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits , seeing a thing is therfore said to be our own , because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure , it can be no iniury to any man , though our liberality be farther extended towards another , then towards him ; unlesse we be thereto obliged by covenant : and then the iniustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant , and not in the inequality of distribution . 6. it happeneth many times , that man benefitteth , or contributeth to the power of another , without any covenant , but onely upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favor of that other , whereby he may procure a greater , or no lesse benefit and assistance to himselfe . for by necessity of nature , every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself . in this case it is a law of nature , that no man suffer him , that thus trusteth to his charity , or good affection towards him , to be in the worse estate for his trusting . for if he shall so do , men will not dare to confer mutually to each others defence , nor put themselves into each others mercy , upon any tearmes whatsoever , but rather abide the utmost and worst even of hostility , by which general diffidence , men will not only be inforced to warr , but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another , as to make any overture of peace . but this is te be understood of those onely , that confer their benefits ( as i have sayd ) upon trust onely , and not for tryumph or ostentation . for as when they do it upon trust , the end they aimed at , namely to be well used , is the reward ; so also when they do it for ostentation , they have the reward in themselves . 2. but seeing in this case there passeth no covenant , the breach of this law of nature is not to be called iniury . it hath another name , to wit , ingratitude . 8. it is also a law of nature . that every man do help and endeavor to accommodate each other as far as may be , without danger of their persons , and losse of their means , to maintaine and defend themselves . for seeing the causes of warr and desolation proceed from those passions , by which we strive to accommodate our selves , and to leave others as far as we can behind us , it followeth , that tha● passion by which we strive mutually to accommadate each ather , must be the cause of peace . and this passion is that charity defined , chap. 9. sect. 17. 9. and in this precept of nature , is included and comprehended also this , that man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong , upon his repentance and caution for the future . for pardon , is peace granted to him that ( having provoked to war ) demandeth it . it is not therefore charity , but feare , when a man giveth peace to him that repenteth not , nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in the time to come . for he that repenteth not , remaineth with the affection of an enemy ; as also doth he that refuseth to give caution , and consequently , is presumed not to seek after peace , but advantage . and therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law of nature , nor is charity , but may sometime be prudence . otherwise , not to pardon upon repentance and caution , considering men cannot abstain from provoking one another , is never to give peace . and that is against the generall definition of the law of nature . 10. and seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon , when there is repentance and caution for the future , it followeth , that the same law ordaineth , that no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past , but of the benefit to come , that is to say , that all revenge ought to tend to amendment , either of the person offending , or of others , by the example of his punishment ; which is sufficiently apparent , in that the law of nature commandeth pardon , where the future time is secured . the same is also apparent by this , that revenge when it considereth the offence past , is nothing else , but present triumph and glory , and directeth to no end : and what is directed to no end , is therefore unprofitable ; and consequently the triumph of revenge , is vain-glory : and whatsoever is vain , is against reason ; and to hurt one another without reason , is contrary to that , which by supposition is every mans benefit , namely peace , and what is contrary to peace , is contrary to the law of nature . 11. and because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt , provoke in the highest degree to quarrell and battel , ( in as much as life it self , with the condition of enduring scorn , is not esteemed worth the enjoying , much lesse peace ) it must necessarily be implyed as a law of nature , that no man reproach , revile , deride , or any otherwise declare his hatred , contempt , or disesteem of any other . but this law is very little practised . for what is more ordinary then reproaches of those that are rich , towards them that are not ? or of those that sit in place of judicature , towards those that are accused at the bar ? although to greive them in that manner , be no part of the punishment for their crime , nor contained in their office . but use hath prevailed , that what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth , is also practised a● lawful in the more mighty towards the lesse though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance . 12. it is also a law of nature , that one man allow commerce and traffick indifferently to one another . for he that alloweth that to one man , which he denyeth to another , declareth his hatred to him , to whom he denyeth . and to declare hatred , is warr . and upon this title was grounded , the great war between the athenians , and the peloponnesians . for would the athenians have condescended to suffer the megareans , their neighbours , to traffick in their ports , and markets , that war had not begun . 13. and this also is a law of nature , that all messengers of peace , and such as are imployed to procure and maintaine amity between man and man , may safely come and goe . for seeing peace is the general law of nature , the meanes thereto ( such as are these men ) must in the same law be comprehended . chap. iv. 1. a law of nature , that every man acknowledge other for his equal . 2. another , that men allow aequalia aequalibus . 3. another , that those things which cannot be divided , be used in common . 4. another , that things indivisible and incommunicable , be divided by lot . 5. natural lot , primogeniture , and first possession . 6. that men submit to arbitration . 7. of an arbitrator . 8. that no man presse his counsel upon any man against his will . 9. how to know suddenly what is the law of nature . 10. that the law of nature taketh place after security from others to observe the same . 11. the right of nature not to be taken away by custome , nor the law of nature abrogated by any act. 12. why the dictates of nature are called lawes . 13. whatsoever is against conscience in a man that is his owne judge , is against the law of nature . 14. of malum poenae , malum culpae ; virtue and vice . 15. aptitude to society , fulfilleth the law of nature . the question which is the better man , is determinable onely in the estate o● government and policy , though it be mistaken for a question of nature , not onely by ignorant men , that thinke one man blood better then anothers by nature , but also by him , whose opinions are at this day and in these parts , of greater authority then any other humane writings . for he puttet so much difference between the powers 〈◊〉 men by nature , that he doubteth not to s● down as the ground of all his politick , that some men are by nature worthy to govern and others by nature ought to serve which foundation hath not only weakne● the whole frame of his politicks , but hath also given men colour and pretences , whereby to disturb and hinder the peace of one another . for though there were such a difference of nature , that master and servant were not by consent of men , but by inherent virtue , yet who hath that eminency of virtue above others and who is so stupid , as not to govern himself , shall never be agreed upon amongst men , who do every one naturally think himself , as able , at the least to govern another , as another to govern him . and when there was any contention between the finer and the courser wits , ( as there hath been often in times of sedition and civill war ) for the most part , these latter carried away the victory ; and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour then they give to others , it cannot be imagined , how they can possibly live in peace : and consequently we are to suppose , that for peace sake , nature hath ordained this law , that every man acknowledg other for his equall . and the breach of this law , is that we call pride . 2. as it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to every thing , so also was it , that he should retain his right to some things ; to his own body ( for example ) the right of defending , whereof he could not transfer ; to the use of fire , water , free aire , and place to live in , and to all things necessary for life . nor doth the law of nature command any devesting of other rights , then of those only which cannot be retained without the losse of peace . seeing then many rights are retained , when we enter into peace one with another , reason and the law of nature dictateth , whatsoever right any man requireth to retain , he allow every other man to retain the same . for he that doth not so , alloweth not the equality mentioned in the former section . for there is no acknowledgement of worth , without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect . and this allowance of aequalia aequalibus , is the same thing with the allowing of proportionalia proportionalibus . for when a man alloweth to every man a like , the allowance he maketh , will be in the same proportion , in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made . and this is it men mean by distributive justice , and is properly termed equity . the breach of this law is that which the greeks call {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which is commonly rendred coveteousness , but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word incroaching . 3. if there passe no other covenant , the law of nature is , that such things as cannot be divided , be used in common , proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same , or without limitation , when the quantity thereof sufficeth . for first supposing the thing to be used in common , not sufficient for them , that are to use it without limitation , if a few shall make more use thereof then the rest , that equality is not observed , which is required in the second section . and this is to be understood , as all the rest of the laws of nature , without any other covenant antecedent : for a man may have given away his right of common , and so the case be altered . 4. in those things which neither can be divided , nor used in common , the rule of nature must needs be one of these , lot , or alternate use : for besides these two wayes , there can no other equality be imagined ; and for alternate use , he that beginneth , hath the advantage ; and to reduce that advantage to equality , there is no other way but lot . in things therefore indivisible and incommunicable , it is the law of nature , that the use be alternate , or the advantage given away by lot ; because there is no other way of equality . and equality is the law of nature . 5. there be two sorts of lots ; one arbitrary , made by men , and commonly knowne by the names of lot , chance , hazard , and the like ; and there is natural lot , such as is primogeniture , which is no more but the chance , or lot , of being first born , which it seemeth they considered , that call inheritance by the name of kleronomia , which signifieth distribution by lot . secondly , prima occupatio , first feizing , or finding of a thing whereof no man made use before , which for the most part also is meerly chance . 6. although men agree upon these laws of nature , and endeavour to observe the same ; yet considering the passions of men , that make it difficult to understand by what actions , and circumstances of actions , those laws are broken , there must needs arise many great controversies about the interpretation thereof , by which the peace must need● be dissolved , and men return again to their former estate of hostility . for the taking away of which controversies , it is necessary that there be some common arbitrator and judge , to whose sentence , both the parties to the controversies ought to stand . and therefore it is a law of nature , that in every controversie , the parties thereto ought mutual●● to agree upon an arb●trator , whom they bot● trust , and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give ther●in . for where every man is his own judge , there properly is no judg at all ; as wh●re every man ca●veth out his own right , it hath the same effect , as if there were no right at all : and where is no judge , there is no end of controversie ▪ and therefore the right of hostility remaineth . 7. an arbitrator therefore , or he that is judge , is trusted by the parties to any controversie , to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgement therein . out of which followeth first , that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversie he endeth ; for in that case he is a party , and ought by the same reason to bee judged by another . secondly , that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties , to pronounce sentence for the one , more then for the other . nor doth he covenant so much , as that his sentence shall be just ; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence , whereby the controversie would remaine still undecided . neverthelesse for the trust reposed in him , and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties , he violateth that law , if for favour , or hatred to either party , he give other sentence then he thinketh right . and thirdly , that no man ought to make himself judge in any controversie between others , unlesse they consent and agree thereto . 8. it is also the law of nature , that no man obtrude or presse his advice or counsell to any man , that declareth himselfe unwil●ing to heare the same . for seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is good or hurt of himself onely , and not of his counsellor , and that counsel is a voluntary action , and therefore tendeth also to the good of the counsellor , there may be often iust cause to suspect the counsellor : and though there be none , yet seeing counsell unwillingly heard , is a needlesse offence to him that is not willing to hear it , and offences tend all to the breach of peace , it is therefore against the law of nature to obtrude it . 9. a man that shall see these lawes of nature set down and inferred with so many words , and so much adoe , may think there is yet much more difficulty and subtilty required to acknowledge and do according to the said laws in every sudden occasion , when a man hath but a little time to consider . and while we consider man in most passions , as of anger , ambition , coveteousness , vain-glory , and the like , that tend to the excluding of natural equality , it is true . but without these passions , there an easie rule to know upon a sudden , whether the action i be to do , be against the law of nature , or not . and it is but this ; that a man imagine himself in the place of the party with whom he hath to do , and reciprocally him in his . which is no more but a changing ( as it were ) of the scales . for every mans passion weigheth heavy in his owne scale , but in the scale of his neighbour . and this rule is very well knowne and expressed in this old dictate , quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris . 10. these lawes of nature , the sum whereof consisteth , in forbidding us to be our own judges , and our own carvers , and in commanding us to accommodate one another ; in case they should be observed by some , and not by others , would make the observers but a prey to them that should neglect them , leaving the good both without defence against the wicked , and also with a charge to assist them : which is against the scope of the said lawes , that are made only for the protection , and defence of them that keepe them . reason therefore , and the law of nature over and above all these particular lawes , doth dictate this law in general , that those particular lawes be so far observed , as they subi●ct us not to any incommodity , that in ou● owne judgments may arise , by the neglect thereof in those towards whem we observe them ; and consequently requireth no more , but the desire and constant intention to endeavour , and be ready to observe them , unlesse there be cause to the contrary in other mens refusall to observe them towards us . the force therefore of the law of nature , is not in foro externo , till there be security for men to obey it , but is alwaies in foro interno , wherein the action of obedience being unsafe , the will and readiness to performe , is taken for the performance . 11. amongst the lawes of nature , customes and prescriptions are not numbred . for whatsoever action is against reason , though it be reiterated never so often , or that there be never so many precedents thereof , is still against reason , and therefore not a law of nature , but contrary to it . but consent and covenant may so alter the cases , which in the law of nature may be put by changing the circumstances , that that which was reason before , may afterwards be against it ; and yet is reason still the law . for though every man be bound to allow equally to another , yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same , & make himself inferior , then , if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior , he breaketh not thereby that law of nature , that commandeth to allow● equallity . in sum , a mans owne cons●nt may abridge him of the liberty which the law of nature leaveth him , but custome not ; nor can either of them abrogate either these , or any other law of nature . 12. and forasmuch as law ( to speake properly ) is a command , and these dictates as they proceed from nature , are not commands , they are not therefore called laws , in respect of nature , but in respect of the author of nature , god almighty . 13. and seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience , not he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary , but also he whose action is conformable to them , in case he think it contrary . for though the action chance to be right , yet in his judgment he despiseth the law . 14. every man by naturall passion , calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present , or so far forth as he can foresee ; and in like manner , that which displeaseth him , evil . and therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his proservation , ( which is the end that every one by nature aymeth at , ) must also call it good , and the contrary evil . and this is that good and evil , which not every man in passion calleth so , but all men by reason . and therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason , and the breaking of them evill . and so also the habit , or disposition , or intention to fulfill them good ; and the neglect of them evill . and from hence cometh that distinction of malum poen● , and malum culpae , ; for malum p●n● is any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever ; but malum culpae is that action which is contrary to reason , and the law of nature : as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature , that tend to our preservation , is that wee call virtue , and the habit of doing the contrary , vice . as for example , justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants , iniustice the contrary vice ; equity that habit by which we allow equality of nature , arrogancy the contrary vice ; gratitude the habit whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others , ingratitude the contrary vice ; temperance the habit , by which wee abstain from all things that tend to our destruction , intemperance the contrary vice ; prudence the same with virtue in general . as for the common opin●on , that virtue consisteth in mediocrity and vice in extreames , i see no ground for it , nor can find any such mediocrity . courage may be virtue , when the daring is extream , if the cause be good ; and extream fear no vice , when the danger is extream . to give a man more then his due , is no iniustice , though it be to give him less : and in gifts , it is not the sum that maketh liberality , but the reason . and so in all other virtues and vices . i know that this doctrine of mediocrity is aristole's , but ●is opinions concerning virtue and vice , are no other then those which were received then , and are still by the generality of men , unstudyed , and therefore not very likely to be accurate . 15. the sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be soc●able , and formidable to them that will not . and the same is the sum of the law of nature : for in being sociable , the law of nature taketh place by the way of peace and societie ; and to be formidable , is the law of nature in war , where to be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power : and as the ●ormer consisteth in actions of equity and justice , the latter consisteth in actions of honour . and equity , justice , and honour , contain all virtues whatsoever . chap. v. a confirmation out of holy scripture of the principall points mentioned in the two last chapters concerning the law of nature . the lawes mentioned in the former chapters , as they are called the lawes of nature , for that they are the dictates of naturall reason , and also morall lawes , because they concern the manners and conversation , one towards another , so are they also divine lawes in respect of the author thereof , god almighty ; and ought therefore to agree , or at least not to be repugnant to the word of god , revealed in holy scripture . in this chapter therefore , i shall produce such places of scripture , as appear to be most consonant to the said lawes . 2. and first , the word of god seemeth to place the divine law in reason , by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and understanding ; as psal. 40.8 . thy law is in my heart : heb. 8.10 . after those dayes saith the lord , i will put my lawes in their mind . and heb. 10.16 . the same psal. 37.31 . speaking of the righteous man he saith , the law of god in his heart , psal. 19.7 , 8. the law of god is perfect , converting the soul . it giveth wisdome to the simple , and light unto the eyes . jer. 31.33 . i will put my law in their inward parts , and write it in their hearts . and joh. 1. the law-giver himself , god almighty , is called by the name of {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which is also called , ver. 4. the light of men . and vers. 9. the light which lighteth every man which cometh in●o the world . all which are descriptions of naturall reason . 3. and that the law divine , for so much as is morall , are those precepts which tend to peace , seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of scripture , as these , rom 3.17 . righteousnesse ( which is the fufilling of the law ) is called , the way of peace . and psa. 85.10 . righteousness and peace shall kiss each other . and matth. 5.9 . blessed are the peacemakers . and heb. 7.2 . melchisedeck king of salem , is interpreted king of righteousness , and king of peace . and ver. 21. our saviour christ is said to be , a preist for ever after the order of m●lchisedeck : out of which may be inferred , that the doctrine of our saviour christ annexeth the fulfilling of the law to peace . 4. that the law of nature is unalterable , is intimated by this , that the preisthood of melchisedeck is everlasting ; and by the words of our saviour , matth. 5.18 . heaven and earth , shall passe away , but one jot , or tittle of the law shall not passe till all things be fulfilled . 5. that men ought to stand to their covenants , is taught , psal. 15. where the question being asked , vers. 1. lord , who shall dwell in thy tavernacle , &c. it is answered , vers. 4. he that sweareth to h●s own hinderance , and yet changeth not . and that men ought to be gratified , where no covenant passeth , deut. 25.4 . thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn , which s. paul , 1 cor. 9.9 . interpreteth not of oxen but of men . 6. that men content themselves with equality , as it is the foundation of natural law , so also is it of the second table , of the divine law , matth. 22 39.40 . thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self . on these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets ; which is not so to be understood , as that a man should study so much his neighbours profit as his own , or that he should divide his goods amongst his neighbours ; but that he should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and priviledges that himself enjoyeth ; and attribute unto him , whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself : which is no more , but that he should be humble , meck , and content with equality . 7. and that in distributing of right amongst equalls , that distribution is to be made according to the proportions of the numbers , which is the giving of aequalia aequalibus , & proportionalia proportionalibus ; we have , numb. 26.53.54 . the commandement of god to moses ; thou shalt divide the land according to the number of names ; to many thou shalt give more , to few thou shall give lesse , to every one according to his number . that decision by lot is a means of peace . prov. 18.18 . the lot causeth contention to cease , and maketh partition among the mighty . 8. that the accommodation and forgiveness of one another , which have before been put for lawes of nature , are also law divine , there is no question . for they are the essence of charity , which is the scope of the whole law , that we ought not to repr●ach , or reprehend one another , is the doctrine of our saviour , matth. 7.1 . judge not that ye be not judged . vers. 3. why seest thou the mote that is in thy brothers eye , and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye ? also the law that forbiddeth us to press our councell upon others further then they admit , is a divine law . for after our charity and desire to rectifie one another is rejected , to presse it farther , is to reprehend him , and condemn him , which is forbidden in the text last recited ; as also rom. 14.12 . every one of us shall give account of himself to god . let us not therefore judge one another any more , but use your judgment rather in this , that no man put an occasion to fall , or a stumbling block before his brother . 9. farther , the rule of men concerning the law of nature , quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris , is confirmed by the like , matth. 7.12 . whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you , that do you unto them : for this is the law and the prophets . and rom. 2.1 . in that thou judgest another , thou condemnest thy self , &c. 10. it is also manifest by the scriptures , that these laws concern only the tribunall of our conscience ; and that the actions contrary to them , shall be no farther punished by god almighty , then as they proceed from negligence , or contempt . and first that these lawes are made to the conscience , appeareth , matth. 5.20 . for i say unto you , except your righteousnesse exceed the righteousnesse of the scribes and pharisees , ye shall not enter into the kingdome of heaven . now the pharisees were the most exact among the jews in the external performance ; they therefore must want the sincerity of conscience ; else could not our saviour have required a greater righteousnesse then theirs . for the same reason our saviour christ saith , the publican departed from the temple iustified rather then the pharisee . and christ saith , his yoke is easie , & his burthen light , which proceedeth from this , that christ required no more then our best endeavour . and rom. 14.23 . he that doubteth is condemned , if he eat . and in innumerable places both in the old and new testament , god almighty declareth , that he taketh the will for the deed , both in good and evill actions . by all which it plainly appears , that the divine law is dictated to the conscience one the other side is no less plain ; that how many and hainous actions soever a man commit through infirmity , he shall nevertheless , whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience , be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong . for at what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sinns from the bottome of his heart , i will put all his iniquties out of my remembrance , saith the lord . 11. concerning revenge which by the law of nature ought not to aym ( as i have sayd , chap. 3. sect 10. ) at present delight , but future profit , there is some difficulty mad● , as if the same accorded not with the law divine , by such as obiect the continuance of punishment after the day of judgement , when there shall be no place , neither for amendment nor for example . this obiection had been of some force , if such punishment had been ordained after all sinnes were past ; but considering the punishment was instituted before sinne , it serveth to the benefit of mankinde , because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terrour . and therefore such revenge was directed to the future only . 12. finally , there is no law of natural reason that can be against the law divine : for god almighty hath given reason to a man to be a light unto him . and i hope it is no impiety to think , that god almighty will require a strict account thereof , at the day of judgment , as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here , notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now adayes , to rationall and morall conversation . chap. vi . 1. that men notwithstanding these lawes , are still in the state of war , till they have security one against another . 2. the law of nature in war , is nothing but honour . 3. no security without the concord of many . 4. that concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe . 5. the cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrationall creatures , and not of men . 6. that vnion is necessary for the maintaining of concord . 7 how union is made . 8. body politick defined . 9. corporation defined . 10. soveraign subiect defined . 11. two sorsts of bodies politick , patrimonia , and common wealth . in chap. 12. sect. 16. of the treatise of human nature , it hath been shewed that the opinions men have of the rewards and punishments which are to follow their actions , are the causes that make and govern the will to those actions . in this estate of man therefore , wherein all men are equal , and every man allowed to be his own judge , the fears they have one of another are equal , and every mans hopes consist in his own sleight and strength : & consequently when any man by his natural passion , is provoked to break these lawes of nature , there is no security in any other man of his own defence but anticipation . and for this cause , every mans right ( howsoever he be inclined to peace ) of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes , remaineth with him still , as the necessary means of his perservation . and therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one towards another , men are still in the estate of war , and nothing is unlawfull to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity : and this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutuall ayd and help of one another , whereby also followeth the mutuall fear of one another . 2. it is a proverbiall saying , inter arma silent leges . there is little therefore to be said concerning the lawes that men are to observe one towards another in time of war , wherein every mans being and w●ll-being is the rule of his actions . yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war , that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions , whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come . for that betrayeth not a necessity , but a disposition of the mind to war , which is against the law of nature . and in old time we read , that rapine was a trade o● life , wherein nevertheless many of them ●hat used it , did not only spare the lives of those they invaded , but left them also such things , as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them ; as namely , their oxen and instruments for tillage , though they carried away all their other cattel and substance . and as the rapine it self was warranted in the law of nature , by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves , so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature , unless fear suggested any thing to the contrary . for nothing but fear can just●fie the taking away of anothers life . and because fear can hardly be made manifest , but by some action dishonorable , that bewrayeth the conscience of ones own weakness , all men , in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been predominant , have abstained f●om cruelty , insomuch , that though there be in war no law , the breach wherof is iniury , yet there are in war those lawes the breach whereof is dishonour . in one word therefore , the only law of actions in war , is honour , and the right of war , providence . 3. and seeing natural ayd is necessary for defence , as mutual fear is necessary for peace , wee are to consider how great ayds are required for such defence , and for the causing of such mutual fear , as men may not easily adventure on one another . and first it is evident , that the mutual ayd of two or three men is of very little security . for the odds on the other side , of a man or two , giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault . and therfore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another , their number must be so great , that the odds of a few which the enemie may have , be no certaine and sensible advantage . 4. and supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence , yet shall not the effect follow , unless they all direct their actions to one and the same end ; which direction to one and the same end is that , which chap. 12. sect. 7. is called consent . this consent ( or concord ) amongst so many men , thoug● it may be made by the fear of a present invader , or by the hope of a present conquest , or bootie , and endure as long as that action endureth , nevertheless , by the diversity of judgements and passions in so many men contending naturally ●or honour and advantage one above another ; it is impossible , not only that their consent to ayd each other against an enemie , but also that the peace should last between themselves , with out some mutual and common fear to rule them . 5. but contrary hereunto may be obiected , the experience we have of certain living creatures irrational , that nevertheless continually live in such good order and government for their common benefit , and are so free from sedition & war amongst themselves , that for peace , profit , and defence , nothing more can be imaginable . and the experience we have in this , is in that little creature the bee , which is therefore reckoned amongst animalia politica . why therefore may not men that foresee the benefit of concord , continually maintain the same without compulsion , as well as they ? to which i answer , that amongst other living creatures , there is no question of precedence in their owne species , nor strife about honour , or acknowledgement of one anothers wisdome , as there is amongst men , from whence arise envie and hatred of one towards another , and from thence sedition and war . secondly , those living creatures aim every one at peace , and food common the will of man being voluntary , but the beginning of voluntary actions , is not subject to deliberation and covenant , yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another , he obligeth himself to this , that he resigne his strength and meanes to him , whom he covenanteth to obey . and hereby he that is to command , may by the use of all their means & strength , be able by the terrour thereof , to frame the will of them all to unity and concord , amongst themselves . 8. this union so made , is that which men call now adayes , a body politick , or civil society and the greeks call it {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that is to say , a city , which may be defined to be a multitude of men , united as one person , by a common power , for their common peace , defence and benefit . 9 and as this union into a city or body politick , is instituted with common power over all ther particular persons , or members thereof , to the common good of them all , so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members instituted , a subordinate union of certain men , for certain common actions to be don by those men for some commo● benefit of theirs , or of the whole city ; a● for subordinate government , for counsell for trade , and the like . and these subordinate bodies politick are usually calle●corporations ; and their power such over the particulars of their own society , as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them . 10. in all cities , or bodies politick not subordinate , but independent , that one man , or one councell , to whom the particular members have given that common power , is called their soveraign , and his power the soveraign power ; which consisteth in the power and the strength , that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves by covenant and because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another , or for that other to receive it , it is to be understood , that to transfer a mans power and strength , is no more , but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it . and every member of the body politick , is called a subiect , to wit , to the soveraign . 11. the cause in generall , which moveth a man to become subiect to another , is ( as i have sayd already ) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself . and a man may subiect himself to him that invadeth , or may invade him , for fear of him ; or men may joyne amongst themselves , to subject themselvs to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others , and when many men subject themselves the former way , there ariseth thence a body politick , as it were naturally . from whence proceedeth dominion , paternal , and despotique . and when they subiect themselves the other way , by mutual agreement amongst many , the body politick they make , is for the most part called a common wealth in distinction from the former , though the name be the generall name for them both . and i shall speak in the first place of common wealths , and afterward of bodies politick , patrimoniall , and despotical . the second part . chap. i. 1. introduction . 2. a multitude before their union , &c. 3. expresse consent of every particular , &c. 4. democratical , aristocraticall , monarchiall union , may be instituted for ever , or , &c. 5. without security no private right relinquished . 6. covenants of government without power of coertion are no security . 7. power coercive , &c. 8. the sword of war , &c. 9. decision in all debates &c. annexed to the sword . 10. laws civil , &c. 11. appointment of magestrates , &c. 12. soveraign power includeth impunity . 13. a supposed common weal●h , where lawes are made first , and the common-wealth after . 14. the same refelled . 15. mixt formes of government sup●osed in soveraignty . 16. that refelled . 17. mixt government , &c. 18. reason and experience to prove absolute soveraignty some where in all common wealths . 19. some principal , &c. marks of soveraignty . in that treatise of humane nature which was formerly printed , hath been wholly spent in the consideration of the naturall power , and the natural estate of man , namely , of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters , and how from thence proceed his actions ; in the twelfth , how men know one anothers minds : in the last , in what estate mens passions set them . in the first chapter of this treatise , what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason , that is to say , what be the principall articles of the law of nature , in the 2.3.4.5 . and lastly , how a multitude of persons naturall , are united by covenants into one person civil , or body politick . in this part therefore shall be considered , the nature of a body politick , and the lawes thereof , otherwise called civill laws . and whereas it hath been sayd in the last chapter , and last section of the former part , that there be two wayes of erecting a body politick ; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together which is like a creation out of nothing by humane wit ; the other by compulsion , which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force ; i shall first speak of such erection of a body politick , as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude . 2. having in this place to consider , a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politick , for their security , both against one another , and against common enemies , and that by covenants , the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make , dependeth on the knowledge of the persons , and the knowledge of their end . first , for their persons they are many , and ( as yet ) not one ; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together , be attributed to the multitude , or truly called the action of the multitude , unless every mans hand , and every mans will , ( not so much as one excepted ) have concurred thereto . for multitude , though in their persons they run together , yet they concur not alwaies in their designes . for even at that time when men are in tumult , though they agree a number of them to one mischeife , and a number of them to one another ; yet in the whole , they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility , and not of peace ; like the seditious jews besieged in jerusalem , that could joyn against their enemies , and fight amongst themselves . whensoever therefore any man saith , that a number of men hath done any act , it is to be understood , that every particular man in that number hath consented therunto , and not the greatest part only . secondly , though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves , they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to every thing , and consequently as hath been sayd , chap. 1. sect. 10. in an estate of inioying nothing . and therefore meum & tuum , hath no place amongst them . 3. the first thing therefore they are to do is expresly , every man to consent to something by which they may come neer to their ends , which can be nothing else imaginable , but this , that they allow the wills of the maior part of their whole number , or the wills of the maior part of some certain number of men by them determined and named ; or lastly , the will of some one man , to involve and be taken for the wllis of every man . and this done they are united , and a body politick . and if the maior part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars , then the wills of the particulars , then are they said to be a democracie , that is to say , a government wherein the whole number , or so many of them as please , being assembled together , are the soveraign , and every particular man a subject . if the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest , be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars , then are they said to be an oligarchy , or aristocracy , which two words signifie the same thing , together with the divers passions of those that use them . for when the men that be in that office please , they are called an aristocracy , or otherwise an oligarchy , where in those the major part of which declare the wills of the whole multitude being assembled , are the soveraign , and every man severally a subiect . lastly , if their consent be such , that the will of one man whom they name , shall stand for the wills of them all , then is their government or union called a mornarchy , and that one man a soveraign , and every of the rest a subiect . 4. and those several sorts of unions , governments , and subiections , of mans will may be understood to be made , either absolutely , that is so say , for all future time , or for a time limited only . but forasmuch as we speak here of a body politick , instituted for the perpetuall benefit and defence of them that make it ; which therefore men desire should last for ever , i will omit to speak of those that be temporary , and consider of those that be for ever . 5. the end for which one man giveth up , and relinquisheth to another , or others the right of protecting & defending himself by his own power , is the security which he expecteth thereby , of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it ; and a man may then account himself in the estate of security , when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him , from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that soveraign , to whom they have every one subiected themselves : and without that security , there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages , and make himself a prey to others . and therefore when there is not such a soveraign power erected , as may afford this security , it is to be understood that every mans right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes , remaineth still with him ; and contrarywise , where any subiect hath right by his own judgment and discretion , to make use of his force , it is to be understood that every man hath the like , and consequently that there is no common wealth at all established . how far therefore in the making of a common wealth , man subiecteth his will to the power of others , must appear from the end , namely , security . for whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof , so much is transferred , or else every man is in his naturall liberty to secure himself . 6. covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a common wealth ; and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion , are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant , nor are to be called laws , and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility . for seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear , and where there is no power of coercion , there is no fear , the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness , lust , anger , and the like , to the breaking of those covenants , whereby the rest also , who otherwise would keep them , are set at liberty , and have no law , but from themselves . 7. this power of coercion as hath been sayd , chap. 2. sect. 3. of the former part consisteth in the transferring of every mans right of resistance against him , to whom he hath transferred the power of coercion . it followeth therefore , that no man in any common wealth whatsoever hath right to resist him , or them , on whom they have transferred this power coercive , or ( as men use to call it the sword of justice , supposing the not resistance possible . for part 1. chap. 2. sect. 18. covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour . 8. and forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security , by the means of this sword of justice , that keep them all in awe , are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without , if there be not some means found , to unite their strength● and natural forces , in the resistance of such enemies , their peace amongst themselves is but in vain . and therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member , to contribute their several forces fore the defence of the whole , whereby to make one power as sufficie●t , as is possible for their defence . now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his strength to him , or them , that have the sword of justice , it followeth , that the power of defence , that is to say , the sword of war , be in the same hands , wherein is the sword of justice ; and cons●quently those two swords are but one , and that inseperably and essentially annexed to the soveraign power . 9. moreover , seeing to have the right of the sword , is nothing else but to have the use thereof depending onely on the judgement and discretion of him or them that have it , it followeth , that the power of indenture in all controversies , wherein the sword of justice is to be used ; and in all deliberations concerning war , ( wherein the use of that sword is required ) the right of resolving and determining what is to be done , belong to the same soveraign . 10. farther , considering it is no less , but much more necessary to prevent violence & rapine , then to punish the same when it is committed , & all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerning meum & tuum , right and wrong , good and bad , and the like which men use every one to measure by their own judgements , it belongeth also to the judgment of the same soveraign power , to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his , and what anothers ; what is good and what bad , and what he ought to do and what not , and to command the same to be observed . and these measures of the actions of the subiects are those , which men call laws politick , or civil . the making whereof , must of right belong to him that hath the power of the sword , by which men are compelled to observe them ; for otherwise they should be made in vain . 11. farthermore , seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such soveraign power , can be able in person , to hear and determine all controversies , to be present at al deliberations concerning common good , and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto , whereby there will be necessity of magistrates , and ministers of publique affaires ; it is consequent that the appointment , nomination , & limitation of the same be understood , as an inseperable part of the same soveraignty , ●o which the sum of all iudicature , and execution hath been already annexed . 12. and forasmuch as the right to use the forces of every particular member , is transferred from themselves , to their soveraign , a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself , that to soveraign power ( whatsoever it doth ) there belongeth impunity . 13. the sum of these rights of sov●r●ignty ; namely the absolute use of the sword in peace and war , the making and abrogating of laws , supream , judicature , & decision , in al debate iudiciall and deliberative , the nomination of all magistrates , and ministers , with other rights contained in the same , make the soveraign power no less absolute in the common-wealth , then before common-wealth , every man was absolute in himself , to do , or not to do , what he thought good ; which men that have not had the experience of that miserable estate , to which men are reduced by long war , think so hard a condition , that they can not easily acknowledge such covenants , and subiection on their parts , as are here set down to have been ever necessary to their peace . and therefore some have imagined that a common-wealth may be constituted in such manner as the soveraign power may be so limited , and moderated , as they shall think fit themselves . for example ; they suppose a multitude of men to have agreed upon certain articles , ( which they presently call lawes ) declaring how they will be governed , and that done , to agree farther upon some man , or number of men , to see the same articles performed , and put in execution ; and to enable him , or them thereunto , they allot unto them a provision limited , as of certain lands , taxes , penalties , and the like then , which ( if mispent ) they shall have no more , without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former . and thus they think they have made a common wealth , in which it is unlawfull for any private man to make use of his owne sword for his security ; wherein they deceive themselves . 14. for first , if to the revenue , it did necessarily follow , that there might be forces raised and procured at the will of him that hath such revenue , yet since the revenue is limited , so must also the forces : b●t limited forces against the power of an enemy , which wee cannot limit , are unsufficient . whensoever therefore there happeneth an invasion greater then those forces are able to resist , and there be no other right to levy more , then is every man by necessity of nature , allowed to make the best provision he can for himself ; and thus is the private sword , and the estate of war again reduced . but seeing revenue , without the right of commanding men , is of no use , neither in peace nor war , it is necessary to be supposed , that he that hath the administration of those articles , which are in the former section supposed , must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men . and what reason soever giveth him that right over any one , giveth him the same over all . and then is his right absolute . for he that hath right to all their forces , hath right to dispose of the same . again , supposing those limited forces and revenue , either by the necessary , or negligent use of them to fail , and that for a supply the same multitude be again to be assembled , who shall have power to assemble them , that is to compel them to come together ? if he that demandeth the supply , hath that right , to wit , the right to compell them all , then is his soveraignty absolute ; if not , then is every particular man at liberty to come , or not ; to frame a new common wealth , or not , and so the right of the private sword returneth but suppose them willingly , and of their own accord assembled to consider of this supply , if now it be stil in their choice , whether they shall give it , or not , it is also in their choice , whether the common wealth shall stand , or not . and therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force , in case they think it tend to their defence . this device therefore of them that will make civil laws first , and then a civil body afterwards ( as if policy made a body politick , and not a body politick made policy ) is of no effect . 15. others , to avoid the hard condition , as they take it , of absolute subiection ( which ( in hatred thereto ) they also call slaverie ) have despised a government , as they think , mixed of three sorts of soveraignty . as for example ; they suppose the power of making laws , given to some great assembly democratical , the power of judicature to some other assembly , and the administration of the laws to a third , or to some one man ; and this policy they call mixt mona●chy , or mixt aristocracy , or mixt democracy , according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate . and in this estate of government , they thinke the use of the private sword excluded . 16. and supposing it were so , how were this condition which they call slavery , eased thereby . for in this estate they would have no man allowed , either to be his own judge , or own carver , or to make any lawes unto himself ; and as long as these three agree they are as absolutely subject to them , as is a child to the father , or a slave to the master , in the state of nature . the ease therefore of this subjection , must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom they have dist●ibuted the rights of soveraign power . but the same disagreement is war . the division therefore of the soveraignty , either worketh no effect to the taking away of simple subjection , or introduceth war , wherein the private sword hath place againe . but the truth is , as hath been already shewed in 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12. precedent sections , the soveraignty is indivisible . and that seeming mixture of severall kinds of government , not mixture of the things themselves , but confusion in our understandings , that cannot find out readily to whom we have subiected our selves . 17. but though the soveraignty be not mixt , but be alwaies either simple democracy , or simple aristocracy , or pure monarchy , nevertheless in the administration thereof , all those sorts of government may have place subordinate . for suppose the soveraign power be democracy , as it was sometimes in rome , yet at the same time they may have a counsel aristocratical , such as was the senate ; and at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch , such as was their dictator , who had , for a time , the exercise of the whole soveraignty , & such as are all generals in war . so also in monarchy there may be a councel aristocratical of men , chosen by the monarch , or democratical of men chosen by the consent ( the monarch permitting ) of all the particular men of the common wealth . and this mixture is it that imposeth , as if it were the mixture of soveraignty . as if a man should think , because the great councel of venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrats , ministers of state , captains , and governours of towns , ambassadors , councellors , and the like , that therefore their part of the soveraigt , is only chusing of magistrates : & that the making of war , and peace , and laws were not theirs , but the part of such counsellors as they appointed thereto ; wheras it is the part of these to do it but subordinately , the supream authority therof being in the great councel that chuse them . 18. and as reason teacheth us , that a man considered out of subjection to lawes , and out of all covenants obligatory to others , is free to do and undo , and deliberate as long as he listeth ; every member being obedient to the will of the whole man , that liberty being nothing else but his naturall power , without which he is no better then an inanimate creature , not able to help himself ; so also it teacheth us , that a body politick , of what kind soever , nor subiect to another , nor obliged by covenants , ought to be free , and in all actions to be assisted by the members , every one in their place , or at least not resisted by them . for otherwise , the power of a body politick ( the essence whereof , is the not resistance of the members ) is none , nor a body politick of any benefit . and the same is confirmed by the use of all nations and common-wealths , wherein that man or councel which is virtually the whole , hath any absolute power over every particular member ; or what nation or common-wealth is there , that hath not power and right to constitute a general in their wars ? but the power of a general is absolute ; and consequently there was absolute power in the common wealth , from whom it was derived . for no person , natural or civill , can transfer unto another more power then himself hath . 19. in every common vvealth , where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves there resideth an absolute soveraignty ; as i have already shewed . but in what man , or in what assembly of men the same is placed , is not so manifest , as not to need some marks , whereby it may be discerned . and first , it is an infallible mark of absolute soveraignty in a man or in an assembly of men , if there be no right in any other person , naturall or civil , to punish that man , or to dissolve that assembly . for he that cannot of right be punished , cannot of right be resisted ; and he that cannot of right be resisted , hath coercive power ove● all the rest , and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure , which is absolute soveraignty . contrariwise , he that in a common-wealth is punishable by any , or that assembly that is dissolvable , is not soveraign . for a greater power is alwaies required to punish and dissolve , then theirs who are punished or dissolved ; and that power cannot be called soveraign , then which there is a greater . secondly , that man or assembly , that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other , may make laws , or abrogate them at his or their pleasure , have the soveraignty absolute . for seeing the laws they make , are supposed to be made by right , the members of the common wealth to whom they are made , are obliged to obey them , and consequently not resist the execution of them , which not resistance , maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them . it is likewise a mark of this soveraignty , to have the right originall of appointing magistrates , judges , councellors , and ministers of state . for without that power , no act of soveraignty or government can be performed . lastly , and generally , whosoever by his own authority independent , can do any act , which another of the same common wealth may not , must needs be understood to have the soveraign power . for by nature men have equal right . this inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the common-wealth . he therefore that doth any act lawfully by his owne authorit● , which another may not , doth it by the power of the common-wealth in himself , which is absolute soveraignty . chap. ii. 1. democracy precedeth all other , &c. 2. the soveraign people covenanteth not with the subiects . 3. the soveraign , &c. cannot , &c. do iniury , &c. 4. the faults of the soveraigne people , &c. 5 democracy , &c. an aristocracy of orators . 6. aristocracy how made . 7. the body of the optimates not properly said to iniure the subiects . 8. the election of the optimates , &c. 9. an elective king , &c. 10. a conditional king , &c. 11. the word people equivocal . 12. obedience discharged by release . 13. how such releases are to be understood . 14. obedience discharged by exile . 15. by conquest . 16. by ignorance of the right of succession . having spoken in generall concerning instituted policy in the former chapter , i come in this , to speak of the sorts thereof in special , how every of them is instituted . the first in order of time of these three sorts , is democracy ; and it must be so of necessity , because an aristocracy and a monarchy , require nomination of persons agreed upon , which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part ; and where the votes of the maior part involve the votes of the rest , there is actually a democracie . 2. in the making of a democracie , there passeth no covenant between the soveraign and any subiect . for while the democracy is a making , there is no soveraign with whom to contract . for it cannot be imagined , that the multitude should contract with it seif , or with any one man , or number of men parcell of it self , to make it self soveraign nor that a mulritude considered as one aggregate , can give it self any thing which before it had not . seeing then that soveraignty democraticall is nat conferred by the covenant of any multitude , which supposeth union and soveraignty already made ; it resteth that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of evry several man , that is to say , every man with every man , for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence , covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the maior part of their whole number , or the maior part of such a number of them , as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place , shall determine and command . and this is that which giveth being to a democracy , wherein the soveraign assembly was called of the greeks , by the name of demus , ( that is , the people ) from whence cometh democracy . so that , where to the supreame and independent court , every man may come that will and give his vote , there the soveraign is called the people . 3. out of this that hath been sayd , may readily be drawn , that whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject of the common wealth , the same by him ought not to be stiled iniury . for first iniury ( by the definition , part 1. chap. 3. sect. 2. ) is breach of covenant ; but covenants ( as hath been said in the precedent section ) there passed none from the people to any private man ; and consequently ( to wit the people ) can do him no iniury . secondly , how uniust soever the action be , that this soveraigne d●mus shall do , is done by the will of every particular man subiect to him , who are therefore guilty of the same . if therefore they stile it iniury , they but accuse themselves . and it is against reason for the same man , both to do and complain , implying this contradiction , that wheras he first ratified the peoples acts in general , he now disalloweth the same of them in particular . it is therefore said truly , volenti non fit injuria . nevertheless nothing doth hinder but that divers actions done by the people may be uniust before god almighty , as breaches of the law of nature . 4. and when it hapneth , that the people by plurality of voices , that decree or command any thing contrary to the law of god or nature , though the decree and command be the act of every man , not only present in the assembly , but also absent from it , yet is not the iniustice of the decree , the iniustice of every particular man , but only of those men , by whose express-sufferag●s the decree or command was passed . for a body politick , as it is a fictious body , so are the faculties and will thereof fictious also . but to make a particular man uniust which consisteth of a body and soul natural , there is required a naturall and very will . 5. in all democracies , though the right of soveraignty be in the assembly which is virtually the whole body , yet the use therof is alwaies in one , or a few particular men . for in such great assemblies , as those must be , whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure , there is no means any waies to deliberate and give councel what to do but by long and set orations , whereby to every man there is more or less hope given to incline & sway the assembly to their own ends . in a multitude of speakers therefore where alwaies either one is eminent alone , or a few being equal amongst themselvs are eminent above the rest , that one or few must of necessity sway the whole . insomuch that a democracy , in effect is no more then an aristocracy of orators , interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator 6. and seeing a democracy is by institution , the beginning both of aristocracy and monarchy , we are to consider next , how aristocracy is derived from it . when the particular members of the common wealth growing weary of attendance at publick courts , as dwelling far off , or being attentive to their private businesses , and withall , displeased with the government of the people , assemble themselves to make an aristocracy , there is no more required to the making thereof , but putting to the question one by one , the names of such men as it shall consist of , and assenting to their election ; and by plurality of vote to transfer that power , which before the people had , to the number of men so named and chosen . 7. and from this manner of erecting an aristocracy , it is manifest , that the few , or optimates , have entred into no covenant with any of the particular members of the common vvealth , wherof they are soveraign ; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man , that can be called injury to him , howsoever their act be wicked before almighty god , according to that which hath been sayd before sect ● . farther it is impossible , that the people , as one body politick , should covenant with the aristocracy or optimates , on whom they intend to transfer their soveraignty . for no sooner is the aristocracy erected , but the democracy is annihilated , and the covenants made unto them void . 8. in all aristocracies the admission of such as are from time to time to have vote in the soveraign assembly , dependeth on the will and decree of the present optimates . for they being the soveraign , have the nomination ( by the 11. section of the former chapter ) of all magistrates , ministers , and counsellors of state whatsoever , and may therefore chuse either to make them elective , or hereditary , at their pleasure . 9. out of the same democracy , the institution of a political monarch proceedeth in the same manner , as did the institutio● of the aristocracy , to wit , by a decree of the soveraign people , to passe the soveraignty to one man named and approved by plurality of suffrage . and if this soveraignty be truly and indeed transferred , the estate or common-wealth is an absolute monarchy wherein the monarch is at liberty , to dispos● as well of the succession , as of the possession and not an elective kingdome . for suppos● a decree be made first in this manner , tha● such a one shal have the soveraignty for hi● life , and that afterward they will chuse a new ▪ in this case , the power of the people is dissolved , or not ; if dissolved , then after the death of him that is chosen , there is no man bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall , as private men , run together to make a new election ; and consequently , if there be any man , who by the advantage of the raign of him that is dead , have strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience , he may lawfully , or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do ; if this power of the people were not dissolved at the chusing of their king for life , then is the people soveraign still , and the king a minister thereof only , but so , as to put the whole soveraignty in execution , a great minister , but no otherwise for his time , then a dictator was in rome . in this case at the death of him that was chosen , they that meet for a new election , have no new , but their old authority for the same . for they were the soveraign all the time , as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings , that have procured from the people , that their children might succeed them . for it is to be understood , when a man receiveth any thing from the authority of the people , he receiveth it not from the people his subiects , but from the people his soveraign . and farther though in the election of a king for his life , the people grant him the exercise of their soveraignty for that time ; yet if they see cause , they may recall the same before the time . as a prince that conferreth an office for life , may nevertheless upon suspition of abuse thereof , recall it at his pleasure ; in as much as offices that require lobour and care , are understood to passe from him that giveth them , as onera , burthens , to them that have them ; the recalling whereof are therefore not injury , but favour . nevertheless if in making an elective king , with intention to reserve the soveraignty , they reserve not a power at certaine known and determined times and places to assemble themselves , the reservation of their soveraignty is of no effect , in as much as no man is bound to stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble themselves without the soveraign authortiy . 10. in the former section is shewed , that elective kings that exercise their soveraignty for a time , which determines with their life , either are subjects , or not soveraigns ; and that it is , when the people in election of them , reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certaine times and places limited and made known ; or else absolute soveraigns to dispose of the succession at their pleasure , and that is , when the people in their election have declared no time nor place of their meeting , or have left it to the power of the elected king , to assemble and dissolve them at such times as he himselfe shall think good . there is another kind of limitation of time to him that shal be elected to use the soveraign power , ( which whether it hath been practised anywhere , or not i know not , but it may be imagined , and hath been obiected against the rigor of soveraign power ) and it is this , that the people transfer their soveraignty upon conditions . as for example , for so long as he shall observe such and such lawes , as they then prescribe him . and here as before in elected kings , the question is to be made , whether in the electing of such a soveraign , they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known , or not ; if not , then is the soveraignty of the people dissolved , and have neither power to iudge of the breach of the conditions given him , nor to command any forces for the deposing of him , whom on that condition they had set up , but are in the estate of war amongst themselves , as they were before they made themselves a democracy ; and consequently , if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the publick meanes , be able to compel them to unity and obedience , he hath not only of the right of nature to warrant him , but of the law of nature to oblige him thereunto . but if in electing him , they reserved to themselves a right of assembling , and appointed certain times and places to that purpose , then are they soveraign still , and may call their conditional king to account at their pleasure , and deprive him of his government , if they judge he deserve it , either by breach of the condition set him , or otherwise . for the soveraign power can by no covenant with a subiect be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command , as a burden imposed not particularly for his good , but for the good of the soveraign people . 11. the controversies that arise concerning the right of the people , proceed from the equivocation of the word . for the word people hath a double signification . in one sense it signifieth onely a number of men , distinguished by the place of their habitation ; as the people of england , or the people of france , which is no more , but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions , without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them , by which any one of them is obliged to the rest . in another sense , it signifieth a person civill , that is to say , either one man or one councel , in the will whereof is included and involved , the will of every one in particular . as for example ; in this later sence , the lower house of parliament is all the commons as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto ; but after they be dissolved , though they remain , they be no more the people nor the commons , but only the aggregate , or multitude of the particular men there sitting , how well soever they agree , or concur , in opinions amongst themselves ; whereupon they that do not distinguish between these two significations , do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved multitude , as belong only to the people virtually contained in the body of the common wealth or soveraignty . and when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation , they usually give them the name of the whole nation . in which sense they say the people rebelleth , or the people demandeth , when it is no more then a dissolved multitude , of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something , yet the heap , or multitude , cannot be said to demand or have right to any thing . for where every man hath his right distinct , there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto : and when the particulars say , this is mine , this is thine , and this is his , and have shared all amongst them , there can be nothing whereof the multitude can say , this is mine ; nor are they one body as behoveth them to be , that demand any thing under the name o mine , or his : and when they say ours every man is understood to pretend in severall , and not the multitude : on the other , side , when the multitude is united into a body politick , and thereby are a people in the other signification , and their wills virtually in the soveraign , there the rights and demands of the particulars do cease ; and he or they that have the soveraign power , doth for them all demand and vindicate under the name of his , that which before they called in the plural , theirs . 12. vve have seen how particular men enter into subiection by transferring their rights ; it followeth to consider , how such subiection may be discharged . and first , if he or they that have the soveraign power , shall relinquish the same voluntarily , there is no doubt , but every man is again at liberty to obey or not . likewise , if he or they retaining the soveraignty over the rest , do neverthless exempt some one or more , from their subiection , every man so exempted , is discharged , for he or they to whom any man is obliged , hath the power to release him . 13. and here it is to be understood , that when he or they that have the soveraign power , give such exemption , or priviledge , to a subiect , as is not seperable from the soveraignty , and nevertheless directly retaineth the soveraign power , not knowing the consequence of the priviledg they grant , the person or persons exempted or priviledged , are not thereby released . for in contradictory significations of the will , part 1. chap. 13. sect. 9. that which is directly signified , is to be understood for the will , before that which is drawn from it by consequence . 14. also exile perpetual , is a release of subiection , forasmuch , as being out of the protection , of the soveraignty that expelled him , he hath no meanes of subsisting but from himself . now every man may lawfully defend himself , that hath no other defence ; else there had been no necessity , that any man should enter into voluntary subiection , as they do in common wealths . 15. likewise a man is released of his subiection by conquest . for when it cometh to pass , that the power of a common wealth is overthrown , and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of his enemy , yeildeth himself captive , he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him , and consequently discharged of his obligation to the former . for no man can serve two masters . 16. lastly , ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience . for no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom . chap. iii. 1.2 . titles to dominion ; master and servant , &c. 3. chaines and other , &c. bonds &c. slave defined . 4. servants have no property against their lord , &c. 5. the master hath right to alienate his servant . 6. the servant of the servant , &c. 7. how servitude is discharged . 8. the middle lord . &c. 9. the title of man , &c. over beasts . having set forth in the two preceding chapters , the nature of a common wealth institutive by the consent of many men together , i come now to speak of dominion , or a body politick by acquisition , which is commonly called a patrimonial kingdome . but before i enter thereinto , it is necessary to make known upon what title one man may acquire right , that is to say , property or dominion over the person of another . for when one man hath dominion over another , there is a little kingdome . and to be a king by acquisition , is nothing else but to have acquired a right or dominion over many . 2. considering men therefore again in the estate of nature , without covenants or subjection one to another , as if they were but even now all at once created male and female , there be three titles only , by which one man may have right and dominion over another ; whereof two may take place presently , and those are , voluntary offer of subjection , and yeilding by compulsion : the third is to take place upon the supposition of children begotten amongst them . concerning the first of these three titles , it is handled before in the two last chapters . for from thence cometh the right of soveraigns over their subjects in a common wealth institutive . concerning the second title , ( which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of death ) thereby accrueth a right of dominion . for where every man ( as it happeneth in this case ) hath right to all things , there needs no more for the making of the said right effectual but a covenant from him that is overcome , not to resist him that overcometh . and thus cometh the victor to have right of absolute dominion over the conquered . by which there is presently constituted a little body politick , which consisteth of two persons , the one soveraign , which is called the master or lord ; the other subiect , which is called the servant . and when a man hath acquired right over a number of servants so considerable , as they cannot by their neighbours be securely invaded , this body politick is a kingdome despotical . 3. and it is to be understood that when a servant taken in the vvars , is kept bound in natural bonds , and chaines and the like , or in prison , there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master . for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant , and they shew , that the servant is not trusted . but covenant , ( part 1. chap. 15. sect. 9. ) supposeth trust . there remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound , or in prison , a right of delivering himself , if he can , by what means soever . this kind of servant is that which ordinarily , and without passion , is called a slave . the romanes had no such distinct name , but comprehended all under the name of servus ; whereof such as they loved and durst trust , were suffered to go at liberty , and admitted to places of office , both neer to their persons , & in their affaires abroad ; the rest were kept chained , or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance . and as it was amongst the romanes , so it was amongst other nations , the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant , without which the master had no reason to trust them ; the later being without covenant , and no otherwise tyed to obedience , but by chains , or other like forcible custody . 4. a master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those , whose bodies he leaveth at liberty , then over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment , and hath absolute dominion over both , and may say of his servant , that he is his , as he may of any other thing : and whatsoever the servant had , and might call his is now the master's ; for he that disposeth of the person , disposeth of all the person could dispose of : insomuch , as though there be meum & tuum among servants distinct from one another by the dispensation and for the benefit of their master , yet there is no meum & tuum belonging to any of them against the master himselfe , whom they are not to resist , but to obey all his commands as law . 5. and seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him , is the property of the master , and every man may dispose of his own , and transfer the same at his pleasure , the master may therefore alienate his dominion over them , or give the same by his last will to whom he list . 6. and if it happen , that the master himself by captivity or voluntary subjection , become servant to another , then is that other master paramount ; & those servants of him that becometh servant , are no farther obliged , then their master paramount shall think good ; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate , disposeth of all he hath , and consequently of his servants . so that the restriction of absolute power in masters , proceedeth not from the law of nature , but from the political law of him , that is their master supream or soveraign . 7. servants immediate to the supream master , are discharged of their servitude , or subiection in the same manner that subiects are released of their allegiance in a common wealth institutive . as first , by release . for he that captiveth , ( which is done by accepting what the captive transferreth to him ) setteth again at l●berty , by transferring back the same . and this kinde of release is called manumission . secondly , by exile . for that is no more but manumission given to a servant , not in the way benefit , but punishment . thirdly , by a new captivity , where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself , hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master , and for the safety of his life , entring into new covenant with the conquerour , is bound to doe his best endeavour to keep that likewise . fourthly , ignorance of who is successor to his diceased master , dischargeth him of obedience : for no covenant holdeth longer then a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it . and lastly , that servant that is no longer trusted , but committed to his chains and custody , is thereby discharged of the obligation in foro interno , and therefore if he can get loose , may lawfully goe his way . 8. but servants subordinate , though manumitted by their immediate lord , are not thereby discharged of their subiection to their lord paramount , for the immediate master hath no propertie in them , having transferred his right before to another , namely , to his own and supream master . nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant , doth he thereby release his servants of their obligation to him that is so manumitted . for by this manumission , he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before . for after a release , ( which is the discharge of a covenant ) the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made . 9. this right of conquest , as it maketh one man master over another , so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures . for if a man in the state of nature be in hostility with men , and thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill , according as his owne conscience and discretion shall suggest , unto him for his safety and benefit , much more may he doe the same to beasts ; that is to say , save and preserve for his own service , according to his discretion , such as are of nature apt to obey , and commodious for use ; and to kill and destroy with perpetual war , all other , as fierce and noysome to him . and this dominion is therefore of the law of nature , and not of the divine law positive . for if there had been no such right , before the revealing of gods will in the scripture , then should no man to whom the scripture hath not come , have right to make use of those his creatures , either for his food or sustenance . and it were a hard condition of mankind , that a fierce and salvage beast , should with more right kill a man , then a man a beast . chap. iv. 1. the dominion over the child , &c. 2. preheminence of sex giveth not the child to the father , rather then to the mother . 3. the title of the father or mother , &c. 4. the child of a woman-servant , &c. 5. the right to the child given from the mother , &c. 6. the child of the concubine , &c. 7. the child of the husband and the wife , &c. 8. the father , or he or she that bringeth up the child , have absolute power over him . 9. freedome in subiects what it is . 10. a great family is a patrimonial kingdome . 11. succession of the soveraign power , &c. 12. though the successor be not declared , yet there is alwayes one to be presumed . 13. the children preferred to the succession , &c. 14. the males before females . 15. the eldest before the rest of the brothers . 16. the brother next to the children . 17. the succession of the possessor , &c. of three wayes by which a man becometh subiect to another , mentioned sect. 2. chap. the last , namely , voluntary offer , captivity and birth , the former two have been spoken of , under the name of subiects and servants . in the next place , we are to set down the third way of subiection , under the name of children , and by what title one-man commeth to have propriety in a child , that proceedeth from the common generation of two , ( to wit ) of male and female . and considering men again dissolved from all covenants one with another , and that ( part 1. chap. 4. sect. 2. ) every man by the law of nature , hath right or propriety to his own body , the child ought rather to be the proprietie of the mother , ( of whose body it is part , till the time of separation ) then of the father . for the understanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his or their child , two things are to be considered ; first , what title the mother , or any other originally hath , to a child new born : secondly , how the father , or any other man , pretendeth by the mother . 2. for the first , they that have written of this subiect have made generation to be a title of dominion over persons , as well as the consent of the persons themselves . and because generation giveth title to two , namely , father , and mother , whereas dominion is indivisible , they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the father only , ob praestantiam sexus ; but they shew not , neither can i find out by what coherence , either generation inferreth dominion , or advantage of so much strength , which , for the most part , a man hath more then a woman , should generally and universally entitle the father to a propriety in the child and take it away from the mother . 3. the title to dominion over a child , proceedeth not from the generation , but from the preservation of it ; and therefore in the estate of nature , the mother , in whose power it is to save or destroy it , hath right thereto by that power , according to that which hath been sayd , part 1. chap. 1. sect. 13. and if the mother shall think fit to abandon , or expose her c●ild to death , whatsoever man or woman shall finde the child so exposed shall have the same right which the mother had before ; and for this same reason , namely , for the power not of generating , but preserving . and though the child thus preservd , do in time acquire strength , whereby he might pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him , yet shall that pretence be thought unreasonable , both because his strength was the gift of him , against whom be pretendeth , and also because it is to be presumed that he which giveth sustenance to another , whereby to strengthen him , hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof . for else it would be wisdome in men , rather to let their children perish , while they are infants , then to live in their danger or subiection , when they are grown . 4. for the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother , they be of divers kinds . one by the absolute subiection of the mother ; another , by some particular covenant from her , which is less then a covenant of such subiection . by absolute subiection , the master of the mother hath right to her child , according to sect. 6. chap. 3. whether he be the father thereof , or not . and thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master in perpetuum 5. of covenants that amount not to subiection between man and woman , there be some which are made for a time ; they are covenants of cohabitation , or else of copulation only . and in this later case , the children pass by covenants particular . and thus in the copulation of the amazones with their neighbours , the fathers by covenant had the male children only , the mothers retaining the females . 6. and covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed , or for society of all things ; if for society of bed only , then is the woman called a concubine . and here also the child shall be his or hers , as they shall agree particularly by covenant . for although for the most part , a concubine is supposed to yeild up the right of her children to the father , yet doth not concubinate enforce so much . 7. but if the covenants of cohabitation be for societie of all things ; it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both ; without which , ( as hath been often said before ) societie cannot last . and therefore the man , to whom for the most part , the woman yeildeth the government , hath for the most part also , the sole right and dominion over the children . and the man is called the husband , and the woman the vvife . but because sometimes the government may belong to the vvife only , sometimes also the dominion over the children shall be in her only . as in the case of a soveraign queen , there is no reason that her marriage should take from her the dominion over her children . 8. children therefore , whether they be brought up and preserved by the father , or by the mother , or by whomsoever are in most absolute subjection to him or her , that so bringeth them up , or preserveth them . and they may alienate them , that is , assign his or her dominion , by selling , or giving them , in adoption or servitude , to others ; or may pawn them for hostages , kill them for rebellion , or sacrifice them for peace , by the law of nature , when he or she , in his or her conscience , think it to be necessary . 9. the subiection of them who institute a common wealth amongst themselves , is no less absolute then the subiection of servants . and therein they are in equal estate . but the hope of those is greater then the hope of these . for he that subiecteth himself uncompelled , thinketh there is no reason he should be better used then he that doth it upon compulsion ; and coming in freely calleth himself , though in subiection , a freeman ; whereby it appeareth that liberty is not any exemption from subiection and obedience to the soveraign power , but a state of better hope then theirs , that have been subiected by force and conquest . and this was the reason , that the name which signifieth children in the latine tongue , is liberi , which also signifieth free men . and yet in rome nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others , as children in the family of their fathers . for both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers , and the father might kil his son by his own authority , without any warrant from the state . freedome therefore in common-wealths , is nothing but the honour of equality of favour with other subiects , and servitude the estate of the rest . a free-man therefore may expect employments of honour , rather then a servant . and this is al that can be understood by the liberty of the subiect . for in all other senses , liberty is the state of him that is not subiect . 10. now when a father that hath children hath servants also , the children ( not by the right of the child , but by the natural indulgence of the parents ) are such fremen . and the whole consisting of the father or mother , or both , & of the children , & of the servants , is called a family , wherin the father or mother of the family is soveraign of the same , and the rest ( both children and servants equally ) subiects . the same family , if it grow by multiplication of children , either by generation or adoption ; or of servants , either by generation , gonquest , or voluntary submission , to be so great and numerous , as in probability it may protect it self , then is that family called a patrimoniall kingdome , or monarchy by acquisition , wherein the soveraignty is in one man , as it is in a monarch made by politicall institution . so that whatsoev●r rights be in the one , the same also be in the other . and therefore i shall no more speake of them as distinct , but of monarchy in general . 11. having shewed by what right the several sorts of common-wealths , democracy , aristocracy , and monarchy , are erected , it followeth , to shew by what right they are continued . the right by which they are continued , is called the right of succession to the soveraign power ; whereof there is nothing to be said a democracy , because the soveraign dyeth not , as long as there be subjects alive . nor in any aristocracy , because it cannot easily fall out , that the optimates should every one fail at once : and if it should so fall out , there is no question , but the common wealth is thereby dissolved . it is therefore in a monarchy only , that there can happen a question concerning the succession . and first , forasmuch as a monarch , which is absolue soveraign , hath the dominion in his own right , he may dispose thereof at his own will . if therefore by his last will , he shall name his successor , the right passeth by that will . 12. nor if the monarch dye without any will concerning the succession declared , it is not therefore to be presumed , it was his will his subiects , which are to him as his children and servants , should return again to the state of anarchy , that is to war and hostility . for that were expresly against the law of nature , which commandeth to procure peace , and to maintain the same . it is therefore to be conjectured with reason , that it was the intention to bequeath them peace , that is to say , a power coercive , whereby to keep them from sedition amongst themselves ; and rather in the form of a monarchy , then any other government ; forasmuch as he , by the exercise thereof in his own person , hath declared , that he approveth the same . 13. farther , it is to be supposed , his intention was , that his own children should be preferred in the succession ( when nothing to the contrary , is expresly declared ) before any other . for men naturally seek their own honour , and that consisteth in the honour of their children after them . 14. again , seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue the governmen● in his successors , as long as he may ; and that generally men are indued with greate● parts of wisdom and courage , by which al● monarchies are kept from dis●olution , then women , are it is to be presumed , where no express will is extant to the contrary , he preferreth his male children before the female . not but that women may governe and have in divers ages and places governed wisely , but are not so apt thereto in generals , as men . 15. because the soveraign power is indivisible , it cannot be supposed , that he intended the same should be divided , but that it should descend intirely upon one of them , which is do be presumed , should be the eldest , assigned thereto by the lot of nature , because he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof . besides , what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren , the odds shall be adiudged to the elder , because no subiect hath authority otherwise to judge thereof . 16. and for want of issue in the possessor , the brother shall be presumed successor . for by the judgement of nature , next in blood , is next in love , and next in love , is next to preferment . 17. and as the succession followeth the first monarch , so also it followeth him or her that is in possession ; and consequently , the children of him in possession , shall be prefe●red before the children of his father , or predecessor . chap. v. 1. the utility of the common-wealth , &c. 2. the losse of liberty , &c. 3. monarchy approved , &c. 4. monarchy less subiect to passion , &c. 5.6 . subiects in monarchy , &c. 7. laws in monarchy less changeable , &c. 8. monarchies less subiect to dissolution . having set forth the nature of a person politick , and the three sotts thereof , democracy , aristocracy , and monarchy , in this chapter shall be declared , the convencies , and inconveniencies , that arise from the same , both in general ; and of the said several sorts in particular . and first , seeing a body politick is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular men , the benefit and damage thereof consieth in the benefit or damage of being ruled . the benefit is that for which a body politick was instituted , namely , the peace and preservation of every particular man , then which it is not possible there can be a greater , as hath been touched before , part 1. chap. 1. sect. 12. and this benefit extendeth equally both to the soveraign and to the subjects . for he or they that have the soveraign power , have but the defence of their persons , by the assistance of the particulars ; and every particular man hath his defence by their union in the soveraign . as for other benefits , which pertain not to their safetie and sufficiency , bu● to their well and delightfull being , such as are superfluous riches , they so belong to the soveraign , as they must also be in the subject ; and so to the subiect , as they must also be in the soveraign . for the riches and treasure of the soveraign , is the dominion he hath over the riches of his subiects . if therefore the soveraign provide not so , as that particular men may have means , both to preserve themselvs , and also to preserve the publick the common or soveraign treasure can be none . and on the other side , if it were not for a common and publick treasure belonging to the soveraign power , mens private riches would sooner serve to put them into confusion and war , then to secure and maintain them . insomuch , as the profit of the soveraiegn & subiect goeth alwayes together . that distinction therefore of government , that there is one government for the good of him that governeth , & another for the good of them that be governed ; whereof the former is despotical , ( that is lordly ) the other , a government of freemen , is not right . no more is the opinion of them that hold it to be no city , which consisteth of a master and his servants . they might as well say , it were no city that consisted in a father and his own issue , how numerous soever they were . for to a master that hath no children , the servants have in them all those respects , for which men love their children . for they are his strength , and his honour . and his power is no greater over them , then over his children . 2. the inconvenience arising from government in general , to him that governeth consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about the businesse of other men , that are his subiects , and partly in the danger of his person . for the head alwayes is that part , not only where the care resideth , but also against which the stroke of an enemy most commonly is directed . to ballance this incommodity , the soveraignty , together with the necessity of this care and danger , comprehendeth so much honour ; riches and means , whereby to delight the mind , as no private mans wealth can attain unto . the inconveniences of government , in generall to a subiect are none at all , if well considered , but in appearance . there be two things that may trouble his mind , o● two general grievances , the one is losse of liberty ; the other , the uncertainty of meum & tuum . for the first , it consisteth in this , that a subiect may no more governe his own actions according to his own discretion and judgement , ( which is all one ) conscience , as the present occasions from time to time shall dictate to him , but must be tyed to do according to that will onely , which once for all , he had long ago laid up , and involved in the wills of the maior part of an assembly , or in the will of some one man . but this is really no inconvenience . for , as it hath been shewed before , it is the only meanes , by which we have any possibility of preserving our selves . for if every man were allowed this liberty , of following his conscience , in such difference of consciences , they would not live together in peace an hour . but it appeareth a great inconvenience to every man in particular , to be debarred of this liberty , because every one a part considereth it as in himself , and not as in the rest , by which means , l●berty appeareth in the likeness of rule and government over others . for where one man is at liberty , and the rest bound , there that one hath government ; which honour , he that understandeth not so much , demanding by the name simply of liberty , thinketh it a great grievance and iniury to be denyed it . for the second grievance concerning meum & tuum , it is also none , but in appearance only ; it consisteth in this , that the soveraign power , taketh from him that which he used to enjoy , knowing no other propriety but use and custome . but without such soveraign power , the right of men is not proprietie to any thing , but a community , no better then to have no right at all , as hath been shewed , part. 1. chap. 1. sect. 10. propriety therefore being derived from the soveraign power , is not to be pretended against the same , especially , when by it every subject hath his propriety against every other subject , which when soveraignty ceaseth , he hath not , because in that case they return to war amongst t●ems●lves . those levies therfore which are made upon mens estates , by the soveraign authority , are no more but the price of that peace and defence which the sovraignty maintaineth for them . if this were not so , no money nor forces for the wars , not any other publick occasion , could justly be levied in the world . for neither king , nor democracy , nor aristocracy , nor the estates of any land , could do it , if the soverainty could not . for in all those cases it is levied by virtue of the soveraignty . nay more , by the three estates , here the land of one man may be transferred to another , without crime of his from whom it was taken , and withomt pretence of publick benefit , as hath been done ; and this without injury , because done by the soveraign power . for the power whereby it is done , is no less then soveraign , and cannot be greater . therefore this greivance for meum & tuum is not real , unless more be exacted then is necessary ; but it seemeth a greivance , because to them that either know not the right of soveraignty , or to whom that right belongeth , it seemeth an injury , and iniury howsoever little the dammage is alwaies greivous as putting us in minde of our disability to help our selves , and into envy of the power to do us wrong . 3. having spoken of the inconveniencies of the subiect , by government in general , let us consider the same in the three several sorts thereof , namely , democracy , aristocracy and monarchy ; whereof the two former are in effect but one . for ( as i have shewed befo●e ) democracy is but the governement of a few orators . the comparison therefore will be between monarchy and aristocracy : and to omit that the world as it was created , so also it is governed by one god almighty ; and that all the ancients have have preferred monarchy before other governments , both in opinion , because they faigned a monarchial government amongst their gods , and also by their custome ; for that in the most ancient times all people were so governed ; and that paternal government which is monarchy , was instituted in the beginning from the creation , & that other governments have proceeded from the dissolution thereof , called by the rebellious nature of mankind , and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented by humane wit , i will insist only on this comparison upon the inconvenies that may happen to the subiects , in consequence to each of these governments . 4. and first , it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so great a power to one man , as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the same ; and som think it inconvenient eo nomine , because he hath the power . but this reason we may not by any means admit . for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by almighty god , who without question hath more power over every man , then can be conferred upon any monarch . this inconvenience therefore must be derived , not from the power , but from the aff●ctions and passions which raign in every one , as well monarch , as subject , by which the monarch may be swayd to use that power amiss . and because an aristocracy consisteth of men , if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together , then the passions of one man alone , it will follow , that the inconvenience arising from passions will be greater in an aristocracy then a monarchy . but there is no doubt , when things are debated in great assemblies , but every man delivering his opinion at large without interruption endeavour●th to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good , better ; and what he would have apprehended as evill , worse , as much as is possible , to the end his counsel may take place ; which counsel also is never without ayme at his own benefit , or honour ; every mans end ●e●ng some good to himself . now this cannot be done without working on the passions of the rest . and thus the passions of these that are singly moderate , are altogether vehement , even as a great many coals , though but warm asunder , being put together , inflame one another . 5. another inconvenience of monarchy , is this , that the monarch , besides the riches necessary for the defence of the common wealth , may take so much more from the subiects , as may enrich his children , kindred and favourites , to what degree he pleaseth ; which though it be indeed an inconvenience , if he should so do , yet is the same both greater in an aristocracy , and also more likely to come to pass . for their , not one only , but many have children , kindred , and friends to raise . and in that point they a●e as twenty monarchs for one , and likely to set forward one anothers designs mutually , to the oppression of all the rest . the same also happeneth in a democracy , if they all do agree , otherwise they bring a worse inconvenience , to wit , sedition . 6. another inconvenience of monarchy , is the power of dispencing with the execution of iustice , whereby the family and friends of the monarch may with impunity , commit outrages upon the people , or oppresse them with extortion . but in ar●stocracies , not only one , but many have power of taking men out of the hands of iustice , and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits . and therefore they understand amongst themselves without further speaking , as a tacite covenant , hodie mihi , cras tibi . 7. another inconvenience of monarchy , is the power of altring lawes . concerning which , it is necessary that such a power be , that lawes may be altered , according as mens manners charg , or as the coniuncture of all circumstances within and without the common wealth shall require ; the change of law being then inconvenient , when it proceedeth from the change , not of the occasion , but of the minds of him or them , by whose authority the laws a●e made . now it is manifest enough of it self , that the mind of one man is not so variable in that point , as are the decrees of an assembly . for not only they have all their natural changes , but the change of any one man may be enough with eloquence and reputation , or by solicitation and faction , to make that law to day , which another by the very same means shall abrogate to morrow . 8. lastly , the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a common wealth , is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war , and to this are monarchies much less subiect then any other governments . for where the union or band of a common wealth is one man , there is no distraction whereas in assemblies , those that are of different opinions , and give different counsel are apt to fall out amongst themselves , and to cross the designs of the common wealth for one anothers sake : and when they cannot have the honour of making good their owne devices , they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of the adversaries prove vain . and in this contention , when the opposite factions happen to be any thing equal in strength . they presently fal to war . wherein necessity teacheth both sides , that an absolute monarch , to wit , a general , is necessary both for their defence against one another , and also for the peace of each faction within it self . but this aptitude to dissolution , is to be understood for an inconvenience in such aristocracies onely , where the affairs of state are debated in gr●at and numerous assemblies , as they were anciently in athens , and in rome ; and not in such as doe nothing else in great assemblies , but choose magistrates and counsellours , and commit the handling of state-affaires to a few ; such as is the aristocracy of venice at this day . for these are no more apt to dissolve from this occasion , then monarchies , the counsel of state being both in the one and the other alike . chap. vi . 1. a difficulty concerning absolute subiection to man , arising from our absolute subiection to god almighty , propounded . 2. that this difficulty is onely amongst those christians , that deny the interpretation of scripture , to depend upon the soveraign authority of the common-wealth . 3. that humane lawes are not made to govern the consciences of men , but their words and a●●ions . 4. places of scripture to prove obedience due from chr●stians to their soveraign in all things . 5. a distinction propounded betwe●n a fundamentall point of faith , and a superstruction . 6. an explication of the points of faith , that be fundam●ntal . 7. the bel●ef of those fundamental points , is all that is required to salvation , as of fai●h . 8. that other points not fundamen●all , are not necessary to salvation , as matter of faith ; and that no more is required by way of faith to the salvation of one man , th●n to another . 9. that super●●ructions are not points of the faith necessary to a christian . 10. how faith and justice c●ncurre to salvation . 11. that in christian common-wealths , obedience to god and man stand wel together . 12. this tenet , whatsoever is against the conscience , is sin , interpreted 13. that all men do confess the necessity of submitting of controversies to some humane authority . 14. that christians under an infidel , are discharged of the iniustice of disobeying them , in that which concerneth the faith necessary to salvation , by not resisting . having shewed , that in all common-wealths whatsoever , the necessity of peace and government requireth , that there be existent some power , either in one man , or in one assembly of men , by the name of the power soveraign , to which it is not lawfull for any member of the same common-wealth to disobey ; there occurreth now a difficulty , which if it be not removed , maketh it unlawfull for a man to put himself under the command of such absolute soveraignty , as is required thereto . and the difficulty is this ; we have amongst us the word of god for the rule of our actions : now if wee shall subiect our selves to men also , obliging our selves to do such actions , as shall be by them commanded , when the commands of god and man shall differ , we are to obey god , rather then man ; and consequently , the covenant of general obedience to man is unlaw●ull . 2. this difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the world . there was no such dilemna amongst the jewes ; for their civil law , and divine law , was one and the same law of moses ; the interpreters whereof were the priests , whose power was subordinate to the power of the king ; as was the power of aaron to the power of moses . nor is it a controversie that was ever taken notice of amongst the grecians , romanes , or other genti●es : for amongst these their severall civill lawes , were the rules whereby not only righteousness and virtue , but also religion , and the external worship of god was ordered and approved ; that being esteemed the true worship of god which was {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , according to the laws civil . also those christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of rome , are free from this question ; for that they allow unto him ( their soveraign ) to interpret the scriptures , which are the law of god as he in his own judgement shall think right . this difficulty therefore remaineth amongst , and troubleth those christians only , to whom it is allowed , to take for the sense of the scripture , that which they make thereof , either by their own private interpretation , or by the inte●pretation of such as are not called thereunto by publick authority ; they that follow their own interpretation continually demanding liberty of conscience ; and those that follow the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the soveraign of the common-wealth , requiring a power in matters of religion , either above the power civil , or at least not depending on it . 3. to take away this scruple of conscience , concerning obedience to humane lawes , amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of god in the holy scriptures , i propound to their consideration , first , that no humane law is intended to oblige the conscience of a man , unlesse it break out into action , either of the tongue , or other part of the body . the law made thereupon would be of none effect , because no man is able to discern , but by word or other action , whether such law be kept or broken . nor did the apostles themselves pretend dominion over mens consciences concerning the faith they preached , but only perswasion and instruction . and therefore s. paul saith , 2 cor. 1.24 . writing to the corinthians , concerning their controversies , that he and the rest of the apostles had no dominion over their faith , but were helpers of their joy . 4. and for the actions of men which proceed from their consciences , the regulating of which actions is the only means of peace , if they might not stand with justice , it were impossible that justice towards god , and peace amongst men , should stand together in that r●ligion that teacheth us , that justice and peace should kiss each other , and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obedience to humane authority ; as mat. 23.2 , 3. we have this precept . the scribes & pharisees sit in moses seat ; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe that observe and do . and yet were the scribes and pharisees not preists , but men of temporall authority . again , luke 11.17 . every kingdome divided against it self shall be desolate ; and is not that kingdome divided against it self , where the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private opinion or conscience , and yet those actions such as give occasion of offence and breach of peace . again , rom. 13.5 . wherefore you must be subject , not because of wrath only , but also for conscience sake , tit. 3.1 . put them in remembrance , that they be subiect to principalities and powers , 1. pet. 2.13.14 . submit your selves unto all manner of ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be unto the king , as unto the superiour , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent of him for the punishment of evill doers . jude verse 8. these dreamers also that defile the flesh , and despise government , and speake evill of them that are in authority . and forasmuch as all subiects in common wealths are in the nature of children and servants , that which is a command to them is a command to all subiects . but to these s. paul saith , colos. 3.20.22 . children obey your parents in all things , servants be obedient to your masters according to the flesh in all things . and verse 23. do it heartily as to the lo●d . these places considered , it seemeth strange to me , that any man in a christian common wealth , should have any occasion to deny his obedience to publick authority , upon this ground , that it is better to obey god then man . for though s. peter and the apostles did so answer the councel of the jews , that forbade them to preach christ , there appeareth no reason that christians should alledge the same against their christian governours that command to preach christ . to reconcile this seeming co●tradiction of simple obedience to god , and simple obedience to man , we are to consider a christian subiect , as under a christian soveraign , or under an infidell . 5. and under a christian soveraign we are to consider , what actions we are forbidden by god almighty to obey them in , and what not . the actions we are forbidden to obey them in , are such only , as imply a denial of that faith which is necessary to our salvation : for otherwise there can be no pretence of disobedience ; for why should a man incur the danger of a temporal death , by displeasing of his superiour , if it were not for fear of eternal death hereafter . it must therefore be inquired , what those propositions and articles be ; the beleife whereof our saviour or his apostles have declared to be such as without beleiving them a man cannot be saved ; and then all other points that are now controverted and made distinction of sects , papists , lutheran , calvinists , arminians &c. as in old time , the like made paulists , apollonians , and cephasians , must needs be such , as man needeth not for the holding thereof , deny obedience to his superiours . and for the points of faith necessary to salvation , i shall call them fundamental , and every other point a superstruction . 6. and without all controversie , there is not any more necessary point to be believed for mans salvation then this , that jesus is the messiah , that is , the christ ; which proposition is explicated in sundry sorts , but still the same in effect ; as that he is gods annointed , for that is signified by the word christ . that he was the true and lawful king of israel , the son of david , the saviour of the world , the redeemer of israel , the salvation of god he that should come into the world , the son of god , and ( which i desire by the way to have noted , against the now sect of arrians ) the begotten son of god , act. 3.13 . heb. 55. the only begotten son of god , 1 joh. 1.14.18 . joh. 3.16 , 18. 1 joh. 4.9 . that he was god joh. 1 1 joh. 20.28 . that the fulness of the god●ead dwelt in him bodily . moreover , the holy one , the holy one of god , the forgiver ●f sins , , that he is risen from the dead . these are explications , and parts of that general article , that jesus is the christ . this point therefore , and all the explications thereof are fundamental ; as also all such , as be evidently inferred from thence : as , belief in god the father . joh. 12.44 . he that beleveth in me , believeth not in me , but in him that sent me : 1 joh. 2.23 , he that denyeth the son , hath not the father , belief in god the holy ghost , of whom christ saith , joh. 14.26 . but the comforter which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name . and joh. 15.16 . but when the comforter shall come whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth . beleife of the scriptures , by which we beleeve those points , and of the immortality of the soul , without which we cannot beleeve that he is a saviour . 7. and as these are the fundamentall points of faith necessary to salvation , so also are they only necessary as matter of faith ●nd also essential to the calling of a christian ; as may appear by many evident places of holy scripture : joh. 5.39 . search the scriptures , for in them you think to have eteral life , and they are they which testifie of me . now , forasmuch as by the scripture , is meant there the old testament ( the new being then not written ) the beleife of that which was written concerning our saviour in the old testament , was sufficient beleife for the obtaining of eternal life : but in the old testament there is nothing revealed concerning christ , but that he is the messiah , and such things as belong to the fundamentall points thereupon depending . and therefore those fundamental points are sufficient to salvation as of faith . and joh. 6.28.29 . then sayd they unto him , what shall we do , that we might work the works of god ? jesus answered and said unto them , this is the work of god , that ye beleeve in him , whom he hath sent . so that the point to be beleived is , that jesus christ came forth from god , and he which believeth it , worketh the works of god . joh. 11.26.27 . whosoever liveth and beleiveth in me , shall never dye . beleevest thou this ? she sayd unto him , yea lord , i beleeve that thou art the christ the son of god , which should come into the world . hence followeth , he that beleiveth this shall never dye . joh. 20.31 . but these things are wri●ten that ye might beleeve , that jesus is the christ , the son of god , and that in beleiving , ye might have life through his name . by which appeareth , that this fundamentall point is all that is required , as of faith to our salvation . 1 joh. 4.2 . every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come into the flesh is of god : 1 joh. 5.1 . whosoever beleiveth that j●s●s is the christ is born of god , and ver. 5. who is it that overcometh the world , but he that beleiveth that jesus is the son of god : and vers. 13. these things have i written unto you that beleeve in the name of the son of god , that ye may know that ye have ●ternall life . act. 8.36.37 . the eunuch said , here is water , what doth let me to be baptized ? and philip said unto him , if thou beleevest with i● thy heart , thou mayst . he answered and sayd , i beleeve that jesus christ is the son of god . this point therefore was sufficient for the reception of man into baptisme , that is to say , to christianity . and act. 16.30 . the keeper of the prison , fell down before paul and silas , and said , sirs , what shall i do to be saved ? and they sayd , beleeve in the lord jesus christ . and the sermon of s. peter upon the day of pentecost , was nothing else but an explication , that jesus was the christ . and when they had heard him , asked him , what shal we do , he said unto them , ac. 2.38 . amend your lives , and be baptized evry one of you in the name of jesus christ for the remission of sins . rom. 10.9 . if thou shalt conf●ss with thy mouth the lord jesus , and shalt beleeve in thy heart , that god raised him up from the dead , thou shalt be saved . to these places may be added , that wheresoever our savior christ doth approve the faith of any man , the proposition beleeved ( if the same to be collected out of the text ) is alway some of those fundamentall points before mentioned , or something equivalent : as the faith of the centurion , mat. 8.8 . speake the word only , and my servant shall be healed , beleiving he was omnipotent : the faith of the woman , which had an issue of blood , math , 9.21 . if i may but touch the hem of his garment , implying , he was the messiah , the faith required of the blind men , mat. 9.28 . beleeve you that i am able to do this ? the faith of the canaanitish woman , matth. 15.22 . that he was the son of david , implying the same . and so it is in every one of those places ( none excepted ) where our saviour commendeth any mans faith , which because they are too many to insert here , i omit , and refer them to his inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied . and as there is no other faith required , so there was no other preaching : for the prophets of the old testament , preached no other , and john the baptist preached only the approach of the kingdome of heaven , that is to say , of the kingdome of christ , the same was the commission of the apostles , mat. 10.7 . go preach , saying , the kingdome of heaven is at hand . and paul preaching amongst the jews , act. 18.5 . did but testifie unto the jews that , jesus was the christ . and the heathens took notice of christians no otherwise , but by this name that they beleeved jesus to be a king , crying out . act. 17.6 . these are they that have subverted the state of the world , and here they are , whom jason hath received . and these all doe against the decrees of caesar , saying , that there is another king , one jesus . and this was the sum of the predictions , the sum of the confessions of them that beleeved , as well men as devils . this was the title of his crosse , jesus of nazareth , king of the jewes ; this the occasion of the crowne of thorns , scepter of reed , and a man to carry his crosse ; this was the subiect of the hosan●a's ; and this was the title , by which our saviour commanding to take another mans goods , bad them say , the lord hath need : and by this title , he purged the temple of the profane market kept there . nor did the apostles themselves believe any more , then that jesus was the m●ssiah , nor understand so much ; for they understood the messiah to be no more then a temporall king , till after our saviours resurrection . furthermore , this point , that christ is the messiah , is particularly set forth for fundamentall by that word , or some other equivalent thereunto in divers places . upon the confession of peter , matth. 16.16 . thou art the christ , the son of the living god , our saviour ver. 18. saith , upon this rock will i build my church . this point therefore is the whole foundation of christs church . rom. 15.20 . s. paul raith , i so inforced my self to preach the gospel , not where christ was named , lest i should have built upon another mans foundation , 1 cor. 3.10 . s. paul when he had reprehended the corinthians for their sects , & curious doctrines and questions , he distinguisheth between fundamental points , and superstruction ; and saith , i have laid the foundation , and another buildeth thereupon ; but let every man take heed how he buildeth upon it , for other foundation can no man lay , then that which is laid , which is jesus christ . colos. 2.6 . as you have received christ jesus the lord , so walk in him , rooted and builded in him , and stablished in the faith . 8. having shewed this proposition , jesus is the christ , to be the only fundamentall and necessary point of faith , i shal set down a few places more , to shew , that other points , though they may be true , are not so necessary to be believed , as that a man may not be saved , though he believe them not . and first , if a man could not be saved without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies , which are now in agitation concerning religion , i cannot see , how any man living can be saved ; so full of subtilty , and curious knowledge it is to be so great a divine . why therefore should a man think that our saviour , who , mat. 11.30 . saith , that his yoke is easie , should require a matter of that difficulty ? or how are little children said to believe . mat. 18.6 . or how could the good thief be thought sufficiently catechized upon the crosse ? or s. paul so perfect a christian presently upon his conversion ? and though there may be more obedience required in him that hath the fundamental points explicated unto him , then in him that hath received the same but implicitely ; yet there is no more faith required for salvation in one man , then in another . for if it be true , that whosoever shall confesse with his mouth the lord jesus , and believe in his heart , that god raised him from the dead , shall be saved ; as it is , rom. 10.9 . and that whosoever believeth that jesus is the christ , is born of god , the belief of that point is sufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he be , for as much as concerneth faith . and seeing he that believeth not that jesus is the christ , whatsoever he believe else , cannot be saved , it followeth , that there is no more required to the salvation of one man , then another , in matter of faith . 9. about these points fundamental , there is little controversie amongst christians , though otherwise of different sects amongst themselves . and therefore the controversies of religion , are altogether about points unnecessary to salvation ; whereof some are doctrines raised by humane ratiocination , from the points fundamentall . as for example ; such doctrines as concern the manner of the real presence , wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning the omnipotency & divinity of christ , with the tenets of aristotle and the peripatelicks , concerning substance and accidents , species , hypostasis , and the subsistence and migration of accidents from place to place ; words some of them without meaning , and nothing but the canting of grecian sophisters . and these doctrines are condemned expresly , col. 2.8 . where after s. paul had exhorted them to be rooted and builded in christ , he giveth them this farther caveat ; beware lest there be any man that spoil you through philosophy and vain deceits , through the traditions of men , according to the rudiments of the world . and such , are such doctrines , as are raised out of such places of the scriptures , as concern not the foundation , by mens natural reason ; as about the concatenation of causes , and the manner of gods predestination ; which are also mingled with philosophy : as if it were possible for men that know not in what manner god seeth , heareth , or speaketh , to know nevertheless the manner how he intendeth , and predestinateth . a man therefore ought not to examin by reason any point , or draw any consequence out of scripture , by reason , concerning the nature of god almighty , of which reason is not capable . and therefore s. paul , rom. 12.3 . giveth a good rule , that no man presume to understand above that which is meet to understand , but that he understand according to sobriety , which they doe not , who presume out of scripture , by their own interpretation , to raise any doctrine to the understanding , concerning those things , which are incomprehensible . and this whole controversie concerning the predestination of god , and the free wil of man , is not peculiar to christian men . for we have huge volumes of this subiect , under the name of fate & contingency , disputed between the epicurians and the stoicks , and consequently it is not matter of faith , but of philosophy : and so are also all the questions concerning any ot●er point , but the foundation before named : and god receiveth a man which part of the question soever he holdeth . it was a controversie in s. pauls time , whether a christian gentile might eate freely of any thing which the christian jews did not : and the jew condemned the gentile that he did eat , to whom s. paul saith , rom. 14.3 , let not him that eateth not , iudge him that eateth : for god hath received him . and vers. 6. in the question concerning the observing of holy dayes , wherein the gentiles the jewes differed , he saith unto them , he that observeth the day , observeth it to the lord , and he that observeth not the day , observeth it not to the lord . and they who strive concerning such questions , and divide themselves into sects , are not therefore to be accounted zealous of the faith , their strife being but carnal , which is confirmed by s. paul , 1 cor. 3.4 . when one saith , i am of paul , and another , i am of apollos , are ye not carnal ? for they are not questions of faith , but of wit , wherein carnally men are inclined to seek the mastery one of another . for nothing is truly a point of faith , but that jesus is the christ ; as s. paul testifieth , 1 cor. 2.2 . for i esteemed not the knowledge of any thing amongst you , save jesus christ , and him crucified . and 1 tim. 6.20 . o timotheus , keep that which is committed un●o thee , and avoid prophane and vain bablings , and opposition of science falsly so called , which while s●me profess , they have erred concerning the faith . 2 tim. 2.16 . stay prophane and vain bablings , &c. vers. 17. of which sort is hymeneus and philetus , which as concerning the truth , have erred , saying , that the resurrectionis past already . whereby s. paul shewed , that the raising of questions by humane ratiocination , though it be from the fundamental points themselves , is not onely not necessary , but most dangerous to the faith of a christian . out of all these places , i draw only this conclusion in general , that neither the points now in controversie amongst christians of different sects , or in any point that ever shall be in controversie , excepting only those that are contained in this article , jesus is the christ , are necessary to salvation , as of faith ; though in matter of obedience , a man may be bound not to oppose the same . 10. although to the obtaining of salvation , there be required no more , as hath been already declared out of the holy scriptures , as matter of faith , but the belief of those fundamental articles before set forth , neverthelesse , there are required other things , as matter of obedience . for as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms ( to avoid the punishment which kings may inflict ) to acknowledge the right and title of the king , without obedience also to his laws ; so also it is not enough , to acknowledge our saviour christ to be the king of heaven , in which consisteth christian faith , unless also we endeavour to obey his lawes , which are the lawes of the kingdome of heaven , in which consisteth christian obedience . and forasmuch as the laws of the kingdom of heaven , are the laws of nature , as hath been shewed , part. 1. chap. 5. not only faith , but also the observation of the law of nature , which is that for which a man is called just or righteous , ( in that sense , in which justice is taken not for the absence of guilt , but for the endeavor and constant will to do that which is just ) not only faith , but this justice , which also from the effect thereof , is called repentance , and sometimes works , is necessary to salvation . so that faith and justice do both concur thereto ; and in the several acceptation of this word justification , are properly said both of them to justifie ; and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn . for not only he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his titl● , but also he that doth it upon the inordinatenesse of his passions , deserveth punishment . and when faith and works are separated , not only the faith is called dead without works , but also works are called dead works without faith , and therefore s. james , chap. 2.17 . saith , even so the faith , if it have no works , is dead in it self , and vers. 26. for as the body without the spirit is dead , even so faith without works is dead . and s. paul , heb. 6.1 . calleth works without faith , dead works , where he saith ; not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works . and by these dead works , is understood not the obedience and justice of the inward man , but the opus operatum , or external action , proceeding from fear of punishment , or from vain glory , and desire to be honoured of men : and these may be separated from faith , and conduce no way to a mans justification . and for that cause , s. paul , rom. 4. excludeth the righteousness of the law , from having part in the justification of a sinner . for by the law of moses , which is applyed to mens actions , and requireth the absence of guilt , all men living are liable to damnation , and therefore no man is iustified by works , but by faith only . but if workes be taken for the endeavour to doe them , that is , if the will be taken for the deed , or internal , for external righteousness , then doe works contribute to salvation . and then taketh place that of s. james , chap. 2.24 . ye see then how that of works a man is iustisted , and not of faith only . and both of these are ioyned to salvation , as in s. mark . 1.5 . repent and believe the gospel . and luk. 18.18 . when a certain ruler asked our saviour , what he ought to doe to inherit eternal life , he propounded to him the keeping of the commandements ; which when the ruler said he had kept , he propounded to him the faith , sell all that thou hast , and fellow me . and joh. 3.36 . he that beleeveth in the son , hath everlasting life . and he that obeyeth not the son , shall not see life . where he manifestly ioyneth obedience and faith together . and rom 1.17 . the just shall live by faith : not every one , but the just . for also the devils beleeve and tremble . but though both faith and justice ( meaning still by justice , not absence of guilt , but the good intentions of the mind , which is called righteousness by god , that taketh the will for the deed ) be both of them said to iustifie , yet are their parts in the act of justification to be distinguished . for justice is said to iustifie , not because it absolveth , but because it denominates him just , and setteth him in an estate , or capacity of salvation , whensoever he shal have faith . but faith is said to justifie , that is , to absolve , because by it a iust man is absolved of , and forgiven his uniust actions . and thus are reconciled the places of s. paul , and s. james , that faith only iustifieth , and a man is iustified by faith onely : and shewed how faith and repentance must concur to salvation . 11. these things considered , it will easily appear , that under the soveraign power of a christian common vvealth , there is no danger of damnation from simple obedience to humane lawes : for in that the soveraign alloweth christianity , no man is compelled to renounce that faith , which is enough for his salvation , that is to say , the fundamental points . and for other points , seeing they are not neces●ary to salvation , if we conform our actions to the lawes , we do not only what we are allowed , but also what we are commanded by the law of nature , which is the morall law taught by our saviour himself . and it is part of that obedience , which must concur to our salvation . 12. and though it be true , whatsoever a man doth against his conscience , is sin , yet the obedience in these cases is neither sin , nor against the conscience . for the conscience being nothing else but a mans setled judgement and opinion , when he hath once transferred his right of judging to another , that which shall be commanded , is no lesse his judgement , then the judgement of that other . so that in obedience to lawes , a man doth still according to his owne conscience , but not his private conscience . and whatsoever is done contrary to private conscience , is then a sin , when the lawes have left him to his own liberty , and never else . and then whatsoever a man doth , not only believing it is ill done , but doubting whether it be ill or not , is done ill , in case he may lawfully omit the doing . 13. and as it hath been proved , that a man must submit his opinions in matter of controversie to the authority of the common wealth , so also is the same confest by the practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it . for who is there differing in opinion from another , and thinking himself to be in the right , and the other in the wrong , that would not think it reasonable , if he be of the same opinion that the whole state alloweth , that the other should submit his opinion also thereunto ; or that would not be content , if not that one or a few men , yet all the divines of a whole nation , or at least an assembly of all those he liketh , should have the power to determine all the controversies of religion ? or , who is there that would not bee content , to submit his opinions either to the pope , or to a genenerall councel , or to a provincial councel , or to a presbyterie of his owne nation ? and yet in all these cases hee submitteth himselfe to no greater then humane authoritie . nor can a man bee said to submit himselfe to holy scripture , that doth not submit himselfe to some or other for the interpretation thereof . or , why should there bee any church government at all instituted , if the scripture it selfe could doe the office of a judge in controversies of faith , ? but the truth is apparent , by continuall experience , that men seeke not onely liberty of conscience , but of their actions , nor that onely , but a farther liberty of perswading others to their opinions ; nor that onely , for every man desireth that the soveraign authoritie , should admit no other opinions to bee maintained , but such as hee himselfe holdeth . 14. the difficulty therefore of obeying both god and man in a christian common wealth is none : all the difficulty resteth in this point , whether hee that hath received the faith of christ , having before subiected himselfe to the authoritie of an infidell , bee discharged of his obedience thereby , or not , in matters of religion . in which case it seemeth reasonable to thinke , that since all covenants of obedience are entred into for the preservation preservation of a mans life , if a man be content without resistance to lay down his life , rather then obey the commands of an infidel , in so hard a case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof . for no covenant bindeth farther then to endeavour ; and if a man cannot assure himself to perform a iust duty , when thereby he is assured of present death , much less it can be expected , that a man should perform that , for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned eternally . and thus much concerning the scruple of conscience , that may arise concerning obedience to humane lawes , in them that interpret the law of god to themselves . it remaineth , to remove the same scruple from them , that submit their controversies to others not ordained thereunto by the soveraign authority . and this i refer to the chapter following . chap. vii . 1. the questions propounded , who are the magistrates in the kingdome of christ . 2. the questions exemplified , in the controversies between moses and aaron , and between moses and corah . 3. amongst the jews , the power temporal and spiritual in the same hand . 4. parallel of the twelve princes of israel , and the twelve apostles . 5. parallel of seventy elders , and seventy disciples . 6. the hierarchy of the church in our saviours time , consisted in the twelve , and in the seventy . 7. why christ ordained not priests for sacrifices , as moses did . 8. the hierarchy of the church in the apostles time , apostles , bishops , and priests . 9. the preaching of the gospel , was not commanding , but perswading . 10. excommunication . soveraignes immediate rulers ecclesiasticall under christ . 11. that no man hath any just pretence of religion against obedience to common-vvealth . god speaketh to man by his vicegerents . in the former chapter have been removed those difficulties opposing our obedience to humane authority ; which arise from misunderstanding of our saviours title and lawes : in the former whereof , namely , his title , consisteth our faith ; and in the latter , our justice . now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning his title , and lawes , may neverthelesse have different opinions concerning his magistrates , and the au●hority he hath given them . and this is the cause , why many christians have denyed obedience to their princes , pretending that our saviour christ hath not given this magistracy to them but to others . as for example , some say , to the pope universally ; some to a synod aristocratical ; some , to a synod democraticall in every several common vvealth ; and the magistrates of christ being they by whom he speaketh , the question is , whether he ●peak unto us by the pope , or by convocations of bishops and ministers , or by them that have the soveraign power in every common-wealth . 2. this controversie was the cause of those two mutinies , that happened against moses in the wilderness . the first by aaron and his sister miriam , who took upon them to censure moses for marrying an ethiopian woman . and the state of the question between them and moses , they set forth , numb. 12.2 . in these words , vvhat hath the lord spoken but only by moses ? hath be not spoken also by us ? and the lord heard this , &c. and punished the same in miriam , forgiving aaron upon his repentance . and this is the case of all them that set up the priest-hood against the soveraignty . the other was of corah , dathan , and abiram , who with two hundred and fifty captains gathered themselves together against moses , and against aaron . the state of their controversie was this , whether god were not with the multitude , as well as with moses , and every man as holy as he . for numb. 16.3 . thus they say , you take too much upon you , seeing all the congregation is holy , every one of them , and the lord is amongst them : wherefore then lift ye your selves above the congregation of the lord ? and this is the case of them that set up their private consciences , and unite themselves to take the government of religion out of the hands of him or them , that have the soveraign power of the common wealth : which how well it pleaseth god , may appear by the hideous punishment of corah and his complices . 3. in the government therefore of moses , there was no power neither civil , nor spiritual , that was not derived from him . nor in the state of israel under kings , was there any earthly power by which those kings were compellable to any thing , or any subiect allowed to resist them in any case whatsoever . for though the prophets by extraordinary calling , did often admonish and threaten them , yet they had no authority over them . and therefore amongst the jews , the power spirituall and temporall , was alwayes in the same hand , 4. our saviour christ , as he was the rightful king of the jewes in particular , as well as king of the kingdome of heaven , in the ordaining of magistrates , received that form of policy , which was used by moses . according to the number of the children of jacob , moses tooke unto him by the appointment of god , numb. 1.4 . twelve men , every one of the chief of their tribe , which were to assist him in the muster of israel . and these twelve , vers. 24. are called the princes of israel , twelve men , every one for the house of their fathers , which are said also , numb. 7.2 . to be heads over the houses ●f their fathers and princes of the tribes , and ●ver them that were numbred . and these were every one equall amongst themselves , in like manner our saviour tooke unto him twelve apostles to be next unto him in authority , of whom he saith , matth. 19.28 . when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his maiesty , ye shall follow me in the regeneration , shall sit also upon twelve thrones , and iudge the twelve tribes of israel . and concerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst themselves , our saviour saith , matth. 20.25 . ye know that the lords of the gentiles have domination over them , &c. vers. 26. but it shall not be so amongst you ; but whosoever will be greatest among you , let him be your servant . and matth. 23.11 . he that is greatest among you , let him be your servant , and a little before , vers. 8. be not called rabbi , for one is your doctor , christ , and all ye are brethren . and act. 1. in the chusing of matthias to be an apostle , though s. peter used the part of a prolocutor , yet did no man take upon him the authority of election , but referred the same to lot . 5. again moses had the command of god , num. 11.16 . gather to me seventy men of the elders of israel , whom thou knowest that they are the elders of the people , and governors over them , and bring them unto the tabernacle , &c. and moses did accordingly , vers . 24. and these were chosen to help moses in bearing the burthen of the government , as appeareth vers. 17. of the same chapter . and as the twelve princes of the tribes were according to the number of jacobs children ; so were the seventy elders according to the number of the persons that went down with jacob into egypt . in like manner our saviour in his kingdome of heaven , the church , out of the whole number of those that believed in him , ordained seventy persons , which peculiarly were called the seventy disciples , to whom he gave power to preach the gospel and baptize . 6. in our saviours time therefore , the hierarchy of the church consisted ( besides himself that was the head ) of twelve apostles , who were equal amongst themselves , but ordained over others , as were the twelve heads of the tribes , or seventy disciples , who had every one of them power to baptize and teach , and help to govern the whole flock . 7. and whereas in the common wealth instituted by moses , there was not only an high priest for the present , but also a succession and order of priest ; it may be demanded why our saviour christ did not ordain the like ? to which may be answered , that the high priesthood , for as much as concerneth the authority thereof , was in the person of christ , as he was christ , that is , king . so also was it in moses , aaron having the ministerial part only . for notwithstanding that aaron was the high priest , yet the consecration of him belonged to moses exod. 29.1 . all the utensils of sacrifice , and other holy things , were ordered by moses , and in sum , the whole levitical law was delivered by god , by the hand of moses , who was to aaron a god ; and aaron to him a mouth . and for the ministerial part , there could no high priest be ordained but himself : for seeing our saviour was himself the sacrifice , who but himself could offer him up ? and for the celebration of that sacrifice for ever after , our saviour annexed the priest-hood to those whom he had appointed to govern in the church . 8. after the ascension of our saviour , the apostles dispersed themselves for the spreading of the gospel , and continually as they converted any number of men , in any city , or region , to the faith ; they chose out such as they thought fittest to direct them in matter of conversation and life , according to christs law , and to explicate unto them , that mysterie of christ come in the flesh , that is to say , to unfold unto them at large the office of the messiah . and of those elders some were subordinate to others , according as the apostles who ordained them , thought meet : so s. paul gave power unto titus , to ordain elders in crete , & to redress things that were amiss . so that titus was an elder & ordained elders . tit. 1.5 . for this cause i left thee in creet , that thou shouldest continue to redress the things that remain , & ordain elders in every city , where the word is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} that is constitute ; whereby it appeareth , that in the apostles times , one elder had authority over another , to ordain and rule them . for , 1 tim. 5.16 . timothy an elder , is made iudg of accusations against other elders . and act. 14.23 . the disciples are said to ordain elders , for all the congregations of the cities , they had preached in . and though the word there be {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , yet it signifieth not election , by holding up of hands , but simply and absolutely ordination . for the ordinary chusing of magistrates amongst the grecians , which were all either popularly governed , or else by oligarehy , being performed by holding up of hands , made that word be taken simply , for an election , or ordination , howsoever made . and thus in the primitive church , the hierarchy of the church was apostles , elders that governed other elders , and elders that ruled not , but their office was to preach , to administer the sacraments , to offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the name of the people . but at that time there appeared no distinction between the names of bishop and elder . but immediatly after the apostles time , the word bishop was taken to signifie such an elder as had the government of elders ; and other elders , were called by the name of priests , which signifieth the same that elder doth . and thus the government of bishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve rulers , and seventy elders of israel , in the twelve apostles , and seventy disciples of our saviour , in the ruling elders , and not ruling-elders in the time of the apostles . 9. and thus much of the magistrates over christs flock in the primitive church . for the office of a minister , or ministress was to be subiect to the flock , and to serve them in those things which appertained to their temporal business . the next thing to be considered is the authority which our saviour gave to them , either over those whom they had converted , or those whom they were about to convert . and for these latter , which as yet were without the church , the authority which our saviour gave to his apostles was no more but this , to preach unto them that jesus was the christ , and to explicate the same in all points , that concern the kingdome of heaven , and to perswade men to embrace our saviours doctrine , but by no meanes to compel any man to be subiect to them : for seeing the lawes of the kingdom of heaven , as hath been shewed , par. 1. chap. 5. sect. 10. are dictated to the conscience onely , which is not subiect to compulsion and constraint , it was not congruent to the style of the king of heaven to constrain men to submit their actions to him , but to advise them only ; nor for him that professeth the sum of his law to be love , to extort any duty from us with feare of temporall punishment . and therefore as the mighty men in the world , that hold others in subiection , by force , are called in scripture by the name of hunters , so our saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw the world unto him , by subduing their affections , fishers . and therefore he saith to peter and andrew , math 4.19 . follow me and i will make yee fishers of men . and luke 10.3 . behol● ( saith christ ) i send yee forth as lambs amongst wolves . and it were to no end to give them the right of compelling without strengthing the same with greater power then of lambs amongst wolves . moreover , math 10. where our saviour giveth a commission to his twelve apostles . to go forth and convert the nations to the faith , he giveth them no authority of coercion and punishment , but only saith , vers. 14. whosoever shall not receive you , nor hear your words , when ye depart out of that house or that city , shake off the dust of your fee . it shall be easier for the land of sodome and gomorrah in the day of judgmemt then for that city . whereby it is manifest , that all that the apostles could do by their authority , was no more than to renounce communion with them , and leave their punishment to god almighty , in the day of judgement . likewise the comparisons of the kingdom of heaven , to the seed math 13.3 . and to the leven , math 13.33 . doth intimate unto us , that the increase thereof ought to proceed from internall operation of gods word preached , and not from any law or compulsion of them that preach it . moreover our saviour himselfe saith joh. 18.36 . that his kingdome is not of this world , and consequently his magistrates derive not from him any authority of punishing men in this world . and therefore also math 26.52 . after s. peter had drawn his sword in his defence , our saviour saith , put up thy sword into his place . for all that take the sword , shall perish by the sword . and vers. 54. how then shal the scriptures be fullfilled , which say , that it must be so ? shewing out of the scriptures , that the kingdome of christ was not to be defended by the sword . 10. but concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over those who were all-ready converted and within the church , ●here be that think it greater then over them ●ithout . for some have said . though the law of christ deprive no prince of his dominion , and paul did rightly appeal unto cesar , whilst kings were ●nfidells and out of the church , yet when they became christians , and of their own accord under went the lawes of the gospel , presently as sheep to a shepherd , and as members to the head , they became subiect to the prelate of the ecclesiastical hierarchy . bell. lib. de rom. pont. chap. 29. which whether it be true or not , is to be considered by that light which we have from the holy scripture , concerning the power of our saviour and his apostles ▪ over such as they had converted . but our saviour , as he imitated the common-wealth of the jewes in his magistrates , the twelve and the seventy , so did he also in the censure of the church , which was excommunication ; but amongst the jews , the church did put the excommunicated persons from the congregation , which they might do by their power temporall ; but our saviour and his apostles , who took upon them no such power , could not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place and congregation , into which he was permitted to enter , by the prince , or soveraign of the place . for that had been to deprive the soveraign of his authority . and therefore the excommunication of a person subject to an earthly power , was but a declaration of the church , which did excommunicate , that the person so excommunicated was to be reputed still as an infidell , but not to be driven by their authority out of any company , he might otherwise lawfully come into . and this is it our saviour saith , math. 18.17 . if he refuse to hear the church , let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican . so that the whol effect of excommunicating a christan prince , is no more then he or they that so excommunicate him depart and banish themselves out of his dominion . nor can they thereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him ; for that were to deprive him of his dominion ; which they may not do , for being out of the church . it is confessed by them that make this objection , and proved in the former section , that our saviour gave no authority to his apostles to be judges over them . and therefore in no case can the soveraign power of a common-wealth be subject to any authority ecclesiasticall , besides that of christ himselfe . and though he be informed concerning the kingdome of heaven and subiect himselfe thereto , at the perswasions of persons ecclesiasticall , yet is he not thereby subiect to their goverment and rule . for if it were by their authority he took that yoke upon him , and not by their perswasion , then by the same authority he might cast it off . but this is unlawfull . for i● all the churches in the world should renounce the christian faith , yet is not this sufficient authority for any of the members to do the same . it is manifest therefore , that they who have soveraign power , are immediate rulers of the church under christ , and all other but subordinate to them . if that were not , but kings should command one thing upon pain of death , and priests another , upon pain of damnation , it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand together . 11. and therefore there is no iust cause for any man to withdraw his obedience from the soveraign state , upon pretence , that christ had ordained any state ecclesiasticall above it . and though kings take not upon them the ministeriall priesthood , yet are they not so meerly laick , as not to have sacerdotall jurisdiction . to conclude this chapter ; since god speaketh not in these dayes to any man by his private interpretation of the scriptures , nor by the interpretation of any power above or not depending on the soveraign power of every common wealth , it remaineth , that he speaketh by his vice-gods , or lievtenants here on earth , that is to say , by soveraign kings , or such as have soveraign authority as well as they . chap. viii 1. the things that dispose to rebellion , discontent , pretence , and hope of successe . 2. discontent that disposeth to sedition , consisteth partly in fear of want , or punishment . 3. partly in ambition . 4. six heads of pretences to rebellion 5. the first of them , that men ought to do nothing against conscience , confuted . 6. the second , that soveraigns are subiect to their own lawes , confuted . 7. the third , that the soveraignty is divisible , confuted . 8. the fourth , that subiects have a propertye distinct from the dominion of the soveraign confuted . 9. the fift . that the people is a person distinct from the soveraign , confuted . 10. the sixt , that tirannicide is lawfull confuted . 11. foure heads of hope of successe in rebellion . 12. two things necessary to an author of rebellion , much eloquence , and little wisdome . 13. that the authors of rebellion necessarily are to be men of little wisdome . 14. that the same are necessarily eloquent . 15. in what manner they concur to their common effects . hitherto of the causes why , and the manner how , men have made common wealths . in this chapter i shall shew breifly by what causes , and in what manner they be again destroyed ; not meaning to say any thing concerning the dissolution of a common wealth , from forreign invasions , which is as it were the violent death thereof . i shall speak only of sedition , which is also the death of the common-wealth , but like to that which happeneth to a man from sicknesse and distemper . to dispose men to sedition , three things concur . the first is discontent ; for as long as a man thinketh himself wel , and that the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his proceeding from well to better , it is impossible for him to desire the change thereof . the second is pretence of right ; for though a man be discontent , yet if in his own opinion there be no iust cause of stirring against , or resisting the government established , nor any pretence to justify his resistance , and to procure aid , he will never shew it . the third is hope of success : for it were madness to attempt without hope , when to fail , is to dye the death of a traytor . without these three , discontent , pretence , and hope , there can be no rebellion : and when the same are all together , there wanteth nothing thereto , but a man of credit to set up the standard , and to blow the trumpet . 2. and as for discontent , it is of two sorts : for it consisteth either in bodily pain present or expected , or else in trouble of the mind ; ( which is the general division of pleasure and pain , part 1. cha. 7 sect. 9. ) the presence of bodily pain disposeth not to sedition ; the feare of it doth . as for example ; when a great multitude or heap of people , have concurred to a crime worthy of death , they joyn together , and take armes to defend themselves for feare thereof . so also the feare of want , or in present want , the feare of arrests and imprisonment dispose to sedition . and therefore great exactions , though the right thereof be acknowledged , have caused great seditions . as in the time of hen 7. the seditions of the cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy , and under the conduct of the lord audley , gave the king battel upon black heath ; and that of the northern people , who in the some kings time , for demanding a subsidy granted in parliament , murthered the ea●l of northumberland in his house . 3. thirdly , the other sort of discontent , which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease , without fear of want , or danger of violence , ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power , and that honour and testimony thereof , which they think is due unto them . for all joy and grief of mind consisting ( as hath been said part 1. chap. 9. sect. 21. ) in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves , such men must needs take it ill , and be greived with the state , as finde themselves postposed to those in honour , whom they think they excell in virtue and ability to govern . and this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as slaves . now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subiection , liberty in a common wealth is nothing but government and rule , which because it cannot be divided , men must expect in common ; and that can be no where but in the popular state or democracy . and aristotle saith well , lib. 6. c. 2. of his politicks , the ground or intention of a democracy , is liberty . vvhich he confirmeth in these words ; for men ordinarily say this , that no man can partake of liberty , but only in a popular common wealth : whosoever● therefore in a monarchicall estate ▪ where the soveraign power is absolutely in one man , claimeth liberty , claimeth ( if the hardest construction should be made thereof ) either to have the soveraignty in his turn , or to be collegue with him that hath it ; or to have the monarchy changed into a democracy . but if the same be construed ( with pardon of that unskilful expression ) according to the intention of him that claimeth , then doth he thereby claim no more but this , that the soveraign should take notice of his ability and deserving , and put him into imployment and place of subordinate government , rather then others that deserve lesse . and as one claimeth , so doth another , every man esteeming his own desert greatest . amongst all those that pretend to , or are ambitious of such honour , a few only can be served , unlesse it be in a democracy ; the rest therefore must be discontent . and so much of the first thing that disposeth to rebellion , namely , discontent consisting in fear , and ambition . 4. the second thing that disposeth to rebellion , is pretence of right . and that is when men have an opinion , or pretend to have an opinion , that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them that have the soveraign power , or deprive him or them of the means to execute the same . of which pretences , there be six special cases . one is , when the command is against their conscience , and they believe , it is unlawful for a subiect at the command of the soveraign power , to doe any action , which he thinketh in his own conscience not lawfull for him to do , or to omit any action , which he thinketh not lawful for him to omit . another is , when the command is against the lawes , and they think the soveraign power in such sort obliged to his own lawes , as the subiect is ; and that when he performeth not his duty , they may resist his power . a third is , when they receive commands from some man or men , and a supersedeas to the same from others , and think the authority is equal , as if the soveraign power were divided . a fourth is , when they are commanded to contribute their persons or money to the publick service , and think they have a propriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the soveraign power ; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their goods and persons , no more then every man shall of himself think fit . a fifth , when the commands seem hurtfull to the people ; and they think every one of them , that the opinion and sense of the people , is the same with the opinion of himselfe , and those that consent with him , calling by the name of people , any multitude of his own faction . the sixth is , when the commands are grievous ; and they account him that commandeth grievous things , a tyrant ; and a tyrannicide , that is the killing of a tyrant , not onely lawful , but also laudable . 5. all these opinions are maintained in the books of the dogmaticks , and divers of them taught in publick chaires , and neverthelesse are most incompatible with peace and government , and contradictory to the necessary and demonstrable rules of the same . and for the first , namely , that a man may lawfully doe or omit any thing against his conscience , and from whence arise all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiasticall government , it hath been plainly declared in the two last chapters , that such opinion is erroneous . for those two chapters have been wholly spent , to prove , that christian religion not onely forbiddeth not , but also commandeth , that in every common wealth , every subiect should in all things to the uttermost of his power , obey the commands of him or them that is the soveraign thereof , and that a man in so obeying , doth according to his conscience and judgement , as having deposited his judgement in all controversies in the hands of the soveraign power ; and that this errour proceedeth from the ignorance of what and by whom god almighty speaketh . 6. as for the second opinion , which is this , that the soveraign is in such sort obliged to his own laws , as the subiect is ; the contrary thereof hath been shewed , part 2. chap. 1. sect. 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12. by which it appeareth , that the soveraign power is not to be resisted ; that it carryeth the sword both of war and justice ; that it hath right of deciding all controversies , both judicial , and deliberative ; that it hath the the making of all the lawes civill , that it appointeth magistrates and publick ministers , and that it implyeth an universall impunity . how can he or they be said to be subiect to the lawes which they may abrogate at their pleasure , or breake without feare of punishment ? and this error seemeth to proceed from this , that men ordinarily understand not aright , what is meant by this word law , confounding law and covenant , as if they signifie the same thing . but law implyeth a command ; covenant is but a promise . and not every command is a law , but only ( part 1. chap. 13. sect. 6. ) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action commanded . and then only is the reason of our actions in the command , when the omitting is therefore hurtful , because the action was commanded , not because it was hurtful of it self ; and doing contrary to a command , were not at all hurtful , if there were not a right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth . he or they that have all punishments in their own disposing , cannot be so commanded , as to receive hurt for disobeying , and consequently no command can be a law unto them . it is an errour therefore to think , that the power which is virtually the whole power of the common wealth , and which in whomsoever it resideth , is usually called supream , ●r soveraign , can be subiect to any law but that of god almighty . 7. the third opinion , that the soveraign power may be divided , is no less an errour then the former , as hath been proved , part 2. chap. 1. sect. 15. and if there were a common wealth wherein the rights of soveraignty were divided , we must confess with bod●n , lib. 2. chap. 1. de repub. that they are not rightly to be called common wealths but the corruption of common wealths . for if one part should have power to make the laws for all , they would by their laws at their pleasure , forbid others , to make peace or war , to levy taxes , or to yeild fealty and homage without their leave ; and they that had the right to make peace and war , and command the militia , would forbid the making of other lawes , then what themselves liked . and though monarchies stand long , wherein the right of soveraignty hath seemed so divided , because monarchy of it self is a durable kind of government , yet monarchs have been thereby diverse times thrust out of their possession . but the truth is , that the right of soveraignty is such , as he or they that have it , cannot ( though they would ) give away any part thereof , and retaine the rest. as for example ; if we should suppose the people of rome to have had the absolute soveraignty of the romane state , and to have chosen them a councel by the name of the senate , and that to this senate they had given the supream power of making lawes , reserving nevertheless to themselves in direct and express terms , the whole right and title of the soveraignty ; ( which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable connexion between the soveraign power , and the power of making lawes ) i say , this grant of the people to the senate , is of no effect , and the power of making lawes is in the peopl● still . for the senate understanding it to be the will , in intention of the people to r●tain the soveraignty , ought not to take that for granted , which was contradictory thereto , and passed by error . for part 1. chap. 13. sect. 9. in contradictory promises , that which is directly promised , is preferrd before that which is oppositp thereunto by consequence , because the consequence of a thing is not alwaies obscured , as is the thing it self . the error concerning mixt government hath proceeded from want of understanding of what is ment by this word , body politick , and how it signifieth not the concord , but the union of many men . and though in the chapters of subordinate corporations , a corporation being declared to be one person in law , yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a common wealth or city , nor have any of those inumerable writers of politicks , observed and such union . 8. the fourth opinion , to wit , that subiects have their meum , tuum , & suum , in property , not only by virtue of the soveraign power over them all , distinct from one another , but also against the soveraign himself , by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the publick , but what they please , hath been already confuted , by proving the absoluteness of the soveraignty and more perticularly , part 2. chap. 5. sect. 2. and ariseth from this , that they understand not ordinarily that before the institution of soveraign power , meum & tuum implyed no propriety , but a community , where every man had right to every thing , and was in state of war with every man . 9. the fifth opinion , that the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the soveraignty over them , is an error already confuted part 2. chap. 2. sect. 11. where is shewed , that when men say , the people rebelleth , it is to be understood of those particular persons onely and not of the whole nation . and when the people claimeth any thing otherwise then by the voice of the soveraign power , it is not the claim of the people , but only of those particular men , that claim in their own persons . and this error ariseth from the equivocation of the word people . 10 lastly , for the opinion , that tyrannicide is lawfull , meaning by a tyrant , any man in whom resideth the right of soveraignty , is no lesse false and pernicious to humane society , then frequent in the writings of those moral philosophers , seneca and others , so greatly esteemed amongst us . for when a man hath the right of soveraignty , he cannot iustly be punished , as hath been often shewed already , and therefore much lesse deposed , or put to death . and howsoever he might deserve punishment , yet punishment is uniust without judgment preceding , and judgment uniust without power of judicature , which a subiect hath not over a soveraign . but this doctrine proceedeth from the schools of greece , and from those that writ in the romane state , in which not onely the name of a tyrant , but of a king was hatefull . 11. beside discontent to the disposing of a man to rebellion , and pretence there is required in the third place , hope of successe , which consisteth in foure points : 1. that the discontented have mutual intelligence . 2. that they have sufficient number . 3. that they have armes . 4. that they agree upon an head . for these four must concur to the making of one body of rebellion , in which intelligence is the life , number the limbs , arms the strength , and an head the unity , by which they are directed to one and the same action . 12. the authors of rebellion , that is , the men that breed these dispositions to rebel in others , of necessity must have in them these three qual●ties . 1. to be discontented themselves . 2. to be men of mean judgment and capacity . and thirdly , to be eloquent men , or good orators . and as for their discontent , from whence it may proceed , hath been already declared and for the second and third , i am to shew now , first , how they may stand together ; for it seemeth a contradiction , to place small judgement , & great eloquence , or ( as they call it ) powerful speaking in the same man . and then in what manner they concur , to dispose other men to sedition . 13. it was noted by salust , that in catiline ( who was author of the greatest sedition that ever was in rome ) there was eloquentiae satis , sapientiae parum , eloquence sufficient but little wisdome . and perhaps this was said of catiline , as he was catiline . but it was true of him , as an author of sedition . for , the coniunction of these two qualities made him not catiline , but seditious . and that it may be understood , how want of wisdome , and store of eloquence , may stand together , we are to consider , what it is we call wisdome , and what eloquence . and therefore i shall here again remember some things , that have been said already , part 1. chap. 5.6 . it is manifest that wisdome consisteth in knowledge . now of knowledge there are two kinds ; whereof the one is the remembrance of such things , as we have conceived by our sences , and of the order , in which they follow one another . and this knowledge is called experience ; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it , is that ability to coniecture by the present , of what is past , and to come , which men call prudence . this being so , it is manifest presently , that the author of sedition , whosoever he be , must not be prudent . for if he consider and take his experience aright , concerning the success which they have had , who have been the movers and authors of sedition , either in this or any other state , he shall find , that for one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour , twenty have come to a reproachful end . the other kind of knowledge , is the remembrance of the names or appellations of things , and how every thing is called , which is in matters of common conversation , a remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves , concerning how to be understood of one another . and this kind of knowledge is generally called science , and the conclusions thereof truth . but when men remember not how things are named , by general agreement , but either mistake & mis-name things , or name them aright by chance , they are not said to have science , but opinion , and the conclusions thence proceeding , are uncertain , and for the most part erroneous . now that scie●ce in particular , from which proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong , and what is good and hurtful to the beeing , and well-being of mankind , the latines call sapientia , and wee by the generall name of wisdome . for generally , not he that hath skill in geometry , or any other science speculative , but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the good and government of the people , is called a wise man . now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation of the word , is sufficiently proved , in that it hath been already demonstrated , that no pretence of sedition can be right or just . and therefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of state , that is to say , unwise . it remaineth therefore , that they be such , as name things , not according to their true and generally agreed upon names , but call right and wrong , good and bad , according to their passions , or according to the authorities of such , as they admire , as aristotle , cicero , seneca , and others of like authority , who have given the names of right and wrong , as their passions have dictated ; or have followed the authotity of other men , as we do theirs . it is required therefore in an author of sedition , that he think right , that which is wrong ; and profitable , that which is pernicious ; and consequently that there be in him sapientiae parum , little wisdome . 14. eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say . and to that end we must have ayd from the passions of the hearer . now to demonstration and teaching of the truth , there are required long deductions , and great attention , which is unpleasant to the hearer . therefore they which seek not truth , but belief , must take another way , and not only derive what they would have to be believed from somewhat believed already , but also by aggravations and extenuations , make good and bad , right & vvrong , appear great or lesse , according as shall serve their turnes . and such is the power of eloquence , as many times a man is made to believe thereby , that hee sensibly feeleth smart and damage , when he feeleth none , and to enter into rage and indignation , without any other cause , then what is in the words and passion of the speaker . this considered , together with the businesse that he hath to do , who is the author of rebellion , namely , to make men believe , that their rebellion is just , their discontents grounded upon great iniuries , and their hopes great ; there needeth no more to prove , there can be no author of rebellion , that is not an eloquent and powerfull speaker , and withall ( as hath been said before ) a man of little wisdome . for the faculty of speaking powerfully , consisteth in an habit gotten of putting together passionate words , and applying them to the present passions of the hearer . 15. seeing then eloquence and want of discretion concur to the stirring of rebellion , it may be demanded , what part each of these acteth therein . the daughters of pelias king of thessaly , desiring to restore their old decrepit father to the vigour of his youth , by the counsell of medea , chopped him in pieces , and set him a boyling with i know not what herbs in a cauldron , but could not revive him again . so when eloquence and want of judgement go together , ●ant of judgment like the daughters of pelias consenteth through eloquence , which is as the witchcraft of medea , to cut the common wealth in peices , upon pretence , or hope of reformation , which when things are in combustion , they are not able to effect . chap. ix . 1. the law over soveraigns , salus populi . 2. that soveraigns ought to establish the religion they hold , for best . 3. that to forbid unnatural copulation , promiscuous use of women &c. is the law of nature . 4. that to leave man as much liberty as may be , &c is the duty of a soveraign by the law of nature . 5. meum & tuum to be set out to the subjects distinct from one another , &c. a duty of soveraigns by the law of nature . 6. an extraordinary power for judging the abuses of magistrates necessary , &c. 7. the suppressing of popularity , &c. necessary , &c. 8. the institution of youth , &c. necessary , &c. 9. avoiding of unnecessary war , a necessary duty of the soveraign , ctc. having hitherto set forth how a body politick is made , and how it may be destroyed , this place requireth to say something concerning the preservation of the same , not purposing to enter into the particulars of the art of government , but to sum up the general heads , wherein such art is to be imployed , and in which consisteth the duty of him or them that have the soveraign power . for the duty of a soveraign consisteth in the good government of the people . and although the acts of soveraign power be no injuries to the subiects who have consented to the same by their implicite wills , yet when they tend to the hurt of the people in general , they be breaches of the law of nature , and of the divine law ; and consequently the contrary acts are the duties of soveraigns , and required at their hands to the utmost of their endeavour by god almighty , under the pain of eternall death . and as the art and duty of soveraigns consist in the same acts , so also doth their profit . for the end of art is profit , and governing to the profit of the subiects , is governing to the profit of the soveraign , as hath been shewed part 2. chap. 5. sect. 1. and these three : 1. the law over them that have soveraign power 2. their duty ; 3. their profit , are one and the same thing contained in this sentence , salus populi suprema lex . by which must be understood , not the meer preservation of their lives , but generally their benifit and good . so that this is the generall law for soveraigns , that they procure to the uttermost of their endeavour , the good of the people . 2. and for as much as eternal , is better ●●en temporal good , it is evident , that they ●ho are in soveraign authority , are by the ●aw of nature obliged to further the esta●lishing of al such doctrines and rules , and the commanding of all such actions , as in ●heir conscience they beleive to be the true ●ay thereunto . for unless they do so , it ●annot be said truly , that they have done the ●ttermost of their endeavour . 3. for the tempo●al good of the people , ●●consisteth in four points : 1. multitude 〈◊〉 commodity of living . 3. peace amongst themselves . 4. defence against forraign ●ower . concerning multitude . it is the ●uty of them that are in soveraign autho●●ty , to increase the people ; in as much as ●●ey are governours of mankind under god ●lmighty , who having created but one ●an , and one woman , declared , that it ●as his will they should be multiplyed and ●ncreased afterwards . and seeing this is to ●e done by ordinances concerning copu●ation , they are by the law of nature bound ●o make such ordinances concerning the ●ame , as may tend to the increase of man●ind . and hence it cometh , that in them ●ho have soveraign authority , not to for●id such copulations as are against the use 〈◊〉 nature ; not to forbid the promiscuous use ●f vvomen , not to forbid one vvomen to ●ave many husbands , not to forbid marriages within certain degrees of kindred and affinity , are against the law of nature . for though it be not evident , that a private man living under the law of natural reason only , doth break the same , by doing any of the things aforesaid , yet it is manifestly apparent , that being so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind , that not to forbid the same , is against the law of natural reason , in him that hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve . 4. the comodity of living consisteth in liberty and vvealth . by liberty i mean , that there be no prohibition without necessity of any thing to any man , which was lawful to him in the law of nature , that is to say , that there be no restraint of naturall liberty , but what is necessary for the good of the common vvealth , and that well-meaning men may not fall into the danger of lawes , as into snares , before they be aware . it appertaineth also to this liberty , that a man may have commodious passage from place to place , and not be imprisoned or confined with the difficulty of wayes , and want of means for transportation of things necessary . and for the wealth of people it consisteth in three things , the well ordering of trade , procuring of labour , and forbiding the superfluous consuming of food and apparel . all those therefore that are in soveraign authority , and have taken upon them the government of people , are bound by the law of nature to make ordinances consisting in the points afore named , as being contrary to the law of nature , unnecessarily either for ones own fancy , to inthrall , or ty men so , as they cannot move without danger , or to suffer them whose maintenance is our benefit , to want any thing necessary for them , by our negligence . 5. for maintaiinng of peace at home , there be so many things necessary to be considered , and taken order in , as there be several causes concurring to sedition . and first , it is necessary to set out to every subiect , his propriety and distinct lands and goods , upon which he may exercise , and have the benefit of his own industry , and without which , men would fall out amongst themselves , as did the heardsmen of abraham and lot , every man enchroaching and usurping as much of the common benefit as he can , which tendeth to quarel and sedition . secondly , to divide the burthens and charges of the common wealth proportionably . now there is a proportionably to every mans abilily , and there is a proportionably to his benefit by common weath . and this latter is it , which is according to the law of nature . for the burdens of the common wealth being the price that we pay for the benefit thereof , they ought to be measured thereby . and there is no reason , when two men equally enioying by the benefit of the common wealth , their peace and liberty , to use their industry to get their livings , where of one spareth , and laieth up somewhat , the other spendeth all he gets , why they should not equally contribute to the common charge . that seemeth therefore to be the most equall way of dividing the burden of publick charge , when every man shall contribute according to what he spendeth , and not according to what he gets . and this is then done , when men pay the common wealths part in the payments they make for their own provision . and this seemeth not only most equal , but also least sensible , and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it . for there is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money to the publick , as to think they are over-rated , and that their neighbours whom they envy , do thereupon insult over them , and this disposeth them to resistance , and ( after that such resistance hath produced a mischief ) to rebellion . 6. an other thing necessary for the maintaining of peace , is the due execution of iustice ▪ which consisteth principally in the right performance of their duties , which are the magistrates , ordained for the same by and under the authority of the soveraign power , which being private men in respect of the soveraign , and consequently such as may have private ends , whereby they may be corrupted with gifts , or intercession of friends , ought to be kept in awe by an higher power , lest people ( greived by their injustice ) should take upon them to make their own revenges , to the disturbance of the common peace ; which can by no way be avoided in the prineipal and immediate magistrates , without the judicature of the soveraign himself , or some extraordinary power delegated by him . it is therefore necessary , that there be a power extraordinary , as there shall be occasion from time to time , for the syndication of judges and other magistates , that shall abuse their authority , to the wrong and discontent of the people , and a free and open way for the presenting of grievances to him or them that have the soueraign authority . 7. besides these considerations , by which are prevented the discontents that arise from oppression , there ought to be some meanes for the keeping under of those , that are disposed to rebellion by ambition ; which consist principally in the constancy of him that hath the soveraign power , who ought therefore constantly to grace and encourage such , as being able to serve the common wealth , do nevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of modesty , without repining at the authority of such as are imployed , and without aggravating the errours which ( as men ) they may commit , especially when they suffer not in their own particular ; and constantly to shew displeasure , & dislike of the contrary . and not only so , but also to ordain severe punishments for such , as shall by reprehension of publick actions , affect popularity and applause amongst the multitude , by which they may be enabled to have a faction in the common wealth at their devotion . 8. another thing necessary , is the rooting out of the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to iustifie and give pretence of right to rebellious actions ; such as are the opinions , that a man can do nothing lawfully against his private conscience ; that they who have the soveraignty , are subiect to the civil laws : that there is an authority of subiects , whose negative may hinder the affirmative of the soveraign power ; that any subiect hath a propriety distinct from the dominion of the common wealth ; that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the soveraign power ; & that any lawful soveraign may be resisted under the name of a tyrant ; which opinions are they , which part 2. chap. 8. sect. 5.6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10. have been declared , to dispose men to rebellion and because opinions which are gotten by education , and in length of time , are made habitual , cannot be taken away by force , and ●pon the sudden ; they must therefore be ●aken away also by time and education . and ●eeing the said opinions have proceeded ●rom private and publick teaching , and ●hose teachers have received them from grounds and principalls , which they have ●earned in the universities , from the doctrine of aristotle , and others , who have dilivered nothing concerning morality and policy demonstratively , but being passionately addicted to popular government , have insinuated their opinions by eloquent sophistry . there is no doubt , if the true doctrine concerning the law of nature , and the properties of a body politick , and the nature of law in general , were prespicuously set down and taught in the universities , but that young men , who come thither void of preiudice and whose minds are as white paper , capable of any instruction , would more easily receive the same , and afterwards teach it to the people , both in books and otherwise , then now they do the contrary . 9. the last thing contained in that supream law , salus populi , is their defence , and consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of the subiects , of which hath been already spoken , and in which consisteth the means of levying souldiers , and of having money , arms , ships , and fortified places in readiness for defence ; and partly , in the avoiding of unnecessary wars . for such common wealths , or such monarchs , as affect war for it self , that is to say , out of ambition , or of vain glory , or that make account to revenge every little iniury , or disgrace done by their neighbours , if they ruine not themselves , their fortune must be better then they have reason to expect . chap. x. 1. all expressions , &c. concerning future actions , are either covenant , councel or command . 2. the difference between a law and a covenant , 3. the command of him whose command is law in one thing , is law in every thing . 4. the difference between law and counsell . 5. the difference between jus and lex . 6. the division of laws , ctc. 7. that the divine morall law , and the law of nature , is the same . 8. that the civil lawes are the common measure of right and wrong , &c. 9. martiall law is civil law . 10. written laws , &c. unwritten , &c. customes and opinions , &c. thus far concerning the nature of man , and the constitution and properties of a body politick . there remaineth only for the last chapter , to speak of the nature and sorts of law . and first , it is manifest , that all laws are declarations of the mind , con●erning some action future to be done , or omitted . and all declarations and expres●ions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions , are either promissive , as i will do , or not do , or provisive . as for example , if this be done or not done , this will follow ; or imperative , as do this , or do it not . in the first sort of these expressions , consisteth the nature of a covenant , in the second , consisteth counsel , in the third , command 2. it is evident when a man doth , or forbeareth to do any action , if he be moved thereto by this only consideration , that the same is good or evil in it self ; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another , should be of any weight in his deliberation , that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated is any breach of law-and consequently , whatsoever is a law to a man , respecteth the will of another , and the declaration thereof . but a covenant is a declaration of a mans own will . and therefore a law and a covenant differ : and though they be both obligatory , and a law obligeth no otherwise then by vertue of some covenant made by him who is subiect thereunto , yet they oblige by severall sorts of promises . for a covenant obligeth by promise of an action , or omission especially named and limited ; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general , whereby the action to be done , or left undone , is referred to the determination of him , to whom the covenant is made . so that the difference between a covenant and a law , standeth thus : in simple covenant , the action to be done , or not done , is first limited and made known , and then followeth the promise to do or not to do ; but in a law , the obligation to do or not to do , precedeth , and the declaration what is to be done , or not done , followeth after . 3. and from this may be deduced , that which to some may seem a paradox , that the command of him , whose command is a law in one thing , is a law in every thing . for seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known , he is obliged to obey in general , that is to say , in every thing . 4. that the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled , and that he who alloweth another to give him counsell , doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same , is manifest enough . and yet men usually call counselling , by the name of governing , not that they are not able to distinguish between them , but because they envy many times those men that are called to counsel , & are therefore angry with them that they are counselled ▪ but if to counsellours there should be given a right to have their counsell followed , then are they no more counsellours , but masters of them whom they counsel ; and their counsels no more counsels , but lawes . for the difference between a law and a counsel being no mor but this , that in counsel the expression is do , because it is best ; in a law do , because i have a right to compel you ; or do , because i say do ; when counsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to , because the reason thereof it self is no more counsel , but a law . 5. the names lex & jus , that is to say , law and right , are often confounded , and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification . for right is that liberty which law leaveth us , and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge on anothers liberty . law and right therefore are no less different then restraint and liberty , which are contrary , and whatsoever a man doth , that liveth in a common wealth jure , he doth it jure civili , jure naturae , and jure divino . for whatsoever is against any of these laws , cannot be said to be jure . for the civill law cannot make that to be done jure , which is against the law divine , or of nature . and therefore whatsoever any subiect doth , if it be not conrary to the civil law , and whatsoever a soveraign doth , if it be not against the law of nature , he doth it jure divino , by divin right . but to say lege divina , by divine law , is another thing . for the laws of god and nature allowing greater liberty then is allowed by the law civil ; ( for subordinate laws do still bind mo●e then superior laws , the essence of law being not to loose , but to bind ) a man may be commanded that by a law civil , which is not commanded by the law of nature , nor by the law divine . so that of things done leg● , that is to say , by command of the law , there is some place for a distinction between lege divina & lege civili . as when a man giveth an alms , or helpeth him that is in need , he doth it not lege civili but lege divina , by the divine law , the precept whereof is charity . but for things that are done jure , nothing can be said done jure divino , that is not also jure civili , unless it be done by them that having soveraign power , are not subiect to the civil law . 6. the differences of law , are according to the differences either of the authors and lawmakers , or of the promulgation , or of those that are subiect to them . from the difference of the authors , or law makers , cometh the division of law into divine , natural , and civil . from the difference of promulgation , proceedeth the division of laws , into written and unwritten . and from the difference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth , it proceedeth , that some laws are called simply laws , and some penal . as for example , thou shall not steal is simply a law ; but this , he that stealeth an ox , shall restore four-fold , is a penal or as other ●all it a judicial law . now in those laws which are simply laws , the commandement is addressed to every man ; but in penal laws the commandement is addressed to the magistrate , who is only guilty of the breach of it when the penalties ordained , are not i●flicted : to the rest appertaineth nothing but to take notice of their danger . 7. as for the first division of law into divine , natural , and civil , the first two brea●hes are one and the same law . for the law of nature , which is also the moral law , is the law of the author of nature , god almighty ; and the law of god taught by our saviour christ , is the morall law . for the sum of gods law is ; thou shalt love god above all and thy neighbour as thy self ; and the same is the sum of the law of nature , as hath b●en shewed , part 1. chap. 5. and although the doctrin of our saviour be of three parts , moral , theological and ecclesiasticall , the former part only , which is the moral , is of the nature of a law universal ; the latter part is a branch of the law civil ; and the theological which containeth those articles concerning the divinity and kingdome of our saviour , without which there is no salvation , is not dilivered in the nature of laws , but of counsel and direction , how to avoid the punishment , which by the violation of the moral law , men are subiect to . for it is not infidelity that condemneth , ( though it be faith that saveth ) but the breach of the law and commandements of god , written fi●st in mans heart , and afterwards in tables , and delivered to the jews by the hands of moses . 8. in the state of nature where every man is his own judge , and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things , and from those differences arise quarels and breach of peace , it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things , that might fall in controversie . as for example ; of what is to be called right , what good , what virtue , what much , what little , what meum & tuum , what a pound , what a quarter , &c. for in these things private judgements may differ , and beget controversie . this common measure , some say is right reason , with whom i should consent , if there were any such thing to be found or known in rerum natura . but commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy , do mean , their own . but this is certain , seeing right reason is not existent , the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof , and that man or men is he or they , that have the soveraign power , as hath been already proved ; and consequently the civil laws are to all subiects the measures of their actions whereby to determine whether they have right or wrong , profitable , or unprofitable , virtuous or vitious , and by them the use and definition of all names not agreed upon , and tending to controversie , shall be established . as for example , when upon the occasions of some strang and deformed birth it shall not be decided by aristotle , or the philosophers , whether the same be a man , or no , but by the laws , the civil law containing in it the ecclesiastical , as a part thereof , proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical government , given by our saviour to all christian soveraigns , as his immediate vicars , as hath been said part 2. chap. 7. sect. 10. 9. but seeing it hath been said , that all laws are either natural , or civil , it may be demanded , to which of these shall be referred that law , which is called martial law , and by the romans , disciplina militaris ? and it may seem to be the same with the law of nature ; because the laws by which a multitude of souldiers are governed in an army are not constant , but continually changing with the occasion ; and that is still a law , which is reason for the present , and reason is the law of nature . it is nevertheless true , that martial law is civil law , because an army is a body politick , the whole power whereof is in the general , and the laws thereof made by him ; and though they still follow and change as reason requireth , yet it is not as the reason of every private man but as the reason of the general requireth . 10. when he or they in whom is the soveraign power of a common wealth , are to ordain law for the government and good order of the people , it is not possible they should comprehend all cases of controversie that may fall out , or perhaps any considerable diversitie of them ; but as time shall instruct them by the rising of new ocasions , so are also laws from time to time to be ordained : and in such cases where no special law is made , the law of nature keepeth its place , and the magistrates ought to give sentence according thereunto , that is to say , according to natural reason . the constitutions therefore of the soveraign power , by which the liberty of nature is abridged , are written , because there is no other way to take notice of them , whereas the laws of nature are supposed to be written in mens hearts , written laws therefore are the constitutions of a common wealth expressed ; and unwritten , are the laws of natural reason . custome of it self maketh no laws . nevertheless when a sentence hath been once given by them that judge by their natural reason , whether the same be right or wrong , it may attain to the vigour of a law ; not because the like sentence hath of custome been given in the like case , but because the soveraign power is supposed tacitely to have approved such sentence for right , and thereby it commeth to be a law , and numbred amongst the written laws of the common wealth . for if custom were sufficient to introduce a law , then it would be in the power of every one that is deputed to hear a cause , to make his erours laws . in the like manner , those that goe under the title of respons a prudentum , that is to say , the opinions of lawyers , are not therefore laws , because responsa prudentum , but because they are admitted by the soveraign ; and from this may be collected , that when there is a case of private contract between the soveraign and the subiect , a president against reason shall not preiudice the cause of the soveraign ; no president being made a law , but upon supposition that the same was reasonable from the beginning . and thus much concerning the elements and general grounds of laws natural and politick . as for the law of nations , it is the same with the law of nature . for that which is the law of nature between man and man , before the constitution of common wealth , is the law of nations between soveraign and soveraign after . finis . the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a perfect politician. with a discourse of kingdoms, republiques, & states-popular. as also, of kings and princes: to which is annexed, the new models of modern policy. / by j.g. gent. de optimo senatore. english goślicki, wawrzyniec, 1530-1607. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a85713 of text r10030 in the english short title catalog (thomason e1766_1). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. 275 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 113 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo 2017 a85713 wing g2027 thomason e1766_1 estc r10030 99858786 99858786 110845 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a85713) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 110845) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; 220:e1766[1]) the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a perfect politician. with a discourse of kingdoms, republiques, & states-popular. as also, of kings and princes: to which is annexed, the new models of modern policy. / by j.g. gent. de optimo senatore. english goślicki, wawrzyniec, 1530-1607. grimefield, john, j. g., gent. [8], 216 p. printed by ja: cottrel, for sam. speed, at the signe of the printing-press in st. paul's church-yard., london, : 1660. a translation of "de optimo senatore" by wawrzyniec goślicki, with "the new models of modern policy" by j.g., i.e. john grimefield?, annexed. title page in red and black. annotation on thomason copy: "july:". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng politicians -early works to 1800. political science -early works to 1800. political ethics -early works to 1800. a85713 r10030 (thomason e1766_1). civilwar no the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a goślicki, wawrzyniec 1660 49938 18 65 0 0 0 0 17 c the rate of 17 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the c category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-09 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-10 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2007-11 elspeth healey sampled and proofread 2007-11 elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the sage senator delineated : or , a discourse of the qualifications , endowments , parts , external and internal , office , duty and dignity of a perfect politician , with a discourse of kingdoms , republiques , & states-popular . as also , of kings and princes : to which is annexed , the new models of modern policy . by j. g. gent. london , printed by ja : cottrel , for sa●… . speed , at the signe of the printing-press in st. paul's church-yard . 1660. to the reader . there are few or none ( i presume ) even among the vulgar , but understand that republique or kingdom to be most happy , that lives most peaceably : yet what doth most conduce to the welfare and felicity of king and people , hath been long debated by the ancient as well as modern philosophers , and politicians . some are of opinion , that good laws work and frame the people to a civil life ; others think it lies in the power of good education : some imagine that it proceeds from the influence and operation of the stars upon sublunary bodies ; and others , from the endeavors and examples of good kings . to the last , we subscribe : for the peace and tranquillity of a nation proceeds primarily from the splendor of princely ●●●…rtues ; which are so glorious and attractive , that they do not onely incite the subject to gaze on them , but with an extasied admiration , to adore and affect them , so that they are stimulated to an imitation , as far as in them lies : and when prince and people mutually labour in the pursuit of vertue ( pro viribus , as we say ) according to the utmost extent of their ability , how can there chuse but be a result of unanimity , peace and concord ? to perfect this , 't is requisite that a senate be elected ; which is a certain number of grave , wise , discreet persons , that may help their soveraign to pull in or slacken the reins of government , according as 't is judg'd convenient ; by the nobility of whose persons , and the prudence of whose consultations , married to the judgement of the king , the quiet and glory of the people is infinitely promoted and preserved . to which intent and purpose , we have here deciphered a sage senator , with all qualifications tending to his perfection ; his office , duty , honour , preferment and repute among the ancients , as well as those of latter ages ; first asserting , and then proving their necessity , and the benefit that accrews to a kingdom or republike from their grave and serious debates in counsel , and their industrious management of political affairs . by such union between king and council , prince and people ; the whole nation will undoubtedly flourish with a perpetual verdure , as if an immortal peace were entail'd upon them and their posterity for ever ; laws will have their full force and efficacie , as well for the punishment of malefactors , as the reward of honourable deserving persons : justice will run in its proper current , and not be diverted to sinister and base ends , by lucre or self-interest ; two hammers that are able to knock a kingdom in pieces . learning will be advanced , and the learned promoted according to their merit and desert : without this , no kingdom can stand ; take away the pen , and the pike will be unnecessary . 't was the saying of a potent monarch , that , he received more benefit from his dead , then living counsellours ; intimating thereby , that his library did afford him better counsel then his senate . learning and senators , like hippocrates his twins , are inseparable ; they cannot dwell asunder ; especially in such a one as is here described . and though i am sufficiently sensible , that a discourse of those qualities that are required in a perfect politician , is , not onely a work of great importance , but attended by a troop of opposing difficulties : yet i have endeavored to display the ancient government of the most famous kingdoms , republiques and states popular , according to the statutes , laws and customs of the most potent , as well as prudent monarchs . and my hope is , ( though my imbecility can lay no claim to merit ) that my earnest desire to promote the publick good , will plead my excuse ; and i am confident , there is no person that is unprejudiced , if commonly courteous , but will accept of my humble devoirs ; which is the very highth of the authors desires ; who at this present hath no more to say , but bid thee , reader , farewel , j. g. the table . the first book . chap. 1. of senators in general , their original and necessity . pag. 1 chap. 2. of the diversity of man's nature in general , and of the parentage and education of a senator in particular . p. 13 chap. 3. the knowledge of arts and sciences required in senators ; and particularly , that of philosophy . p. 32 chap. 4. of eloquence , clemency , piety , and other vertues necessary to the accomplishment of a senator . p. 47 chap. 5. of justice and her concomitants , which our senator ought to be adorned with . p. 78 chap. 6. of fortitude and her concomitants , as magnanimity , constancy , patience , confidence , &c. p. 113 chap. 7. of travel ; the age , gravity , and election of our senator . pag. 136 the second book . chap. 1. of kings and their prerogative . pag. 157 chap. 2. of the division of commonweals and kingdoms . pag. 170 chap. 3. wherein is contained the various forms of the most renowned and famous commonweals and kingdoms in the world . pag. 186 chap. 4. the new-fangled model of modern policy , being of three sorts , a protectordom , a committeedom , and a rumpdom ; and first of the protectordom . pag. 198 chap. 5. of a committeedom . pag. 206 chap. 6. of a rumpdom . pag. 211 the sage senator . book i. chap. i. of senators in general , their original and necessity . he that sweateth in the pursuit of those studies that conduce to private recreation , as well as publike emolument , personates and represents a grave wise man ; and merits the general applause of all persons : for , omne tulit punctum , qui miscuit util● dulci . and ( if i may be a competent judge ) there is no science accompanied with more delight to the student , or benefit to the commonwealth into which he is incorporated , than that of government : wherefore being sufficiently convinced , that all the transactions of a well-regulated state are managed by solid reason , mature deliberation , and sound judgement , not by wavering opinion , uncertain fate , or fantastique fortune ; i have made the original of senators , their duty , dignity , internal and external qualifications , the theme on which i intend to expatiate in general in this first book : but more particularly in this chapter , of the original cause of their institution or creation . for the performance of that task which i have voluntarily imposed upon my self , i have dived into the depth of civil knowledge , and pried into the arcana of philosophy ; collecting whatsoever hath been related , penned , or experimentally known heretofore , either by academick learning , parliaments in commonweals , policy in government , or history . but to begin : man , the perfection of the creation , was not made a citizen or inhabitant of this world only , but lord paramount over all creatures that have a being within the compass of the terrestrial globe : this authority and dignity was conferred upon him by the supreme governour of heaven and earth , who hath descended so far below his sacred self , as to make him his co-partner in government , adorning him with divine understanding ; to the intent , that the scepter of this terrene empire may be swayed by his reason and counsel . the cause of this co-union of government between god and man , proceeds from reason ; which being perfect , makes man capable of imitating almightiness ; so that it appears , there is a kind of near alliance or consanguinity between the creator and the creature , who sometimes is made god's vicegerent upon earth : yet without divine assistance , no reason or counsel can be termed good , or perfect : for , the seed of this glimmering resemblance of a deity planted in man , if it light on fertile ground , and that happen to meet with good culture , produceth a crop according to the expectation of the coelestial planter ; otherwise , it is like corn cast into a barren soyl ; whose product is nothing but brambles , thorns , or thistles . thus then man being reduced to a sense or feeling of those sparks of divinity that lie latent in him , should be wrought to a perswasion , that he hath the character or idaea of a deity in his mind ; the impression of the creator's holy image stamped on his soul ; and ought thereupon to be so industrious in the employment of his talent , and the management of his affairs , that his actions may speak him worthy , in some sense , of so heavenly a favour bestowed on him . yet , though he be made god's associate ( as it were ) he must return him the glory , to whom it properly and primarily belongs ; and acknowledge all authority to flow from him , as from the fountain : for , as brute animals are not governed by animals , but by an herdsman ; no more can man rule or govern man , without the assistance and protection of providence divine . and should any man be so sordidly ignorant , or atheistically prophane , as to undertake the government of any country or nation , without divine knowledge or assistance ; it must necessarily follow , that that state , common-wealth , or kingdom , and every member thereof , be implunged into an ocean of misery and infelicity : for , it is in vain to build upon the imagined welfare of a state , or kingdom , if god be not the protector and patron thereof . it is then as conspicuous as the meridian sun , that all vertue , wisdom and goodness owes its original to god ; which did instigate the purblind , or rather pure-blind heathen , that had only the rush-candle of nature , to consecrate publike temples to vertue , faith , concord , wisdom , peace , &c. and if ovid the ethnick durst be so bold , well may we then à fortiori affirm , and maintain , est deus in nobis , agitante calescimus illo ; spiritus hic sacrae lumina mentis habet . it is therefore our duty to endeavour the deserving a more noble title than that of meer man , and strenuously to labour in the pursuit of understanding , that flies a higher pitch , than either humanity or morality dare aspire unto ; that so , if possible , we may surpass all our ancestors , and live according to the dictates of that which hath the greatest supremacy in us , viz. reason ; by vertue whereof , we are made sensible of a deity , know how to exercise vertu●… , embrace that which is good , and avoid what is evill : this is that which endows a man with the qualifications of wisdom , valour , and justice ; by this we are able to discern , that the terrestrial globe is wheel'd about by divine wisdom ; it is this that makes a man noble , a hero : which was the reason that the lacedaemonians imposed the title of gods upon those persons , that were judged to move in the highest sphear of understanding ; homines de meliore luto ; men of a more noble allay , than dull mud-wall'd man can boast of : nay , homer deifies hector in this ensuing distich : non hominis certe mortalis filius ille esse videtur , sed divino semine natus . so that we may maintain ( without being paradoxical ) that that man , who is guided by solid reason in all his words and actions , is quasi semi-deus inter mortales ; a demi-god among men . now , of such repute is a sage senator , or grave cousellor ; who hath reason for his cynosure , and wisdom his coadjutress in all undertakings . such persons are so necessary in a commonwealth , that they can by no means be omitted or left out : for , the king being but a single person , cannot have an eye unto all the transactions of his kingdom ; besides , somtimes it happens , that he is seduced from the conduct of reason , by yeilding to his affections , or slackning the reins of his appetite and licentiousness ; and the rude multitude , being ignorant , is altogether uncapable of that understanding , or knowledge . yet the senate , elected according to the law of the land , and compacted or made up of vertuous , sober , grave , discreet persons , do from their place , as from a pharos , or watch-tower , look about them , and provide all things requisite for the discreet and well regulating of the state wherein they live ; preventing all mutinies , seditions and dissentions that the rebellious rabble durst any waies attempt : of such great use and necessity are they , and that not only to the king , but the people also ; like unto the vital part of mans soul , which residing in the heart , enliveneth and quickens that which partakes of reason , and is situated in the head : and a monarch that is guided by the advice and counsel of a grave senate , rules his kingdom prudently , and governs it discreetly . for , as reason in all her proceedings , makes use of the service of the senses ; yet she alone determines , and deserves the greatest honour and esteem : so a prince , though he admit of counsel , is to be judged the wisest ; and is uncontroulable in all his actions : for it is a maxim among us , that the king can do no wrong . and as the hand distinguished into fingers is thereby strengthned , and made the more apt to lay hold on any thing ; so he that governeth with the aid and assistance of counsel , shall manage all affairs with the greater consideration and prudence . their original did proceed from the benefit that it was imagined would accrue to the commonwealth , whereof they were members , by their counsel : and although they , that first assembled men into cities , who before like savages , ranged over the woods , and inhabited the desarts dispersedly , without either law or order , first gained the title of kings ; yet that course alone could not make them understand the dutiful allegiance they owed unto their soveraign : wherefore perceiving , that when they were civilized , and reduced from their brutality , the authority of a single person was not of sufficiency to curb and check them in the full career of their exorbitancies , they judged it convenient to have assistance from serious and grave counsellors : which we find performed by romulus the proto-basileus , or first king of the romans ; who supposing the government of a single person without a senate to be perilous and unsafe , made a convocation of 100 senators , who out of respect to their gray heads , and grave understandings , obtained the name of patres . theopompus also , king of sparta , trod the same path ; for , he constituted the ephori , and invested them with eminent authority : whereat his wife being offended , was so pragmatical as to tell him , that he had derogated from his dignity , and clipt the wing of his ensuing posterity , by diminishing their authority and supremacy : but he replied , like himself , that the counsel and gravity of a senate would fortifie his kingdom , and be instead of a bulwark against the impious machinations and plots of rebellious subjects . whereby it is apparent , that monarchs first embraced counsellors out of necessity : and all rational men are of opinion , that those state-transactions are most firm and solid , that are digested by the wisdome of a parliament , ere they come to a publike birth . now , i call that a parliament , or senate , which by royal authority , and the general consent of the whole nation , is freely elected , and constituted , to advise and govern the state ; and consequently , a senator , or parliament-man , is one lawfully chosen into the number of those that are authorized to sit at the helm , and steer the ship of state . and it hath ever been observed , that they were alwaies the most grave , discreet , and noble sort of subjects ; because there is no society of men , or nation , how barbarous and brutish soever , but will voluntarily and cordially consent , that the government should be imposed upon , and rest in those persons that are vertuous ; and think it just and reasonable to obey them . nor are there any so fit to govern , as the ancient , experienced , which are usually chosen ; because others , either through want of maturity or experience , are usually withdrawn by their juvenile phancies , and recreations , from such serious places of authority : but a grave counsellor is not disturbed or discomposed with extravagant affections , transported by appetite , or inveigled by youth ; but by reason directed , by counsel fortified , and by age made perfect . and further , philosophers maintain , that in all things there are three degrees ; great , small , and indifferent : and that is judged the most perfect , that participates of either , and stands in an aequilibrium between two : now , the senator standing as a mean or moderator between the king and people , the monarch and his subjects ; may be the more intimately acquainted with the perfection of all things ; and study what is the office of a king , and the duty and allegiance of a subject ; with the rights , properties , liberties , and laws appertaining to both ; and so advise them accordingly ; that the king may not turn tyrannical for want of counsel , nor the people transcend the bounds of a moderate becoming liberty : therefore he must of necessity be a man of excellent endowments , a clear intellect , and a piercing understanding , to dive into the intricacies of government . scipio saith , that as the end of mariners , and their laborious endeavours , tends to a safe arrival into the intended haven ; the physicians skill and art is employed for the recovering and preserving health in his distempered patients ; and the captains valour levels at victory : so the happiness of subjects , their glory , life , and liberty should be the summa totalis , or chiefest end that our counsellor should aime at ; all which he must labour to preserve , maintain and augment , by his industry and endeavour , to the utmost extent of his ability ; and leave no stone unturned for the benefit of the republick , of which he is a member . nor is it my design here in this treatise to broach any new-fangled opinion , like those that are hatcht in the brains of our phanatick regicides ; or to phancie a chimaera , or make my brain the womb or idaea of an utopian counsellor , that can only be imagined , and not found in esse ( as plato did in his commonwealth , and cicero in his orator ) but my discourse shall tend to , and end in a relation and description of such persons as have liv'd heretofore , and citra omnis controversiae aleam , may be hereafter . and as divine plato composed , and reduced all those things into order , that might conduce to the felicity of his city , or republick ; the same course will we take in the character of our counsellor : wherefore perswade your self to be arrived at , or come to some famous emporium , or piazza ; whereunto all persons , of all nations , countries and cities repair ; and we will disrobe every single person of some vertue , law , custome , or qualification , that shall seem most advantagious and beneficial to our enterprize ; and therewith make up our sage senator , grave counsellor , or perfect politician : that they , who for the future are invested with such eminent dignity and authority , may imitate our senator , and endeavour to be adorned with these ensuing qualifications . chap. ii. of the diversity of man's nature in general , and of the parentage and education of a senator in particular . there is nothing more clear , than that the supreme power , among many other gifts , hath conferr'd that of reason upon man , to the end that by vertue thereof , he may pry into the nature of coelestial , as well as terrestrial bodies ; and thereby honour , reverence , and adore the creator . now , he that is sensible of the gifts of god , and the benefits of nature ; and doth , both by contemplation and action , employ this supernatural gift , slowly apes the deity , and thereby resembles him , as much as comes within the compass of mortality . but , they that contrary to nature , and the end of their creation , indulge their genius , delighting themselves in sensuality , neglecting , or totally deserting reason ; facie tantum homines sunt , non animo : carry only the outward aspect or complexion of a man ; because they are destitute of his more noble endowments . hence ariseth the variety of mens natures and dispositions , or rather conditions : for , some are born free , noble , wise , and with an aptitude to govern ; others , vassals , rusticks , ideots , predestinated to servitude and bondage : all societies of men , being willing and ready to submit to the government of the more grave and wise ; promoting , and accumulating honours on them , and offices , with reverence and respect suitable to their deserving gravity and understanding . plato is of opinion , that god in mans first creation , did by his omniscience so order it , that in the generation of those that are destin'd and adapted to govern , he hath distill'd some drams of gold in their composition ; and in them that are to assist kings and superiours by their deliberate counsel , and mature advice , silver ; but the nature of peasants and mechanicks is tempered with brass and iron . which similitude the philosopher extends to the manners , nature , and capacitie of man . for , although every man naturally desireth , that the issue of his loyns may resemble him ; yet sometimes , though seldom , it happens contrary to his expectation : for gold sometimes produceth silver , a more inferiour metal . therefore it is requisite , that a prince should be capable of understanding the natural disposition and inclination of his royal off-spring , that their iron may be converted into the gold of a more noble disposition : but , if neither good education , documents nor precepts can operate upon their inclinations , so as to cause a metamorphosis , or transmutation ; the government must be transferr'd to those , whose wisdome renders them more capable . for , it hath been prognosticated , and the event hath been experimentally known to succeed according to the prediction ; that they that are ruled by ignorant , mechanick governours , come to ruine , destruction , and confusion . to prevent all which misfortunes , it is requisite , that our counsellor be a natural subject of that place or country where he governeth ; no forreigner : of the same country , because that birth and being do not only oblige , but induce a man to believe , that it is honourable , just , and requisite for him to spend his bloud in defence thereof , when occasion is offered : dulce & decorum est pro patria mori ; it is a sweet and comely thing to die for ones country . and how can it be that any man , of what constitution soever , should not affect that place wherein his parents , neighbours , friends , and allies reside ; and that country to which he is indebted for his life , name , and honour , and every thing else that is either for delight or necessity ? non nobis enim nati sumus ( saith the orator ) sed patriae ; our country challengeth the greatest part of us . and it is most certain , that nature hath so deeply rooted the affection to their native place in the mind of man , that never was any good subject timorous , or unwilling to lay down his life , and hazard his fortunes in her defence , if necessity required . nay , it hath been so prevalent , that the most impious and unnatural persons , that endeavoured the subversion of the place of their nativity , the very sight of their native soyl hath prevented their cruel enterprize . veturia did disswade her son martius befieging rome , only by reducing to his memory the love and respect he ought to bear to his natural country ; branding him with the name of impious and audacious , for being so highly ambitious , as to disturb the quiet of that city wherein he was begot and educated ; altogether unmindful of his wife , children , and friends that remained there . so notable was the piety of veturia to her country , and no less was that of her son in forgiving it ; which had been somewhat ingrateful to him at that time , through the cruelty of the tribunes persecuting the nobility . sertorius also entreated pompeius and metellus to endeavour the procurement of his revocation ; alledging , that he took it for a greater piece of honour to have the name of an obscure roman citizen , than that of emperour in any other place of the habitable world . well then might naso sing , nescio qua natale solum dulcedine cunctas dacit , & immemores non sinit esse sui . the obligation that devoteth and bindeth us to our country , is great , upon this account ; because our goods , persons and fortunes are therein contained . pythagoras ( as it is reported by divine plato ) judged it a crime of as deep a dye , to be guilty of ingratitude to the place of ones nativity , as to ones own mother , to whom we are indebted for being : nor can there be an offence so hainous , but the affection to our native country should allay and mitigate . our counsellor must be of natural birth : no forreiner ; because their counsel or advice is thought and accounted suspicious and dangerous ; which was the reason that mov'd the athenians not only to exclude strangers from their council , but to drive them out of their cities , lest they should aspire at the dignity of magistracy , and instigate or work upon the minds of citizens , so as to perswade them to innovation ; and so mutation of laws , customs and manners might ensue , and consequently seditions and rebellions . which method the venetians have diligently observed ; for , it is their study and their whole industry , to prevent their sitting among them in council , lest they intruding under a false name or title , should arrive to dignity and eminency in the republick . besides , it is requisite he be of the nobility ; begotten of honest parents ; because honest parents produce honest children , for the most part . he must be of the number of noble and free citizens , who assumes his title from that nobility that owes its original to vertue ; which he may partly challenge as his own , and partly as his ancestors . they therefore that are nobilitated and adorned with their own peculiar vertues , as well as with those of their predecessors , merit esteem , preferment , honour and fame , above all others , and are to be highly reverenced ; and the reason is , because that vertuous and good parents , have a generous , good , vertuous and noble issue : according to the lyrick poet , fortes fortibus creantur , & bonis , est in jumentis , est in equis patrum virtus , nec imbellem feroces progenerant aquilae columbam . now ( as aristotle affirmeth ) that person that comes of a noble race , is the stem of a noble stock , and hath the affluence of fortune accompanied with vertue , hath arrived to the apex or perfection , the very quintessence of true nobility . but , because it is a rarity to find one person adorned with them all ; vertue alone can by her own right and property nobilitare viros . as for revenues , large acres , specious & spacious mannors , but no manners , and the honour that we challenge from our ancestors , without vertue , they are so far from being ornaments , that they prove a disparagement and a stain to the owner . such persons render the name of their predecessors obscure ; and through the vices of their posterity , are entombed in the grave of oblivion : therefore it is better to ascend the top of nobility by a man 's own vertue ( saith the fluent orator ) than to be reputed for the opinion conceived of his ancestors ; because the beginner of nobility deserves most praise and applause . he that is the off-spring of a noble family , deserves honour and esteem undoubtedly , with this proviso , that he make it the butt and end of his endeavours and industry , to equal , if not excel , the vertues of his parents and predecessors , and to gain unto himself more vertuous and glorious attributes . and infinitely are they to be commended that do so ; for they are so far from obscuring the fame and renown of their fore-fathers , that they add a most resplendent lustre : to it by their own vertue yet verdant and blossoming . the law of the rhodians is worthy of commendation ; for they enacted , that those children that did lead a debauched life , not imitating the vertues of their parents , should be utterly disinherited , and their lands by a deed of gift freely disposed of to the most vertuous of the race or family . it is an office of piety , to leave unto posterity a demonstration of our gratitude and thankfulness to our ancestors , whose heirs we are , not only of their external substance , ( the goods of fortune , i mean ) but of their virtue , glory , and renown : which is the true inheritance , and the best of all terrene possessions . for , 't is not a stately building hung within with coats of arms , and badges of the honour of others , nor the vast unmeasurable pieces of land belonging thereunto , but vertue , that nobilitates ; as juvenal sings , tota licet veteres exornent undique cerae atria , nobilitas sola est , atque unica virtus . for , wheresoever vertue is resident , it deserves more ample commendation than fortune can lay claim to , because she refuseth none , but may be by every one embraced ; she dwels in the homely peasants cottage , as well as in the princes stately palace ; and we find the sun-bak'd peasant adorn'd with russet-honesty , when the gaudy fantastick lord oft-times is so vitious , that he is a stranger both to vertue and honesty . cleanthes was a poor water-drawer ; and , though his outside might seem rough-hewn , and he despicable and contemptible to one whose sight pries no farther than the external part : yet his mind was refin'd , and his intellect ennobled with such faculties as will speak him man , to an understanding person , maugre all the force and violence of poverty or fortune : nor did vertue find plato noble , but made him so . and it is most certain , that from bondmen kings have descended , and the off-spring of kings hath been enslaved : such revolutions , long tract of time , by the assistance of fickle fortune , doth produce : for , according to the poet , si fortuna volet , fies de rhetore consul ; si volet haec eadem , fies de consule rhetor . up and down , kiss and frown . fortune is no state at all . was not agathocles from a potter advanced to the throne ? what heroes were romulus , tullus , hostilius , tarquinius priscus , and the whole race of the romans , more than others ? of mean parentage all , not atavis regibus editi . hearken to juvenal , and he will give you the same information : et tamen ut longe repetas , longoque revolvas , nomen ab infami gentum deducis asylo . who therefore may be termed noble ? he that by nature is made vertuous , and qualified or adorned with the attribute of wisdom . moreover , as the exercise of our qualities is various , so are the degrees of nobility . the nobility of private persons , that lead a contemplative life only , may be called philosophical nobility ; but the same in those that gain glory and renown by their sage and wise counsel in behalf of the commonwealth , or that manifest themselves stout and valiant in managing war for the defence of their country , is termed civil nobility . the force and efficacy of this nobility extends to posterity , and engraves or makes monumentum aere perennius ; that is , armour of proof against the iron teeth of time ; quod nec jovis ira , nec ignis , nec poterit ferru●… , nec edax abolere vetustas . by these ensigns of fame and vertue , men are stimulated and spurred on to imitate and exceed the vertue of all their predecessors . and as in every republick there are two kinds of time , the one of peace , and the other of war : so the citizens are of two sorts ; the one fitted for peace , and the other adapted for war : the former by arms doth enlarge the territories and bounds of his native country , or at least defend them from the invasion of forraign enemies ; the other by wise counsel and grave advice doth rule and preserve it inviolable . wherefore , a commonwealth should be composed of these two sorts of men : for , as in the management and proceedings of state-affairs , action followeth consultation , and is inferior to it ; so those persons , by whose mature counsel and deliberate advice the commonwealth was quietly , peaceably and discreetly governed , were of greater esteem than those that enlarged the confines thereof by war and arms . homer , the prince of graecian poets , produceth agamemnon , saying , he could sooner surprize and subjugate the city of troy by the advice of ten nestors or ulysses , than by the valour of twice as many ajaces or achilles . pyrrhus likewise was heard to use this expression frequently , that cineas by his eloquence had won more cities , than he with all his men of war had ever conquered . but , he that excelleth in wisdom and martial knowledge , deserves the crown and honour above all : and though , as we said before , it is vertue that makes a man noble , without the additional riches of fortune ; yet it is requisite our counsellor should be wealthy ; because thereby he may be able to supply his country , if compelled to wage war ; for money is the sinews and strength of war . but good education , saith plato , is the basis and foundation of solid wisdom and prudence . it is therefore requisite , that from their tender years they be instructed in all things that conduce to the accomplishment of man , è cunabulis , as we say , even from the cradle and swathing clouts , for then are they most apt to imbibe and suck in the most wholesome precepts that shall be exhibited unto them : for then anima est quasi tabula rasa , like a blank or piece of clean white paper , capable of any vertuous or noble impression . and as it behoveth a republick to be stored with knowing subjects , so ought they to be diligent in their education , and provide them good tutors , that may instruct them , and chalk them out the way of vertue . for , as a good husbandman diligently pruneth his plants , and loppeth off the superfluous branches , when the season requires it , that they may grow the faster ; so the commonwealth , that may justly be termed the parent and housewise of subjects , ought to be extraordinary diligent to provide for the careful and vertuous education of youth , by lopping off the superfluous branches of vice , and engrafting them on the stock of vertue . the lacedaemonians used to elect magistrates out of the number of their grave , wise and sober citizens , and call them publike tutors , which might serve to educate and train up their younglings ; and were alwaies reverenced by them , being judged vertuous men in action , and well skill'd in military discipline . and the ancient romans were as strict and careful in this point of education , as the lacedaemonians . cato was so diligent in the nurture and education of his son , that he disdained not to receive him into his tuition , and take him into his pupillage or guardianship as soon as ever ripeness of age had fitted him for instruction . and although at that very time he kept chilo the grammarian , and one excellent in that art , in his house , to instruct his children , yet he had not permission to correct them , but that was left to the discretition of the father . besides , he disdained to be engaged to a school-master for the instruction of his children altogether ; wherefore he taught them the laws , manners and customes of his own as well as other nations ; as also , how to dart , handle his arms , swim , ( which was anciently much in esteem ; for , aristotle when he would set forth an absolute dulman or ignaro , saith , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , he could neither read nor swim , ) and to endure both heat and cold , that he might be hardened and seasoned for any enterprize . besides , he penn'd a history with his own hands , and committed it to the perusal of his son , that he might therein see and understand the heroick deeds and actions of his ancestors , and be instructed in the art of government . he never spake any unclean or passionate word before his son , but was as circumspect in his language , as if the vestal virgins or priests were in presence ; observing that ancient rule , nil dicta foedum , factuve haec ●●…ina tangat intra quae puer est — — and this was the oeconomique or domestique discipline of cato , and of the major part of the romans , especially of the better sort , in the education of their children . in like manner the philosophers of greece composed plaies for the instruction of youth ; which is preserved to this very day among us , ( though that custome for some years was almost obsolete and out of request . ) nor were they only capable of indoctrinating , or laying down the tenets that are necessary to a happy and good life , but they were of ability to instruct in the laws and manner of government : yea , this our present age hath some seminaries of learning and vertue ( according to the graecian custome ) the universities of cambridge and oxford , ( though lately ready to expire , and almost demolished by the phanaticks , who hated all book-learning ( as they term it ) because their crimes were so hainous , that they went beyond the mercy of the book . ) hither youth might resort , as unto a harvest of science and knowledge , and might reap a crop of vertue and good discipline . but it were to be wish'd , that the doctors and tutors in our universities would instruct their pupils in the art of living , and not disputing well altogether , ( for , so might they deserve preferment from the commonwealth , and commendation from all solid persons , ) and not take more delight in hearing a praevaricator or jester , than a solid philosopher . in ancient times , philosophers enjoyned their pupils silence , and taught it also ; but our modern wits teach them only to talk or discourse ; which is the reason the nation is filled with so many worded orators , and prating philosophers . they endeavor not , nunc di●rum , ▪ to refine the understanding , but to cloath the tongue with frothy language ; and are applauded for altercation and strength of wit in their publike arguments , but not for modesty or solid wisdom : yet there is hope of a reformation in these schools of learning , when those loyal spirits , that for their allegiance to their soveraign were dismissed , are re-instated . the ancient graecian academies were the nurseries of commonweals ; and out of them ( as from the trojan horse ) issued most excellent monarchs , stout captains , and wife governors . alexander and scipio , with whose fame the whole world hath ecchoed , had their primitive education in schools of literature ; and many others , which i omit . thus it is apparent , that men ought to be trained up in schools , that so they may be instructed in the principles of government : wherefore it ought to be the care of every state , republick and kingdom , that their seminaries of learning be as well furnished and stored with vertues , as the citizens shops are with wares and commodities . now then , we see that good education is requisite , and accomplisheth our senator . besides , he must have an inclination to vertue ; for if not , his evill disposition will hardly be bettered by philosophy : for , the nature of man prompts him to evill ; and he finding himself strengthned with the science of philosophy , is more expert , and gains more skill to palliate and plead for his bad actions : for the best of sciences possessed by a man of an evil dispostion , is depraved , and , contrary to its own nature , is a help to , and promoter of evill counsel . so that it may be maintained , that good instruction bestowed upon an evill nature , is oftentimes ill employed , and ineffectual . though it is most certain , that education prevails much with tender years , changing it from vice , and molding it according to the form of vertue . diogenes being demanded , how a man might lead a peaceable and quiet life ; replied , first , he must fear the deity , who is the author of all felicity . secondly , he must bestow good education on his children , the want whereof makes them enemies , and disrespectful to their aged parents . thirdly , he must avoid ingratitude to his friends , which of all crimes is the most odious and comprehensive , containing within it self a whole bundle of offences . ingratum dixeris , & omnia dixeris . mention but ingratitude , and you have epitomized all sins in a word . moreover , it is necessary that children be instructed in the rudiments of grammar , rhetorick and logick , whereby they may understand the property of speech , and the excellency thereof , as also defend it by argumentation . thus may he understand the art of eloquence , which is perfected by use , discourse , and surveying the works of poets and orators ; and being thus instructed , he will shake off those petty inconsiderable things that are understood by every mean capacity , and take into consideration matters of greater weight and importance . and the mind , beginning to know her self , seeks after the true food and nourishment that will satisfie and content her , which is philosophy ; of which in this ensuing chapter . chap. iii. the knowledge of arts and sciences required in senators ; and particularly , that of philosophy . philosophy is the food and medicine of the mind , affording it vertue as aliment , and healing all sorts of maladies and disturbances that are incident thereunto , making a perfect path-way to happiness . the reason is , because that then the mind shaketh on the terrene incumbranees that usually clog the body , and meditates upon things divine and coelestial . this knowledge of philosophy is of two sorts ; the one consists in the subtilty of nature , and is subject to the universal contemplation of all men : the other demonstrateth and laies down the true institution of men and manners , shewing how republicks and kingdoms ought to be regulated , and private families ordered . to the first these parts of philosophy belong : physicks or natural philosophy , metaphysicks or divinity , and the mathematicks ; and to the other , ethicks , politicks and oeconomicks . nor is the finis or end of these two sorts of philosophy altogether discrepant , since they both tend to the perfection of man : yet in this they differ , that the one endeavours it by contemplation , and the other by action ; the one by theory , and the other by practice ; whereof a double felicity doth arise , the one private , and the other publike . now , those that place felicity in the exercise of vertue for the good of the republick , the more publike it be , the more praise-worthy it is judged ; because a multitude receives benefit thereby , and not one single person . yet we are necessitated and compelled to confess , that contemplation on felicity hath the pre-eminency , because it instructs in the principal efficient causes of all things and transactions . god also without action , by his perpetual and divine contemplation and prescience , foreseeing all things , doth by his own example move philosophers to prefer divine contemplation before all humane action and felicity . that philosophy is necessary in a senator , for the more secure management of state-affairs , will appear by what follows . philosophy is the eternal , immortal gift of the creator , instructing us in the knowledge of all things both divine and humane ; as also the nature of vertue and vice : so that he that ( as in a glass ) peeps therein , and then considers and meditates upon it , shall see the forms , idaea's and images of all things ; and perceive a resemblance or representation both of body and mind . it was not therefore without cause styled by fluent cicero , universal knowledge , the conduct of life , the searcher of vertue , the expeller of vice , and the panacea , or health of the soul . for indeed , there is nothing in the world to be thought or acted , either in court or council , of great or small importance , but proceeds from philosophy , as the nurse of all consultations , actions , and resolutions : which if you make your rule to walk by , all your words and actions will be judged sober , wise , discreet , and in all respects perfect , as far as man can be . for , in what country soever the people have a philosopher to their prince , or one that is counselled by philosophers ; war , discord , or rebellion is seldome found . but , methinks i hear some phanatick lay this objection in my way , as a stumbling-block to my proceedings . dost thou imagine , sir philosopher ( that 's as good as mr doctor , an usual phrase among them ) that the felicity of kingdoms and republicks , or the wisdom of kings and governours proceeds from thy lazy idle discipline ? ( rash , illiterate fellows , they never consider that the sweat of the brains is greater than the sweat of the brow ) whenas that art is but a meer juggling , prating science ; not that knowledge whereby men arrive to their intended felicity . how canst thou be so impudent ( the omer of respect they afford to every one is thou and thee ; and if it lay in their power , they would take away two as necessary pronouns , thine and mine ) as to dare to infect the kingdom ( commonwealth , i should have said ; for the name of king is enough to fright them into convulsion-fits ) with that that will prove the ruine and destruction of it ? for , as thou hast filled the schools with debate and contention , so wilt thou rend the state with divisions ; and though it may be argued out in the university without blows , yet canst thou think , that it will be determined in a commonwealth without the effusion of bloud ? how shall the happiness of a republick be maintained and preserved by philosophers , whose opinions carry so much variety , dubiousness , and diametrical opposition ? which of all the philosophical sects shall our common-wealth be guided by ; the platonist , peripatetick , stoick , cynick , or epicure ? now , they that differ about the summum bonum , do they not dissent in the substance of philosophy ? therefore i am clearly of opinion , that they who relie solely on philosophy , are rather to be excluded than admitted to govern in any state or republick whatsoever . is it consentaneous to reason , that he should be a legislator , that approves of no law , but what is of his own prescription , relying wholly upon his own reason , or rather phancie and opinion ; conceiting all persons , himself excepted , brutish and irrational ? is not this the humour and disposition of your philosophical crew ? did diogenes , zeno , or epictetus ever deserve to sit at the helm of state ? to which i reply ; there are two sorts of philosophers whom i judge altogether unfit to govern : the first are they that have only had a smack of philosophy , so that the thirsting heat of their vitious desires and appetites is not quenched by vertue ; and they themselves lead lives quite contrary to the precepts of philosophy , for want of good ground and solid foundation in that science . another sort of philosophers there is , quite contrary to the forementioned , who having à tenera aetate , from their very youth been conversant with philosophers , and studied philosophy , do waste away their daies in the contemplative part only : such kind of philosophy , which conduceth not to the emolument & benefit of the commonwealth or kingdom , is altogether improfitable . for , albeit they be learned , wise , and have turned over most authors , and can give an account of all their precepts and rules ; yet they applying their minds to contemplation , not being experienced in civill affairs , are unfit for government . now these contemplative philosophers are justly called sapientes , but they are not prudentes ; as geometricians , mathematicians , and all the society of natural philosophers . in like manner diogenes , zenocrates , chrysippus , carneades , democritus , metrocles , aristippus , anaxagoras , and thales , were wise men , and of profound knowledge ; but not prudent ; because their manner of wisdom and philosophy did prompt them to recreate and content themselves in obscure , secret and hidden matters , contrary to the nature of prudence : and though these sciences in themselves are good and commendable , yet are they impertinent and unprofitable to the state , when kept close to themselves , and not employed for the publick good . now , prudence consists in those things that require deliberation and counsel : yet , if those contemplative philosophers had not debarr'd themselves from humane society and conversation , but sought after employment in publike affairs , as pericles , solon , lycurgus , plato , demosthenes , cato , cicero , and others did , they had no doubt been men of incomparable wisdom and prudence , which socrates ( though herein he contradict aristotle ) styles the only vertue ; meaning ( as i conceive , with submission to more mature judgements ) that no vertue can be or continue without it . bion was of opinion , that prudence did excel all other vertues , as far as the sight doth the rest of the senses ; affirming that vertue to be as proper and frequent in old men , as vigour and strength in those that are young . wherefore it is requisite that our senator be endued therewith ; for he can neither speak nor act any thing sutable to his age and gravity , if he be not , as with sauce , seasoned therewith . the latines call this vertue prudentia , à providendo , from foreseeing things to come , disposing of those that are present , and recollecting things past . for , he that doth not ruminate on things past , is altogether unmindful of his elapsed life ; and he that foresees not things future , is subject to many perils , and apt to be ensnared by every misfortune . prudence ( saith cicero ) is the knowledge of things good , evill , and indifferent ; consisting wholly in the choice of that which is to be embraced , as also in that which is to be eschewed , or carefully avoyded . and according to aristotle , it is a habit coupled with perfect reason , apt for good action , and exercised in those things which are either good or evil , and may evene or happen to man during this life . therefore contemplative wisdome differs from prudence in this , that the former exceedeth not the bounds of contemplation , and the latter is wholly exercised in action , and the management of humane affairs . plato affirmeth , that there are two things observable in the life of man ; the first is , for a man to know himself : and the second , to know and understand all things : therefore let our senator be stored with this wisdom , viz. of knowing himself ; for without it , no reason , vertue , action or cogitation can be reputed good or perfect . by the help of this wisdom , the prudent man first settles and orders his own affairs ; in which skill if he be deficient , he must not be offended at the name of fool . now , under prudence is comprehended or contained the skill of well-regulating domestical business , and the knowledge of enacting and making laws , civill wisdom , and policy in consultation and judgement . which is the reason why cicero termeth the prudent management of oeconomiques , or houshold , domestical , and the fame in state-affairs , civill wisdom . and to the end that the senator may ground his wisdom upon a solid foundation , whereunto his imagination may have recourse for reason to steer him to the truth ; let him alwaies have before his eyes these things , honesty , and profit : so that whatsoever he acteth or affirmeth privately , or publikely , may be directed by them both : for , all things that can be either conceived by reason , or expressed by truth , are included within the limits of these two . wherefore it is convenient that he be furnished with a peracute wit , and solid understanding , that he may dive into the abstruse nature of things , and find out what is honest and profitable ; lest the mind hoodwinckt with inordinate affections and desires , seduce the judgement , and lead him from the path of truth . and many there are , who finding themselves to have depraved their reason , by giving the reins to their loose affections and lusts , do fall into erronious opinions quite opposite and contrary to wisdome . whence it follows inevitably , that they are not only cheated in their choice of that which is honest and profitable , but are blindfolded with the love of that which is absolutely dishonest and unprofitable . to prevent which errour , two things are to be taken into consideration . first , not to take things unknown for known , and praecipitantly assent unto them : next , not to give way in the least to any evill custome ; ( for , consuetudo or usus secunda natura ; custome doth tyrannize over the nature of man ; ) or to walk contrary to the rules of vertue . a thing that may with facility be comprehended by a senator , if he consider the good and welfare of the commonwealth , which is the meta or scope that all wisdom and counsel aims at : nor can the natives of his own country , nay , wisdom her self , require more at his hands , or expect more from him , than industry in preserving the safety and felicity of the place of his nativity . but now it lies upon me to prove what philosophy best befits a senator . wherefore since the felicity of every counsellor , and the quintessence of all knowledge consists in action , it ought to be his care and study to be exquisite in that part of philosophy which prescribeth the rules of regulating mens actions , and the science of government ; to the end , that he may understand what is the best course of life ; what is necessary and requisite for the administration of publike and private affaires , and be skilful in ordaining laws , correcting judgments , and governing of people . let him therefore be expert in that part of philosophy that instructeth the management of mans life , and the art of consultation . for otherwise what account will he be able to give de vivendi ratione , of the best way of living , according to the rules of vertue , that is uncapable of giving you a definition thereof ? what discourse can such a one make concerning counsel , justice , fortitude , temperance , or wisdom ? how shall he appease the mutineers , suppress sedition , or mitigate the rigour and severity of the laws , or proceed according to the rigour thereof , when he is ignorant of the precepts of justice and prudence ? what counsel or advice can he afford either of war , peace , or contracts , that understands not when war is lawful , or unlawful ; peace just , or unjust ; and treaties honorable , or dishonorable ? whenas he ought not only to conceive all the precepts of vertue and morality , and to understand them by name ; but to exercise and put them in practice . the sum of which knowledge is contained in the ethicks , politicks , and oeconomicks ; from these , as from a magazine or store-house , he may furnish himself with all rules , directions , and precepts , for the exercise of vertue , and the government of a kingdom , as also the order of a domestical life . and though all this while we plead for the necessity of philosophy in our senators , yet are we clearly against the divisions and sects of philosophy ; nor is it profitable , but rather injurious to the commonwealth , that the minds of men should be divided into several whimsies and opinions . first therefore , we extirpate epicurism ; because it being grounded on , and supported by sensual delights and pleasures , ought not to be in him whom we elect for our senator . the stoick we do not blame or accuse ; yet we hold it convenient that their tenets be exploded , as unfit for our counsellor ; in regard that ( as cicero saith ) they maintain the philosopher to be the only wise man , and that all other persons are but thieves , barbarous , and infatuated . for , it were absurd to admit him a senator , that is of an opinion there is no wise counsellor , freeman , or citizen , himself excepted . and though there hath ever been a dissention between the stoick and peripatetick touching the summum bonum : yet we adhere to the latter , because they are the best tutors of vertue and good manners , and the most noble , valiant , wise , discreet captains : counsellors , emperours and kings have issued out of that society . besides , it is requisite that our senator be well read in history , and exercised in all humane learning : for first , in history he will find out the notable sayings and acts of wise men , that have lived in elapsed time , which are not so plentifully found in any books , as in the monumental annals , and chronicles of fore-past ages . this was the reason that moved tully to call history , the witness of time , the light of truth , the memorial of life , and the herald of antiquity . for , can any person paint out so fully to the life , or give so perfect a delineation of vertue , fortitude , justice , continence , frugality , and contempt of death , in an eloquent and fluent oration , as may be read in the actions of cornelii , valerii , fabritii , curii , decii , mutii , and others ? what noble heroes have our modern times produced ! hath not the politick monck , noble massey , and loyal montross , been singular and almost unimitable for their policy , valour , and magnanimity ? from these , and the like , he may make an extract of the most exact civill knowledge , and direct himself in the management of state-affairs . besides , policy must be one of his chief studies : and he must be expert in understanding the transactions of noblemen , the humors , dispositions , and temper of all mens spirits , the order and government of commonweals , and civill societies : it is also necessary , that he be perfect in all ordinances , acts and laws , either for peace , war , provisions , the quality of the subject , the administration of the state , or the nature of men : as also to understand , what exalts , and what abaseth the mind ; what vertue is , what discipline and education is most convenient for youth ; what customs must be ratified or made firm ; what duty we owe to god , and what reverence to religion , and allegiance to our soveraign : in all which , we have a monck among us of late ( though none that ever entred into canonical orders ) who will sufficiently instruct us . nor must he be ignorant in leagues , contracts , and alliances with forraign princes and potentates : since such proceedings are dayly found in kings courts . well therefore did antonius describe a senator or counsellor , in these words : he is one that ought to understand by what means the kingdom or republick receives benefit ; and when occasion offers , to put them in practice . and , such were in rome the lentuli , gracchi , metelli , scipiones , and lelii . now , he that is well practised in the law , hath experience in war , or skill in oeconomicks , or domestick authority , deserves to be promoted to the dignity of a counsellor . eloquence is also a great ornament to our senator ; but of that and some other qualifications , more at large in the ensuing chapter . chap. iv. of eloquence , clemency , piety , and other vertues necessary to the accomplishment of a senator . these most noble sciences and arts will be infinitely adorned in our senator by the addition of eloquence , which is the true ornament of wisdom . for , without this accomplishment , all things else are as it were dead , till they do flourish by the help of rhetorick ; and an eloquent , terse , and curiously-penn'd oration doth not only commend the author , but the private and publike benefit is oftentimes promoted thereby . it is this that appeaseth with her neat-spun blandishments the fury of our enraged enemies . now , whatsoever he pronounceth , it must be done gravely , advisedly , eloquently , readily , and with comely gesture ; for this , according to the poet , — emollit animos , & temperat iras . the supple oyl of an insinuating oration will heal the wounds of a mutinous rabble , and reduce them to their former obedience . next unto eloquence , the knowledge and insight in the law is required ; the end whereof tends to the conservation of equity . and indeed , who can with greater wisdom decide a cause or controversie ? who can better appease sedition , ( the poyson of a kingdom ) or more rationally defend the laws , customs , rights and priviledges of the people , than he that is skill'd in the law ? well then may we say , as it hath been affirmed heretofore , that the habitation of a learned lawyer is the oracle of the city . now , the law in all kingdoms is bound to tye every man to his duty , and to defend them so long as they continue vertuous and faithful . but , it is not sufficient only to enact laws neither , that punish or recompence men according to demerits ; but , to compose laws , customs , and exercises ( as the lacedemonians did ) wherein the people may take delight : besides , such judgement must be used in the prescribing of laws , that therein all occasion of offences may be removed . for , as the physician by his medicines heals the maladies of the body ; so the counsellor ought by good and wholsome laws to cure the distempers of the mind . yet they are not to be approved of , who perceiving an inconveniency growing , immediately fall to execution , without considering how the same mischievous design may be utterly extirpated : for it is more consonant to reason , for a senator to endeavour the reducing men to justice and honesty , than to study how to execute them for every offence committed . what man can be so inhumane , that would not rather remove the cause ? and then assuredly the effect would cease . who would not rather provide corn for the poor , than through the want thereof force them to turn robbers , and send them to execution for it ? and who is there , that seeing the kingdom overspread with debauchery , and the peodle addicted to licentiousness , would not endeavour to correct and reform these enormities by pecuniary mulcts , sooner than by penal laws ? therefore , as cicero saith , if thou wilt remove covetousness , take away her mother , execess . wherefore he must have all the commodities and discommodities of his country before his eyes , and then he may be so expert in state-chirurgery , as to heal the sores and wounds wherewith the body politick is oftentimes troubled . yet we desire not that our senator should be a pleader at the bar , proctor , or advocate , because that most of that tribe ( charity forbids me to say all ) being mercenary , are many times the ministers of falshood and injustice , bearing about them minds and tongues principled against justice and truth . indeed , it is a difficult piece of business for him to be a lover of equity and truth , whose tongue hath been accustomed to walk for lucre . not but that many famous counsellors have been found among those gowned gentlemen ; but all men are incident to failings , of what profession or function soever : nor is this to be imputed to them alone , there are others that shake hands with them : but enough of that . civill discipline falls next under our consideration , whereby he is instructed how to lead his life discreetly , and to govern his country with gravity and justice . now he was termed a civill man among philosophers , who by vertue and wisdom was enabled to command civilly ; and he oftentimes had the authority of making laws , and governing of subjects . plato in his commonwealth hath framed two sorts of discipline ; the one relating to the exercises of the body , and the other of the mind : the discipline of the mind he called musica , and that of the body gymnastica . now , by the harmony of musick , he understands a certain concord or consent of mind , wherein all actions do amiably agree with vertue , and vertue with them ; which copula law and philosophy make up in man : for hereby we are capable of judging what is honest , and what dishonest ; what just , and what unjust ; what is to be loved , and what to be loathed : and besides , what duty we owe to our parents , princes and magistrates . by gymnastica , he means the exercises of the body , whereby the vigour and strength of man is much helped and encreased . this consists in leaping , running , wrestling , hunting , riding , darting , swimming , to be both right and left-handed ; in brief , all military exercises and honest recreations are contained in this word gymnastica . it is very necessary and requisite in all sorts of men ( much more then in our senator ) to conjoyn the exercises of the body with the vertues of the mind , and to mix fortitude with temperance . for , as by the one , man aspireth to that which is noble ; so by the other , he thinks it no derogation to him to be humble ; and being thus in aequilibrio , he inclines neither to this side , nor that ; so that he shall never dare , nor doubt too much . and as by fortitude we are able to repulse injury , so by temperance and moderation we abstain from offering injury . by the former , we are prompted to an honest becoming violence ; by the latter , we are instructed to check and curb hair-bain'd fury , and to quench the flames of a vindicative spirit . now , it is the opinion of plato , that the musical and gymnastical sciences conduce much to these qualifications ; for to the one , temperance , and the other vertues may be referred ; to the other , fortitude of body , and magnanimity of mind . wherefore it is convenient , that they be both united , and walk hand in hand ; because the gymnastick exercises alone , create firmness ; and musick of it self , begets too much mildness and effeminacy : but both twinn'd and coupled together in any man , do mould him according to the shape and perfection of vertue . therefore every person that would be thought fit for counsel , must be thus exercised ; because hereby he is adapted both for peace and war ; and to this very purpose was he born ; for he must be as able to perform the office of a commander , as a counsellor : notable therefore , and worthy the mentioning , was that roman institution , which imposed a command upon them to train up their noble and honourable citizens to be counsellors at home , and captains abroad : which is the reason , that rome enclosed so great a number of sage senators and stout souldiers within the circumference of her walls : insomuch that cyneas , the embassadour of pyrrhus , having had audience of the splendid and illustrious senate , reported , that in rome he had seen an assembly of many kings . nor can they be skill'd in commanding , if the subjects are not exercised in obedience ; which is performed by their love and honour to the magistrate , as well as obeying their commands ; all which proceeds from the due execution of laws : and the first step that leads up to the temple of vertue , is to submit to the law , and the law maker : for the law of every kingdom , state , or republick , is nothing but vertue , and a good decorum in the leading of our lives , reduced to certain rules . theopompus king of sparta , hearing it related that the reason why that commonwealth flourished so much , proceeded from the kings skill in policy and government ; replied , no such matter ; for the true reason is this , the subjects are well exercised in their duty and obedience to superiours . and ( as plutarch hath it ) to obey the magistracie and the laws , to undergo all dangers and travels with patience , to fight manfully , and die voluntarily , was the chief point of the lacedemonian discipline . and herein they were all trained ; to the end , that being thus instructed , they might know how to defend their country in time of war , govern it in time of peace ; and such as live privately , to employ their vacant hours honestly , that is , in the prosecution of learning ; obtaining a becoming gesture , musick , painting , vaulting , and the like , that they may keep themselves in action , and be freed from that gross imputation of ignorant . it behoves him also to be witty and docible . now , wit is a certain natural force of reason , able to conceive what is rational ; which , although many times it be not helpt by industry , art or memory , yet it is powerful of it self , and without learning may burnish a man . wherefore he must so know his own wit , as to become sharp in reason , and finding out the causes of things : which of it self is a happiness , and that a great one too ; as the poet sings , felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas . nay , wisdom her self , whereby we first conceive all things , springs from acuteness of wit : now , they that are adorned with them both , are termed ingenious ; and that wit is the best , and most to be commended , which is constant , strong , sharp , pleasant , and natural . now , the edge of ingenuity is very much acuated by the whetstone of docility and memory : by the one , we are taught to make a construction of those things that are laid before us ; by the other , we retain whatsoever proceeds from our invention , or the expressions of others ; therefore it is requisite our counsellor should be well exercised in these accomplishments : for , it is an argument of a dull , slow , ignorant person , not to have a quick conception of what is said , and a tenacious memory to recollect what hath been spoken by others . now next , he must have understanding : for as wit is the ornament of a senator , so understanding is the light of wit , by which we conceive all things , or their idaea's , whether true or false . for , by common understanding we comprehend the knowledge of things , and thereby pass a judgement on them , and conclude , all that is honest is to be referred to vertue , and what is unlawful or dishonest , to vice : yet this understanding is not separated from the senses , who are , as it were , interpreters and reporters of knowledge ; yet must we be careful to avoid being deceived by sensual judgement ; for it is frequently known , that either art or subtilty , singly or joyntly , play the cheat with us ; which errour is to be diligently avoided . besides , he must be circumspect , not only in private , but publick chances and events : for he must endeavour to foresee all blustring storms that may be injurious to the state , and study the preservation of every member thereof . this that we call circumspection , is a careful and mature consideration of things to be practised or acted ; and of great importance , as well in the serene time of peace , as in the blustring season of war ; because that wise circumspection diverts the force and fury of fortune , and we are ready to submit to grave counsel and advice . in this vertue quintus fabius did excell ; for he according to the poet , by procrastination and lingring delay , preserved the roman state . unus homo nobis cunctaendo restituit rem . but on the contrary , flaminius relying upon the arm of strength , and his courage , incircumspectly assaulted hannibal , to his great disadvantage and prejudice . so q. scipio the consul , with divers that might be mentioned , through their incircumspection were infested by the cimbri . and it is as useful in time of peace : for the senator should be eyed like argus , and lynx-sighted , to pry narrowly into those things that might arise to the discommodity of the commonwealth , and make a discovery of them ; otherwise , he cannot prevent the seditions , wars , and calamities that dayly happen to the prejudice of the common-wealth . some men are so ignorant and blinded with superfluity and pleasure , that they can hardly discern things that are placed before their eyes , much less foresee them ; which sort of men , as persons given up to their private more than the publike interest , are to be exempted from government . for , though they understand that through want of circumspection war threatens a nation , the people are captivated , the country run over and ruinated , towns sack'd , houses burnt , fields wasted , temples profaned ; yet use they no circumspection , counsel , and medicine , either to cure or cool their fury or rage . but the grave counsellor studies by what means to continue the common safety and welfare of a country or kingdom : he provideth , that the rage of a barbarous enemy may be beaten back or restrained by fortresses , pallizadoes , and garrisons ; that castles and bulwarks may be erected , the places of defence fortified , and all breaches stopt up ; all which thus ordered , check the fury of an insulting enemy , and annihilate his barbarous design and intention to bring all to destruction . now there being a convention of well-trained citizens , armed and ready to oppose , the commonwealth is thereby fortified , ( and the lacedemonians call stout men the walls of sparta ) disdaining the force of forrein enemies , and preventing their offering violence . as for his speech , he must be compendious , curt and grave , in all his orations that he pens , or speeches that he makes ; as horace adviseth him , in verbis etiam tenuis , cautusque serendis . for , a rash inconsiderate speech , is not so soon called back as pronounced ; and the unadvised utterance thereof , may prejudice the commonwealth , and afford the orator matter of repentance . and the reason is this , because in an extempore speech we pour out and divulge many things that are to be concealed . nor must our senator be overswayed by passion ; for , passion is like false position in verse , nine faults at least . now it is the noblest piece of wisdom under the heavens , for a man to monarchize over himself , so as to subjugate and conquer his affections , according to that known verse , fortior est qui se , quam qui fortissima vincit moenia — it is a greater piece of valour for a man to subdue and curb his hair-brain'd passion , than to conquer the stoutest enemy . besides , when he is put upon a parley with the enemy , a treaty with embassadors , or a conference with neighbouring princes , he must be very circumspect ; for their endeavour is to discover secrets by conjecture , and fish out the design intended by circumstances and signs . wherefore he must have a constant fixed resolution , and a composed countenance ; for the changing of the countenance , motion of the eyes , and variety of gesture , are the bewrayers of mens minds , as gondamore well observed ; and indeed , facies est index rerum . one may soon read a mans mind in his face , and by the calculation of his looks guess at his intentions . and as he must not be too credulous , no more must he be altogether incredulous , unless the reputation of the matter or person compel him to it ; since it is very unseemly , and beneath the gravity of a judicious senator , to maintain a controversie against an apparent truth . neither would we confine him to an absolute silence , or padlock his mouth , so as to debar him of that excellent gift of speech ; for , thereby he may be thought stupid or effeminate , since the one is imputed to ignorance , and the other to a kind of maidenly modesty , or misbecoming bashfulness . therefore he must use a mean between both ; yet so , that he be a greater hearer than speaker : nature bestowed on man a pair of ears , and but one single tongue . yet , notwithstanding all this , it must needs be judged as great a piece of discretion to know when to be silent , as well as how , where , to whom , and in what place to speak . next , sagacity and craftiness is requisite : for , war was never more politickly managed , armies more securely governed , nor the plots and machinations of subtile enemies more wisely undermined , or overthrown , than by the vertue of caution ; which he that wants , can no way be termed a captain general . now , sagacity is a sharp and pleasant conceit ; and as it is the property of a wise man to consult well , so it is the part of an apprehensive spirit , ingeniously to understand , and pass a solid sentence or judgement of what another speaketh . and as he must be quick of apprehension , so it is likewise necessary that he be crafty and subtill in searching and prying into the thoughts of subjects , to the end he may understand what they desire , what they expect or hope for , and what their inclination binds them most unto . by which means , he will not only keep the subject close to his lawful obedience , but also by knowing their intended conspiracies , prevent the evil thereof . for , sometimes debauched subjects aime at the destruction of sober solid persons ; induced thereunto , or rather seduced , by hate , malice , or insolency ; sometimes because they find themselves inferiour to others in riches , dignity or authority ; and sometimes because they imagine themselves to be inconsiderable , and of little or no esteem in the kingdom , republick , or state wherein providence hath allotted them their being and residence : and so by these means , create war , and cause sedition , and reduce the state to an apparent hazard . in suppressing these commotions and cogitations of wicked men , he must be close and reserved , not dealing openly , or by direct opposition ; but rather by soft perswasion , kind admonition , earnest entreaty , or favourable chastisement , reduce them to a better temper , and furnish them with more honest principles . but , if he deal with a refractory stubborn people , he must menace them with authority , and terrifie them with severity , that so he may divert them from such execrable enterprises ; perpetually meditating on the conservation of the commonwealth , which is consummated by his endeavour for the felicity of subjects , and his extirpation of sedition and discord , with their efficient causes . aristotle saith , that a man may speak doubtfully upon any occasion twice , and be excused : but if he trip the third time , he is permitted to speak no more in that cause . nor must he be tedious or prolix ; for a long-winded oration , cram'd with cart-rope speeches , longer than the memory of man can fathom , doth but talk them into dulness , and sooner stupifie their minds than quicken their attentions . and he must likewise suit his discourse to the capacity of his auditory ; for , he prodigals a mine of excellency ( saith one of our learned gentlemen ) that wasts a terse oration to an ignorant assembly , where mercury himself , were he orator , would lose his labour . therefore as his speech must not be over-long , ( a fault that caesar sometimes found cato guilty of , and reproved him for ) no more must it be obscured with aenigmatical sentences , or intricate words , which puzzle the auditors rather than profit them ; and by labouring in the explication of the terms , make them forget the subject and matter of the discourse . now it importeth not much whether his speech be penn'd or rehearsed ; yet the reasons written are more solid , and penn'd with more diligence , if the matter require a long oration . his voice should be manly , promising of gravity , not effeminacy , clear and audible ; not so low as cannot well be heard , nor so loud as to be term'd bawling . and as he must be moderate in his speech , so it is requisite that he be of a temperate mind . now , nature hath so ordered it , that there is a kind of combate or contention between the mind and body of man , suspending and diverting his disposition from the true end of vertue . for , the alluring irretiating lusts of the body do labour to oppress and enslave the mind ; and the mind armed and fortified with reason , doth endeavour to resist and oppugn them : and that vertue of mind is called temperance , which is employed in contemning all pleasures , especially those that are known by the senses , as taste , and touch ; yet doth it not generally detest all pleasures , but only those that thwart vertue and reason . now , some pleasures there are by nature lawful , and others unlawful ; and both incident to the mind , as well as the body . the corporeal pleasures are bred up and born with us , so that with difficulty are they restrained , especially in those men that take more delight and complacency in the exercises of the body than those of the mind , which renders them brutish and sensual . therefore the body must submit to the checks and controulment of the mind , and by this means man may attain perfection . all vertues conduce to the felicity of a kingdom , but temperance alone is the preservatrix of felicity ; for it keeps the state from that infection which oftentimes ariseth from excess and immoderation , and hath subverted many famous cities and countries . now every senator ought to furnish the kingdom with such laws as may punish riot and excess , lest the subject being poyson'd therewith , covetousness spring up among them , the mother of all vices . we read , that in rome there were laws and ordinances made and enacted against excess both in expences and apparel . the lacedemonians did also keep their feasts in publike places , that no man should dare to be wastful in the sight of other citizens , and so encourage them to an imitation of their luxuriousness or extravagancy . heretofore , the magistrates of gallia belgica allowed of no law nor custome that might make the people effeminate . and at this day , licentiousness and immoderate expences are inhibited by law in some parts of italy . and since the lusts of men are insatiable , ( as appears by catiline and his fellow-conspirators , who being thriftless and licentious persons , attempted to make war against the commonwealth ) they must be held in with the bridle of the law . and the senator must be free from intemperancy , that so he may be an example for others to follow and imitate ; wherein let him take pattern by the severity of the censores , who were the masters and tutors of civil temperance and modesty : and so by private admonition , as well as publike castigation , he may withdraw them from intemperance . nor is this vertue without her concomitants , modesty , bashfulness , honesty , and continency . and by these , mans life is beautified , adorned , and made happy . modesty ( say the stoicks ) is a vertue that containeth the knowledge of decent speech and action . and whatsoever we speak or do , we ought to observe a mean , lest we expatiate on a subject more largely than necessity requires , forgetting the counsel of solon , ne quid nimis . wherefore tye your self to a comely decorum in all your words and actions , composing your countenance , eyes , gesture , motion , and your whole body to a modest posture , that the simplicity and integrity of your intentions may thereby be made manifest and apparent . bashfulness sometimes gains a man much commendation ; and this qualification renders a man honest , and induceth him to lead a good life , because in all actions it instructs how to avoid all reproach , obloquy , and villany . and as justice forbids the wronging of a person by act or deed ; so bashfulness teacheth a man not to be offended : for a good man doth not only voluntarily abstain from doing injury , but is , as it were , frightned from it by bashfulness . yet i mean not here , that bashfulness that is frequent with young men , and offenders , because they are compelled or constrained to that kind of shamefac'dness ; and that perturbation of mind doth misbecome a grave and temperate person ; but that that we hunt after , ariseth from a vertuous disposition , and so gets a certain habit or exercise , accompanied with a fixed resolution to avoid all evill : so that if at any time through ignorance an errour be committed , we remain ashamed ; which is commendable . julius caesar engaged with pompeius the younger at corduba , perceiving his men ready to retreat , and seek for refuge by their heels , steps out into the front , and there in person behaved himself manfully ; which the souldiers seeing , could not for shame but turn about , and face the enemy again ; being , partly by the valour of their general , and partly by their own shamefac'dness , instigated thereunto . there is in man a certain natural instinct of honesty , prompting and spurring him on to the performance of all lawful actions , and diverting him from the perpetration of what is unlawful ; which proceedeth from vertue ; and therein her dignity resteth , though sometimes it ariseth from fame , glory and opinion . now , he that through diligent observation understandeth what is meant by measure , order , and gravity , and observes this sweet decorum in his words and actions , making it his chiefest care not to think or speak any thing unseemly , effeminate , or licentious , may be termed honest ; and the power of honesty is so great , that of it self it sufficeth to disswade men from an ignominious life . among the number of vertues required in our senator , continency & abstinency challenge no mean place ; for , they not only contemn the illecebrae , or allurements of inordinate desires , but also withhold our eyes from beholding , or our hands from fastning on them . nor is there a more noble spectacle , than to see men contented with what nature and industry hath allotted , without coveting what appertains to others ; which they might easily do , did they but consider , that natura pauc is contenta : nature will be satisfied with mean commons . paulus aemylius is highly extolled for his continency , who converted no part of the vast wealth that was brought out of macedonia and spain to his own private use , but delivered the whole into the publike exchequer ; choosing rather to be termed poor , than branded with the name of deceitful : and after his expiration , his goods being sold under the launce ( uti mos erat , according to custome ) there was not left a sufficient competency for his wife to live on . the example of scipio africanus is admirable , who in his greener years , at the taking of carthage , being but twenty years old , had there ( among many other captives ) a virgin of incomparable beauty , yet did he not offer to deflower her , but gave her to a man unto whom she was formerly betrothed ; and bestowed all that gold upon her for a dowry , which her friends offered for her redemption . we therefore judge it necessary that our senator be continent , imitating pericles in his advice to sophocles his associate , and praetor at rome ; who fixing his eye on a beautiful roman damosel , whom they met accidentally in their way to the senate-house , and being somewhat too large in her commendation ; told him , that a senator must not only keep hands free from corruption , but also chaste eyes , that cast no wanton glances , because they are grand instigations to lust . wherefore , it was judged an act of discretion in cato the censor , to turn lucius quintus flaminius out of the senate for his incontinency ; because he being consul in france , permitted a common strumpet , at her request , to strike a prisoner that had his sentence past , without offence . nay , manlius was devested of that dignity , for kissing his own wife in the sight of his own daughter . and salustius for adultery , and light actions , was excluded from fitting ( had it been so with us , henry martin had never rested so long in the parliament-house . ) i omit speaking of alexander the great , with many more , who by their continency gain'd no less honour than by their martial triumphs . now , it is most certain , that there is nothing brings more dishonour to the dignity of a senator , than a leud , debauched , incontinent life ; because it procureth private obloquy or reproach , and defaceth , or at least blemisheth the majesty of commanding . sardanapalus spun out his daies among the distaff-bearers , i mean women , consuming all his time in incontinent exercises , wasting both his internal and external substance upon wanton women , and the pleasing his gust ; as appears by that epitaph , which , living , he commanded to be engraven on his tomb , ede , bibe , lude . which aristotle chancing to spy , stopt , and read ; and smiling , said , it was fitter to be fixed on the grave of an oxe , than the tomb of a prince . all pleasures that are not reduced to necessity and honesty , are reproachful ; and those above all , draw men to vice and uncleanness most , that are discerned by the touch and taste . wherefore the counsellor must be careful , that neither his own , nor the life of his subjects , be implunged into the mire of voluptuousness and obscenity ; which may be soon effected , by removing all occasions of intemperancy . the lacedaemonians used to shew their drunken servants to their children , that they , beholding their sordidness and bestiality , might abhor the vice of excessive compotation . but it were to be wished that we could follow , as well as read these instances . great was the moderation and temperance of the ancients in their diet ; for , they lived not to eat , but did eat to live : though in these our modern times the plague of intemperance is so epidemical , that more men are infected with , and perish thereby , than by the rage or fury of war ; and it is the mode for them to drink other mens healths so long , till at last they drink away their own . who would not then commend m. curius the roman senator , that had rather the embassadors sent by the samnites should find him at a homely supper , quenching his thirst in a woodden bowl , than surrounned or accommodated with all the variety nature or art could afford ? nay , he refused the gold they presented him with ; saying , i had rather command those that are rich , than be rich . i need not mention fabricius , fabius , tubero , cato and scipio , whose temperate and sober lives have eternized their names . hortensius went not without a reproof , for presenting his guests with a boyl'd peacock , at a supper prepared for the augurs . and cassius was thought intemperate , for drinking a little water in publike , and not enduring thirst for a small time . yet do we not tye our senator to so much strictness , but only to moderation in all things . duronius was removed from the senate , because that he being a tribune , made null the law for the restraint of feasting . surely , the roman state was altogether happy in such senators , that were not only masters of counsel , but tutors of vertue and good manners . now , that the people of rome were temperate , even to admiration , may be conjectured from what is reported of them : when the presents which pyrrhus king of epire , after his overthrow , brought to rome , were publikely shewn , hoping thereby to gain the good will of the people , there was not one among them , that did so much as offer to stretch forth his hand to lay hold on any of them ; so as that king saw himself twice vanquished at once , as well by continency , as force of arms . but , when excess found footing in rome , after the victory obtained in asia , and that the people began to wantonize through plenty and idleness ; on a sudden , the civil discipline of temperance and parsimony was neglected ; and in lieu thereof , avaritiousness attended with a legion of other vices , soon entred among the roman legions , and ( if we may credit salust ) brought their city to a sad and lamentable catastrophe . nor indeed is there any thing that sooner works the ruine of king , kingdom , and subjects , than excess . diogenes seeing a bill upon the door of a prodigals house , which shewed it was to be let ; said , i knew very well that house was so full of meat and wine , that ere long it would vomit out the master . now 't is most certain , that immoderate pampering , and excessive drinking , wasteth the strength of the body , and prejudiceth the mind . notable is that law of solon , whereby that senator was thought to deserve death , that was addicted to the vice of drunkenness . philip the macedonian king being over-come with drink , past sentence upon a woman : she forthwith made her appeal ; and being demanded to whom , replied , to philip being sober . and without doubt , excess in drinking depraves the judgement of man ; insomuch , that kings are made slaves , old folks become children , wise men are infatuated and made fools , and fools turned to mad men . but our senator shall observe the old rule : — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . a medium is to be observed in all things : we must eat and drink for necessity , not satiety ; following the advice of the poet anacharsis , who usually said , the first draught was of necessity , the second of superfluity , and the third of madness . besides , it were unseemly in a counsellor to have bloud-shot eyes , a furious countenance , and a stammering speech ; all which imperfections are the customary attendants of drunkenness : nor will it become him , overcome with meat or drink , to snore away the night , but only to use both with so much moderation , as that they may only continue health , and make the body agile and fit for action . for , by moderate diet we find , not only the mind , but the body more submissive and obedient ; when as satiety and excess is the sepulchre of the one , and the corruption of the other . we find troy to be ruinated through the excess of the inhabitants ; when as otherwise it might have stood to this day : invadunt urbem somno , vinoque sepul●am . but , although we discommend excess in both , as a thing misbecoming , and very hainous ; yet our senator must be sure not to be avaricious , niggardly , and close-fisted , because it is an argument of a base servile spirit , to debar himself of that comliness and order that is required in the family of such a person . therefore private excess must be banished , and publike magnificence maintained ; and as needless and superfluous delicacy is to be avoyded much more than penury and niggardliness ; and , as immoderate expences are known to be prejudicial both to the estate , body , and mind : so necessary and convenient fare is both comly and wholsome ; and this must be observed with respect to the place , time and persons . for , we read , that l. tubero making a publike feast , covered all his beds with the skins of kids ; and in so doing was judged indiscreet , and ignorant in the knowledge of what appertained to publike honour and dignity ; and for this same fact , lost the office of praetor . notable was that quip that a duke bestowed upon a prince , to this purpose ; who with his noble retinue being invited to a collation , the prince altogether ignorant of any mode used at court , or indeed common civility , suffered them to be seated without cushions ; which the duke perceiving , put his cloak under him in lieu thereof ; and all his followers in imitation of him , did the same ; and after their repast , left their cloaks upon the stools , and were departing : at which the prince somewhat amazed , told them , they forgot their cloaks : no , no , replied the duke , an 't please your majesty , it is not our custome to be so uncivil , as to carry our cushions along with us : then did he begin to understand the mistake , and went away ashamed . next to temperance , justice is a vertue to be very much followed by our senator ; of which in the next chapter . chap. v. of justice and her concomitants , which our senator ought to be adorned with . nature hath made all things in themselves good , certain , perfect , and in all respects absolute ; which was the reason that induced the stoick to believe , that to live according to nature was the chief felicity of man : for , nature is the conductrix & tutoress of perfect life , instructing us in our obedience to the author thereof . now , this harmony of nature may be fitly called justice ; for , this is that vertue ( and indeed regina virtutum , the queen of all vertues ) which labours in defence of the law , and preservation of the consent of nature ; since whatsoever complies with nature , is just ; and what dissenteth , unjust . such men therefore , that follow the dictates of nature , are just ; being it is contrary to nature to think ill either of god or man . whereupon justice is of three sorts , ( though there be many subdivisions ) natural , humane , and divine . the first foundation of justice natural , proceeds from nature her self ; which informes us to do as we would be done by : quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris . this natural equity commandeth us to abstain from doing injury , or offending of any person whatsoever . and by this ligament , men are conglutinated or co-united with a mutual affection and bond of amity . in that age , which is known by the name of aetas aurea , among the poets ; by the help of natural justice only , deceit , fraud , or injury had no residence upon earth ; they were non-entia , no such things to be found in nature . then was there no sedition , tumults , or hatred ; but benevolence , fidelity , true love , and real affection . the lawyers profession was not in use , pleading and wrangling was unknown to them ; for , equity and justice determined all things , and all things were common ; every man thought that his own goods did belong as much to his neighbour as to himself . they that lived in that age were enforced and confined to vertue and honesty , because they knew not vice , and by natural instinct were stimulated to the exercise of justice . of this happy time ovid sings most excellently . aurea prima sata est aetas , quae vindice nullo , sponte suâ , sine lege , fidem rectumque colebat ; poena , metusque aberant , nec supplex turba timebat judicis orasui , sed erant sine judice tuti . but , as soon as the sun of truth declined , and began to be obscured with the caliginous mists of vice ; immediately the minds of men were depraved , and they headlong without fear or wit implunged themselves into an ocean of filthiness . then every man shielded himself against vertue , quite contrary to his former principles ; but afterwards it was a practice among them , lawful , to scandalize and prejudice all persons , whether in goods , or good name ; to lead a brutish , inhumane life ; abuse that excellent gift of reason , and employ it in the exercise of vice ; as the same poet hath it , protinus erupit venae pejoris in aevum omne nefas , fugere pudor , verumque , fidesque , in quorum subiere locum , fraudesque , dolique , insidiaeque , & vis , & amor sceleratus habendi . and surely that deluge of impiety had over-run the whole race of mankind , had not the force of nature and reason in some few , opposed , and stood as a trench against the fury of this inundation . that small residue of men ( proclaiming war against vice ) did so work upon them ( that lived like brutes ) by perswasion , as to reduce them to humanity ; informing them how to live , not only by words , but also by works ; what civility , vertue , and honour was , and what was the original of laws in cities and countries : so that hereby they might be instructed in those things that were good , honest , and civill . from hence the precepts of vertue took their original , and vast volumes of the duty and manners of men were composed . this consideration of humane nature and the universe , was epitomized in one word by the grecians , viz. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , or wisdome ; and the authors thereof were termed {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , or wisemen , who afterwards ( according to the example of pythagoras , ) named themselves philosophers . and by this means the light of humane reason and nature , that was benegroed with the clouds of vice , did reassume its pristine lustre and splendor , and endowed us with the knowledge of divine and humane things ; which knowledge is called philosophy . thus was that golden world restored . now , that duty which natural justice prompts us to observe to our parents , is called piety ; which was the reason , that aeneas by the homer of our latine poets was styled pious aenaeas . the daughter of cimon was adorned with this vertue ; for she fed her father with her own milk , being condemned to die , and thereby did eternize her name . this justice doth also oblige us to nourish and cherish all persons in distress ; defend and govern himself : for , he that by wilful obstinacy destroys himself by famine , negligence , or violent death , is judged an enemy , and no friend to nature . by this justice natural , we are engaged to relieve and refresh our necessitated friends and neighbours , and by generation to propagate posterity ; which is called nodosa aeternitas : propagation is a knotty eternity ; for , by the issue of our loyns we do as it were tye a knot , and thereby lengthen our name and family . socrates defineth this natural justice thus : it is the science of good and evill according to nature ; which that man that exercises , deserves the term of a good man ; and if he communicate it to others , the title of a good citizen ; because then he is not only beneficial to himself , but to others also . they that nature hath been so prodigal unto , as to bestow singular gifts , and incomparable endowments on , ought to transcen●… all others in this natural justice , as much as they do in their natural parts ; otherwise they will have but a mean repute ( if any at all ) in the world . the next is justice divine ; whereby we are obliged and bound to acknowledge , love , honour , reverence , adore , and worship god : and it hath pleased nature to implant this knowledge in man ; as if thereby she would intimate unto us , that all other creatures do only feed and pamper their bodies , whenas man should aime at a more noble marke , viz. the deity . nor is there any people upon earth but adore some god or other , and hold it a duty incumbent upon every one of them so to do . now all the substance and force of this justice is contained in religion , which is the worship of god . but being that is a different subject from what we intend to expatiate on , we shall leave the prosecution thereof to the clergy . humane justice , which is also termed sometimes civil , is of an obscure and hidden nature ; for , although it receive its being from justice natural , and therefore the precepts and use thereof carry little or no seeming difficulty along with them : yet is it not truly conceived , unless it be by such who are either endued with a kind of divine nature , or have been employed in all sorts of vertue . for , this vertue requireth a learned , wise man , who reasonably , constantly and voluntarily practiseth it . and such our senator should be . all civil justice consists , partly in the preservation of humane society , and is partly exercised in a court of judicature . this vertue approveth of no unlawful , cruel , or barbarous action ; but embraceth honesty , tranquillity and peace ; endeavouring to keep men from sedition , malice , and enmity ; not coveting aliena bona ; but , unicuique suum tribuens ; gives every one their due . by this vertue our counsellor becomes a defender of the common people ; the protector of the innocent and orphans ; and a debaser of the proud and haught : a lover of those that are good , a friend to truth , and an enemy to vice , and consequently to vicious persons . the foundation of this vertue is fidelity ; which cicero defines to be a constant and true performer of promise . a just senator therefore affirms the truth , sticks close to his promise ; standeth to compacts ; restoreth what he borrows ; and is not compelled to be faithfull by law , testimony , or oath , but by his own free will and conscience ; labouring to keep under injustice , and to see that the weaker sort be not over-powred by the stronger ; that might over-come not right . valiant men , in his judgement , deserve to be crowned with reward ; and idle , puny-spirited subjects , the lash of punishment ; and by these two , punishment and preferment , the benefit of a commonwealth is infinitely promoted . in the distribution of offices , he is directed by the rule of uprightness and equity ; hating to be greaz'd in the fist with bribery , reputing those worthy of most ample honour , who can lay claim to the greatest merit . which is a thing to be very much insisted on in a kingdom , or republick ; because , honos virtutes praemium , honour is the reward of vertue ; and as due to a deserving person , as wages to an hired servant : which was the reason , that wrought the antients to erect stately images , triumphal arches ; and publike sepulchres , open commendation , and the like , were conferred on men of service and desert . now they that are nobly educated , vertuously enclined , grave and ancient , deserve honour and reverence ; and that either by bowing the head or body , in giving them place : and , as goods are of three sorts , viz. goods of the mind , goods of the body , and goods of fortune ; so they are all in conferring of honour to be respected . therefore those of the mind assume the first place ; those of the body the next , and those of fortune the last , as the meanest in value and worth , though now adaies of most esteem in the eye of the world . all these things our senator must be skill'd in ; and in the distribution of offices , and conferring of honours , he must observe equality , the balance of justice ; wherewith every mans manners , vertues and actions are poized and examined . in which he must be very circumspect and unbyassed , lest he prove partial , leaning to one side more than another ; and so come off with the term of an unequal judge . for , he that bestows honour , and accumulates favours upon the undeserving , doth a manifest injury to those that can plead desert ; and so by consequence is an unjust judge . wherefore philosophers give us a definition of this justice , as followeth : it is an habit of the mind destined to common utility ; giving honour to every person that may be judged worthy of it . and among those vertues that plead for an interest in humane society , equality is neither the last , nor the least ; she exercising the office of a handmaid or lady of honour to that queen of vertues , justice : nor doth she remove a hairs-breadth from her , but sticks close to her principles and precepts . now this equality in just pondering and weighing things , and persons , useth a double manner of proceeding ; the one ordinary , and the other common ; one judging by number , weight , and measure ; the other more difficile and secret , that is , weighing every thing by reason and judgement . which knowledge is only attained by wise men , and those that are exercised in great affairs , and matters of importance and weight ; and the other by those that are chiefly employed in barrating , buying and selling . let our senator be skill'd in that knowledge that proceeds from reason and judgement , that he may thereby understand how to distribute offices , confer honours , bestow gifts , what is due to every person , just , good , and indifferent in all things , persons , and places . this equality is an excellent qualification , and of eminent use and service in a kingdom . and where counsellors are ignorant therein , we find but raw and weak consultation , and all things managed at randome , without any thing of certainty ; to the disturbance of publike society . another kind of justice there is , which is commonly called justice forraign , not much unlike this before mentioned , chiefly conversant about judgement ; whose foundation is the law , and whose prop or support is the judgement of wise , solid , discreet senators . before such time ( as is already mentioned ) that written laws were found out , each man was his own legislator , and prescribed his own peculiar laws , not diving into the books of law-makers or doctors for precepts or instructions : for , then that pure and immaculate virgin justice had her residence in the mind of man , dictating unto him laws and precepts , whereby he led an upright life , without exercising any fraud , deceit or collusion . but , as soon as men , tired with the strict discipline of justice , began to covet their neighbours goods , offer injuries , and neglect the restauration of what they had taken no upon credit ; immediately hate , dissimulation , enmity and war sprung up , and gave way to the invention of martial weapons , as well offensive as defensive ; and that in so furious a manner , as might force justice , nay , compel jupiter himself to give place : thus , as sweet-tongued ovid sings , — terras astraea reliquit . she made her self wings , and flew to heaven for sanctuary , whereever since she hath taken up her habitation . and hence it is that we have recourse to heaven in our dayly orizons for justice . homer used to term kings inspired with the wisdome of good government , sons of jupiter : and we style them , gods vicegerents . and since reason cannot prevail with us so far , as thereby to lead a quiet , peaceable , and just life ; we must have recourse to justice ; who by her laws admonisheth , corrects , and honours us , preparing rewards for good , and storing up punishments for evill actions . this justice ( according to ulpianus ) is a constant desire , or fixed resolution to bestow upon every man that which of right belongs unto him . now the ordaining and enacting of laws , appertains to a counsellor , as the most discreet person , and fit for that office . and plato teacheth , that these things are to be observed in constituting laws , acts , or ordinances . the legislator must enact them with a paternal love , that may cause a reciprocation of filial duty : not with a lordly , tyrannical intent , yet framing them to the terror of malefactors , who neither regard law , nor reason ; according to that known hexameter , sic volo , sic jubeo ; stat pro ratione voluntas . my will is the only law that i own or acknowledge . besides , he must be sure that his laws contain no more prescription of commands , than discipline of manners ; that the severity of the one may be mitigated by the gentleness of the other . and the intent and end of all law is , that men may be felicitated thereby , as far as comes within the compass of humanity ; and that offenders may receive a punishment sutable to their crimes , of necessity , and not on set purpose : which moved justinian to make a triple division of legal precepts : to live honestly , prejudice no man , and give to every one his due . he therefore that doth abandon the law , and follows the dictates of his own corrupt will , contemning the statutes of a kingdom , is guilty of a notorious crime , as well as he that denies god , nature , or reason . heraclitus , that stream'd away his time in tears , was wont to say , that all men were as deeply engaged to defend their laws , as the walls of their city ; and his reason was , because that a wall-less city might be preserved , but a lawless one could never , by all the strength of humane invention . for by laws they expel idleness , the mother of vice , which renders the mind effeminate , and makes it grow wanton . cato said as truly , as pithily , nihil agendo , male agere didicerunt : by doing nothing , the people learn'd to do ill . diodorus mentions a certain law that was among the aegyptians , whereby every subject was compelled to give in his name to the magistrates , withall declaring what kind of life he most affected , how he lived , and what art he exercised : and if he were found to give a false account of his life , he was put to death . draco seeing the citizens wasteful , made a law , that he that was found idle should be executed ; which being too severe and rigid , solon did qualifie , punishing that offence with infamy only . by the imperial law it is provided , that idle , sloathful , and thriftless subjects be either whipt to death , or enslaved . in every kingdom there are certain exercises both for peace and war : some are bred up clergy-men , counsellors , and judges ; others , captains , commanders , and souldiers : that so the kingdom may be furnished with subjects in peace or war , and by their actions the country may be defended from the invading enemy , and her territories or skirts enlarged . nor must laws be often altered ; for , as soon as the people perceive any mutation , their minds being prone to innovation , they presently desire all the rest be changed and subverted ; though sometimes necessity requires that they be corrected or reformed . the least mutation in a kingdom , is of dangerous consequence , breeding a contempt of laws , and sedition also . wherefore the locrenses had a law , that if any man did invent a new law , he should propose it to the people in publike , with a halter about his neck ; to the end , that if it were judged pernicious or unprofitable , he should be forthwith hang'd , as an author of evill . and it doth very much concern princes and counsellors to walk according to those laws they ordain ; for it is odious to be legislator ; & legis violator ; a law-maker , and a law-breaker : for there is nothing that subjects so much look upon , as the lives of their superiors . regis ad exemplum totus componitor orbis . all nations , all the world over , follow the example of a king : which if he steer his actions according to justice , finds subjects obedient and loyal , who will keep close to their allegeance . seleucus made a law , that whosoever was taken in adultery should be deprived of both his eyes . afterwards his son was found guilty of that crime : his subjects went to mediate , desiring him to sign his pardon ; but their suit prevailed no otherwise , then that first he caused one of his sons eyes to be put out , and then one of his own ; that so the severity and reputation of law might be observed , and that the force thereof might be in more esteem than the authority of men . the ends why laws were ordained , were two : the one , that men may understand justice , and have entertainment among them ; the other , that it may continue . the first , is the duty of the law-maker , who frameth the people in the mould of vertue . and the second is the office of the judge , who is to suppress the exorbitancies of offenders , and preserve the rights and priviledges of his country . now it often falls out , that dubious businesses , and those matters of concernment too , are brought before a judge ; expecting his determination . wherefore he must reduce that to equality , which he thinketh unequal : not unlike a line cut into unequal parts , and that part which is found too long is cut shorter , and so added to the other : so doth the judge , who is the living law and oracle of the kingdom . nor must he pass a sentence upon any matter , or decide any cause , before he hath heard both plaintiff and defendant , and examined all their witnesses : for , as seneca hath it most excellently , qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera ; aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus fuerit . he must be voyd of all passion , hate , or partiality : one that scorns bribery , will not be daunted with menaces , or threatned out of the truth , or moved by the subtilty of adulation : for , where a judge , magistrate , or senator is subject to passion , there is little , or indeed no justice in his judicature : nor is there any one thing that poysons a commonwealth or kingdom more , then corrupt and unjust magistrates . justice of old was by philosophers painted like a beautiful virgin , having a severe grave countenance , penetrating eyes , a chaste look , inclining to gravity : which image carries this representation , that judges ought to be incorrupt , chaste , severe , sharp-witted , good , grave , constant and inexorable . cambyses , king of persia , caused the skin of an unjust judge to be flea'd , and hung up in the court , as a terror to all those that were unjust in their sentence . solon being demanded , how a kingdom might best be preserved ; answered , by the peoples obedience to superiour authority , and the magistrates subscription to the law . and bias used to say , that place was most secure , where men stood in awe of the law , no less than of a tyrant . it is a shame and reproach to a nation to have laws , that like the spiders web , entangle the weak and simple , and let the strong and mighty escape . which our senator must very diligently observe , and continually provide that the laws be preserved inviolable . justice admits of another division among moral philosophers , and that is distributive and commutative . justice distributive , is that that respects equality in the distribution of reward or punishment , according to geometrical proportion . for , as there are several degrees of crimes and offences perpetrated by the impious ; so there are likewise of the merits of deserving and vertuous persons ; in regard that the circumstances of persons , places , and time , do oftentimes aggravate the crime . as for instance ; he that offends a magistrate , deserves a higher punishment than he that offends a private person : and he that commits an insolency in the church during divine service , or in court before a judge sitting upon the bench , must be more severely corrected , than if these circumstances did not accompany the fault . and in like manner , the different conditions of men in the distribution of recompences , or conferring of honours , must be narrowly considered and pried into . wherefore it is apparent , that in the distribution of honour , as well as in the inflicting of punishment , this geometrical proportion must be observed ; because that by this means we observe the same proportion between persons , as we do between things ; and though there be an inequality of measure , yet will there be an equality of reason . as thus : he that hath a double share of merit , twice as much as another man , deserves a double recompence according to the geometrical proportion , which differs from the arithmetical , observed in justice commutative : for the latter respects the equality of quantity , and things distributable , without regard to the merits or demerits of a person . justice commutative is that that looks upon equality and faith in contracts , bargains , humane commerces and negotiations ; as buying , selling , borrowing , and the like . as for example ; the same sort of wine , oyl , corn , cloath , or other vendible commodities , is sold to a magistrate as well as to a mechanick . but now let us come to her concomitants . and first of piety ; by which we please god , and get repute among men . numa pompilius , to get credit by the religion that he framed for the romans ( counterfeiting piety ) induced them to believe that he and his wife aegeria used to convene with the gods in a certain place consecrated to camena , and there did receive the laws and religion the romans were to follow : so that they that neither by the softness of perswasion , nor the violence of compulsion could be reduced to religion ; by a counterfeit colour of piety were brought to be very religious . and if so among them , how will the true religion prevail among us that are christians ? yet in religion two things are to be declined , viz. heresie and superstition ; which vices pervert weak instable persons . there is likewise a certain kind of piety due to parents , by which we obey , reverence , and respect them . innocency is another of her associates ; which vertue affects simplicity , abhorring dissimulation and hypocrisie ; wherefore , fawning sycophants , that dog-like will {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , fall down under your feet , and seem to adore you ; dissemblers , that hold with the hare , and run with the hound ; carry fire in one hand , and water in the other ; and tale-bearers , that are rimarum pleni , full of chincks , no sooner a secret can be committed to their keeping , but it drops from them like water through a sieve ; such persons are to have no place in the catalogue of our senators . and as no man might have admittance into the temple of ceres elucina , but he that was innocent ; there being this superscription over the portal , let no man enter but he that knoweth his own innocency : so into holy council , which is the temple of justice and truth , let no man have admittance , but he that is innocent , and of integrity . his mind must be open and sincere , not obscure or deceitful , saying one thing , and meaning another ; his thoughts and his words must be relatives ; his tongue must be the true interpreter of his mind ; and his face not shrowded with a fained disguise , but full of natural sincerity . courteous he must be ; for an affable debonaire disposition will scrue it self into the good will of all men . he must hear with patience , and reply with discretion ; free from all sowerness and insolency in words or action . benignity is another thing necessary ; for as god is kind and gentle to us , so must we manifest our selves to those that are a sphere below us . he must therefore be gentle , mild , and of a sweet disposition : not austere , supercilious ; and as timon was , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a man-hater . for as to the moderator of all things , religion and piety is due ; so is love and benevolence unto men . next , clemency ; which properly appertains to magistrates , and men in authority ; for by vertue hereof , the heat of their displeasure towards malefactors is abated , and they themselves qualified . her opposite is cruelty , and bitter extremity in punishment ; a quality proper to tyrannical and inhumane persons . draco was so rigid and severe , nay ( i may say ) cruel , that he inflicted death upon idle persons , as well as murderers ; and being askt the reason , replied , because he thought that punishment due for the commission of a petty offence ; and for those of a higher nature , he could not invent any great enough . but scipio much more clement and pitiful , could say , that he had rather be instrumental to the saving of the life of one single citizen , than to the slaughter of 1000 enemies . and indeed for a magistrate to be perpetually punishing , is as reproachful , as to see physicians alwaies killing their patients with their quacksalving and emperical tricks . besides , clemency in a governour creates a kind of bashfulness or fear of offending in any person . yet clemency must be so used , as that severity , if need be , must not be altogether neglected : for no country can be well governed without it , by reason of the different dispositions of men ; for a harsh word strikes deeper with some , than a shrewd punishment with others . over-much clemency was an imperfection that the stoicks would have all wise men to want ; alledging , that it was an argument of an ignoble mind , condescending and subscribing to the guilt of other mens crimes and offences : and therefore such men may be assimilated to fond foolish women , that would have malefactors freed from the lash and rigour of the law , because crocodile-like , after the commission of an hainous offence , they can drop a deceitful tear . next , liberality . among some of those vertues that were constellated in scipio africanus , this is not the least ; that before his return from any place , he obliged some person or other to him by his liberality . the son of titus vespatianus was wont to say , that that day wherein he had not bestowed some benefit , was utterly lost . now in giving , these two things are observable ; to forget the benefits we bestow , and remember perfectly what we have received : for ingratitude is a black crime ; ingratum dixeris , & omnia dixeris ; name but ingratitude , and you epitomize all crimes in a word . magnificence is the next concomitant of justice ; which vertue consisteth in large expences , and great gifts ; differing from liberality in this only , that the one is employed in small and mean , the other in large gifts . now it is observable , that magnificent men usually erect churches , build cities , towns , and villages , and employ themselves about such things as may either redound to the glory of the creator , or else augment the fame of the author . and though parcimony be judged a noble revenue , yet must not our senator be so penurious , as altogether to forget liberality , or magnificence ; and so degenerate into covetousness , which is a malady incurable : which as salust hath it , doth effeminate both body and mind : delighting it self in two things , giving nothing , and receiving much : and yet excess must be avoided ; so that the middle way is best . the advice of apollo to his unsatisfied son phaeton is very good , — medio tutissimus ibis . therefore that no man might exceed a becoming moderation in expences , it was provided by a law at rome , that no senator should be indebted above a certain sum of money prescribed . which order was taken , to remove excess and superfluity in expences . p. rufinus was deposed by the censors for having 10 l. weight in silver . and aemilius lepidus having spent 6000 l. in building a house , was devested of his senatorship . so strict were the ancient romans , lest the senators excess should move the plebeians to the same superfluity . yet we allow a senator far more liberty than so ; for , our laws do not so narrowly confine them . next , friendship ; which is absolutely necessary : for , since man is a civil person , and a lover of society , he cannot be destitute of other mens conversation ; from hence , as from a source or foundation , all amity , marriage , or consanguinity doth flow : and he that endeavours to deprive a kingdom of united friendship , doth in a manner snatch the sun out of the firmament . friendship is of an uniting or congregating quality ; for as cold congeals a multitude of waters into one cake of ice , so friendship makes of many one ; which is by laelius defined to be a perfect consent of things divine and humane , in all love , charity , and affection . yet are we not to entertain any person at the first sight ( prima facie , as we say ) as a friend ; we must first , according to our proverb , eat a bushel of salt with them , that so we may dive into their disposition , and know what metal they are made of . it is the opinion of the philosophical tribe , that that amity is most sure , and best grounded , that is nourished by similitude of temper ; for where mans delight is one and the same , his affection cannot be divers . such friends were achilles and patroclus ; orestes and pilades ; damon and pythias , with many more that might be mentioned . the friendship of the two last was so great , that dionysius did earnestly desire to make a third person , that so there might be a trinity of friends linked together with the ligament of love . few friends are best ; and the reason is , because perfect friendship is inconsistent with multiplicity of persons : and indeed they that delight to associate themselves with many , are not accounted friends , but sociable ; for it is one thing to be a lover of conversation , and courteous in the entertainment of all persons ; and another thing to be a friend to one whom we make a constant companion , one who is the manuscript wherein we write all our secrets . epaminondas was heard to use this expression frequently , that a man should not leave the court till he made an addition to the number of his old friends by gaining of a new one ; but this observation tends more to the obtaining of the common good will of men , than perfect friendship . now true friendship requires three things . first , vertue , from which we must never swerve ; next , pleasure , which proceeds from familiarity and sweet conversation , stealing away the tediousness of melancholy hours . for , amici fures temporis . and lastly , profit ; whereby one real friend may accommodate another with necessaries , when stimulated by that tyrant necessity . though it be the custome of the world to fawn upon a person that abounds with the affluence of all terrene comforts , and hath high and mountain'd fortunes ; but when he is at a low ebb , then they usually forsake him with a benedicite , or god help you . nor can you try a real friend better , than in the kick of malignant chance : then , if he deserves that name , he will stick close to you ; if not , scoff at your meanness . well might the satyrist say , nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se , quam quod ridiculos homines facit . — as if the poor man were but fortunes dwarf , ( saith one excellently ) made lower than the rest of men , to be laugh'd at . yet , if any thing that is unjust be requested by one friend of another , it is his duty to disswade , rather than encourage him . pericles being desired by a friend to assist him by bearing false witness ; replied like a christian more than a pagan , tuus sum usque ad aras ; i am yours to do you any courtesie that comes within the limits of my power , as far as religion gives me leave : intimating thereby , that he would aid his friend so far as justice , equity , or divinity would permit , and no farther . now by the concatenation of amity , and co-union of senators , the kingdom is as it were linked together , and so strengthned . whenas , who can expect concord or mutual love between subjects , when magistrates are disagreeing and at variance ? aristides and themistocles were enemies , yet whensoever they went out on publike embassage or commission , being arrived at the borders of the athenian land , there they laid down all contention and former enmity ; though after their return home they did often renew their old grudge and displeasure . to forget injuries received , is a noble part , and an argument of a royal spirit . out of friendship ariseth concord , which is nothing but civil amity : and a conspiracy or plot among all degrees of men to maintain liberty , law , justice , fidelity , religion and quietness in a kingdom . wherefore the senate of rome did usually sit in the house of concord , to demonstrate thereby , that in council nothing should pass contentiously . agesilaus , king of lacedaemonia , being asked why sparta was not environed with walls ; informed the questionist , that the citizens lived united ; and shewing him the men , said , behold the walls of sparta . scilurus blest with a numerous off-spring , fourscore sons , before he expired , produced a bundle of arrows , and bid them break them all at once : they replied , it was absolutely impossible : then took he the arrows from them one by one , and so brake them all ; thereby exhorting his children to live in concord , for so they might be invincible and happy ; whenas otherwise they would be ruinated and dispersed . in like manner mycypsa , king of numidia , being on his death-bed , assembled all his children , and left them this golden sentence as a legacy : by concord the smallest inconsiderable things encrease ; but the greatest and most considerable by discord come to confusion . hospitality is a companion to friendship and concord , which entertains strangers as well as friends , with courtesie and affability ; which vertue redounds very much to a mans credit and reputation . the priviledges belonging thereunto are so considerable , that the romans observed the performance of the rights thereof even to their very enemies ; and would never joyn in battel with them , till such time as the prisoners to whom they were indebted for food , were manumitted . plato understanding that it was impossible to reduce his commonwealth to a happy condition by any other way but amity , concord , or hospitality ; brought down all laws and customs to friendship , making all things common , that so mutual society and love might be conserved ; affirming withal , that that brace of words , meum and tuum , were like a pair of engines framed on purpose to unhinge the whole world . now , since it is manifest , that man , whilst he lives , floats in a turbulent sea of vexations and misfortunes , subject to perils as considerable for their number as their weight ; and that we must overcome them by patient suffering , or manfully revenge them ; we must next discourse of fortitude , which is able to supply us with weapons to defend us against the assaults of the mind and fortune . a life free from the intermixture of discontent , is aimed at by all , but impossible to be obtained by any : for nature hath so ordained it , that care , trouble and molestation is interwoven with the web of our life ; so that as our more gross part , the body , is burthened with labour and toyl ; so our more spiritual part , the mind , is disquieted with discontented imaginations . nor indeed can we tell how to rellish vertue , unless we first taste of discontent ; for , the clouds of sorrow being overblown ( like rest after labour ) the fruit of felicity is much more delightful and pleasing . vertue is not a lady that loves to smother her self in down , and lie at her ease ; — petit ardua virtus : but she affects industry , triumphing in the midst of most imminent danger : which made hercules forsake the path of pleasure , because it was wide , broad , and easie to be traced ; and turn into the way of vertue , whereunto the passage is hard , and the ascent difficult . nor must we only despise all labours and difficulty in ascending the pyramid of vertue ; but when we are possessed therewith , we must with far more courage and magnanimity endure all calamities , sorrows and afflictions . now there is no misfortune , how great soever , but she can withstand , and with her own power overcome . this excellency of mind is called fortitude , an affection that submits to vertue by constant and patient suffering . the nature and substance of prudence , justice , and temperance , is soft and effeminate without fortitude : for it is their property to think and act only ; but the quality of this vertue is to think and execute constantly , manfully , and valiantly . all commendation due to fortitude , consisteth in domestical , and publike or military actions . domestical fortitude adorns a man ; and her quality is to remove all perturbation of mind , fear , sorrow , anger , voluptuousness , and every other exorbitant affection . fortitude military consists in undergoing all perils and dangers , all labour and hardship , that so a man may be able to look death in the face , if his country or a good cause require it . he must look to lie sometimes at the signe of the star , and have his bed feathered with the down of heaven ; lie down a man , and rise a snow-ball ; gnaw match , instead of liquorish ; he must fear nothing ; contemn all worldly things , and be resolved to suffer whatsoever can befall him . moreover , it is the duty of our senator to be so couragiously affected and disposed , that all his gifts of body and mind be as with a certain sauce seasoned with fortitude ; for , as without salt all meats , so all vertues without fortitude are judged unsavoury . this is that which defendeth both body and mind from the cruel shock of misfortune . this is that which renders us quiet and peaceable in prudence , constant in temperance , and stout , valiant and invincible in justice . yet is there something to be declined in this vertue ; as being fool-hardy , proud , rash , timerous , sloathful , or puny-spirited ; for , he that intends to gain the reputation of valiant , must be pricked forward by no other spur than glory , renown , or vertue ; — immensem gloria calcar habet . he must follow the conduct of no other captain but reason , and not be led up by chance , hazard , or desperation ; alledging that rash piece of poetical fury for his excuse , una salus victis nullam sperare salutem . the people of numantia chose rather to be massacred , than yield to the merciful enemy ; and the saguntines were guided by the same precepts : but we must never act any thing desperately . well might that roman demosthenes cicero say , injustissimam pacem bello justissimo antefero ; i prefer the most unjust peace before the most just war . now he that despairs , flees from fortitude ; and it is an argument of a dunghil-spirit , to seek death by shewing the heel through fear and pusillanimity . but a valiant man despiseth life judiciously , fighteth stoutly ; not as one destitute of all hope ; but , because he is grounded on this perswasion , that it becomes him so to deport himself : which moves him rather to choose an honourable death , than blur his life with the stain of reproach . this vertue hath many concomitants , which with some other qualifications shall be the subject of the ensuing chapter . chap. vi . of fortitude and her concomitants , as magnanimity , constancy , patience , confidence , &c. this vertue , as is before mentioned , wants not her retinue of other vertues . and first , magnanimity , which makes a man aspire to honour and dignity ; and yet by the help of vertue , imitating marcellus , who consecrated a temple to honour our of the spoyls of syracusa , making the access thereunto through the house of vertue near adjoyning ; perswading himself , that there was no possible way of catching at honour , to a mans credit and reputation , but by the aid and assistance of vertue . this will support him , as bladders do a young swimmer , from being implunged into despair when he floats upon the waters of affliction . the fame of codrus shall live till the conflagration of the world , who for the preservation of his souldiers and country , offered up himself a sacrifice . curtius and scaevola are immortal ; the one , because he cast himself into a merciless gulph , to cure rome of the infectious plague ; the other , for burning his own hand , to make his enemies sensible that no torture should deter romans from prosecuting the defence of their liberty . heroick actions embalm the memories of magnanimous spirits , and preserve them sweet and fresh , maugre the malignity of fickle fortune , or the succession of ages . there is no chronicle nor history in which they shall not have a place , and be honourably mentioned and registred , for posterity to imitate . besides , our senator must bestow gifts voluntarily and liberally , and receive them with a modest blush , and a kind of unwilling willingness , following the counsel of hesiod , who teacheth , that a good turn received should be returned with interest ; for the recipient is inferiour to the donor . taxilis , an indian king , meeting with alexander the great ( as plutarch informs us ) accosted him in this manner : noble monarch , i challenge you , not to war , or duel ; but to another kind of combat : if you be our inferiour , receive a benefit ; if our superiour , bestow one on us . to whom alexander replied , as the story farther informs us , this contention is laudable , and suits with our dignity ; for we should endeavour to exceed one another in well doing : and closed these words with an embrace ; suffering him to enjoy his kingdom , with additions . among those of the more noble extract , let him behave himself with a well-balasted deportment , and be the discreet herald of his own praise ; but among those of the inferiour allay ( the vulgar i mean ) he must abstain from so doing , because of the contrary effects : for in the one , it attracts love ; in the other , it causeth hatred . next , it behoveth our senator in all successes and events to be constant and unmoved ; and not like proteus , capable of receiving all shapes . the constancy of aristides deserves no mean commendation , considered as he was a heathen ; for dionysius the tyrant , demanding his daughter in marriage , he retorted , that he had rather see her wedded to her grave , than to a tyrant : and having slain her , he was re-demanded , whether he had changed his opinion ; he replied , he was sorry for the fact , but glad that he had so exprest himself . who can but admire the constancy of cato ? who , if we may relie upon the records of the ancients , was ever observed to keep the same countenance , as well when he was repulsed and accused , as when he was praetor : being still immutable in counsel , war , at the time of his death , and when that pannick fear agueshook his whole country ; caesar being victorious , and as a tyrant usurping the government of the republick . xantippe , who was the billingsgate wife of socrates , the wife philosopher ( if a modern title may be applied to an ancient scold ) could utter this to his eternal honour , that she alwaies observed he went out and returned with the same countenance ; for indeed , he was so rarely qualified , that no violent or impetuous gusts of adversity could shake him out of his constant composed temper . merit will be crowned with her deserved bayes , velit nolit invidiae , in spight of fate ; or else her very enemies will lend a helping hand . it becomes him therefore to be a fixed star , no planet , in his own sphere ; like regulu● , who rather than the captives should be restored , delivered himself into the hands of the carthaginians . it is reported , that when nicorontos , the tyrant of cyprus , had vanquished anaxarchus ; he told him , he might prolibitu , as he pleased , torment and wrack his body , but he could never prejudice the constancy of his mind ; that would be still inviolable . yet he must be wary that his constancy extend only to just causes and ends ; for to defend any conceit by strength of sophistical dissertations , against the opinion of wise men , is an argument of a perverse and obstinate , no constant disposition : for in vain were all our consultations , if like the river euripus , they ebb and flow at no certainty . in council , as he must be active , so like a stone he must be mute , and not divulgive , because there pass many things in consultations which are to be communicated neither to strangers , nor domestical friends ; and it is the property of a light and unsettled head , to blab all mysteries spoken in council : as if they could receive nothing , but like squeamish stomachs they must immediately cast it up . the romans would not admit the senators pedarii , when they had any weighty matter in hand , nor any of the clerks to be present ; but they themselves debated it . at first , indeed , the senate-house was open to all young men , that were descended of the patricii ; till after that noble and memorable part acted by papyrius , they were forbidden ; lest through the unsetledness of greener heads , the secrets of state should be divulged , and the republick thereby damnified : who being one day questioned by his mother , what matter was so long in debate among them , and compelled to give some answer ; replied merrily , whether it were more advantagious to the common-wealth , that one man should have two wives , or one woman have two husbands : and so by dissembling the truth , came off handsomely , satisfying his mother without prejudice to the senate or the commonwealth . the next concomitant of fortitude is patience , which ( according to tully ) is a voluntary and continual enduring of adverse fortune , either for credit or commodity ; which are the two poles about which the world moves ; and the use hereof is in war greatest . for they that are men of war , souldiers , adventure their lives for their country , and undergo all perils and dangers whatsoever , with a patient , resolute , and undaunted mind . if coriolanus had taken it patiently when he had a repulse for aspiring to the consulship , he had manifested himself discreet , and his life had not been attended by so many disasters . patience is the panacea of all griefs : for things past that are irrecoverable , may be endured , though not amended . he that cannot undergo the bitter chance of misfortune , is but a bearded woman : yet in the exercise of patience , we must be very circumspect that the multitude and greatness , the quantity and quality of injuries do not discompose us : for , laesa patientia fit furor ; patience abused is turned into fury . confidence is another of fortitudes associates , which is a certain conceit or assurance of mind that we shall have future success ; encouraging , and fetting us forward to the atchievement of noble and heroick performances . he that is confident , is a perfect stranger to cowardly fear . it is storied of julius caesar , that seeing caius crastinus prepared for the pharsalick war with hope of success , asked him what he thought would be the event of the battel : whereunto crastinus ( holding up his hand armed ) answered , caesar , thou shalt be victorious , and have cause to commend me dead or alive : which accordingly fell out , and he was slain in the skirmish ; whereupon caesar assembled his army , and made an oration in his praise . aristotle affirms , that men , according to the success they have already had , judge of the future in their proceedings . plutarch reports , that antonius was alwaies accompanied with an egyptian philosopher , who , by the calculation of mens looks , would give a shrewd guess at their disposition , fortune , and destiny : he did very much expatiate upon the felicity of antonius , but more upon that of octavius ; saying , that the genius that waited on octavius was more powerful than that that attended antonius ; which he conceived , because in gaming , cock , or quail-fighting , he had the better hap , and was most fortunate ; besides other conjectures . it is thought , nay , maintained , that every king , prince , and person hath a certain guardian angel ; which spirits are by homer and plato called genii ; and by others lares , daemones , lemures ; and by us , angeli : which , as they affirm , assist them in battel , and inform them what is to be done . of which there are two sorts , the one good , the other evill . we read that uladislaus jagelonus king of polonia , in the prussian war against the germans , spied an angel armed assisting him ; whom he religiously called divum stanislaum : by reason of this spectacle , he fought resolutely , came off victorious , and in spight of the tyrants fury delivered prussia . plutarch tells us of an evil angel that still accompanied brutus ; who being in consultation about the management of war , perceived a man standing before him of a prodigious bulk : he demanding of him , who he was ; received this answer , that he was his evil spirit , whom he should see in the philippick war : which proved true ; for thereby he did not only prognosticate his ill success , but his death also , which accordingly happened . that the romans relied much upon the predictions of their spirits , appears , by the inscriptions of the roman coyns : genius augusti , genius senatus , genius populi romani ; and thereupon ovid sings , et vigilant nostra semper in urbe lares . but to pass by all these phancies ; there is nothing conduceth more to the perfecting of a conquerour , than confidence ; which our senator must be endowed with ; for many times all other helps and hopes fail , when this remains for the last refuge . security brings up the rear of the concomitants of that noble general fortitude ; which as it is the end of a good , so is it of a valiant life ; and hereby we gain tranquillity of mind . he that hath security , is in the same condition he was before his birth : my author is cicero . now , this security tends to a peaceable and quiet life in a republick , which is commonly termed , common felicity . yet our security must have a better foundation than an airy conceit ; sloath , carelesness , or negligence . pompeius , being commander of numerous forces , and going to wage war with caesar , seem'd secure ; yet some of his captains , that feared the vigilancy of caesar , advised him to be diligent : to whom he said , all was secure , and they might in utramque aurem dormire , take their rest , and sleep securely . but this security caused his flight , and by consequence his overthrow . this is an errour incident to most kingdoms and republicks ; who being russetted with peace , and grown hoary , as it were , with quietness , think themselves secure , when as they are sloathful , cowardly , dull , and negligent . the roman empire was extreamly enlarged by their vertue military ; insomuch that their eagles flew as far , if not father , than the current of their laws did run . this metropolis , from the time of romulus , till the reign of octavius augustus , was never unarm'd . but octavius finding a general peace all the world over , caused the temple of janus ( which stood open in time of universal peace only , ) to be shut ; as if thereby the state should be for ever secured from martial tumults . rome being by this means secured , no succeeding emperour opened the temple of janus : so that from that time the people embraced an idle lazy life ; whence it followed , that in process of time all countries , cities and kingdoms shook off the roman yoke , and purchased their own liberty ; whereas she , quite-disarm'd , became subject to the goths . we therefore approve of no other security in our counsellor , but such , as wanteth not care and provision to repel danger and misfortune when they begin to encroach upon us . and happy is that kingdom , that in time of peace prepares for war . it will not be amiss , i presume , to inform you what men are to be judged valiant , and the rewards due unto such persons so judged . some there are , that only led with love to vertue , grounded upon honest principles , choose rather to hazard their lives and bodies in fight , than in time of necessity to abandon their prince , country , or friends . we find it recorded , that the roman , german , and french captains did alwaies animate their souldiers to fight , with perswasions of the efficacious power of their great forces , the valour of their general , the virtue of their ancestors , and the numerous spoils taken from the enemy : but the commanders of polonia use no other argument or compellation than this ; let every person be mindful of his own virtue , and peculiar reputation : which only sentence did satisfie the polonians , whose fixed resolution it is to fight till victory seats her self upon their banners , or die in the field . now , he that stands thus affected to vertue and honesty , may lawfully be termed valiant . which sort of men are not to pass without their reward , and badges of honours , as ensigns of their loyalty and allegiance to their king . it is but reason and equity , that after the turmoyls of war , they should be cloathed with long robes , and enjoy the tranquillity of a serene , quiet and peaceable life . in rome , all such souldiers were adopted senators , as brought home any spoyl that did belong to the person of the enemy , or that wore a garland for saving a citizen in fight . those that had born office in the field for the space of ten years , were admitted to be civill magistrates . nay , regulus being removed from the dignity of a senator , was so much disturbed at the affront , that he tore his cloaths , and manifested the wounds of his body that he had received in battel ; thereby claiming a place in the senate-house ; and made a succinct relation of those martial services he had done for the good of his country ; which wrought so much upon the senate , that he was re-admitted to his former dignity . the peripateticks affirm , that anger is cos fortitudinis , the whetstone of fortitude ; and men lightly moved thereby , attempt all things with the more vivacity and sprightliness . yet our senator must be careful that he avoid all fury and outrage in the use thereof , lest he be branded with madness , and lose the title of valiant ; which may be effected by making anger a companion , no commander of fortitude . there is nothing more misbecoming any man ( especially a counsellor ) than anger : for he that is overswayed with that furious passion , becomes like a brute beast , whose property it is to seek revenge in the heat and height of fury . wherefore in all enterprises , let honesty bring up the front , or be commander ; and anger be adjutant general . plato the divine calls anger , the sinews of the mind , because thereby she is stretched and scrued up , and by lenity let down . and he that engageth with an enemy , prompted to his enterprize by no other instigation than anger , deserves the name of cholerick , and not valiant ; because he undertakes the management of his affairs , moved thereunto by a certain perturbation of mind , not by reason or honour . wherefore it was well said by the epicure , anger is the issue of madness ; which is a prejudicial to the health of the body , as the perfection of the mind . some there are that ascribe more to fortune , than , if rightly considered , she can lay claime to ; and being armed with this conceit , only cry out victoria , before they do classicum canere ; which , as we say , count their chickens before they be hatcht . for although the force of fortune be great , and most considerable in war , ( because it is most prevalent in those things where reason is least powerful ) yet must we not rely upon her so much , as altogether to forsake all advice and consultation ; for , those that are conducted by reason , want not the auspices of fortune . hannibal suing for peace with scipio , expressed himself as followeth ; i have been instructed by good and bad success so well , that i am sensible it is far better to relie on reason , than fortune . for she often fails when a man is come to the last pinch of extremity ; and there is nothing more fickle and inconstant ; she 's a female , and will wax and wane twice in a minute ; and blinds the judgement of those that bridle not her head-strong fury . therefore let our senator be suae fortunae faber , the hammer of his own fortune ; and make way for his success by his valour and magnanimity , and then she will afford assistance ; for she lacqueys reason , as a shadow doth the body . it is the opinion of xenophon , that in war evill fortune accompanies the bad , and good fortune the good . alexander , scipio and hannibal were fortunate , but not so much through the aide of that fickle lady , as the assistance of wisdome , and the benefit of vertue . yet he behaves himself wisely , that takes fortune and opportunity when it is offered : for , post est occasio calva ; he must take her by the foretop , because she 's bald behind ; and once past , is past recovery . now , some there are , that if they find success in their undertakings , immediately ascribe all to fortune as the authoress , as is before mentioned ; yet there is no man that may be termed wise , but scorns to make her the directress of his actions . now , to the perfection of our senators body , ( for we have already discoursed of the endowments of the mind . ) the goods of the body consist partly in the whole body , and partly in some particular members thereof : health , strength and soundness are required in the whole body ; but perfect sence , and agility , and activeness in some peculiar members only . and as there is a consent or harmony between the body and mind ; so is there a certain correspondency and similitude between the vertues of them both . health resembleth justice ; because it reduceth the different constitutions of the body to an equal temperature , and they both conspire to make the body and mind perfect . strength is compared to fortitude ; because they mutually assist one another in the undergoing of perils and dangers . soundness of body is assimilated to prudence : for as prudence makes a reconciliation between all opinions and judgments , till they shake hands ; so in a sound body , all parts unite their forces together , to make it up perfect . health doth very much avail ; for in all our actions she sets us forward with courage and delight ; whereas sickness debilitates the body , and hinders it from the prosecution of a design : she 's not to be had by price , saith the lyrick poet , — non gemmis neque purpura venale nec auro . neither gold nor silver can purchase it . the multitude of acres will not cure so much as the head-ach ; nor the tumbling over of your bags , the rich-gout , stone , or collick . it is a free gift of the creator , as from the prime efficient ; but good diet and exercise is the secundary cause : therefore our senator must take heed lest he destroy or lose this inestimable jewel by intemperancy . health ( saith the prince of orators ) is maintained by knowing a mans own body , and taking an observation of those things which agree or disagree most with the natural constitution ; as also by continency in diet , and contempt of pleasures : what else remains , must be fetch'd out of the volumes of those two famous pillars of the temple of aesculapius , galen and hippocrates . diogenes used to laugh them to scorn , that thought to procure health , being distempered , by sacrificing to the gods ; and yet wallow all their life-time in debauchery and excess . let our senator therefore be , as the physicians term it , sanguine or cholerick ; for those humours encline men to be ingenious , docible , healthy , and of large memories . aristatle saith , melancholick men are witty , because they being subject to anger , are apt to have divine cogitations , and profound thoughts ; yet are they to be excluded from council , because the humour most predominant in such persons is cold and dry ; which makes their consultations solitary , sowre , sad and dull : for a melancholy person is nothing but a lump of quickned care ; whereas the merry soul is blithe , pleasant , affable and debonair . cicero chancing to meet with that passage in aristotle , that melancholick persons were ingenious ; with a smile , said , he rejoyced extremely , that nature had favoured him so far , as to make him dull witted , and not melancholick . caesar being desired to take heed of a corpulent , merry , jovial person ; said , such persons were not to be feared , but those rather that were sad , of a swarthy meagre complexion ; pointing to brutus and cassius . nor do we approve of phlegmatick persons , as fit for senators ; lest their cross humour be a disturbance to all the rest , and so prove offensive : for , as the motion of the phlegmatick is saturnine , slow and dull ; so likewise is the disposition of their mind . good proportion and comliness of bodie is requisite in our senator ; for according to the poet , gratior est pulchro veniens & corpore virtus . now i call that comliness in him , which shews him to be manly , and not effeminate . aristotle saith , in tall persons there is no great vertue , and in the short or low of stature , little ; therefore let him be of a moderate size . his body must not be gross , nor yet lean and dry , like a skeleton or anatomy . for , the former is unapt for travel , and the latter over-weak to endure hardship . besides , great notice should be taken of those that nature hath mark'd with any deformity , or defect of member , as the want of an eye : for such persons are counted crafty and subtile , and so unfit for consultation , ( had this been observed among us , hewson had never sate so oft in council . ) yet , notwithstanding all these niceties of features and comeliness , if any such person , though deformed in body , be perfect in mind ; he shall be admitted : for the excellency of vertue over-comes the imperfection of nature . and though the inward disposition is sometimes known by the outward complexion ; yet is not the conjecture of the virtues of the mind by the lineaments of the body so certain , but that it may fail : for many there be , who are rough-hewn without , but neatly polisht within . nor can deformity of body blemish the mind , though the beauty of the mind beautifie that of the body . nor doth vertue confine her self either to beauty or deformity , meanness or greatness ; but sometimes dwels with russet honesty , in the low cottage , as well as with plumed gallantry in lofty palaces . so that not the countenance of a senator is altogether to be regarded , but his mind and qualifications . now , to the robes and vesture of our senator : he must be decently apparelled , according to his degree and dignity ; for the comely ornament of a garment adds a reverence to his person ; and by his robes he is distinguished from all other sorts and kinds of persons . the roman senators wore a garment set full of studs or tufts of gold ; and on their hose did they wear the form of the moon ; which was the cognizance or hadge of great honour . this kind of ornament the romans were beholding to other nations for , according to all probability ; for isaiah the prophet foretold the noble women of judaea , that god would take away those moons and ornaments of the hose . plutarch alledgeth four causes of this fashioned hose among the romans , which for the readers delight and recreation i shall here rehearse . first , because their superstition taught them , that the souls of their heroes should be led the nearest way to heaven by the light of the moon . the second was , that the sign of the moon did manifest their descent from the arcadians , who came into italy with evander ; and the arcadians were so lunatick as to imagine themselves more ancient than the moon . the third cause that mov'd them to the wearing of the moon , was , to the end that in prosperity it might be as a memento unto them of the mutability and inconstancy of fortune . for , as the moon is sometimes partly lightned , and partly darkned ; so no honour or felicity can be so clear and refulgent , but it may somtimes be overcast with clouds of obloquy and malice . the fourth cause was , that as the moon drinks in all her light from the sun ; so ought all men to think themselves indebted to heaven for their wisdom . others there are who affirm , that the roman senators did not wear the figure of the moon , but the proportion of the letter c. as though the hundred that romulus chose to be patres ( as he call'd them ) should thence take their title . it hath ever been a custom in all kingdoms , republicks , and well-govern'd states heretofore , to distinguish the degrees of men by their vesture ; and without doubt this is of much moment to make them constant and settled in their professions . among the romans no man might be adorned with purple , but senators , magistrates , priests , and the younger sort that were of noble ranke and quality . i omit the mentioning of rings , chains , and bracelets , which were bestowed on vertuous persons , advanced to dignity , as encouragements . though these customs now adaies are obsolete , since the alteration of vertues , manners and times ; for jone is as neatly trickt up as my lady , and the artizan as the gentleman : it is most certain , that by ornaments and additional titles of honour men are put in mind of their duty ; and thereby they prosecute all things with the more eagerness and diligence . scepters , crowns , chains , rings , gowns , robes and saddles , are no dignities , but the badges of dignity , whereby men are stirred up and encouraged to perform what is requisite in the office and place whereunto those badges belong . remulus ( saith livy ) intending to take the government of a strange people upon him , did adorn himself with his majestical robes , and called twelve lictors with maces , to attend upon his person , that he might thereby appear with greater pomp and ostentation , and so captivate the hearts of the people : for the vulgar ( like children ) are hugely taken with the outward face and appearance of things ; and mind the outward bark more than the inward substance . our senator therefore shall observe such a decorum in his apparel , as not to encline to lightness or foolish gallantry , so to decline all slovingliness and rusticity : as he must not be like the frenchified gallant , who when he hath once seen paris , comes over metamorphos'd both in body and mind ; dancing out an entertainment to his friend with a giddy feather in his crown : no more must he be like the sunbak'd-peasant , who understands nothing of ceremony or civility besides the management of his plough , and understands no other gammut but hay , gee , ho , which he signs to his country teem when they draw the plow that furrows the face of the earth . he must ever observe such a comly neatness , as may speak him man , and not woman ; utterly declining and abhorring all nice curiosity . chap. vii . of travel ; the age , gravity , and election of our senator . the major part of the wisdom of a counsellor consists in the knowledge of the manners , laws and customs of all nations ; which is best attained by forrain travel , as homer sings of ulysses , dic mihi musa virum captae post tempora trojae , qui mores hominum multorum vidit , & urbes . and indeed , there is nothing accomplishes a man more than forrain travel . in motu melas . there is a certain kind of harmony in motion . and as the master of eloquence hath it , plebeiae sane sunt istae animae , quae suis affixae trabibus domi resident ; illa divinior , quae coelum imitatur , & gaudet motu . those are dunghil spirits , that live confin'd to the narrow round of the place of their nativity ; and that soul is of a more noble allay , that like the heavens rejoyceth in motion . sir thomas moor writes , that a mans best friends in travel is his coyn : yet under favour , notwithstanding the authority of so learned a grandee , if a man be accompanied with too many of these friends , his journey will be motus trepidationis ; for according to the nipping satyrist , pauca licet portes argenti vascula puri ; nocte iter ingressus gladium , contumque timebis , et motae adlunam trepidabis arundinis umbram whereas , as he immediately affirms , cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator . the indigent traveller shall sing before a qui va la ? or high-way-man . yet would not we have our counsellor so destitute of money , as thereby to expose himself to hardship and distress ; but so handsomly accommodated , as that he may take a survey of all countries with honour and credit . yet in travelling , he must be very careful that he only come over again furnished and full fraughted with those laws and customes that are honest and civil , and leave those that are erroneous and evill behind him . for , terras , non animos mutant , qui transmare currunt . or at least they should do so , and not like some green heads that corrupt themselves , and learn nothing but the superstitious idolatrous ceremonies of other countries , and be sure to retain what is bad , though it prove to their own prejudice and ruine . he must be very exact in informing himself what laws , jurisdictions , what order of life , military discipline , civil government , and domestical life is in every nation practised . he shall take particular notice of the situation of countries and places , the building of cities , their fortification , strength and ammunition . let him also understand the vertue of every prince ; how his people stand affected to him , and upon what terms ; the wisdom of their senate , the form and method of their consultations , as far as without prejudice to himself it may be pried into ; the nature and ingenuity of the people ; what vertues they adhere to , and what vices they are most addicted unto ; what learned men , souldiers and commanders are in every country to be found out ; that so by the report of them to his own nation , the best precepts may be cull'd out , and the rest rejected . yet he must take heed , lest by the new-fangled fashions that he brings over , he make not the people effeminate , and careless of their own laws , customs , and ancient vertues : for as pliny saith truly , est natura hominum novitatis avida : man's nature prompts him to embrace novelty , which oftentimes proves pernicious , and tends to the molestation of the kingdom , republick , or state . many famous persons have taken delight in travel , as nestor , menelaus , and alexander the great , out of love thereunto , homer , and democritus , that merrily passed his time away , travelled all over aegypt , babylon , and persia ; thereby hoping to obtain knowledge , that so their minds being stored with variety of observation , they might be the more accomplished , and remain content with their own fortune . the words that diodorus siculus reports to be written upon the tomb of osiris , are worthy the quotation and remembrance ; which are these , or to this effect : osiris rex sum , saturm antiquior filius , qui nullum orbis locum reliqui , quem non attigerim , discens ea omnia , quae generi humano utilia sunt , & necessaria . but if he want money to support him in travel , let him employ his time in the study of geography , and cosmography : and a smack he may have of natural philosophy ; but to consume much time in that science , is judg'd , by some , superfluous in a senator . the field of knowledge is unmeasurable and infinite ; which was the reason that men applied themselves to one particular art or science . aliquis in omnibus , and nullus in singulis , is no fit motto for a counsellor . wherefore , we commit to the jurisdiction of our senator two sorts of countries ; the one is that which containeth both god and man ( not as if we prescribed god his place of residence , but we speak here according to vulgar capacities ) not limited within the bounds of europe , asia or africa ; but is only surrounded by the posting sun . the other is the place that nature hath destined for his residence or being , as england , france , italy , spain , germany , &c. for it belongs unto him to take a survey of the order and nature of the macrocosm , the universal world , which the latines call , majorem mundum ; as well as the microcosme , or little world , where he hath his habitation and abode , which they term , minorem mundum . and when the mind is dismanacled of those worldly incumbrances which usually adhere to the body , and by travel and science is perfected , as much as lies within the verge of humanity to be ; she officiates as she ought , affecting vertue , and disaffecting vice , suppressing the lusty insurrections of the flesh , and like a monarch curbing and giving laws to all exorbitant affections . nay further , when the mind hath pried into the nature of the heavens , considered their harmonious motion , knows the circumference of the earth , her longitude , latitude , and the rarities contained therein ; hath plough'd the furrow'd ocean , and seen the wonders of the deep , understands their causes , beginnings and ends ; what is the order and beauty of the glimmering lights of heaven , and what influence they have upon sublunary bodies : what causeth the passions or deliquia of the two grand luminaries , the sun and moon ; the reason of their rising and setting , their diurnal , nocturnal and horary motion ; what is the generation and corruption of all things ; what the nature of the elements , of animals , and the vertue and beauty of that innumerable number of fragrant herbs that usually adorn the earth : when , i say , all these things are understood by one single person , and god acknowledged the supreme author and governour of them all ; shall not that person be judged a prince , rather than a meer inhabitant or citizen of the world , that is of so profound and polite an understanding ? surely yes . socrates , who by the oracle at delphos was pronounced the wisest of ethnicks , being demanded what country-man he was ; replied , a man of the world ; not confining himself to any particular place or country ; for he thought himself to be an universal prince . the same laertius reports of that tub-hugging cynick diogenes . omne solum forti patria , is an old saying ; and omne solum sapienti patria , carries as much truth with it , as the former antiquity . the whole world is a wise man's country : 't is a city that comes not under the tyrannous scourge of any nero , domitian , or caligula ; nor can be environ'd with walls , but is surrounded with the universal circle , governed by a comly order , and natural decorum , as it were with a law certain and inviolable , palizadoed with no other fortifications than the elements . the citizens or inhabitants of this place are termed philosophers , commanded only by themselves , fortified with invincible minds , and sufficiently arm'd against the griping talons of penury , or any other misfortune that can seize upon man . such persons ( nay , princes as these , i may say , without entrenching on the royal charter of kings ) no fury of war can terrifie , no faggot frighten , nor axe disturb ; for they are all valiant , resolute , and beyond the prejudice of fortune . now , to the age and gravity of our senator . they that have penned any thing of the life of man , did usually confine it to a certain proportion of time . plato assigneth eighty one years ; solon , eighty ; others affirm , that the continuance of mans life extends but to seventy , referring all to the number seven , because it frequently fals out , that every seventh year some alteration or change appears in the body . the first seven years , childrens teeth fall out ; the next seven , their hair grows ; the third , their body comes to its proper stature and height ; the fourth , they encrease in bulk and thickness ; the fifth , they arrive at their full strength and virility ; the sixth , they find themselves addicted to pleasure and delight ; the seventh , they come to the maturity and ripeness of wit and understanding ; the eighth , they begin to be termed aged , or ancient ; the ninth , weak and feeble , beholding to the support of the staff , and the help of spectacles ; and the tenth , they have one foot in the grave , and are reckoned to be è peculio proserpinae , of proserpina's fold . others there are , who maintain that this change happens every ninth year , and so ascribe the alteration thereof to every unequal number till twenty and one . pythagoras the silent , called the eightieth year of mans age fatal , dividing it into four times twenty , as followeth : childhood , continues till twenty ; youth , other twenty ; man's estate , the other twenty ; and old age , the fourth , which puts a period to all . some again compare mans age to the four seasons of the year : childhood , is compared to the spring ; youth , to summer ; manhood , to autumn ; and old-age , to winter . varro divides man's age into four degrees , and comprehends every of them within the number of fifteen : childhood ( saith he ) lasts till fifteen , for so long children are weak and tender ; youth , till thirty , because till that age men encrease and grow in height and thickness ; ripe age till forty five , for so long strength of body continues , and men are then fit to be employed in publike affairs ; old-age begins at sixty , and then the body is impotent , crazy and decay'd ; so that they are not fit for state-employments , lingring , and consuming till death come and trip up their heels , as he did all their ancestors before them . to this division of mans age we assent ; but the distinction by number doth principally belong to physicians ; for they in exhibiting their medicines , observe certain critical daies . but our opinion is , that the forty fifth year of man's age is most suitable for consulation ; because then the strength both of body and mind is arrived to the very height . besides , it is the middle age of man ; and at that time , if ever , the mind is perfect in judgement and experience , less attracted with brutish affections and desires , and least of all transported with rage , fury , or passion . when old rome was in her glory , and shone with all her splendor , senators were chosen at that age , being then most perfect in body and mind : yet dare we not deny , but that some men may be termed aged at thirty ; that is , are both prudent , grave and wise . and we find it upon record , that some , though very few , were created senators by the romans before the thirtieth year of their age ; which we do not disallow , in regard that men may be reputed ancient for vertue as well as number of years : yet care must be taken that the kingdom be governed chiefly by mature and grave head-pieces ; for as plutarch affirms , that kingdom is most happy that hath store of young mens lances , and old mens laws . pertinent is that of euripides to this purpose : dictum est vetustu●… facta juvenum , caeterum magis valent concilia senum . in athens no person was created senator before he was fifty years old . and in rome it was permitted for any man of sixty to enter the senate-house , though he never came to the senatorship by choice or election ; and after that year , it was left to his pleasure to be present or absent ; so that they did neither bind him to , nor bar him from coming to council . a good , though ancient custom ; for every man , though he hath seen as many winters as hoary-headed nestor , ought to employ himself pro posse suo , according to his utmost ability , for the benefit of his native country . plato is of opinion , that men must learn till age snow white hairs upon their heads . nulla dies sine linea ; that day is lost , in which a man hath not better'd his knowledge . yet we prohibit decrepit , doting persons , whose judgements are as crazy as their bodies ; and the reason is , because their counsels and consultations are for the most part dubious , and are rather he sitant conjectures than solid counsels , beginning every sentence with perhaps , perchance , peradventure , and the like : and this they do , as being sensible of their former imbecility and weakness , and so are unwilling to suffer a relapse into their juvenile and youthful errours and mistakes . yet , if they have only so many years over their heads as may render them grave , solid and wife , they are perfect in uttering their conceits : for by use and experience ( which is the best school-mistris ) they have gain'd , as it were , a third eye , whereby they are enabled to pry into , and discern with the more vivacity , the events and causes of things . and as every man is discovered by his speech , so is the prudence and wisdom of a senator manifested by uttering his opinion . socrates , casting his eye upon a youth that he never had seen before , saies to him , speak , that i may know thee : so may we say to our counsellor , by the solidity of thy speech , and the gravity of thy deportment , manifest thy self unto us . now his opinion must be delivered in significant , but plain naked terms ; not daubed over fuco rhetoricae lascivientis , with the paints of lasciviating rhetorique , which becomes the rhetorick school , better than the parliament house . but so much for his age and gravity . now to the election of our senator . among the romans ( in the times of yore lords of the whole world ) senators were elected divers waies ; for , they were chosen either by the king , consuls , dictators , tribunes of the people , the censors or chieftains . and the custome of free-born natives is to choose senators among themselves , or else to commit the authority of election to a single person , who for wisdome , gravity and dignity is judged the most fit , and that is the king ; which the romans did at first . romulus , the first founder of their city , elected a hundred senators ; which custome was followed by their succeeding kings . but , when kingly government , through the insolent government of tarquinius the ravisher , was removed , this power of election ( according to the quality of the time ) was somewhat changed , yet not given to a multitude ; for till the state returned to the basis and foundation of government , monarchy , senators were elected by consuls , censors , dictators , or chieftains . in all which elections , till the time of augustus , there is no mention made of lots ; but the fame , family , order , office before born , riches and possessions , were most of all considered and respected . now , since there is no earthly possession but comes far short of vertue for excellency in the choice of senators , that must be chiefly look'd upon ; because they are reputed defenders of the law , moderators of liberty , and conservers of a kingdom . and as the republick or kingdom is oftentimes infected by the vice and impiety of magistrates ; so is it antidoted , corrected and repaired by their vertues . such are the people of every country , as are the manners of their governours ; and the subjects are apt to ape the customs and constitutions of their prince . it was well said of one , that the change of princes lives , and the alteration of manners in magistrates , would also work even to a mutation of the customs , institutions and rights , nay , of the kingdom it self . and to deal really with you , evill princes are very much to be blamed , not in that they themselves are guilty of any crime , for it is a maxim in our common law , that the king can do no wrong ; but that thereby the subjects are prone to be feduced , and led away to the same exorbitancies ; which may justly be so termed in them , though not in a king . and indeed , how can it enter within the lists of possibility for a man to perswade other men to be vertuous , when he himself is vicious ? the romans derided scylla , who , though a man infinitely debauched , and wholly given up to licenciousness , did nevertheless admonish and stir up others to sobriety , temperance and frugality . and who would not blame lisander ? though he swam in a contrary stream , yet he allowed and gave toleration to the citizens for those vices which he himself abstained from and abhorred . but lycurgus deserves commendation , because he never imposed the observation of that upon any man , which he himself did not first of all diligently follow . yet in a free-state , ( if any such there be ) it hath been observed , they have been directed by the suffrage of chance . this order of election is observed by that virgin , venice . the like institution solon authorized among the athenians for the choice of the five hundred senators : for , out of every tribe were so many elected , as were thought to deserve that dignity ; whose names were put into a pot ; and into another as many beans , the one half white , and the other black : now so many as hapned upon the white , were pronounced senators ; and those that chanced to light on the black , were repulsed and dismissed : which made thucydides to call that senate , senatum à faba . besides , it was observed among the romans what office he had born before his election , and with what fidelity he had discharged himself of his duty : for they made choice of their senators out of that number of men only , that were by them styled patres , which was , as it were , the nursery of counsellors , that so they might be known to be men famous for some publike exploit , or renowned for their wisdom and gravity . among us , those that sit in parliament obtain that dignity three manner of waies : first , by reason of their tenure . secondly , by vertue of writ ; and thirdly , by vertue of office . per tenure are these : archbishops , bishops , abbots , priors , dukes , marquesses , earls and barons . and these are summoned to appear before the parliament in the space of 48. daies . they that come in per breve , or by writ , are these : knights of the shires , burgesses , citizens , barons of the cinque-ports , and the king's council . there come also per breve , directed to the several deans and arch-deacons of this kingdom , two several proctors of the clergy for every several deaconry & arch-deaconry ; and these proctors of the clergy are elected by the clergy . there come hither per service , or by vertue of office , the chief crier of england ; the chief usher ; the chancellor ; the treasurer ; the chamberlain , and barons of the exchequer ; the justices of either bench ; the steward of england ; the porter , grooms , and all tyed by service to be here done . the stewards office was to place the lords ; the porter used to see there be but one door to enter in and go out at : and every one of the above-mentioned officers , hath had his several charge respectively . thus have you had a description of our sage senator , of all the qualifications that tend to his accomplishment ; his duty , dignity and office displayed and laid open ; the rewards due unto , and conferred on him ; the ancient customs of the romans and grecians touching this particular ; their election and choice ; as also their manner of sitting in parliament among us ; how and by what means they obtain the senatorship , or title of parliament-men , according to our modern styles , who were so termed , because every member of this high and most absolute court of justice in england ( from which there is no appeal to any other for redress ) should sincerely and discreetly parler la ment , as it is in the old norman french , that is , freely express their minds for the benefit of the kingdom . nor are the laws of this island only , and the liberty of the subject conserved by parliament , but those of all well policied kingdoms & countries else in europe . the germans have their diets ; the danes and swedes their riicks dachs ; the spaniard calls his parliament las cortes ; and the french have ( or at least should have ) their assembly of the three states , though it be now in a manner grown obsolete , because the authority thereof was by accident devolv'd upon the king : it will not be altogether impertinent to give you a succinct account of this memorable alteration ; which hapned as followeth : when our nation had taken such large footing in france , that they advanced as far as orleans , and had forced their then soveraign to fly to bourges in berry , for sanctuary ; the assembly of the three states not being able to convene during these pressures in full parliament , because that by those invasions the enemy made into the very bowels of the kingdom , the country was altogether unpassable , so that the power that was inherent in the parliamentary convention , of enacting laws , assessing the subject with taxes , subsidiary levies , and other impositions , was transmitted to the king , during the rage and fury of that war only ; which proving of long continuance , that entrusted authority began to grow habitual , and could never hitherto be taken from him ; so that his edicts stand in lieu of acts of parliament . out of these foregoing premises this conclusion may easily be deduced , that the principal fountain whence the king derives his happiness and safety , is the parliament : it is the great conduit-pipe which conveys unto him his peoples bounty and gratitude ; the truest looking-glass wherein he discerns their loves . now the subjects love hath been ever accounted the prime citadel of a prince . in his parliament he appears as the sun in the meridian , in the altitude of his glory , in his highest state-royal , as the law informs us . but lest we should spin out too long a thread , and so wear the readers patience thread-bare , we will conclude this first book , and make the discourse which we allot for the scope and subject of our next , run in another channel . finis libri primi . the second book , treating of kings , and their prerogative . chap. i. ek {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} — a jove principium — in the trinity we find unity ; among the orders of angels there is an archangel ; the heavens have their primum mobile , and the sun is their chief luminary ; the beasts of the forest have the lion to their king ; the fowls of the air , the eagle : the fish of the sea a soveraign ; and shall man only be independent ? absit , absit ; let us therefore sing with homer : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . kings ( saith one of our quondam pen-men , though since an apostate ) are lively representations , living statues or pictures , drawn to the life of the great deity : these pictures , for their better continuance , are done in oyl ; the colours of the crown never fade , they are no water-colours . they are gods vicegerents here upon earth ; nay , god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost say , they are gods , and would have them live as gods . god the father plainly affirms , joh. 10. 34. dixi dii est is : i have said ye are gods . god the son told pilat● thou shouldst have no power , except it were ( ●●…ta de super ) given from above . and i 'm sure the holy ghost tells us , per me reges regnant ; by me kings reign , and not by the suffrage of the people ; for then it would have been per nos . they are the lord 's anointed , therefore not to be touch'd or brought in question by their subjects : for all the failings in a king can but make him a bad king ; but he remains a king still . if indeed , as one saith excellently , kings held their crowns by indentures from the people , they were then disobliged from their obedience to him upon his failing ( in those things whereunto he was sworn at his coronation ) on his part ; but if they receive their crowns immediately from god , and that by him alone kings raign , as is said before , then they must still stick close to their allegiance , or else come off with the brand of traytors . our modern times have furnished us with too many of that infernal rabble , who were so hellishly wicked and impious , as to fight against their lawful soveraign ; and having got him in their clutches , slew him at his own door . but to the purpose . the athenians , ( as demosthenes writes in his oration against neaera ) when theseus had contrived the model of their commonwealth , being accustomed to choose some one out of the number of the vertuous , by a general consent , manifested by holding up their hands , they elected him king . in ancient times , the election of kings was ever held sacrum & divinum quid , a certain holy and divine action among the very heathens . romulus , after the sight of twelve ravens ( if we may credit livy ) or rather because the lightning had pierced his body from the left to the right side ( as dionysius hath it ) was by divination chosen king ; and that ordinance , called jus auspiciorum , was religiously obeyed . their authority hath been judged ever as divine as their election ; for homer and isocrates joyntly affirm , that he that governeth as a king , represents the deity . the kings of persia were honour'd as gods , and the people believed that they were the sole and absolute defenders of their laws , liberties , lives , and country . the ancient latines called their kings , indigetes , that is , deified ; ( as aeneas and romulus were ) whose bodies after they were expired , could never be found . kings are the sons , not of the most voices , but of the most high ; and as god is king of the whole universe , so are they lords of the whole commonwealth . about their skirts they have this motto written by the finger of god , touch not mine anointed . nor did ever any church-man , christian father or expositor , obtrude any other sence upon this text , than that it was meant of kings , till such time as the puritan and papist , both at a time , and that time bearing not above 100. years date , who began then to infect the world with this damnable doctrine , that it was lawful to murder kings . it is strange that two such contrary factions , that had ever been antipathetical one to the other , should nevertheless , like herod and pilate , agree in condemning the lord's anointed . dieu & mon droit , is their motto ; god , and my right : no body else have any thing to do with me . they have a noli me tangere , to defend them from the assaults of rebellious subjects . yet although kings are counted god's lieutenants , or adjutant-generals ; the council , wisdom , and knowledge of kings is not their own , but given them by god , who is the author of every good and perfect gift , according to that verse of the holy pen-man : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . — and since , i say , no king can with his own peculiar stock of wisdom govern his kingdom rightly ( for it is the prerogative of the almighty only to know all things that appertain to good government , ) they have ever used to call unto their aid and assistance some wise grave men , by whose advice and counsel the kingdom might be well regulated . these men being as a mean between the king and the people , do on the one hand , understand the office of the king ; and on the other , the duty of the subject ; knowing what course must be taken for the preservation of the kings honour and royal prerogative , and what belongs to the profit and benefit of his good and loyal subjects . thus a king may govern all things well , not only by his own opinion , which may oftentimes prove deceitful ; but by the general advice and counsel of others , whereby his judgement and reason is brought to perfection . and as the hand divided into many fingers , is thereby made more strong and apt to lay hold on all things ; so he that governs by the aid and assistance of councellors , will manage all publike affairs , tending to the benefit of the kingdom and country whereof he is soveraign , with the greater discretion and wisdom : for a single person is not able to manage all affairs without additionall help . alexander , king of macedonia , conquered many countries , and subjugated a multitude of enemies . pyrrhus was excellent at the choice of places for fortification . hannibal was often attended with success in victory , but knew not how to make the best improvement of it : vincere scis hannibal , uti victoria nescis . philopoemon was a brave admiral at sea ; cleon could manure lands and possessions ; cicero was a famous orator ; pompeius a valiant general ; cato a grave senator ; and scipio admirable both in peace and war . so were several others , that might be instanced : for every man ( according to the proverb ) is a roscius in his own profession . now when so many well-qualified heroes are bound up together in council , what a constellation of vertues will shine and appear there ? and what firm edicts and good laws will there be enacted by them for the publick benefit and good of the kingdom ? which he is obliged to ; for he is called rex , à regendo ; but some will have it , à recte agendo . and it is clear , that one man cannot be so clear sighted as to perceive all ; which proves that verse of homer to be true , rendred into latine , thus : bini conveniunt melius rem perspicit alter . nor doth this any waies diminish his power and authority ; for though many convene , yet he is still the head of them all , and hath a negative voice ; nor can any act be pass'd without his royal assent or approbation . it is taken pro confesso , that there is much care and vigilancy required in a monarch ; for , he must not seek so much after his own profit , as the publike good and commodity of his people ; he must observe the laws , preserve the rights and liberty of his subjects , and maintain the authority and reputation of his senate . for kings were first of all instituted for the aid and assistance of the vertuous , against those that are vicious : to them absolute power is transmitted , to the end that they may revenge injuries , and be just judges in all causes and legal proceedings . a good king ought to be as vigilant over those whom providence hath allotted him supreme , as a shepherd is of his flock . homer calls king agamemnon , the shepherd of the people ; and plato in imitation of him , the shepherd and conserver of mankind . besides , he should govern his people , not as masters do their servants , but as parents do their children ; with paternal care , not with rigid severity or cruelty . and as it is customary with indulgent parents , sometimes to rebuke their children , sometimes to admonish and encourage them , and sometimes also to correct and punish them ; so should a prince behave himself toward his subjects ; manifesting himself sometimes severe , ( when moved thereunto ) and at other times gentle , affable and courteous , both for the preservation of his people , and the safety of the kingdom ; defending and enlarging the bonum commune with no less care than a father provides for the sustentation of his children . this makes the difference between kings and tyrants : the one is studious for the publike good , the other for his own private profit . the end of the tyrants endeavour is voluptuousness ; but the kings study is honour : riches are the mark at which a tyrant levels , but vertue is the true meta of the king . tyrants desire the assistance of strangers , but kings are guarded by their own loyal subjects . alphonsus , king of arragon , being demanded what subjects of his he most tenderly affected ? answered , i love them better that love me , than those that fear me . and not without reason did he thus express himself : for fear is usually accompanied with hatred . a king is as secure by the love , good will and loyalty of his subjects , as by the defence of arms ; and his senators will stand him in more stead upon any occasion , than a tyrants souldiers . trajanus , that great emperour of the world , did alwaies call the senate , his father : for , as the father usually foretels the son what may prove beneficial , and what injurious to him : so the senate counsels the king , and instructs him how to conserve his kingdom , and by what laws and ordinances it must be governed . this is the only way to keep the king from tyranny , and the subject from rebellion . now tyranny in the one , with rebellion in the other , will soon verifie that dystich of the satyrist : adgenerum cereris sine caede , & vulnere pauci descendunt reges , & sicca morte tyranni . a good king knows how to irretiate and allure the hearts of the people to him by love and clemency , sooner than by violence and compulsion . and good people know their duty and obedience : and if the king through the sins of the people be any way misguided , they will bite their nails , and not scratch their heads ; they know it is a crime inexplable , to quarrel with majesty : the only way to live happy in a kingdom , is this , first , to give god , and then caesar his due . but when kings grow tyrannical , then there is little or no allegiance from the subject , but what they are compelled to ; whereas that is far more to be esteemed , that flows naturally and voluntarily from the people ; and this usually stirs them up to sedition , and so consequently to their utter ruine and destruction , and the downfal both of kingdom and king : and the reason is , because tyrants use certain sleights and state-tricks to deprive the subject of liberty : first , by clearing the country of all good and wise men , either by banishment , imprisonment , or death ; because the vertue of good men reproves them for their vice , and renders them odious ; whenas all they aim at is only to enslave the nation , to the intent that they may prosecute their own lust and pleasure without obstruction . such counsel as this , periander poysoned thrafibulus with ; who by his infernal rhetorick endeavoured to perswade him to cut off the highest spikes of corn ; meaning thereby , that he should cause the cream of the athenian nobility to be executed . the like subtilty did sextus tarquinius , the son of lucius , follow ; who being suborned by his father , pretended to be banished , and fled fraudulently to the gabii ; where having scrap'd as much acquaintance as he judged convenient , sent privily to his father to know his will and pleasure , and what farther was to be done in the business for his satisfaction : who conducted the messenger into the garden , where walking together , he with a wand in his hand strook off all the heads of the poppies before him ; which being by the nuncio reported to his son , who had hellish wit enough to understand such damnable mysteries , soon put the chief of the nobility to death , and by force and injustice usurped the government of the commonwealth , and deprived the subjects of their liberty . another knack they have to prejudice their subjects , by inhibiting their meetings , conventions and conferences , to prevent their study of honest discipline . nay , farther , they often sow discord among the people , to the end that filled with hate and private displeasure , they may be stirred up to civil war and sedition ; who being thereby much impoverished , and the war ceasing , are compelled to pay for their pardon ; and being after this manner fleeced both waies of their money , and reduced to poverty , become base minded , and altogether unfit to defend their lives , laws , or liberties . these , and many more that might be numerated , are the plots and devices of tyrants ; all which , they imagine , tend to their own benefit , and to the promoting of their ambitious designs ; whenas oftentimes it proves quite contrary , to their own ruine and personal destruction : for if they mount themselves too often on the subjects galled back , they will undoubtedly cast their rider , let him be never so expert a horseman . but kings are of a quite contrary temper and disposition : it is the good , and not the ruine of their subjects they labour for ; because they understand sufficiently , that the loss of subjects is the shaking off of their crowns ; and wanting their protection , they are left unarm'd to the mercy of the insulting enemy . but we will now leave the lofty subject of kings to the fancy of a more sublime wit , and the work of a more noble quill ; and come to our second chapter , which treats of the division of commonweals . chap. ii. of the division of commonweals and kingdoms . the diversity of republicks proceeds not from fortune , or chance-medley , nor the disposition of the heavens , or the influence of the stars upon things sublunary ; but every government is framed according to the minds , tempers , and constitutions of men , their wits and education ; though some ascribe their variety to the situation of the country or climate where men have their allotted residence and beeing . it is confest , that sometimes , through sedition , faction , and civil war ; kingdoms are subverted , and changed into states ; for the proof whereof we need not ramble far , since our native rebellions have lately manifested the truth hereof . such is the fluctuating condition of all worldly things , that mischance waits at the elbow of good fortune , and vice is masked with vertue , that she may not appear in her own native hew and deformity ; for man is prone to forsake v●●●…ue and embrace vice , which ever hood-winks him with an appearance of good . sometimes also it falls out , that well-governed republicks , through evill ministers , are either utterly extinguished , or altered into other forms of government . hence it happens , that kingdoms become tyrannies , optimacies come under the jurisdiction of a few ; popular states are perverted into licentious liberty , and from that reduced into tyranny ; and this is the revolution of their government , and original of their catastrophe . plato writes , that the mutation of commonweals is fatal , through the disposition of the heavens , and the operation or influence of coelestial bodies upon terrestrial . but as we have already instanced , their variation happens from the variety of the minds of the inhabitants . for some countries abound with rich , others are cram'd with poor men . in some , there is store of nobles , souldiers and husbandmen ; in others , plenty of merchants , handicraftsmen and artificers . now , wheresoever the number of merchants , artificers and husbandmen surmount the rest , that state usually becommeth popular : but where there is the greatest quantity of rich men , there is established the government of a few . where the major part of citizens be good , wise and vertuous , that state is apt to be governed as an optimacy . there are three things ( saith aristotle ) that contend for priority in government : liberty , riches and vertue . for , nobility ( which supplies the fourth place ) is the associate of vertue and riches , because the equal mixture of rich and poor men , make a popular state . a faction of rich men , is called , the government of a few ; and the consent of all three , viz. freemen , rich men , and good men , is counted an optimacie : such was the carthaginian republick ; for rich men , good men , and noblemen were therein equally esteemed . now , it is the disposition and desire of some men to live , in kingdoms rather than in any other state ; who are such men as are naturally ambitious of honour , vertuous , and fitted for action . the cappadocians having enjoyed kings for many years ( whose race was at length extinguished ) were profered by the romans to have their state converted into popular liberty ; but they refused it : whereupon they appointed ariobarsanes , their friend , king of cappadocia . the athenians followed the quite contrary course ; for they affecting a popular state , would not allow of the government by one , nor many . yea , some there are that approve of tyrannical government most of all ; as the siculi of old , who were ever accustomed to be ruled by tyrants , and so were almost all the people of asia ; who being naturally servile , are even to this age subject to tyrannical government . now , if any man demand , what a common-wealth is ? this doubt cannot arise from the name , it being a certain order among the inhabitants assembled together in one city or country , and there residing ; but from the variety and difference of republicks : for as mens manners , delights and estates be various , so also is the government of commonweals manifold . and though the terminus ad quem , or end , is one and the same , viz. bonum , good ; yet the terminus d quo , or means whereby they aspire to that good , are various , and so consequently the laws and customs are of sundry sorts that are by them used . for , he that shall compare the laws of hippodamus enacted for the miletians , with those of minos made for the candians ; or the ordinances of lycurgus , with the decrees of solon , the one writing of the lacedaemonian , the other of the athenian government , may with facility understand their laws to be divers , their magistrates unlike , and the form of their states very discrepant . the seven wise wen ( thales excepted , who did not care for fishing in the troubled waters of state-affairs ) introduced several exercises , laws and governments according to the peoples capacity , and their own pecular fancies , and by sundry orders and uses did execute them . which variety of government hath ministred matter of great controversie and contrariety of opinion ; insomuch , that the learned , as well in our , as forrain schools and universities , have assumed the disputation of the several sorts of commonweals , and confined them to a certain number ; besides , they have manifested which of them deserve the greatest commendation , and ought to be embraced . plato and aristotle seem to excell all persons that ever wrote on this subject : for they with solid judgement , and great respect to the nature of men , and the temperature of the region or climate , have discreetly appointed laws and governments suitable to the disposition and temper of the inhabitants : therefore according to the opinion of these two famous philosophers , we will discourse of three sorts of republicks : the first is called , monarchia ; the second , aristocratia ; and the third , democratia ; which the latines term , regnum , optimatum principatus , & popularis respublica . the supreme governour of all things , by his providence divine , hath so ordered , that the faculties or powers of man's mind should reside in three parts of his body , representing thereby three idaea's or forms of republicks ; constituting reason as sole monarch , or lord paramount of them all , to remain in the head , being the highest part . the second part , as most vigilant and apt to obey , he hath placed near unto it , in the breast , creating it a companion and helper to the head ; which plato calls , vim irascendi , or affectuum sedem . the third , resembling a rude multitude , witless , froward , and full of sensual desires , harbours beneath the heart , far remote from the other . in these parts of the soul , as in a mirrour or looking-glass , we may spy out three sorts of commonweals . the highest supplies the place of king , as destined and appointed to exercise authority over all . the second , though in place inferiour , yet in quality is of no less regard , being well obeyed : for , where reason swaies without the aid and assistance of the affections , all actions are weak and impotent . just so a senate wanting the assistance of reason , which deports her self partly as captain , partly as a souldier in all actions and consultations , becomes timorous and effeminate . aristotle hath therefore made a division of the power of reason , making one part absolute and standing upon its own guard , and the other , as it were , depending and subservient , like a son that obeyeth the father . which titus livius hath significantly expressed , in setting forth the errour of minutius in his unadvised fight against hannibal , which fabius reprehends in these or the like words : souldiers ( saith he ) i have often heard , that he that of himself can rightly judge , deserves the greatest commendation : next unto him are they , that know how to subscribe to the good advice of others : but he that can neither counsel , nor follow the counsel of others , is but an inch on this side a natural , and of a very shallow capacity . the third part of man's mind resembles a popular government , wherein the multitude hath authority to hear all causes , and determine or decide all controversies , though many contests arise from hence to the prejudice both of the country and inhabitants . aristotle writes also , that the image or representation of republicks may be found out in private families ; for the authority of the father over his children may be compared to principality ; because children are the parents charge ; he alone must provide for them all , and their faults are chastised , rather than severely punished by him ; so ought a good king to demean himself toward his good subjects . therefore jupiter , the god of gods and men , is by homer styled father . the husbands authority over the wife may be compared to optimacie ; for the husband ought to rule his wife according to justice , and command nothing but what may endure the test of the laws of god and man . the state popular is assimilated to brotherly society ; for they ought to live in equality , differing only in the degrees of age . and as the father that useth rigour and cruelty towards his children , is judged a tyrant , and no father ; so that king , that by the oppression of the subject endeavours to encrease his private interest , contemning all laws , and living dishonourably , puts off his kingship , and is called tyrant . a husband and wife living in discord , either through negligence , or obstinacy , rejecting the care of their children , and domestick affairs , do thereby abuse their authority , and become unworthy the name of natural parents ; so optimacie abused , deserves not that title . in like manner brethren disagreeing , neglecting their mutual profit , addicting themselves to sloath and lasciviousness , are not to be accounted brethren ; no more is a popular state so to be esteemed , if of such a temper . thus it is apparent , that through the default and inconsiderateness of superiors , true commonweals are converted into false and contrary governments . policy , which by the graecians is called , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and by plato and aristotle , respublica popularis , may be referred to all sorts of republicks ; because that word is universal , and includes all civil government . plato adds another kind of government , that is , a king subject to his laws ; making monarchy of two sorts , and consequently two kings ; the one bound and confined , the other free , and not restrained to any law : this is his opinion of monarchy , though not ours . but now let us discourse of the best sort of republicks , though it be a very hard task : to the accomplishment of which intended work , it is requisite that a man understand the best kind and order of life ; for otherwise a perfect commonwealth cannot be conceived : but what sort of life merits the reputation of the best , as yet latet in obscuro among the major part of philosophers . the epicures , stoicks and peripateticks are of different opinions concerning this subject , and have divided the world by the variety of their sects and whimsies . but our intent is to concur with the peripateticks , because their schools have been the greatest nurseries of good governours . the stoicks , that did ever wed themselves to an austere life , ground their felicity upon vertue only ; which we disapprove not , so that they consent , that external goods , which both nature and fortune have made for the use of man , to the end he may thereby be the better accommodated , be joyned thereunto as necessary additaments ; otherwise he cannot be perfect : and seeing that man's felicity is numbred among things that are perfect , and that thing is only perfect that wants nothing ; surely , whosoever desires to be happy , must necessarily be fully furnished , so that his felicity may be absolute , and no way deficient . riches are very necessary ; the liberal person stands in need of money to perform the actions of liberality , and the just man must therewith reward and make satisfaction . the warriour wants it ; for according to the poet , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . argentis pugna telis , ac omnia vinces . now the epicure , he placeth his summum bonum in sensual delights and pleasures ; which is more becoming a beast , than a man . whereas aristotle makes a joynt agreement of vertue , and other additional ornaments , or external helps , most necessary for a well-regulated person . philosophers affirm , that there are three sorts of life : the first , consisteth in action ; the second , in contemplation ; and the third , in pleasure . that which resteth in action , if not accompanied with wisdom and vertue , proveth unprofitable , and is subject to many vices and imperfections . that which is employed in contemplation , not being accompanied with action , is vain and ineffectual . for , as he that boldly looks upon the sun when in the meridian of his lustre , is made blind with his vehement heat and tralucent splendor : so the mind of man , continually occupied with the speculation of sublime mysteries , becomes stupid , heavy , and languishing . he therefore that desires the name of vertuous , must lead a civil as well as a philosophical , an active as well as a contemplative life ; the mixture of which two , makes man happy and fortunate . but he that delights only in sensuality , absolutely forgetting that he was ever qualified with the gift of reason , may be said to represent man , as to his outward complexion or blush ; but he wants the true and proper nature of man . hence ariseth the diversity of mankind ; for some are born free , noble , wise , and fit for government ; others , servile , boorish , witless , destined to servitude and bondage . plato hath it , that god in man's creation had so ordered , that in the generation of those that are apt to govern , he hath mixed gold ; of them that are appointed as assistant to governours , silver ; and the nature of plough-men and artizans is compounded with brass and iron : which similitude aristotle applies to the manners and capacities of men . for , although every man doth naturally desire that his children should resemble him ; yet it often happens , that silver is the issue of gold , and some metal of a more inferiour allay , the issue of silver . it is therefore very requisite , that princes pry into the nature of their children , that they may understand their disposition ; and they that are like iron may be converted into gold ; or that proving impossible , the government may be allotted to others : for it hath been oraculously prophesied , that those countries that are governed by brass and iron , should perish and come to confusion . but now as to optimacie , it consists in a certain number of vertuous citizens ( or at least should ) because they govern the republick according to the rules and edicts of the law ; whereas in popular states all things are contrarily managed : for liberty being the end thereof , the state is ruled according to will and popular fury , without the consideration of vertue or reason . in such cities , men are called good , because they are profitable or beneficial to the commonwealth , not for their being endowed with honesty , which consists in the action of vertue ; so that vertue there is measured by publike profit , not honesty ; for popular justice , called jus populare , is where honour is conferred upon persons , not according to the vertue of him that receiveth , but the number of those that give it ; who think those things to be most equitable , that are so according to the vogue of the multitude , not as justice instructs us ; and that to be honourable , which hath the repute of popular fame , or approbation of the multitude . and though it must necessarily be granted , that there is corruption in all republicks ; yet is it frequently known in popular states , and that more than in any other kind of government : for if any man well-principled chance to have his residence or abode in any such state , and he out of natural reason only disgust the plebeian insolency , and by admonition , reprehension and correction strives to reduce the citizens or inhabitants to a more vertuous and religious course of life , he is instantly branded with the name of an enemy to the state , and arrested by the law of ostracisme ; and many times it falls out , that he comes to execution . many famous citizens of the popular states of greece were hereby afflicted , as aristides , thucydides , socrates , themistocles and damon ; and at rome , camillus and scipio had the same measure dealt them . aristides deserves a monument that may endure to perpetuity , for his singular vertue and wisdom ; who for his integrity of life and conversation , was sirnamed justus . and at that time when the law of ostracisme was in force among the athenians , a rude , boorish , beef-brain'd fellow , with a scrole of paper in his hand , chanced to meet him , who with much importunacy would have forced him to write his name therein . aristides being astonished at his earnest and strange request ; asked him , whether any man could ever say he had injured any person ? no , ( replied the fellow ) all the reason that prompts me to my demand , is only this , i stomach your sirname , justus . it is reported by cicero , that the ephesi , at the banishment of their prince , hermodorus , pronounced this sentence : let us not excel one another ; and if any do contrary to what is herein specified or mentioned , he shall no longer reside among us , but must procure some other dwelling place . strange customs of popular states ! plato ( as we have already instanced ) saith , that no state can be long liv'd that is governed by iron or brass ; that is , by phanatick or infatuated persons ; who being altogether unfit for government , seem to be born to disturb , rather than obey . for they , after some petty or imaginary success at war , growing insolent and tympanous , have alwaies some flattering tutors , and colloguing popular captains to extol their vertues , ready at hand ; who immediately upon this allured , or rather caught with the golden bait of glory , reject the authority of their wise governours , rebelling against their superiours , and so usurping their lawful power , take it into their hands , and manage it according to their own corrupt wills and depraved judgements ; which is the cause that such states soon expire , and that oftentimes in their very infancy : for through the diversity of minds and opinions among them , they become void of counsel ; and after a continued series ( if it last any considerable time ) of insolency , contention and faction , they become submissive either to a few , or else to some single person . thus did the athenians , who having obtained the victory in a memorable sea-fight against the medes , bladder'd up with pride from their success herein , it caused sedition and tumultuation in that state , notwithstanding the contrary endeavours of the more sober to prevent it . nay , the original of states popular sometimes ariseth from rebellion attempted against the royal party , as it frequently happened at rome : and at other times it falls out , when the people through tyranny are exasperated , and made desperate by the rigour of their princes or governours ; for then by force of arms against their king , they begin to mould a new-fashioned government among themselves ; which the swisses , not many years since , have done . as to oligarchy or tyranny , we shall not extend our discourse , but pass them by , because we judge such kind of government to be altogether unjust , insupportable , and quite contrary to a vertuous and civill life . now , as to the discovery of the most notable and imitable commonweals and kingdoms in the habitable world , that shall be the subject of our ensuing chapter . chap. iii. wherein is contained the various forms of the most memorable and famous commonweals and kingdoms in the world . the excellency and pre-eminency of every nation or republick may easily be understood by the government and laws therein practised and exercised : for those are judged the best , that direct the course of their life according to justice and equity , and not the peculiar w●imsies of their own natural fancy ; and constantly persevere therein , without so much as the appearance of change or variation : it is an apparent and clear argument of female frailty , far derogating from the dignity of man , to be so fickle and inconstant , as to seek after variety ; but to be fix'd and grounded , is an argument of a noble resolution . and first , as for the commonwealth of plato , we shall pass that by , because it is usually said , that such a government as his , neither is , hath been , nor shall be hereafter . the athenian republick was first made as followeth : that people being dispersed , and haunting the woods and fields like brute animals , were first by cecrops , and after by theseus confined to a city , which was then called cecropia , now athens , and at length reduced to a kingdom , descendable to their posterity . but what authority the senate had under those kings ( which order did represent the optimacie ) cannot be manifested or apparently known , by reason of the length of time , and multitude of years since elapsed , as also the paucity of those writers that have any waies discoursed thereon . yet we must believe , that kings had in those daies their sages or wisemen about them , and made use of their counsel in the management of their political affairs . the kings of that age ( as thucydides writes ) did rule by consent of people , and with their suffrages did many times determine those things whereof they themselves were doubtful . yet that government was of short continuance ; for , in tract of time ( which altereth all things ) it was committed to the multitude , whose force and power did utterly subvert the commonwealth . the lacedaemonian state seemed to contain all the three sorts of government , viz. king , nobles , and people ; the nobles were their senators , and the people were the ephori ; for they were alwaies elected out of the number of popular men . now the lacedaemonians are very much extolled , in that for the space of seven hundred years compleat , they have continued without any alteration of their laws , customs , or government . but the venetians in that respect may challenge a greater portion of glory , for they have till this very present age of ours constantly lived under one form of government and governours the space of one thousand years , and better . now the venetians in framing their republick , do include within the name of people , gentlemen and citizens ; being very careful to oppose any other , if he presume or dare usurp that title , because they only are capable of magistracy . the senate is chosen out of that number that represents an optimacie , and is the foundation , as it were , of that state . the duke is elected out of that number that resemble kings . polybius doth very much extol the roman monarchy , because it was made up of the king , nobility and people ; supposing that by this means the king for fear of the people durst not become insolent ; and the people , out of respect to the senate , durst not disobey the king . which form of republick is accounted most just . for as perfect harmony is made up of treble , mean , and base ; so the best and surest agreement among men , and the most stable government , is established by the mixture of the best , the mean , and the base people . romulus ( saith livy ) being ( as we have already mentioned ) by consent both of god and men elected king , though the state was then but an embryo , refused to have the reins of government lie altogether upon his own shoulders , and did therefore call unto his assistance one hundred senators , who out of respect to their age and gravity , were called fathers . and lest the people should suppose that they were hereby deluded , misled , and defrauded of all honour , and thereby envy and malignity might ensue , to the prejudice of the king or senate ; he made them judges , and gave them full power and authority to sit and determine war , and conclude peace , with many other priviledges thereunto annexed . and if this model of government had still continued in rome , there had not been so great an effusion of bloud in aspiring after liberty and enlarging the territories of the roman empire ; nor had the happiness of that country been shaken with so many seditions , which did at length work her ruine and desolation : for she was observed to be very little acquainted with peace all the time she stood upon her own legs , ever since she was able to go alone . but now let us take the governments of our age into consideration ; and first , of the french monarchy ; which owns a king , who rules ad placitum , at his own discretion : and although his authority come not under the lash of the law , yet like an honourable and just prince , he acts nothing contrary to law , or honour . in his kingdom , the noblemen , which they call peers , represent an optimacie : the people are divided into three sorts ; gentlemen , clergy-men , and the popular multitude ; and a choice number of these three assembled together by the kings edict or command , determine matters of greatest importance in the kingdom . this council was anciently called panceltium , as the aetolians named theirs panaetolium , and the universal council of the ionians was termed panionium ; though since , as we have already hinted , by reason of the english wars there , the king got all authority into his own hands , so that his word carries as much force and validity with it , as the former acts of parliament , which were their three estates conven'd and met together . as for the spanish monarchy , the king there hath soveraign authority and power ; the council-royal represents an optimacie ; and the three prime orders of knighthood may be compared to the popular state . for the order of st jago , collatrava , and alcantara , assembled with the king , decide the most important state-controversies and affairs . the monarchy of polonia consists likewise of these three sorts , i. e. the king , nobility and people ; but it is to be noted , that this word people here , denotes only knights and gentlemen . the union and fellowship of these orders is so admirable , that the king without the advice of his council and their authority , can do nothing ; nor can the council determine without the king's approbation , and the peoples consent . in this kingdom , the laws are of so great force , that every man religiously swears to keep and observe them ; and if any person act contrary to that oath , he is accounted unjust and impious . now that oath by which they swear to be strict in the observance of their laws and liberty , is in their vernacular language called , captue ; which is as much as tegmen capitis in latine : for , as the head is kept in health , and preserved from the injury of the nipping weather , by being covered ; so by vertue of that oath , their laws , lives , and liberties are conserved ; and to maintain it , no man is so fearful , as not to venture his life against tyrants , and all such as endeavour to cut the wings of publick liberty and happiness . this people enjoy great freedom ; being principled with this perswasion , that to live according to the direction of the law , is the most absolute liberty in the world . in this kingdom , the prince follows not the dictamen of his own will and fancy , but sticks close to the rule of the law . in waging war , or concluding peace , he makes use of his council ; never transgressing law : which works this effect , that the kings person is not only honoured among the people , but had in high reverence and estimation ; so that he may be said to be adored , rather than obeyed . and who indeed is there , that would not entirely love , honour , respect , and reverence that prince , that in governing steers himself by the cynosure of the law , contented to be led by the line of reason , directing himself in all his undertakings , according to the prudent and grave advice of his senators ? authority thus used , creates a general love , liking and consent among the subjects . to conclude , the king of polonia seems such a prince , as plato , aristotle , xenophon , and other legislators have desired to bear sway in all well-regulated commonweals and kingdoms , and such as both god and nature approve . the senate here bears the image of optimacy , and hath much power and authority ; for they being chosen out of the wiser sort of nobles , they only , i say , consult with the king about state-affairs . their authority is not unlike the homotimi of persia , or the ephori of lacedaemonia . the gentlemen of polonia resemble the popular state ; for on them is imposed a great part of the government , and may be said to be as a seminary from whence issue both counsellors and kings . the empire of germany consists of the emperour , princes , and people ; which being governed by divers potentates , and their policy being scattered into sundry governments , comes not easily within the reach of a concise description . the quondam kingdom of britain , now called england , obeyeth one king ; who electeth senators , unto whom the residue of nobles , and some of the popular order being joyned , make one common council , which is called in our idiom , a parliament . but native modesty forbids us to proceed any farther upon this subject ; whose encomia's we judge to be a theme far more suitable to a forrain pen . one difficulty there remains still , the resolution whereof we have reserved for the close of this chapter ; and that is this ; what a citizen is , which we have so much all along discoursed of ? to which we answer : that this word citizen hath had several acceptations among writers . some have called the whole number of inhabitants by the name of citizens . others , only those that are descended of noble and free-born citizens . some call them citizens whose fathers were free-born within the city ; others would have them to fetch their pedigree more remote , from their ancient grandfathers . and some are of opinion , that forrainers received into the society of citizens , and naturalized , or denizen'd , deserve the name of citizens . aristotle terms them citizens , that are capable of publick offices in state , and are descended of free and honest parentage . in popular states , all they are usually called citizens that dwell in the city , as well poor , as rich ; bad , as good ; none being bond-men ; for every one is capable of government , because there is an universal parity among them . of this nature was the athenian commonwealth ( before spoken of ) so long as it was subject to popular government ; and the cantons of switzerland steer the same course even to this very day . and divers cities in germany there are , called free ; where the inhabitants live popularly , secluded from gentlemen , and noble citizens . in an oligarchy , because men are most respected for their revenues and substance , they that are most rich are reputed citizens , though they are dishonourable , because careless of all vertue ; and make it their whole study to be rich quo jure , quaque injuria , by hook or by crook ( as we say ) right or wrong , no matter which way they obtain it ; to the end that they may come to dignity and preferment , not as wise and vertuous , but as rich and wealthy persons . among the romans , there were several sorts of citizens ; some were called municipes , some coloni , and others latini ; every one of them retaining those conditions that were allotted them by the people of rome . some whereof were free , some confederate , and some stipendiary . some were created citizens pleno jure , which was by voice ; and they were thought worthy of all honours ; others , jure honorario , which were of the number of those that were admitted into the the city without the suffrage of the people ; and they were honoris gratia called citizens , as the campani , and equites . he likewise was counted a citizen of rome , whose name was written in the book of the censors , and was an house-keeper . by all which it is perspicuous and evident , that in all republicks they were properly called citizens that could plead a right to office , and could give suffrage in the state ; whereas he that wants these priviledges , is rather to be called inhabitant , or client , than citizen . in monarchies and aristocracies those are citizens that are vertuous . in the latter , good and vertuous men only govern ; in the former , one alone , that for bounty , liberality , and magnificency excels all others . those people which are naturally slaves , or wickedly debauched , do for the most part obey tyrants , and that government is called imperium despoticum : yet are not all they to be judged slaves , that are encumbred with the power and oppression of tyrants , if they be not withall base minded and vicious . for we read of many citizens that have freed themselves and their country from servitude , by slaying or expelling the tyrants ; and if they found their expectations were herein frustrated , they chose rather to lose their lives than their liberty , as brutus and cato did , with many other romans . thus we have given the description and division of the ancient states popular , republicks and kingdoms ; in the next chapter we shall demonstrate the new models of government set up by the rebellious since the late unhappy wars between king and parliament . chap. iv. the new-fangled model of modern policy , being of three sorts ; a protectordom , a committeedom , and a rumpdom ; and first , of the protectordom . as for that hellish monster , that damnable machiavilian that first gave rise to this same strange and unheard of government ; we shall say nothing tending either to his parentage , birth , or education , because we have reserved that as a subject for another entire peece ; only , that he might be said to be a man of blouds , in the plural number , as zipporah said to her husband moses : who butcher-like made cruelty his profession , and was never better than when he had his sword sheathed in his country-mens bowels ; so that we may affirm , what succeeding ages will unquestionably maintain : — dicat de tygride natum posteritas — an audacious rebel , that durst aspire from the mean condition of a private person , to the throne , though he first wash'd his hands in the bloud of his soveraign ! he represented the real tragedy of a king and no king ; whose mouth water'd after that title , but that he durst not assume it , being he had fought so long against it , and was sworn to the deposition of all kingship for the future . he , to raise himself on the top of the pyramid of honour , trampled over the heads of the most loyal subjects of the realm ; made a foot-ball of a crown , and endeavoured utterly to extirpate the royal progeny , root and kind , stem and stock : nay , i will be bold to say , if that an innocent babe had been born with vive le roy in his mouth , he must have been food for his sword , as well as the first-born were for herods . it is credibly reported , that hugh peters , that spiritual dragooner , and nol , hatch'd this government as they were walking together in a field : a brace of pious devils ! they would carry the outward shew of sanctity , whenas all their actions proclaim'd them diabolical . there was never so furious an incendiary , as this pious pulpit-cuffer ; nor no machiavel more apt to receive the impression of infernal counsel , who would sacrifice both soul and body to accomplish his own ends , or promote his self-interest . the whole nation was enchained in a more than aegyptian bondage ; who were compelled to submit to this tyrant nol , or be cut off by him ; nothing but a word and a blow , his will was his law ; tell him of magna charta , he would lay his hand on his sword , and cry magna farta : no liberty was granted to the subject , unless it were that of conscience ; and that too was denied the more orthodox and loyal party . the people were rob'd of all laws , rights and priviledges , and sometimes of their lives ; whilst he , like a tyrant , insulted with a quis contradicet ? the citizens were so fleeced and pilled , that had this inhumane barbarous wretch continued much longer , he had sent london into the country a begging . to say god save the king , was a crime as black as any forbidden in the decalogue : but so long as that was prohibited publikely and privately , it was in vain to cry out , god speed the plough , or expect any blessing from the superiour power . his infernal plots and machinations had wrought the utter ruine and desolation of the country , had not providence divine cut him off , to the general benefit and rejoycing of the nation . english ground groaned with the burthen of this inhumane tyrant . it was not enough that the english should be scourged , but the whip must lye before them ; it was not sufficient that he should be the author of all their woes while living , but they must live subject to his tyranny and oppression ; and like so many mutes , condescend to all his actions by silence , not daring to mention the least dislike , though it thwarted their disposition never so much . he was a rod of their own making , and they were content to untruss whilest he whipt them . in vain it was for the most accurate wit to plead reason or law against the sword : the tongue is too weak a weapon for the dagger . during the usurpation of this same hellish tyrant , what a chaos of confusion bespread the face of the whole nation ? how was all the land benegroed with more than the egyptian darkness of persecution ? the whole country was enveloped in clouds , and ruine hung over the heads of the people , by as slender a thread , as the sword over the head of damocles at the banquet . the whole land was entombed in despair , and little or no hope of a resurrection , till a divine hand wrought it by his long-expected death : and it is the cordial wish and hearty desire of the loyal pen-man , that all his majesties and the kingdoms enemies were as stately interred as he was . had he deserved an epitaph , we would have stretch'd hard but our brain should have furnished him with one ; but since he was so unworthy , we hold it as great a disparagement to our quill to bestow a copy of verses on him , as he was a grief and trouble to the loyal party of the nation . and indeed , how can any son of phoebus employ his time so ill , as to salute his dead corpse with an epitaph , that was so great an enemy to them when living ; who had a real design to extirpate all literature , and implunge us into as deep a gulph of ignorance and profaneness as the turk is cast into ? he hated all learning , and the learned , because his crimes were so black and horrid that they went far beyond the mercy of the book . he granted a toleration for all religions , because his own was to choose ; and that he might not offend the tender consciences of his pretended zealots and favourites , who were true vassals to the lust and villany of such an imperious usurper . honesty was so much out of fashion , that he that was vertuous was a malefactor , and deserved death ; for knavery was à la mode ; and you know the old saying , it is as good to be out of the world , as out of the fashion . an honest loyall subject was as much hooted and pointed at , and judged as ridiculous an object , as a spanish don in his country garb at paris . an honest man was as strange a sight in england , as a horse in venice , or a beggar in holland ; and he was as like to be preferred to his favour , as a spurrier was to queen elizabeth . but since he is in his grave ▪ we will not rake up his ashes any farthe●… if he can find any rest there now dead , who living i am sure had little or none in his conscience ; ( for he ever carried a civil war in his breast , of fears , suspicions and jealousies ) he shall lie secure ; for we intend to disturb him no farther . after the death of this british idoll , richard the fourth his son peep'd out ; who had no fault so great , as that he had him to his father ; for it was generally believed , he would be but tenant to the right landlord , or the stuarts steward , to set all things in order till he was restored . but alas ! he prov'd but a fortnights wonder ; no sooner up , but down ; his deposition ( if we may credit report ) was the womanish plot of weeping fleetwoods lady ; who stomach'd it that his preferment should be greater than her husbands , though it proved to little purpose : & indeed , it is seldom known that female counsel ever arrives to any better success ; nor is there any reason that the distaff should be a companion for the scepter . a kitchin was a great deal more fit for her than a throne , though she had ambition enough to perswade her self that she deserved the name of a princess . yet had richard been heir of his fathers parts ( though it was well he was not ) he would soon have frustrated all their designs , and come to as much height and greatness : but he had not enough of the rogue in his composition , to make up a damned politician . he was fitter to bear a hawk on his fist , than to hold a scepter in his hand . a sedentary , retired , country-life , was far more suitable to his temper and disposition , than a tumultuous city-life . he was altogether ignorant in that so much practised profession of piecing the lion with the foxes tail ; which no doubt he might have done , had he been as well read in machiavil as his sire was . he was not much read in politicks , as appears by the small term of time that was allotted him to play the protector . but no matter , it was well it fell out so : he is like to fare the better for it , in the judgement of the most censorious . besides , it was what suited with his phancy ( according to relation ) better than all the usurped power and authority of his predecessor . exit protector , he was but like a pageant , a king in a play ; he only appears upon the stage , makes a leg , and takes his leave of you : but what comes next ? the state-grotescoes will soon resolve you , the business is already hatch'd ; room for a committteedom , which being the second branch of this tripartite anarchy , challenges a place in the fifth chapter . chap. v. of a committeedom . when richard ( as the major part of the gentry do ) had retired himself to his country-house for a mouth-full of fresh air , there starts up another kind of government , hatch'd by a committee of safety ; ( of slavery , they meant ) who were a rude rabble of factious , illiterate , phanatick , disloyal rebels ; a knot of knipperdolings ; of the same stamp with that german botcher , jack-a-leyden : the very merdaille and excrementitious off-scouring of the nation : during which time we might be said to be the true antipodes ; for the shooe was placed above the head : and the nation troubled with such a state-apoplexy , or political meagrim , that it would soon have reel'd to its destruction ( being drunk with rebellion ) had not the heavens made a restautation of our pristine laws and ancient liberty , by the re-establishment of our most gracious soveraign , charles the second . thus did they wheel about the circumference of government , till they hit upon the center , viz. monarchy . how like a senseless body did the nation lie , during this strange unheard-of government ? nor was it a wonder ; for how can the members live without their head ? miserable and despicable was the condition of the natives , so that they became ridiculous to their neighbours ; law lay bleeding , and justice run quite contrary to her institution . learning was of so small esteem and account , that it was thought an incumbrance and prejudice to him that could boast of it . divinity was quite out of date ; churches were pulled down for edification ; to rob cathedrals sacrilegiously , was piety ; the temple was converted into a stable ; so that it might well be said , that horse and man serv'd god alike . the pulpits were hung with blew aprons , and cheapside produced better preachers than cambridge . no order nor decorum in gods house , but all things sluttishly handled ; as if the queen of sciences , divinity , must be cloathed in filthy rags . as if the father of languages understood no language but english , the latine and greek fathers must not be quoted , but were almost come to the chandlers shops to make waste paper . no prayer but what was by the spirit : bold audacious villains , that dare ascend the pulpit , and there talk with god ex tempore . and indeed , most of these spirit-mongers made moving sermons : for not a man of understanding in the church , but would go out before they had done . the orthodox clergy were dis-respected , calumniated , reviled , imprisoned , and executed , what not ? but why , or wherefore , no one knew : as squeamish as these sectaries seemed to be , they could swallow down fat benefices , and never disgorge them . the steeple-houses must down , they were superstitious businesses ; they say , their tender , i say , their large consciences prompted them to these sacrilegious actions ; and all for the promoting of their own filthy lucre and self-interest ; which made them convert those church-utensils that were consecrated to sacred uses , to their own benefit and profit . these foul fiends haunted sacred grounds most , not out of devotion , but gain ; thus was it their dayly practice to learn to leap over steeples : and whereas we used to say , lord encrease our faith ; we might then heartily cry out and say , lord decrease our faiths ; for we had then so many among us , that if a jew or pagan had come to be converted among us , he would have found as much difference in the outward ceremony and preaching of the word , as there is between our tenets and theirs : outward shew and ostentation had almost worm'd out the substance of religion . but this cockatrice ( thanks to heaven ) was crusht in the shell ; this prodigious birth prov'd abortive , almost as soon confounded as conceived . had we suffered those birds of prey to have been fledge ( for they were but pin-feathered ) it might have been said in our proverb , that we brought up birds to pick out our own eyes . but they were all soon got by lowbelling ; these silly wood-cocks were ensnared in a gin laid by the royal party . well may albion acknowledge st george her patron , since we have a trinity of them to protect us ; one st george , and a brace of sir georges . this committee-conventicle of cacodaemons was soon crackt and dissolved ; which hapned very successfully , for else the whole nation had soon come to its dissolution . if ever there was a tower of babel , sure it was here then ; for what could be said of england more justly , than that it was a land of confusion ? now the anabaptists strutted it en cuerpo ; they domineered as if they had been sole masters of the universe : and had liberty to broach their damnable and erroneous opinions in all places without controule : six days shalt thou labour , that part of the commandment they allowed ; and the seventh thou shalt teach , that was their own addition ; at work all the week , and a preaching on sundaies . surely the leaven of these pharisees must be very strong , that can work a cobler out of the stall into the pulpit ; where you might see him thumb the bible with his massey fist , and begins to pitch on a portion of scripture , though he begin at the wrong end of the book ; and then like a fugitive , runs away from the text ( and how can he do otherwise ? for he is beside the last . ) ne sutor ultra creptdam , was an ancient proverb ; but they neglected all antiquity so much , that they pulled down all churches whose outside pronounced them ancient , and crept in holes and corners ; which is enough to evince that they can never be registred inter angelos , who were found so often in angulis : but their deeds of darkness required such dark corners , who if they had appeared in the light , had soon manifested their imbecility and villany : but now we may in the juglers dialect say , presto ! jack lambert and his legion of hobgoblins are vanished ; ingoldsby routed his forces , and secured his person ; where now in the tower he hath so much liberty ( though confined ) as to sing a palinode for his fore-past misdemeanors , if he have but the grace to do so : his hellish crew may wait for his deliverance by an angel , as long as the turks did for the resurrection of their mahomet , and find themselves at length miserably deluded . all which may afford them matter of repentance , if they have but the knowledge to make a spiritual improvement of so gracious an opportunity . but as their reign was short and of small continuance , so will we be , suiting the discourse to the matter discoursed on , and come to the third sort of this new-fangled government , which will take up the last chapter . chap. vi . of the rumpdom . the subject of this discourse being concerning the rump , we thought fit to place it in the buttock of our book , that so we may come to an end by discoursing of an end , a fag-end of parliament , the rump . it is credibly reported , that noble brown was their godfather , and bestowed this name upon these arse-worms ; which proves him to be as good a nomenclator as adam , who gave names according to the nature of the beasts that came before him ; and so did he ; which was , and will continue to be a brand upon them ( notwithstanding the vote that past in the house for a fifty pound forfeiture on every person that should call them by that name ) and their posterity , so long as the sun and moon endures . had he searched all the dictionaries that ever were extant , he could never have found out a term more suitable for them . had these beasts been to enter the ark , it would have puzzled noah himself to have suited them into pairs . this rump was made up of a rabble of rude , illiterate , rebellious fellows ; a heap or cluster of mechanicks ; that intended to reduce the nation to as much slavery and servility , as they themselves were born to . and first of all , let us nip hesilrig ; that wide-mouth'd fellow , that could swallow down church and bishops lands without any scruple or conscience : so furious a villain , that he was able to set a whole kingdom in combustion : one , that would have made a bonefire of the city , so that he might but have warm'd his hands thereby , rather than fail . so horrible a mammonist , that he was resolved to cram his coffers , though he starved his conscience : so that lord have mercy upon rich sir a. hesilrig a sinner , might have been the sum of his letany . desborow , that bloudy beef-brain'd wretch falls under our description next ; who was a state hay-gee-ho , or carter ; and never shall come to the honour to be waggoner to charles his wain ; who still thought , when he sate in the parliament , that he was whistling to the country teem ; and therefore alwaies endeavoured to ride the citizens , and make asses of them . but indeed , to speak truth , we cannot much blame the man ; for he was ever so much used to the whip , that he must still be lashing where-ever he came . yet one would have thought he might have spit in his hand and took better hold ; for now his whip may prove like a rod for his own breech : but no matter , every school-boy could have told him , that the rump used to pay for all faults ; and he might have remembred that we have a proverb runs thus , the pot goes not so often to the water , but it comes broke home at last ; which no doubt he will soon be made sensible of . but i am weary with whistling to this brawny boor . enter scot : his very name implies treachery ; as treacherous as a scot , is old , though true ; and may be appliable to him : for they are as true types one of the other , as the dragon of the devil . a bitter enemy to kingship he was , and one that had the impudence to affirm publikely ( so report informs me ) that he was one of the chiefest that sate in the highest court of injustice for the executing of charles the first ; and were it to do again , he would be as ready upon that design as ever . sure he was some kin to a tinker , he proves himself such a man of metal . surge harry martin ; shew thy smock-face : well might he be a rumper , he delighted so much in the tail . a lewd dissolute fellow ; fitter to walk before a party of whores , than to lead up a regiment of horse . this is one of that sanctified crew , that would procure any business to be done , if a female , from whom he might but expect a kindness , put up the petition . but he was once handsomly fitted by a handsome girl ; which action made the name of trepan first known in england : his lustful desire , though unaccomplished , cost two hundred pounds in sawce ; only they were so civil to bestow a dinner of him , inviting some other of the members of this mock-parliament , only to divulge the frollick . henceforth , harry , take this advice as from a friend , beware of all such costly petitions , if ever it be thy hap to prefer any more . but to dwell upon particulars thus , would require a volume : i must hasten , since i am come to the end . thus did nol and the rump play at nose in a — with the nation , intending ( as it is thought ) to stink the people out of their dominions , and to remain with their confederates lords of great britain . ( as for the rumpers , they provided a scavenger ) to sweep london-streets ; and he hath swept them away , and made the house clean for more deserving persons . i wonder what benefit did ever accrew to the nation by their acts and ordinances ; or when did they ever attempt any thing , but , tinker-wise , in mending one hole they made three ? all their consultations tended only to their own preferment . a knot of gnawing vermine , that fed upon the fat of the land ; a company of book-worms , who , because ignorant themselves , were resolved to destroy all learning , and implunge the people into an abyss of brutishness and barbarism : and make them subscribe to , and approve of whatsoever their dunghil spirits prompted them to . but i must draw to a period . this new-fangled model you have under the notion of modern policy ( though it is a favour to call it so ) for rebellion it should be ; but i was unwilling to front my page with so formidable a title . for the nation hath been too too long sensible of the heavy effects of rebellion ; which have lighted somewhat hard upon their shoulders . the latter part of this piece , i confess , differs from the former , as much as heraclitus from democritus ; yet it is no offence , i presume , ( if i may be thought a sufficient apothecary ) to put a scruple of mirth into a dose of seriousness ; wherefore i shall conclude with what i ever made my motto , — non seria semper . finis . the beginning, continuance, and decay of estates vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. written in french by r. de lusing, l. of alymes: and translated into english by i.f. de la naissance, durée et cheute des estats. english lucinge, rené de, sieur des alymes, 1553-ca. 1615. 1606 approx. 367 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 88 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2009-10 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a06425 stc 16897 estc s107708 99843404 99843404 8135 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a06425) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 8135) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1475-1640 ; 846:08) the beginning, continuance, and decay of estates vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. written in french by r. de lusing, l. of alymes: and translated into english by i.f. de la naissance, durée et cheute des estats. english lucinge, rené de, sieur des alymes, 1553-ca. 1615. finet, john, sir, 1571-1641. [12], 163, [1] p. printed [at eliot's court press] for iohn bill, london : 1606. a translation of: de la naissance, durée, et cheute des estats. translator's dedication signed: iohn finet. identification of printer from stc. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic 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proquest page images 2008-10 john latta sampled and proofread 2008-10 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2009-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the beginning , continvance , and decay of estates : vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies . written in french by r. de lusing , l. of alymes : and translated into english by i. f. london , printed for iohn bill . 1606. to the most reverend father in god , richard , lord archbishop of canterbury his grace , primate and metropolitane of all england , and one of his maiesties most honorable priuie councell , &c. most reuerend father , it pleased your graces right woorthy predecessor , to vouchsafe my vnwoorthy letters sent him in my trauailes , a gracious acceptance . the greatest trouble they put him to , was to peruse them ; so were the proofes he gaue of his vertue , and the signes of his loue towards me , the onely end and vse i euer had or made of them . your grace hath had the happines , with the merit , to succeed him in his dignities : his vertues were already yours in proprietie . of his loue i may say , as of your graces ; that i then did , as i now doe , rather desire to deserue it , then deseruing it , desire to make bold vse of it . loue that descends on vs from men of vertue and eminencie , is it selfe both hope and reward , hire and paiment . that to-boote which we call doing good , or a benefit , as it is an effect that true loue matched with ability , will euen striue to produce , so is it then most welcome when it cōmeth sooner imparted then expected . with this freedome of minde , and dutie of respect , i present to your grace this new apparelled discourse : it hath alreadie put on the habit of three seuerall languages , and if my iudgement erre not , our english fashion will not ill become it . i met with it in my wandrings , and brought it along with me , with an intent , for my priuate exercise of that tongue it first spake in , to translate it : that performed , my determination to recommend it to your graces patronage , fell to be at this late dangerous time , when the diuell ( arch-enemie of trueth ) and his execrable ministers held their generall counsaile how they might make but one fire-worke of our whole estate : but the consideration of your graces most iust imployments in so weightie a businesse , withheld me with a reuerend feare of their disturbance , till i weighed that euen this subiects handling might perhaps doe good to some bad that had a head , if not a hand ( for so great a clock could not strike without many wheeles ) in so damnable a proiect : since if they will needs out-strip former ages , or forreine countries in strange plots of ruining kingdomes and cōmon wealths , they may by this discourse be drawen to practise them vpon the common enemie of christendome , and not vpon vs that acknowledge with them one iesus , one bible , one baptisme . your grace seeth the reasons and scope of these my well intended endeuours , which subiect their allowance or disallowance to your graces most graue censure , so doth my vnworthy seruice with my selfe , to your much desired imployment , as your graces most seruiceably deuoted , iohn finet . the epistle dedicatorie of the author to the duke of sauoy . of all we admire in these times there is nothing comparable to the fortune of the ottomans , and the increase of their greatnesse ; if we examine their beginning and meanes , for they are by nation tartarians , sprung from the most base and remote parts of asia , in former times as vnknowen as vnworthy : if we consider their conditions , they bewray no feeling of ciuility or curtesie : if we regard the parts of their minde , where shall we see ought more rude , and rough hewen then the spirit of that people ? what haue beene the souldiours they haue had through whose valor they haue aduantaged themselues by so many memorable victories ? no better then slaues haled in their infancy from the breasts and laps of their mothers , children of tribute tythed euery yeere from amongst the miserable christians ouer whom they command and domineere . yet we see that with these feeble meanes they haue , in lesse then three hundred yeeres , conquered asia as far as tigris , and the gulfe of persia , possest themselues of aegypt , numidia , and all the red sea . more , hauing atchieued these glorious cōquests they haue beene seene to march , as they say , with colours flying thorow europe , to ouerrun large countries , seaze themselues of kingdomes and most puissant estates , finally to become monarches of greece , and to haue caried the empire of constantinople ; whose neighbours haue not bene exempt from the hauocke of their forces , so many armies ouerthrowen , so many princes ruined , so many rich cities and townes sackt and rased . their power , ouerflowing in happinesse , is at this day the scourge of the east and the terror of the west : in sum , they are feareful to the whole world . but the greater is the astonishment , when we consider , that naked and vnarmed , they haue marched victorious ouer the bellies of the most warlicke nations vnder the heauens , the best prouided of forces and all munition necessary for the wars , that such a people as they vnskilled in nauigation should become masters almost of all the seas . many haue gone about to search out the cause of this thriuing greatnesse , and i amongst others haue for my part with no small diligence perused such authors as haue written their history ; but when i haue narrowly sifted all they haue said of that matter , i finde not this my honest appetite and curiosity as i would contented ; rather as one ill satisfied with the diuersity and negligence of their historiographers , all of them nothing neere approching the course and knowledge of the first and essentiall cause of this their so raised fortunes , i haue sought to please my selfe with setting down as i haue , the many acts and obseruations i haue thereof collected , and which well deserue to be published : not that i so far forget my selfe as to thinke my selfe able to flie a higher pitch then others whom i much honour and esteeme ; but because i haue taken cleane an other way ; with this hope neuerthelesse , that huely representing and distinguishing by order as i doe , the establishment of this monarchy ( answerable to what may be vnderstoode thereof ) the apparence and truth of my discourse wil somwhat inlighten this subiect & affoord me an honest excuse vpon the defects which may be discouered in my opinion . the argument then of this book consisteth of three points , whereunto the order of the whole discourse hath reference : in the first place i summarily handle the meanes they haue practised for their aduancement and greatnesse ; secondly with what cunning and deceit they maintaine what they haue gotten : and lastly how we may be able to assaile them , and turne the chance of their victories and powers . this my trauaile ( most mighty prince ) taketh his flight straight to your highnesse to range it selfe vnder the shelter of your protection , armed with the allowable opinion , that your aighnesse as a generous prince cannot but take especiall pleasure to heare , see , & waigh such speculations . to say the truth , the ordinary discourses of your highnesse table are no other but sundry questions , which it pleaseth your highnesse vsually to propound to all those noble spirits that attend you ; but aboue all , when any one awaketh matter cōcerning either estate affaires , or the atchieuement of deedes of armes ; then is the time your highnesse lendeth an attentiue eare to such as discourse thereof , and to all mens admiration resolueth the most difficult points of the matter in handling , wherein you discouer a iudgment so far beyonde the vulgar and surpassing your age , as we cannot but confesse that the propositions you make are so many proofes and resolutions which you deliuer , and please to draw from out the capacity of your seruants . which considering often with my selfe , i finde forthwith allaied in me the heat of the intention i had to dedicate this my booke to your highnesse , but at the same instant finding represented before mine eies ; the excellency of your iudgment , together with your noble and gentle disposition , which knoweth how to accommodate your greatnesse to the honest designes of your subiects , such especially as reuerence you like me , feare immediatly vanisheth and my desire gathereth strength , with assurance that you wil be so gratious , as , though i be the least of your seruants , you will not spare to entertaine and honour this my little labour with your iudgment : practising vpon me what the sunne ( common father of generation ) doth on the earth , bestowing his beames indifferently as well vpon the low plants as high trees . it may please your highnesse then to vouchsafe to receiue this treatise with the like coūtenance as you would ought else especially labored , in imitation of the diuine maiesty ( only idea of all perfection ) which as well excepteth the offering of the poore widow , as the presents of great princes . againe , it may please your highnes not to thinke amisse so farforth to protect the whole discourse , that it may , supported by your authority , passe with that credit as i wish among men , and remaine free from the many censures of such as take no other delight then in reprehending other mens inuentions . this assurance will make me lift my head higher then otherwise i would , for two causes : the one for the honour and particular contentment i shall receiue hauing performed ought pleasing to your highnesse , the other for the testimony i shall heereby haue of the participation of your fauour beyond my merit and expectation : for which i offer vp my selfe not to die vngratefull , as your highnesse most humble subiect and vassall , r. de lvsing . to the reader . the world had neuer more bookes , bookes neuer lesse woorthy matter : learned , vnlearned , all will be writing , and of these the most affecting the glorious names of authors , become the authors of their inglorious names . pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli . the readers skill , makes bookes thriue well or ill . but the true life of a worke , and sound discretion of the writer , appeere not more in the well handling , then wise choice of a subiect . i know diuers courses may meete with one end , as many waies leade to one citie , so may one theame entertaine a world of inuentions ; but of these ( like the same meate serued in in seuerall fashions ) some few onely shall carry the true pleasing relish and temper ; the rest ( as knots in names ) stand rather for ornaments or flourishing differences , then matters regardable or of consequence : well may the will or appetite for a time transport vs , but reason as soueraigne must in the end controle and checke vs. in the compasse of my obseruations , i haue seene discourses and stiles , otherwise hollow and vnsound , sway euen the best iudgements , not alone to allowance , but imitation . whether this were the infection of ignorance , that seasing the most might spread to the best ; or the tyrannie of fashion , which must , howsoeuer monstrous , ( if our selues will not seeme monstrous ) be followed , i know not : one thing i am sure of ; time hath discouered their weaknesse , and trueth his concealed daughter is come to light , when such light owles liue ( or to say better ) die confined to perpetuall obscuritie . this worke seemes to haue passed the pikes of such dangers ; it hath for a sufficient time vndergone the view and censure of the best discerning nations of europe : it hath beene taught to speake both their and the old roman language : if england should not now affoord it kind entertainment , i should thinke it in an error ( not to say of iudgement ) of custom , as being not yet cleere of the imputation it carries of harshnesse towards euen woorthy strangers ; but since i finde ( as doe themselues that suffer ) that this discourteous fault is laid vpon the common sort , and the contrary extolled in the gentrie & persons of more eminent quality , vilia miretur vulgus : we will appeale from their ignorance , to the more generous and better bredde vnderstandings . and to awake these , let me tell them , they shall finde it a discourse not faint or languishing , but such as like a wel breathed runner , gathers more strength towards the end of the race , then was bewraied in the beginning . now to others which shal perhaps obiect , that the scope hereof lying out of our distance , asketh as small heede , as it smally concerneth vs ; i answere , that then the gout or gangrene is not to be regarded because the great toe onely hath it . time and sinne may one day ( which god turne from vs ) make vs more sensible , and this subiects debating more necessary : such as it now is , or may prooue ( reader ) i heere expose it to thy view and censure . i know some acquainted with me and my courses , will expect rather matter of mine owne , then others inuention . they haue reason in this , howsoeuer i haue abilitie : but i cannot yet forget an honest learned physician i once obserued , who ( it seemes ) to spare others , so spent his owne spirits in the personall practise of his medicinall conclusions , as his bodie yet suffers the iniuries of such selfe-offered violence . i am not so charitable ; neither hold i him the vnwisest , that out of others triall frameth his owne confirming . it is time that begets iudgement and assurance . and to this purpose i will close with a saying of that euer most reuerenced master of moralitie seneca , non ignoro etiam quae in speciem laborant , dignitatem dico & eloquentiae famam , & quicquid ad alienum suffragium venit , mora conualescere . i. f. the table of the chapters of the first booke . the turke hath applied his thoughts wholly to the warres . chap. 1. he hath alwaie● sought to make offensiue war. chap. 2. he hath made no account of fortresses . chap. 3. he hath trained vp his souldiours to valour and hardinesse . chap. 4. he hath maintained his souldiours in military discipline . chap. 5. he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne . chap. 6. he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceit . chap. 7. he hath beene alwaies serued in his warre by good and valiant captaines . chap. 8. he hath made no skip in his enterprises . chap. 9. he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance . chap. 10. he hath laide hold on occasion . chap. 11. he hath behaued himselfe with nimblenesse and celerity vpon his occasions . chap. 12. he hath gone himselfe in person to the warre . chap. 13. he hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars . chap. 14. he hath neuer fought out of season . chap. 15. he hath neuer diuided his forces . chap. 16. he hath not long held warre with one alone . chap. 17. the table of the chapters of the second booke . of religion . chap. 1. of the direct dependency of the turkes subiects vpon their soueraigne . chap. 2. how he hath depriued his subiects of strength . chap. 3. the causes that may moue a people to fury . chap. 4. the common remedy applied by the turke against the force and fury of the people . chap. 5. how the turke curbeth the power of the great men of his estate . chap. 6. how he confoundeth the practises of forraine princes his neighbours . chap. 7. the table of the chapters of the third booke . the causes of the fall and ruine of estates . chap. 1. from what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered . chap. 2. that the monarchy of the turke is comprehended within the number of great estates . chap. 3. whether the empire of the turkes draw towards an end . chap. 4. by what kinde of causes the empire of the turke might most easily faile . chap. 5. that it is not an impossible thing for the christians with open force to vanquish the turke . chap. 6. why the leagues amongst christian princes are commonly of small effect . chap. 7. the defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeeres 1537. and 1571. chap. 8. a league which may be treated without danger of the former defects . chap. 9. wherein consisteth the greatest forces of the turke . chap. 10. where the turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him , either by sea or by land . chap. 11. of the inward causes whereby the empire of the turke may come to ruine . chap. 12. of the mixt causes . chap. 13. how particular persons may be gained . chap. 14. how the people of the turke may be wrought from his obedience . chap. 15. considerations vpon the greatnesse of the turkish empire . wherein are handled the manner how it is become so great , the meanes whereby it is maintained , and how it would be easie to bring it to ruine . 1 the summe of this discourse . 2 the diuision thereof into 3. principall parts . 3 the argument of the first booke . 4 steps to the turkish greatnesse . first : my purpose is to examine in this treatise how the empire of the turke is growne to that height and greatnesse . 2 : and the better to effect it i will diuide the whole discourse into three principall parts . the first , what way he hath taken to attaine to the top of such a raised greatnesse as his now is . the second , with what meanes and arre he behaueth and maintaineth himselfe therein ; and finally i will declare how the pride of this tyrant may be abated ; his greatnesse diminished , and his empire ruined . 3 : the subiect then of the first booke shall be to examine what haue beene his courses in his conquests ; and though they haue beene without any order , reason or faith : yet will it be no hard matter to discerne , by the successe of such counsailes as he hath put in practise in his most difficult enterprises , the good from the bad , and also to separate in the course of his actions all whatsoeuer hath beene profitable ; from what hath beene hurtfull and ill vndertaken : heerin imitating the bee which from bitter herbes sucks most sweete hony . these are in my opinion the steps and dessignes he hath followed to attaine to his greatnesse , wherby as by degrees he hath built his strange fortune which makes vs at this day so much to feare him . 1 first he hath applied himselfe wholy to the wars . 2 his war hath beene alwaies offensiue . 3 he hath made slender account of fortresses . 4 he hath fashioned his wisdome to valour and hardnesse . 5 he hath maintained his great and mighty armies in military discipline and policy . 6 he hath made no reckoning of other forces then of his owne . 7 he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceipt . 8 he hath beene serued by excellent captaines . 9 he hath not made any skip in his enterprises . 10 he hath not spent time vpon matters of small importance . 11 he hath laid hold on occasions . 12 he hath speedily put in execution his dessignes . 13 he hath gone in person to the war. 14 well appointed . 15 in a fit season . 16 he hath not diuided his forces . 17 he hath not long continued war with one alone . chap. i. that he hath applied his thoughts wholly to the wars . 1 bookes held by the gothes a let to armes . 2 charles the 8. his expedition to naples . 3 christians held vnfit for wars , because so intent to studie . 4 the turkes wholly addicted to the wars . 5 the romans most martiall . 6 barbarous nations most warlike and prompt in their attempts . 7 the turks despisers of liberall arts . 8 they inuade italy . 9 their military vertues . 10 whether liberall artes disable their followers for the wars . 11 the vse of history and the mathematikes . 12 letters and armes fitly maried together . 13 learning and valour necessary in a commander , obedience in a souldier . 1 at the time that the gothes made a most fearefull sacke of greece , and as a violent streame ouerflowed her fruitfull plaines , ransacking her many cities and rich townes ; amongst other spoiles there fel into their hands a great number of bookes of all sorts of professions ; wherewith not knowing what to doe , as vnprofitable stuffe , they would haue burnt them , if one amongst the rest had not opposed himselfe : who stepping foorth cried out ; it was requisite they should carefully preserue them , and leaue ( quoth he ) this poison amongst the grecians , since in time they will bereaue them of all martiall courage , as ordinarily they do all such as apply themselues too much to the like learning and knowledge , making them become tender , effeminate , and altogether vnfit for the vse of armes ; so as failing of courage they will prooue more easily the pray of our fortunate conquest . 2 when charles the eight of france with so smal an army made his way thorough italy , and that without vnsheathing his sword or couching his lance , he became master of the kingdome of naples , and of the greater part of thoseany ; the french nobilitie reasoning among themselues whence such a base cowardlinesse , as they had founde amongst the italians , should proceed , imputed the cause thereof to the studie of learning , as that which softeneth the courage , and is not fit for ought but to make a man fearefull , vnapt , and of a weake resolution for the wars . 3 heeretofore and at this day , the turkes haue and doe esteeme the christians of little valour in martiall affaires , becaus of the varietie of arts whereunto they vsually addict themselues ; and though a man be so smally durable as he cannot attaine to perfection in diuers sciences , nor so inable himselfe to the attention of sundry matters as hee may game the mastery for which he striueth ; yet all men will busie themselues about knowledge , and intermeddle with all arts and practises , not heeding that in stead of forwarding themselues , they recoile from that perfect knowledge which is requisite for them , and so remaine vnfurnished , or but weakely grounded in one onely profession . 4 on the contrarie , the turkes fashion their whole dessignes to the war , and bend all their thoughts and studies to the exercise of armes , reiecting all other courses , and pleasing themselues onely in what may stand them in stead for that profession . 5 there is nothing more true ( and we finde it in histories ) then that the romanes were most excellent souldiers , but especially before they opened their gates to arts and sciences presented them by the greeks , and that they gaue themselues ouer to the pleasures of the east . then were they at the best for true cariage of marshall affaires when their consuls scorned not to hold the plough ; when physicians , surgeons , & men of such like profession were in no credit amongst them . and to say the truth , we finde that if afterward they did atchieue any worthy enterprise , it was not by meanes of any valour which was remaining with them , but by the reputation & strength they had formerly gotten . for proofe heereof we may plainly perceiue that as soone as they had giuen entertainement to forraine sciences , made tender by study , they receiued notable and dishonorable ouerthrowes , as well at the hands of iugurtha , mithridates , the cimbrians , numantins , spartans , the parthians , as of others . 6 for confirmation whereof we obserue in ancient histories , that the most warlike people , & withal such as haue performed the memorablest acts , haue beene the most grosse , rude and inured to paine and hardnesse , far from all ciuility ; free from such delicacy and wantonnesse as is corruptly stept in amongst vs ; such as had no learning or taste of any knowledge or action which might allay or neuer so litle shake their couragious resolutions and warlike dessignes . of this composition were long since and are at this daie the scythians , who sometimes made their worthy armes resound as far as the most remote parts of the east , as far as the danow and the bankes of nilus . it is not long since that they , conducted by quingus their king , ouerran all the east , harrowed the plaine country , and replenished all with misery and desolation . the memory of the famous acts of great tamberlane is yet fresh , who only hitherto may vaunt that he hath in a ranged battel vanquished the turkish armies , & led their cōmander captiue , making him serue as his footstoole . in our time the mogores , a grosse and ignorant people sprung out of scythus ( or to say better ) out of tartaria , haue atchieued great conquests towards india . euery man also knowes that the great cham , as rude & rough hewen as these , is neuerthelesse one of the most mighty potentates of the world , ruling ouer a people of the least ciuilitie that can be imagined . but not to wander out of europe , let vs behold the swizzers , & we shall finde that for knowledge and ciuility they are no better then these , yet haue they performed many worthy exploits as well at nancy , dijon , nouare , marignan , dreux , as else where : in such sort as , not infected with our vanity , they giue ( as a man may say ) the law to the mightiest princes that seeke their assistance . 7 now the turks aboue all nations haue euer profest to follow this course of life so barbarous and rude , and euen at this day they contemne all knowledge and profession of whatsoeuer arte , be it neuer so noble or industrious ; among the rest they abhor painting and ingrauing , neither make they any account of architecture : and in very deede we see that they haue euer held it an especiall offence towards god , to ingraue or paint him . as for learning they recken it as meere foolery : in a word , there are none amongst them so slenderly esteemed as men learned and seene in any kinde of knowledge . in their garments they affect not stuffes wrought , imbroidered or curiously cut and fashioned , but such as are whole and lasting ; laces , fringes and other ornaments are by them reiected : beaten and massie gold is only in request amongst them . in the wars they seeke rather to appeere fearce and terrible , then gallantly set forth and apparelled : their whole delight is set vpon war and armes ; insomuch as it is hard to finde any one of them who will not manifest by his fashion of liuing that he is rather borne for the wars then ought else : so as when there is any leuying of souldiours , such as are left at home hold themselues highly iniured ; so honorably doe they esteeme of the life of a souldier . whence it proceedeth , that they are so feared in all their attempts , either for beseeging , battering , or forcing of places of greatest strength ; for skirmishing on foote or on horsebacke , in set battailes by sea or by land , or for fortifying and defending . 8 whereof they gaue sufficient proofe when hauing gotten ottranto they valiantly made it good against the forces of all italy ; euen till the death of their master mahomet the 2. leauing behinde them , trenches , bulwarkes , ramparts and all other sorts of fortifications , so well contriued and disposed , as they haue serued since for patterns and models to our commanders of christendome . 9 such is their laborious vertue in the wars , as there is no place so strong , or enterprise so difficult which will not prooue easie at the enforcing of their powers . 10 returning now to that i said concerning knowledge : i expect that some one should say : and what i praie , is learning a let to military vertue , or a meanes to hinder a man from becomming a perfect souldier ? surely no : i am of a contrary opinion , and i ground it in part vpon the experience of such captaines as i will heere reckon . alexander the great and caesar who were of the principall most aduenturous , and politicke masters of the wars were most excellently seene in all sorts of knowledge ; for my owne part i hold it very difficult for any without the aide of historie or the mathematiques , to deserue the name of a great captaine and sage conductor of armies : 11 since historie by the variety of examples both of good and bad successe furnisheth a man with heedfulnesse and discretion , with resolution and aduice in all occurrents , and makes him more considerate in what he vndertaketh ; like as the mathematikes refine his knowledge and iudgement , as well in engines of war as in fortifying . 12 in conclusion , it is not to be denied but that learning is most proper to mould and perfectly fashion a heart and courage borne and disposed to armes : for this cause they would in old time , that pallas armed should signifie vnto vs the marrying of letters with armes . now to come againe to the turkes rudenesse , we shall finde ( examining some of their princes ) that somewhat must be abated . let vs consider what were mahomet the 2. and selim and soliman his sonnes ( the most valiant princes of the race of the ottomans ) and we shall see that they delighted in reading histories , and in studying the mathematikes : so as though nature dispose a man to hardinesse and magnanimitie , it is sure that if he be wholy vnfurnished of artes and learning , he will be of a disposition doubtfull , vnassured , vnresolued and without any true stomacke or valour ; parts especially required in a souldier . this hath beene seene in those of the ottomans which wanted the vertues of the three aboue named ; and amongst others baiazet the second and corcas his sonne can witnesse it . these indeed had in some measure the knowledge of good letters , but these performed no valiant act , because they had not hearts and courages borne to the wars . 13 whence it followeth that the study of learning auaileth much to the forming of a wise and discreet captaine , and to helpe him to attaine to the perfection worthy his name ; nature withall disposing him to valour and generositie . as for the priuat souldier i hold that he needes not know more then to obey it , not being necessary he should be instructed in so excellent an vnderstanding of matters as the commander , considering that humaine sciences and the liberall arts in an vnsetled minde make it embrace ciuility , wantonnesse and ease in stead of trauell ; make vs loue quietnesse ; feare death , flie hunger and thirst , with other paines and periles of the wars : in sum , they imprint in a man rather a desire to husband his life then to lauish it for the glory and good of his country , and for his particular honour : which is more dangerous in a souldier then in a man of any other profession : for this reason such an one neede know no more then to obey , goe well armed , and valiantly defend himselfe against his enemy . chap. ii. that he hath alwaies sought to make offensiue war. 1 of offensiue and defensiue war. 2 the authors opinion thereof . 3 others opinions . 4 reasons in behalfe of the offensiue , and inconueniences of the defensiue war. 5 commodities of the offensiue war. 6 spoiles in our enemies or our owne countrie : their difference . 7 machiauel confuted . 8 the chiefe cause of the turkish greatnesse hath beene the christians idlenesse . 9 the war vpon the turke must be offensiue . 10 examples of good successe in that kind . 1 it is a doubt often disputed , and not yet resolued , whether it be better to assaile the enemy at his own home , or to attend till he assaile vs : the lord of langei , machiauell , and others of our times haue discoursed heereof to the full . 2 for my part i am of opinion ( as also the worthiest captaines haue beene ) that it is alwaies better to assaile , then stay till we be assailed : alexander the great , hannibal , scipio , caesar , and many other romans serue to approue it ; and all these would haue laughed at such as should haue otherwise counselled them . 3 yet some there are in our times which haue endeuored to proue the contrarie by demonstrations subtill enough ( but vnsound ) and to this very purpose of the turke , to wit , that it were better to attend him then to seeke him out vpon his owne dunghill : these are counsailes more curious then well grounded , whereof consequently ensue few effects of moment : we may couple such men with those vaunting ingenours or artists , who discoursing vpon some worke of their inuention promise of it wondrous effects , and set foorth some simple module which serueth but for demonstration only ; but when it commeth ( as they say ) to the push , and that they must put their instrument to his true triall and vse , then is it that they are far to seeke , and that they confesse the difference betweene an essentiall effect and a superficiall flourish , such as their first module afforded . iust in this manner these contemplatiue state-philosophers will attend the turke at their owne home , whom they dare scarce looke in the face neither in nor out of his country . 4 it is most certaine that hee which assaileth hath alwaies more resolution and courage then he that attendeth . for he hath already formed his determination and prouision when the other goeth by heeresaie and likelihoods : moreouer in assailing , the war is vndertaken with more aduantage , and commodity then otherwise it would be ; and he which mindeth to force a country or prouince may make his vse of all such aduantages and commodities as he findeth may serue his turne in the country he intendeth to conquer . as among others , if he haue set on foote some practise , or hatched some treason in the minds of two or three , such of the subiects of the prince he assaileth as he knoweth offended or malecontent . or if he haue plotted some matter of purpose for an vniuersall rebellion . all which incountring with the dessignes of the supposed conquerour , he makes them serue his turne with more aduantage in going to seeke out the enemy ; then he should doe in staying for him at his owne home . by these meanes charles the eight king of france found the way open to the conquest of naples ; and lewes the 12. possest himselfe of the estate of milan : by the like occasion also the empire of the mamelucks subiected their neckes to the yoake of selim the first . 5 but of all this we may collect a more sure proofe of my proposition then when the enemy is at our doores , and that the astonishment surpriseth vs , ouerthroweth and confoundeth all counsaile and courage ; at such a time vnexpected disorders hem vs in on euery side ; necessitie presseth vs ; all things become suspected and difficult , so as most commonly we know not to what saint to recommend vs ; nor what course were best to be taken ; for since we must haue an eie , misdoubt , make prouisions in sundry places , bestowe garrisons where most need requireth ; we shall finde that applying remedies on the one side our affaires will grow desperate on the other . moreouer by distributing garrisons in this sort , it must needs follow that we so much the more weaken the body of our armie , and that through this constraint we quit the field to the more strong ; which disaduantage commonly drawes with it the ruine of our whole estate . if contrariwise we will preserue all our forces in one bodie , we leaue to the assailer many passages and places where he may set downe and fortifie himselfe there to hold vs play and traine vs on at his pleasure ; but if it should so happen that the assailer were encountred by him which attendeth with equall force , with as braue a countenance , and like courage , the retraict and defence rest at his election , so he be a captaine wise , and aduised , such as was solyman when he marched into hungarie , and when the emperour charles the 5. went couragiously to meet him . 6 and because the disastrous chance of war may sometimes light vpon the assailer be he neuer so warie and valiant ; it is to be presupposed ( that being granted ) that he will sell his skin at so deare a rate , as the forces of the assailed shall remaine thereby so disordred , as he will not be able to offend the vanquished , or disturbe his affaires , notwithstanding that his countrey be farre distant from the countrey assailed : this may be seene by the example of the ouerthrow the french receiued , and the taking of their king prisoner before pauye insomuch as that losse ( besides that of their prince ) did not afford ought to the victorious whereby he might aduantage himselfe vpon the kingdome of france . also it is much more easie to set a foote againe an armie discomfited , abroad then at home ; because if fortune haue shewed her selfe aduerse and our foe at our home , then is the time that such as are malecontents and mutinous lift vp their heades , and that our people stand amazed and for the most part vntractable . then must we trauaile amaine to put our men in hart , then must we make much of those few good men , the remaines of a battell to bestowe in our townes and trust them with the gouernment thereof . on the other side if these losses betide vs far from our home and in another country , the feare and the stonishment will be the lesse amongst our subiects , and they more pliable and forward to succour vs , were it but to keepe the danger aloofe from themselues . 7 me thinkes machiauel much abuseth himselfe when he so opiniatiuely mainteineth , that if the romans had receiued out of italy the blowes hannibal gaue them by the ouerthrow of * three armies , that they had neuer beene able more to haue held vp their head or re-established their affaires as they did : machiauel laieth this ground ; that they had neuer found meanes againe to set a foote so soone as they did the residue of their forces , had it beene out of italy . marke i praie how he erreth ; for it is well knowen that the ouerthrowes they had in their owne country made them lose , besides their souldiours , many good townes , and bred reuolt in their colonies which followed the fortunes of the victorious , with diuers other accidents that shooke their estate ; all , which had not succeeded with such disaster if the losse had befell them far from italy : for in this case both heart and meanes had serued them more abundantly then they did , to assemble new forces and as great as they had lost . it is also certaine that if hannibal had knowen how to make good vse of his victory the romans had beene vtterly ouerthrowen . it must needes be , that their meanes and power were very great , and that god had an especiall hand in their affaires , seeing that in such disorder they should recouer themselues ; & that with such corage , as they refused to serue their turns with those which had by flight escaped from their ouerthrows , neither made they any account of redeeming those which were taken prisoners , nay rather in stead of doing this they depriued some of them of all honour and confined others into sicily . it seemeth to me that these reasons may serue to confute those of machiauel , and that it is high time we returne to that principall point concerning the fortune of the turke . 8 we will say then that the faint-hearted slacknesse of the christians hath made way to the turke for the inlarging of his limits , so as they abut almost of all sides vpon europe , and hath beene a meanes that he can now not only attend the enemie ( as machiauel saith ) but goe to rowse him at his owne home . it is the course he hath obserued and taken ; to ruine his neighbours round about him , and increase his power , which he hath so doone as he hath cleane bereaued vs of all stomacke to assaile him , yea or once to dare to attempt it . for though there be princes enow which hold it necessary for the good of christendome to set vpon him at his home , yet to this day we see none that will begin to strike the first stroake , or set first hand to the breaking of this ice . 9 but if euer god gaue vs the courage vertuously to attempt this enterprise in reuenge of the oppression and wrongs christendome hath endured at his hands ; we must not thinke to vndertake it by other meanes then those he hath himselfe put in practise against vs , & that is to seeke him out at his owne home and nobly to embrace the dessignes himselfe hath obserued ; which doing , and hauing god to guide , we shall doubtlesse obtaine those victories of him which he hath had of vs. admit he haue beene for a time our schoole-master , and that we haue learned of him to our cost , it is now high time that wee shew how we haue profited by his instructions , and that we know how to put them in practise and pay the interests of our damages . 10 now to make it appeere that it is not a matter of that difficultie and danger that some imagine , let vs note these examples which are in a maner familiar vnto vs. had not andrew dorea the courage with a small number of ships to enter into greece where he got patras and coron ? don iohn of austria , did he not affoord a notable proofe hereof in the yeare 1571. when being generall of the league , he sought the enemie out in the inmost parts of the leuant where he gaue him battaile with that courage , that though he were inrferior to him in men & galleies , yet failed he not ( assisted by god ) to ouerthrow the most puissant & great armie that the ottomans euer set foorth by sea against the christians : there is nothing the turke so much feareth , as to be set vpon by the christians , both because he knowes they haue valor in them , as also for the iealousie he conceiueth of the great number of them vnder his obedience : all which would without question rise in armes if they might but once see the christians coulours flying , and so accompanied , as that they might to some purpose make head against the ottamans . chap. iii. that he hath made no account of fortresses . 1 we must endeuour as well to keepe as conquer . 2 the reason and vse of colonies amongst the ancient . 3 their discommodities . 4 the causes of rebellions . 5 an other discommoditie of colonies . 6 the portugals manner of planting colonies . 7 their benefite . 8 fortresses the second meanes of preseruing an estate . 9 their vse and necessitie . 10 machiauels vaine opinion confuted . 11 forces euer in readinesse , the third meanes of preseruing an estate . 12 whether is better to maintaine fortresses vpon the borders , or to haue an armie euer ready . 13 how the turks cuntries liue in peace by means of the latter . 14 in keeping the second meanes , in getting the third is most approoued . 15 whence the power of the turke doth grow . 16 wars abroad beget peace at home . 1 princes generally striue by all meanes to preserue not onely their own estates , but such prouinces also as they haue conquered ; obseruing what the time , the humour of the people , and their meanes will permit . but because each one takes a different course , and of this difference hapneth both good and euill , i iudge it necessarie to say somwhat thereof by way of discourse : i will spare to meddle with the forme each one keepeth in the politicke gouernment of his dominions or principalities ; and will draw my selfe within compasse of handling , in three seuerall points , all that may be said or alleaged vpon this subiect . first then we will speake of colonies , next of fortresses , and last of armies , entertained for the defence of the countrey . 2 colonies haue beene one of the meanes which the ancients haue most ordinarily obserued ; and at this day they are practised to mainteine a subdued people vnder the obedience of a new soueraigntie . such then as allowed of this manner of preseruing estates , by way of colonies bestowed the lands of those they had conquered vpon their naturall subiects , equally distributing them according to their merits ; supposing that in so doing , they should sowe the countrey conquered with new men , which might behaue themselues with a like deuotion and dutifull obseruance towards them , as vassals performe toward their soueraigne . 3 the grecians vsed them first ; and then the romanes : but this manner of assurance is not so commendable , as many may suppose , insomuch as it draweth after it these two dangerous consequents . the first is , that when a prince depriueth such of their goods as are naturall owners thereof , to bestow them vpon his owne subiects , it winneth him and his immortall hatred , accompanied with an euerlasting thirst of reuenge , and of regaining their libertie , for though such as are so despoiled of their goods be but few in number in regard of the colony , yet it is to be imagined that they haue many kinsfolkes and friends interessed in their miseries , and that there need but three or foure men of resolution to draw all the rest to a mutinie and reuolt . if this be held a difficult matter , yet is it a thing naturall to become wise by anothers mishaps , and to feare and be prouident lest we fall into the like inconuenience as our neighbours . the apprehension of which calamitie makes vs ofttimes conceiue worse of the euill then it deserueth , especially when the actions of the conquering prince are grounded rather vpon force then reason , as ordinarily they are . 4 most commonly the rebellions and insurrections of people and cities , happen not so much for the outrage done to a whole communaltie , as for the iniuries particularly receiued by some of those which haue reuolted : but howsoeuer , such wounds alwaies breed the vniuersall destruction of a common weale . to this purpose we may alledge the example of roderick king of spaine , who hauing rauished cuba the daughter of count iulian , the indignity of the fact entred so far into the harts of al the nobles of the country , as euery one took the wrong to be his , and hauing thereupon taken armes to aide the father in his reuenge , it grew to a worse matter ; for hereby they gaue the moores entrance into the estate who put to death their king : and were themselues beholders of the spoile of their country by persecuting vengeance vpon so infamous an act performed by the disordinat lust of him who ought to haue reproued and chastised it in others . 5 the other discommodity which they meete who will settle the establishment of their fortunes vpon the erections of colonies is , that in succession of time those men so remoued from their owne country into another newly subdued , fashion themselues vnto the climat , humors , and complexions , and to the same minde of preseruing their estate , as those amongst whom they are sent to inhabit . and hauing thither transported their goods and begotten children , they thenceforth make more reckoning of the country whither they are come as colonies , then of their naturall country whence they were displaced : like trees which planted in an other soile change much both of their nature and taste . this the more easily happeneth to colonies by how much the more remote they are from their natiue place of abode . for proofe , finde we not that euen the neighbour colonies of italy during the time of the second punicke war would not in any wise contribute to the necessities of rome their originall mother ? 6 the portugals obseruing these inconueniences haue to assure the indies , practised a manner of colonies much more sure , tolerable , and lesse enuied ; which is thus : they plant their colonies not all at once , but few at a time by carauans or companies according as neede requireth , to inhabite the countries by them newly discouered ; yet not throughly to people them , but after as they shall see they thriue , and so accordingly they by little and little replenish the colonie . goa is the best prouided of all they haue established , and there they contract alliances with the ancient inhabitants , and take and giue their daughters in mariages : by this meanes ( which is as i haue said the more plausible ) they liue free from violence , assured of the good wils of the first inhabitants who inrich themselues greatly by their trafficke and commodities . in this manner they multiply and are scarcely perceiued how , growing to such a multitude of people as they serue to inlarge and establish the name and gouernment of the portugals . from yeare to yeare they ad to this increase which serueth them instead of a fortresse amongst such as they subdue , and in such prouinces as they will people and accustome to their fashions and rule . 7 time and experience make it plainly appeare , that these formes of colonies are more tollerable and sure then any heeretofore practised , for in these the naturall inhabitants are so farre from being thrust out of their houses , as on the contrarie , they are therein maintained and more confirmed in the peaceable inoying o● their goods . moreouer the vnion and commixture of blood one with another softning their naturall roughnesse , retaineth and redoubleth the affection as well of the auncient inhabitants , as of those of the colony . the spaniards do the like in the west indies that which i finde most notable heerein , is , that the one and the other rest not satisfied onely with establishing colonies , but further they conuert and instruct the indians in the christian faith , to gods glorie and theirs : it is that which the king of spaine performeth and continueth by meanes of such religious orders as he hath planted among them : for not being able to store so many and so large countries as those are with naturall spaniards and portugals , they by this conuersion and baptisme , make those people become portugals and spaniards . 8 hauing discoursed of the forme of colonies , and how the conquering prince may profit himselfe by them , it is now time that we come to the second thing which may afford assurance to an estate . the meanes are many , but the christians most vsually make choise of fortifications , as seeming to them most strong bridles to raine in and curbe both the auncient and newly subdued prouinces . there they appoint their magazins for munition and other prouision for the wars ; there they bestow garisons of souldiers for their defence ; some places they fortifie vpon the frontiers , where they constitute for gouernors and officers , creatures of their owne fashioning , the better to containe all vnder the obedience of the victorious . 9 yet is it that which machiauell reproueth and reiecteth as vnprofitable : but because they are reasons or opininions so weake as that like spyders cobwebs , they are easily broken , i will not spend time farther to confute them ; onely i will say thus much , that alfonso king of naples , a most iudicious prince , whose authoritie should carrie credit , alwaies esteemed this practise of fortification most necessarie and profitable , especially in a countrey newly conquered , and not to leaue it open and consequently subiect to iniurie and reuolt . the proceedings in this kinde , of francis sforce duke of milan , of the emperor charles the 5. and of so many other princes and captaines which haue woone reputation and renowne amongst men , are such as who well considereth them will laugh at the opinion of machiauel . without seeking any further , haue we not the french for example ? who made no account of erecting cittadels in the i le of sicily : but after they had conquered it , they assoone lost it not without a most lamentable slaughter executed on them by the inhabitants ; but contrariwise deriuing their wisdome from their owne miserie , after they once tooke in hand to make fortresses in sundry places of italy , there was no meanes but by peace to dislodge them . the mamelucks who were in the same error of not trusting to fortresses , found themselues in lesse then two daies depriued by selim of the most part of their liues , estate , and powers . the spaniard imbracing the indifferency of this opinion , and desirous to gratifie the flemings whom they thought to appease by this moderation , returned into their hands the strong holdes of their prouinces : which they had no sooner done , but they were neere-hand expelled the low-countries . 10 and though all these examples are but too sufficient to confute the opinion of machiauel , yet will i bring him once more vpon the stage , and sift him a little better : see heere the substance of what he saith : either thou art able ( saith he ) to bring sufficient store of men into the field ( in which case fortresses are not any waies necessarie ) or thou hast not meanes to leauie such forces as are requisite to defend and warrant thy estate , and then they are vnprofitable . marke , i praie , the wrong course he taketh , walking as he doth in extreames , without keeping the meane , most necessarie in these propositions : to say the truth , he is much mistaken ; since this matter as others , should be distinguished by the portions and qualities thereof , the better and more easily to vnderstand it . in my opinion then ( which i deliuer not to exclude others ) we must say thus : either a prince hath meanes to leuie men out of hand by an ordinarie continuance of armes , or else he must haue time to doe it , be it either by leuying a sufficient number of his subiects trained vp to armes , and by the assistance of friends and associats , or of neighbours , which in regard of their particular interest , will willingly ioyne with him , that he may protect them from the same iniurie he may himselfe receiue . in these two first cases , fortresses would prooue more profitable then necessarie : or else a prince is of that power as he is able at once to assemble so manie men as he will keepe or winne the field from the enemie , or will be able , at least , commodiously to succour the place besieged . in these two respects , cittadels are necessarie though not much profitable , because they by their constant defence , stoppe and intertaine the enemie , affoord by such temporising , meanes and leasure to order matters ; for ( as the venetians say ) chi ha tempo , ha vita , who hath time , hath life . 11 the third meanes for a prince to preserue his estate , is that which those allow of , who not trusting to fortresses , and making no account of colonies , doe ordinarily intertaine strong companies of horse and foote , and in such numbers , as they may alwaies containe their subiects in naturall obedience , hinder rebellions , and which most importeth , repell , and oppose the enemy , and as occasion requireth , visit him at his owne home . in time passed the mamelucks practised this forme of gouernment ; and the turkes at this day obserue it in all points . the visconti sometime lords of milan , vsed this forme of preseruing their estates , and amongst others azzo-visconti ordinarily gaue intertainment ( yea euen in time of peace ) to 22000. horse , and they did him no small seruice . 12 a man may yet put one doubt more of this matter , the resolution whereof shall fit very well for the course and concluding of the discourse . that is , which is best either to erect cittadels or alwaies to maintaine a great army . experience ( our common mistres ) teacheth vs that for the conseruation of great princes estate sortresses are the best ; because they doe not so much incumber nor dislike the subiect as doth an army , whose troupes dispersed in diuers parts of the country waste and disorder all : on the other side souldiours shut vp in a fortresse are not so insolent and licentious as those commonly are which keepe the field , yea and that oft-times with more hauocke then if the enemy himselfe had ransaked and ouerrun it . the liberty which armies dispersed thorowout an estate challenge and assume to themselues , is such as makes them forget all policy and military discipline : the example of the milanois heerein will not be beside the purpose . they neuer complained of the garrison of the castle , but when it came to that that lewes the 12. would haue lodged his horse within the towne they presently reuolted ; whereupon ensued the losse of the estate . what was it that wrought the reuolt of the flemings ? was it not the obstinate mutining of only 1500. spaniards , who crying after their paie ouerran and made spoile of all the country ? the selfe same spanish nation disquieted the estate of milan vnder the marques of guasto and the i le of sicily vnder ferdinand gonzaga . the sorians and the egyptians no sooner saw selims standards displaced but they rebelled against the mamelucks , whose armies had maruellously oppressed them , they hauing beene constrained to maintaine them at their owne charges . 13 whereto i know may be replied , that the turke neuerthelesse peaceably holdeth his estate after the same manner we speake of , his forces being euermore on foote and in a readinesse : it is true , and so is it that to cleere this , two principall reasons may be alledged . the one that he hath depriued such his subiects as are christians and of a different law , of all vse of armes ; and that he hath brought them to this passe that they cannot vant to hold any thing in propriety : which was not practised towards the aboue mentioned ; moreouer all assemblies vpon whatsoeuer cause are expresly forbidden them : he keeps them vnder and makes no more reckning of them then of sheepe pend vp in a fould vsing them like brute beasts , not once vouchsafing to imploy them in the wars . the other reason is that they haue no power of themselues to oppose the turkes so mighty forces ; and ( which is worst of all ) they neuer haue had any forraine succour to incourage them to such an enterprise . 14 i will forbeare to diue any deeper into this subiect ; me thinkes we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are cittadels , then armies ordinarily intertained . but if we speake of conquering , i allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses , considering that we thereby inioy meanes to embrace all occasions offered , and at an instant to execute both the will and designe of a prince so prouided . 15. to say the truth it is that which the ottamans haue practised , to aduance their empire to such greatnesse as at this day we see it ; it is that which hath heaped on them the honors of so many victories , and which hath endowed them with authoritie , reputation and meanes . they haue alwaies had ( as they yet haue ) their armies in a readinesse , and haue fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much aduantage as a man armed against one that is naked . 16 some i know will maruell how such a number of people so armed , can containe themselues from reuolting . i am of opinion , that if they were not ordinarily imploied as they are , in attempts of warre , that in the end their multitudes growen ranke with quiet , would easily be drawen to rebellion or mutinies ; which the souldiers of alexander the great can witnesse , for whilest the enemy kept them in doings , who were then they more hardy and valerous ? but after their victories , who more insolent and vnsufferable ? the roman armies , how fortunate were they whilest they had continuall warre , atchieuing all their interprises in a manner as they could wish ? but after their conquest they became so turbulent and vnquiet , as they assumed to themselues the authoritie of creating emperors , and for the most part so licentiously , as euery armie made his particular choise , so as there was no remedie but to trie by fight who should carie it ; which occasioned the ouerthrow of the state . the french , haue they not euermore faithfully serued their king against strangers ? but so soone as they had peace with the english , and after with the spaniard , they filled euery corner of their country with sedition , sackings , cruelties , and slaughters ; and that with such obstinate persisting , as the contagion thereof hath not beene able for 25. yeeres space to be remooued . but that which is most to be lamented , is the scandall they haue brought vpon the church . this selfe thing may be appropriated to the flemings , and the cause may be imputed to idlenesse , and the exceeding plentie wherein they liued . the example of bajazet the second shall serue to close vp this discourse , for he being giuen ouer to his ease ; the soldiours , who could not brooke such idlenesse , so awaked the courage of his two sonnes , selim and acomath , as all the forces of the empire ( which had established the turkish scepter ) were diuided into two , and it lacked not much of being vtterly ouerthrowne , euery one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sonnes against the father . chap. iiii. that he hath trained vp his soldiours to valour and hardinesse . 1 why the armies of these daies consist not of so good souldiers as in former times . 2 principall causes of victories . 3 what care is to be had in leuying of good souldiers : and this to be wrought by a fourefould meanes . 4 by election . 5 exercise . 6 honors and profit . 7 the turkes proceeding heerein . 1 it is seldome seene that the armies of these times consist of good souldiours , for the more we vary from the course our forefathers tooke to bring them to perfection , by so much the more are we depriued of that happinesse which were to be desired and seriously sought after by princes , and those which as commanders would reape honor and profite by the wars . 2 victory ( which dependeth of the diuine will ) deriueth her successe and principall ground from the multitude of men , but especially from the wisdome of the commanders and from the valour and generositie of the souldiour . 3 it is requisite then that we looke more narrowlie then we doe vnto their choice , and that they be such as we may honour and profit our selues by them : now we must deliuer how we may light vpon , or make good and hardy souldiours , which is doone in my opinion by a foure fold meanes , by election , exercise , honor , and profit . 4 by election , because all those which we leuie for the wars haue not that naturall inclination to valour and courage , nor a constitution of bodie fit to indure the trauailes and dangers incident thereunto . moreouer a gallant fashion and spirite are not found in euery one , much lesse a resolution to attend , defie , and assaile the enemy ; also euery mans hart will not serue him to enter the trenches , throw himselfe desperatly into the dike , scall the wals , offer himselfe valiantly , to make good a breach in despite of the cannon , of stones , of wilde-fire , and of death it selfe : their complexions perhaps will not brooke that they should spend the whole day in continuall turmoiles without eating , and the night without rest , so as where some make account that antwerpe is able to make 30000. men , venice 40000. gant 60000. paris 100000. all fit and able to beare armes , me thinkes they should be vnderstood that they are such as haue the age required , but not the disposition proper to such a profession . for proofe hereof haue we not of late seene that the prince of parma hath ranged vnder the obedience of the king of spaine euen with small forces those of gant & antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their soueraigne ? the romans held in such esteeme this manner of making choise of their souldiours as when they would expresse a leuy of men they termed it delectum agere vel habere to make a choise . in our times no man hath beene more carefull and circumspect in the choise of his souldiours ( at the least of the captaines of italy ) then cosmo de medici duke of florence ; and indeede he was prouided of the best and most approued souldiours of his time . 5 to election we are to adde exercise , without the which there is no forwardnesse or constitution of body be it neuer so strong , able to attaine to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish , as appertaineth to a good , braue , and noble souldiour . 6 but if the generall be so wise as to ioine to exercise profit and honor , then is it that there is no danger or difficulty be it neuer so great which his souldiours will not ouercome ; no incounter which they will not force ; no enterprise which they will not happily compasse . as for a prince there is no mony better bestowed then that wherewith his captaines whet and intertaine the courage of the souldiour . this was the cause why the romans beside the ordinarie pay of their armies , ordained crownes for them which had in the wars saued the life of a citizen , first entred the breach , or boorded a ship : these were termed coronae ciuicae , murales , & nauales . 7 the turkes , to our confusion , are not inserior to the romans , be it either for the choice they make of their souldiours , or for rewarding them . for they chuse from among the nations vnder their obedience , the most warlike , and take of them but the flower and such as are most proper for the wars , sparing not afterwards to recompence them at the full . it is a thing incredible with what continuall excercise they inure their souldiours , in so much that euen from the cradle ( if a man may so say ) they traine them vp vnto the wars . the intertainment the turke giueth them is sufficient ; but as for the rewards , honours , and commodities he shareth among them , it is hardly to be expressed : there is not any prince at this day liuing that may in this regard bee compared to him ; and which is more , the meanest of his souldiers vpon his vertuous behauiour in armes is capable of attaining to the most eminent charges and dignities of his estate , and of inriching himselfe with inestimable treasure . to confirme this , the goods which meehmet bassa left behinde him , ( who of a christian apostate aspired to that greatnesse ) were valued at two millians of crownes . in a word they are sure that rewarde waiteth alwaies vpon valour . moreouer the prowesse of the priuate souldiours cannot be smothered amongst them , it is rather immediatly discouered and notice taken thereof . of all the ottoman princes mahomet the second was the most bountifull , for he gaue beyond measure , so as sometime he increased the souldiours pay a thousand fould . selim the first did the like ; and it is worth the noting , that as those two surpassed the residue in liberality , so did they in honourable and triumphant victory . chap. v. that he hath maintained his souldiers in military discipline . 1 a very great army may be easily ouerthrowne by a meane army . 2 the cause hereof , and benefit of the latter . 3 care is to be had that an army be not ouercharged with baggage . 4 a generall-with more ease may command a meane , then too great an army . 5 souldiers are animated by the perswasion and presents of their chiefe commander . 6 they are in seruice to be well acquainted with one an other . 7 the incumbrance of huge and ouer great armies . 8 how it commeth to passe that the turkes so great numbers of men proue victorious . 9 defects in christian armies . 10 obedience of the turkes . 11 battailes lost through disobedience of the souldiours . 12 the military discipline of the turkes notable . 1 the happy successe of battailes by those of ancient times with such wisdome atchiued , makes it most apparent vnto vs that most commonly the meane armies haue ouercome the great . alexander the great , diuers grecian captaines , amongst others miltiades and themistocles , and among the romans lucullus , scylla , pompey and caesar alwaies assailed and vanquished the barbarous people rather with vnequall then equall numbers , if we respect the multitude ; but they went far beyond them if we consider their militarie vertue . in these latter times the commanders of the emperour charles the 5. and of king philip his sonne haue likewise gained the victory of many armies greater then this . 2 to such as demaund the reason of it , i wil answere that it was because the principall strength and sinew of an army consisteth , in affection , in military discipline , and in a well disposed order in the day of battell : without which parts an army is as fraile as glasse . a few may be more easily and orderly ranged then many . vertue vnited is alwaies more powerfull then separated and disiointed . hence is it that bodies of an indifferent stature are for the most part more vigorous then such as are ouer great and huge , which the poet ( speaking of fidaeus ) expresly signifieth in these words . maior in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus . great vertue in a little body raignd . and virgil alluding to the bees saith , ingentes animi angusto in corpore versantur . in slender bodies they haue mighty mindes : questionlesse a meane army must needes be more stable and vnited then a great , because multitude is naturally accompanied with confusion , commonly waited vpon by disorder . 3 moreouer , it is a thing of high consideration to be able to take such order that a campe be not incombred with baggage : rather that it be free and manageable , so as it may be euery where commodiously cōducted , ranged and euer in a readinesse to gaine and make good dangerous & difficult straites and passages ; that it be not tired and discouraged for the long marches it must often vndertake ; that it doe not faint for such accidents as diuersly chance , nor for any exploits or executions which present themselues vnexpected . all which a meane campe will be more proper to performe then a great : for it shall not neede so great a quantity of victuals , nor so great an incombrance of baggage or cariage as the other . 4 moreouer seeing it is more profitable and necessary that an army be conducted & gouerned by one only generall ; and that it depend of no other then him ; it will be more easily effected in a meane then a great army , especially compounded of diuers nations . and this dependance shall be better ordered if the generall can content himselfe with small store of luggage and that well trussed vp . the multitude of meane causes slacketh alwaies the course of the efficient , and keepeth backe the fruite thereof . a little army hath not neede of so much luggage as a great . 5 and it is much better that the captaine himselfe know his souldiours and they him ; then to rely vpon the credit and report of such as are vnder his charge ; for the souldiour that shall heare himselfe named by his captaine aduanceth himselfe so much the more , and becommeth more desirous of honor . whereas if he see himselfe forgotten and vntespected of him which commandeth , he groweth distasted and out of heart , and almost carelesse how matters haue their procedings . who doubteth that the presence of the captaine or generall of an army doth not serue as a motiue to the souldiour to make him diligently preserue his reputation , and to shunne the reproch of cowardise ? which he will not so carefully performe , if he finde himselfe out of the presence of his commander , or that his commander make as if he did not see him . 6 it is good also that the souldiers frequent brotherly together , for that assureth them more , and maketh them trust to one anothers assistance in time of the most crosse fortunes . all these parts incounter and are intertained more easily in a meane , then in a great armie . 7 which is often attended vpon by more inconuenienences then the other , as by famine , plagues , contagious mutinies and dissentions . there is yet another dangerous inconuenience which is most vsually the companion of a multitude ; that is , that they forme to themselues a confidence of their owne forces greater then they ought : of this confidence followeth a contempt of the aduerse power , of this contempt a presumption , author of infinite mischiefes . 8 but how happeneth it then ( will some say ) that the turkes haue euery where gained the victorie by multitude ? would you know how ? because they haue betimes trained vp and instructed their great armies , to keepe so good an order , as well in execution , iudgement , military discipline , readinesse , as disposition to armes , that they are become as tractable , and easie to manage as ours though meane and few in number . 9 on the other side we haue suffered our armies to slide into such insolencie and libertie , as we can hardly rule and conduct them without so many dangers , confusions and luggage , as it were enough to trouble captaines of great policie and experience ; and to say the trueth , see wee not that the turke more easily furnisheth an hundred thousand men with vittailes , then we fiftie thousand ? for besides that his souldiers make not , as ours , any account of the diuersitie of vittailes , of delicacie or of toothsome morsels , they drinke no wine nor beere , which importeth the consideration of almost the one halfe of our munition and charge . 10 what need i speake of obedience , nurse of the order obserued amongst them ? since it was neuer seene that the turkes euer lost battaile through disorder , much lesse left off pursuing any attempt for their souldiers mutinies . 11 whereas almost all the battailes we haue bid them , had not beene lost , but by the meere disorder and disobedience of our men . whereto may we impute the miserable losse of nicapolie , but to the disordinate rashnesse of the french , who serued at that time in the armie ? sigismond king of bohemia ( afterward emperour ) seeing that contrary to his will and commandement they aduanced themselues as couragiously as vnaduisedly . what shall we speake of the ouerthrowe of the same sigismond which hapned some few yeeres after ? came it not to passe by meanes of the disordering of his infantery ? which being not yet fully set in battaile array were couered with a cloud of arrowes , let flie by the enemy so to the purpose as they were all hewen in peeces euen vnder the noses of his horse ; which seeing themselues destitute of foote were strooke with such a feare as they betooke themselues to flight not without the losse of many good souldiours and worthy captaines , all to the shame and confusion of the christians . ladislaus king of polonia , was he not ouercome at varna through the disorders of the bishops of strigonia and varadin ? who to the end to chace inconsideratly the enemy , shaken and flying in one part of his army , forsooke their rankes to pursue them , so making way for them : who laying hold on the occasion came with the rest of their army to charge them there where they lay most open , in such sort as they wan the victory most miserably slaughtering the christians . at buda , at exechium , at gerba , and in sundry other places where we haue bene ouercome , it proceeded rather of our disorders then of the turkish forces . 12 so as we must acknowledge that the turke excelleth vs both in number of good souldiours and in all other military discipline : he is followed with such numbers of men as it seemeth he relieth wholy on their multitude , but it is in so good a manner as if he respected nought but order & military discipline , parts ( to our dishonor ) far from vs. chap. vi. that he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne . 1 the wars are to be maintained by our owne strength , neither must we rely vpon forraine powers . 2 the good and ill that resulteth of both these . 3 conditions of confederate forces . 4 other inconueniences which arise from assistance of forraine powers . 5 examples of leagues against the turkes . 6 their defects , hindrances of their successe . 7 the turkes not accustomed to make leagues with any , but vsing their owne forces , haue ouerthrowne many armies confederates . 8 with whom they might well haue ioyned in league to their aduantage . 1 all high enterprises either for preseruation of an estate , or for denouncing of warre , haue beene ill plotted and as ill caried when they haue relied vpon the assistance and fauour of a third power , and not of our owne ; seeing that from hopes and proiects so ill grounded we neuer come to inioy the fruits which such a succour , the desseigne of him that enterpriseth , & his extraordinary preparation promised vs ; rather they are infallibly attended on by some lamentable accident which vtterly ouerthroweth them . 2 since oftentimes it falleth out that the expectation of such succour promised , serueth rather to slacke the course of our endeauours , and lessen the preparation of the enterprise , then otherwise to forward or better them ; were it not for the confidence of such succour he that attempteth would prepare his forces proportionable to his proiect , and not trust to outward helpes either of friend or confederat . who doubteth , when we so repose our selues vpon an others forces , and that he is at charge for our loues sake , that he doth not make vs more backward to prouide and disburse of oure owne store ? but this is not all : the worst is , that while we thus expect , time wasteth vnprofitably , and occasion ( which once escaped cannot be laid hold on ) is let slip and lost without recouery : for whilst we so attend our assistants our practises are discouered . 3 and who will beleeue that a friend or associat will embrace the desseign of him he assisteth , or wish his good fortune with such harty affection , as he wil not be ready vpon the least occasion he shall desire to finde , to leaue him in the lurch ? and without question this occasion will offer it selfe at any time whensoeuer he hath a purpose to dissolue the league and couenants agreed vpon betweene them ; especially if he be the stronger and more mighty , and finde not himselfe interessed in the successe of the enterprise , for which he tooke armes and became confederate . 4 we may also adde another defect and imperfection ; & that is , if the succour we attend be to be assembled from diuers places , or , that the windes ( if it be by sea ) or some vnlooked for accident ( if by land ) hinder by so many meanes the preparations for the war and intended voiage , as that the season fit for execution escapeth him that enterpriseth ; so as before he begin to march or set forward to the rendeuous his opportunities of attempting or atchieuing any memorable act , vtterly faile him in a matter which he had before discreetely enough plotted and disposed : moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces , insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited , then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit . also the least distaste either of the prince which assisteth , or of the captaine which conducteth such succours , serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces , deceiue the others expectation , and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing : so as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment , but his owne forces also become vnprofitable , and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine : for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper , it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion ; so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes , the effects , which in part depend thereon , likewise faile , and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerted . i will not forget also to say that a campe consisting of such borrowed peeces , hath necessarily need of many heads to command it , and an armie compounded of so manie heads ( because of the diuersity of opinions and affections ) will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes . 5 we may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere , and are familiar vnto vs , and were not long since practised ; for this cause i will more willingly , then otherwise i would , heere produce them . in our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the pope , the king of spaine , and the venetians , consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the turke : the one was vnder pope paul the third , and the other in the life time of pius quintus . the first was caried with an excessiue charge , yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly : the cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces , and draw them together at the rendeuous in due season : for they met not till the end of september . although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose , which ouerthrew , the good successe of such a holy and christian attempt ; yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof , it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence , then was the taking of castle-nouo , if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power . concerning the second , which was ( as i said ) in the time of pius quintus , the army of the venetians , very gallant and strong , spent all the sommer in attending the galleis of spaine which were to conuoy succours into the i le of cypres then attempted by the turke ; so as this slacknesse of assembling the galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawen together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them . notwithstanding all this they forbeare not to make towards cypres so late , as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of nicosia : which made them imagine that the turkes had , vpon that commodity , most strongly manned their galleys ( as it was likely enough ) with land souldiours , and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them : vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time ; hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues : returning they incountred so many misfortunes , as well weather beaten by reason of the winter then approching , they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled . the yeare following the army of the consederats met , notwithstanding all this very late , yet vndertooke they to incounter the enemy , of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare 1571. if god had permitted vs to reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect . now for all this cypres was not recouered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour . the third yeare of the league the king of spaine , in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the turke as he had determined , caused don iohn of austria admirall of his fleete to stay at messina , because he then doubted that the french would assaile flanders , with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholy cased and dismissed : so as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation , as the confederates had in due time set forth . this was an occasion of excessiue charge , and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late , attending what their neighbours would do , who , as i haue said , seemed to threaten the king of spaine with some attempt vpon his country of flanders . in the meane time the venetians , tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose , treated a peace with the turke . 6 who will make any question now ( those things well weighed and considered ) that if the leagues ( both the first and second ) had beene well caried without these crossings , iealousies and suspitions which accompanied them , ( though vainly and vpon no ground ) but that they would haue brought foorth some woorthie and honorable fruite , to the glory and honour of god , the peace of his church , the encrease and establishment of the christian common-wealth ? this may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations , depending of many and different heads , are in marching more slowe , and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others . it may appeere to some that i heereby inferre , that leagues betweene princes are vnprofitable , and therefore not to be made : so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion , as i rather willingly embrace the contrarie : but i reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league , ( especially against the turke ) when i shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose , to the end i may discourse of it at full . now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling . 7 the ottomans neuer made league , either offensiue or defensiue with any : and neuer had helpe of strangers : on the contrarie , they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate , and conducted by sundrie commanders , all which ( as ill vnited , not vnderstanding one another ) they haue euermore vanquished . moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone , then accompanied ; and consequently more vnited in their force , more nimble in execution , and ( it must needes follow ) more renowned and fortunately victorious . 8 yet they had no lacke of whom where with to practise their associations ( if they had approoued them as good & necessarie ) as among other with the soldan of caito , with the kings of carmania and of persia , and with many other great princes al of their owne sect and religion , who would not ( as it is to be supposed ) haue set light by their league and amitie ; especially then when they saw them so increase in power and greatnesse . but they haue euer made verie slender account of such practizes and confederacies , esteeming them vnprofitable for him , who of himselfe hath a high courage , and forces answerable wherewithal to goe thorough with a conquest , which they iudge will admit no sharing or diuision , since the ambition of rule striues to be alone and brookes no fellowship , no not betweene brothers ; as little betweene father and sonne . it is true , the turkes haue sometime taken to their seruice some few troopes of allarbs paied as mercenaries , in like manner as now a daies the french entertaine the switzers and other forreigne nations ; but they neuer termed them , as they now vse , confederates or associates , titles inuented purposely to giue colour and applause to such leuies . chap. vii . that he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceit . 1 machiauels peruerse opinion of not obseruing faith , reiected . 2 the ground of a princes authoritie and estimation laide by the obseruation of his faith . 3 confutation of machiauels opinion . 4 breach of faith a heinous crime . 5 other mischiefes that spring out of machiauels position . 6 to obserue faith is godly , honest , and profitable . 7 what we are to conceiue of the turkes falshood and periury : machiauel amongst other vertues wherewith hee would adorne his imagined prince , woonderfully commendeth disloyaltie in a great person , affirming that he ought not to make reckoning to obserue his treaties of peace or ought else he vndertaketh , at the least when his game is faire : and that he may at such a time without scruple of conscience , or other honest respect , violate his faith , breake the lawes of nations , and his oath . a thing questionlesse vnbefitting a magnanimous spirit , and which ought neuer to haue place among the actions of a christian prince , to the end he may not by so foule and dishonest a staine disgrace the residue of his vertuous operations . this makes me esteem this axiom so lewd and detestable , that we should blush , so much as to imagine it , much lesse to propound it as a precept for princes ; who are not to professe other then iustice and generositie . it is good for none but those whose case is desperate , and who respect not that their posteritie condemne them for men of foule and cauterized soules . 2 to say the trueth , no man can with reason gainsay , renowne and a good reputation , as well at home as abroad , to be the most firme foundation of all principalitie . and what reputation can a prince haue either among his owne people or strangers , if he be noted for a disloyall , vnfaithfull , and periurde person , one that stands neither to his word nor agreement ? 3 machiauel to conceale the fault he not ignorantly committeth , saith , that this is sometimes most requisite for the good of princes affaires , since occasion once passed is irrecouerable . what more meere folly could he discouer to his confusion , then in thus concluding , that a prince is not to regard the bond of his faith , if the good of his estate present an occasion to violate it ? truely none at all : neither were it necessarie according to gods lawes , or the carriage of humane affaires , that christian princes were of that minde ; for it would prooue the direct course neuer to see but fire and sword amongst vs. 4 such as are good detest these opinions , as did heretofore frances the first ; who professing faith and honour , reiected such counsaile when the emperour charles the 5. about the establishment of the affaires of flanders , passed thorow france , and vpon the kings word , crossing his country came to paris . that word this noble prince preferred before the greatest good that could betide his estate , if he would haue retained the emperour , and constrained him to forgoe the places and estates he held in lombardy and italy , whereto the king pretended a right , which he often vnprofitably disputed , as did also henry the second . 5 by the same reason a man may also say that sometimes it is well done to ransacke churches , robbe altars , oppresse innocents , and succour the wicked : for there is not any vice so detestable , or crime so hainous that sometime carrieth not with it a shew and colour of good , and proueth not profitable to him which in due season performeth it ; were it for nought else but because he attaineth the effects of his corrupt will. if that were not , should wee haue so many murtherers , falsifiers , sacrilegious persons and men giuen ouer to all reprochfull vices ? if thereby they did not reape some temporall commodity ? 6 i will yet adde further , and maintaine it to the end , that for a man to keepe his promised faith , and be so accounted of by the world , is a worke of god and without comparison much better then to violate it and embrace such a damnable opinion as that of machiauel , yea though the profit were immediat and such as might afford wherewithall to ballance his breach of faith and promise : not to keepe touch with one is enough to incurre the suspition and ill conceit of all ; neither is there any which will not thinke he doth god good seruice in performing the like towards all such princes as shall take such courses ; which will yet farther administer matter for an other repentance , to see that when they shall tell or meane truth no man will beleeue or trust them . i could illustrate this proposition with infinite examples but i will content my selfe with that one of duke valentine sonne of pope alexander the 6. cited by machiauel , as a perfect captaine ; who without respect of truth , his oath , reuerence of religion , or honour , which is so charily to be preserued amongst men ordinarily , abandoned himselfe to all disloialty , breach of faith , and whatsoeuer other wicked and traiterous courses ; so they caried with them some shew of present commodity . this man during the life of his father went thorow with certaine his designes , borne out rather by the popes authority then any fortunate successe of his mischieuous attempts . after the death of his father it was quickly seene how smally durable are all such estates as are founded vpon deceit . for he found himselfe immediatly forsaken of his friends and pursued by his enimies ; so as more liuely to expresse what he came to , after he had most maliciously hatched & atchiued so high enterprises , he serued ( as they say ) but for a cipher , and was as one that had no being , leauing nought behind him but only the footsteps and a cursed memory of his wickednesse , which made his life and name infamous to all posterity . 7 some one will tell me that the turkes haue done the like , and haue vsed all sortes of cunning , deceit and trechery , towards their neighbours , and that neuerthelesse they haue thriued by it . it is true , but the causes are different , and yet we see that the most disloiall amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their trecheries . amurath the second , mahymeth the second , baiazeth the second , selim the second , were held the most subtile princes of their race ; but we must grant that if those their wicked procedings thriued for a time , it was more through the coldnesse and dissentions of the christians when they should haue reuenged and repelled their iniuries , then that we should therefore beleeue that it is well done to proue periured and disloiall . amurath the second made proofe of it to his cost , and hauing receiued an ouerthrow at the handes of ladislaus king of polonia , he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against caramania , where whilest he was busied , ladislaus iudging ( so perswaded and backt by pope eugenius ) that hee should not doe amisse to falsifie his faith with a barbarous turke of so insolent a nature , and so capital an enimie of christendome as all breach of peace might seeme as a true performance thereof ; resolued to make war vpon him on the sodaine , which proued so dangerous as amurath was neere tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery ; so as his estate was neuer more shaken and endangered ; if the christian army ( which followed their victory ) had not , as i haue said , disordered thēselues : whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the infidels to the great misery and confusion of the christians . selim the second , hauing vnlooked for , attempted vpon the venetians to the preiudice of his vowed faith pulled vpon his necke the forces of the league , & had too late repented himselfe if god in regard of our sinnes had not in such sort sealed vp the eies of the christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his diuine maiesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the losse they receiued at lepanto . soliman that was held the most wise prince of all the ottomans ( if wisdome be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and christian beleefe ) hauing vnderstood at such time as he caused his army by sea to fall downe towards ottranto the yeare 1537. that mercurin de gatinaro and the citizens of castro were made prisoners after they had surrendred the place contrary to promise , hee foorthwith commanded that they should be released , saying that disloialtie to violate their faith and word once passed , was not the meanes to win the hearts and likings of strange nations . chap. viii . that he hath beene alwaies serued in his wars by good and valiant captaines . 1 whether an experienced commander and rawe souldiers : or experienced souldiers and an vnskilfull commander be the better . 2 the first best allowed and the reasons . 3 examples heereof . 1 it is ordinarily disputed amongst souldiers and martiall men , which is the better , a good captaine emploied about the conducting of an armie consisting of raw souldiers , or an armie of old souldiers committed to the command of a raw and vnexperienced captaine . 2 as for me ( if my opinion may carie credit amongst so many , sufficient to decide this question ) i hold it better that a worthy and valiant captaine should haue the charge of an armie of vntrained men without experience , then that an armie of old souldiers trained and beaten to the wars , should be recommended to a captaine , yet a nouice and vnskild in the profession of armes . the reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plaine to such as without being obstinate or passionate , in behalfe of either party , will entertaine them , as they are not to be gainsaid : for is it not much more fit and easie that a good captaine make and fashion a campe of rawe souldiers , then that good and experienced souldiers prepare and fashion their captaine to the conduct of an armie ? who can without shame denie that an armie doth not rather obey the voice and command of their captaine , then the captaine of his armie ? otherwise it were as they say , to set the cart before the horse . 3 now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make cleere the truth of my proposition . if we will as we ought , examine how many times the christians haue beene ouerthrowne by the turkes , we shall vndoubtedly finde , that it hath euermore hapned rather through want of experience , courage , sufferance , concord , and authoritie in the commanders ; then for any other default . so at the battailes of nicepolis , for that such like captaines did set light by the turkes forces , and tooke not a sufficient suruey of them , they receiued a most shamefull ouerthrow , a woorthy reward of their weake experience , in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations , whom they might well thinke wanted neither skill nor valour . did not lewes king of hungary by meanes of the bishop of tomerea ( who brought him almost to the slaughter ) indure the like disgrace , at the battaile of mogoria , for want of experience in matter of warre , and of iudgement sufficiently to discouer the enemies forces , and the passages of the countrey where he was to buckle with him ? in like sort was not the vnskilfulnesse of the italians cause of that victorie the turkes gained at grado , who had then for their leader homarbay , generall of the turkish armie ? also the yeare 1537. at exechium ( mahomet iahiaoglis being gouernour vnder soliman of belgrad and the frontiers of hungarie in the time of king iohn ) the great caziauer losing his courage , did he not abandone to spoile , death , and ruine a faire and strong armie , which he commanded for the princes of germany and italy , some one troupe excepted , which dishonorably togither with him saued themselues by flight ? also before this heauie losse , did not anthony grimani generall of the venetian armie faile of courage when with great aduantage he might haue charged the turkes , and put them to the woorse ? the very like want of experience and valour was seene in an other venetian generall , who shamefully left the i le of negropont to the spoile of the enemy . to conclude , haue not the christians beene so many times put to the woorse neere about buda , for want of valiant and experienced captaines , as it cannot without griefe be related ? on the contrarie , the ottomans haue neuer suffered misfortune of warre ; at the least for lacke of authoritie , command , or wisedome in managing their armies : for they themselues haue in person conducted them , and beene present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them atchieued . they haue likewise euermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affaires of warre to the most valiant and experienced captaines amongst them , whom they had formerly well knowen , trained vp , and exercised to such charges by infinite proofes of their courage and wisdome in most dangerous and difficult occasions . in summe , experience is that which perfecteth valor . the turkish emperors haue alwaies giuen to their captaines ample power & commission freely to dispose of their most important affaires , wherin they haue bene thus happy that we cannot finde that euer such captaines lost battaile for lacke of command or obedience ; or that they euer for want of courage or experience in the arte military , made stay or question of their proceedings . of all the bashas that euer had the managing of matters of importance , & had greatest hand in the affaires of their masters , acomet was the chiefe ( who serued mahomet the 2. and added much to his greatnes by obteining many glorious victories ) insomuch as he was no lesse feared then his soueraign . to him sinam may be ioyned who liued vnder selim the first , and being slaine at the battaile of matarea ( wherein he wan the victorie for his master ) selim said of him that the death of so worthy a man as he , was cause of such great griefe vnto him as it equalled the ioy he conceiued for so happy a victory : such also was barbarossa that famous pirat , who for his many warlike acts wan the renowne of a valiant captaine , and was most highly reputed of his master soliman , for whom he performed many memorable enterprises as wel by sea as by land . hence we may gather that vndoubtedly a great prince cannot doe worse then commit the charges of his wars , the dignities and conducts of his armies , to them which inioy his fauour but vnworthily : he should consider the deserts of others , & especially of such as with more sufficiencie would render an honorable account of so worthy an imploiment . we see it fall out oftentimes that for default of wel measured elections a prince plungeth himselfe and his estate in a thousand dangers and confusions through the insufficiency of his vnskilful ministers : the examples of such infortunate euents would fill this volume if i would stand to relate all such as my memory presenteth vnto me . but omitting all i will only put you in minde of the emperour charles the fifth well knowen for most iudicious in all his elections , meruellous in his actions , mighty for the great number of his excellent captaines bredde and trained vp vnder him ; all which can witnesse the care he had in his choice , and in very deede they did him such seruice as by their meanes he enlarged his dominions with many rich prouinces , adorned his scepter with most memorable victories , and his house with triumphes to his immortall glory . chap. ix . that he hath made no skippe in his enterprises . 1 vnited vertue strongest . 2 the strength of kingdomes by their situation . 3 what it is to skippe in an enterprise . 4 kingdomes preserued by the coniunction of their subiect prouinces . 5 confirmation of the roman empire . 6 the meanes of establishing an empire by confederacies . 7 the french as quicke in losing as in conquering countries . 8 we are not to indeauor so much to conquer as to keepe . 9 the portugals and spaniards distracted gouernment . 10 industrie of the ottomans in conquering . 11 an admonition to christians . 12 horror of the turkes . 1 nothing would be so strong as a poinct , if it were to bee found in nature ; at the least if the rules of the mathematiques be true as they be held , because being most simple , it cannot be corrupted either by inward beginnings , or outward causes ; so is a body more induring and powerfull , the neerer it approcheth to the resemblance of a poinct , that is to say , the more it is vnited and compact in it selfe . and in very deede as nature vnable to bring to passe that all the world should be one only body , made it continued and ioining one part vpon another ; and as to preserue this continuation , she in all she may opposeth vacuum , which is onely able to corrupt and destroy her : 2 so estates become more durable , and of greater abilitie to maintaine themselues when they are ( as i may say ) sowed , linked , and bound together , the one helping to entertaine and preserue the other . hence we may gather that such prouinces as haue their situation trussed vp together in a round forme , are more strong and mightie then such as extend themselues in length : as for example , one may say of france in comparison of italy , because this latter resembling a legge stretched out is lesse fit to defend it selfe then france , which is round , as her prouinces lie and are situate : whereby she is consequently not only more vnited in her forces then italy , but also more nimble and able to maintaine herselfe then the other . 3 now let vs come to our discourse and make it appeare what it is we vnderstand by this discontinuation , and that which we tearme to skip in our enterprises . it is properly when we regard not the contiguity ( if i may so say ) or neere adioyning of our estates ; and that happeneth as often as we leaue an enimy behind vs , at one side of vs , or otherwise , in such sort , as he may crosse , cut off , beseege , or inclose vs when we so inconsideratly skip or stride ; we may likewise saie that he truly skips who crosseth from one country to another so far distant , as by that time he hath finished his voiage , his strength failes him and his troopes proue so out of heart and tired , as they become vtterly vnprofitable . we may alledge for example that which befell the emperours of germany , the king of france and of england in their voiages of the holy land , for the length of the iourny , the far distance of the country , the diuersity of the climate , the change of the aire , and many other such like inconueniences , so tired and discouraged them by reason of the trauailes and miseries they had suffered vpon the way , as they could not attempt any matter of importance , or goe thorow with their enterprise according to their proiect : not vnlike a ball which stirreth not from the place where it is once setled , through want of that moouing power which should tosse and raise it . so if these princes at the first arriuall did affoord any proofe of their courage , valour , and likelihood of good fortune ; the languishing of the principall motiue suddenly made them lose their aduantages , and reduced the whole to tearmes vnwoorthy the merit of their holy intentions and trauels . 4 we must then allow that it is requisite for the preseruation of estates , either that their prouinces touch and intertaine the one the other , or that their forces be of ability to maintaine themselues of themselues : for this continuation hath of it selfe such force and efficacie for the lasting and preseruation of estates , as we see that common-weales and meane kingdomes haue thereby longer maintained themselues then great and rich monarchies . wee may alledge for example the common-weales of sparta and of venice ; of the kingdomes of persia and france , whose rule hath much longer endured then that of the sarazins , of the mamelucks , or of other more mighty empires . the cause proceedeth , as i haue said , of the vnion of that entertainment and coniunction of prouinces , abutting the one vpon the other , which is of such vertue and efficacie to giue strength and continuance to a monarchie , as it almost exceedeth conceit and imagination . 5 the romans which saw wel enough that the inlarging of their empires limits , trained after it a consequence of a necessary dispersing of their forces , endeuored by al means possible to reunite this body , augmented and made huge by their aduantageous conquests ; reducing to their obedience and rule , all they got both by maintaining sufficient forces vpon the frontiers of their empire or garrisons in places of importance , as also by establishing colonies , and infranchising many strong townes , with bestowing on them the like liberties as the people of rome enioyed , by them tearmed municipia . in other places also they instituted certaine fraternities and assemblies of people , with prerogatiues of the romanes priuiledges , which they named conuentus : moreouer , they committed estates and intire kingdoms to the gouernment of certaine princes held and esteemed as friends of the people of rome . by these meanes ioyning them to their loue as well by gratifying them with their liberty and bounty , as with other priuiledges , honours and dignities , whereof they did partake in their towne as in right of citizens : they tearmed these townes and people their confederates , and the kings their friends . as for example in africke they had massinissa , and iuba ; in asia , eumenes , prusias and the king of egypt . in europe those of marseilles , autum , auerg●●● , rennes and others ; making account more to auaile themselues by such confederacies and amities then by meanes more strickt and seuere : so then power is established and continued either by our owne forces , or by annexing of the forces of our friends which serue vs as a continued rampart and conducteth vs out of danger euen into the country which we intend to inuade , and that with so much the greater aduantage , when vpon some part it confineth with the country of our confederates . 6 but because we are neuer able with good assurance ( especially princes amongst whom this is a tickle point ) to maintaine so good intelligence , it is requisite if we will make this vse of an other , to make him confident either through the hope of participation in our conquests , or else by intimating vnto him ( if he be our inferiour ) an euident assurance in our proceedings , and such a plainnesse and integrity in all our other actions , as euen that may rid him of the distrust he might conceiue of being one day praied vpon and brought vnder by that insolencie which accompanieth the prosperitie of fortune , and may serue to stretch the conscience of a conquering prince . after we haue in this manner framed an impression of our integritie in the heart of our neighbour , we may march in his countrey as securely as in our owne , and rest assured that we shall by him be furthered and assisted . 7 the french could neuer keepe any countrey by them conquered abroad , vnlesse it were piemont and sauoy : for it one day they had gained a foote of land , they were enforced to forgoe it the next , no sooner winning it , but they lost it . 8 we commonly say , that there is no lesse vertue in him that keepeth them in him that getteth . i affirme that there is neede of more dexterity in keeping then in getting , for an amazement of the people we inuade , a rebellion in our behalfe , or any other such like sturre makes vs easily masters of that whereto we aspire ; but to preserue what we get , we must maintaine a continuall counsaile which must haue all the parts thereto appertaining , as grauity of iudgment , ripe deliberation , nimblenesse to dissemble , industry ioyned with a daily heedefulnesse and patience to attend occasions . the french ( which are reputed the most warlike nation vnder the sunne , ) are but too sodaine , open , impatient and of too stirring a nature ; for proofe you shall obserue that what they atchieue not when they first attempt , they almost neuer compasse it : all their boilling heat is soone exhaled and spent by the sodaine feruencie of their courage , which most commonly transports them beyond all moderation and aduice most requisite in what wee vndertake , without heeding the end for which they begā . this negligence together with their impatience hath made way to all the misfortunes which out of their countrie they haue induced : the voyage of the terseras and certaine other attempts vpon the portugales haue not long since confirmed this opinion , and made the wound of their vnhappines bleede a fresh . lews the eleuenth , a prince of an approued wisdome and cleare sighted in matters of estate , would neuer lend any eare to the perswasions of sending an army into italie or other remote parts ; reiecting all such practises , as well for the reason formerly alledged , as because of the infidelitie which he thought to be in the italians , and particularly in them of genoa . if charles the 8. his sonne , lewes the 12. francis the first , and henry his sonne had inherited this their predecessors opinion , they had not with such excessiue charge , mishap , and misery attempted italy . 9 heere some one will obiect that neuerthelesse the dominion of the portugals is of 90. yeares continuance or thereabout in the indies , so far distant from the first spring and originall . the like appeareth in the gouernment of philip king of spaine spread and diuided in so many places aswell in europe as in india . surely it is not possible to imagine a greater distance then from lisbon to ormus , goa , malaca , and ternate , so as from portugale to their farthest conquests , there are no lesse then twentie thousand miles ; and although they endeuour to ioyne these estates so seuered , by the neerenesse of sundry fortresses heere and there bestowed in the midway ( as zofala , mohambique , melinde , which belongeth to a certaine king their ally , besides other like meanes ) yet all these are but weake sinewes long to sustaine the vnion of so far separated members . but it is gods pleasure that by how much the foundations of this rule are more feeble and subiect to be shaken , by so much the more we should admire the omnipotency of his diuine maiesty , whereby they are maintained , fortified , and protected . the dominion likewise of the king of spaine is spread into so many parts of asia ( especially by meanes of annexing the crowne of portugale ) of afrike , of europe , and of the new found world , as there appeareth in this preseruation a greater miracle then counsail or humane prouidence , for in very deed to rule so many and so seuered nations differing in religion , manners and tongues without stirring from home , is it not a worke of heauen rather then of humane policy or discourse ? god therefore which hath of his goodnesse made him owner of so many and so goodly countries , hath not denied him wisedome and counsaile to know how to order and maintaine them , as he doth , vnder his obedience . 10 the ottomans haue ordinarily behaued themselues more iudiciously in this one part of conquering ( without inconsiderat skipping ) then in any other of their actions . for neither couetousnesse of inriching or inlarging their estate , nor the easinesse of attempting , nor the inticements of peoples insurrections , nor the thirst of reuenge ( which commonly makes princes mighty in men and mony , forget themselues when the maintenance of their authority & credit is called in question , especially perceiuing the law in their hands to execute more readily then can particular persons ) nor any such like motiues haue beene able , as i said , to induce the turkes indiscreetly to skip or to ingage themselues in any enterprise far from home . rather on the contrary they haue marched faire and soft from country to country , and deuoured ( as they continue still to doe ) all such as confine and are neighbours vnto them . hence hath growen the consequence of so many happie victories , the benefite of so great and rich conquests ; the course of so easily preseruing what they haue gotten . 11 i haue said that for the most part they haue not inconsideratly skipped or strid in their enterprises , as the christians doe and haue done : and as we see , when any of them haue taken such waies to greatnesse , the fruits and effects haue not prooued answerable to their proiect and promised fortunes . this vnhappinesse , common with the error founded vpon the reasons formerly alledged , ought hencefoorth to serue as an instruction to make vs become more wise and regardfull then we yet are , to the end that after we haue by an holy and vniuersall amendment appeased the wrath of god , we may war against them with the same policies and aduantages as they haue practised in raising themselues to our cost and confusion . these examples also should admonish vs of what is to be feared , to wit , least failing to chastice & humble our selues , his diuine maiesty inflict vpon vs a more seuere punishment , then that we haue hitherto indured , and for this cause open a more large gate to those infidels vtterly to ruine and destroy vs. 12 now lest any one should thinke i haue against reason held that the turkes haue not , as we , forgotten thus inconsideratly to skip , i will recite certaine examples to that purpose . the first then that did it , was mahomet the second , which vnfortunatly attempted italy , soliman performed the like against the same country , after the interprise of diu in the indies , which was vndertaken the yeare 1537. then that of the yeare 1542. that of ormus 1552. and finally vpon good grounds the attempting of malta which was so valiantly defended by the knights of the order , as ( next the honour due vnto the diuine maiestie ) all those braue gentlemen , who with their grand master parisot , made it good against the infidels , deserue to be consecrated to all praise , and to a most glorious and eternall memory . chap. x. that he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance . 1 get the greater , the lesse will follow . 2 the besieging of some small holde , may be the hinderance of the whole expedition , this exemplified . 3 the turkes discretion in their expeditions and sieges . 4 the best course is , to become masters of the field . 5 error in the siege of malta . 1_nature as wise and prouident , doth not busie her-selfe about the birth of euerie particular thing , but rather setteth her hand to the generation of the substance , which without any further paine , is afterward attended on by the accidents euery where inseparably accompanying her . in like sort a good and discreet captaine in the carriage of his enterprises , should not aime at ought else but to conquer the places of importance ; for of their consequence other inferior parts of the estate come tumbling in ( as it were ) of themselues , which as vnseparable accidents or qualities , vndoubtedly follow the first examples of greater moment , whereon dependeth and subsisteth the others being . 2 we haue often seene , that a paltrie sconce ( either because of the naturall strength of the situation , thicknesse of the wall , goodnesse of the matter , couragious obstinacy of the defenders , or some other accident not foreseene or dreampt of , hath stopt the proceeding of a royall armie , and hath prooued it selfe as able to withstand the force thereof , as a citie greater , richer , and more peopled . and though we become after masters of such blocke-houses and small fortes , yet that is no furtherance to a more important conquest ; or helpe to the enterprise begun . we finde written that the emperour maximilian , because he to no purpose spent so much time about asola ( which he striued to subdue by the way , for the reputation and credit of the armie , he conducted to milan ) inconsiderately lost the occasion offered him to become lord of that dukedome ; and performed not any thing after to the good of his affaires . the french also , after they had passed the alpes in the time of lewes the 12. thriued not in their attempts of the kingdome of naples ; hauing vpon an ill ground vndertaken rocca-secea , where they engaged both their honors and liues ; for hauing besieged it certaine daies , and giuen the assault in vaine , they lent leasure and courage to the spaniards , to bethinke themselues : made their powers lesse valued for so badde a beginning , and discouraged the people for euer attempting any thing in their behalfe , as no doubt they had done if they might haue seene a fortunate and better digested proceeding then theirs was , the name of the spaniard being then odious amongst them . this fault made the spaniards so bold as to say , that the rest of the kingdome was reserued for them , and not for the other , who had so ill husbanded their opportunities . in the yere 1556. holding on the said designe for the conquest of naples , did they not vainely spend time , money , their forces , and paines at ciuitella , to the ruine of that goodly armie which henry the 2. of france sent thither vnder the command of the duke of guyse : who was neuerthelesse a valiant and discreet captaine , and who had perhaps done better if his particular interest , or the ouermuch trust he reposed in the popes nephewes , had not blinded him : other reasons may be alleaged for the small good this armie did the king , who had conceiued of it great and honorable hopes ; but i will referre them to such as write that historie . the spaniards also haue thrice attempted the i le of gerbes , and euerie time lost a goodly and florishing armie , able to haue performed a farre greater matter then they could hope for by getting the henroust ( if i may so tearme it . ) the yeare after the battell of lepanto the armie of the confederates , which was then in the leuant , hauing their forces augmented by the arriuall of don iohn , made ochiallo generall of the turkish armie , retire to modon , as fearing those of whom he had made triall the yeere before . if they had put him to it as they should haue done , no doubt but they had found him dismaide , and hardly bestead how to defend as well the fortresses as his armie by sea : for he had not left aboue 60. gallies , to garde the hauen , and had bestowed the rest of his forces one yeare . but when he sawe they went to besiege nauaria neere modon , and that they had no saying to him at his landing , as he feared they would , he tooke heart at grasse , and after made a iest of the designes of the christians armie , which he in such sort held plaie and entertained , as it performed nothing woorthie such a power assembled immediately vpon the good successe of a former victory . 3 the turkes in what concerneth the ordering , commoditie , and assurance , in their enterprises , surpasse ( to say the very trueth ) all other nations for well managing of warlike affaires : for they neuer attempted place that the designe thereof was not farre more woorth then the paine they emploied about it ; or that the enterprise did not deserue the like or more expence : carying themselues thus , they are by the effect of their enterprises growne mightie , for force and meanes , and haue opened the way to the encrease of their greatnesse and successe of their affaires : which in such sort assuring ( wherein they haue aimed principally at profit ) they haue more and more weakened our forces , not without an euident consequence of extreame danger : when they tooke in hand the conquest of cypres , they were wise enough not to bestow time in taking cerynes a fortres almost impregnable . they foresaw that it was of small moment , at the least not to import much in that they intended to compasse , but they rather directed their course and indeuours against nicosia , as against the principall place of all the iland , whereabouts they so well imploied their paines as they caried it . by which conquest it was found that cerynes soone followed , ( as of a necessary consequence ) the disaster of their capitall towne . 4 in all the executions of their hardy dessignes they haue alwaies at the very first beene masters of the field , which hath so furthered them as thereby the strongest holds of the country , which they could not otherwise haue gotten but by force of armes , haue beene surrendred vp vnto them . such fortresses being vnable long to hold out when all hope of succour is cast off by the opposition of so strong and mighty armies as theirs are . 5 at the war of malta it seemeth god did dull them , ouerthrowing the policies and practises which are ordinary with them . for the bassa ( who would needes begin with s. hermes because it seemed commodious to stop vp the hauen and after to get the suburbs where the knights made their aboade ) consumed much time about it , and lost the better part of his best souldiours . in the meane space the season of the yeare spent so fast , and the resolutions and valour of them in the towne prooued such , as in the end he grew confounded , perceiuing too late how flenderly he had preuailed , and that he must necessarilie begin a new with the principall place , which he should haue at the first attempted , if god ( as i said ) for the good of christendome , had not blinded him in his enterprise . dorgut raiz vice-roy of argiers , who was to second this basha in all his warre , and to whom he was commanded to communicate his designes assoone as he should arriue , ( which he did some few weekes after his first setting downe and beginning to batter ) soone discouered his error , and could vpbraid him with it , telling him he shuld haue gone right on to the fountaine , without stooping to the shallow streames . so as after the taking of s. hermes , they did not performe or attempt any matter of importance , but as men tired and discouraged , they trust vp bagge and baggage to be gone assoone as the succour appeared before malta ; these leauing behinde them the memorie and testimonie of their shame , and ill grounded aduise , and the knights of their honour and valour . chap. xi . that he hath laid hold on occasions . 1 occasion pourtraied . 2 it is to be obserued . 3 examples of the ottomans diligence in laying hold on occasions offered by the christians . 4 the difficulties of a defensiue and offensiue league . 5 the false guesse of the selfe-ruine of the turkish empire . 6 the weaker princes are easily subdued by the mightier . 7 other occasions offered by the christians to forward the turkish greatnesse . 1 the ancient romans signified vnto vs by the picture of occasion ( whom they adored as a goddesse , putting wings to her feete , supported with a bowle , behinde bald , and before hairie ) that we must bee diligent to apprehend her when shee presenteth her-selfe , and not in any case to let her slippe : considering that if she once escape vs , she leaueth vs nought but a vaine and vexing repentance . 2 and to say the truth , in all a mans actions . there is nothing more commendable then to be able to make the best vse of occasion and especially in mater of war. in as much as he that knoweth his aduantage , how to take it and to carry the time before him is furnished with the principall adorning vertue of a captaine , occasion being no other thing , then an opportunity that the time more by accident then prouidence offereth vnto vs , for the well performing of what we haue in hand , and for the abstaining and well comming off from a dessine vnsesonably attempted , as the euent of the aboue mentioned interprise may sufficiently witnesse . this is that these infidels haue studied at such times as god hath made them his instruments to afflict and chastice vs , and this is that we ought to doe against them , for the glorifying of gods diuine maiesty , not yet for ought i see pleased with vs. in a word all such as haue inlarged their estates haue either inioyed or hammered out some notable occasion which they wisely laid hold on , and haue consequently reaped the fruites of an vnusuall aduancement . the grecian and romane histories can teach vs this , but i omit them as too far from vs , to betake my selfe to such as are more familiar and neere vnto vs. pepin and charlemaine were by the romish church called into italy : the like was charles of aniou into the kingdome of naples . those of aragon were inuited to sicily by the people and to the conquest of the kingdome of naples by queene ione the second : the house of austria is at this day inriched with many goodly kingdomes brought them by their alliance and mariages : one whereof subiected vnto them the lowe countries , the other gaue them spaine with her apurtenances , the third for a perfect raising of this howses gretnesse , annexed vnto it the crowne of portugale and the east indies , so as if we neerely consider humaine casualties , we shall finde that force without occasion is fruitlesse or smally auaileable . 3 the ottomans haue not attained to the height of so mightie an empire but by such occasions as we haue too carelesly , vnworthily , and as of our free bounty , presented vnto them . the first sprang from the negligence and cowardice of the emperors of greece , who through their extreame lasciuiousnesse and sloath ( sardanapalus and heliogabalus like ) became deformed monsters of all loosenes and riot : so as abandoning themselues to all voluptuousnesse and excesse , that martiall vigor which had till then honored and preserued them , began by little and little to decline amongst them , and next amongst their people , ( these framing their manners after their gouernours ) which prepared meanes and occasions for the turke to set foote one while into some inferiour prouince , and ere long into a mighty kingdome . the second occasion which shewed it selfe fauorable and proper for the turkes , was , when the grecians vpon a malicious enuy began to disfauour and oppose the dessignes of the christian princes which had by league vnited themselues for the conquest of the holy land , and so ill aduised they were as insteade of seconding them they crossed them in all they might , to the end to stop the fortunat proceeding of their woorthy armies , not heeding poore soules that they thereby befriended the turke ; who did but watch his opportunities . for they well obseruing this fault , and temporising the occasion which after appeared , failed not to spie when they might surprise them ( as they did ) all beaten , tired , and disunited in force and meanes , whereupon it finally insued that the christians were vtterly expelled iury , by the turkes , who after turned their armies against the greekes themselues and bereaued them of their empire . these were mischiefes and wounds by them well deserued , neither are they to be pittied , but so far forth , as they haue bread the calamities and ruines which haue and doe still continue to afflict christendome . the iarres and diuisions of the princes of greece ministred the third time an occasion to the turkish thriuing greatnesse : this hapned at such time as the emperour of constantinople was so ill aduised , as to craue the aide of amurath the first to defend him . this prince which lay still in waite , willingly sent his troupes , not to succour , but to discouer the country for the better aduancement of his designes ; and in very deed the souldiers returning from that voiage , deliuered so aduantageous reports of the riches , pleasantnesse , and fruitfulnesse of that country , painting it out vnto him so abounding in all commodities necessarie for the life of man , as he foorthwith resolued to attempt it , so as not long after without bidding , he in person passed the streight , and so well husbanded the occasion to settle himselfe in europe , as since his successors haue there made the principall seate of their empire . the diuorce and separation of the greeke church from the romaine , prepared a large way for the fourth occasion , embraced by the turks , more aduantageously to ouertop vs : since this diuision was a meane to distaste and allay the courage of the princes of either partie , neither hath it euer since beene possible to reconcile or vnite them by any good or firme intelligence , so as remaining in this sort diuided , they haue neuer beene able to enterprise ought woorthy christian pietie , or the greatnesse of their powers and monarchies ; thereby to cut off and ouerthrow ( as they might and ought ) the proceeding of the common enemie of christendome ; who getting by his negligence , scope and libertie , is growne greater to our vniuersall hurt , which those princes haue euermore fostered ; a disease now by their obstinate diuision growen remedilesse . this euill hath prooued the more lamentable because of the discord amongst other christian princes which refuse to make their benefit of others calamities , or to acknowledge them as corrections comming from the hand of god. this mischief grew greater at such time as some potentates of italy inconsiderately called the turke to their succour , shewing him the way into our seas farther then was conuenient . in this regard our portes stood open vnto them , they entred and conuersed with vs as with friends and associats , a thing most abhominable before god and man , and of most dangerous consequence . and to the end i be not held an outlasher , i will reckon some of those that haue so ouershot themselues . alfonso the second king of naples , and lodouick sforsa duke of milan , were those that brought in baiazet the second : that against the french , this against the venetians . isabell queene of hungarie craued aide likewise of soliman , against ferdinand king of the romans . francis the first of france , and henry the second that succeeded him , d●d not onely let in the turkish power into our seas , but suffered them also to land at nice and in corsica , leading captiue at their returne , an infinite multitude of poore christians , ( without respect of amitie , age , or sexe , which they snatched vp in those places and along the adriatick coasts . the sixt occasion obserued and embraced by the turkes , may be said in my opinion to proceed from the consideration they haue had of the pluralitie of christian princes , supposing ( as it is true ) that it could not be without that iealousie and suspicion which ech man particularly conceiueth of his owne estate , ranke , and dignitie , and and so the whole being deuided into diuers gouernments , it must follow the parts should be more feeble and scanted of meanes to vndertake against him : since ( as we haue saide ) vertue vnited in one entire body , is alwaies more strong then separated into many parcels . that which is woorse , is , that in this diuision of monarchies , the ambitious thirst of greatnesse , hath taken dangerous footing amongst princes , and hath bred ( as by a necessarie consequence ) discord , separation of willes , diuersitie of designes , and varietie of pretences , of all which partialities , hath sprung suspition , the common plague amongst princes . this suspicion like a canker hath contaminated the vnion and rid the meanes how to knit and establish a holy league and confidence amongst them for a defensiue or offensiue war. 4 now to make a defensiue league against the turke is in these daies a hard matter in so much as the princes of christendome are so far from one another , and some especially from the enemy , as like men out of danger they weigh it not esteeming themselues most assured : and to vndertake to establish an offensiue league is no lesse difficult seeing the profit of their conquest cannot be drawne to a proportionable equality , it may be also euery man feares the greatnesse of his companion ( although neuer so much his partner for aide and common association ) but aboue all he that hath the most commodious hauens or his prouinces most proper for the mannaging of the war. or else he who can better maintaine his conquests would proue the most suspected and maligned . these considerations hinder them from vniting and assembling themselues as they ought for the common good . 5 moreouer euery one flattereth himselfe that time and the worlds ordinarie change will breede ruine and alteration in the estate of the ottomans , and settle their affaires without being constrained to expose themselues to danger , trauell , and charge . 6 another reason and inconuenience may yet be alledged that each of these princes being weake in respect of the other they cānot so couragiously resolue to vndertake what were profitable and necessary for them ; whence it groweth that the feeblenesse of their strength is yet made more feeble by this irresolution ; so as a mighty power charging them they shal remain subiect to the discretion of the indiscreet enemy : by these means the lords of the seueral parts of lombardy became the pray of the venetians who subdued them with as much facility as resolution ; but had the repulse when they attempted the state of milan , vtmost limit of their power , dominion , and conquests . after the same sort also the french in time past brought vnder all the prouinces of gaull , but when they would enter the confines of spain , the opposition of that neighbour-greatnesse stopped their course and was a rampart to defend them from further proceedings . in the very like manner the turkes hauing deuoured all the princes of greece , macedonia , bulgaria , and seruia attempting the inuasion of hungaria , they had their hands full , since the valour of these kings and people ( so fashioned , hardned and enured , of a long time to the wars , as they were the better able to make head against them ) discouered it selfe to be greater then the consideration of their indifferent estate could well beare , as witnesse the exploits of ladislaus and mathias coruin , who found the turkes play to their cost . but so soone as those kings and people did forgoe this first valour and suffered the exercise of armes to degenerat , soliman ouercame them both at belgrade and at mogacia . after the turks had gone thus far , they met with that bar of the house of austria seconded by the german forces , and supported by the power of the king of spaine ; who shewed himselfe alwaies fearelesse of the turkish forces : as for the venetians they haue euermore ( backt with the popes and the spaniards power ) behaued themselues most honorably : one happinesse there is that those places of christendome which border neerest vpon the turke were neuer in more mighty hands , nor had euer so few princes to rule them , as at this day : whence groweth an infallible consequent that they are more easily defended and maintained , especially hauing that particular coniunction of the power of spaine , which is such as the turke cannot stur without incurring an apparant danger ; it being manifest that besides that the king of spaine is of ability without feare to resist him , he can also with his owne forces curbe him and bring him to reason . so as the turke awed by so mighty a king , will not , as he was wont , so so one bend his forces against the christians his neighbours . the muscouit on the one side , and the kings of polonia and persia on the other , are of such power and courage , as they will alwaies make the fame of their particular forces , to be both respected and feared . 7 the diuersitie of opinions in matter of religion , haue made way to the seuenth occasion , haue disunited the courages , spent the forces of the christians , & haue made them rise vp in armes one against an other . in the meane time the turke getteth footing , groweth great in sight of all men , and is become a terror to christian princes . disloyall and traiterous renegades or apostates , are those which haue discouered to the turkes the christians secrets , haue acquainted them with the aduantages of landing and inuading , haue beene guides to their armies into the very hearts of our richest countries , and haue opened the doore of the eight occasion . but for the ninth , let vs consider what subtilties they haue practized , and whereon that hath beene principally grounded . i am of opinion , that the better to order their affaires , and seize vpon the christians with more security , their leagues , treaties of peace , and suspensions of armes , passed betweene them and our princes , haue beene their greatest furtherances : for the turkes neuer warred with anie christian prince or infidel either to defend their owne estate , or with hostilitie to assaile an others , but they first of all made their countrey sure against the power of their neighbours , but aboue all , such as ( seeing them elsewhere busied ) had meanes to disquiet their affaires , inuade their territories , and assaile them at vnawares . the peace they haue so long maintained , with the polonians can testifie as much : againe the quiet they haue suffered the venetians to inioy for these many yeares sufficiently bewraieth with what care they handle this businesse . the continued peace they keepe with the french teacheth vs likewise with what prouidence and wisdome their matters are caried ; to the end not to receiue any incombrance or interruption by meanes of strange enmities , at such time as they proceed in their enterprises ; they take truce with the emperour alwaies to their aduantage ; and lately intending to war vpon persia they dealt for a suspension of armes with the king of spaine , so as making all sure on one side they in a trice assaile the other , heereby so well playing their parts , as hauing the law in their hands they remaine as arbitrators of peace and war , pursuing alwaies the course of their dessines with an aduantage too great vnworthy and preiudicious to the princes of christendome ; whose greater part is so awed by their forces , as they haue often chosen to enter into conditions of a dishonest peace or truce though neuer so vnassured , rather then to expose themselues to the danger of their mighty armies : not heeding that thereby they haue lost many faire occasions of doing good vpon them : whereof we neede not seeke farther for examples then now that the king of persia keepeth them in continuall war ( at least if such newes as comes thence be true ) and that he hath lately giuen them an ouerthrow neere taurijs of aboue foure score thousand men . which if it be so , what better occasion can you desire ( ô ye princes of christendome ) to set vpon them and reuenge the dishonour of our passed iniuries ? can it be otherwise but that in their former incounters and in this last they must haue lost the flower of their captaines and choice souldiours , and is it possible that the swelling pride of their command and greatnesse should not shortly vndergoe some change and decrease if you will intertain the occasion which god offereth you ? ô but you sleepe and are altogether vnprouided to assaile them . they are our sins that hinder vs and haue bred the disorders of ciuill wars which disquiet france and the low countries , with such obstinacie and cruelty as these princes haue worke enough to order their owne affaires : their neighbours in the meane time hauing their eares filled with the noice thereof , looking what will become of such sturs and fearing lest the fire which so cruelly burneth their neighbours house , should fasten vpon theirs , which makes them stand vpon their guard to keepe out such broiles & disorders . in the mean time the turke wanteth no time to recouer his losses ; and to laugh at oure inconsiderate follies ; follies indeede for vs , but wisdome for him . it is a maruelous matter to consider with what succes and aduice he hath quieted his neighbours , in such sort as he hath beene neuer knowen to haue had two quarrels in hand at one time . imitating heerein the wisdome of the romans who had an especiall care not to haue two enemies to deale with at once , but if they assailed one , they tooke order by deuice and friendly meanes that the other were lookers on , or associats in their trauailes . selim the first , which warred with the persians , so ordered the rest of his estate , as during all the time he was imploied that way , the souldan of egvpt neuer disturbed him : his sonne amurath continuing the same enterprise , neuer receiued let of any christian potentate . the dessignes of the princes of europe , & the wars they haue so long and so wilfully maintained one against the other , haue affoorded the turks a large passage for the tenth occasion to benefit themselues by their obstinacies & diuisions ; neither haue they omitted nimbly to lay holde on it to some purpose for the good of their affaires . what enmities were euermore cruelly exercised with fire and sword then those our ancestors and we our selues haue seene betweene france and spaine ? what malice was euer more deepely rooted then that of the two kings ? what nations are there in the world more mighty or more valiant then these are ; and hence let vs consider what profit , what comfort would haue redounded to christendome , and what fearefull ruine to the turke , if by some holy league they had beene vnited ; such vndoubtedly as there should haue beene no memory of them , whereas they are now most mighty , and most dreadfull . if we will descend to particulars , was there euer prince that had better meanes to conquer the turke then charles the fifth ? for besides his valour , inuincible courage , and other notable parts which shined in him , he had sufficient force to execute his enterprises : he was followed by captaines of incomparable vertue , his souldiers were most resolute , his people and prouinces were all most desirous of so holy a war , he had hauens and roades fit wherein to harbour his ships , and in a word he had whatsoeuer was necessary , but how ? he was alwaies constrained to haue an eie behinde him , to stand vpon his gard , because of his neighbours who spared not to molest him as soone as he did but once aime at so holy an interprise . king philip his sonne hath met with the like incombrances : so as we may well say our sinnes haue ministred occasions enowe to the turkes to assaile vs with such aduantage , as it hath beene an increase and establishing to his estate , we alwaies shrinking at the cruell shocke of his mighty forces . amongst all the ottomans amurath the first was the most diligent to hunt after , and embrace occasions , who ( as we haue already deliuered ) sent his supplies to the emperour of constantinople , passed the straights in person and got into his hands the two castles . baiazet the first , his sonne shewed himselfe nolesse politicke and prompt to discouer his aduantages , patient to attend his occasions , and diligent to gather the fruits wherewith his hopes presented him . chap. xii . that he hath behaued himselfe with nimblenesse and celeritie vpon his occasions . 1 the fortune of warre consisteth not in discerning but in the vse of occasion . 2 celeritie in wars most expedient . 3 the turkes readinesse and wisdome in that kinde . 4 furtherance of this celeritie . 5 impediments of the christians in their expeditions . 6 treasure requisite . 7 exact obedience in captaines and souldiers and an obseruation of militarie discipline . 8 strength and abilitie of men and horse . 9 examples of the turkes celerity . 10 in their sea-actions and their order : 11 defects of the christians shipping . 1 because this chapter , in regard of the continuance of the matter in handling , is but as one dependencie and coniunction with the former , we will still make vse of this word occasion , heeretofore discoursed vpon , as of a table wherein is represented all whatsoeuer our forefathers haue conceited of it ; and what we ought to admit thereof : following this path we are to remember that who in time laieth not hold on occasion , shall neuer more inioy a like time to recouer it with the like commoditie of wel doing as he once had , if he had knowne how to entertaine it as hee ought . to discouer then the opportunitie of affaires , is not al that is required : that which most importeth , is to serue our turnes with it at an instant , when it presenteth it selfe , to guide our intentions to that perfection we aime at . 2 celeritie is an especiall matter in all affaires of importance , but aboue all in the warres , wherein it is more necessarie then in any our actions . because ( as saide selim the first ) the least delay we therin vse , turneth to a grosse error , especially since it bereaues vs of the commoditie and aduantage offered to put in execution , what we had wisely and with studie determined : hannibal a woorthy and renowned captaine , was noted of slownesse , not in resoluing but in embracing his occasions of victory which might haue assuredly established his affaires . that great pompey was likewise subiect to the same imperfection , which did vtterly vndoe him . in a word , no motion wanting speedinesse , can be of much force , or produce woorthy effects : violent agitations loose alike their force with their swiftnesse , but such as are naturall attaine it , and fortifie themselues in it . 3 this is that the turkes know well enough how to practise , fashioning themselues to quicknesse , nimblenesse , habilitie , and to a certaine store of whatsoeuer may seeme necessarie to that purpose , so as their promptnesse and forecast hath neuer omitted the occasions presented vnto them without reaping the fruites and glory thereof . 4 but some one will say , that it is requisite for the suddainnesse of occasion that many things relie in the power of him that will follow this course . i grant it , for they indeed who will fitly make vse of such aduantage , must be alwaies in armes , and heerein also the turke surpasseth vs , for he continually entertaineth so many souldiers , as it were hard to take him vnprouided , or to finde him ( when need requireth ) without a mightie army , which serueth to hearten him , and to awake his courage : but aboue all , he hath so great a number of horse ordinarily in a readinesse , as that is but too sufficient to make him proudly humour his owne will ; so as thought and execution are in a manner one with him . this is yet farther accompanied with a powerfull commoditie which addeth facillititie to his promptnesse ; and this is , that his horse and foot are lightly armed , and without incombrance of luggage , so as by this meanes he more easily assembleth his troups , ordreth them , and conducteth them wheresoeuer he pleaseth , without distinction of time . againe , sobrietie and sparing ( familiar among his souldiers ) make much to the aduancement of his enterprises , contenting themselues , as they do to drinke water and eat rice and salted flesh , which they reduce into powder , so as euery one carrieth with him his prouision almost for a moneth , and when that faileth , they liue by the bloud of their horses , which they salt themselues , like as doe the muscouites and tartars . 5 on the other side , when our souldiers march , they must haue such store of munition follow them , to their so strange confusion and hinderance , as they are neuer able to goe thorow speedily with any notable attempt . this bringeth a twofold let to their enterprises . the first in their prouision , which in the vnmeasurablenesse thereof is neuer made in due time . the second , in the conuoy thereof , neuer so well ordered as it ought , whereof the euent of the enterprise of exechium , is but too true a testimonie , the souldiers then suffering more in regard of the famine and difficultie of conueying victuals vnto them , then of-the enemies forces . whose attempt had beene vnprofitable if the campe had not beene disordered by this inconuenience , whereby the souldiers became halfe dead for hunger , and grew so feeble , as the courage to defend themselues vtterly failed them . which the general of the turkish armie foreseeing , waited till such time , as the famine had brought them low , and made them strengthlesse , that he might vpon their enforced retrait assaile them behinde , and so wearie them with continuall skirmishing as they should at length chace and ouerthrow themselues , as indeed it came to passe . i remember i haue heard one worthie to be credited , say to this purpose ; that when emanuel philibert duke of sauoy , deceassed , was generall of the armie in flanders , he found no difficultie in the wars more important then the discommoditie of proportioning and carriage of necessarie prouision as he had oftentimes approoued . on the contrarie , it may be said to the christians shame and confusion , that neuer any of the turkish armies were knowen , through such default , to suffer extreamitie or to be disordered . 6 let vs now come to the point of sodaine execution , and to the instruments thereof , and let vs dwell somewhat thereupon . i finde the most necessarie and profitable is to haue alwaies store of money in our coffers : and that is a hard matter , especially for such as are not prouident , and that in all things so pamper themselues as the christians doe ; but not for the turke , for he hath ( when and what he will ) in store to serue his need for the warres , and for whatsoeuer belongeth thereto . this is the sinew of warre , and the onely meanes to hasten forward occasion , and attaine ( as he doth ) to a happie end of his enterprises , but at his returne home , he obserueth a barbarous and insolent course of remboursing his charge : after he hath performed what he vndertooke , he repaieth himselfe by new impositions , whereto he enforceth his subiects to contribute : this to him is easie : but to vs the most difficult materiall point is the procuring of money : for the greater part of christian princes are so bad husbands and of so small forecaste , that they haue scarce one crosse in store : and are alwaies at the borrowing hand , or enforced to pawne their lands and demaines . and though the christians be not so couetous as the turkes , yet they are of so good a hold fast , as no small time will serue to draw money from them , so as while that is doing , occasion hath alreadie turned her backe and left vs nought , but the shame and sorrow of our enterprises ill successe and effect . and if it chance that we hold on our courses , it is with such headlong rashnesse and ill aduice in all we doe , but particularly in prouiding of armes , horse , munition , and other necessaries , as all being performed out of season , there is neither the forwardnesse , the array , the election , the aboundance , the resolution , nor the well disposing of matters which would otherwise haue beene , and which we see to be in our aduersaries . 7 there is another thing which addeth much assurance to the turkes designes , and makes them more easily to execute : and this is the incredible obedience of the captaines towards their generall , and of the souldiours towards their captaines and such is the loue amongst them as there is no danger or difficulty ( be it neuer so great ) which they will not easily ouercome , so willingly they performe what is inioyned them . it was neuer heard that any reuolt or mutiny stopt or slacked the course of their conquest . 8 they haue yet another most considerable aduantage and that is the strong constitution of their men , spirit and speed of their horse . where on the contrary our forces dare scarce bouge vnlesse they be backed and strengthned by forrain succors either almines or switzers , people faint and of little courage vpon a sodaine and vnexpected action , as being framed of a dull and slow mettall seruing for nought but to make good the intire body of a battaile , and be vnto it as a solide and vnmoueable rampart . the incounters they haue had with the turke at buda and elsewhere haue taught vs how vnprofitable they are & of how slender effect for the speedy and happy aduancement of the affaires of christendome in those parts : moreouer the turkes horse are of more speede and strength then ours : the spanish genet is indeede nimble and full of spirit , but wanteth strength and breath : contrariwise the horse of germany is able and strong but tender withall and not ready vpon the hand , so as he is more proper to make a stand and defend then to assaile , skirmish , or giue the chace . the napolitane is good and strong but of such a nimblenesse as is not held for perfect speede , on the other side the enemy hath the hungarian good for seruice , the barbary horse of incredible swiftnesse , the valachian , the turkish , and the moore almost hard for induring of trauaile and well breathed , so as we may conclude that he inioyeth whatsoeuer is necessary for the war , better , more redy , and in greater aboundance then we , and that this is it which makes him speedily and with aduantage , to serue his turne with all occasions which present themselues . 9 there are so many examples of this aduantageous celerity in their actions as they are almost innumerable ; but i will only note two or three which may seeme in a manner prodigious so admirable hath beene their successe . amurath the second hauing intelligence of the great forces leauied by ladislaus king of hungary ( with whom he had formerly concluded a peace ) with an intent to ouerrunne him , being then busie in the wars of caramania ; he sodainly quitted that interprise , and with such maruelous speed crossed all the helespont as in seuen daies he ariued at varna with fower score thousand men , in like manner scheder bassa imploied by baiazet the second to diuert the attempt of the venetians vpon milan , came with such extraordinary speed as he appeered in the territory of treuiso before they could haue newes so much as of his departure , lesse of his arriuall in those parts . selim the first marched so speedily from cesaria to aleppo , crossing the mountaine aman with his army and artillery , as he came vpon the souldan before he dreampt of him supposing him to be as then rather vpon his way to encounter the persian then to attempt him . 10 this particular dilligence of the ottomans is not to be limited all only with their land wars : they haue performed as much by sea , so vigilant and wary haue they shewed themselues in exalting the honour of their names , and of their great estate , by them maintained euen vnto this day : and since they are so incredibly nimble and aduised in maritine exploits , i hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they obserue in assembling their forces . they reiect the vessels and ships of great burden as ouer-heauy and vnwealdy if the wind faile them , rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them . their gallies and galliots are speedy , well manned and well appointed . 11 wee on the contrary drag with vs a great number of ships and gallions as our best strength and choice prouision , but they are in proofe the cause of such incombrance to the seruice in hand , as we for the most part waste the season vnprofitably and spend our opertunities in rigging and attending them ; being also oft times enforced to disorder our gallies , to the end these great cartes may keepe with vs. hence groweth yet another discommodity , and that is , that hauing placed a kinde of hope in our ships , we in forgoing them , finde our selues too weake and failing of courage to assaile the enemy ; who is not to be forced to fight but when he please , hauing too open a field to flie and espy his occasion , as it hapned at preueza the yeare 1537. and at the battaile of lepanto which was the yeare 1571. for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of souldiours vnprofitable for that action , in regard they could not ariue there time enough . the yeare after they encountred the like discommodity : since for the very same cause the army of the league , goodly and mighty fought not at all , neither performed ought worthy so great a preparation . and when the gallies of the pope and venetians met , and that they attended don iohn ( who aboade still at missina , because of the then beginning troubles of flanders ) the army of the turk being then commanded by oechially , he once presented battaile , but because of the aduantage of the winde which without other helpes draue our ships , and fearing the incounter of our round vessels , he made his escape by meanes of a certaine stratagem , which for the strangenesse thereof put the counsailes and iudgments of our army to a plunge . in verie deede it is worthy the noting : for seeing the whole strength of our ships vnited with such confederat gallies as were then there , make towards him , he gaue commandement that in euery one of his gallies they should put fire to a barrell of powder and row backewards ( not making for al this any shew of flight , the prowes of their gallies still appeering towards them ) and as soone as the smoake had couered his fleete he halled on a maine , and in an instant hoissing vp al his sailes shaped his course to napolis in romania , our ships not daring to follow him . in regarde he had gotten the aduantage of them they bearing but their mizen sailes , and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designes , to breake company : eight daies after we comming neere together there followed some light skirmishes , but so soone as they perceiued vs to faint , as being depriued of our ships , they charged vs with the whole army , in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired . so as it was then found by experience that the great ships serued but to keepe vs from buckling with the enemy . i haue made mention of this incountre in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in latine , and somewhat more at large then i heere deliuer , for i was present in the army during all that voiage , vnder the command of the duke de mayne . chap. xiii . that he hath gone himselfe in person to the war. 1 a question concerning the princes presence in the wars : 2 the first commodity is , if the prince be there in person , it ads courage to the souldiour . 3 the second is , it causeth plenty of all things in his army . 4 the third , it increaseth the army . 5 the fourth , it worketh facility and speede in aduice and execution . 6 of the power of lieutenant generalls in the wars . 7 the fift commodity , is the princes authority and dignity . 8 the first discommodity growing from the princes presence , is , that thereby the enemy proceedes more prouidently . 9 the second , that his commanders vse lesse diligence in discharge of their places . 10 the third , is emulation of the leaders , whence groweth contention . 11 the fourth , the emulation of the lieutenant generall toward the prince . 12 examples to this purpose pro and contra . 13 the preposition defined by distinction . 14 the ottomans wars in their persons haue succeeded well . 15 exhortation to christian princes to vndertake wars against the turke . 1 whether the prince should in person goe to the war , or else send his lieutenant , is a question often disputed with such reasons and earnestnesse by sundry graue personages , as whatsoeuer may be now deliuered to that purpose would proue but an vnprofitable repetition of what hath bene formerly digested by so many rare spirits . this then excusing me , i will referre the deciding thereof to men of more experience then my selfe ; yet will i not forbeare by way of discourse to deliuer my opinion ; and cite such examples as may helpe for the clearing of these doubts . first then we are to recken the commodities the kings presence affoordeth in his armie , and so in order of the other consequences . 2 whereof one of the principall is , that it putteth spirit and courage into the souldiers , it so neerely presseth them as they must of force , as it were , make their valour appeare , especially when they ioine battell where the maiestie and life of the prince , yea and their owne too is in hazard . then is it that the honest desire of preseruing their masters life groweth feruent in them , and so much the more by how much it is farre more pretious then the life of a captaine or generall , either mercenary or subiect which the prince might haue sent to command them . this occasion more then any other moueth them more freely to hazard their liues and meanes for their princes seruice , which they would not so couragiously performe vnder any other that should command in his stead . they likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others . 3 againe , the king is alwaies better followed ; he is attended on with the consequence of farre greater prouisions either of victuals , munition , money , or whatsoeuer may be necessary for the enterprise , than his lieutenant , who hath his power limited , his allowance stinted , and cannot dispose but in part of the credit and authority of his master , to whom he remaineth as countable . moreouer , the subiect fixeth his eies and affection vpon his prince , and lauisheth his life and meanes according as the businesse is , and he is addicted . francis the first , king of france , being before pauy powred money foorth ( as a man may say ) by bushels , yet odet de lautrey his lieutenant generall , lost the duchy of millan for lacke of three hundred thousand crownes that were assigned him for his charges , but were neuer deliuered him . whereupon the switzers failing of their entertainment ( whom he had till then fed with hopes of pay ) he was constrained to fight with such disaduantage as hee miscaried , and his whole army was put to flight ; which had not happened if the king had beene there in person , for either money had not failed , or else the credit and authority that accompanieth the princes presence had wrought them to patience and contained them in entire deuotion . 4 moreouer the great train of nobility and men of quality that the prince bringeth with him is a strengthening to his army , and addeth to it life and beauty , euery man striuing to appeare more gallant then other ; which they would not vouchsafe to doe nor to subiect themselues , commanded but by an ordinary generall ; for there are alwaies about the king , by election or necessity , many great personages equall in power and dignity , and some differing too in rancke and charge , either as being princes of the bloud , or for honor and authority woon by desert , al which would perhaps doe little for the generall , but would most willingly obey and expose all for their king and master to whom they owe a duty both of nature and benefit . these great mens followers serue also to increase the army . 5 beside these considerations the king bringeth euermore with him a resolution of his enterprises , wherein a generall most commonly proceedeth with a restraint and aduise , as fearing in his too forward attempting , to exceed his commission . in the meane while , time passeth , and occasion escapeth , most often to the princes hinderance and blot to his reputation . 6 in this regard if the wisedome and loyalty of the captaine be approued , princes ought not too strictly to limit their charges : but if they doubt of them , it is indiscretion to put them into their hands , as we may see by these examples . don emanuel king of portugal hauing sent the duke of braganza general into africke , he fortunately wan and made sure for his prince the towne of aza azamor : but that performed hee would not take marocco ( as at that time he might haue easily done ) though he were counselled thereto by the wisest and greatest of his army , because that ( said he ) it went beyond his commission : lopez zoares generall for the same king lost in like manner the opportunity to take the city of aden , of especiall importance for the affaires of his master ( for it standeth iust in the mouth of the red sea ) though the inhabitants would haue deliuered him the keies . insomuch as hee should haue taken vpon him ( as he said ) more then his commission allowed him . the thing was of that consequence as hee might well haue forborne the obseruation of his fast , to swallow such a morsell . neither had the seruice beene one of the least , he could haue performed for his master . 7 in conclusion we are to grant that the presence of the king bringeth with it a certaine greatnesse , and more aweth the enimy then his lieutenant ; as it was seene at the enterprise of tunise ; for barbarossa sharply tooke vp and reproued those who said that the emperour charles the fift was himselfe in person in the christian army , inferring heereby that he should then haue his hands fuller then he made account , and that nothing could be lacking in the enemies campe , when their prince was there present . this is that may be saide of the good redoundeth from the presence of the king in his army . let vs now see what may be alledged on the contrary . 8 first it may be said that the king which goeth to the wars in person ministreth greater occasion then he would to his enemy to prouide himselfe of forces , meanes and friendes : and affordeth him matter also of pretending a more glorious victory , with the hopes whereof and of rich spoiles , he putteth courage in his men , disposing them to attempt valiantly all things be they neuer so hazardous , so hartning them to fight . 9 it may be said likewise that the presence of the king maketh his captaines lesse heedefull and diligent at all occurrants and aduantages , because they in part relie vpon the vigilant eye of the prince , who is to carry away the whole honour of the enterprise , their valour remaining as dimmed and eclipsed . this hapned at the battaile of pauie . for the commanders relying vpon the kings presence and discreet carriage of matters , had no regard but of their pleasures in stead of diligently bethinking themselues of the duty of their seuerall charges , which in the ende turned to the ruine and dishonor both of their masters and themselues . 10 againe an army where the king is in person , is alwaies replenished with princes and great personages , all which promising themselues great matters , seeke not but to excel one another in place and command , whence grow among them iealosies , enuies , and sundry differences breeding infinite disorders , to the ouerthrow or hinderance of their masters affaires . who is not without his part of feare to discontent some in contenting others ? this plague of ambition , is such as it will sometimes so wrest the consciences and honours of these great men , as they will not sticke to hinder the seruice of their masters only to oppose the fortune and woorth of such a one , as they see out-strippeth them in preferment ; yea oft times their ambition groweth so extreame , as for despitethey wil vtterly forsake their princes seruice : their vertue and valour being perhaps in the meane time not of the meanest , and such as if it were well imploied would gaine honour and victory to the army . 11 there is yet another discommodity , and that is , that the king carying with him the party , whō in his absence he intendeth to constitute his lieutenant , he in the mean time repineth at his masters worthy exploites , considering how the honour should haue beene his , if alone he had the managing of the army ; againe , knowing that all such misfortunes or discomfitures , as may befall , it shall be attributed to the insufficiencie of the prince , and not to him , he the lesse regardeth it . in a word , the glory we pretend , and the iealousie we haue of our particular honors , are two especiall powers , to shake and curbe generous spirits . the emperour charles the fift , had sufficient triall of it : for some of his captaines and lieutenants could oft times with small store of money , and few men , gaine triumphant victories , as well at milan and naples as else where , which perhaps in presence of the emperour , would not haue beene so fortunately atchieued . notwithstanding all that hath beene said , the question is not yet fully determined , rather it remaineth diuersly ballancing to and fro , as appeareth by these and the following examples . 12 charles of france , surnamed the sage , neuer set foot out of his studie to command his armies , yet knew he so well how to make the best vse of his captaines valour , and manage his affaires sutable to the time , that he finally recouered his whole kingdome , and expelled thence the english , who possessed the greater part thereof . on the contrarie , the emperour ferdinand , who warred by his captaines , himselfe not stirring out of vienna , receiued great and dangerous ouerthrowes . charles the fift , on the other side , wan more honour and victories by the valour of his captaines , then euer he did in those warres and enterprises himselfe vndertooke in person . if the attempt vpon marseilles had taken effect , it might haue beene truly said that his captaines had beene in all places victorious : witnesse pauie , the bicock , landrino , naples , coron , genoua , rome , and africk ; but where he went in person , as in saxony , at tunis , dura , and vienna , his fortune prooued indifferent betweene good and bad . but at argiers , in piemont , and at metz , he encountred on all sides such misfortune , as it deemed ( as a man may say ) the luster of his renowne and victories formerly gained . 13 marke the effects of successe and fortune so different , as it were a hard matter to passe a sound and determined iudgement vpon this proposition : so as the more i imagine by the contrarietie of these examples to inlighten it , the more obscure me thinkes i make it ; the finall deciding thereof , may be framed thus . the king which vndertaketh the conduct of an armie , is either a discreet and aduised captaine , or else he is altogither vnskilled in the mysterie of warre . in this last case i should thinke that it were most for his good , to relie vpon an others relation and execution , especially if priuie to his owne imperfections , he want a dexteritie to make the best vse of another mans valour , wisedome and counsaile . but if so be he be capable of the gouernment , and conduct of an armie , and that he haue courage to execute , in mine opinion he cannot doe better then to vndertake the warre and attempt himselfe in person : for if in all militarie vertues he equall the most valiant of his armie , he will surpasse them in fortune , credit , and authoritie , and in all the other good parts aboue mentioned . kings compounded of these excellent parts , alwaies crowne their eminency with honourable triumphes . theodosius the emperour , charles the great , and sundrie others can witnesse this sufficiently ; lewes the 12. of france , hauing beene alwaies conquerour , and neuer conquered in whatsoeuer he vndertooke himselfe in person , was put besides the kingdome of naples , by means of a battaile which his captaines lost neere the riuer of garillion , for lacke of resolution and aduice ; which mischance was by that good prince so lamented , as he made a vow , thence forward to command personally in his wars ; and to say the truth , if the captaine be not discreet , valiant , and of long approoued experience , it is strange if he euer performe woorthy act : in such cases the presence of one only turnus is more auaileable then of a thousand such captaines . 14 the turkish emperours who goe themselues to the wars , haue tasted the sweetnesse thereof by so many and so notable victories , as we are at this day their admirers . selim the first was wont to say that battailes gained in the princes absence were not to be tearmed accomplished victories , and we see that they haue scarce euer enterprised ought which hath not taken effect in the ende . yea it hath beene obserued that when their captaines haue beene ouerthrowne , if they themselues went afterward in person , they alwaies returned victorious . amurath the second went himselfe after carambeius generall of his army ( who was ouerthrowen by ladislaus king of polonia ) to war vpon that prince , whom he ouercame and cut his whol army in peeces : mezat bassa was imploied by mahomet the second in the enterprise of rhodes , which he shamefully abandoned ; but soliman going himselfe in person , caried it by plaine force , and chased thence the knights of saint iohn of ierusalem , who disquieted his estate by their ordinary excursions in the leuant . amurath captaine of the said mahomet receiued a notable ouerthrow at the hands of vsumcassan king of persia : but mahomet going after himselfe in person vanquished the enemy already victorious , and put him to a desperat plunge . the mamelucks ouerthrew querseolus and calubeius , baiazet the second commanders : selim the first after personally vndertaking them , ouercame them , and wholy rooted out both them and their empire . amurath the third now raigning hath been so many times beaten by cudabenda king of persia in person , and through the vnskilfulnesse of his commanders , that a man may well say that neuer any of the race of the ottomans receiued so notable ouerthrowes as this hath : whereto may be added , that he met with last of all before taures ; where he lost about 80000. men together with the bassa generall of his army ; a great blot to the glory of his ancestors , yet the losse being so far off from his estate , he receiued not so great a shake as if it had beene neere him or in his country . 15 but who will take hold of such aduantages to doe good vpon him , seeing the greatest princes of christendome are turmoiled in ciuill wars and troubles of their owne estates ? surely none : nay rather he is like to gather strength more then euer , which he would not so easily doe , if he were to incounter the christians well appointed , resolute and in a readinesse ioyntly , and with one consent to make their benifit of so goodly an occasion . chap. xiiii . that he hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars . 1 that our deliberations may take good effect , we must proue all courses , but vndertake nothing rashly . 2 rather superfluous then but necessary prouision is to be made of what belongeth to the wars . 3 aduantages of errours committed in military prouision . 4 the wisdome of the romaines and turkes in their prouision . 1 nothing can be imagined more contenting the spirit then the happy successe of that euery one vndertaketh answerable to his condition : much more a great prince when he hath resolued vpon anie thing , espeically the war , is not to forget any one thing of what soeuer may perfect his designe , which he ought to conceale and keepe to himselfe all he may . we haue one notable example hereof yet fresh in memory , and that is of the prince of parma alexander farnese , who for a time had the managing of the troubles and wars in flanders , where he almost neuer attempted any thing which according to his intent , he did not performe : in very truth his actes were such as he deserueth to be reckoned as one of the most iudicious , wise , and aduised princes of our age , particularly in this point of making prouision of things necessary in due season . and to say the truth , who soeuer disposeth his affaires , is euermore attended on rather by shame , reproch , and repentance , then honour , glory , and contentment : that prince which once loseth his reputation by this default , hardly recouereth it , but remaineth infamous ; he is lesse feared of his neighbors , and which is more , he himselfe entreth into a certaine ill conceit , and distrust of himselfe , which in such sort accompanieth him , as in whatsoeuer he afterward a new vndertaketh , he resteth vnassured , doubtfull , confounded in all his determinations , and is vncapable of constant and resolued counsaile , carying alwaies the repentance of his former fault with a sorow which tormenteth his verie soule , so much the more strangely , by how much such a prince is the greater , or is well conceited of himselfe . 2 this is an aduertisment which should open the eies of all such not to vndertake any thing but what is well digested , and with such order and forecast , as there be rather abundance then necessity : for when the prouision is small and that it neuer so little miscary , it depriueth the prince , not of courage but of confidence and aduice , of whose lacke insueth the want of wherwithall to warrant and shelter his reputation , vnlesse it be that he will say , i had not thought , words most dangerous in the wars where he can erre but once , and vnwoorthy euer to proceede out of the mouth of one wise and aduised , vnlesse he meane that the misse of these two vertuous partes be to be borne withall . 3 prospero colonna a great captaine proued this to his cost at such time as he vndertooke to assaile parma without cannon or other munition of war requisite wherewith to take such to taske as were the french souldiours then in the towne . for they sent him away well laden with blowes , shame and displeasure , vnable to performe ought of what he too vnaduisedly attempted . fredericke of bossola met with the like at the same place for want of counsaile , mony , and other meanes which are not borne as pompers souldiours in striking the ground with our foot : guicciardin was then within the towne and had a command within that garrison . and though the captaine be wise , yet if the armie once discouer that their prouisions faile them , that they be far from succours , farre from places of retrait : then is it , loe that they become astonished , that feare and disobedience seiseth them , and that all these meete in one , make a foule adoe ; which the enemie perceiuing ( as it is vnpossible but he should ) will if he be wise , make his benefite of our necessitie ; which will serue him as a rampart and bridge at his pleasure to assaile and harme vs , but to preserue himselfe safe and vntouched : it is that the turkes taught our men at exechium . 4 the romans more wary , neuer fought but in grosse and answerable to the proportion of the enterprise , their armies were either pretorian or consulary : the turke hath alwaies sent to the field mighty forces , and aduantagioussy furnished ; neither hath he euer quitted enterprise for lacke of men , munition , or money . what was his prouision of artillery at the siege of malta , but in a manner infinite . for not to reckon his other charge , he there discharged threescore thousand cannon shot . at the siege of nice , where the french were , barbarossa generall of the turkish armie , brought such store of artillerie , as the french that were at their own doores had lacke of powder to continue their portion of batterie which they had vndertaken ; and were constrained to borrow of the turkes , to whom they should rather haue lent ; since the enterprise was theirs , and they brought the other thither . chap. xv. he hath neuer fought out of season . 1 especiall wisdome to be vsed in giuing battaile . 2 errors of charles the 5. and other christian princes in their sea-fights . 3 the turkes wisedome in that kinde . 4 sea actions vnseasonably vndertaken . 5 aduantages that the turke hath in such cases aboue the christians . 1 every man is able to resolue that he wil fight with whatsoeuer force shall present it self , & with hopes of victory , or else to sel his life at a deare rate ; but to perform it against heauē and time , was neuer heard of ; for in such cases courage , wisdome , and power become danted , so as consequently there followeth a despaire rather then any honorable fruit of a labor & indeuor wel imploied . in a word , who so precipitates his enterprise without attending fit time and season , seeketh nought else but to lose his time , his pain , charge , and reputation ( which is the maine point ) to his ruine and confusion . 2 the emperour charles the fifth might make vs wise , since hauing obstinatly vndertaken the seege of metz our of due season , and without mature aduice ; he was constrained to rise from before it with such a disorder , shame , and losse , as he afterwards hardly thriued ; not long before that , for lacke of applying himselfe to the time when he enterprised vpon algiers , how many ships and men lost he ? so many as it was a long time ere hee could recouer himselfe , learning this lesson to his cost , that earth cannot force heauen . and though the valour and policy of the turke can challenge no part in that action , yet can he make vse of the christian losses to his aduantage . now if tempests and inconstancy of weather opposed this prince both at algiers and metz , they did not lesse at such time as he attempted the voiage of tripoli in barbary : for the contrariety of windes made him waste much time at saragossa , and after by the like constraint and violence , as much at malta , during which time the most part of his souldiours died , and in the end vtterly despairing to reach tripoli in due season , the army a boade at gerbes , where it was after ouerthrowne as well by tempest as by the turkes , who knew well enough how to aduantage themselues by this disorder . the first yeere of the war of cypres , the armies of the pope and of the venetians incountred notable losses by tempest of sea , euen in the mouthes of their own hauens , and all for too late assembling themselues . 3 the turke neuer fought , especially by sea , but when the season and opportunity would permit him . 4 some one that may perhaps long to ouerthrow this position will alledge that the princes of christendome haue neuerthelesse in the winter attempted voiages by sea . it may be , but i should thinke it was either in regard of the hope they had , not to incounter the turke as they might , in the sommer , then for any assurance they had or might haue in the well-speeding of a voiage inconsiderately attemted . 5 in breefe , if we must aduenture beyond reason , it were better we did it fighting against the turkes , then against the windes , with the moores then with stormes and shipwrackes . to say the very truth , our princes of christendome haue their forces and estates so far separated one from the other , that before we can reduce them to one consent and body ; time and opportunities are fled . but the turke hath his powers so limited and ranged , not depending but of one only head , as he is alwaies in a readines to repell all assaults almost before the threatning of them can be with him . in conclusion , if all these reasons suffice not to cleare the proposition , yet should they teach vs at the least to proue wise , resolute & aduised hence forward not to enterprise ought so out of season , as that we should be driuen to fight with time rather then men ; they should teach vs to gaine rather then to lose occasions ; to abound rather then want ; to seeke to be honoured and to thriue rather then to receiue dishonour and losse : but the maine point in all is to haue god on our side as our chiefe strength and most assured conductor . chap. xvi . that he hath neuer diuided his forces . 1 wisdome of the turkes in vndertaking one , not many wars at once . 2 diuision of forces dangerous . 3 those few good commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be farre separated . 4 the ouerthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest . 5 prouision cannot be made at once for many expeditions . 1 svch hath beene the wisdome and foresight of the ottomans , as they haue neuer almost had to do with two enemies at once . contrariwise they haue so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawen on the beginning of an other ; but when they forsooke this beaten and sure way , then loe miserie ouertooke them , as it hapned to mahomet the second , who would needes warre with three armies at one time , sending one for italy , at such time as he tooke ottranto : the other to rhodes , where his generall and armie were well beaten : the third he himselfe went to conduct against the mammoelucks , if by death he had not beene preuented . he had in these three armies aboue three hundred thousand men , besides his armie at sea , consisting of aboue fiue hundred saile . the voyages and designes ill digested , all these three armies were discomfited ; for that of italy , though it tooke ottranto , got nothing by it ; seeing that assoone as the souldiers vnderstood of their masters death , they quitted the place vpon composition . 2 but me thinkes this proposition , whereby i maintaine that it is not good at once to set a foote diuers enterprises , may be thus impugned . that the successe of the turkes death , and the commotion it wrought amongst his people , was cause that those armies miscaried , and not the separation of them and their enterprises . i confesse as i ought , that whatsoeuer betideth vs , necessarily hapneth by way of a first or exciting cause . but to come to the ground of our principall matter ; without farther subti●●tsing this discourse , it is easily seene how hard it is for a prince to prouide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises , at the least vpon a sound foundation thereby to reape honorable fruites : since all diuision of forces bringeth with it a debility , and becommeth rather a subiect of iniurie then to be able to iniure others , to be beaten then to beat , to be others pray rather then to pray vpon others : for as a body diuided by parcells is not of that weight taking it seuerally , as when it is reduced to the first vnitie : in like sort the forces of a prince , when they are diuided and disunited haue not that vertue and subsistance as they would haue in their vnitie and well-ordered consunction : for proofe , who considereth that mahomet had three hundred thousand men , will say that the vnitie of such force was inuincible ; but diuided it proued not so ( though indeed each of these powers by it self ( at the least in regard of the christians ) was a most mightie army , had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt ) and if this masse of 300000. souldiours had marched in one intire body it had beene easie for them to haue attained their purpose , one seconding another as he might haue done with that of rhodes , patros , and ottranto , which he had in this case vndoubtedly conquered . 3 an other reason may be yet alledged , and that is , that it is hard to finde such captaines as are fit for the conduct of armies ; that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute souldiours ; and that they which are such being once by their diuision ( as a man may say ) diminished , it is a kinde of gelding the army of those which may serue by their example to assure and incourage the other confused multitude . 4 moreouer when we vndertake three enterprises at once ( as mahomet , who serueth to this purpose did ) if it happen but one of them to faile , the newes of their misaduenture , maketh the rest ( vndoubtedly depending the one vpon the other ) to faile of resolution . 5 again , as we haue before deliuered , it is necessary that the war be vndertaken in grosse , and that assay be made of our forces as soone as may be , that we may not be driuen long to entertaine a great army ( which for delay of execution doth oft times disband , breake vp and ouerthrow it selfe with it selfe , but especially with answerable prouisions the better to inioy great happinesse with smal charge ; which will neuer befall him that diuideth his forces and at once attempteth in diuers places . we will then conclude that the ottomans for the most part haue not had but one enterprise in hand at once , and that to atchieue it they haue so well prouided for it , as the victory hath remained on their side . chap. xvii . that he hath not long held warre with one alone . 1 why the turkes haue not continued war with one alone . 2 a long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy . 3 it moueth neighbours out of the feare of their owne like misery to aide the oppressed . 4 the turkes manuer of shifting his wars , and making peace at his pleasure . 1 what more assured testimony can wee haue of a continued wisdome , or to say better of a well caried subtilty amongst the ottomans , then in that they haue alwaies come off well in concluding their wars , and haue not maintained them long against one and the selfe same enemy ? the practise of this policy hath beene most aduantageous vnto them ; such people as they haue not been able at the first to subdue , they haue left in peace , yet haue not forborn in the meane time to turne their armes elsewhere . i haue fashioned to my selfe two especiall causes of this discreet course . 2 the first is the feare they haue euer had lest they might make good souldiours of those against whom they should wilfully maintaine a lingering war. a thing ill practised by the spaniards in flanders and the low-countries ; for continuing war many yeres together against them , they haue acquainted that people ( before soft and effeminate ) with the fearfull clashe of their armes , they haue so encouraged and imboldened them , as at this day there are few nations more industrious about their fortifications , or more resolute in the field . 3 the other occasion which hath withheld the turke from making war long time together vpon one people , is , in mine opinion the feare he hath to incite their neighbour princes to take armes against him . for if the compassion & fire which burneth our neighbours house doc not mooue vs , the feare of the like to light on vs will make vs bestirre our selues . 4 the turke then following these steps one while assaileth the venetians , despoiling them now of a prouince , then of a good towne or place of strength . and hauing there made vp his mouth he praieth next vpon the hungarians , doubting lest he might pull vpon his necke a generall league of the other of italy . he euermore pretendeth in shew that hee will attempt no further : rather that hee meaneth to plant the vtmost of his limits at the place by him last conquered : in the meane time he forgetteth not to be watchfull where he may sease himselfe of some other place of more importance , more easily to incroch vpon vs. after he hath gotten from the hungarians some peece of their country , he retireth himselfe before their neighbours be assembled , or that they haue meanes couragiously to reuenge themselues of their iniuries . in conclusion he so well behaueth himselfe as he hath neuer suffered vs to fasten vpon him whatsoeuer wars he hath made vpon vs , and he hath alwaies so timely made his retraite , as he hath not enforced the neighbours of the country assailed to ioyne and be in league together ; he in the meane time resting vpon his aduantages of hauing a great number of souldiours well trained and entertained in continuall wars whereby they become more experienced in all occurrents , then ours ; by these meanes attaining to the triumphes of so many crownes and estates . the end of the first booke . the second booke . chap. i. of religion . 1 religion the principall bridle of the subiects . 2 excellencie of the christian religion . 3 the vainnesse and abhomination of the mahometan religion . 4 disputation of religion forbidden amongst the turkes . 5 the great turkes example is a confirmation of his religion . 6 so are the calamities of the christians , and of others different from them in opinions . in like sort as by the disposing of what hath beene before handled we haue made it apparent by what wayes & meanes the turke is become great ; so are we now to deliuer the manner how he holdeth , and maintaineth what he hath already gotten . 1 all such as haue gone about to lay the foundation of souerantie haue begun with religion , as that wherof princes must necessarily make vse , to containe their people in obedience and worship of one god true or false ; if this were not , it were impossible they should acknowledge one soueraigne in earth ▪ were they without the feare & knowledge of one supreame in heauen : we might alleage ancient histories whereby it would appeare that all such as haue gone about the establishment of a monarchy , haue had an especiall care to grounde it on the pretence of religion , by whose mysterie and ceremonies they helde in those whom they sought to range to their lawes , by this scruple making them more tractable and pliant to receiue instruction ; numa pompilius , lycurgus , sertorius , and others are sufficient proofes , whose credit grew from the communication they gaue out they had with som diuinity ; others that could not hit of the way to frame a new religion fortified themselues neuerthelesse with a pretence of it , in reforming the old , as did not long since ismael king of persia and his coosine harduellas , who performed great matters in the partes of asia by introducing a new superstition of religion . 2 but to the purpose , we must auow that as there is no religion more true , so is there none more fauorable to princes then the christian , for the quiet and preseruation of their estate and minde . in somuch as this by way of conscience subiecteth to the king & all other superiours ( howsoeuer peruerse and vitious ) the heart , the person , & goods of the subiect ; what greater reason or instrument of state can we meete with then that which bringeth the people vnder a full and perfect obedience ? if our sauiour christ submitted himselfe to the law of the emperour and paid taxe and custom for himselfe and saint peter , who will doubt that his disciples are not to doe the like as true obseruers of his precepts ? i remember a discourse written by the iesuites of a certaine prince of a country newly dscouered in india , who as one very politicke and wise perceiming the simplicity and purity of the christian doctrine , though himselfe were an idolater , permitted that his subiects should be baptized , cathechized and instructed in our faith ; and was present at their baptisme ; furthering to his power all the actions of the iesuites ; because ( said he ) i am assured if these men obserue their law as they are bound , they will faile neither of loialty nor obedience , and will pay me my tributes and reuenues without fraude or contradiction . 3 let vs now enter into the principall matter of the subiect which we haue vndertaken to handle . the law of mahomet is full fraught with fables and grosse absurdities , and so far from reason to maintaine them , as it would be an easie matter by way of some holy manifestation of their errors to alter the estate & gouernment of the turkish empire . what more strange impertinency can there be then that of their alcaron ? it is impossible to deuise more absurdities , dreames and cousenings , then those their law giuer mahomet hath introduced : but he perceiuing well enough that the foundation of his falfe doctrine was such as it would be easie to ouerthrow it ; knew cunningly how manie ways to remedie it . first he framed all the precepts of his law according to naturall sense , and made them sutable to the course of things base and earthly , therby to make their obseruation so much the more pleasing and easie to be admitted and maintained , as being founded vpon the pleasures of the flesh and the world ; he could neuer better charm the reason and lull asleepe the spirite of that dull and wholly illiterate nation , then to tie them to the performance of a law altogether sensuall . 4 the other meanes he held to make his law lasting , was the expresse forbidding to enter into disputation about any one point of it , vnlesse it were with the edge of the sword : in regard whereof he tearmed it , the law of the sword . thus the prince of the turke who hath in his hand the sword & force , is also consequently the arbitrator & iudge of the doubts and controuersies which arise in his law , and determineth them as he seeth good , so as he is wise enough to suffer any newe opinion to take footing . for as soone as that hapneth he turneth his sword against the authours thereof , and that with such rigour and cruelty as he vtterly rooteth them out not leauing so much as a seed or any parcell of them . the troubles and dissentions which heresies haue brought in amongst the christians serue him for examples , he seeth such histories daily verified ; he is very well informed of them , and turneth them to the best vse beyond the experience his predecessors haue had of such fruites as spring from a new interpretation of their law . harduclles in a very small space wan such credit amongst that barbarous people , that by means of a certaine new interpretation of the points of their sect , he busied all asia , where he sowed so many troubles , as he well neere indangered the whole estate of baiazet the second . 5 but that which maketh the law of this cursed race more durable is , that the emperour himselfe obserueth it with that deuotion , honoreth it with that reuerence , embraceth it with that religion , and preserueth it in that credit and authority ; as it is hard to imagine a man more deuout and affected towards it . 6 againe , the misery and vexations that the turks ( depriued of all other light but that their mother sense affordeth them ) beholde other nations dispersed thorow their dominions and of a contrary beleefe to indure , wholy weddeth their dull soules to this false doctrine : neither is there that misery which that vile mahometane race make not all those to suffer who embrace not their religion , but aboue all the christians . chap. ii. of the direct dependency of the turkes subiects vpon their soueraigne . 1 subiects must haue their eies chiefly vpon their soueraigne . 2 tyrants strength and guard of strangers . 3 the absolute authority of the ottomans . 4 the princes seuour , the subiects safetie . 5 his subiects exact obedience and the cause thereof . 6 rebllions whence procceding . 1 the best cement that can be made to giue long continuance to an estate , is to worke so , as that the subiects , of whatsoeuer qualitie or condition they be , may haue alwaies neede of him that is their commander , to the end they may immediatly depend vpon him and reuerence him : but because it is hard to bring all the world to this passe , especially in a great monarchy : those at the least are to be drawen to it , as farfoorth as is possible , who should be the sinewes and supporters of the princes power . 2 this moued such tyrants as durst not assure themselues of such people as they had subdued , to haue about them captaines , souldiours , and seruants which were strangers and had neither kinsfolkes , nor friendes in that country , but relied absolutely vpon them . this heeretofore was the maner of the soldans of egypt ; and though they be courses so violent , barbarous and vnworthy of christian princes , as they should neuer be set before them , yet may they somewaies aduantage them in the consideration of their ends and aime of their intentions , applying them and appropriating them so far forth as christian policy and the interest of faith may permit . 3 now then we will deliuer what vse the turke in these times makes of them . he to establish his empire and amplifie his greatnesse and authority , intitleth himselfe not only prince and monarch of his estates , but lord also and peaceable master of the persons , habilities , goods , houses , and possessions of his vastals ; neither is there inheritance or succession so assured , be it neuer so lawfull , but it dependeth of the disposition and free wil of the turke , so as if any aske of his subiects whose house it is wherein he dwelleth , and to whom belongeth the land he tilleth , he makes no other answeare , but that they are the great turks his master ; moreouer they all tearme themselues slaues of their prince : whence followeth that they can not any waie maintaine the quiet possession of their goods , nor account of any thing as of their owne but by his especiall fauour . much more if they aime at raising themselues to any eminent place of honour they are to beg it of the magnificence and pleasure of their prince ; meanes which serue to curbe those barbarous people , yet to be reiected of christians and abhorred of lawfull princes , who receiue and hold their monarchies of the hand of god. there are more honest precepts to be giuen , whereby they may purchase and preserue the loue and obedience of their people , without vsing such cruelties and tyrannies . but because the argument propounded requireth that i relate the meanes this barbarons race hath obserued to become great , and that i am fallen into that matter , i will continue it : yet not as approuing any such course , or as indeuoring to set them downe , by them to forme a receiuable example , or to induce christian princes to make them their paterne of gouerning their estates . 4 by this former discourse then we haue deliuered how the turkes subiects haue neede of him , some to preserue what they haue gotten , others to attaine to dignities and places of honour . and in a word , their being and life depending indifferently vpon the prince , their principall care is to winne his fauour . 5 thi● dependency fortifieth it selfe & increaseth by the obedience and gouernment of great personages , imploied by the turke in his seruice , and fashioned by himselfe to this end , who are from their infancy brought vp at the princes charge , and instructed euery one according as hee is naturally inclined either in the excercises of armes or any other laborious trade , so as such not knowing other father or benefactor then their soueraigne ( from whom they receiue both goods and honours ) : neuer thinke of kindred or friends , neither haue they any touch of bloud or naturall alliance , dedicating their body , minde and whole deuotion to the only goood of their masters affaires , whose creatures they acknowledge themselues to be , to whatsoeuer degree of honour they be preferred : neither is it in their power to amasse other wealth then that which is rawght them by the hands of the great turke . to make it more plaine to the reader who these are ; they are the spachi , spachioglani and ianizzars ; in these consisteth the strength and guard of the turkish empire . i hold it not amisse to discouer in a word ( as by the way ) what is the forme and condition of these bandes and companies : so to deliuer a more cleare vnderstanding of their manner and power . the spachi and spachioglani are horse men , whereof there are a thousand in number , which march at the right hand of their lord. the selactari or soluptari , are other thousand horse , which accompany the great turke on the left hand , when he marcheth , as the spaihioglani on the right ; of these two companies are chosen the gouernours of prouinces , and vpon these according to their merit , the turke bestoweth his daughters in mariage . the vlufezgi are other thousand which march after the aboue named , who in part are called out of the bands of ianizzars , as men noted for their especiall valour : or they are such as haue beene slaues , and for their notable seruice performed toward their masters , or for hauing saued the life of some bassa or beglerbee in the wars , attaine to this degree of being one of the turkes garde . the charipies are of like number as the vlufezgi , and march after them . the ianizzars follow after , who are foote , and appointed for the guard of the turke : these at their first institution were few in number , but now they amount to 4000 : in these two sorts of foote and horse , consisteth the strength of the turke , being as the seminarie of the sangiaks , bassas , and lisirs . this great number we speake of , giue no armes or any other marke of hereditary gentry , being in such sort ordained as they cannot attribute to themselues any thing in particular , nor attaine to any preheminence , but such as by their vertue they may inuite their prince to bestow vpon them . it is the onely meanes whereby the turke gaineth all the obedience and loialtie he can wish ; obedience in regard they are ( as i haue said ) trained vp vnto it from their infancie , which in them turneth to a naturall habite , placing the fruit of their labours in the assurance of such a seruitude : loyaltie , in as much as they expect from him their whole aduancement , and acknowledge to receiue more benefits of him then of any other prince ; neither hath it beene knowne that they euer committed treason of importance , vnlesse it were the reuolt of gazeles at damasco , and of acomat bassa at cairo , in the time of soliman . which was but ( as a man may say ) a fire of stubble extinguished at the very first appearance and pursute of their master . now the ianizars , and the other mentioned , who are the sinewes and principall foundation of the ottomans greatnesse , and who receiue so many commodities by this dependencie , and doe daily expect more ; haue no more deere care , then to vphold their masters safetie , and preserue the greatnesse of his estate , whereunto their owne fortune is linked . 6 to shew by what meanes the turke maintaineth this dependencie , let me say that all dependency of the subiect vpon his master and soueraigne , may receiue an alteration either by force furie of the people : authoritie , of some great man of the country . by the support of a for●en prince . matters thus disposed ( not to enquire nicely after al sorts of inconueniences ) it resteth that we see how he remedieth these kinde of accidents , and preuenteth the causes of such like infirmities as these , which in time might weaken and ruine his empire : let vs begin then with the strength of the people . chap. iii. how he hath depriued his subiects of strength . 1 wherein consisteth the strength of an estate . 2 the turkish empire maintained by the vse of armes , as that of the romans . 3 tithing of christian children by the turkes . 4 the manner of their education : and the commodity accreweth thereby to the turkes . 5 great assemblies amongst them forbidden . 1 the strength of an estate consisteth in the valour of the nobilitie , loue and faithfulnesse of the subiect , reputation of armes , multitude of souldiers , and commodities of horse , which may bee therein bred or nourished . 2 the turke then which would attaine to this poinct , onely by armes , horse , and souldiers , obserueth euermore this rule : he taketh away all vse of armes from such prouinces as he hath newly reduced to his obedience , he forbiddeth them the commoditie of horses fit for the war , & endeuoureth all he may to choake in them the springing vp of men proper for the exercises of arms ; and hath an ere that in all his dominions , not any man haue in his house weapons for the warre , no not so much as a knife , vnlesse without a point ; moreouer , he alloweth not any iewe or christian to haue or keepe any horse , imitating heerein the manner of the romanes , who obserued both the one and the other , especially at the surprises and surrenders of townes ; the principall conditions were alwaies , that they should forgoe their weapons , their horses , and deliuer hostages : hence is it that we reade so often in caesar , arma proferri , iumenta produci , obsides dari iubet . heereby depriuing the subdued people of all meanes to vndertake or maintaine a rebellion . againe , hostages gaue them a future assurance of the fidelitie and obedience of their subiects : for amongst such as they admitted , the chiefe of the counsaile and such as were valiant men at armes , were the first mentioned : but aboue all , those of whom they might conceiue any doubt or suspition . we reade that caesar hauing taken auxerra ( which was not one of the greatest not best peopled townes of france ) drew thence sixe hundred hostages : so as it is to be thought , that the rest after such an abatement , could not be of any great courage or strength to reuolt . 3 the turke without troubling himselfe with the care how to traine after him an vnprofitable multitude of hostages , in an instant riddeth his subiects hands of their best forces , and strangely armeth and fortifieth himselfe with themselues , against themselues ; and heerein he thus proceedeth . he maintaineth in pay about two hundred commissaries , who as superintendents trauell vp and downe all the countries of his obedience , to see and ouersee all that is saide and done by the christians . these men goe throughout grecia , wallachia and bosnia , and extort by way of tenthes , the children from the bosomes of their fathers and mothers , according as they esteeme them fit and likely to be fashioned to the wars . 4 these childrē thus culled & assembled from al cuntries of his obedience are after sent to constantinople and distributed amongst the merchants , and citizens by name , and inroulement ; to the ende they may be there instructed in the lawe of mahomet , and taught the turkish tongue : after ( when they come to the age to beare armes ) to be of the number of ianizzars . for during their youth they are trained vp to all such military exercises as may put valour in them , and make them souldiours ; and this by particular masters appointed to teach them to shoote , wrastle , leape , vault , and so to harden their bodies as the tranailes of the wars may be after held but as pleasures and naturall actions . thus the turke by this tithing of children assureth himselfe of his people in a two-folde manner ; in despoiling as he doth the prouinces of the flower of their martiall men ; and applying them to his owne strengthning both at home and abroade . 5 hereunto he addeth the expresse forbidding his subiects all assemblies , or building of any strong houses , which may stead them in time of sedition or tumult , neither are they allowed the vse of bels , by whose sound they might call themselues together to the execution of some plotted reuolt , or mutiny . in a word , they are naked of all meanes , to fortifie , to arme , to assemble themselues or to become any waies ; fit for the wars ; no other subiect is left them to worke vpon but the tillage of the land , whereto , as to al other mechanical artes , they apply themselues ; so becomming base , abiect , and vnapt for the wars . chap. iiii. the causes that may moue a people to fury . 1 despaire armeth the weake . 2 how to auoid tumults and ciuill commotions . 3 feare amongst subiects is vpheld by iustice , and plentie of thinges necessary . 4 praise of peace and iustice . 5 execution of iustice amongst the turkes pleasing and tollerable , though vniust . 6 an exhortation to christian princes to administer iustice . it hath oft hapned , and in our times we haue had triall of it , that the people , though vnarmed , haue in their despaire and fury disquieted a whole estate , and brought the common-weale into an exceeding distresse and perplexity . furor arma ministrat ( saith virgil ) iamque faces & sax a volant . we haue the testimony of the romans time , in those ciuill wars which hapned in italy & in sicily , & of the mischiefes which followed those rebellions ; as much hath beene seene to happen in these times in the i le of s. domingo about the change of gouernment introduced vpon those conquered people , forced to subiect themselues to a new kinde of seruitude . in very deede that people is not weakely armed which hath a heart , a good spirite , and a nimble hand . 2 this is the cause why the turke to preuent these popular commotions , hath depriued the people of all sorts of armes , to the end they may forget both the vse and courage to handle them , and that they may not by them take occasion to mutiny . now to prouide that so barbarous a yoake driue them not to despaire , he maintaineth a general peace and tranquillity throughout his estate : he hath a care that iustice be equally distributed : that they haue plenty of victuals , and all other vsuall commodities , the better to lull asleepe their fury . 3 by these meanes euery one maketh the best of his fortune and liueth quietly at home , embracing that naturall desire of holding his owne , which to performe euery man emploieth whatsoeuer may proceed out of himself : moreouer this quiet and ease of minde doth so soften men , as they rest free from the thought of plotting or vndertaking sturs and rebellions : iustice , quiet , and plenty , are three things which haue for their opposites , the violence of soldiours in time of war , the corruption of iudges in time of peace , and scartsiy and famine in both . the iniustice , the abuse , and auarice of officers and magistrates , are those which procure the subuersion and vnauoidable ruine of a country . i could adde to this discourse many examples & domesticall proofes , but not to enter into too deepe a sea i will spare them , and will content my selfe to say only that all those of ancient times , and such as haue had any touch of a good minde ( either christians or infidels ) haue euermore confessed that the sincere execution of iustice is the strongest piller of all well ordered estates , as on the contrary iniustice is the ouerthrow , not alone of men and countries , but of beasts also . to returne to our matter , it is sure that when the common subiect hath wherewith to nourish , cloath , and handsomely accommodate himselfe and family ; when in the middest of armes he is safe in his owne home ; when he standeth not in feare of forged crimes , or bribery of iudges ; then is it that he falleth asleepe in securitie , and careth not but to entertaine that tranquillitie , reiecting all thought of rebellions . this is it which the turke ( who warreth continually with his neighbours ) putteth in practise to maintaine peace throughout his dominions , and to be beloued and faithfully serued of his subiects , whom he tieth to him with those strong bands , which are to say the truth ( besides iustice and tranquillitie ) most proper for preseruation . a great helpe heereunto is his continuall imploying his captaines and souldiers in the wars , especially out of his owne countrey , and to the spoile of his enemies . 5 peace is the horne and true mother of abundance : then is it that euery man tilleth his land without disturbance , and quietly inioyeth and encreaseth his owne store , since as the poet saith , pax arua colit : iustice queene of vertues , is that which serueth as the base and most sure foundation to peace , which could not otherwise subsist , nor the lawes likewise ; then is it that they gaine strength and vigour . 5 and though the forme of the turkish iustice be not without much vanitie and oppression , and though all matters be determined amongst them by way of witnesses , who are alike bought and sold ; and that iudgements passe as gold and siluer is stirring : yet the quicke dispatch they receiue , maketh them forget this inconuenience ; and though the sentence of such iudges be often pronounced against all order of iustice ; yet is there thus much good gotten by it ; that men consume not themselues bodie and goods in pleading and trotting after lawyers and atturnies , which haue their consciences as large as the other , who are bought more deerely : besides the delay , vexation and vncertainety of the iudgement . and though the sentence of such men be much displeasing , yet the people haue this to comfort them , that they many times see them endure most notable and exemplary punishment : for the turke sometimes vpon the least complaint brought against them , putteth them to death , be they neuer so great personages , as well to inrich himselfe with their spoiles , as to manifest himselfe to be a prince most respectiue of iustice and equity , and to giue also a manner of satisfaction to his subiects so oppressed as selim , left that example of bostand bassa . 6 hence christian princes are to fetch an aduertisment how to be more carefull then they are in making their ministers obserue a more vpright and speedy distribution of iustice amongst their subiects : not vpon the grounds and intents of this barbarous turke ; but rather because they are one day to render an account before god , who to this ende established them in place aboue others . questionlesse the long delaying of suites is the most damnable plague to be found at this day in all estates : the abuses committed otherwise by the ministers of princes are more to lerable then these ; where the whole is in question . for this cause princes ought to looke more neerely to this then to any other thing . chap. v. the common remedy applied by the turke against the force and fury of the people . 1 another way of preuenting popular seditions , by hauing alwaies bands of foote and horse in a readinesse . 2 the turkes strength in his court . 3 his other strengthes . 4 inconueniences that grew by the romane legions : 5 preuented by the turke . 1 though the meanes formerly deliuered be sufficient to keepe the turkes subiects from rebelling , yet there are stronger by him practised , wholly to preuent and extinguish euen the least sparke of sedition , and to prouide against other like inconueniences . he maintaineth a great number of horse and foot alwaies armed , alwaies in pay , and distributed in garrisons thorow out his empire , especially in places most proper to resist or assaile . these curbe the people , and vpon the least shew of rebellion lay hands on them , represse their insolency , and suffer not the least apparance of sedition to take roote , remouing the causes euen at the first without respect to any . this is the reason that there hath neuer beene knowen any popular rebellion in his estate . 2 the port of the great turke , as they tearme it ( as who would say his courte and gard ) consisteth chiesely and ordinarily of foure thousand horse , distributed into foure companies , to wit the spahioglani , who are in al a thousand besides their seruants , which march not in their rancke but apart , and of these euery one hath seauen or eight . these range themselues on the right hand of their lord wheresoeuer he become ; and the solastri ( equall in place and authority ) on the left . these two sortes are accounted as children of the great turke , and are nourished and brought vp in the sarraglio at his charge ( as hath beene said ) and there trained vp in all exercises of armes . after these , march the companies of the vlifezgi & charipici , inferiour to the other in rancke and authority . those on the right hand , these on the left , either consisting of a thousand horse . and wheresoeuer the great turke goe , they neuer forsake him . these foure thousand horse together with twelue thousand ianizzars are the strength and gard of the person and port of the turke , with these forces he is alwaies able to hold in awe and subiection a city more populous then constantinople , and not stand in feare of any attempt against his person . 3 in other places of his empire he bestowes other great numbers of the ianizzars to be assistant to the gouernors and bassas , besides the succours they are to haue of such horse and foote as those are bound to furnish on whom the turke hath at other times bestowed such arable lands as haue beene conquered by armes , whence he draweth one man or more as the necessity of his affaires requireth , and according as is the value of what they possesse . these are called mozzellini . such as are tied to this contribution may be compared to the feudataries of our prince , towards whose seruice they are to finde a light horse or musket , and some of them two , more or lesse according to the imperiall institutions of such fees and tenures as so binde them . after all those we haue named , march the alcanzi , or aconizij , as a man would say aduenturers , which haue no wages , & are appointed to march a daies iourny before the campe , pilling , harrowing , and hauocking all before them , whereof they are to answeare the fift parte clcere to the great turke : of these there are thirty thousand , besides them there are the azapi ( of meane quality ) but such as serue his turne for gally-slaues , mariners and pioners to intrench , fill vp ditches , raise engines , and perform other such like seruill offices , their number is 40000. ouer and aboue these vnder two beglerbees or lientenants generall , the one in europe the other in asia ; he hath neere an hundred thousand horse in ordinary intertainment . the beglerby of grecia or europ ( which is as much to say as prince of all princes ) hath his place of residency at sophia a towne of seruia . that of asia abideth at culhea a towne of galatia . each of these hath vnder his obedience many sangiacks ( as much as to say sherifes or bailifs ) the very children of the great turke which gouerne in the prouinces where they command are bound to obey them . this great multitude of horsemen are so well mounted and armed , as none can chuse or wish a more fit or direct meanes then their ordinary strength to hinder all popular reuolts or rebellions , be they neuer so great . that which hapned to gazeles after the death of selim doth sufficiently approue it ; he thought to stirre against soliman , and to moue syria to rebell ; but he was preuented by that mighty power which soliman found euen then in a readinesse , wherewith he ouerthrew him . these ordinary prouisions of war are the more terrible and effectual , in regard that all the people of his obedience are intirely disarmed of whatsoeuer offensiue weapons . 4 the romans obserued this custome , to distribute diuers of their legions about the frontiers of germany alongst the rhene and danowb , to the same end and purpose as the turke entertaineth his horse . but it seemeth that he proceedeth therein more discreetly then did the romans , for they kept all their forces together in one place , and vnder one generall , of whom depended the absolute command of the armies : whence it fell out that to accommodate themselues , they ouerthrew the houses of particular men , ruined , and famished the countrey , as well by the hauocke they made ( which alwaies attendeth so great a multitude ) as by their large prouisions most necessary for an armie : the other prouinces farre distant were exempt from this oppression , yet not from contribution , but those which sustained the armie , were so ouerburdened , as their miserie incited them to rebell , and shake off their obedience . but contrariwise , the turke which disperseth his horse and foote into diuers prouinces , vnder the command of sixtie and six sangiacks , draweth not after him such disorder or ill satisfaction as did the romans . their great assemblie in one place was cause of seditions , debates , mutinies and other mischiefes , most difficult to be preuented . they did not perceiue how this manner of proceeding was a means that the souldiers grew too much to affect their captaines , and that the captaines found themselues by them enabled to attempt ( as they often did ) many things to the preiudice of the empire . and in very deed it oftentimes hapned that their armies made choice of their general for emperour , in despite of the senatours authoritie ; either in regard of the valour they knew to be in them , or of some pecuniarie corrupting their affections , which the senate could not remedy : and in trueth it was a very easie matter for the generall , so farre from home , and holding his forces vnited in one body , to practise the colonels , and the colonels to bargaine and buie the harts and affections of the souldiers , by them to possesse the empire , so as sometime the armie of spaine chose their generall emperour , and at the same time that of germany theirs : whereof we haue many examples , as also of the calamities and miseries which did thence accrew to the estate and subiects . 5 it is an inconuenience whereto the turke cannot be subiect ; for keeping his troups and armies so spread abroad and disperst , they haue not the meanes to mutinie ( especially being in no place ouer strong ) nor yet grow to affect their beglerbyes or gouernours , whom they seldome see or repaire to : much lesse can the beglerbee in his owne behalfe easily winne or entice the hearts of the sangiacks , or affections of the souldiers , as he might well doe if the troupes were alwais together in time of peace , and abroad in one and the same prouince . chap. vi. how the turke represseth the power of the great men of his estate . 1 the authoritie of a prince ( if his vertue be not eminent aboue all the great men of his kingdome ) is by their vertue obscured , whence groweth the diminution of the subiects obseruance . 2 from whence the authoritie of the nobilitie doth proceed . 3 the detestable crueltie of the turkish emperour against the next of his bloud . 4 vsage of great men taken by the turkes . 5 the vncertaine fortune and estate of the turkes officers . 1 to the end the dependencie and authoritie whereof wee haue hitherto entreated be without alteration maintained , it is requisite that the prince haue a care , that there be none in his countrey who for their greatnesse may incourage the people , and embolden them to attempt ought , backt by their authoritie , countenance and conduct . 2 this greatnesse may grow from three principall causes : either in regard they are princes of the bloud , or for that they are noted to be nobly descended and rich , or else for the reputation they haue gotten , and a long while preserued , either by cunning , or by their owne valour , and merit : things that winne credit and name amongst the common people . concerning the first cause , the children , brethren , and kinsmen of the turke , are great by consanguinitie . the barons of the country obtaine the second ranke , whereto the noblenesse of their family calleth them : for the third , such ministers and officers as beare a stroake and swaie in matters of the highest consequence , are accounted great . 3 the ottaman princes , of nature barbarous and cruell , ordinarily shelter themselues from these inconueniences , with courses far from all humanity , in as much as without all respect of law , religion , or other ciuill consideration , they vpon the least scruple that may be , ridde their hands by execrable murthers , of their neerest kinsfolkes and friends , yea euen of their fathers and brethren , alone to inioy and by their death to assure to themselues the quiet possession of their kingdome . selim the first murthered two of his brethren , procured the death of all his nephewes , yea and of his father also . he would often say that there was nothing more sweet then to raigne out of the suspition and shadow of his kindred ; and that he deserued pardon for what he had committed , since it was the same play and vsage he should haue receiued , if any other but himselfe had attained to the crowne . amurath the third which now raigneth , made his entry by the death of his brother , and searched the establishing of his empire , euen in the belly of his mother , then great with childe , making for this end , one end of her & what she went withall : these cruelties are monstrous in the sight of god and man , and full of horror and infamie : yet hath it not beene knowen for all this , that euer any citie , any people , or armie , did reuolt or mutine . this inhumanitie is amongst them growne to that lawfull and ordinarie consequence , as they vsually put it in practise , without feare of blame or reproch . the examples thereof are as infinite as their memories , stinking and abhominable . in a word , this butchering is amongst them an hereditary succession , descending from one to another , which god would reuenge with our hands if we would amend our liues . 4 as for the barons and lords of the countrey , mahomet the first , destroied their seed , expelling them out of his estate , as he did all the originarie turkish princes his allies ; and if by chance there remaine any of the ottoman race , he is so kept downe , as he traileth ( as they say ) his belly vpon the ground , liuing most poorely without all charge , and manage of affaires : so as neither valour nor riches can make him appeere or shine in the worlds eie ; rather he remaineth eclipsed amongst the vulgar sort , without honour , credit , or estimation . as for the princes and mightie men of the countrey by them subdued , they know well enough how to ridde their hands of them , in sort as we haue before declared : so as neuer empire was raised , or maintained with more execrable murthers , then this hath beene in these daies ; they neither sparing princes of their bloud , nor the chiefe potentates of their prouinces ; for they blinde them , if not kill them . 5 now concerning the ministers and officers , who by long managing of waightie affaires , haue attained to honorable places , authority and reputation ; there is not one , be hee neuer so great , which at the least winke , wrath , and pleasure of his lord , loseth not his life immediatly . baiazet caused acomat bassa to be put to death , an excellent man of armes and a woorthy captaine , saying the too much reputation of the seruant was a cause of the too great ielousie of the master . selim likewise put many to death , and amongst others mustafa bassa , whom he caused to be strangled at prusa , and after to be cast out to the dogs . this was his recompence for fauoring him in the vsurpation of the empire against baiazet his father then liuing , and for making riddance of his two brethren acomat and corcut. he suspected it was he that had reuealed his secret ( as indeed he had ) to aladin and amarath children of his brother acomat , because contrary to his expectation he sought their death . it is in a manner an ordinary course with princes that one light offence obscureth and maketh them forget a thousand good seruices performed for the good of their affaires . for my part i am of opinion that this rage , and inhumane cruelty familiar with the house of the ottomans , is but a true and iust iudgment of god , who will by their parricid handes chastice the apostasies and wickednesse of one by another , considering the greater part of them are christians who haue denied their faith , and by that miserable act climed vp to the height of those eminent charges and dignities they possesse . as not long since his diuine maiestie permitted a poore simple souldiour to kill mahomet bassa , a man most mighty in credit and authority ; but more rich of power and meanes ; yet such a one as had beene a christian and had taken vpon him the orders of priesthood . chap. vii . how he confoundeth the practises of forraine princes his neighbours 1 the diuorce of the greeke church from the romish confirmeth the turkish empire . 2 what were requisite to stir vp the turkish subiects to rebellion . 3 the greekes vtterly destitute of meanes for such proceedings . 4 his owne subiects throughly curbed . 1 one of the most assured meanes practised by the turke , as an infallible course of setling his estate against the intelligence which his people might hold with christian princes , is the diuorce & separation he maintaineth betweene the greeke & the romish church , supposing while this schisme shall continue amongst them , that they will neuer establish betweene them a sound amity . this made the conquest of constantinople easie vnto them ; this hath forwarded the proceeding of his victories , and as it were , put into his hands all those rich and goodly prouinces , whereof he is at this day the peaceable , but tyrannicall owner : moreouer he so narrowly obserueth our vnhappie discord , as he by a perpetuall counsaill endeuoureth all he can possibly , that the patriarkes render no obedience to the pope : neither is it long since zacharias , patriarcke of constantinople , was like to be staked for hauing admitted the new callender and the reformation of the course of the yeere , made in the time of gregorie the 13. 2 now to returne to the principall point , it is to be presupposed that the proiects and carriage of popular rebellions , cannot be vndertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth , meanes , and authority , in the country which we would surprise ; and that princes will not bouge to set a foote these plots and enterprises , but by offered occasion of some fortresse which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate , and may serue for a refuge to recouer their decaied strength : or else that their destigne relieth vpon some promised succour , or finally vpon the consideration that those who inuite them to this conquest are so strong within themselues , as they may hope for an honorable issue of their enterprise . 3 these are all necessary particularities , but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the greekes abased by extreame seruitude , and so far from hauing any fortresse at their deuotion , as they cannot once stir without being discouered ; and though they were disposed to vndertake , they haue at their backe so great a number of men at arms , as at the least breath of a rebellion , they would cut them off before they should haue meanes once to peepe forth of their shels . 4 the turke againe maketh them sure to him so many waies , though all barbarous and vnciuill , as he scarcely alloweth his subiects leaue to draw their breath , nor suffreth his mighty men once to hold vp their heades ; or forraine princes to be able in due time to attempt ought against him . the end of the second booke . the third booke . chap. i. the causes of the fall and ruine of estates . 1 estates are subiect to change . 2 some of longer , some of lesse continuance . 3 great , small , and meane estates , and their causes of ruine ; externall , internall , and mixt . 4 lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes . 5 the great by internall . 6 the meane more durable , yet subiect to alteration . 1 the order that nature obserueth in all things created doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoeuer is borne passeth and hastneth towards death ; and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end . this proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course , or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies . hence we drawe this construction , that estates change , monarchies faile , and the ruine of one serueth as the raising to the other . 2 againe , as of humaine bodies some are more strong , vigorous , and of a better composition then others , and so are of longer continuance ; so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates : in as much as some preserue themselues longer , either because by their nature they are more surely founded ( as for example the signory of nobles is more lasting then the popular estate , and a monarchal estate more then a common-weale , because a monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her ; or is policed with better lawes ) or because of the situation which is naturally more strong then the other , as we see at this day in the signorie of venice . 3 but because this assertion is subiect to diuers obiectiōs , we will diuide it only into two propositions . first then of principalities , some are small , some great , some indifferent , either in regard of their subsistance or first essence , or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours : secondly , the efficient causes of the vtter ruine of estates are either inward , or outward , or mixt : the inward are to be fetched and conceiued in respect of the negligence , ignorance , and riot of princes which giue themselues ouer to all voluptuousnesse ; whereto may be added the factions , secret practises , ambitions , and desperate humors of subiects , with sundrie other occasions , all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine . the outwad causes are the stratagemes , armes , and force of the enemie . the mixt are such as participate of both , as are the rebellions of the people , treasons of particular men , put in execution by forraine ayd and force . since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three causes ; we are now to vnfold what maladies may infect , as well great and indifferent , as small estates ; and draw all within the compasse of inward , outward , and mixt causes . now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent , so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age , or by the violence of some not forseene cause . 4 returning then to our former diuision and well examining it , wee shall finde that small estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes ( brought in by force and violence ) then otherwise : in as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts , they are at the first incounter ouerset with the storm of his conquests ; in this maner the seueral signories of lombardy fel in subiection either of the duke of milan , or of the venetiās ; the free cities of thoscany became a pray to the duke of florence : the princes of africke to the king of fez-marocco , and algiers . 5 on the contrarie , great empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes ; either by ease & plenty , which customarily makes princes to swell with insupportable pride ; by voluptuous riot ( whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone ) or else by insolency and presumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselues much followed and reuerenced , all fit inticements to dispose a hart ( but indifferently generous ) to plot for his owne raising . nec quenquam iam ferre potest caesarue priorem , pompeiusue parem . then is it ( as one saith ) that caesar cannot brooke a superior , and that pompey stomaketh an equall . 6 meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two former , yet far lesse , since they hold the meane as the other the extreams , for they are not so vnfurnished of strength , as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them , neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth , as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty , or else abandon themselues immoderatly to delights & pleasures , or to transport themselues beyond the limits of reason . this is it that so long preserued the common weales of sparta & of venice , which euermore respectiuely intertained a meane and equality . the mixt causes of the ruine of estates are inward treacheries and outward force . treason hatched within an estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane empire . for a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon euery corner of his kingdome ; and sturring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity ( the nourse of vices in all estates and gouernments ) or with the opinion they haue conceiued of not being discouered till such time as their proiects meete with some good successe . these things happen sooner , when the prince is far off then at hand . spaine can witnesse it , which was so vnhappily betraied by count iulian , as it thereby fell into the hands of the moores . so was the empire of the mamelucks by the treason of caierbeius possest by selim emperour of the turkes . who would search more narowly into christendome shall finde that the ciuill wars of france minister more examples for proofe of this then is necessary . thus wee see that small estates are most to stand in feare of forraine force , since they haue not wherewitheither of or in themselues to be able to resist or to take breath : that the meane estates are alwaies lesse offended by outward force then the smallest , and more free from inward treason then the greatest . chap. ii. from what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered . 1 causes of the change of estates . 2 the ruine of estates is most answearable to their beginnings . 3 the rootes of common wealths how maintained . 4 security especially to be auoided . 1 i will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter , nor diue into the other efficient causes of the ruine of estates : for should i handle what might be farther said of this matter , i should wander too far frō the propounded subiect , and perhaps racke the argument beyond his due pitch . i will then tie my selfe only to the coniectures of the continuance or fall of estates , omitting other causes , as also all that may be referred to the iudgement of the heauens , the influence of the stars , and to their vertue ; sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof , as i will spare to search too far into it : though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vaine , and that those celestiall bodies moue not by chance , but rather by diuine order and disposition . againe , the errors of their ephimerides and the different supputation of the first masters of their profession , make the knowledge to be vncertaine and their so surely grounded maximes to afford contrarie resolutions . let vs not meddle then with the aspects of the stars , or the natiuities of estates , but regard and consider the effects of what is at our owne home without taking so high a flight . we say then that estates suffer either by the vnremoueable ordinance of god , or by the naturall course of time , wherewith in time they grow feeble , and change : or else by the wils of men , so vnstable and light , as they ordinarily breede an vniuersall alteration thorow out a whole estate and common-weale . we will only drawe our coniectures from naturall causes ( not to meddle with the iudgement of the diuine maiesty or mans inconstancy ) nakedly and simply to speake of them as neere and familiar , to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heauenly and most remote . 2 so then we are to thinke that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning . it is with them as with sensible creatures , which the more they hasten to arriue at the perfection of their being , the sooner also they faile and die : the contrarie is seene in those which with a slow and measured pase attaine to a more faire maturity and perfection : as for example , among beastes the horse , amongst trees the willow are of no long indurance : but those that ( as the hart and oliue ) make by degrees and slowly towards their ripenes , are likewise more lasting . we may say the like of empires and estates : for as we see them slow or swift in their increase , so are they more swift or slow in their ruine . haue not the french more then once conquered the duchy of milan and the kingdome of naples , and that as a man may say almost in a moment ? so haue they many times lost it and all in a moment : such conquests resemble torrents tumbling downe the mountaines , which in lesse then an hour , by reason of the great shoutes of waters they bring with them , become fearefull and dangerous ; when soone after in an instant , we see them fallen and shallow , so as a childe may wade thorow them without trouble or danger . now not to leaue this conquest of milan and naples , we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition : which to performe , i will set before you the manner how the spaniards conquered and held these prouinces . i finde it hath been by a long course of time , and infinite trauaile accompanied with all the paines and troubles , which those who set vp their rest vpon a conquest and resolue to abide out the wars , ordinarily indure . hence their labour hath taken such roote , as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands , howsoeuer they haue been oft times galled and put to their plunges . it is requisite then that empires haue their rootes to sustaine them , which must be deepe and sound , otherwise it is impossible they should long continue . now that they may be such , there is an especiall wisedome and many yeeres required . 3 the true rootes of an estate are the loue of the people towards their prince , the sincere and holy distribution of iustice amongst the subiects ; military discipline well policed and obserued by the souldiours ; honours , rewards , and benefits bestowed according to vertue and merit : that great men be not slightly set by , abased or contemned : that the common sort of people be intertained with all honest satisfaction : necessary prouisions for the maintenance of places of strength ; well husbanding of the treasure ; friendly intelligence with neighbour princes ; vncorrupt election of officers ; modesty in their proceedings : these are the very true rootes able to fortifie and make monarchies to flourish and raise them to eternity : which rootes can neuer proue setled spring , or send foorth worthy fruit , vnlesse they be planted in the soile of wisdome , aduice and industrie , and husbanded by the continuance of time . 4 it is often seene that great conquests and victories attained without losse or labour , so blinde the conquerour , as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good apparance , but are inwardly hollow and of fraile substance . they cause him to contemne his companions , and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories , but more the subdued people , whence ordinarily followeth , that the higher is his fortune , the neerer is his fall . wee haue straied sufficiently . it is now high time to returne to our principall discourse : and as we haue heretofore made it appeare that there are three sorts of estates ; so wee are now to vnfold in what ranck of the three the turke is to be bestowed . chap. iii. that the monarchy of the turke is comprehended within the number of great estates . 1 the substance of the ensuing chapters . 2 greatnesse of the turkish empire . 3 compared with the romaines . 4 the marueilous successe thereof inwarre . 1 from the diuision of estates deliuered by vs in the former chapter , this is to take his foundation , and by these causes wee are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest ; by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the other may vndergoe a change , either outwardly or inwardly , and in which rank of the three wee are to lodge the turke . some one perhaps will iudge this question superfluous and vnprofitable , seeing his renowne , his conquests , and his long rule doe but too much teach vs what he is : notwithstanding all this i should not thinke it besides the purpose a little to particularize the causes of his greatnesse . 2 the estate of the turke is held without question to bee one of the greatest and mightiest , as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth , as of his power : he is great because of so many prouinces reduced to his obedience ; and though he haue not so great a share in europe as the romaines sometimes had , he hath to counteruaile this , more aduantaged himselfe in asia and africke : for when the fortune of the romaines was at the greatest , and that they had their armes most at libertie , yet went they not beyond euphrates : it is very true , that traian went farther , but all the prouinces he subdued were soone abandoned by adrian his successor . the turke hath not done so , for he hath extended his dominion as far as tigris ; he possesseth all mesopotamia , or as they terme it diarbecke . from thence he reacheth as far as balsera or the gulfe of persia , which the romans neuer saw , and the gulfe of arabia . and to say better , all is his from the red sea to the cittie aden , which is in the maine continent beyond the mouth of this sea , more then an hundred and fiftie miles : he hath also inlarged his dominions toward the south far beyond aegypt . in africk all is his , except three places of strength which the king of spaine holdeth , pegnon de veles , oran , and melila : mauritania also is his , only three fortresses excepted , which are tanger , arsilla , and mazagan , conquered by the portugall : when i name africk , i intend that country commonly termed barbary , and not ethiopia . 3 hauing now seene the largenes of his dominions , we are next to discourse of his meanes and power . i finde that he hath better established the one and the other , then the romans euer did whē they were at their intirest greatnes , because in such a most large compasse of his country , there is no king or common weale beareth sway to distinguish his dominions : which was otherwise with the romanes , who had many such wedged in , within the continent of their empire . there is not any one of his subiects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth , or the land he tilleth , is his owne . they acknowledge to hold all they haue of him : he ordinarily intertaineth diuers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land . so as it must needes be granted that he is greater in his estates , meanes and power , then euer were the romans , for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered , as he can no waies vndergoe the troubles and wars which the romans endured at the hands of mithridate , the parthians , farnaces and others . moreouer , next europe the gaules are not his enemies . the cymbrians are his associats ; so as he fostereth such a tranquillity and obedience on all sides , as he amasseth inestimable treasure . 4 and more , ( a thing worth the noting ) in three hundred yeeres space since he began first to reigne , he hath receiued but foure notable ouerthrowes ( that excepted which he receiued the yeere past neere tauris ) but the romaines in lesse time receiued more and greater at the only hands of the carthaginians . in sum , there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories in so short a space , or to haue triumphed of the captiuity or death of so many kings and great princes , as the great turke ; or that haue with such happie successe and discipline so soone raised so mightie an empire as his is at this day . is it not a fearfull matter to heare it related that mahomet the second ( an infidel ) hath had such fauour of the heauens , as to haue beene able in the space of 32. yeeres raigne , to subdue two empires , vsurpe twelue kingdomes , and take by force two hundred cities ? that which affordeth the greatest cause of wonder , is , that all this hath succeeded in the very time when the art of military engines & fortifications were in their perfection , and wherewith we might haue armed our selues to withstand him . in conclusion , what shal we say of selim the first , who in lesse then foure yeeres space vanquished the mamelucks , subdued all syria , palestina , the red sea , a great part of arabia and all aegypt ? these are questionlesse goodly and notable tropheys of the turks greatnesse , but most dishonorable and dangerous for all christendome . chap. iiii. whether the empire of the turke draw towards an end . 1 the ottaman empire leaneth toward ruine . 2 the reasons are the bordering princes vpon the turkes estate , and their prouiding for their safety . 3 made wise by others harmes they stand vpon their defensiue war. 4 they are bridled by strong fortresses . 5 contrary arguments . 1 we haue discoursed as briefely as might be of the fall and ruine of estates , of their efficient causes , and vpon what coniectures a man might gather them . it is now time that we see and examine in like sort whether the empire of the turke be nere his end , and abatement of his greatnesse , according as a man may draw from coniectures it leaneth towards his declining ; and though the foundation heereof be built vpon reasons so cleere and euident as they are not to be contraried , yet will i alledge one that carrieth more apparence then all the other ; and that is , that the greatnesse of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruine of princes by him expelled , vanquished and made away one after an other , whilest he hath in the meane time triumphed of their estates and rich spoiles ; but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so fauourable issue as had the other : his ambition , heart , and courage will grow idle and languish ; whence in time will spring the ruine of his empire ; is he not already come to that passe ? the princes that confine vpon him , though more weake then he to bid him battaile , assaile , or defend , haue neuerthelesse so ordered their affaires and meanes , as they are able at this day to sheeld themselues sufficiently from his attempts . 2 amongst others the king of persia , doth he not so ballance his power as he hath giuen him many great ouerthrowes , and one lately ( as i haue said ) neere tauris ? the tartarians also hold him plaie and more prouoke him then he them ; and of late they got from him caffa a strong and wealthy towne ; moreouer whilest he was busied about the wars of persia the georgians took and sacked xistis ; but they were not able to hold it ; so as the turke hath repossessed himself of it . the muscouit doth not only defend himselfe from the incursions of the turks , but he oft times also skirmisheth with them , commanding as he doth aboue an hundred and fifty thousand horse . the king of polonia likewise more mighty then the muscouit , is so strong as he will not take wrong ; but is able rather at all times to repell the violence of his enemy . the house of austria together with the aid of the princes of germanie , hath wherewithall to make their party good and to oppose him : the venetians , vnited with italy and spaine ( which in such a case will not abandon them ) are likewise able enough to defend themselues and hold their owne . as for the king of spain , he is so mighty by sea and by land , both of men and mony , as he dareth vndertake himselfe to incounter the turke in battaile , much more to defend himselfe if assaulted . the king of fez is not anie way awed by him , and is more strong then he , at the least in africke ; which he approued to the common hurt of christendome by that ouerthrow and death of the king don sebastian of portugall , where so many christians miserably ended their daies . the last of those which abut vpon the turke is prester iohn , who hath hitherto behaued himselfe so honorably against him , as he hath neuer shewed any token of fearing his forces . so as being now vnable by reason of the concord & stout opposition of his neighbours , to gaine farther ground ; he must of necessity ( vnlesse god in regard of our sinnes be otherwise pleased ) begin to recoile ; and that greatnesse which he hath built vpon others ruines must decay and lessen ; since the matter which gaue the increase is on his part wanting . 3 there is yet an other point which fortifieth this opinion , and that is : that all such princes as confine vpon the turke , are by others example made more wise , aduised and considerat , then they were before the ruine of such as serued for a pray to the ottomans ; whereby they will discreetly looke to themselues how they courageously hazzard their persons or estates at one battaile : they will rather be content to stand vpon their defence , attending while time beget some apparent occasion , roundly and to the purpose to set vpon him . 4 againe , there are at this day so many fortresses , so strong and so well appointed , as they are in a manner impregnable , so as the turke is not like to finde the way so open as heereto fore he did to carry them : but if he should put himselfe vpon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one , it were as much as to become the author of his owne ruine . 5 neither ought any man in opposing this , alledge the losse of cypres , since it hapned not so much through the turkes power , as because of the distance of venice , which was to supply them with men and munition . a man may by a contrary argument say as much of the sauing of malta ( speaking according to humaine causes ) for it was not protected either by the forces within it selfe , or by the succor sent thither from other parts : but only because the iland was so far distant from constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receiue their prouisions and bee refreshed as was requisite , nor well imploie such as were sent thither . if it would please god that the turke might often make such voiages , he would prepare vs faire occasions to attempt the reuenge of the outrages christendome hath by him sundry waies receiued . chap. v. by what kinde of causes the empire of the turkes might most easily faile . 1 the power of the turke not to be easily ouerthrowne by outward causes . 2 the power of princes & estates bordering vpon the turke , as the persians , tartarians , moscouits , polonians , germans , venetians , spaniards , &c. 1 as wee haue at large intreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruine ; so are we now to come to that of the ottomans , as one of the greatest ; and examine by what inconueniences it may vndergoe a change . i am of opinion that this their so raised greatnesse can hardly decay by vertue of outward causes ; seeing the princes bordering vpon their estate , are euery one in particular weake to assaile them , as they might well doe if they were peaceably vnited . 2 this weakenesse presupposed , it followeth that it will proue a hard matter to ruine him by forraine force , whose strength and meanes it is requisit we examine to inlighten this opinion . first , those that confine vpon the turke next africke , are the king of fez , of marocco , and prester iohn : next asia , the sophi and the tartarians : in europe the duke of muscouy , the king of polonia , the emperour , the venetians , and the king of spaine . as for the king of fez he hath men enow , but small store of mony , so as he hath not the meanes or ability to maintaine a lasting war : againe , though i should suppose he were able to be at the charge , yet i finde him naked of other things necessarie to aduantage himselfe vpon the turke , such as are places of strength to forward his proceedings , and assure his retrait : so as he is like enough to come short of his aime : and if he should performe some worthy exploit in africk , doubtles the king of spaine his neighbour would soone be iealous of his good fortune . and in very deede this is not the point , for it is all one with christendome whether the king of fez be too strong for the turke , or the turke for the king of fez , since both are the christians enemies . as for prester iohn , all the world knoweth he hath enough to doe to defend himselfe against the turkes forces ; neither is it long since he wan from him all the hauens he had vpon the red sea , and amongst others that of archiech and mazzua : now for the sophi , if we search their histories we shall finde that the kings of persia haue alwaies had the worse of the turks , & among all other mahomet the second ouercame vsumcassan ; after him selim the first did as much to ismael whom he forced into the remotest parts of his country . tarmas also met with the like measure at solimans hands : and on the contrary we see that cudabenda hath had such a hand of amurath the third now raigning , as he hath often vanquished his armies , and now of late at tauris : and though he haue atchieued most worthy victories , yet hath he nothing aduantaged himselfe . in the turkes country , he hath not wan one fortresse of importance , or ought else that might counteruaile the charge of his wars : this hath succeeded in regard the soph●is strōg of horse , but vnprouided of foote , which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend . moreouer , to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon & other munition , all wanting to the sophi , who may well meete the enemy in the feeld and bid him battaile , but not pursue and assaile him if he retire into his fortres ; because of the aboue said defects of foot & artillery ; & though he were prouided of them , yet wants he the skill how to vse thē like others . the example of tauris approueth this sufficiently , for after he had this last yeere vanquished the armie of the turks , and slaine an hundred thousand men , he could neuer take the cittadell wherein the turks had drawne all their munition of war , and left aboue eight thousand men ; neither is there any newes hitherto that he hath taken it & expelled them thence . the tartarians are as ill stored with foote and artillery as the persians , and except that they last got of the turke , it may be truly said that they neuer did him harme . as for the moscouit which abutteth vpon him ( as doe also the polonians ) they haue in regarde of the turke small store of men , horse and mony ; so as the most they can doe is to hold their owne . now concerning the germans , they haue lost much of their ancient reputation by the ouerthrow they receiued of the turke at exechium , buda , and sundry other places ; so as they are glad to keepe home without daring to assaile him . the venetians haue beene so vnfortunate , as they haue neuer moued war against the turke but it hath succeeded contrary to their hopes : and which is the worst of all , they neuer consented to anie treatie of peace , but they did forgoe some important member of their estate . and to say the truth mahomet the second got negropont , scutari , and groya ; baiazet tooke from them lepanto and modon , and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with s. moore ; in an other treaty they left to soliman napoles of maluasia : selim the second wan by force the i le of cypres , duleme , and antiuari : and though these be heauy losses , yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable then if they had beene neere hand , so ought they now more then euer aduise how to strengthen themselues against the turke by their braue resolution and prouision , which they may better doe now then euer , in regard their forces are more liuely , and the members of their common-weale more vnited and compact then heeretofore . now we are to come to the king of spaine . let vs say that he hath store of mony and all prouision necessary to be imploied in the wars ; that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alwaie in pay ; that hee hath the commodity extraordinarily to leuy so many men as may make the turke stand in feare of him ; that his forces by sea are good and strong , and that he can increase them at his pleasure ; that he hath store of victuals , commodity of hauens , for conuenient landing in his countries ; and in a word that he is so mighty , as that neither he standeth in awe of the turk , neither dareth the turke assaile him : yet this power and hability could neuer hitherto be imploied to the purpose against the common enemy of christendome . not for want of will or inclination thereto , but because he is hindred by the reuolt of flanders . the suspition also and feare of his neighbours armes , would neuer permit him to display an vnited and firme power against the turke : he hath rather beene enforced to wast his time and meanes vpon the particular preseruation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other , in stead of courageously exploiting them against the turkes to the good and consolation of christendome . but our sinnes are they especially which haue depriued vs of the glorious fruits and aduantages we might haue gained by so worthy a power . in conclusion , we must grant that since the empire of the turke cannot receiue any damage or alteration by outward causes ( which are wont to ruine estates ) it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixt effect it ; yet before we discourse of these two meanes i hold it not amisse a little to examine , whether his estate may be by maine and open force ouerthrowne . chap. vi. that it is not an impossible thing for the christians with open force to vanquish the turke . 1 the turke is not inuincible . 2 examples of their sundry ouerthrowes . 3 a comparison of their good and ill successe in battailes . all proofes that they may be conquered . 1 the conclusion of the argument of the former chapter , is , that the turke cannot by way of open force receiue harme or ruine of importance ; because of the mighty power and meanes he hath of his owne . but heereby is not inferred that therefore christian princes should faile of courage or hope , to goe thorow with their affaires to his preiudice ; rather otherwise placing their confidence in the almighty , they are to hope better then euer , for the reasons i shall heereafter alledge ; by the handling wherof i hope to proue that so far is he from being inuincible , as on the contrary he may be easily vanquished as many experiences may resolue vs. 2 we haue elsewhere said that baiazet the first was ouercome and taken aliue at the battaile he fought at mount-stella against the great tamberlain , vnder whose hands he died a captiue . carambeius bassa of amurath the second , was discomfited by ladislaus king of polonia in the valley of mount hermus : he came with an intention to reuenge himselfe of the losse and dishonor that the bassa of notalia had receiued at the hands of iohn huniades , which at one time recouered from him a part of seruia and all moldauia : but instead of performing this he became himselfe prisoner of that king , and had almost al his army put to the sword . baiazet the second sent calibeius and querscogles his sonne in law into asia against caitheus soldan of aegypt with a great army to reuenge the intertainment the soldan had giuen zizimus his brother , whom he had succored with men and mony against him : his army was ouerthrowne neere adena a towne of cilicia , where the turke receiued the most notable ouerthrow that was euer giuen him . for of an hundred thousand which presented themselues in the battaile , the third part remained not aliue ; yet those that performed this noble execution , were scarce one against sixe ; but the aduice of two italians and of the mameluckes so furthered the affaires of caytheus , as he spied a time to charge the turkes when they least expected it . soliman left the siege of vienna with losse of 60000. men which were there slaine , hauing giuen twenty generall assaults to the towne . the yeere following he assembled an other army of 200000. men , with intention cruelly to reuenge the harmes he had receiued ; but the emperour charles the fift went to meete him , with such forces , as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leasure to saue his baggage . don iohn of austria naturall sone of charles the fifth in the yeere 1571. got at lepanto that so renowned victory of the army of selim the second ; this hath since made them walke ( as they say ) with the bridle in their hands , and confesse they had passed too rash a iudgment vpon the power of the christians either by sea or by land : i omit to speake of the prowesse & noble acts of scanderbeg against the turkes , and how many times he ouerthrew the commanders of amurath the second : and valiantly recouered albania the place of his birth whereof he and his predecessors had beene depriued by that tyrant , neither will i again cite the examples of iohn huniades or mathew coruin , who in a manner with a handfull of men opposed and discomfited the turkish forces , nor of the portugals , though they haue at sundry times assailed the turk neere the red sea , barred him of passage , and rid him of the meanes of farther issuing out of the mouth of that sea . what should i speake of the tartarians , who but lately tooke from him taurica chersones ( called at this day perocopsky ) if the reports which come from those partes be credible ? 3 such as haue beene curious in the search of the turkish history haue obserued , that in the space of two hundred and fourescore yeeres they haue fought with their neighbours thirty and sixe battailes , whereof they haue only gained eighteene and lost the rest . these are all signes and successes whereby a man may conclude that they are not inuincible , and that their fortune hath beene ballanced betweene gaine & losse , so as we may beleeue , if god for our offences did not busie the forces of christian princes elsewhere then against the turke , where he hath had the ouerthrow once , he had had it thrice : by all these foregoing examples we may collect that this proud enemy hath not his head so hard as it may not be broken , or else sorely brufed . and though christian princes are not of power sufficient apart and of themselues to take him to taske , yet may they doe it by ranging themselues to that vnion and concord , as that there be amongst them but one common fortune . this being granted ( as i presume it shall ) we are to vnfold how they may purchase his ruine . chap. vii . why the leagues among christian princes are commonly of small effect . 1 leagues are concluded for the respect of honour and profit . 2 the inequality of gaine bringeth a difficulty to the conclusion of leagues . 3 christian princes the farther they are from the turke , the lesse haue they feare of dangers wherewith other more neere him are possessed . 4 no man vainely exposeth himselfe to an apparant danger but where an euident commodity inuites him . 5 while each striues to protect his owne frontiers from the turke , others are neglected . 6 the inequality of aide begetteth a contention who shall command most in the wars . 7 remedies against such difficulties and calamities . 1 there are many respects and causes , which customarily make the leagues of christian princes altogether vneffectuall , which may appeere to some a matter of hard disgestion , and for this cause i hold it requisite particularly to cleere it . it is a receiued maxime that all the actions of princes are vndertaken for two principal causes , honor and profit : that the consideration of honor often masqueth vnder the pretence or good of their affaires : we will then only meddle with profit which we may tearme interest . 2 now this interest ( a common maske for all faces ) cannot be a like equall betweene christian princes with one consent vndertaking the war against the turke : for they diuersly confine vpon the common enemy , and this diuersity breedeth a difference also betweene their resolutions and interests ; and though this be an inconuenience not in the case in handling to be contemned , yet the principall difficulty dependeth not heerein : it rather consisteth wholly in the concord of the treaty of the league , and this concorde is hard to be wrought for these following reasons . 3 all these princes are not neighbours of the turke in the same equallity : some are more strong then other : this difference of strength affordeth to some a commodity to defend themselues or offend him with their owne forces : others are weake , and consequently exposed to the incursions and spoiles of the turke . it is an infallible maxime , that the farther princes are from the danger , the lesse forward are they to stir , prepare for the war , or contribute to the charge or meanes requisite for the vndertaking thereof with the like feruency and affection as they would if they saw themselues so neere to the mischiefe , and that there were apparant danger . 4 againe , that prince which seeth no great profit or interest in such an enterprise doth lesse regard it then he whō necessity inforceth to stand vpon his garde , and feare that tyrants inuasion . moreouer , if the princes vnited to this league and combination shall once know that they shall get little or smally aduantage their estate , it is not to be expected ( when they enter into it ) that they will bring with them that courage , resolution , affection , and forwardnesse as the businesse would require . see then how the disposition of the interest makes the beginning difficult , the proceeding and issue vncertaine , by reason of the diuers alterations and varieties which accompany euery associated prince , sutable to his passion or affection ; whereupon would vndoubtedly follow an impossibilitie of establishing this league , and vnion vpon so sure foundations , as that the beginning may be good , the middle and end better : since the effect without vnion amongst many agents remaineth euermore as nothing or nothing woorth . 5 we fall then farre short of our reckoning , vnlesse wee can minister some remedy to the diuersities of this interest and profit . this inconuenience is attended on , and counterpeized by an other of as great or greater consideration : and this is the interest and particular consequence of the neighbourhood that euery one indifferently hath with the turke ; by the which indifferency , each one according as his feare is , will desire the warre may be vndertaken to his aduantage . as for example , spaine feareth the neighbourhood of algiers ; venice of albania : hence will grow that the league taking effect , the venetians will striue that the forces of the league may be imployed in the leuant , the spaniards toward the south : so as it will not be possible to manage the enterprise to both their satisfactions . 6 there is yet another inconuenience that our princes wil not be able by an equall portion to enter into the league , inasmuch as one wanteth meanes to contribute thereto in money more then a sixt part , another a fift part ; others that haue no money , will contribute men or ships ; others more mightie in both , will vndertake halfe or a second . these are all the portions by whose assemblie a league may be formed . of their indifferencie groweth yet another difficultie or inconuenience ( as we list to tearme it ) and that is , that whosoeuer contributeth the halfe , would likewise haue in his handes ( as the greatest and mightiest ) all the power and swaie . in which it will follow , that the other shall not vndertake or performe ought but by his aduice , direction , and assistance : if he will make a stand , they are not to go forward ; if he list to march elsewhere , then their desires carrie them , they must follow him : if his affaires presse him to alter his resolution and minde , and that hee will retyre to his home , they are constrained to doe the like , so as all their charge , paines , and holy intentions , are vtterly ouerthrowne , and they oftentimes rest exposed to the iniurie and reuenge of their dangerous neighbour , against whom they iointly rose in armes . 7 these are , to say the trueth , considerations and inconueniences of that value and consequence ( measuring them by their parts , and not by the whole ) as we must conclude that none but god is able to tune this league to an agreeing harmony , which we are most humbly to craue at his almightie hands with a strong faith , a true amendment of life , and a more perfect charitie then this age affoordeth . chap. viii . the defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeere 1537 : and 1571. 1 the conditions , successe and errors of the league in anno 1537. 2 of that of 1570. 3 how a league may be established to auoide the formerly committed errors . 1 continuing the matter of the former chapter , it will not be beside the purpose , by the way to touch the defects which were found in two the most memorable leagues that haue beene made in our time betweene the princes of christendome . the first resolued vpon in the time of pope paul the third , betweene him , the emperour charles the fifth , and the venetians . it was then , beside the conditions , agreed vpon that the emperour and the knightes of malta should set foorth 82. gallies , the venetians a like number , the pope 36. only . andrew doria was chosen generall of the emperours army , vincentio capelli of the venetians , and marco grimani patriarch of aquileia of the popes , hauing for his lieutenant paul iustinian ; and for the maine land seruice ferdinand gonzaga was chosen generall . moreouer it was concluded betweene the princes , that whatsoeuer they should get from the turkes with the forces of the league either in greece or dalmatia should be left to the venetians as in recompence of their so great expence and losse that they should suffer by warring vpon the turke . soliman seeing the forces of the league assembled , made hast to lanch his gallies foorth into the maine . such was his diligence as they were within a few daies in a readinesse and went for candy , where they made some hauocke , but of no great moment . after these roades barbarossa made a stay of al the army in the gulfe of larta , there to attend the christians which came onward , but so slowly as the season passed without performing ought , or without that they once met together , and that which was yet worse , our men inforced by tempest , retired themselues to corfú whence they set foorth . barbarossa followed them as far as antipaxo within an hundred miles of corfú , but perceiuing them to prepare themselues to fight he speedily retired to the gulfe of larta , so as our army was resolued for dirachium , otherwise called drazo or la velona , but that being a dangerous harbour for the gallies , they turned their force vpon castell nouo which they carried by assault : an exploit ( to say the truth ) of that small importance ( respecting their charge and prouision ) as it wan them as much dishonor as profit , the towne being won the spaniards seazed themselues of it . the venetians disputed it as a thing appertaining to them according to the articles of the league ; but it was to small purpose , wherefore quieting themselues since it was not to be remedied they tooke an occasion thereupon to shift themselues of the league . the yeere following soliman recouered castle nouo with the losse of those spaniards which kept it , who were all put to the sword , those which escaped induring a most miserable seruitude : and though the peace treated by the venetian was somewhat disaduantageous , yet they indured that more willingly , then to be otherwise dealt with then was agreed vpon : other causes might be alleaged , as the ceasing of trafficke and many other discommodities , besides the impouerishing of their estate , all which necessarily attende the intertainement of armies . 2 the last league of the yeere 1571. yeelded not much better fruits , for after a great charge , and the gaining of so famous a victorie , no other good redounded thence to the christians , but that the turke made an assay of their valour ; and by little and little the confederate forces diuided themselues : the venetians departing vpon occasion of almost the same iealousies , as in the former league . 3 it will be now time to deliuer how all these inconueniences may be stopped , and the league become firme and durable , without consideration of any particular interest , to the end that euery one may voluntarily in deuotion consent thereto to the glory of god with a free heart , and an vndaunted magnanimitie : in which case , the conditions being rather free then forced on either side , we may reape thereby fruits woorthy and honorable : these two leagues heeretofore mentioned , hapned in a time so dangerous for the venetians , as it was more then necessarie that the christian princes ( though not interessed ) should vnite their forces to assist and protect the other . so the one standing in the water vp to the throat , and incompassed with danger , and the other on the contrary , free from feare of perill , they entred into the couenants and conditions of the league , not such as they ought to haue beene to make them lasting ; but such as were presented to men standing in neede of them , who inforced by necessitie , might not refuse them , to the end to cleere themselues of a neere threatning mischiefe . leagues wil then be durable when they shall be stablished at a time whē men are free and exempt from all constraint ; and not to attend as they do , till the turke affright one of the confederates , and that he be alreadie come into the field so strong both by sea and land , as the venetians or some other of the confederates are already by him assailed . at such a time to seeke a remedy by their hastie assembling , is the way to imprint a certaine feare in their people ; and make them flocke together in the fold as sheepe in presence of the woolfe . it is requisite then that the league be contracted at leisure , in a time of peace , and in a season when the associates may be inuited , not by any vrgent danger , but voluntarily , and with such an alacritie of heart , as they may vnite their persons , their meanes , their powers , and their courages all together to offend the common enemy . chap. ix . a league which may be treated without danger of the former defects . 1 the qualities of perfect leagues . 2 the conditions of leagues , and what each of the confederates is to attempt vpon the enemie . 3 the commoditie of them so concluded . 4 aduise for a generall contribution against priuate gaine . 5 that the danger we stande in of the turke , is greater then many suppose , and that therefore those that are most remote , ought willingly to contribute . 6 what should mooue vs to ioyne in league against the turke . 1 now then to reape the woorthie and honorable fruits of a holie league & association , we are to remooue the defects and inconueniences which haue made the former leagues prooue abortiue : and the better to effect it , it is necessary that their treaties be voluntarie : that princes voluntarily ioyne their powers & meanes to one end , though by different courses : so as growing to capitulations , the one doe not aduantage himselfe vpon the straightning of the others affaires . this is it which equalling the conditions , will cause euery one to partake in the enterprise , without all suspect or particular iealousie : it is not enough that the defects of these leagues be discouered , if they make vs not more wise in the framing of other to come : to the end we may with all deuotion and sinceritie builde them on a strong and vnmooueable foundation ; and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding . 2 it is not required that to establish this league and make it fructifie , the confederate forces should assemble in one place , but at one time : my meaning is , that our princes must bee readie to assaile the enemie at once in diuers places , and that euery one bende his forces towards parts which are neerest to him , so to begin the warre to some purpose : as for example , the spaniards should inuade the parts of algiers : the venetians and the pope , of albania : the gallies of sauoy , malta , and florence , should continue their ordinarie courses against the turke ; vnlesse they would ioyne with the venetians or the king of spain : the polonians should set vpon walachia : the emperour and princes of germany vpon hungary . 3 questionlesse if each of these did in this manner assaile him , their courage and force would be the greater , as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprise , without any respect of paines or expence , hoping all would redound to their honour , profit , and particular securitie : which they cannot expect from the other leagues , and this is that which hath in part made them defectiue . the enemie that should be so many waies set vpon , would be constrained to diuide his forces , which consequently would become lesse able to protect him , on all sides whersoeuer he should be assailed . first , the gallies of malta assisted with some other , and scouring ( as they might ) the leuant seas , would keepe in such awe those that guarde alexandria and rhodes , as they would not dare to peepe out : againe , if spaine would inuade barbarie , the gallies of algiers would be sure to keepe home : so as the strength of venice ioyned with that of the church , would doe what they list , and would meete with no encounter by sea which they should not easily ouermatch : especially if at the same time the emperour and the king of polonia , would warre likewise vpon the turke . we haue an example of the times which verifieth our position . when soliman vndertooke the warre of hungary , against charles the 5. andrew doria generall of his galleies , with a very small armie troubled all the leuant , tooke by maine force coron and patras , and harrowed all those seas without controule or encounter of the enemies : whence followeth , that if the christians would as i haue saide , at one instant set vpon the turke , they would force him no doubt into a narrow straight . 4 there is one point that would make the enterprise easie , more forcible and lasting , but it would hardly be disgested , and that is to draw all christian princes which confine not with the turke , to contribute vnto it . all these suppose themselues free from danger and make no reckning of others sufferings , in whose behalfe they thinke they should not cōtribute , as those that were like to haue but the charge and the other the profit . in a word , all catholike princes are so wedded to this particular interest , which is euer more differing and vnequall among them ( as hath beene before alledged ) as the league would neuer be thorowly concluded or of long continuance , this must of necessity be forgotten , and the only desire of the exaltation of the church of god must be that which must range them to the necessarie point , whereof they need not trauell to seeke examples out of their owne houses , which if they would but imitate all would succeed wel , to inuite them to it i wil alledge one . the principall aime of the league set on foote by godfrye of buillion , and of so many princes and nobles some greater then himselfe which accompanied him , was not placed but vpon the particular honour of the maiesty of god , whereabout euery man emploied himselfe with such zeale and deuotion , as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great king or emperour , they drew together an army of an hundred thousand horse and three hundred thousand foote , wherewith they subdued almost all the east . 5 leauing apart all these considerations let vs come to the opinion that some haue of their being far from danger , and we shall finde peraduenture that they are neerer thereto then they are aware . when amurath came first out of asia into europe was not hungary ( which is now subiect to the turke ) farther off from the confines of the ottomans empire then are now the countries of saxony or of bauiers , then they of franconia , the swichzers and the french ? yet we see it now most in his possession . 6 shall we then say because we haue a mountaine before vs , or a riuer betweene vs , or some estate that seemeth to shelter vs , that therefore we should hold our selues happy and in security , and not be touched with others danger and misery ? no surely . for if we be christians we ought not only to haue compassion of others calamities , but afforde them also our good and charitable assistance : moreouer he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present , findeth himselfe oft times beguiled ; we are to haue such prouident care of what is present , & to come , that we may leaue to ours the same assurance we wish to our selues , to the end to preserue them by this prouidence from such danger as they might incur after vs. and though we should not carry that regard of our children and posterity , and that the consequence of our estate did not spur vs on to such an enterprise , shall there remaine in vs so little courage and charity , loue and deuotion to the glory of god , from whom we haue our being and of whom wee hold our powers , as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard , and expell thence such as intrude themselues into it and pollute it ? wherefore serue all those heapes of treasure which the princes of lombardy amasse , one in enuy of an other ? whereupon will those so mighty princes of germany and the imperiall townes spend their reuenues and incomparable riches ? what occasion can all of them finde more goodly then this to attaine to an immortall glory ? it is then for the inlarging the kingdome of christ that we must imploy all we haue , and for the deliuerance of those sacred places ouer which those barbarous infidels tyrannize , to redeeme so many thousand of poore christian slaues which suffer and grone vnder the yoake of that inraged dogge , to giue life to an infinite number of christians , to reuenge their wrongs , to punish the iniurires & blasphemies which that tyrant and his helhounds haue breathed out against the glory of god , his holy name and church . and if humaine appetite must needs be an actor in this theater , it would be an easie matter for great princes that send their forces , to vrge this consideration in the capitulations , that they should haue in fauour of their contributions part of the spoiles and conquests that they might happily obtaine . againe , if the loue of the seruice of god had a working in them , they might vndertake in person the generall conduct of the army , or command part of the confederat troupes . godfrey a poore prince , in comparison of those that now sway christendome , alienated the duchy of bouillion for so godly a voyage . stephen count of chartres did the like with his estate , as did also many great men , who had no other motiue thereunto then the enterprise of the holy land . charles the seuenth king of france , did he not succor the emperour of constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him vnder the conduct of the greatest personages of his kingdome ? and must we sit idle with crossed armes whilest the cruell flames of this infidels tyranny burne and consume the houses of our neighbours ? chap. x. wherein consist the greatest forces of the turke . 1 whether the ianizzars be the chiefe strength of the turke . 2 that horse are more necessary in the war then foote . 3 the progresse of the turke before and after the institution of the ianissars . 4 victories gotten by the horse . 5 ouerthrowes giuen by the enemies horse to the christians . 6 conclusion that horse in seruice excell foote . it seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the turke attribute his chiefe strength to the band of ianizzars , as the only sinew of his power : and amongst other reasons wherewith they striue to fortify their oppinion , this is one . it hath hapned many times that the army of the ottomans hath beene so hardly laide to , as the battaile hath been in a manner lost , yet haue they gathered strength and kept themselues on foote , yea they haue gotten the victory , and all through the vertue and valour of these legionaries . 2 machiauel discourseth vpon this point , and as one much passionate holdeth himselfe to this argument , that foote are more necessary then horse in all exploites of war , and he laieth his principall foundation vpon the example of certaine romaine captaines , which ( saith he ) to breake into , and force the enemy on foote haue caused their men at armes to alight from their horses and fight on foote against them : it is a poore argument and of small importance , since that for once that they made their horsemen alight , an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horse backe if they had the commodity of horse ; he which is on horsebacke may when he please alight , but a footeman cannot get vp on horsebacke when hee will. this mony shall serue to pay machiauel whom i leaue to proceed forward . i affirme , that in a ranged battaile , and in the plaine field the forces of the turke consist and principally rely on the horse . the proofes are cleere and at hand , as the processe of this discourse shall discouer . 3 first no man is ignorant of the great victories the turk got long time before the institution of the ianizzars . amurath the second the yeere 1420. was he that first ordained them : yet ottoman had before that taken sebasta ( a city of importance in asia ) where he slew aboue an hundred thousand of his enemies . orcan his sonne had dispoiled the emperour of constantinople and of bithinia at seuerall worthy incounters . amurath the first had passed asia into europe , with his forces tooke gallipoli , filipoli , and andrinople ; and we may thinke that he did not obtaine those victories without dangerous and bloudy incounters : he conquered also diuers other cities and wan many other victories of the princes of seruia and bulgaria , whom he compelled to stoope vnder the yoake of his obedience . baiazet the first ouercame sigismonde king of bohemia , and put all those french to the sword which charles the 6. of france sent to his succour . calepin his sonne vnderstanding that sigismond had raised an army , vpon the newes of the ouerthrow giuen by tamburlaine to baiazet , to salue his losses went to meete him at salumbezza , and so valiantly incountred him , as his whole army was cut in peeces , so as it cannot be said that the victories the turke hath obtained since the institution of ianizzars haue beene either greater or more memorable then the former , rather they were the steps to these other happy atchieuements . the beginning of things containe in them the efficient vertue of the whole . this disputation might proue great and might ballance on either side , if i did not ad waight to one of the opinions . i will then say , that before the institution and seminary of ianizzars , the turks receiued but one memorable ouerthrow at mount stella at the hands of tamburlan the most strong enemy that euer they assaied , and that after their institution they receiued more and greater , as were those of vsumcassan , of iohn huniades , of mathew coruin , of the mamelucks , of the great scanderbag , of don iohn of austria , of the kings of persia and others . 4 the second proofe which i will produce to fortifie the truth of my proposition , is , that all such as haue had the better hand of the turkes , euer had it by the meanes of their horse , wherein they did exceed the enemy in number and strength , as we haue so often saide of the persians and of the mamelucks . the great sophi ●●mael , had he not vanquished selim the second with the strength of his horse , if when he did set vpon the rier-ward , where the turke was in person , the thunder of his cannon had not so affrighted the horse , as they ran away with their masters , to the disordering of the whole armie ? the onely thing that ouerthrew the fortune which the persian had almost alreadie in his possession . cudabeuda king of persia , hath many times ouercome the turkish forces , by the onely strength of his horse , whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other . the hungarians in like sort haue many times put the turkes to the woorse by their fight on horsebacke . 5 the third and strongest proofe of my assertion , is , that all the harmes we haue receiued of the turke , haue come by his horse , as at nicapolis , at salembezza , at varna , at the riuer of moraua , at exechium , at buda and elsewhere . 6 and if it euer hapned that the ianizzars recouered the battaile halle lost , it is to be imputed to this , that they were reserued for the rierward ; so as it was easie for fresh men to repell those which were already weakned and tyred . but i thinke no man but will grant , that if instead of the ianizzars they had beene as many horse , they had performed as much . as on the contrarie , if the other had kept in store some fresh troupes of horse , as the turkes , they had dealt otherwise with them , and kept them well enough from bereauing them of the victorie . in conclusion , the horse are they that defeat the enemie , and become masters of the field , that prepare the way for the foote to the beseeging of townes , and giue them time and leisure to force and take them . chap. xi . where the turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him either by sea or by land . 1 examples of sea victories . 2 the goodnesse of our hauens . 3 the number of our skilfull mariners . 4 the christians farre beyond the turkes in maritime matters . 5 the turkes horse fearefull to the christians , vnprofitable at sea . 6 that the turkes are easily to be ouerthrowne at sea . 1 there were much matter for doubt and disputation vpon this question , if reason and experience did not cleere it : for experience we haue it fresh in many accidents ; which instruct vs that an attempt by sea , would be lesse difficult to vs , and more hurtfull to the turke , for the reasons and examples which i will deliuer . as often as our forces haue to some purpose put themselues into the leuant seas , they haue beene euermore victorious , as at metelin , at cafalonia , at preuesa , at scorsolari . if any one opposing me obiect the ouerthrow of our armie at gerbes , which hapned about the same time , let him read the discourse of the historie , ( as is requisite ) and he shall finde that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy , but rather through our owne fault ; insomuch as our armie could not take their opportunitie to dislodge in due time ; but suffered themselues to be besieged by the hardnesse of the season , and by tempests ; which so disordred them as it was easie for the enemie to force them . grimani generall of the venetians , let slippe the occasion of a woorthy victorie , when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enemie , as he might well haue done at sapienza . but on the contrarie , as often as the emperour charles the fift set foorth an armie to some purpose , the turke durst neuer looke abroad ; as when he vndertooke the voyage of tunis and of algiers , where neuerthelesse he encountred many disasters , he brought before tunis seauen hundred saile , and before algiers fiue hundred onely . thus much for experience . 2 now we must see what reasons we haue in store to prooue that we may more easily assaile the turke by sea then by land . among others this may passe , that our seas are more frequented , and our ports more rich and safe then those of the leuant . for first ( set aside constantinople ) there is not thoroughout their obedience , any one porte that may be equalled to those of venice , lisbone , siuill , antwerp , london , amsterdam , lubec , or danske , &c. and very few also that may be compared with those of naples , genoua , villa-franca , nessina , palermo , ragusa , marsseilles , tolon , bourdeaux , new-hauen , rochelle , and rouane , &c. 3 it is cleere then that we surmount the turke not only in numbers of portes and good harbers for the retraict and shelter of our armies , but also in mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas . moreouer , there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affoordeth greater plentie of men then that of genoua , dalmatia , sclauonia , venice , candye . againe , there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better proofe for sea affaires , then are those of marseilles . i omit to speake of the catalonian , the portugal , the biskayan , the english , the norman , the hollander , and zelander , all people marueilous skilfull in nauigation . 4 i would willingly demaund , what it auaileth the turke to possesse a large and spacious sea bordering country , if it remaine vnhabited ; neither were it enough if it were : for the exploits of maritime warre , it is requisite they be valiant , resolute , and such as can endure trauell and paine . alongst all the coast of africke , the turke hath not one hauen of account besides algies . in all egypt hee hath only alexandria , and dalmatia , at the least which are held in any consideration . in soria , take away saffo and pamphilia , those neere tirus , ephesus , cicize , and the rest so celebrated in ancient times , remaine at this day namelesse , and buried in their owne ruines . they haue gallipoli which is of no great traffike : they haue that of constantinople , whereof they steade and vaunt themselues most of all : moreouer , all these ports are not so good or so conuenient as ours , either if we consider the forme , or the commoditie of situation , nor so well stored with artillerie as ours are . 5 againe , fighting by sea , wee shall not need to feare their horse , whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror vnto vs ; relying as they doe vpon them , as the principall nerue of their forces ; but as for foote , we excell them in number and valour : 6 for conclusion , it is most certaine , if we could once depriue the turke of the vse of the sea , he would be soone ouerthrowne by land with a sufficient number of gallies , which might be maintained in the archipelago : we should cut him off from all trafficke with egypt and soria , as also keeping certaine gallies in the straight and chanell , we should hinder the commerce of asia and constantinople , which he could not be long without , so that by continuing this manner of warring vpon him without intermission , we should by little and little heaue him out of the whole empire of greece , where there would be enough to satiate the greedie ambition of the christians . chap. xii . of the inward causes whereby the empire of the turkes may come to ruine . 1 of inward causes by which an estate may be ouerthrowne . 2 the occasions of the change of the turkish empire , are , a defect that may happen of the ottoman race : 3 the hatred , contempt , and disobedience of the turkes officers and seruants : 4 the discorde that may arise betweene his children about the succession . 5 that it is hard now to stirre vp and maintaine dissention amongst them . 6 another occasion may be the iannizzers libertie and insolencie towards their master : 7 another the rebellion and reuolt of his countries and their gouernours . 1 as we haue before deliuered by what outward causes the empire of the turks may soonest receiue an alteration , so we are now to handle the meanes whereby he may be inwardly weakened , and whether by the infirmities which are begotten in other estates , that of the ottomans may be likewise distempered and corrupted ; of the inward causes of this corruption , some concerne the heads and ministers , others are deriued from among the people . i will then produce some few examples noting the errors of such as sway a soueraigne authority , and so orderly come to the other , to collect thence what may serue to procure the turkes ruine . 2 that which would fall most to our purpose would be if the great turke should die without heires of the true line and race of ottoman . for in such a case it is likely the beglerbyes , vizirs , bassas , sangiacks , and the greatest personages of the turkish nation , would each one for himselfe indeauour to possesse himselfe of whatsoeuer he could most easily compasse . 3 the second cause would be , if in regard of his cruelty , or negligence , the prince should giue his subiects occasion to hate and contemne him : but the mischiefe would proue yet greater if it did arise from the cowardlinesse or sloath of the prince . for his strength consisting wholly in the great numbers of his souldiours ordinarily intertained , how could he possibly containe such mighty armies in deuotion and quietnesse ; if he did not daily busie them in the exercise of war ? and lesse how could so many nations be held within compasse of feare and obedience without the feare of ordinary armes ? it is not to be doubted then if they had a prince who were giuen ouer to idlenesse and a loose life , or that they discried him to be a coward & slothfull , but they would be forward to draw their swords against him , and thence worke their owne destruction . baiazet the second had proofe of this , for abandoning himselfe to all pleasures and resoluing vpon a priuat and retired course of life , to spend his time in reading good authors ; his sonne sought his destruction , and in the end fauored by the ianizzars depriued him of his life and kingdome . for though baiazet repressed the first violence of his sonnes ambition , yet he was at the last forced by the ianizzars not only to pardon his rebellion , but also to send him with an army against his other sonne accomat , who supposing his father ment to prefer selim before himselfe , who was the elder , caused the noses and eares of his fathers messengers most shamefully to be cut off ; the enormity of this fact ill digested , and worse interpreted was that which cancelled the greater faults of selim , to take vengeance of this last & lesse outrage ; whence it came to passe in the end that these same ianizzars possest selim of the empire , who soone after put to death his vnhappy father . amurath the third now raigning hauing withdrawne himselfe from the actions of war to liue in ease and quiet hath lost much of his souldiours and seruants ancient obedience , zeale , and obseruance , such as they were wont to carry towards their soueraignes greatnesse . the bassa of cairo who had the gouernment of aegypt , named ragusei , being summoned ( according to their emperious custome ) to make his appearance at the port , flatly refused to come thither and made his escape with a world of treasure which he had amassed by extorsions and pilling of the people , during the time of his administration . the ianizzars which were at those times appointed for the wars of persia , would not once moue a foote to march thitherward : but as halfe in a mutiny said plainly they would not any more go vpon any enterprise vnlesse the great turke their lord would vnchamber himselfe from among his concubines , and vndertake the voyage himselfe in person , so as he was constrained by vertue of giftes and increase of pay to win them to the war. moreouer of late after the ouerthrow of tauris , the turke hauing appointed a new generall for the succoring of his vanquished army , and reenforcing of such as remained within the cittadell ; all the commandements he could lay vpon him , could not preuaile so much with him as to get him to march forward , rather he grew to capitulate with him , and that finished , he made the most adoe in the world to muster vp twenty thousand men , who refused likewise to goe to that war , otherwise then vpon all the aduantages they could deuise to demand : not like subiects and slaues , but as if they had beene neighbours , allies , and confederates . these breaches already made in the obedience they were wont to render thir lord and master , may perswade vs that they will easily rebell , vpon the first occasion that shall present it selfe without respect of their princes greatnesse , or obseruation of their ancient military policy . 4 the third occasion might befall , if there were many brethren to debate the empire after the death of their father , as it hapned between zizimus , and baiazet , sonnes of mahomet , and betwene acomat and selim , sonnes of baiazet . this baiazet was fauoured of the ianizzars against his brother . zizimus was vpheld onely by the aid of the soldan of cairo , and king of persia . selim likewise was borne by the ianizzars and bassas , and acom●nt by forraine princes : they incountred and fought cruel battailes , whose victories brought the whole estate in danger : baiazet and selim remained conquerours , each one his party by meanes of the great numbers of men that accompanied them , and of the valour of the souldiours of the old bandes which serued vnder them . notwithstanding all these opportunities which god so to the purpose prepared , not one christian prince once stirred , or so much as made offer to arme in fauour of the weaker of those which contended : which would no doubt haue entangled both of them in a long and dangerous strife , enough finally to haue ruined or much decaied the house of the ottomans , when they should haue called such an one to their succour as would haue rather blowen then quenched their fires . amongst all the princes of christendome there was none but the great master of rhodes , which sent some supplies of artillery to zizimus , and which after receiued and defended him from the hands of baiazet , when he was driuen to retire himselfe to his protection . 5 these domestique quarrels cannot now become so strong ( especially such as might happen betweene brethren ) as then they might , considering that the mamelucks , who as neighbours might haue fomented and giuen intertainment to such differences , are now extinct and their name no more mentioned . they were in their time the only emulators of the turkes glory : rhodes hath made an exchange of her fortune , and is now in the power of this tyrant . cypres beareth the like yoake . these two ilands affoorded an especial commodity to sow dissentions among the turks , to fauour and succour one of the parties . 6 the fourth cause would easily arise from the presumption and head-strong rashnesse of the ianizzars , likely enough to attempt and execute as much as sometime did the pretorian bands of the romans , who made slender account to fill the empire with slaughters and massacres , wherein many emperours ended their daies : they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the senat , and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne towards their country . the like may we hope or expect from the ianizzars , that they will one day assume to themselues the same power and learne to performe the like , whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled baiazet the second to resigne the empire to selim his sonne . they did almost the like when soliman caused his sonne mustapha to be murthered ; for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space , crying out they would know the cause of that yong princes death . in the end by the deuise of the bassa and with stoore of coyne , he wan to him foure thousand of them , who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged . 7 the fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie , or of ministers swaying the supreame authority & credit in places of gouernment . gazeles gouernour of soria made way for a reuolt of the like quality , as did also acomat generall of aegypt : gazeles , assisted by the mamelucks , arabians and those of rhodes , endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great turke : but he was discouered by cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy . this man either for feare ( as looking into the danger of the enterprise ) or for enuy of his companions greatnesse , reuealed all to his master soliman , who presently dispatched against him faratha bassa , by whom he was vanquished in battaile . acomat had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt , for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof , so was he as speedily discouered , and in an instant suppressed and slaine , without hauing thriued ought in his dessignes . chap. xiii . of the mixt causes . 1 what are the mixt causes . 2 how estates are ouerthrowen by mixt causes . 1 in this third booke we haue at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes , estates may be indangered : now we must speake of causes compounded , of the one and the other , which , to discourse more intelligibly , we tearm mixt , which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an empire and to bring it , either by an vniuersall or a particular change , to a lamentable ruine . these mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad , and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an estate and subuert it . 2 one of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy , or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises ; or to tearme it better , the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour , and by the meanes and authority of their neighbours . this hapneth in a twofold manner , when the subiect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise , or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some coulered pretence , or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression . finally , this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one , two , or three , of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the estate . chap. xiiii . how particular persons may be gained . 1 how his people are to be prouoked to rebellion . 2 how his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained . 3 these courses at the first not succeeding , are to be oftner attempted . 4 wary proceeding is requisite , lest those that manage the businesse incurre danger . 5 to whom such businesses are to be committed . 1 it resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished : we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person , by whose assistance it may take effect . we must presuppose that this person is either priuat or publike , the priuat persons are those which suffer themselues most often to be corrupted by mony , and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or bro●kings , but if they be publike persons of rancke and authority , either in regard of the greatnesse of their family , or managing of state affaires ; there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other : yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse , and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours , for the execution of the des●●gne ; then is it that we bring them to dare any thing , especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receiued indignity . it is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers . 2 but if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the estate , we must warily make choice of our time , sound them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their prince , either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice , or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoake and seaze themselues of the estate . these are the meanes and occasions , which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our christian princes , smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy ; putting on ( as they say ) the foxes skin when the lions is wanting . the displeasure and ielousie which faratha bassa conceiued against hebraim bassa because he saw him raised by soliman to greater honour and estimation then himselfe , so depriued him of all reason , as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him , he began to plot a rebellion , but discouered he was forthwith put to death : the selfe same occasion was the ouerthrow of pirrus and mustapha raised by soliman . in our time in the court of amurath the third now raigning , these ielousies and hart-burnings haue beene great betweene mahomet and mustapha , and since that betweene the same mustapha and cicala ( who hath outstript him ) and all for fauour of their master . if these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great prince of christendome , they had beene fit matter to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barbarous people . 3 now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants empire ; yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismaied ; remembring that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commotions so extraordinary , are feeble , and that that wisdome sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth . i am of opinion , that when we incounter with instruments that are not without ambition , courage , and a thirst of reuenge ; after we haue felt and sounded them once , twise , or thrise , we shall in the end make a breach in their loyalty and obedience ; especially if we set before them ( be it vnder a true or false title ) the certaintie of some mightie succour , whereof they may see the preparatiues ; for so they will the more couragiously attempt against the life and estate of their prince . 4 moreouer it is not to be forgotten , that when such practises shall be discouered by the turke , and that he shal see the christians more diligent then hitherto they haue beene , to sound the affections of his seruants and subiects : he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them , as euen that will make him offer them some hard measure . this distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspitions and hard conceits in his seruants , and subiects , either for the managing of affaires , or for the danger that the opinion of loyaltie incurreth , when it hath to deale with such a distrustfull and suspitious prince , as this would prooue : so as by little and little it would worke vs out some occasion fitting our purpose , especially , if whilest this practise were hatching , and on foote , the children of the turke should take armes one against the other , or that during their fathers life , they should dispute the possession of the empire : for the ice being already broken , there would be a more easie passage and better successe , then if it had not beene taken in hand at all . 5 but because an especiall iudgement , patience , and much wisedome are requisite in such businesses , we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts , to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportunities and times , to sow these dissentions , and that there be not want of mony to distribute amongst this people , which are farther in loue therewith , then any other nation the world affoordeth . chap. xv. how the people of the turke may be wrought from his obedience . 1 how the turkes christian subiects are to be wrought to rebellion . 2 a place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebell . 3 the vaine fooleries of their alkoran are to be discouered . 4 how bookes written to that purpose may come to his subiects hands . 5 how such bookes are to be composed . 6 what fruites are to be hoped from their reading . 7 exhortation to the ianizzars . 8 the conclusion of this worke . 1 the turke hath two sorts of people subiect to his empire ; one followeth the sect of mahomet ; the other the truth of the gospel of iesus christ . the mahometanes are quiet , as those which being of one and the same law , haue no cause to make any tumult . the christians cannot stirre , as being ouer topped and awed by a greater power then their owne , which curbeth them so , as there is no better way to moue them to rebel , then to make them handle ( as it were ) and see the assurance of an approching succour , to prouide them of armes and all other furniture for the wars : for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least shew once to mooue , whilest they haue the enemie ouer them alwaies in a readinesse and armed , who would in a moment confound them , especially being as they are naked and vnprouided of armes , offensiue or defensiue . selim the second doubting the woorst , by the counsaile of occhially , caused al the christians inhabiting the sea coasts , to retire themselues farre vp into the maine land , to the end the presence of the christian forces should not incourage them against him , as it hapned at such time as andrew dorea atchieued the enterprise of patras and coron . 2 if the christians should euer vndertake the like dissigne they ought to take especiall heede how they vnship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand , since they were likely enough by their strength to choake at the first the reuolt of the christians , for so mighty are they in horse , and of such speed and dexterity , as they would in an instant beare downe before them whatsoeuer should oppose them . wherefore it would be better to enter by albania and by places mountanous and of difficult accesse , where the horse are not able to serue , as in the plaine . this is as much as we ment to say of such christians as are vnder the turkes dominions , all which i will imagine want not will to rebell , if the princes of christendome would furnish them of meanes . 3 now let vs see what way were best to be taken to prouoke the mahometans to reuolt , and to fill their countries with troubles , and ciuill dissentions . if we will but consider how their religion is fraught with vntruthes , their alcoran abounding in follies , we shall finde it easie to picke matter enough out of it to set them together by the eares , especially if wee doe but disperse among them certaine bookes fit to conuert them , or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they obserue , composing them for europe in the sclauonian tongue , and for asia in the arabian . 4 but because it would be hard to conuey these bookes into the countries of the turkes obedience but that they would soone perceiue the deuice and speedily remedy it : it were best beginning far off , in the indies and in the parts of asia and africke held by the portugales : for because of the trafficke which is great in those parts many turkish marchants and others ariue there from all quarters . they come to mozambique in africke , to zophala and quiloe in asia . they descend also as low as the moluccas , cochien , goa , dia , ormus , and sundrie other parts appertaining to the crowne of portugale . these bookes also might be dispersed abroad in the countrie of the gentiles , which are friends and confederates of the christians , as in calicut , zailan , cambeia , and others ; and the like at oran , arzilla , and in other parts of arabia subiect to the crowne of spaine and portugall , and in all other parts of europe which border vpon the turkes . 5 there must be a care had that the title of the booke be so coloured , as it doe not at the first discouer the intent of the author , but rather that it intice them to peruse it with a certaine curiosity and shew of pleasantnesse and delight . it is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with any disputations or subtill point against the articles of their beleefe , but that contrariwise it be full of tales and matter fit to moue laughter ; yet with some well conueied passage which may by the way discouer or make them doubt of the fables of their alcoran . 6 the turkish marchants or others , into whose hands this booke should light , would cōfidently reade it in those parts where the turke is not obeied . and though perhaps they durst not aduenture to carry it with them , yet the impression and substance of what they had read would remaine fixt in their mindes , so as they would after relate it as newes to their friends and families , in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be diuulged thereabout , whence would spring a longing in others which should come and goe into those countries to buy & reade them : in this manner the alcoran in processe of time would grow out of credit amongst them , and those things which with scruple and obseruation they collect thence , would turne to a iest and subiect of laughter , whence there could not but insue some schisme and diuision amongst them , for the most religious men of their sect and the most interested would oppose themselues wilfully to maintaine it . neither would it make for the purpose to make mention in any sort of our sauiour christ , much lesse to let it be knowen that the author thereof were a christian : for the immortall hatred they beare to that name would make it odious , and would bring it at the very first to be reiected . it should rather be so contriued as if it came from some other of an other sect , wherein a man might borrow the hand of the inhabitants of cambaia , of india , of arabia , or of persia . in this manner it would be better welcome and would carrie with it more estimation and authority . 7 it were well also if there were framed and published a remonstrance to the ianizzars in the sclauoman tongue , whereby might be signified vnto them their originall , and howe in their infancy they were cruelly halled from the bosomes of their christian fathers and mothers , conueyed into turky , and there nusled vp in the sect of mahomet , not hauing iudgement as then to distinguish of good and euill ; that they are the pillers to vphold this tyrant which hath set his foote vpon the throat of their fathers liberty , and which keepeth them as slaues vnder the yoake of a dishonorable and barbarous seruitude . this would auaile much , especially if there were thereto annexed an exhortation to take better knowledge of themselues , and hence , forward like good children to imbrace and free their miserable parents , which daily lament them ; and aboue all to perswade them to returne to the deare bosome of the church wherin they were first , regeuerate and which attendeth with spread armes to receiue them , entertaine them , and saue them . 8 these things well caried would in the end make the turke so suspitious , and vntractable , as he would offer occasions enow to his people hencefoorth to rouse vp themselues , and better aduise how to shake off that cruell and vnsupportable yoake which so mightily oppresseth them , and to fashion themselues to a more happy and secure life for the quiet of their consciences and saluation of their soules . this is that whereof the christians ought diligently to bethinke themselues ; and not to worke one an others ruine and destruction , as they spare not to doe against the expresse commandement of god , which so often recommendeth vnto vs loue and charitie towards our neighbours . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a06425-e890 1494. guicciard . li. 1. zingis . 1397. 1477. 1513. 1515. 1480. 1482. 1494. 1499. 1516. 1524. mac. disput . lib. 2. c. 12. at the riuer of trebia , where sempronius was slaine , at the lake of thrasimenus where flaminius was ouercome , and at cannas where terentius varro and l. paulus lost the field . maharbals saiing to hannibal , was , vincere seu hannibal , sed victoria vti nescis . liu. dec. 3. l. 2. 1532. ●●●●t . lib. 3. c. 8. rer. hisp . ri● neap. l. 2. reg. hisp . 〈…〉 de christ ●oem . lib 1. lin. dec . 3. li. 7. 7. annal. v. c. 545. olymp. 144. dis . l. 2. c. 24. 1281. 13. ap. 1516. aemil. lib. 3. tuicae . 1765. 1526. paul. iou. lib. 7. de vita vir . ill . 1584. & 1585. veget. lib. 1. c. 15. eo enim impenditur labor & periculum aplirisque vnde emolumentum & honos speratur : t. liu. plut. lib. 2. c. 5. & 6. li. 1● . c. 4. gel. lib. 5. cap. 6. 1396. 1409. 1444. 1541. 1538. 1560. 1537. 1570. vid. l. 3. c. 7. 8. 9. princ. c. 18. 1539 iou. lib 8. hist . at the mountaine hemus . at varna . 1444. 1570. male imperatur cum vu●gus regit duces . senec. trag . 1396. 1526. sabel en. 10. l. 9. 1471. non min●r est virtus quàm quaerere , part● tueri . 1560. 1572. 1560. 735. 800. 1263. 1476. 1579. the christians ministred occasion to the ottamans of their owne ouerthrow 1 the first occasion : the sloth of the emperours of greece . 2. occasion : enuie of the emperours of greece . about anno 1290. 3. occasion : the ciuill wars of the emperors of greece . iohn paleologus . 1363. 4. occasion : the separation of the greeke church from the roman . 5. occasion : the turkes aide called into italy . 1498. 1540. 1543. 6. occas . the plurality of the christian princes . 1408. 1412. 1438. 1521. 1526. 7 occasion : the diuersity of opinions in religion . 8 occasion : treason and disloialtie . 9 occasion : the turkes peace with some christians , to warre with others . 1514. 1536. 10 occasi●n : christian princes warring one vpon an other . 1360. 1363. veg. lib. 3. c. 26. 1538. qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat vincitur sine ferro . liu. l. 3. c. 26. 1557. 1542. 1444. 1498. 1516. antiently called nicoplu a city of epirus . 1572. 1525. 1522. guic. lib. 14. 1523. about 1364. 1524. 1503. guicc . lib. 6. 1444. 1481. 1522. 1469. & 1407. 1474. 1583. 1585. iou. lib. 20. capienda saepius seius in malis praeceps via est . sencca . agamem . 1481. 1482. this was licurgus rule to the lacedemonians . p●ut . vitu . lic . notes for div a06425-e10110 vid pluit in their liues . about 1499. 1520. iou. l. 13. about 1529. notes for div a06425-e11890 anno 714. 1516. 1570. 1565. quae non prosunt singula , multa ●uuant . 1474. 1397. 1439. 1440. 1482. 1529. 1537. 1570. 1532. alcut 1088. 1363. machiauels opinion for foote . 1305. 1363. 1396. 1397. 1580. vid. 181. 1511. 1482. 1513. plato redivivus, or, a dialogue concerning government wherein, by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern, an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own, with the causes and remedies ... neville, henry, 1620-1694. 1681 approx. 350 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 239 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2003-11 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a52855 wing n515 estc r14592 12939759 ocm 12939759 95842 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking 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(eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a52855) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 95842) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 363:7) plato redivivus, or, a dialogue concerning government wherein, by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern, an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own, with the causes and remedies ... neville, henry, 1620-1694. the second edition, with additions. [17], 293 p. printed for s.i. and sold by r. dew, london : 1681. written by henry neville. cf. dnb. errata: p. [14]. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. page 268 has print missing in filmed copy. pages 136-end photographed from princeton university library copy and inserted at end. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng prerogative, royal -england. political science -early works to 1800. great britain -politics and government -1660-1688. 2003-07 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2003-08 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2003-09 john latta sampled and proofread 2003-09 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2003-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion plato redivivus : or , a dialogue concerning government . wherein , by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern , an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own , with the causes , and remedies . non ego sum vates , sed prisci conscius aevi . pluribus exemplis haec tibi mysta cano. res nolunt male administrari . the second edition , with additions . london , printed for s.i. and sold by r. dew , 1681. the publisher to the reader . courteous reader , all the account i can give thee of this piece is ; that about the middle of october last it was sent to me , accompanied with a letter without a name , and written in a hand altogether unknown to me , though different from the character of the dialogue it self , and the argument . the letter was very short ; and contained only , that the writer having the fortune to meet with this discourse ( of which he denied to be the author ) he thought it very fit to be sent to me , to the end if i thought it could be of any advantage to me , and no prejudice , i might publish it if i pleased , and make my best of it . when i had opened it , and perceived that it treated of government , and of the present times ; i supposing it to be something of the nature of those scurrulous libels which the press spawns every day , was extreamly displeased with my servant , for receiving in my absence , and in these dangerous days , such a pacquet , without taking any account or notice of the messenger who brought it : 'till he , to appease me , assured me , that the bearer did look like a gentleman , and had a very unsuitable garb to a trapan ; and that he did believe he had seen him often at my shop , and that i knew him well . when i had begun to read it , and found no harm , i was resolved to peruse it in the company of a gentleman , a worthy friend of mine ; who , to his exact skill and learning in the laws of his country , hath added a very profound knowledge in all other literature ; and particularly , the excellence of platonick philosophy . when we had joyntly gone through it , he was clearly of opinion , that although some might be angry with certain passages in it , yet the discourse reflecting upon no particular person , was very uncapable of bringing me into any danger for publishing it ; either from the state , or from any private man. when i had secured my self against damnum emergens , we went about the consideration of the other part of the distinction of the schools , which is lucrum cessans , and i made some objections against the probability of vending this dialogue to profit ; which , in things of my trade , is always my design , as it ought to be . my first fear in that behalf was , that this author would disgust the reader , in being too confident and positive in matters of high a speculation . my friend replied , that the assurance he shewed was void of all sawciness , and expressed with great modesty : and that he verily believed that he meant very faithfully and sincerely towards the interest of england . my next doubt was , that a considerable part of this treatise being a repetition of a great many principles and positions out of oceana , the author would be discredited for borrowing from another , and the sale of the book hindred . to that my friend made answer , that before ever oceana came out , there were very many treatises and pamphlets , which alledged the political principle , that empire was founded in property , and discoursed rationally upon it : amongst the rest , one entituled a letter from an officer in ireland , to his highness the lord protector , ( which he then shewed me ) printed in 1653. as i remember ; which was more than three years before oceana was written : and yet , said he , no man will aver that the learned gentleman who writ that book had stollen from that pamphlet . for whosoever sets himself to study politicks , must do it by reading history , and observing in it the several turns and revolutions of government : and then the cause of such change will be so visible and obvious , that we need not impute theft to any man that finds it out : it being as lawful , and as easie for any person , as well as for the author of oceana , or that pamphlet , to read thucidides , polybius , livy or plutarch : and if he do so with attentiveness , he shall be sure to find the same things there that they have found . and if this were not lawful , when that any one person has written in any science , no man must write after him : for in polity , the orders of government ; in architecture , the several orders of pillars , arches , architraves , cornishes , &c. in physick , the causes , prognosticks and crisis of diseases , are so exactly the same in all writers , that we may as well accuse all subsequent authors to have been but plagiaries of the antecedent . besides this , the learned gentleman added , that oceana was written ( it being thought lawful so to do in those times ) to evince out of these principles , that england was not capable of any other government than a democracy . and this author out of the same maxims , or aphorisms of politicks , endeavours to prove that they may be applied naturally and fitly , to the redressing and supporting one of the best monarchies in the world , which is that of england . i had but one doubt more , and that was an objection against the title , which i resolved at the first not to mention , because i could salve it by altering the title page . but since i had opportunity , i acquainted the gentleman with it : and it was , that certainly no man would ever buy a book that had in front of it so insolent and presumptuous a motto as plato redivivus ; for that he must needs be thought not only vain in the highest degree , but void of sence and iudgement too , who compares himself with plato , the greatest philosopher , the greatest politician ( i had almost said the greatest divine too ) that ever lived . my counsellor told me that he had as great a resentment of any injury done to plato as i , or any man could have . but that he was hard to believe that this man intended to compare himself to plato , either in natural parts or learning ; but only to shew that he did imitate his way of writing , as to the manner of it ; ( though not the matter ) as he hath done exactly . for plato ever writ these high matters in easie and familiar dialogues , and made the great philosophers , and learned men of that age ; as simias , cebes , timaeus , callias , phaedon , &c. yea and socrates himself , the interlocutors , although they never heard any thing of it till the book came out . and although talking of state affairs in a monarchy must needs be more offensive than it was in the democracy where plato lived . and therefore our author has forborn the naming the persons who constitute this dialogue ; yet he does make a pretty near representation and character of some persons , who , i dare swear never heard of this discourse , nor of the author's design . this convinced me , and made me suffer the title to pass . so that i have nothing more to say to thee , courteous reader , but to desire thee to pardon the faults in printing , and also the plainness and easiness of the style , and some tautologies : which latter i could easily have mended , but that i thought the author did not let them pass out of neglect , but design : and intended that both they , and the familiarity of the words and expressions , suited better with his purpose of disposing this matter to be treated in ordinary conversation amongst private friends , than full periods and starch'd language would have done ; which might have been impropriety . the next request i have to thee is , that if thou dost believe this discourse to be a very foolish one , as it may be for ought i know ( for i am no fit iudge of such matters ) that thou wilt yet vouchsafe to suspend thy censure of it for a while , till the whole impression is vended : that so , although neither the publick nor thy self may ever reap any benefit or profit by it , i may be yet so fortunate by thy favour as to do it . which will make me study thy content hereafter in something better ; and in the mean time remain , thy friend and servant . errata . pag. ii. lin . 4. for we r one . p. 16. l. 26. ' for sphynx r. oedipus . p. 45. l. ult . r. iussu . p. 64. l. 24. r. endeavested , p. 105. l. 7. r. ●eirotonia . p. 124. l. 9. for of r. or . l. 26. r. the mending . p. 134. l. 24. for or r. and. p. 209. l. 9. for of r. or , p. 221. l. 7. for ●is will r. his writ , p. 222. l. 27. r. most monarchies , p. 243 , l. 24. for is r. by an . political discourses and histories worth reading . 1. the works of the famous nicholas machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence , containing , 1. the history of florence . 2. the prince . 3. the original of the guelf and ghibilin factions . 4. the life of castruccio castracani . 5. the murther of vitelli , &c. by duke valentino . 6. the state of france . 7. the state of germany . 8. the discourses on titus livius . 9. the art of war. 10. the marriage of belphegor , a novel . 11. nicholas machiavel's letter , in vindication of himself and his writings : all written in italian , and from thence newly and faithfully translated into english. in folio , price bound , 16 s. 2. i ragguagli dj parnasso ; or advertisements from parnassus , in two centuries , with the politick touchstone , written originally in italian , by that noble roman trajano boccalini . englished by the earl of monmouth : in folio price bound 8 s. 3. the history of the affairs of europe , in this present age , but more particularly of the republick of venice , written in italian , by battista nani , cavalier and procurator of st. mark : englished by sir robert honiwood , knight ; in folio , price bound 12 s. 4. the history of the government of venice , wherein the policies , councils , magistrates , and laws of that state are fully related , and the use of the balloting box , exactly described : written in the year 1675 , in octav. price bound 3 s. 5. the history of the turkish empire , from the year 1623 , to the year 1677 , containing the reigns of the three last emperours , viz. sultan morat , sultan ibrahim , and sultan mahomet 4th , his son , the 13th emperour now reigning : by paul rycaut , esq late consul of smyrna . in folio , price bound 14 s. 6. the present state of the ottoman empire in 3 books , containing the maximes of the turkish polity , their religion and military discipline , illustrated with divers figures . written by paul rycaut , esq late secretary to the english ambassadour there , and since consul of smyrna . the fourth edition , in octavo , price bound 5 s. him for near two moneths , had certain necessary occasions , which called him for some time into the country . where he had not been above three weeks , before he heard , by meer accident , that the gentleman of venice was fallen dangerous sick of a malignant feaver . which made him post away immediately to london , to assist and serve him in what he might . but he found him almost perfectly restored to his health by an eminent physician of our nation , as renowned for his skill and cures at home ; as for his writings both here and abroad : and who besides his profound knowledge in all learning , as well in other professions as his own , had particularly arriv'd to so exact and perfect a discovery of the formerly hidden parts of human bodies , that every one who can but understand latine , may by his means know more of anatomy than either hypocrates , or any of the ancients or moderns did , or do perceive . and if he had lived in the days of solomon , that great philosopher would never have said , cor hominis inscrutabile . this excellent doctor being in the sick mans chamber , when the other english gentleman , newly alighted , came to visit him . after some compliments and conversation of course , they begun to talk of political matters , as you will better understand by the introduction , and by the discourse it self . the first day . the introduction . english gentleman . the sudden news i had of your sad distemper , and the danger you were in , has been the cause of a great deal of affliction to me , as well as of my present and speedy repair to london , some weeks sooner than i intended : i must confess i received some comfort to hear at my arrival of your amendment , and do take much more now to find you up , and as i hope recover'd ; which i knew would be a necessary consequence of your sending for this excellent physician , the esculapius of our age , it being the first request i had to make to you , if by seeing him here in your chamber i had not found it needless . for the destiny of us english-men depends upon him , and we either live or dye infallibly , according to the judgment or good fortune we have , when we are sick , either to call or not call him to our assistance . noble venetian . i am infinitely obliged to you , for your care of me , but am sorry it has been so inconvenient to you , as to make you leave your affairs in the countrey sooner than you proposed to your self to do : i wish i might be so fortunate in the course of my life , as to find an opportunity of making some part of an acknowledgment , for this and all the rest of your favours , but shall pray god it may not be in the same kind ; but that your health may ever be so entire , that you never need so transcendent a charity , as i now receive from your goodness : and as to this incomparable doctor ; although , i must confess , that all the good which has happen'd to me in this country , as well as the knowledge i have received of persons and things , does derive from you ; yet i must make an exception , as to this one point ; for if i can either read , or hear , this gentleman 's excellent writings , and the fame he worthily injoys in my country , would have made it inexcusable in me , to implore the help of any other ; and i do assure you , that , before i left england , it was in my ambition to beg your mediation towards the bringing me into the acquaintance and favour of this learned person , even before i had any thoughts of becoming the object of his care and skill , as now i am the trophy of both . doctor . well , gentlemen , you are both too great to be flatterers , and i too little to be flattered , and therefore i will impute this fine discourse you both make about me , to the overflowing of your wit , and the having no object near you to vent it upon but me . and for you , sir , if my art fail me not , the voiding this mirth , is a very good sign that you are in a fair way to a perfect recovery . and for my countryman here : i hope whilst he has this vent , that his hypocondriack distemper will be at quiet , and that neither his own thoughts , nor the ill posture of our publick affairs will make him hang himself , for at least this twelve months : only , gentlemen , pray take notice , that this does not pass upon me , nor do i drink it like milk ( as the french phrase it ) being mindful of what a grave gentleman at florence replyed to a young esquire , who answered his compliments with , oh , sir , you flatter me , i prencipi s'adulano i pari vostri si coglionono ; that last word i cannot render well into latin. english gentleman . well , doctor , we will not offend your modesty : the next time we do you justice , it shall be behind your back , since you are so severe upon us . but you may assure your self that my intention of recommending you to this gentleman , was for his own sake , and not for yours : for you have too many patients already , and it were much better , both for you and us , that you had but half so many : for then we should have more of your writings , and sometimes enjoy your good conversation ; which is worth our being sick on purpose for . and i am resolved to put my self sometimes into my bed , and send for you , since you have done coming to our coffee-house . but to leave this subject now , i hear you say , that this gentleman is in a perfect way of recovery ; pray is he well enough to hear , without any prejudice to his convalescence , a reprehension i have to make him ? doct. yes , yes ; you mav say what you will to him , for your repremands will rather divert than trouble him , and prove more a cordial than a corrosive . eng. gent. then , sir , pray consider what satisfaction you can ever make me , for the hard measure you have used towards me , in letting me learn from common fame and fortune , the news of your sickness , and that not till your recovery ; and for depriving me of the opportunity of paying the debt i owe to your own merit , and to the recommendation of those worthy persons in italy , who did me the honour to address you to me . and this injury is much aggravated by the splendour of your condition , and greatness of your fortune , which makes it impossible for me ever to hope for any other occasion to express my faithful service to you , or satisfie any part of the duty i have to be at your devotion . to be sick in a strange country , and to distrust the sincerity and obedience of — noble ven. pray , sir , give me leave to interrupt you , and to assure you , that it was not any distrust of your goodness to me , of which i have had sufficient experience ; nor any insensibleness how much your care might advantage me ; much less any scruple i had of being more in your debt ; which if it had been possible for me to entertain , it must have been thought of long since , before i had received those great obligations , which i never made any difficulty to accept of . it was not , i say , any of these considerations , which hindred me from advertising you of my distemper ; but the condition and nature of it , which in a moment depriv'd me of the exercise of those faculties which might give me a capacity of helping my self in any thing . but otherwise i assure you that no day of my life shall pass , wherein i will not express a sence of your favours , and — doct. pray now , sir , permit me to interrupt you ; for this gentleman , i dare say , looks for no compliments ; but that which i have to say , is ; that the desire you signified to me , to give you some account of our affairs here , and the turbulency of our present state , will be much better placed , if you please to address it to this gentleman whose parts and studies have fitted him for such an employment ; besides his having had a great share in the managing affairs of state here , in other times : and really no man understands the government of england better than he . eng. gent. now , doctor , i should tell you , i pari miei si coglionono , for so you your self have baptized this kind of civility ; but however , this is a province that i cannot be reasonably prest to take upon me , whilst you are present , who are very well known to be as skillful in the nature and distemper of the body politick , as the whole nation confesses you to be in the concerns of the natural . and you would have good store of practice in your former capacity , if the wise custom amongst the ancient greeks were not totally out of use . for they , when they found any craziness or indisposition in their several governments , before it broke out into a disease , did repair to the physicians of state ( who , from their profession , were called the seven wise men of greece ) and obtain'd from them some good recipes to prevent those seeds of distemper from taking root , and destroying the publique peace . but in our days , these signes or forerunners of diseases in state are not foreseen , till the whole mass is corrupted , and that the patient is incurable , but by violent remedies . and if we could have perceived the first symptoms of our distemper , and used good alteratives , the curiosity of this worthy gentleman had been spared , as also his command to you , to give him some light into our matters ; and we unfortunate english-men had reposed in that quiet , ease , and security , which we enjoy'd three hundred years since . but let us leave the contest who shall inform this gentleman , lest we spend the time we should do it in unprofitably , and let each of us take his part ; for if we speakall , it will look like a studied discourse fitted for the press , and not a familiar dialogue . for it ought to be in private conversation , as it was originally in the planting the gospel , when there were two sorts of preaching ; the one concionary , which was used by the apostles and other missionaries , when they spoke to those who had never heard of the mysteries of christian religion , possibly not so much as of the jewish law , or the history of christ : the duty of those was to hear , and not reply , or any way interrupt the harrangue : but when the believers ( called the church ) assembled together , it was the custom of such of the auditors , to whom any thing occurred , or ( as s. paul calls it ) was revealed , to interpose and desire to be heard , which was called an interlocutory preaching , or religious conversation ; and served very much to the instructing and edifying those who had long believed in christ , and possibly knew as much of him as their pastor himself ; and this is used still amongst many of our independent congregations . doct. i have ( besides the reason i alledged before , and which i still insist upon ) some other cause to beg that you will please to give your self the trouble of answering this gentleman's queries ; which is , that i am very defective in my expressions in the italian language ; which though i understand perfectly , and so comprehend all that either of you deliver , yet i find not words at hand to signifie my own meaning , and am therefore necessitated to deliver my self in latin , as you see . and i fear that our pronunciation being so different from that which is used in italy , this worthy person may not so easily comprehend what i intend , and so be disappointed in the desire he hath to be perfectly instructed in our affairs . noble ven. really , sir , that is not all ; for besides that , i confess your pronunciation of the latin tongue to be very new to me , and for that reason i have been forced to be troublesom to you , in making you repeat things twice , or thrice . i say besides that your latinity , as your writings shew , and all the world knows , is very pure and elegant , which it is notorious to all , that we in italy scarce understand : gentlemen there never learning more latin , than what is necessary to call for meat and drink , in germany or holland , where most of the hosts speak a certain franck , compounded of dutch , latin , and italian . and though some of us have latin enough to understand a good author , ( as you have of our language ) yet we seldom arrive to speak any better than this franck , or can without study comprehend good latin , when we meet with it in discourse . and therefore it is your perfection in that tongue , and my ignorance in it , that makes me concur with you , in desiring this gentleman , to take the pains of instructing my curiosity in italian . eng. gent. i shall obey you in this , and all things else , upon this condition , that both you and the doctor will vouchsafe to interrogate me , and by that means give me the method of serving you in this : and then that you will both please to interrupt and contradict me , when you think i say any think amiss , or that either of you are of a different opinion , and to give me a good occasion of explaining my self , and possibly of being convinced by you , which i shall easily confess ; for i hate nothing more than to hear disputes amongst gentlemen , and men of sence , wherein the speakers seem ( like sophisters in a colledge ) to dispute rather for victory , than to discover and find out the truth . doct. well , all this i believe will be granted you ; so that we have nothing to do now , but to adjourn , and name a time when to meet again . which i , being this gentlemans physician , will take upon me to appoint , and it shall be to morrow morning about nine of the clock , after he has slept well , as i hope he will , by means of a cordial i intend to send him immediately . in the mean time , not to weary him too much , we will take our leaves of him for this night . noble ven. i shall expect your return with great impatience , and if your cordial be not very potent , i believe the desire of seeing you will make me wake much sooner than the hour you appoint . and i am very confident , that my mind aswell as my body , will be sufficiently improved by such visits . it begins to be darkish , boy light your torch , and wait on these gentlemen down . both. sir , we wish you all good rest and health . noble ven. and i , with a thousand thanks , the like to you . the second day . doct. well , sir , how is it ? have you rested well to night ? i fear we come too early noble ven. dear doctor , i find my self very well , thanks to your care and skill , and have been up above these two hours , in expectation of the favour you and this gentleman promist me . doct. well , then pray let us leave off compliments and repartees , of which we had a great deal too much yesterday , and fall to our business , and be pleas'd to interrogate this gentleman what you think fit . noble ven. then , sir , my first request to you , is , that you will vouchsafe to acquaint me for what reasons this nation , which hath ever been esteemed ( and very justly ) one of the most considerable people of the world , and made the best figure both in peace , treaties , war , and trade , is now of so small regard , and signifies so little abroad ? pardon the freedom i take , for i assure you it is not out of disrespect , much less of contempt that i speak it : for since i arrived in england , i find it one of the most flourishing kingdoms in europe , full of splendid nobility and gentry ; the comliest persons alive , valiant , courteous , knowing and bountiful ; and as well stored with commoners , honest , industrious , fitted for business , merchandise , arts , or arms ; as their several educations lead them . those who apply themselves to study , prodigious for learning , and succeeding to admiration in the perfection of all sciences : all this makes the riddle impossible to be solved ; but by some skillful sphynx , such as you are ; whose pains i will yet so far spare , as to acknowledge , that i do in that little time i have spent here , perceive that the immediate cause of all this , is the dis-union of the people and the governours ; the discontentment of the gentry , and turbulency of the commonalty ; although without all violence or tumult , which is miraculous . so that what i now request of you , is , that you will please to deduce particularly to me , the causes of this division , that when they are laid open , i may proceed ( if you think fit to permit it ) from the disease , when known , to enquire out the remedies . eng. gent. before i come to make you any answer , i must thank you for the worthy and honourable character you give of our nation , and shall add to it , that i do verily believe , that there are not a more loyal and faithful people to their prince in the whole world , than ours are ; nor that fear more to fall into that state of confusion , in which we were twenty years since ; and that , not only this parliament , which consists of the most eminent men of the kingdom , both for estates and parts ; but all the inhabitants of this isle in general ; even those ( so many of them as have their understandings yet entire ) which were of the anti-royal party , in our late troubles , have all of them the greatest horrour imaginable , to think of doing any thing , that may bring this poor country into those dangers and uncertainties , which then did threaten our ruin ; and the rather for this consideration ; that neither the wisdom of some , who were engaged in those affairs , which i must aver to have been very great , nor the success of their contest , which ended in an absolute victory , could prevail , so as to give this kingdom any advantage ; nay , not so much as any settlement , in satisfaction and requital of all the blood it had lost , mony it had spent , and hazzard it had run . a clear argument why we must totally exclude a civil war from being any of the remedies , when we come to that point . i must add further , that as we have as loyal subjects as are any where to be found , so we have as gracious and good a prince : i never having yet heard that he did , or attempted to do , any the least act of arbitrary power , in any publick concern ; nor did ever take , or endeavour to take from any particular person the benefit of the law. and for his only brother ( although accidentally he cannot be denyed to be a great motive of the peoples unquietness ) all men must acknowledge him to be a most glorious and honourable prince ; one who has exposed his life several times for the safety and glory of this nation ; one who pays justly and punctually his debts , and manages his own fortune discreetly ; and yet keeps the best court and equipage of any subject in christendom ; is courteous and affable to all ; and in fine , has nothing in his whole conduct to be excepted against , much less dreaded ; excepting , that he is believed to be of a religion contrary to the honour of god , and the safety and interest of this people , which gives them just apprehensions of their future condition : but of this matter , we shall have occasion to speculate hereafter ; in the mean time , since we have such a prince , and such subjects , we must needs want the ordinary cause of distrust and division , and therefore must seek higher to find out the original of this turbulent posture we are in . doct. truly you had need seek higher or lower to satisfie us , for hitherto you have but enforced the gentleman's question , and made us more admire what the solution will be . eng. gent. gentlemen , then i shall delay you no longer : the evil counsellors , the pensioner-parliament , the thorow-pac'd iudges , the flattering divines , the buisie and designing papists , the french counsels , are not the causes of our misfortunes , they are but the effects ( as our present distractions are ) of one primary cause ; which is the breach and ruin of our government ; which having been decaying for near two hundred years , is in our age brought so near to expiration , that it lyes agonizing , and can no longer perform the functions of a political life , nor carry on the work of ordering and preserving mankind : so that the shifts that our courtiers have within some years used , are but so many tricks , or conclusions which they are trying to hold life and soul together a while longer ; and have played handy-dandy with parliaments , and especially with the house of commons , ( the only part which is now left entire of the old constitution ) by adjourning , and proroguing , and dissolving them ( contrary to the true meaning of the law ) as well in the reign of our late king , as during his majestics that now is . whereas indeed our counsellors ( perceiving the decay of the foundation , as they must , if they can see but one inch into the politicks ) ought to have addrest themselves to the king to call a parliament , the true physician , and to lay open the distemper there , and so have endeavour'd a cure , before it had been too late , as i fear it now is : i mean the piecing and patching up the old government . it is true , as the divine machiavil says , that diseases in government are like a marasmus in the body natural , which is very hard to be discovered whilst it is curable ; and after it comes to be easie to discern , difficult if not impossible to be remedy'd ; yet it is to be supposed that the counsellors are , or ought to be skilful physicians , and to foresee the seeds of state-distempers , time enough to prevent the death of the patient ; else they ought in conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime employment , and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities . so that although for this reason the ministers of state here are inexcusable , and deserve all the fury which must one time or other be let loose against them , ( except they shall suddenly fly from the wrath to come , by finding out in time , and advising the true means of setting themselves to rights ) yet neither prince nor people are in the mean time to be blamed for not being able to conduct things better . no more than the waggoner is to answer for his ill guiding , or the oxon for their ill drawing the waggon , when it is with age and ill usage broken , and the wheels unserviceable : or the pilot and marriners , for not weathring out a storm when the ship hath sprung a planck . and as in the body of man , sometime● the head and all the members are in good order , nay , the vital parts are sound and entire ; yet if there be a considerable putrifaction in the humors much more , if the blood ( which the scripture calls the life ) be impure and corrupted ; the patient ceases not to be in great danger , and oftentimes dies without some skillful physician : and in the mean time the head and all the parts suffer , and are unquiet , full as much , as if they were all immediately affected . so it is in every respect with the body politick , or commonwealth , when their foundations are moulder'd : and although in both these cases , the patients cannot ( though the distemper be in their own bodies ) know what they ail , but are forced to send for some artist to tell them ; yet they cease not to be extreamly uneasie and impatient , and lay hold oftentimes upon unsuitable remedies , and impute their malady to wrong and ridiculous causes . as some people do here , who think that the growth of popery is our only evil , and that if we were secure against that , our peace and settlement were obtain'd , and that our disease needed no other cure. but of this more when we come to the cure. noble ven. against this discourse , certainly we have nothing to reply : but must grant , that when any government is decay'd , it must be mended , or all will ruine . but now we must request you to declare to us , how the government of england is decay'd , and how it comes to be so . for i am one of those unskilful persons , that cannot discern a state marasmus , when the danger is so far off . eng. gent. then no man living can : for your government is this day the only school in the world , that breeds such physicians , and you are esteemed one of the ablest amongst them : and it would be manifest to all the world for truth ; although there were no argument for it , but the admirable stability and durableness of your government , which hath lasted above twelve hundred years entire and perfect ; whilst all the rest of the countreys in europe , have not only changed masters very frequently in a quarter of that time , but have varied and altered their polities very often . which manifests that you must needs have ever enjoy'd a succession of wise citizens , that have had skill and ability to forwarn you betimes of those rocks against which your excellently-built vessel might in time split . noble ven. sir , you over-value , not only me , but the wisdom of my fellow citizens ; for we have none of these high speculations , nor hath scarce any of our body read aristotle , plato , or cicero , or any of those great artists , ancient or modern , who teach that great science of the governing and increasing great states and cities ; without studying which science no man can be fit to discourse pertinently of these matters ; much less to found or mend a government , or so much as find the defects of it . we only study our own government , and that too chiefly to be fit for advantagious employments , rather than to foresee our dangers . which yet i must needs confess some amongst us are pretty good at , and will in a harangue made upon passing a law , venture to tell us what will be the consequence of it two hundred years hence . but of these things i shall be very prodigal in my discourse , when you have leisure and patience to command me to say any thing of our polity ; in the mean time pray be pleased to go on with your edifying instruction . eng. gent. before i can tell you how the government of england came to be decayed , i must tell you what that government was , and what it now is : and i should say something too of government in general , but that i am afraid of talking of that subject , before you who are so exact a judge of it . noble ven. i thought you had been pleased to have done with this discourse , i assure you , sir , if i had more skill in that matter than ever i can pretend to , it would but serve to make me the fitter auditor of what you shall say on that subject . eng. gent. sir , in the course of my reasoning upon this point , i shall have occasion to insist and expatiate upon many things , which both my self and others have publish'd in former times . for which i will only make this excuse , that the repetition of such matters is the more pardonable , because they will be at least new to you , who are a stranger to our affairs and writings . and the rather because those discourses shall be apply'd to our present condition , and suited to our present occasions . but i will say no more , but obey you , and proceed . i will not take upon me to say , or so much as conjecture , how and when government began in the world , or what government is most ancient : history must needs be silent in that point , for that government is more ancient than history . and there was never any writer , but was bred under some government , which is necessarily supposed to be the parent of all arts and sciences , and to have produced them . and therefore it would be as hard for a man to write an account of the beginning of the laws and polity of any countrey , except there were memory of it , ( which cannot be before the first historiographer ) as it would be to any person without records to tell the particular history of his own birth . doct. sir , i cannot comprehend you , may not historians write a history of matters done before they were born ? if it were so ; no man could write but of his own times . eng. gent. my meaning is , where there are not stories , or records , extant ; for as for oral tradition , it lasts but for one age , and then degenerates into fable : i call any thing in writing , whereby the account of the passages or occurrences of former times is derived to our knowledge , a history , although it be not pend methodically , so as to make the author pass for a wit : and had rather read the authentick records of any country , that is a collection of their laws and letters concerning transactions of state , and the like , than the most eloquent and judicious narrative that can be made . noble ven. methinks , sir , your discourse seems to imply , that we have no account extant of the beginning of governments ; pray what do you think of the books of moses , which seem to be pend on purpose to inform us how he , by gods command , led that people out of egypt into another land , and in the way made them a government ? besides , does not plutarch tell us , how theseus gathered together the dispersed inhabitants of attica , brought them into one city , and under one government of his own making ? the like did romulus in italy , and many others in divers countries . eng. gent. i never said that we had not sufficient knowledge of the original of particular governments ; but it is evident , that these great legislators had seen , and lived under other administrations , and had the help of learned law-givers and philosophers , excepting the first who had the aid of god himself . so that it remains undiscovered yet , how the first regulation of man-kind began : and therefore i will take for granted that which all the politicians conclude : which is , that necessity made the first government . for every man by the first law of nature ( which is common to us and brutes ) had , like beasts in a pasture , right to every thing , and there being no property , each individual , if he were the stronger , might seize whatever any other had possessed himself of before , which made a state of perpetual war. to remedy which , and the fear that nothing should be long enjoyed by any particular person ( neither was any mans life in safety ) every man consented to be debar'd of that universal right to all things , and confine himself to a quiet and secure enjoyment of such a part as should be allotted him : thence came in ownership , or property ; to maintain which it was necessary to consent to laws , and a government to put them in execution . which of the governments now extant , or that have been formerly , was first , is not possible now to be known ; but i think this must be taken for granted , that whatsoever the frame or constitution was first , it was made by the perswasion and meditation of some wise and vertuous person , and consented to by the whole number . and then , that it was instituted for the good and preservation of the governed , and not for the exaltation and greatness of the person or persons appointed to govern : the reason why i beg this concession is , that it seems very improbable , not to say impossible , that a vast number of people should ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the power of others , but for the ends abovesaid , and so lose their liberty without advantaging themselves in any thing . and it is full as impossible that any person ( or persons so inconsiderable in number as magistrates and rulers are ) should by force get an empire to themselves . though i am not ignorant that a whole people have in imminent dangers , either from the invasion of a powerful enemy , or from civil distractions , put themselves wholly into the hands of one illustrious person for a time , and that with good success , under the best forms of government : but this is nothing to the original of states . noble ven. sir , i wonder how you come to pass over the consideration of paternal government , which is held to have been the beginning of monarchies ? eng. gent. really i did not think it worth the taking notice of , for though it be not easie to prove a negative , yet i believe if we could trace all foundations of polities that now are , or ever came to our knowledge since the world began ; we shall find none of them to have descended from paternal power ; we know nothing of adam's leaving the empire to cain , or seth : it was impossible for noah to retain any jurisdiction over his own three sons ; who were dispersed into three parts of the world , if our antiquaries calculate right ; and as for abraham , whilst he lived , as also his son isaac , they were out ordinary fathers of families , and no question governed their own houshold as all others do ; but when iacob upon his death-bed did relate to his children , the promise almighty god had made his grandfather , to make him a great nation , and give his posterity a fruitful territory , he speaks not one word of the empire of reuben his first-born , but supposes them all equal : and so they were taken to be by moses , when he divided the land to them by lot ; and by gods command made them a commonwealth . so that i believe this fancy to have been first started , not by the solid judgement of any man , but to flatter some prince , and to assert , for want of better arguments , the jus divinum of monarchy . noble ven. i have been impertinent in interrupting you , but yet now i cannot repent of it , since your answer hath given me so much satisfaction ; but if it be so as you say , that government was at first instituted for the interest and preservation of mankind , how comes it to pass , that there are and have been so many absolute monarchies in the world , in which it seems that nothing is provided for , but the greatness and power of the prince . eng. gent. i have presumed to give you already my reason , why i take for granted , that such a power could never be given by the consent of any people , for a perpetuity ; for though the people of israel did against the will of samuel , and indeed of god himself demand , and afterwards chuse themselves a king ; yet he was never such a king as we speak of ; for that all the orders of their commonwealth the sanhedrim , the congregation of the people , the princes of the tribes , &c. did still remain in being , as hath been excellently proved by a learned gentleman of our nation , to whom i refer you ; it may then be enquired into , how these monarchies at first did arise . history being in this point silent , as to the ancient principalities , we will conjecture , that some of them might very well proceed from the corruption of better governments , which must necessarily cause a depravation in manners ( as nothing is more certain than that politick defects breed moral ones , as our nation is a pregnant example ) this debauchery of manners might blind the understandings of a great many , destroy the fortunes of others , and make them indigent , insuse into very many a neglect and carelesness of the publick good ( which in all setled states is very much regarded ) so that it might easily come into the ambition of some bold aspiring person to affect empire , and as easily into his power , by fair pretences with some , and promises of advantages with others , to procure followers , and gain a numerous party , either to usurp tyranny over his own countrey , or to lead men forth to conquer and subdue another . thus it is supposed that nimrod got his kingdom ; who in scripture is called a great hunter before god , which expositers interpret , a great tyrant . the modern despotical powers have been acquired by one of these two ways , either by pretending by the first founder thereof , that he had a divine mission and so gaining not only followers , but even easie access in some places without force to empire , and afterwards dilateing their power by great conquests . thus mahomet and cingis can began , and established the sarazen and tartarian kingdoms ; or by a long series of wisdom in a prince , or chief magistrate of a mixt monarchy , and his council , who by reason of the sleepiness and inadvertency of the people , have been able to extinguish the great nobility , or render them inconsiderable ; and so by degrees taking away from the people their protectors , render them slaves . so the monarchies of france , and some other countries , have grown to what they are at this day ; there being left but a shadow of the three states in any of these mocarchies , and so no bounds remaining to the regal power ; but since property remains still to the subjects , these governments may be said to be changed , but not founded or established ; for there is no maxim more infallible and holding in any science , than this is in the politicks , that empire is founded in property . force or fraud may alter a government ; but it is property that must found and eternise it : upon this undeniable aphorisme we are to build most of our subsequent reasoning , in the mean time we may suppose , that hereafter the great power of the king of france may diminish much , when his enraged and oppressed subjects come to be commanded by a prince of less courage , wisdom , and military vertue , when it will be very hard for any such king to govern tyrannically a country which is not entirely his own . doct. pray , sir , give me leave to ask you by the way , what is the reason that here in our country , where the peerage is lessened sufficiently , the king has not gotten as great an addition of power as accrews to the crown in france ? eng. gent. you will understand that , doctor , before i have finisht this discourse ; but to stay your stomach till then , you may please to know that in france the greatness of the nobility which has been lately taken from them , did not consist in vast riches and revenues , but in great priviledges , and jurisdictions , which obliged the people to obey them ; whereas our great peers in former times had not only the same great dependences , but very considerable revenues besides , in demesnes , and otherwise : this vassallage over the people , which the peers of france had , being abolisht , the power over those tenants , which before was in their lords , fell naturally and of course into the crown , although the lands and possessions divested of those dependences did and do still remain to the owners ; whereas here in england , though the services are for the most part worn out , and insignificant ; yet for want of providence and policy in former kings , who could not foresee the danger a ▪ far off , entails have been suffered to be cut off ; and so two parts in ten of all those vast estates , as well mannours as demesnes , by the luxury and folly of the owners , have been within these two hundred years purchased by the lesser gentry and the commons ; which has been so far from advantaging the crown , that it has made the country scarce governable by monarchy : but if you please , i will go on with my discourse about government , and come to this again hereafter ? noble ven. i beseech you , sir , do . eng. gent. i cannot find by the small reading i have , that there were any other governments in the world anciently than these three , monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy . for the first , i have no light out of antiquity to convince me , that there were in old times any other monarchies , but such as were absolutely despotical ; all kingdoms then , as well in greece ( as macedon , epirus , and the like ; and where it is said , the princes exercised their power moderately ) as in asia , being altogether unlimited by any laws , or any assemblies of nobility or people . yet i must confess , aristotle , when he reckons up the corruptions of these three governments , calls tyranny the corruption of monarchy ; which if he means a change of government , ( as it is in the corruptions of the other two ) then it must follow , that the philosopher knew of some other monarchy at the first , which afterwards degenerated into tyranny , that is , into arbitrary power ; for so the word tyranny is most commonly taken , though in modern languages it signifies the ill exercise of power ; for certainly arbitrary government cannot be called tyranny , where the whole property is in the prince ( as we reasonably suppose it to have been in those monarchies ) no more than it is tyranny for you to govern your own house and estate as you please : but it is possible aristotle might not in this speak so according to terms of art , but might mean , that the ill government of a kingdom or family is tyranny . however we have one example , that puzzles politicians , and that is egypt , where pharaoh is called king ; and yet we see , that till ioseph's time he had not the whole property ; for the wisdom of that patriarch taught his master a way to make a new use of that famine , by telling him , that if they would buy their lives , and sell their estates ( as they did afterwards , and preserve themselves by the kings bread ) they shall serve pharaoh ; which shews that ioseph knew well , that empire was founded in property : but most of the modern writers in polity , are of opinion , that egypt was not a monarchy till then , though the prince might have the title of king , as the heraclides had in sparta , and romulus and the other kings had in rome ; both which states were instituted common-wealths . they give good conjectures for this their opinion , too many to be here mentioned ; only one is , that originally ( as they go about to prove ) all arts and sciences had their rise in egypt , which they think very improbable to have been under a monarchy . but this position , that all kings in former times were absolute , is not so essential to the intent i have in this discourse , which is to prove , that in all states , of what kind soever , this aphorisme takes place : imperium fundatur in dominio . so that if there were mixed monarchies , then the king had not all the property ; but those who shared with him in the administration of the soveraignty , had their part , whether it were the senate , the people , or both ; or if he had no companions in the soveraign power , he had no sharers likewise in the dominion or possession of the land. for that is all we mean by property , in all this discourse ; for as for personal estate , the subjects may enjoy it in the largest proportion , without being able to invade the empire : the prince may when he pleases take away their goods , by his tenants and vassals ( without an army ) which are his ordinary force , and answers to our posse comitatus . but the subjects with their money cannot invade his crown . so that all the description we need make of this kind or form of government , is , that the whole possession of the country , and the whole power lies in the hands and breast of one man ; he can make laws , break and repeal them when he pleases , or dispense with them in the mean time when he thinks fit ; interpose in all judicatories , in behalf of his favourites , take away any particular mans personal estate , and his life too , without the formality of a criminal process , or trial ; send a dagger , or a halter to his chief ministers , and command them to make themselves away ; and in fine , do all that his will or his interest suggests to him . doct. you have dwelt long here upon an argumentation , that the ancients had no monarchies , but what were arbitrary . eng. gent. pray give me leave to save your objections to that point , and to assure you first , that i will not take upon me to be so positive in that ; for that i cannot pretend to have read all the historians and antiquaries that ever writ ; nor have i so perfect a memory as to remember , or make use of , in a verbal and transient reasoning , all that i have ever read ; and then to assure you again , that i build nothing upon that assertion , and so your objection will be needless , and only take up time . doct. you mistake me , i had no intent to use any argument or example against your opinion in that ; but am very willing to believe that it may be so . what i was going to say was this , that you have insisted much upon the point of monarchy , and made a strange description of it , whereas many of the ancients , and almost all the modern writers , magnifie it to be the best of governments . eng. gent. i have said nothing to the contrary . i have told you de facto what it is , which i believe none will deny . the philosopher said it was the best government ; but with this restriction , ubi philosophi regnant , and they had an example of it , in some few roman emperours ; but in the most turbulent times of the commonwealth , and factions between the nobility and the people , rome was much more full of vertuous and heroick citizens , than ever it was under aurelius or antonius : for the moderns that are of that judgement , they are most of them divines , not politicians , and something may be said in their behalf , when by their good preaching , they can insuse into their imaginary prince ( who seems already to have an image of the power of god ) the justice , wisdom , and goodness too of the deity . noble ven. we are well satisfied with the progress you have hitherto made in this matter ; pray go on to the two other forms used amongst the ancients , and their corruptions , that so we may come to the modern governments , and see how england stands , and how it came to decay , and what must rebuild it . eng. gent. you have very good reason to hasten me to that ; for indeed , all that has been said yet , is but as it were a preliminary discourse to the knowledge of the government of england , and its decay : when it comes to the cure , i hope you will both help me , for both your self and the doctor are a thousand times better than i at remedies . but i shall dispatch the other two governments . aristocracy , or optimacy , is a commonwealth , where the better sort , that is , the eminent and rich men , have the chief administration of the government : i say , the chief , because there are very few ancient optimacies , but the people had some share , as in sparta , where they had power to vote , but not debate ; for so the oracle of apollo , brought by lycurgus from delphos , settles it ; but the truth is , these people were the natural spartans . for lycurgus divided the country or territory of laconia into 39000 shares ; whereof nine thousand only of these owners were inhabitants of sparta ; the rest lived in the country : so that although thucidides call it an aristocracy , and so i follow him , yet it was none of those aristocracies usually described by the politicians , where the lands of the territory were in a great deal fewer hands . but call it what you will , where ever there was an aristocracy , there the property , or very much the over-ballance of it , was in the hands of the aristoi , or governours , be they more or fewer ; for if the people have the greatest interest in the property , they will , and must have it in the empire : a notable example of it is rome , the best and most glorious government that ever the sun saw ; where the lands being equally divided amongst the tribes , that is the people ; it was impossible for the patricii to keek them quiet , till they yielded to their desires , not only to have their tribunes , to see that nothing passed into a law without their consent , but also to have it declared , that both the consuls should not only be chosen by the people ( as they ever were , and the kings too before them ) but that they might be elected too , when the people pleased , out of plebeian families . so that now i am come to democracy . which you see is a government where the chief part of the soveraign power , and the exercise of it , resides in the people ; and where the style is , iessu populi authoritate patrum . and it doth consist of three fundamental orders . the senate proposing , the people resolving and the magistrates executing . this government is much more powerful than an aristocracy , because the latter cannot arm the people , for fear they should seize upon the government , and therefore are fain to make use of none but strangers and mercinaries for souldiers ; which , as the divine machiavil says , has hindred your commonwealth of venice from mounting up to heaven , whither those incomparable orders , and that venerable wisdom used by your citizens in keeping to them , would have carried you , if in all your wars you had not been ill served . doct. well , sir , pray let me ask you one thing concerning venice : how do you make out your imperium fundatur in dominio there ? have the gentlemen there , who are the party governing , the possession of the whole territory ? does not property remain entire to the gentlemen , and other inhabitants in the several countries of padua , brescia , vicenza , verona , bergamo , creman , trevisi , and friuli , as also in the vltramarine provinces , and islands ? and yet i believe you will not deny , but that the government of venice is as well founded , and hath been of as long continuance as any that now is , or ever was in the world. eng. gent. doctor , i shall not answer you in this , because i am sure it will be better done by this gentleman , who is a worthy son of that honourable mother . noble ven. i thought you had said , sir , that we should have done complimenting ; but since you do command me to clear the objection made by our learned doctor , i shall presume to tell you , first how our city began . the goths , huns , and lombards coming with all the violence and cruelty immaginable , to invade that part of italy which we now call terra firma , and where our ancestors did then inhabit , forced them in great numbers to seek a shelter amongst a great many little rocks , or islands , which stood very thick in a vast lake , or rather marsh , which is made by the adriatique sea , we call it laguna ; here they began to build , and getting boats , made themselves provisions of all kind from the land ; from whence innumerable people began to come to them , finding that they could subsist , and that the barbarous people had no boats to attack them , nor that they could be invaded either by horse or foot without them . our first government , and which lasted for many years , was no more than what is practised in many country parishes in italy , and possibly here too , where the clerk , or any other person , calls together the chief of the inhabitants to consider of parish-business , as chusing of officers , making of rates , and the like . so in venice , when there was any publick provision to be made by way of law , or otherwise , some officers went about to persons of the greatest wealth and credit , to intreat them to meet and consult ; from whence our senate is called to this day consiglio de pregadi , which in our barbarous idiom is as much as pregati in tuscan language : our security increased daily , and so by consequence our number and our riches ; for by this time there began to be another inundation of sarazens upon asia minor , which forced a great many of the poor people of greece to fly to us for protection , giving us the possession of some islands , and other places upon the continent : this opened us a trade , and gave a beginning to our greatness ; but chiefly made us consider what government was fittest to conserve our selves , and keep our wealth ( for we did not then much dream of conquests , else without doubt we must have made a popular government ) we pitcht upon an aristocracy , by ordering that those who had been called to council for that present year , and for four years before , should have the government in their hands , and all their posterity after them for ever , which made first the distinction between gentlemen and citizens ; the people , who consisted of divers nations , most of them newly come to inhabit there , aud generally seeking nothing but safety and ease , willingly consented to this change , and so this state hath continued to this day ; though the several orders and counsels have been brought in since , by degrees , as our nobility encreased , and for other causes . under this government we have made some conquests in italy , and greece , for our city stood like a wall between the two great torrents of goths and sarazens ; and as either of their empires declin'd , it was easie for us , without being very warlike , to pick up some pieces of each side ; as for the government of these conquests , we did not think fit to divide the land amongst our nobility , for fear of envy , and the effects of it : much less did we think it adviseable to plant colonies of our people , which would have given the power into their hands , but we thought it the best way for our government to leave the people their property , tax them what we thought fit , & keep them under by governours and citadels , and so in short make them a province . so that now the doctors riddle is solved ; for i suppose this gentleman did not mean that his maxime should reach to provincial governments . eng. gent. no , sir , so far from that , that it is just contrary ; for as in national or domestick government , where a nation is governed either by its own people or its own prince , there can be no settled government , except they have the rule who possess the country . so in provincial governments , if they be wisely ordered , no man must have any the least share in the managing affairs of state , but strangers , or such as have no share or part in the possessions there , for else they will have a very good opportunity of shaking off their yoak . doct. that is true ; and we are so wise here ( i mean our ancestors were ) as to have made a law , that no native in ireland can be deputy there : but , sir , being fully satisfied in my demand , by this centleman ; i beseech you to go on to what you have to say , before you come to england . eng. gent. i shall then offer two things to your observation ; the first is , that in all times and places , where any great heroes or legislators , have founded a government , by gathering people together to build a city , or to invade any countrey to possess it , before they came to dividing the conquered lands , they did always very maturely deliberate under what form or model of government they meant to live , and accordingly made the partition of the possessions ; moses , theseus , and romulus , founders of demacracies , divided the land equally : licurgus who meant an optimacy , made a certain number of shares , which he intended to be in the hands of the people of laconia . cyrus , and other conquering monarchs before him , took all for themselves and successors , which is observed in those eastern countries to this day , and which has made those countries continue ever since under the same government , though conquered and possessed very often by several nations : this brings me to the second thing to be observed , which is , that wherever this apportionment of lands came to be changed in any kind , the government either changed with it , or was wholly in a state of confusion : and for this reason licurgus , the greatest politician that ever founded any government , took a sure way to fix property by confounding it , and bringing all into common : and so the whole number of the natural spartans , who inhabited the city of lacedemon , eat and drank in their several convives together : and as long as they continued so to do , they did not only preserve their government entire , and that for a longer time than we can read of any common-wealth that ever lasted amongst the ancients , but held as it were the principality of greece . the athenians , for want of some constitutions to fix property , as theseus placed it , were in danger of utter ruine , which they had certainly encounter'd , if the good genius ( as they then call'd it ) of that people , had not raised them up a second founder , more than six hundred years after the first , which was solon : and because the history of this matter will very much conduce to the illustrating of this aphorisme we have laid down , i will presume so much upon your patience as to make a short recital of it , leaving you to see it more at large in plutarch and other authors . the lands in the territory of attica which were in the possession of the common people , ( for what reason history is silent ) were for debt all mortgaged to the great men of the city of athens , and the owners having no possibility of redeeming their estates , were treating to compound with their creditors , and deliver up their lands to them : solon ( who was one of those state physicians we spake of , ) was much troubled at this , and harangued daily to the nobility and people against it , telling them first , that it was impossible for the grecians to resist the medes ( who were then growing up to a powerful monarchy ) except athens the second city of greece did continue a democracy ; that it was as impossible the people could keep their empire , except they kept their lands , nothing being more contrary to nature , than that those who possess nothing in a country can pretend to govern it . they were all sensible of his reasons , and of their own danger , but the only remedy ( which was , that the great men should forgive the common people their debts ) would not at all be digested ; so that the whole city now fully understanding their condition , were continually in an uproar , and the people flock'd about solon , whenever he came abroad , desiring him to take upon him the government , and be their prince , and they would make choice of him the next time they assembled . he told them no , he would never be a tyrant , especially in his own country ; meaning , that he who had no more share than other of the nobles , could not govern the rest , without being an usurper or tyrant : but this he did to oblige his citizens , he frankly forgave all the debts that any of the people owed to him , and released their lands immediately ; and this amounted to fifteen attick talents of gold , a vast sum in those days ; and betook himself to a voluntary exile , in which he visited thales , and went to the oracle of delphos , and offer up his prayers to apollo for the preservation of his city : in return of which ( as the people then believed ) the hearts of the great ones were so changed and inlarged , that they readily agreed to remit all their debts to the people , upon condition that solon would take the pains to make them a new model of government , and laws suitable to a democracy , which he as readily accepted and performed ; by vertue of which that city grew and continued long the greatest , the justest , the most vertuous , learned and renowed of all that age ; drove the persians afterwards out of greece , defeated them doth by sea and land , with a quarter of their number of ships and men ; and produced the greatest wits and philosophers that ever lived upon earth . the city of athens instituted a solemn feast in commemoration of that great generosity and self-denial of the nobility ; who sacrificed their own interest to the preservation of their country : which feast was called the solemnity of the seisactheia , which signifies recision or abolition of debts , and was observed with processions , sacrifices and games , till the time of the roman's dominion over them ( who encouraged it , ) and ever till the change of religion in greece , and invasion of the sarazens . the roman's having omitted in their institution to provide for the fixing of property , and so the nobility called patricii , beginning to take to themselves a greater share in the conquer'd lands than had been usual ( for in the first times of the commonwealth under romulus , and ever after , it was always practised to divide the lands equally amongst the tribes ) this innovation stirred up licinius stolo , then tribune of the people , to propose a law ; which , although it met with much difficulty , yet at last was consented to ; by which it was provided , that no roman citizen , of what degree soever , should possess above five hundred acres of land ; and for the remaining part of the lands which should be conquer'd , it was ordered to be equally divided , as formerly , amongst the tribes : this found admittance , after much oposition , because it did provide but for the future , no man at that time being owner of more lands than what was lawful for him to possess ; and if this law had been strictly observed to the last , that glorious commonwealth might have subsisted to this day , for ought we know . doctor . some other cause would have been the ruine of it , what think you of a foreign conquest ? eng. gent. oh doctor , if they had kept their poverty they had kept their government and their vertue too , and then it had not been an easie matter to subdue them , quos vult perdere iupiter dementat ; breach of rules and order causes division , and division when it comes to be incurable , exposes a nation almost as much as a tyrannical government does . the goths and vandals , had they invaded in those days , had met with the same success which befell the cymbri , and the teutones . i must confess , a foreign invasion is a formidable thing , when a commonwealth is weak in territory and inhabitants , and that the invader is numerous and warlike : and so we see the romans were in danger of utter ruine when they were first attacqued by the gauls under brennus : the like hazzard may be fear'd , when a commonwealth is assaulted by another of equal vertue , and a commander of equal address and valour to any of themselves . thus the romans run the risk of their liberty and empire , in the war of hannibal ; but their power and their vertue grew to that heighth in that contest , that when it was ended , i believe , that if they had preserved the foundation of their government entire , they had been invincible : and if i were alone of this opinion , i might be ashamed ; but i am backt by the judgement of your incomparable country-man machiavil ; and no man will condemn either of us of rashness , if he first consider , what small states , that have stood upon right bottoms , have done to defend their liberty against great monarchs ; as is to be seen in the example of the little commonwealth of athens , which destroyed the fleet of xerxes , consisting of a thousand vessels , in the streights of salamis , and before the land army of darius of three hundred thousand in the plains of marathon , and drove them out of greece ; for though the whole confederates were present at the battel of platoea , yet the athenian army singly under their general miltiades , gain'd that renowned battel of marathon . noble ven. i beseech you , sir , how was it possible , or practicable , that the romans conquering so many and so remote provinces , should yet have been able to preserve their agrarian law , and divide all those lands equally to their citizens ; or if it had been possible , yet it would have ruin'd their city , by sending all their inhabitants away ; and by taking in strangers in their room , they must necessarily have had people less vertuous and less warlike , and so both their government and their military discipline must have been corrupted ; for it is not to be imagined , but that the people would have gone with their families to the place where their lands lay : so that it appears that the romans did not provide , in the making and framing their first polity , for so great conquests as they afterwards made . eng. gent. yes , surely they did ; from their first beginning they were founded in war , and had neither land nor wives but what they fought for ; but yet what you object were very weighty , if there had not been a consideration of that early : for assoon as that great and wise people had subdued the samnites on the east , and brought their arms as far as the greek plantations , in that part of italy which is now called the kingdom of naples ; and westward , had reduced all the tuscans under their obedience , as far as the river arnus , they made that and the river volturnus ( which runs by the walls of capua ) the two boundaries of their empire , which was called domicilium imperii . these were the ne plus ultra , for what they conquered between these two rivers , was all confiscated and divided amongst the tribes ; the rustick tribes being twenty seven , and the vrbane tribes nine , which made thirty six in all . the city tribes were like our companies in london , consisting of tradesmen . the country tribes were divided like shires , and there was scarce any landed man , who inhabited in the city , but he was written in that tribe where his estate lay ; so that the rustick tribes ( though they had all equal voices ) were of far more credit and reputation than the vrbane . upon the days of the comtia , which were very well known , as many as thought fit amongst the country tribes , came to give their voices , though every tribe was very numerous of inhabitants that lived in the city . now the agrarian did not extend to any lands conquered beyond this precinct , but they were lest to the inhabitants , they paying a revenue to the commonwealth ; all but those which were thought fit to be set out to maintain a roman colony , which was a good number of roman citizens , sent thither , and provided of lands and habitations , which being armed , did serve in the nature of a citadel and garison to keep the province in obedience , and a roman pretor , proconsul , or other governour , was sent yearly to head them , and brought forces with him besides . now it was ever lawful for any roman citizen to purchase what lands he pleased in any of these provinces ; it not being dangerous to a city to have their people rich , but to have such a power in the governing part of the empire , as should make those who managed the affairs of the commonwealth depend upon them ; which came afterwards to be that which ruined their liberty , and which the gracchi endeavoured to prevent when it was too late ; for those illustrious persons seeing the disorder that was then in the commonwealth ▪ and rightly comprehending the reason , which was the intermission of the agrarian , and by consequence the great purchases which were made by the men of rome ( who had inriched themselves in asia and the other provinces ) in that part of italy which was between the two rivers , before mentioned , began to harrangue the people , in hopes to perswade them to admit of the right remedy , which was to confirm the agrarian law with a retrospect ; which although they carried , yet the difficulties in the execution proved so great , that it never took effect , by reason that the common people , whose interest it was to have their lands restored ; yet having long lived as clients , and dependents of the great ones , chose rather to depend still upon their patrons , than to hazard all for an imaginary deliverance , by which supineness in them , they were prevail'd with rather to joyne ( for the most part ) with the oppressors of themselves and their countrey , and to cut the throats of their redeemers , than to employ their just resentment against the covetous violators of their government and property . so perished the two renowned gracchi , one soon after the other , not for any crime , but for having endeavoured to preserve and restore their common-wealth ; for which ( if they had lived in times suitable to such an heroick undertaking , and that the vertue of their ancestors had been yet in any kind remaining ) they would have merited and enjoyed a reputation equal to that of lycurgus , or solon , whereas as it happen'd they were sometime after branded with the name of sedition , by certain wits , who prostituted the noble flame of poetry ( which before had wont to be employed in magnifying heroick actions ) to flatter the lust and ambition of the roman tyrants . noble ven. sir , i approve what you say in all things , and in confirmation of it , shall further alledge the two famous princes of sparta , agis , and cleomines , which i couple together , since plutarch does so ; these finding the corruption of their commonwealth , and the decay of their ancient vertue , to proceed from the neglect and inobservance of their founders rules , and a breach of that equality which was first instituted ; endeavour to restore the laws of lycurgus , and divide the territory anew ; their victory in the peloponnesian war , and the riches and luxury brought into their city by lisander having long before broken all the orders of their common-wealth , and destroyed the proportions of land allotted to each of the natural spartans : but the first of these two excellent patriots perished by treachery in the beginning of his enterprize , the other began and went on with incomparable prudence and resolution , but miscarried afterwards by the iniquity of the times , and baseness and wickedness of the people ; so infalliably true it is , that where the policy is corrupted , there must necessarily be also a corruption and depravation of manners , and an utter abolition of all faith , justice , honour , and morality ; but i forget my self , and intrench upon your province : there is nothing now remains to keep you from the modern policies , but that you please to shut up this discourse of the ancient governments , with saying something of the corruptions of aristocracy and democracy ; for i believe both of us are satisfied that you have abundantly proved you assertion , and that when we have leisure to examine all the states or policies that ever were , we shall find all their changes to have turn'd upon this hinge of property , and that the fixing of that with good lawes in the beginning or first institution of a state , and the holding to those lawes afterwards , is the only way to make a commonwealth immortal . eng. gent. i think you are very right ; but i shall obey you , and do presume to differ from aristotle , in thinking that he has not fitly called those extreams ( for so i will stile them ) of aristocracy and democracy , corruptions ; for that they do not proceed from the alteration of property , which is the vnica corruptio politica : for example , i do not find that oligarchy , or government of a few , which is the extream of an optimacy , ever did arise from a few mens getting into their hands the estates of all the rest of the nobility : for had it began so , it might have lasted , which i never read of any that did . i will therefore conclude , that they were all tyrannies ; for so the greeks called all usurpations , whether of one or more persons , and all those that i ever read of , as they came in either by craft or violence , as the thirty tyrants of athens , the fifteen of thebes , and the decem-viri of rome ( though these are first came in lawfully ) so they were soon driven out ; and ever , were either assassinated , or dyed by the sword of justice ; and therefore i shall say no more of them , not thinking them worth the name of a government . as for the extream of democracy , which is anarchy , it is not so : for many commonwealths have lasted for a good time under that administration ( if i may so call a state so full of confusion . ) an anarchy then is , when the people not contented with their share in the administration of the government , ( which is the right of approving , or disapproving of lawes , of leagues , and of making of war and peace , of judging in all causes upon an appeal to them , and chusing all manner of officers ) will take upon themselves the office of the senate too , in manageing subordinate matters of state , proposing lawes originally , and assuming debate in the market place , making their orators their leaders ; nay , not content with this , will take upon them to alter all the orders of the government when they please ; as was frequently practised in athens , and in the modern state of florence . in both these cities , when ever any great person who could lead the people , had a mind to alter the government , he call'd them together , and made them vote a change. in florence they call'd it , chiamar il popolo a parlamento e ripigliar lo stato , which is summoning the people into the market-place to resume the government , and did then presently institute a new one , with new orders , new magistracies , and the like . now that which originally causes this disorder , is the admitting ( in the beginning of a government , or afterwards ) the meaner sort of people , who have no share in the territory , into an equal part of ordering the commonwealth ; these being less sober , less considering , and less careful of the publick concerns ; and being commonly the major part , are made the instruments oft-times of the ambition of the great ones , and very apt to kindle into faction : but notwithstaning all the confusion which we see under an anarchy , ( where the wisdom of the better sort is made useless by the fury of the people ) yet many cities have subsisted hundreds of years in this condition ; and have been more considerable , and performed greater actions , than ever any government of equal extent did , except it were a well-regulated democracy ; but it is true , they ruine in the end , and that never by cowardize or baseness , but by too much boldness and temerarious undertakings , as both athens and florence did ; the first undertaking the invasion of sicily , when their affairs went ill elsewhere ; and the other by provoking the spaniard and the pope . but i have done now , and shal pass to say something of the modern policies . noble ven. before you come to that , sir , pray satisfie me in a point which i should have moved before , but that i was unwilling to interrupt your rational discourse ; how came you to take it for granted , that moses , theseus , and romulus were founders of popular governments ? as for moses , we have his story written by an insalliable pen ; theseus was ever called king of athens , though he liv'd so long since , that what is written of him is justly esteem'd fabulous ; but romulus certainly was a king , and that government continued a monarchy , though elective , under seven princes . eng. gent. i will be very short in my answer , and say nothing of theseus , for the reason you are pleased to alledge : but for moses , you may read in holy writ , that when , by god's command , he had brought the israelites out of egypt , he did at first manage them by accquainting the people with the estate of their government , which people were called together with the sound of a trumpet , and are termed in scripture , the congregation of the lord ; this government he thought might serve their turn in their passage , and that it would be time enough to make them a better when they were in possession of the land of canaan ; especially having made them judges and magistrates at the instance of his father-in-law , which are called in authors , praefecti iethroniani ; but finding that this provision was not sufficient , complained to god of the difficulty he had , to make that state of affairs hold together ; god was pleased to order him to let seventy elders be appointed for a senate , but yet the congregation of the lord continued still and acted : and by the severall soundings of the trumpets , either the senate or popular assembly were called together , or both ; so that this government was the same with all other democracies , consisting of a principal magistrate , a senate , and a people assembled together , not by represention , but in a body . now for romulus , it is very plain , that he was no more then the first officer of the commonwealth , whatever he was called , and that he was chosen ( as your doge is ) for life ; and when the last of those seven kings usurpt the place , that is , did reign injussu populi , and excercise the government tyrannically , the people drove him out ( as all people in the world that have property will do in the like case , except some extraordinary qualifications in the prince preserve him for one age ) and afterwards appointed in his room two magistrates , and made them annual , which two had the same command , as well in their armies as in their cities , and did not make the least alteration besides , excepting that they chose an officer that was to perform the kings function in certain sacrifices ( which numa appointed to be performed by the king ) left the people should think their religion were changed : this officer was called rex sacrificulus . if you are satisfied , i will go on to the consideration of our modern states . noble ven. i am fully answered , and besides am clearly of opinion , that no government , whether mixt monarchy or commonwealth , can subsist without a senate , as well from the turbulent state of the israelites under moses till the sanhedrin was instituted , as from a certain kingdom of the vandals in africa ; where after their conquest of the natives , they appointed a government consisting of a prince and a popular assembly , which latter , within half a year , beat the kings brains out , he having no bulwark of nobility or senate to defend him from them . but i will divert you no longer . eng. gent. sir , you are very right , and we should have spoken something of that before , if it had been the business of this meeting to discourse of the particular models of government ; but intending only to say so much of the ancient policy as to shew what government in general is , and upon what basis it stands , i think i have done it sufficiently to make way for the understanding of our own , at least when i have said something of the policies which are now extant ; and that with your favour i will do . i shall need say little now of those commonwealths , which however they came by their liberty , either by arms or purchase , are now much-what under the same kind of policy as the ancients were . in germany , the free towns , and many princes make up the body of a commonwealth called the empire , of which the emperour is head ; this general union hath its diets or parliaments , where they are all represented , and where all things concerning the safety and interest of germany in general , or that belong to peace and war , are transacted ; these diets never intermeddle with the particular concerns or policies of those princes or states that make it up , leaving to them their particular soveraignties : the several imperial cities , or commonwealths , are divided into two kinds , lubeck's law , and collen's law , which being the same exactly with the ancient democracies and optimacies , i will say no more of them . the government of swizerland , and the seven provinces of the low-countries were made up in haste , to unite them against persecution and oppression , and to help to defend themselves the better , which they both have done very gallantly and successfully : they seem to have taken their pattern from the grecians , who when their greatness began to decline , and the several tyrants who succeeded alexander began to press hard upon them , were forced to league themselves ( yet in severall confederacies , as that of the etolians , that of the achaians , &c. ) for their mutual defence . the swisses consist of thirteen soveraignties ; some cities which are most aristocraticall , and some provinces which have but a village for their head township . these are all democracies , and are govern'd all by the owners of land , who assemble as our free-holders do at the county-court . these have their general diets , as in germany . the government of the united provinces has for its foundation the union of vtrecht , made in the beginning of their standing upon their guard against the cruelty and oppression of the spaniard , and patcht up in haste ; and seeming to be compos'd only for necessity , as a state of war , has made modern statesmen conjecture that it will not be very practicable in time of peace , and security . at their general diet , which is called the states general , do intervene the deputies of the seven provinces , in what number their principals please ; but all of them have but one vote , which are by consequence seven , and every one of the seven hath a negative ; so that nothing can pass without the concurrence of the whole seven . every one of these provinces have a counsel or assembly of their own , called the states provincial , who send and instruct their deputies to the states-general , and perform other offices belonging to the peace and quiet of the province . these deputies to the states provincial , are sent by several cities of which every province consists , and by the nobility of the province , which hath one voice only : the basis of the government lies in these cities , which are every of them a distinct soveraignty ; neither can the states of the province , much less the states general , intrench in the least upon their rights , nor so much as intermeddle with the government of their cities , or administration of justice , but only treat of what concerns their mutual defence , and their payments towards it . every one of these cities is a soveraignty , governed by an optimacy , consisting of the chief citizens , which upon death are supplyed by new ones elected by themselves ; these are called the vrnuscaperie or herne , which council has continued to govern those towns , time out of mind ; even in the times of their princes , who were then the soveraigns ; for without the consent of him , or his deputy , called state holder , nothing could be concluded in those days . since they have instituted an artificial minister of their own , whom they still call state-holder , and make choice of him in their provincial assemblies , and for form sake defer something to him , as the approbation of their skepen and other magistrates , and some other matters : this has been continued in the province of holland , which is the chief province in the succession of the princes of orange , and in the most of the others too : the rest have likewise chosen some other of the house of nassaw . this government ( so oddly set together , and so compos'd of a state , intended for a monarchy , and which , as almanacks calculated for one meridian , are made in some sort to serve for another , is by them continued in these several aristocracies ) may last for a time , till peace and security , together with the abuse which is like to happen in the choice of the herne , when they shall elect persons of small note into their body , upon vacancies , for kindred or relation , rather than such as are of estate and eminency , or that otherwise abuse their power in the execution of it , and then it is believed , and reasonably enough , that those people ( great in wealth , and very acute in the knowledge of their own interest ) will find out a better form of government , or make themselves a prey to some great neighbour-prince in the attempting it ; and this in case they in the mean time escape conquest from this great and powerfull king of france , who at this time gives law to christendom . i have nothing now left to keep me from the modern monarchies , but the most famous commonwealth of venice , of which it would be presumption for me to say any thing whilst you are present . noble ven. you may very safely go one if you please ; for i believe strangers understand the speculative part of our government , better than we do ; and the doctrine of the ballat which is our chiefe excellency : for i have read many descriptions of our frame , which have taught me something in it which i knew not before ; paricularly , donato gianotti the florentine , to whom i refer those who are curious to know more of our orders , for we that manage the mechanical part of the government are like horses who know their track well enough , without considering east or west , or what business they go about . besides , it would be very tedious , and very needless , to make any relation of our model , with the several counsels that make it up , and would be that which you have not done in treating of any other government : what we have said is enough to shew what beginning we had , and that serves your turn , for we who are called nobility , and who manage the state , are the descendents of the first inhabitants , and had therefore been a democracy , if a numerous flock of strangers ( who are contented to come and live amongst us as subjects ) had not swelled our city , and made the governing party seem but a handfull ; so that we have the same foundations that all other aristocracies have , who govern but one city , and have no territory but what they govern provincially ; and our people not knowing where to have better justice , are very well contented to live amongst us , without any share in the managing of affairs ; yet we have power to adopt whom we please into our nobility , and i believe that in the time of the roman greatness , there were five for one of the inhabitants who were written in no tribe , but look'd upon as strangers , and yet that did not vitiate their democracy , no more than our citizens and common people can hurt our optimacy ; all the difficulty in our administration , hath been to regulate our own nobility , and to bridle their faction and ambition , which can alone breed a disease in the vital part of our government , and this we do by most severe laws , and a very rigorous execution of them . doct. sir , i was thinking to interpose concerning the propriety of lands in the territory of padua , which i hear is wholly in the possession of the nobility of venice . noble . ven. our members have very good estates there , yet nothing but what they have paid very well for , no part of that country , or of any other province , having been shar'd amongst us as in other conquests : 't is true , that the paduans having ever been the most revengeful people of italy , could not be deterr'd from those execrable and treacherous murders which were every day commited , but by a severe execution of the laws as well against their lives as estates : and as many of their estates as were confiscated , were ( during our necessities in the last war with the turks ) exposed to sale , and sold to them that offered most , without any consideration of the persons purchasing ; but it is very true that most of them came into the hands of our nobility , they offering more than any other , by reason that their sober and frugal living , and their being forbidden all manner of traffick , makes them have no way of employing the money which proceeds from their parsimony , and so they can afford to give more than others who may employ their advance to better profit elsewhere . but i perceive , doctor , by this question , that you have studied at padua . doct. no really , sir , the small learning i have was acquired in our own university of oxford , nor was i ever out of this island . noble ven. i would you had , sir , for it would have been a great honour to our country to have contributed any thing towards so vast a knowledge as you are possessor of : but i wish that it were your countrey , or at least the place of your habitation , that so we might partake not only of your excellent discourse sometimes , but be the better for your skill , which would make us immortal . doct. i am glad to see you so well that you can make yourself so merry , but i assure you i am very well here ; england is a good wholsome climate for a physician : but , pray let our friend go on to his modern monarchies . eng. gent. that is all i have now to do : those monarchies are two , absolute , and mixt ; for the first kind , all that we have knowledge of , except the empire of the turks , differ so little from the ancient monarchies of the assyrians and persians , that having given a short description of them before , it will be needless to say any more of the persian , the mogull , the king of pegu , china , prestor-iohn , or any other the great men under those princes , as the satrapes of old ; being made so only by their being employed and put into great places and governments by the soveraign ; but the monarchy of the grand seignior is somthing different ; they both agree in this , that the prince is in both absolute proprietor of all the lands , ( excepting in the kingdom of egypt , of which i shall say somthing anon ) but the diversity lies in the administration of the property ; the other emperours as well ancient as modern using to manage the revenue of the several towns , and parishes , as our kings , or the kings of france do ; that is , keep it in their hands , and administer it by officers : and so you may read that xerxes king of persia allowed the revenue of so many villages to themistocles , which assignations are practised at this day , both to publick and to private uses , by the present monarchs . but the turks , when they invaded the broken empire of the arabians , did not at first make any great alteration in their policy , till the house of ottoman the present royal family did make great conquests in asia , and afterwards in greece ; whence they might possibly take their present way of dividing their conquered territories ; for they took the same course which the goths and other modern people had used with their conquered lands in europe , upon which they planted military colonies , by dividing them amongst the souldiers for their pay or maintenance . these shares were called by them timarr's , which signifies benefices , but differ'd in this only from the european knights-fees , that these last originally were hereditary , and so property was maintained , whereas amongst the ottomans , they were meerly at will ; and they enjoyed their shares whilst they remained the sultan's souldiers , and no longer ; being turn'd out both of his service , and of their timarr's , when he pleases . this doubtless had been the best and firmest monarchy in the world , if they could have stayed here , and not had a mercinary army besides , which have often ( like the praetorians in the time of the roman tyrants ) made the palace and the serraglio the shambles of their princes ; whereas if the timariots , as well spahis or horse , as foot , had been brought together to guard the prince by courses ( as they used to do king david ) as well as they are to fight for the empire ; this horrid flaw and inconvenience in their government had been wholly avoided . for though these are not planted upon entire property as david's were , ( those being in the nature of trained-bands ) yet the remoteness of their habitations from the court , and the factions of the great city , and their desire to repair home , and to find all things quiet at their return , would have easily kept them from being infected with that cursed disease of rebellion against their soveraign , upon whose favour they depend for the continuance of their livelihood : whereas the ianizaries are for life , and are sure to be in the same employment under the next successor ; so sure , that no grand seignior can , or dares go about to disband them , the suspicion of intending such a thing having caused the death of more than one of their emperours . but i shall go to the limited monarchies . doct. but pray , before you do so , inform us something of the roman emperours : had they the whole dominion or property of the lands of italy ? eng. gent. the roman emperours i reckon amongst the tyrants , for so amongst the greeks were called those citizens who usurpt the governments of their crmmonwealths , and maintain'd it by force , without endeavouring to found or establish it , by altering the property of lands , as not imagining that their children could ever hold it after them , in which they were not deceived : so that it is plain that the roman empire was not a natural but a violent government . the reasons why it lasted longer than ordinarily tyrannies do , are many ; first , because augustus the first emperour kept up the senate , and so for his time cajold them with this bait of imaginary power , which might not have sufficed neither to have kept him from the late of his uncle , but that there had been so many revolutions and bloody wars between , that all mankind was glad to repose and take breath for a while under any government that could protect them . and he gain'd the service of these senators the rather , because he suffered none to be so but those who had followed his fortune in the several civil wars , and so were engaged to support him for their own preservation ; besides , he confiscated all those who had at any time been proscribed , or sided in any encounter against him ; which , considering in how few hands the lands of italy then were , might be an over-ballance of the property in his hands . but this is certain , that what ever he had not in his own possession , he disposed of at his pleasure , taking it away , as also the lives of his people , without any judicial proceedings , when he pleased : that the confiscations were great , we may see by his planting above sixty thousand souldiers upon lands in lombardy ; that is , erecting so many beneficia , or timarr's , and , if any man's lands lay in the way , he took them in for neighbourhood , without any delinquency . mantua vae miserae nimium vicina cremonae . and it is very evident that if these beneficia had not afterwards been made hereditary , that empire might have had a stabler foundation , and so a more quiet and orderly progress than it after had ; for the court guards , call'd the praetorians , did make such havock of their princes , and change them so often , that this ( though it may seem a paradox ) is another reason why this tyranny was not ruin'd sooner ; for the people , who had really an interest to endeavour a change of government , were so prevented by seeing the prince , whom they designed to supplant , removed to their hand , that they were puzled what to do , taking in the mean time great recreation to see those wild beasts hunted down themselves , who had so often prey'd upon their lives and estates ; besides that , most commonly the frequent removes of their masters , made them scarce have time to do any mischief to their poor oppressed subjects in particular , though they were all slaves in general . this government of the later romans is a clear example of the truth and efficacy of these politick principles we have been discoursing of . first , that any government ( be it the most unlimitted and arbitrary monarchy ) that is placed upon a right basis of property , is better both for prince and people , than to leave them a seeming property , still at his devotion , and then for want of fixing the foundation , expose their lives to those dangers and hazzards with which so many tumults and insurrections , which must necessarily happen , will threaten them daily : and in the next place , that any violent constraining of mankind to a subjection , is not to be called a government , nor does salve either the politick or moral ends , which those eminent legislators amongst the ancients proposed to themselves , when they set rules to preserve the quiet and peace , as well as the plenty , prosperity , and greatness of the people ; but that the politicks or art of governing is a science to be learned and studied by counsellors and statsemen be they never so great ; or else mankind will have a very sad condition under them , and they themselves a very perplexed and turbulent life , and probably a very destructive and precipitous end of it . doct. i am very glad i gave occasion to make this discourse : now i beseech you , before you go to the mixt monarchies , not to forget egypt . eng. gent. 't was that i was coming to , before you were pleased to interrogate me concerning the roman empire . the egyptians are this day , for ought i know , the only people that enjoy property , and are governed as a province by any of the eastern absolute princes . for whereas damasco , aleppo , and most of the other cities and provinces of that empire , whose territory is divided into timarr's , are governed by a bashaw , who for his guards has some small number of janizaries or souldiers ; the bashaw of egypt , or of grand cairo , has ever an army with him ; and divers forts are erected , which is the way european princes use in governing their provinces , and must be so where property is left entire , except they plant colonies as the romans did . the reason why selim , who broke the empire of the mamalukes , and conquered egypt , did not plant timarr's upon it , was the laziness and cowardliness of the people , and the great fruitfulness of the soil , and deliciousness of the country , which has mollifi'd and rendred effeminate all the nations that ever did inhabit it . so that a resolution was taken to impose upon them , first the maintaining an army by a tax , and then to pay a full half of all the fruits and product of their lands ( to the grand seignior ) which they are to cultivate and improve : this is well managed by the bashaws and their officers , and comes to an incredible sum ; the goods being sold , the money is conveyed in specie to the port , and is the greatest part of that prince's revenue . and it is believed , that if all the lands had been entirely confiscated , and that the grand seignior had managed them by his officers , he would not have made a third part so much of the whole , as he receives now annually for one half : not only because those people are extreamly industrious where their own profit is concerned : but for that , it is clear , if they had been totally divested of their estates , they would have left their country , and made that which is now the most populous kingdom of the world , a desart , as is all the rest of the turkish dominions , except some cities . and if the people had removed as they did elsewhere , there would not only have wanted hands to have cultivated and improved the lands , but mouths to consume the product of it ; so that the princes revenue by the cheapness of victual , and the want of labourers , would have almost fallen to nothing . noble ven. pray god this be not the reason that this king of france leaves property to his subjects ; for certainly he hath taken example by this province of egypt , his subjects having a tax ( which for the continuance of it , i must call a rent or tribute ) impos'd upon them to the value of one full half of their estates , which must ever increase as the lands improve . eng. gent. i believe , sir , there is another reason ; for the property there , being in the nobility and gentry , which are the hands by which he manages his force both at home and abroad , it would not have been easie or safe for him to take away their estates . but i come to the limited monarchies . they were first introduced ( as was said before ) by the goths , and other northern people . whence those great swarms came , as it was unknown to procopius himself , who liv'd in the time of their invasion , and who was a diligent searcher into all the circumstances of their concernments , so it is very needless for us to make any enquiry into it , thus much being clear , that they came man , woman , and child , and conquer'd and possest all these parts of the world , which were then subject to the roman empire , and since christianity came in have been so to the latin church , till honest iohn calvin taught some of us the way how to deliver ourselves from the tyrannical yoak , which neither we nor our forefathers were able to bear . whence those people had the government they establisht in these parts after their conquest , that is , whether they brought it from their own country , or made it themselves , must needs be uncertain , since their original is wholly so ; but it seems very probable that they had some excellent persons among them , though the ignorance and want of learning in that age hath not suffered any thing to remain that may give us any great light ; for it is plain , that the government they setled , was both according to the exact rules of the politicks , and very natural and suitable to that division they made of their several territories . whenever then these invaders had quieted any province , and that the people were driven out or subdued , they divided the lands , and to the prince they gave usually a tenth part , or thereabouts ▪ to the great men , or comites regis ( as it was translated into latine ) everyone ( as near as they could ) an equal share . these were to enjoy an hereditary right in their estates , as the king did in his part and in the crown ; but neither he , nor his peers or companions , were to have the absolute disposal of the lands so allotted them , but were to keep a certain proportion to themselves for their use : and the rest was ordered to be divided amongst the free-men , who came with them to conquer . what they kept to themselves was called demesnes in english and french , and in italian , beni allodiali . the other part which they granted to the free-men , was called a feud : and all these estates were held of these lords hereditarily , only the tenants were to pay a small rent annually , and at every death or change an acknowledgment in money , and in some tenures the best beast besides : but the chief condition of the feud or grant , was , that the tenant should perform certain services to the lord , of which one ( in all tenures of free-men ) was to follow him armed to the wars for the service of the prince and defence of the land. and upon their admittance to their feuds , they take an oath to be true vassals and tenants to their lords , and to pay their rents , and perform their services , and upon failure to forfeit their estates ; and these tenants were divided according to their habitations into several mannors , in every one of which there was a court kept twice every year , where they all were to appear , and to be admitted to their several estates , and to take the oath above mentioned . all these peers did likewise hold all their demesnes , as also all their mannors , of the prince ; to whom they swore allegiance and fealty : there were besides these freemen or francklins , other tenants to every lord , who were called villains , who were to perform all servile offices and their estates were all at the l●●●● disposal when he pleased ; these consisted mostly of such of the former inhabitants of these countries , as were not either destroyed or driven out , and possibly of others who were servants amongst them , before they came from their own countries . perhaps thus much might have been unnecessary to be said , considering that these lords , tenants , and courts , are yet extant in all the kingdoms in europe ; but that to a gentleman of venice , where there are none of these things , and where the goths never were , something may be said in excuse for me . noble ven. 't is true , sir , we fled from the goths betimes , but yet in those countries which we recovered since in terra firma , we found the footsteps of these lords , and tenures , and their titles of counts ; though being now provinces to us , they have no influence upon the government , as i suppose you are about to prove they have in th●se parts . eng. gent. you are right , sir ; for the governments of france , spain , england , and all other countries where these people setled , were fram'd accordingly . it is not my business to describe particularly the distinct forms of the several governments in europe , which do derive from these people ( for they may differ in some of their orders and laws , though the foundation be in them all the same ) this would be unnecessary , they being all extant , and so well known ; and besides , little to my purpose , excepting to shew where they have declined from their first institution , and admitted of some change . france , and poland , have not , nor as i can learn , ever had any free-men below the nobility ; that is , had no yeomen ; but all are either noble , or villains , therefore the lands must have been originally given , as they now remain , into the hands of these nobles . but i will come to the administration of the government in these countries , and first say wherein they all agree , or did at least in their institution , which is , that the soveraign power is in the states assembled together by the prince , in which he presides ; these make laws , levy money , redress grievances , punish great officers , and the like . these states consist in some places of the prince and nobility onely , as in poland , and anciently in france ( before certain towns , for the encouraging of trade , procured priviledges to send deputies ; which deputies are now called the third estate ) and in others , consist of the nobility and commonalty , which latter had and still have the same right to intervene and vote , as the great ones have both in england , spain , and other kingdomes . doct. but you say nothing of the clergy ; i see you are no great friend to them , to leave them out of your politicks . eng. gent. the truth is , doctor , i could wish there had never been any : the purity of christian religion , as also the good and orderly government of the world , had been much better provided for without them , as it was in the apostolical time , when we heard nothing of clergy . but my omitting their reverend lordships was no neglect , for i meant to come to them in order ; for you know that the northern people did not bring christianity into these parts , but found it here , and were in time converted to it , so that there could be no clergy at the first : but if i had said nothing at all of this race , yet i had committed no solecism in the politicks ; for the bishops and great abbots intervened in the states here , upon the same foundātion that the other peers do , viz. for their great possessions , and the dependence their tenants and vassals have upon them ; although they being a people of that great sanctity and knowledg , scorn to intermix so much as titles with us profane lay-ideots , and therefore will be called lords spiritual . but you will have a very venerable opinion of them , if you do but consider how they came by these great possessions , which made them claim a third part of the government . and truely not unjustly by my rule , for i believe they had no less ( at one time ) than a third part of the lands in most of these countries . noble ven. pray , how did they acquire these lands ? was it not here by the charitable donation of pious christians , as it was elsewhere ? eng. gent. yes , certainly , very pious men ; some of them might be well meaning people , but still such as were cheated by these holy men , who told them perpetually , both in publick and private , that they represented god upon earth , being ordained by authority from him who was his viceroy here , and that what was given to them was given to god , and he would repay it largely both in this world and the next . this wheedle made our barbarous ancestors , newly instructed in the christian faith ( if this religion may be called so , and sucking in this foolish doctrine more than the doctrine of christ ) so zealous to these vipers , that they would have pluckt out their eyes to serve them , much more bestow , as they did , the fruitfullest and best situate of their possessions upon them : nay , some they perswaded to take upon them their callings , vow chastity , and give all they had to them , and become one of them , amongst whom , i believe , they found no more sanctity than they left in the world. but this is nothing to another trick they had , which was to insinuate into the most notorious and execrable villains , with which that age abounded ; men , who being princes , and other great men ( for such were the tools they work'd with ) had treacherously poisoned , or otherwise murdered their nearest relations , fathers , brothers , wives , to reign , or enjoy their estates ; these they did perswade into a belief , that if they had a desire to be sav'd , notwithstanding their execrable villanies , they need but part with some of those great possessions ( which they had acquired by those acts ) to their bishopricks or monasteries , and they would pray for their souls , and they were so holy and acceptable to god , that he would deny them nothing ; which they immediately performed , so great was the ignorance and blindness of that age ; and you shall hardly find in the story of those times , any great monastery , abbey , or other religious house in any of these countries ( i speak confidently , as to what concerns our own saxons ) that had not its foundation from some such original . doct. a worthy beginning of a worthy race ! noble ven. sir , you maintain a strange position here , that it had been better there had been no clergy : would you have had no gospel preached , no sacraments , no continuance of christian religion in the world ? or do you think that these things could have been without a succession of the true priesthood , or ( as you call it , of true ministry ) by means of ordination ? do's not your own church hold the same ? eng. gent. you will know more of my church , when i have told you what i find the word church to signifie in scripture , which is to me the only rule of faith , worship , and manners ; neither do i seek these aditional helps , of fathers , councels , or ecclesiastical history , much less tradition : for since it is said in the word of god itself , that antichrist did begin to work even in those days ; i can easily believe that he had brought his work to some perfection , before the word church was by him applied to the clergy : i shall therefore tell you what i conceive that church , clergy , and ordination , signified in the apostolical times . i find then the word church in the new testament taken but in two sences ; the first , for the vniversal invisible church , called sometimes of the first-born ; that is , the whole number of the true followers of christ in the world , where-ever resident , or into what part soever dispersed . the other signification of church is an assembly , which though it be sometimes used to express any meetings ( even unlawful & tumultuous ones ) as well in scripture as prophane authors ; yet it is more frequently understood , for a gathering together to the duties of prayer , preaching , and breaking of bread ; and the whole number so congregated is , both in the acts of the apostles , and in their holy epistles , called the church ; nor is there the least colour for appropriating that word to the pastors and deacons , who since the corruptions of christian religion are called clergy ; which word in the old testament is used , sometimes for gods whole people , and sometimes for the tribe of levi , out of which the priests were chosen : for the word signifies a lot ; so ●● dispencer of the christian faith. and i cannot sufficiently admire why our clergy , who very justly refuse to believe the miracle which is pretended to be wrought in transubstantiation , because they see both the wafer and the wine to have the same substance , and the same accidents ( after the priest has mumbled words over those elements ) as they had before , and yet will believe that the same kind of spell or charm in ordination can have the efficacy to metamorphose a poor lay-ideot into a heavenly creature ; notwithstanding that we find in them the same humane nature , and the same necessities of it , to which they were subject before such transformation ; nay , the same debauch , profanness , ignorance , and disability to preach the gospel . noble ven. sir , this discourse is very new to me . i must confess i am much inclined to joyn with you in believing , that the power priests exercise over mankind , with the iurisdiction they pretend to over princes and states , may be a usurpation ; but that they should not have a divine call to serve at the altar , or that any person can pretend to perform those sacred functions without being duly ordained , seems very strange . eng. gent. i am not now to discourse of religion ; it is never very civil to do so in conversation of persons of a different belief ; neither can it be of any benefit towards a roman catholick , for if his conscience should be never so cleerly convinc'd , he is not yet master of his own faith , having given it up to his church , of whom he must ask leave to be a convert , which he will be sure never to obtain ; but if you have the curiosity when you come amongst the learned in your own country ( for amongst our ordination-mongers , there is a great scarcity of letters and other good parts ) you may please to take the bible , which you acknowledg to be the word of god as well as we , and intreat some of them to shew you any passage , the plain and genuine sense of which can any way evince this succession , this ordination , or this priesthood , we are now speaking of ; and when you have done , if you will let your own excellent reason and discourse judg , and not your priest , ( who is too much concerned in point of interest ) i make no doubt but you will be convinced that the pretence to the dispensing of divine things by virtue of a humane constitution , and so ridiculous a one too , as the ordination practised by your bishops and ours ( who descend and succeed from one and the same mother ) is as little justifiable by scripture and reason , and full as great a cheat and vsurpation , as the empire which the ecclesiasticks pretend to over the consciences and persons of men , and the exemption from all secular power . noble ven. well , sir , though neither my faith nor my reason can come up to what you hold , yet the novelty and the grace of this argument has delighted me extreamly : and if that be a sin , as i fear it is , i must confess it to my priest ; but i ask your pardon first , for putting you upon this long deviation . eng. gent. well , this digression is not without its use , for it will shorten our business ( which is grown longer than i thought it would have been ) for i shall mention the clergy no more , but when-ever i speak of peerage , pray take notice that i mean both lords spiritual and temporal , since they stand both upon the same foot of property . but if you please , i will fall immediately to discourse of the government of england , and say no more of those of our neighbours , than what will fall in by the way , or be hinted to me by your demands ; for the time runs away , and i know the doctor must be at home by noon , where he gives daily charitable audience to an infinity of poor people , who have need of his help , and who send or come for it , not having the confidence to send for him , since they have nothing to give him ; though he be very liberal too of his visits to such , where he has any knowledg of them : but i spare his modesty , which i see is concerned at the just testimony i bear to his charity . the soveraign power of england then , is in king , lords , and commons . the parliaments , as they are now constituted , that is , the assigning a choice to such a number of burroughs , as also the manner and form of elections and returns , did come in , as i suppose , in the time of henry the third , where now our statute-book begins ; and i must confess , i was inclined to believe , that before that time , our yeomanry or commonalty had not formally assembled in parliament , but been virtually included , and represented by the peers , upon whom they depended : but i am fully convinced , that it was otherwise , by the learned discourses lately publisht by mr. petit of the temple , and mr. attwood of grays-inne , being gentlemen whom i do mention honoris causa ; and really they deserve to be honor'd , that they will spare some time from the mechanical part of their callings ( which is to assist clients with counsel , and to plead their causes , and which i acknowledg likewise to be honourable ) to study the true interest of their country , and to show how ancient the rights of the people in england are , and that in a time when neither profit nor countenance can be hop'd for from so ingenious an undertaking . but i beg pardon for the deviation . of the three branches of soveraign power which politicians mention , which are enacting laws , levying of taxes , and making war and peace , the two first of them are indisputably in the parliament ; and when i say parliament , i ever intend with the king. the last has been usually exercis'd by the prince , if he can do it with his own money : yet ' because even in that case it may be ruinous to the kingdom , by exposing it to an invasion , many have affirmed that such a power cannot be by the true and ancient free government of england , supposed to be intrusted in the hands of one man : and therefore we see in divers kings reigns , the parliament has been consulted , and their advice taken in those matters that have either concerned war or leagues ; and that if it has been omitted , addresses have been made to the king by parliaments , either to make war or peace , according to what they thought profitable to the publick . so that i will not determine whether that power which draws such consequences after it , be by the genuine sence of our laws in the prince or no ; although i know of no statute or written record which makes it otherwise . that which is undoubtedly the kings right , or prerogative , is to call and dissolve parliaments , to preside in them , to approve of all acts made by them , and to put in execution , as supream or soveraign magistrate , in the intervals of parliaments , and during their sitting , all laws made by them , as also the common law ; for which cause he has the nomination of all inferiour officers and ministers under him , excepting such as by law or charter are eligible otherwise ; and the power of the sword , to force obedience to the judgements given both in criminal and civil causes . doct. sir , you have made us a very absolute prince ; what have we left us ? if the king have all this power , what do our liberties or rights signifie whenever he pleases ? eng. gent. this objection , doctor , makes good what i said before , that your skill did not terminate in the body natural , but extend to the politick ; for a more pertinent interrogatory could never have been made by plato or aristotle : in answer to which , you may please to understand , that when these constitutions were first made , our ancestors were a plain-hearted , well-meaning people , without court-reserves or tricks , who having made choice of this sort of government , and having power enough in their hands to make it take place , did not foresee , or imagine , that any thoughts of invading their rights could enter into the princes head ; nor do i read that it ever did , till the norman line came to reign ; which coming in by treaty , it was obvious there was no conquest made upon any but harold , in whose stead william the first came , and would claim no more after his victory , than what harold enjoy'd , excepting that he might confiscate ( as he did ) those great men who took part with the wrong title , and french-men were put into their estates ; which though it made in this kingdom a mixture between normans and saxons , yet produced no change or innovation in the government ; the norman peers ●●ing as tenacious of their liberties , and as active in the recovery of them to the full , as the saxon families were . soon after the death of william , and possibly in his time , there began some invasions upon the rights of the kingdom , 〈…〉 gat grievances , and afterwards 〈…〉 plants and discontents , which grew to that height , that the peers were fain to use their power , that is , arm their vassals to defend the government ; whilest the princes of that age , first king iohn , and then henry the third , got force together . the barons call'd in lewis the dauphin , whilst the king would have given away the kingdom to the sarazens , as he did to the pope , and armed their own creatures ; so that a bloody war ensued , for almost forty years , off and on ; as may be read in our history : the success was , that the barons or peers obtained in the close two charters or laws for the ascertaining their rights , by which neither their lives , liberties , or estates , could ever be in danger any more from any arbitrary power in the prince ; and so the good government of england , which was before this time like the law of nature , onely written in the hearts of men , came to be exprest in parchment , and remain a record in writing ; though these charters gave us no more than what was our own before . after these charters were made , there could not chuse but happen some encroachment upon them : but so long as the peers kept their greatness , there was no breaches but what were immediately made up in parliament ; which when-ever they assembled , did in the first place confirm the charters , and made very often interpretations upon them , for the benefit of the people ; witness the statute de tallagio non concedendo , and many others . but to come nearer the giving the doctor an answer , you may please to understand , that not long after the framing of these forementioned charters , there did arise a grievance not foreseen or provided for by them ; and it was such an one that had beaten down the government at once , if it had not been redressed in an orderly way . this was the intermission of parliaments , which could not be called but by the prince ; and he not doing of it , they ceast to be assembled for some years : if this had not been speedily remedied , the barons must have put on their armour again ; for who can imagine that such brisk assertors of their rights could have acquiesced in an omission that ruin'd the foundation of the government , which consisting of king , lords , and commons , and having at that time marched near five hundred years upon three leggs , must then have gone on hopping upon one ; which could it have gone forward ( as was impossible whilest property continued where it was ) yet would have rid but a little way . nor can it be wonder'd at , that our great men made no provision against this grievance in their charters , because it was impossible for them to imagine that their prince , who had so good a share in this government , should go about to destroy it , and to take that burden upon himself , which by our constitution was undeniably to be divided between him and his subjects : and therefore divers of the great men of those times speaking with that excellent prince king edward the first about it , he , to take away from his people all fear and apprehension that he intended to change the ancient government , called speedily a parliament , and in it consented to a declaration of the kingdoms right in that point ; without the clearing of which , all our other laws had been useless , and the government itself too ; of which the parliament is ( at the least ) as essential a part as the prince ; so that there passed a law in that parliament that one should be held every year , and oftner if need be ; which like another magna charta , was confirmed by a new act made in the time of edward the third , that glorious prince : nor were there any sycophants in those days , who durst pretend loyalty by using arguments to prove that it was against the royal prerogative , for the parliament to entrench upon the kings right of calling and dissolving of parliaments ; as if there were a prerogative in the crown , to chuse whether ever a parliament should assemble , or no ; i would desire no more , if i were a prince , to make me grand seignior . soon after this last act , the king , by reason of his wars with france and scotland , and other great affairs , was forced sometimes to end his parliaments abruptly , and leave business undone , ( and this not out of court-tricks , which were then unknown ) which produced another act not long after , by which it was provided , that no parliament should be dismist , till all the petitions were answered ; that is , in the language of those times , till all the bills ( which were then styled petitions ) were finished . doct. pray , sir , give me a little account of this last act you speak of ; for i have heard in discourse from many lawyers , that they believe there is no such . eng. gen. truly , sir , i shall confess to you , that i do not find this law in any of our printed statute-books ; but that which first gave me the knowledg of it was , what was said about three years ago in the house of commons , by a worthy and learned gentleman , who undertook to produce the record in the reign of richard the second ; and since i have questioned many learned counsellors about it , who tell me there is such a one ; and one of them , who is counted a prerogative-lawyer , said it was so , but that act was made in factious times . besides , i think it will be granted , that for some time after , and particularly in the reigns of henry the 4 th , henry the 5 th , and henry the 6 th , it was usual for a proclamation to be made in westminster-hall , before the end of every session , that all those that had any matter to present to the parliament , should bring it in before such a day , for otherwise the parliament at that day should determine . but if there were nothing at all of this , nor any record extant concerning it ; yet i must believe that it is so by the fundamental law of this government , which must be lame and imperfect without it ; for it is all one to have no parliaments at all but when the prince pleases , and to allow a power in him to dismiss them when he will , that is , when they refuse to do what he will ; so that if there be no statute , it is certainly because our wise ancestors thought there needed none , but that by the very essence and constitution of the government it is provided for : and this we may call ( if you had rather have it so ) the common-law , which is of as much value ( if not more ) than any statute , and of which all our good acts of parliament and magna charta itself is but declaratory ; so that your objection is sufficiently aswered in this , that though the king is intrusted with the formal part of summoning and pronouncing the dissolution of parliaments , which is done by his writ , yet the laws ( which oblige him as well as us ) have determin'd how and when he shall do it ; which is enough to shew , that the kings share in the soveraignty , that is , in the parliament , is cut out to him by the law , and not left at his disposal . now i come to the kings part in the intervals of parliament . noble ven. sir , before you do so , pray tell us what other prerogatives the king enjoys in the government ; for otherwise , i who am a venetian , may be apt to think that our doge , who is call'd our prince , may have as much power as yours . eng. gent. i am in a fine condition amongst you with my politicks : the doctor tells me i have made the king absolute , and now you tell me i have made him a doge of venice ; but when your prince has power to dispose of the publick revenue , to name all officers ecclesiastical and civil that are of trust and profit in the kingdom , and to dispose absolutely of the whole militia by sea and land , then we will allow him to be like ours , who has all these powers . doct. well , you puzzle me extreamly : for when you had asserted the king's power to the heighth , in calling and dissolving parliaments , you gave me such satisfaction , and shewed me wherein the law had provided , that this vast prerogative could not hurt the people , that i was fully satisfied , and had not a word to say ; now you come about again , and place in the crown such a power , which in my judgment is inconsistent with our liberty . eng. gent. sir , i suppose you mean chiefly the power of the militia , which was , i must confess , doubtful , before a late statute declar'd it to be in the king : for our government hath made no other disposal of the militia than what was natural , viz. that the peers in their several counties , or jurisdictions , had the power of calling together their vassals , either armed for the wars , or onely so as to cause the law to be e●●cuted by serving writs ; and in case of resistance , giving possession : which lords amongst their own tenants did then perform the two several offices of lord-lieutenant , and sheriff ; which latter was but the earls deputy , as by his title of vice-comes do's appear . but this latter being of daily necessity , and justice itself , that is , the lives , liberties and estates of all the people in that county depending upon it , when the greatness of the peers decay'd ( of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter ) the electing of sheriff was referred to the county-court , where it continued till it was placed where it now is by a statute . for the other part of the militia , which is , the arming the people for war , it was de facto exercised by commission from the king , to a lord-lieutenant ( as an image of the natural lord ) and other deputies ; and it was tacitely consented to , though it were never setled by statute ( as i said before ) till his majesties happy restauration . but to answer you , i shall say , that whatever powers are in the crown , whether by statute or by old prescription , they are , and must be understood to be intrusted in the prince , for the preservation of the government , and for the safety and interest of the people ; and when either the militia , which is given him for the execution and support of the law , shall be imploy'd by him to subvert it ( as in the case of ship-money it was ) or the treasure shall be mis-apply'd , and made the revenue of courtiers and sycophants ( as in the time of edward the second ) or worthless or wicked people shall be put into the greatest places , as in the reign of richard the second ; in this case , though the prince here cannot be questionable for it ( as the kings were in sparta , and your doges i believe would be ) yet it is a great violation of the trust reposed in him by the government , and a making that power , which is given him by law , unlawful in the execution . and the frequent examples of justice inflicted in parliament upon the king's ministers for abusing the royal power , shews plainly that such authority is not left in his hands to use as he pleases . nay , there have be fallen fact troubles and dangers to some of th●se princes themselves , who have abused their power to the prejudice of the subjects ; which although they are no way justifiable , yet may serve for an instruction to princes , and an example not to hearken to ruinous councils : for men when they are enraged do not always consider justice of religion , passion being as natural to man as reason and vertue , which was the opinion of divine machiavil . to answer you then , i say , that though we do allow such powers in the king , yet since they are given him for edification and not destruction , and cannot be abused without great danger to his ministers , and even to himself ; we may hope that they can never be abused but in a broken government : and if ours be so ( as we shall see anon ) the fault of the ill execution of our laws is not to be imputed either to the prince or his ministers ; excepting that the latter may be , as we said before , justly punishable for not advising the prince to consent to them ending the frame ; of which we shall talk more hereafter : but in the mean time i will come to the kings other prerogatives , as having all royal mines , the being serv'd first before other creditors where mony is due to him , and to have a speedier and easier way than his subjects to recover his debts and his rents , &c. but to say all in one word , when there arises any doubt whether any thing be the king's prerogative or no , this is the way of deciding it , viz. to consider whether it be for the good and protection of the people that the king have such a power ; for the definition of prerogative is a considerable part of the common law , by which power is put into the prince for the preservation of his people . and if it be not for the good of his subjects , it is not prerogative , not law , for our prince has no authority of his own , but what was first intrusted in him by the government , of which he is head ; nor is it to be imagined that they would give him more power than what was necessary to govern them . for example , the power of pardoning criminals condemned , is of such use to the lives and estates of the people , that without it many would be exposed to die unjustly ; as lately a poor gentleman , who by means of the harangue of a strepitous lawyer was found guilty of murder , for a man he never kil'd ; or if he had , the fact had been but man-slaughter ; and he had been inevitably murdered himself , if his majesty had not been graciously pleased to extend his royal mercy to him ; as he did likewise vouchsafe to do to a gentleman convicted for speaking words he never utter'd ; or if he had spoken them , they were but foolishly , not malitiously spoken . on the other side , if a controversie should arise , as it did in the beginning of the last parliament , between the house of commons , and the prerogative-lawyers , about the choice of their speaker , these latter having interested his majesty in the contest , and made him , by consequence , disoblige , in limine , a very loyal , and a very worthy parliament ; and for what ? for a question , which if you will decide it the right way , will be none : for setting aside the presidents , and the history when the crown first pretended to any share in the choice of a speaker , which argument was very well handled by some of the learned patriots then , i would have leave to ask , what man can shew , and what reason can be alledged , why the protection and welfare of the people should require that a prerogative should be in the prince to chuse the mouth of the house of commons , when there is no particular person in his whole dominion that would not think it against his interest , if the government had given the king power to nominate his bayliff , his attorney , or his referree in any arbitration ? certainly there can be no advantage either to the soveraign or his subjects , that the person whose office it is to put their deliberations into fitting words , and express all their requests to his majesty , should not be entirely in their own election and appointment ; which there is the more reason for too , because the speakers for many years past have received instructions from the court , and have broken the priviledges of the house , by revealing their debates , adjourning them without a vote , and committed many other misdemeanours , by which they have begotten an ill understanding between the king and his house of commons , to the infinite prejudice both of his majesties affairs , and his people . since i have given this rule to judge prerogative by , i shall say no more of it ; for as to what concerns the king's office in the intervals of parliament , it is wholly ministerial , and is barely to put in execution the common law and the statutes made by the soveraign power , that is , by himself and the parliament , without varying one tittle , or suspending , abrogating , or neglecting the execution of any act whatsoever ; and to this he is solemnly sworn at his coronation : and all his power in this behalf is in him by common law , which is reason itself , written as well in the hearts of rational men , as in the lawyers books . noble ven. sir , i have heard much talk of the kings negative voice in parliaments , which in my opinion is as much as a power to frustrate , when he pleases , all the endeavours and labours of his people , and to prevent any good that might accrue to the kingdom by having the right to meet in parliament : for certainly , if we in venice had placed any such prerogative in our duke , or in any of our magistracies , we could not call ourselves a free people . eng. gent. sir , i can answer you as i did before , that if our kings have such a power , it ought to be used according to the true and genuine intent of the government , that is , for the preservation and interest of the people , and not for the disappointing the counsels of a parliament , towards reforming grievances , and making provision for the future execution of the lawes ; and whenever it is applyed to frustrate those ends , it is a violation of right , and infringement of the king's coronation-oath ; in which there is this clause , that he shall confirmare consuetudines , ( which in the latine of those times is leges ) quas vulgus elegerit . i know some criticks , who are rather grammarians than lawyers , have made a distinction between elegerim and elegero , and will have it , that the king swears to such laws as the people shall have chosen , and not to those they shall chuse . but in my opinion , if that clause had been intended onely to oblige the king to execute the laws made already , it might have been better exprest by servare consuetudines , than by confirmare consuetudines ; besides that he is by another clause in the same oath sworn to execute all the laws . but i shall leave this controversie undecided ; those who have a desire to see more of it , may look into those quarrelling declarations , pro and con , about this matter , which preceded our unhappy civil wars . this is certain , that there are not to be found any statutes that have passed , without being presented to his majesty , or to some commissioned by him ; but whether such addresses were intended for respect and honour to his majesty , as the speaker of the house of commons and the lord mayor of london are brought to him , i leave to the learned to discourse ; onely thus much we may affirm , that there never were yet any parliamentary requests , which did highly concern the publick , presented to any king , and by him refused , but such denials did produce very dismal effects , as may be seen in our histories ancient and late ; it being certain , that both the barons wars , and our last dismal combustions , proceeded from no other cause than the denial of the princes then reigning to consent to the desires of the states of the kingdom : and such hath been the wisdom and goodness of our present gracious prince , that in twenty years and somewhat more , for which time we have enjoy'd him since his happy restauration , he hath not exercis'd his negative voice towards more than one publick bill ; and that too , was to have continued in force ( if it had passed into an act ) but for six weeks , being for raising the militia for so long time ; and as for the private bills , which are matters of meer grace , it is unreasonable his majesty should be refused that right that every englishman enjoys , which is not to be obliged to dispence his favours but where he pleases . but for this point of the negative vote , it is possible that when we come to discourse of the cure of our political distemper , some of you will propose the clearing and explanation of this matter , and of all others which may concern the king's power and the peoples rights . noble ven. but pray , sir , have not the house of peers a negative voice in all bills ? how come they not to be obliged to use it for the publick good ? eng. gent so they are , no doubt , and the commons too ; but there is a vast difference between a deliberative vote which the peers have with their negative , and that in the crown to blast all without deliberating . the peers are co-ordinate with the commons in presenting and hammering of laws , and may send bills down to them , as well as receive any from them , excepting in matters wherein the people are to be taxed : and in this our government imitates the best and most perfect commonwealths that ever were ; where the senate assisted in the making of laws , and by their wisdom and dexterity , polisht , fil'd , and made ready things for the more populous assemblies ; and sometimes by their gravity and moderation , reduced the people to a calmer state , and by their authority and credit stem'd the tide , and made the waters quiet , giving the people time to come to themselves . and therefore if we had no such peerage now upon the old constitution , yet we should be necessitated to make an artificial peerage or senate in stead of it : which may assure our present lords , that though their dependences and power are gone , yet that we cannot be without them ; and that they have no need to fear an annihilation by our reformation , as they suffered in the late mad times . but i shall speak a word of the peoples rights , and then shew how this brave and excellent government of england came to decay . the people by the fundamental laws , that is , by the constitution of the government of england , have entire freedome in their lives , properties , and their persons ; nether of which can in the least suffer , but according to the laws already made , or to be made hereafter in parliament , and duly publisht : and to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good laws , which are our birth-right , all tryals must be by twelve men of our equals , and of our neighbourhood ; these in all civil causes judge absolutely and decide the matter of fact , upon which the matter of law depends ; but if where matter of law is in question , these twelve men shall refuse to find a special verdict at the direction of the court , the judge cannot controul it , but their verdict must be recorded . but of these matters , as also of demurrers , writs of errour , and arrests of judgment , &c. i have discours'd to this gentleman ( who is a stranger ) before now ; neither do's the understanding of the execution of our municipal laws at all belong to this discourse : onely it is to be noted , that these juries , or twelve men , in all trials or causes which are criminal , have absolute power , both as to matter of law and fact ( except the party by demurrer confess the matter of fact , and take it out of their hands . ) and the first question the officer asks the foreman , when they all come in to deliver their verdict , is this , is he guilty in manner or form as he is indicted , or not guilty ? which shews plainly , that they are to examine and judge , as well whether , and how far the fact committed is criminal , as whether the person charged hath committed that fact. but though by the corruption of these times ( the infallible consequences of a broken frame of government ) this office of the juries and right of englishmen have been of late question'd , yet it hath been strongly and effectually vindicated by a learned author of late , to whom i refer you for more of this matter . i shall say no more of the rights of the people , but this one thing , that neither the king , nor any by authority from him , hath any the least power or jurisdiction over any englishman , but what the law gives them ; and that although all commissions and writs go out in the king's name , yet his majesty hath no right to issue out any writ ( with advice of his council , or otherwise ) excepting what come out of his courts ; nor to alter any clause in a writ , or add anything to it . and if any person shall be so wicked as to do any injustice to the life , liberty , or estate of any englishman , by any private command of the prince , the person agrieved , or his next of kin ( if he be assassinated ) shall have the same remedy against the offender , as he ought to have had by the good laws of this land , if there had been no such command given ; which would be absolutely void and null , and understood not to proceed from that royal and lawful power which is vested in his majesty for the execution of justice , and the protection of his people . doct. now i see you have done with all the government of england ; pray before you proceed to the decay of it , let me ask you what you think of the chancery , whether you do not believe it a solecism in the politicks to have such a court amongst a free people ; what good will magna charta , the petition of right , or st. edwards laws do us to defend our property , if it must be entirely subjected to the arbitrary disposal of one man , whenever any impertinent or petulant person shall put in a bill against you ? how inconsistent is this tribunal with all that hath been said in defence of our rights , or can be said ? suppose the prince should in time to come so little respect his own honour and the interest of his people , as to place a covetous or revengeful person in that great judicatory , what remedy have we against the corruption of registers , who make what orders they please ; or against the whole hierarchy of knavish clerks , whilst not only the punishing and reforming misdemeanours depend upon him , who may without controul be the most guilty himself , but that all the laws of england stand there arraigned before him , and may be condemned when he pleases ? is there , or ever was there any such tribunal in the world before , in any countrey ? eng. gent. doctor , i find you have had a suit in chancery , but i do not intend to contradict or blame your orthodox zeal in this point : this court is one of those buildings that cannot be repaired , but must be demolished . i could inform you how excellently matters of equity are administred in other countries ; and this worthy gentleman could tell you of the venerable quaranzia's in his city , where the law as well as the fact , is at the bar , and subject to the judges , and yet no complaint made or grievance suffered : but this is not a place for , it this is but the superstructure ; we must settle the foundation first ; every thing else is as much out of order as this . trade is gone , suits are endless , and nothing amongst us harmonious : but all will come right when our government is mended , and never before , though our judges were all angels : this is the primum quaerite ; when you have this , all other things shall be added unto you ; when that is done , neither the chancery ( which is grown up to this since our ancestors time ) nor the spiritual courts , nor the cheats in trade , nor any other abuses , no not the gyant popery itself , shall ever be able to stand before a parliament , no more than one of us can live like a salamander in the fire . noble ven. therefore , sir , pray let us come now to the decay of your government , that we may come the sooner to the happy restauration . eng. gent. this harmonious government of england being founded as has been said upon property , it was impossible it should be shaken , so long as property remain'd where it was placed : for if , when the ancient owners the britains fled into the mountains , and left their lands to the invaders ( who divided them , as is above related ) they had made an agrarian law to fix it ; then our government , and by consequence our happiness had been for ought we know immortal : for our constitution , as it was really a mixture of the three , which are monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy ( as has been said ) so the weight and predominancy remain'd in the optimacy , who possessed nine parts in ten of the lands ; and the prince but about a tenth part . in this i count all the peoples share to the peers , and therefore do not trouble myself to enquire what proportion was allotted to them , for that although they had an hereditary right in their lands , yet it was so clog'd with tenures and services , that they depended , as to publick matters , wholly on their lords , who by them could serve the king in his wars ; and in time of peace , by leading the people to what they pleased : could keep the royal power within its due bounds , and also hinder and prevent the people from invading the rights of the crown ; so that they were the bulwarks of the government ; which in effect was much more an aristocracy , than either a monarchy or democracy : and in all governments , where property is mixt , the administration is so too : and that part which hath the greater share in the lands , will have it too in the jurisdiction : and so in commonwealths , the senate or the people have more or less power , as they have more or fewer possessions ; as was most visible in rome , where in the beginning , the patricii could hardly bring the people to any thing ; but afterwards , when the asiatick conquests had inricht the nobility to that degree , that they were able to purchase a great part of the lands in italy , the people were all their clients , and easily brought even to cut the throats of their redeemers the gracchi , who had carried a law for restoring them their lands . but enough of this before . i will not trouble myself nor you , to search into the particular causes of this change , which has been made in the possessions here in england ; but it is visible that the fortieth part of the lands which were at the beginning in the hands of the peers and church , is not there now ; besides that not only all villanage is long since abolished , but the other tenures are so altered and qualified , that they signifie nothing towards making the yeomanry depend upon the lords . the consequence is , that the natural part of our government , which is power , is by means of property in the hands of the people , whilest the artificial part , or the parchment , in which the form of government is written , remains the same . now art is a very good servant and help to nature , but very weak and inconsiderable , when she opposes her , and fights with her : it would be a very impar congressus , between parchment and power : this alone is the cause of all the disorder you heard of , and now see in england , and of which every man gives a reason according to his own fancy , whilest few hit the right cause : some impute all to the decay of trade , others to the growth of popery ; which are both great calamities , but they are effects , and not causes ; and if in private families there were the same causes , there would be the same effects . suppose now you had five or six thousand pounds a year , as it is probable you have , and keep forty servants , and at length , by your neglect , and the industry and thrift of your domesticks , you sell one thousand to your steward , another to your clerk of the kitchen , another to your bayliff , till all were gone ; can you believe that these servants , when they had so good estates of their own , and you nothing left to give them , would continue to live with you , and to do their service as before ? it is just so with a whole kingdom . in our ancestors times , most of the members of our house of commons thought it an honour to retain to some great lord , and to wear his blew coat : and when they had made up their lord's train , and waited upon him from his own house to the lords house , and made a lane for him to enter , and departed to sit themselves in the lower house of parliament , as it was then ( and very justly ) called ; can you think that any thing could pass in such a parliament that was not ordered by the lords ? besides , these lords were the king 's great council in the intervals of parliaments , and were called to advise of peace and war ; and the latter was seldom made without the consent of the major part ; if it were not , they would not send their tenants , which was all the militia of england ( besides the king's tenth part . ) can it be believed , that in those days the commons should dislike any thing the lords did in the intervals , or that they would have disputed their right to receive appeals from courts of equity , if they had pretended to it in those days , or to mend money-bills ? and what is the reason , but because the lords themselves at that time represented all their tenants ( that is , all the people ) in some sort ? and although the house of commons did assemble to present their grievances , yet all great affairs of high importance concerning the government , was transacted by the lords ; and the war which was made to preserve it , was called the barons wars , not the war of both houses : for although in antienter times the word baron were taken in a larger sense , and comprehended the francklins or freemen ; yet who reads any history of that war , shall not find that any mention is made of the concurrence of any assembly of such men , but that simon monford earl of leicester , and others of the great ones , did by their power and interest manage that contest . now if this property , which is gone out of the peerage into the commons , had passed into the king's hands , as it did in egypt in the time of ioseph , as was before said , the prince had had a very easie and peaceable reign over his own vassals , and might either have refused , justly , to have assembled the parliament any more ; or if he had pleased to do it , might have for ever managed it as he thought fit : but our princes have wanted a ioseph , that is , a wise councellor ; and instead of saving their revenue , which was very great , and their expences small , and buying in those purchases which the vast expences and luxury of the lords made ready for them , they have alienated their own inheritance ; so that now the crown-lands , that is , the publick patrimony , is come to make up the interest of the commons , whilest the king must have a precarious revenue out of the peoples purses , and be beholding to the parliament for his bread in time of peace ; whereas the kings their predecessors never asked aid of his subjects , but in time of war and invasion : and this alone ( though there were no other decay in the government ) is enough to make the king depend upon his people ; which is no very good condition for a monarchy . noble ven. but how comes it to pass that other neighbouring countries are in so settled a state in respect of england ? does their property remain the same it was , or is it come into the hands of the prince ? you know you were pleased to admit , that we should ask you , en passant , something of other countries . eng. gent. sir , i thank you for it , and shall endeavour to satisfie you . i shall say nothing of the small princes of germany , who keep in a great measure their ancient bounds , both of government and property ; and if their princes now and then exceed their part , yet it is in time of troubles and war , and things return into their right chanel of assembling the several states , which are yet in being every where : but germany lying so exposed to the invasion of the turks on the one side , and of the french on the other ; and having ever had enough to do to defend their several liberties against the encroachments of the house of austria ( in which the imperial dignity is become in some sort hereditary ) if there had been something of extraordinary power exercised of late years , i can say inter arma silent leges : but besides their own particular states , they have the diet of the empire , which never fails to mediate and compose things , if there be any great oppresson used by princes to their subjects , or from one prince or state to another . i shall therefore confine myself to the three great kingdoms , france , spain , and poland ; for as to denmark and sweden , the first hath lately chang'd its government , and not only made the monarchy hereditary , which was before elective , but has pull'd down the nobility , and given their power to the prince ; which how it will succeed , time will shew . sweden remains in point of constitution and property exactly as it did anciently , and is a well-governed kingdom . the first of the other three is france , of which i have spoken before , and shall onely add , that though it be very true , that there is property in france , and yet the government is despotical at this present , yet it is one of those violent states , which the grecians called tyrannies : for if a lawfull prince , that is , one who being so by law , and sworn to rule according to it , breaks his oaths and his bonds , and reigns arbitrarily , he becomes a tyrant and an usurper , as to so much as he assumes more than the constitution hath given him ; and such a government , being as i said violent , and not natural , but contrary to the interest of the people , first cannot be lasting , when the adventitious props which support it fail ; and whilst it does endure , must be very uneasie both to prince and people ; the first being necessitated to use continual oppression , and the latter to suffer it . doct. you are pleased to talk of the oppression of the people under the king of france , and for that reason , call it a violent government , when , if i remember , you did once to day extol the monarchy of the turks for well-founded and natural ; are not the people in that empire as much oppressed as in france ? eng. gent. by no means ; unless you will call it oppression for the grand seignior to feed all his people out of the product of his own lands ; and though they serve him for it , yet that does not alter the case : for if you set poor men to work and pay them for it , are you a tyrant , or rather , are not you a good common-wealths-man , by helping those to live , who have no other way of doing it but by their labour ? but the king of france knowing that his people have , and ought to have property , and that he has no right to their possessions , yet takes what he pleases from them , without their consent , and contrary to law ; so that when he sets them on work he pays them what he pleases , and that he levies out of their own estates . i do not affirm that there is no government in the world , but where rule is founded in property ; but i say there is no natural fixed government , but where it is so ; and when it is otherwise , the people are perpetually complaining , and the king in perpetual anxiety , always in fear of his subjects , and seeking new ways to secure himself ; god having been so merciful to mankind , that he has made nothing safe for princes , but what is just and honest . noble ven. but you were saying just now , that this present constitution in france will fall when the props fail ; we in italy , who live in perpetual fear of the greatness of that kingdom , would be glad to hear something of the decaying of those props ; what are they , i beseech you ? eng. gent. the first is the greatness of the present king , whose heriock actions and wisdom has extinguished envy in all his neighbour-princes , and kindled fear , and brought him to be above all possibility of control at home ; not only because his subjects fear his courage , but because they have his virtue in admiration , and amidst all their miseries cannot chuse but have something of rejoycing , to see how high he hath mounted the empire and honour of their nation . the next prop is the change of their ancient constitution , in the time of charles the seventh , by consent : for about that time the country being so wasted by the invasion and excursions of the english , the states then assembled petitioned the king that he would give them leave to go home , and dispose of affairs himself , and order the government for the future as he thought fit . upon this , his successor lewis the eleventh , being a crafty prince , took an occasion to call the states no more , but to supply them with an assemble des notables , which were certain men of his own nomination , like barbones parliament here , but that they were of better quality : these in succeeding reigns ( being the best men of the kingdom ) grew troublesome and intractable ; so that for some years the edicts have been verified ( that is in our language ) bills have been passed in the grand chamber of the parliament at paris , commonly called the chambre d' audience , who lately , and since the imprisonment of president brouselles and others during this king's minority , have never refused or scrupled any edicts whatsoever . now whenever this great king dies , and the states of the kingdom are restored , these two great props of arbitrary power are taken away . besides these two , the constitution of the government of france itself , is somwhat better fitted than ours to permit extraordinary power in the prince , for the whole people there possessing lands , are gentlemen ; that is , infinitely the greater part ; which was the reason why in their asembly of estates , the deputies of the provinces ( which we call here knights of the shire ) were chosen by , and out of the gentry , and sate with the peers in the same chamber , as representing the gentry onely , called petite noblesse . whereas our knights here ( whatever their blood is ) are chosen by commoners , and are commoners ; our laws and government taking no notice of any nobility but the persons of the peers , whose sons are likewise commoners , even their eldest , whilest their father lives : now gentry are ever more tractable by a prince , than a wealthy and numerous commonalty ; out of which our gentry ( at least those we call so ) are raised from time to time : for whenever either a merchant , lawyer , tradesman , grasier , farmer , or any other , gets such an estate , as that he or his son can live upon his lands , without exercising of any other calling , he becomes a gentleman . i do not say , but that we have men very nobly descended amongst these , but they have no preheminence , or distinction , by the laws or government . besides this , the gentry in france are very needy , and very numerous ; the reason of which is , that the elder brother , in most parts of that kingdom , hath no more share in the division of the paternal estate , than the cadets or younger brothers , excepting the principal house , with the orchards and gardens about it , which they call vol de chappon , as who should say , as far as a capon can fly at once . this house gives him the title his father had , who was called seignior , or baron , or count of that place ; which if he sells , he parts with his baronship , and for ought i know becomes in time roturier , or ignoble . this practice divides the lands into so many small parcels , that the possessors of them being noble , and having little to maintain their nobility , are fain to seek their fortune , which they can find no where so well as at the court , and so become the king's servants and souldiers , for they are generally couragious , bold , and of a good meen . none of these can ever advance themselves , but by their desert , which makes them hazard themselves very desperately , by which means great numbers of them are kill'd , and the rest come in time to be great officers , and live splendidly upon the king's purse , who is likewise very liberal to them , and according to their respective merits , gives them often , in the beginning of a campagne , a considerable sum to furnish out their equipage . these are a great prop to the regal power , it being their interest to support it , lest their gain should cease , and they be reduced to be poor provinciaux , that is , country-gentlemen again : whereas , if they had such estates as our country-gentry have , they would desire to be at home at their ease , whilest these ( having ten times as much from the king as their own estate can yield them , which supply must fail , if the king's revenue were reduced ) are perpetually engaged to make good all exorbitances . doct. this is a kind of governing by property too , and it puts me in mind of a gentleman of good estate in our country , who took a tenants son of his to be his servant , whose father not long after dying , left him a living of about ten pound a year : the young man's friends came to him , and asked him why he would serve now he had an estate of his own able to maintain him : his answer was , that his own lands would yield him but a third part of what his service was worth to him in all ; besides , that he lived a pleasant life , wore good clothes , kept good company , and had the conversation of very pretty maids that were his fellow-servants , which made him very well digest the name of being a servant . eng. gent. this is the very case ; but yet service ( in both these cases ) is no inheritance ; and when there comes a peaceable king in france , who will let his neighbours be quiet , or one that is covetous , these fine gentlemen will lose their employments , and their king this prop ; and the rather , because these gentlemen do not depend ( as was said before ) in any kind upon the great lords ( whose standing interest is at court ) and so cannot in a change , be by them carried over to advance the court-designs against their own good and that of their country . and thus much is sufficient to be said concerning france . as for spain , i believe there is no country ( excepting sweden ) in christendom , where the property has remained so intirely the same it was at the beginning ; and the reason is , the great and strict care that is taken to hinder the lands from passing out of the old owners hands ; for except it be by marriages , no man can acquire another man's estate , nor can any grandee , or titulado , or any other hidalgo there , alienate or ingage his paternal or maternal estate , otherwise than for his life ; nor can alter tenures , or extinguish services , or dismember mannors : for to this the princes consent must be had , which he never gives , till the matter be debated in the consejo de camera , which is no iunta or secret consejo de guerras , but one wherein the great men of the kingdom intervene , and wherein the great matters concerning the preservation of the government are transacted , not relating to foreign provinces or governments , but to the kingdom of castile and leon , of which i only speak now . it is true , there have been one or two exceptions against this severe rule , since the great calamities of spain , and two great lordships have been sold , the marquisate del monastero , to an assent ista genoese , and another to sebastian cortiza a portuguese , of the same profession : but both these have bought the intire lordships , without curtailing or altering the condition in which these two great estates were before ; and notwithstanding , this hath caused so much repining amongst the natural godos ( as the castilians call themselves still for glory ) that i believe this will never be drawn into an example hereafter . now the property remaining the same , the government doth so too , and the king 's domestick government , over his natural spaniards , is very gentle , whatever it be in his conquer'd provinces ; and the kings there have very great advantages of keeping their great men ( by whom they govern ) in good temper , by reason of the great governments they have to bestow upon them , both in europe and the indies ; which changing every three years , go in an age through all the grandees , which are not very numerous . besides , castile having been in the time of king roderigo over-run and conquered by the moors , who governed there despotically , some hundreds of years , before it could be recovered again by the old inhabitants , who fled to the mountains ; when they were at length driven out , the count of castile found a tax set upon all commodities whatsoever , by the moors , in their reign , called alcaval , which was an easie matter to get continued ( when their old government was restored ) by the cortes , or states ; and so it has continued ever since , as the excise has done here , which being imposed by them who drove and kept out the king , does now since his happy restauration remain a revenue of the crown . this alcaval , or excise , is a very great revenue , and so prevented , for some time , the necessities of the crown , and made the prince have the less need of asking relief of his people , ( the ordinary cause of disgust , ) so that the cortes , or assembly of the states , has had little to do of late , though they are duly assembled every year , but seldom contradict what is desired by the prince ; for there are no greater idolaters of their monarch in the world than the castilians are , nor who drink deeper of the cup of loyalty : so that in short , the government in spain is as ours was in queen elizabeths time , or in the first year after his now majesties return , when the parliament for a time complimented the prince , who had by that means both his own power and the peoples : which days i hope to see again , upon a better and more lasting foundation . but before i leave spain , i must say a word of the kingdom of arragon , which has not at all times had so quiet a state of their monarchy as castile hath enjoyed ; for after many combustions which happened there , concerning their fueros and privilegios , which are their fundamental laws , the king one day coming to his seat in parliament , and making his demands , as was usual , they told him that they had a request to make to him first ; and he withdrawing thereupon , ( for he had no right of sitting there to hear their debates ) they fell into discourse how to make their government subsist against the encroachments of the prince upon them , and went very high in their debates , whch could not chuse but come to the king's ear , who walked in a gallery in the same palace to expect the issue ; and being in great passion , was seen to draw out his dagger , very often , and thrust it again into the sheath ; and heard to say , sangre ha de costar ; which coming to the knowledg of the estates , they left off the debate , and sent some of their number to him , to know what blood it should cost , and whether he meant to murder any body . he drew out his dagger again , and pointing it to his breast , he said , sangre de reys ; leaving them in doubt , whether he meant that his subjects would kill him , or that he would do it himself . however , that parliament ended very peaceably , and a famous settlement was there and then made , by which a great person was to be chosen every parliament , who should be as it were an umpire between the king and his people , for the execution of the laws , and the preservation of their government , their fueros and privilegios , which are their courts of justice , and their charters . this officer was called . el iusticia d' arragon , and his duty was to call together the whole power of the kingdom , whenever any of the aforesaid rights were by open force violated or invaded , and to admonish the king , whenever he heard of any clandestine councils among them to that effect . it was likewise made treason , for any person of what quality soever , to refuse to repair upon due summons to any place where this iusticia should erect his standard , or to withdraw himself without leave , much more to betray him , or to revolt from him : besides , in this cortes , or parliament , the old oath which at the first foundation of their state was ordered to be taken by the king at his admittance , was again revived , and which is , in these words : nos que valemos tanto camo nos , y podemos mos , os eligimos nuestro rey , conque nos guardeys nuestros fueros y privilegios ; y si no , no. that is , we who are as good as you , and more powerful , do chuse you our king , upon condition that you preserve our rights and priviledges ; and if not , not . notwithstanding all this , philip the second , being both king of castile and arragon , picked a quarrel with the latter , by demanding his secretary antonio perez , who fled from the king's displeasure thither , being his own country ; and they refusing to deliver him ( it being expresly contrary to a law of arragon , that a subject of that kingdom should be against his will carried to be tryed elsewhere ) the king took that occasion to invade them with the forces of his kingdom of castile ( who had ever been rivals and enemies to the aragoneses ) and they to defend themselves under their iusticia , who did his part faithfully and couragiously ; but the castilians being old soldiers , and those of arragon but county-troops , the former prevailed , and so this kingdom in getting that of castile by a marriage ( but an age before ) lost its own liberty and government : for it is since made a province , and governed by a vice-roy from madrid , although they keep up the formality of their cortes still . doct. no man living that knew the hatred and hostility that ever was between the english and scots , could have imagined in the years 1639 , and 1640 , when our king was with great armies of english upon the frontiers of scotland , ready to invade that kingdom , that this nation would not have assisted to have brought them under ; but it proved otherwise . eng. gent. it may be they feared , that when scotland was reduced to slavery , and the province pacified , and forces kept up there , that such forces and greater might have been imployed here , to reduce us into the same condition ; an apprehension which at this time sticks with many of the common people , and helps to fill up the measure of our fears and distractions . but the visible reason why the english were not at that time very forward to oppress their neighbours , was the consideration , that they were to be invaded for refusing to receive from hence certain innovations in matters of religion , and the worship of god , which had not long before been introduced here ; and therefore the people of this kingdom were unwilling to perpetuate a mungrel church here , by imposing it upon them . but i do exceedingly admire , when i read our history , to see how zealous and eager our nobility and people here were anciently to assert the right of our crown to the kingdom of france ; whereas it is visible , that if we had kept france ( for we conquered it intirely and fully ) to this day , we must have run the fate of arragon , and been in time ruined and opprest by our own valour and good fortune ; a thing that was foreseen by the macedonians , when their king alexander had subdued all persia and the east ; who weighing how probable it was , that their prince having the possession of such great and flourishing kingdoms , should change his domicilium imperii , and inhabit in the centre of his dominions , and from thence govern macedon , by which means the grecians , who by their vertue and valour had conquered and subdued the barbarians , should in time ( even as an effect of their victories ) be opprest and tyrannized over by them : and this precautious foresight in the greeks ( as was fully believed in that age ) hastened the fatal catastrophe of that great prince . doct. well , i hope this consideration will fore-arm our parliaments , that they will not easily suffer their eyes to be dazled any more with the false glory of conquering france . noble ven. you need no great cautions against conquering france at this present , and i believe your parliaments need as little admonition against giving of money towards new wars or alliances , that fine wheedle having lately lost them enough already ; therefore , pray , let us suffer our friend to go on . eng. gent. i have no more to say of foreign monarchies , but only to tell you , that poland is both governed and possessed by some very great persons or potentates , called palatines , and under them by a very numerous gentry ; for the king is not onely elective , but so limited , that he has little or no power , but to command their armies in time of war ; which makes them often chuse foreigners of great fame for military exploits : and as for the commonalty or country-men , they are absolutely slaves or villains . this government is extreamly confused , by reason of the numerousness of the gentry , who do not always meet by way of representation as in other kingdoms , but sometimes for the choice of their king , and upon other great occasions , collectively , in the field , as the tribes did at rome ; which would make things much more turbulent if all this body of gentry did not wholly depend for their estates upon the favour of the palatines their lords , which makes them much more tractable . i have done with our neighbours beyond sea , and should not without your command have made so long a digression in this place , which should indeed have been treated of before we come to speak of england , but that you were pleased to divert me from it before : however , being placed near the portraicture of our own country , it serves better ( as contraria juxta se posita ) to illustrate it : but i will not make this deviation longer , by apologizing for it ; and shall therefore desire you to take notice , that as in england by degrees property came to shift from the few to the many , so the government is grown heavier and more uneasie both to prince and people , the complaints more in parliament , the laws more numerous , and much more tedious and prolix , to meet with the tricks and malice of men , which works in a loose government ; for there was no need to make acts verbose , when the great persons could presently force the execution of them : for the law of edward the first , for frequent parliaments , had no more words than a parliament shall be holden every year , whereas our act for a triennial parliament , in the time of king charles the first , contained several sheets of paper , to provide against a failer in the execution of that law ; which if the power had remained in the lords , would have been needless : for some of them , in case of intermission of assembling the parliament , would have made their complaint and address to the king , and have immediately removed the obstruction , which in those days had been the natural and easie way : but now that many of the lords ( like the bishops which the popes make at rome , in partibus infidelium ) are meerly grown titular , and purchased for nothing but to get their wives place , it cannot be wondred at if the king slight their addresses , and the court-parasites deride their honourable undertakings for the safety of their country . now the commons succeeding , as was said , in the property of the peers and church ( whose lands five parts of six have been alienated , and mostly is come into the same hands with those of the king and peers ) have inherited likewise , according to the course of nature , their power ; but being kept from it by the established government , which ( not being changed by any lawfull acts of state ) remains still in being formally , whereas virtually it is abolished ; so that for want of outward orders and provisions , the people are kept from the exercise of that power which is faln to them by the law of nature ; and those who cannot by that law pretend to the share they had , do yet enjoy it by vertue of that right which is now ceased , as having been but the natural effect of a cause that is no longer in being : and you know sublata causa , t●llitur . i cannot say that the greater part of the people do know this their condition , but they find very plainly that they want something which they ought to have ; and this makes them lay often the blame of their unsetledness upon wrong causes : but however , are altogether unquiet and restless in the intervals of parliament ; and when the king pleases to assemble one , spend all their time in complaints of the inexecution of the law , of the multiplication of an infinity of grievances , of mis-spending the publick monies , of the danger our religion is in by practices to undermine it and the state , by endeavours to bring in arbitrary power , and in questioning great officers of state , as the causers and promoters of all these abuses ; in so much , that every parliament seems a perfect state of war , wherein the commons are tugging and contending for their right , very justly and very honourably , yet without coming to a point : so that the court sends them packing , and governs still worse and worse in the vacancies , being necessitated thereunto by their despair of doing any good in parliament ; and therefore are forced to use horrid shifts to subsist without it , and to keep it off ; without ever considering , that if these counsellers understood their trade , they might bring the prince and people to such an agreement in parliament , as might repair the broken and shipwrack'd government of england ; and in this secure the peace , quiet and prosperity of the people , the greatness and happiness of the king , and be themselves not only out of present danger ( which no other course can exempt them from ) but be renowned to all posterity . noble ven. i beseech you , sir , how comes it to pass , that neither the king , nor any of his counsellors could ever come to find out the truth of what you discourse ? for i am fully convinced it is as you say . eng. gent. i cannot resolve you that , but this is certain , they have never endeavoured a cure , though possibly they might know the disease , as fearing that though the effects of a remedy would be , as was said , very advantagious both to king and people , and to themselves ; yet possibly , such a reformation might not consist with the merchandize they make of the princes favour , nor with such bribes , gratuities and fees as they usually take for the dispatch of all matters before them . and therefore our counsellors have been so far from suggesting any such thing to their master , that they have opposed and quashed all attempts of that kind , as they did the worthy proposals made by certain members of that parliament in the beginning of king iames's reign , which is yet called the undertaking parliament . these gentlemen considering what we have been discoursing of , viz. that our old government is at an end , had framed certain heads , which , if they had been proposed by that parliament to the king , and by him consented to , would , in their opinion , have healed the breach ; and that if the king would perform his part , that house of commons would undertake for the obedience of the people . they did believe that if this should have been moved in parliament before the king was acquainted with it , it would prove abortive : and therefore sent three of their number to his majesty : sir iames a croft , grandfather or father to the present bishop of hereford ; thomas harley , who was ancestor to the honourable family of that name is herefordshire ; and sir henry nevill , who had been ambassador from queen elizabeth to the french king. these were to open the matter at large to the king , and to procure his leave that it might be proposed in parliament : which , after a very long audience and debate , that wise prince consented to , with a promise of secresie in the mean time , which they humbly begged of his majesty . however , this took vent , and the earl of northampton ; of the house of howard , who ruled the rost in that time , having knowledg of it , engaged sir r. weston , afterwards lord treasurer and earl of portland , to impeach these undertakers in parliament before they could move their matters ; which he did the very same day , accompanying his charge ( which was endeavouring to alter the established government of england ) with so eloquent an invective , that if one of them had not risen , and made the house acquainted with the whole series of the affair , they must have been in danger of being impeached by the commons : but however it broke their designe , which was all that northampton and weston desired , and prevented posterity from knowing any of the particulars of this reformation ; for nothing being moved , nothing could remain upon the journal . so that you see our predecessors were not ignorant altogether of our condition , though the troubles which have befallen this poor kingdom since , have made it much more apparent : for since the determination of that parliament , there has not been one called , either in that king's reign , or his son 's , or since , that hath not been dissolved abruptly , whilst the main businesses , and those of most concern to the publick , were depending and undecided . and although there hath happened in this interim a bloody war , which in the close of it , changed the whole order and foundation of the polity of england , and that it hath pleased god to restore it again by his majesty's happy return , so that the old government is alive again ; yet it is very visible that its deadly wound is not healed , but that we are to this day tugging with the same difficulties , managing the same debates in parliament , and giving the same disgusts to the court , and hopes to the country , which our ancestors did before the year 1640. whilst the king hath been forced to apply the same remedy of dissolution to his two first parliaments , that his father used to his four first , and king iames to his three last , contrary to his own visible interest , and that of his people ; and this for want of having counsellors about him of abilities and integrity enough to discover to him the disease of his government , and the remedy : which i hope , when we meet to morrow morning you will come prepared to enquire into ; for the doctor says , he will advise you to go take the air this afternoon in your coach. noble ven. i shall think it very long till the morning come : but before you go , pray give me leave to ask you something of your civil war here ; i do not mean the history of it ( although the world abroad is very much in the dark as to all your transactions of that time for want of a good one ) but the grounds or pretences of it , and how you fell into a war against your king. eng. gent. as for our history , it will not be forgotten ; one of those who was in employment from the year 40. to 60. hath written the history of those 20 years , a person of good learning and elocution ; and though he be now dead , yet his executors are very unwilling to publish it so soon , and to rub a sore that is not yet healed . but the story is writ with great truth and impartiality , although the author were engaged both in councils and arms for the parliaments side . but for the rest of your demand , you may please to understand , that our parliament never did , as they pretended , make war against the king ; for he by law can do no wrong , and therefore cannot be quarrelled with : the war they declared was undertaken to rescue the king's person out of those mens hands who led him from his parliament , and made use of his name to levy a war against them . noble ven. but does your government permit , that in case of a disagreement between the king and his parliament , either of them may raise arms against the other ? eng. gent. it is impossible that any government can go further than to provide for its own safety and preservation whilst it is in being , and therefore it can never direct what shall be done when it self is at an end ; there being this difference between our bodies natural and politick , that the first can make a testament to dispose of things after his death , but not the other . this is certain , that where-ever any two co-ordinate powers do differ , and there be no power on earth to reconcile them otherwise , nor any umpire , they will , de facto , fall together by the ears . what can be done in this case de jure , look into your own country-man machiavell , and into grotius , who in his book de jure belliac pacis , treated of such matters long before our wars . as for the ancient politicians , they must needs be silent in the point , as having no mixt governments amongst them ; and as for me , i will not rest my self in so slippery a place . there are great disputes about it in the parliaments declarations before the war , and something considerable in the king's answers to them ; which i shall specifie immediately , when i have satisfied you how our war begun ; which was in this manner : the long parliament having procured from the king his royal assent for their sitting till they were dissolved by act , and having paid and sent out the scottish army , and disbanded our own , went on in their debates for the settling and mending our government : the king being displeased with them for it , and with himself for putting it out of his power to dissolve them , now the business which they pretended for their perpetuation was quite finished , takes an unfortunate resolution to accuse five principal men of the commons house , and one of the peers , of high-treason : which he prosecuted in a new unheard-of way , by coming with armed men into the commons house of parliament , to demand their members ; but nothing being done by reason of the absence of the five , and tumults of discontented citizens flocking to white-hall and westminster , the king took that occasion to absent himself from his parliament . which induced the commons house to send commissioners to hampton-court to attend his majesty with a remonstrance of the state of the kingdom , and an humble request to return to his parliament , for the redressing those grievances which were specified in that remonstrance . but the king , otherwise counselled , goes to windsor , and thence northwards , till he arrived at york ; where he summons in the militia , that is , the trained-bands of the county ; and besides , all the gentry , of which there was a numerous appearance . the king addressed himself to the latter with complaints against a prevailing party in parliament , which intended to take the crown from his head ; that he was come to them , his loving subjects , for protection ; and , in short , desired them to assist him with moneys to defend himself by arms. some of these gentlemen petitioned his majesty to return to his parliament , the rest went about the debate of the king's demands ; who , in the mean time , went to hull , to secure the magazine there , but was denied entrance by a gentleman whom the house had sent down to prevent the seizing it ; who was immediately declared a traytor , and the king fell to raising of forces : which coming to the knowledge of the house , they made this vote , that the king , seduced by evil counsel , intended to levy war against his parliament and people , to destroy the fundamental laws and liberties of england , and to introduce an arbitrary government , &c. this was the first time they named the king , and the last : for in all their other papers , and in their declaration to arm for their defence ( which did accompany this vote ) they name nothing but malignant counsellors . the kings answer to these votes and this declaration , is that which i mentioned ; wherein his majesty denies any intention of invading the government , with high imprecations upon himself and posterity if it were otherwise : and owns that they have right to maintain their laws and government . this is to be seen in the paper it self now extant ; and this gracious prince never pretended ( as some divines have done for him ) that his power came from god , and that his subjects could not dispute it , nor ought he to give any account of his actions ( though he should enslave us all ) to any but him . so that our war did not begin upon a point of right , but upon a matter of fact ; for without going to lawyers or casuists to be resolved , those of the people who believed that the king did intend to destroy our liberties , joyned with the parliament ; and those who were of opinion that the prevailing party in parliament did intend to destroy the king or dethrone him , assisted vigorously his majesty with their lives and fortunes . and the question you were pleased to ask never came ; for both parties pretended and believed they were in the right , and that they did fight for and defend the government : but i have wearied you out . noble ven. no sure ▪ sir , but i am infinitely obliged to you for the great care you have taken and still have used to instruct me , and beg the continuance of it for to morrow morning . eng. gent. i shall be sure to wait upon you at nine a clock , but i shall beseech both of you to bethink your selves what to offer , for i shall come with a design to learn , not to teach : nor will i presume in such a matter to talk all , as you have made me do to day ; for what i have yet to say in the point of cure , is so little , that it will look like the mouse to the mountain of this days discourse . doct. it is so in all arts , the corollary is short , and in ours particularly . those who write of the several diseases incident to humane bodies , must make long discourses of the causes , symptomes , signs and prognosticks of such distempers ; but when they come to treat of the cure , it is dispatched in a few recipes . eng. gent. well , sir , for this bout , i humbly take my leave of you ; nay , sir , you are not in a condition to use ceremony . doct. sir , i forbid you this door ; pray retire : to stand here , is worse than to be in the open air . noble ven. i obey you both . doct. i shall wait on you in the evening . the third day . noble ven. gentlemen , you are very welcome : what , you are come both together ! doct. i met this gentleman at the door : but methinks we sit looking one upon another , as if all of us were afraid to speak . eng. gent. do you think we have not reason , in such a subject as this is ? how can any man , without hesitation , presume to be so confident as to deliver his private opinion in a point , upon which , for almost 200 year ( for so long our government has been crazy ) no man has ventured ; and when parliaments have done any thing towards it , there have been animosities and breaches , and at length civil wars ? noble ven. our work to day is , to endeavour to shew how all these troubles may be prevented for the future , by taking away the cause of them , which is the want of a good government ; and therefore it will not be so much presumption in you , as charity , to declare your self fully in this matter . eng. gent. the cure will follow naturally , if you are satisfied in the disease , and in the cause of the disease : for if you agree that our government is broken , and that it is broken because it was founded upon property , and that foundation is now shaken ; it will be obvious , that you must either bring property back to your old government , and give the king and lords their lands again , or else you must bring the government to the property as it now stands . doct. i am very well satisfied in your grounds ; but because this fundamental truth is little understood amongst our people , and that in all conversations men will be offering their opinions of what the parliament ought to do at their meeting , it will not be amiss to examine some of those expedients they propose , and to see whether some or all of them may not be effectual towards the bringing us to some degree of settlement , rather than to venture upon so great a change and alteration as would be necessary to model our government anew . eng. gent. sir , i believe there can be no expedients proposed in parliament that will not take up as much time and trouble , find as much difficulty in passing with the king and lords , and seem as great a change of government , as the true remedy would appear , at least i speak as to what i have to propose ; but however , i approve your method , and if you will please to propose any of those things , i shall either willingly embrace them , or endeavour to shew reason why they will be of little fruit in the settling our state. doct. i will reduce them to two heads ( besides the making good laws for keeping out arbitrary power , which is always understood : ) the hindering the growth of popery , and consequently the providing against a popish successor ; and then the declaring the duke of monmouth's right to the crown , after it hath been examined and agreed to in parliament . eng. gent. as for the making new laws , i hold it absolutely needless , those we have already against arbitrary power being abundantly sufficient , if they might be executed ; but that being impossible ( as i shall shew hereafter ) till some change shall be made , i shall postpone this point : and for the first of your other two , i shall divide and separate the consideration of the growth of popery from that of the succession . i am sorry that in the prosecution of this argument , i shall be forced to say something that may not be very pleasing to this worthy gentleman , we being necessitated to discourse with prejudice of that religion which he professes ; but it shall be with as little ill breeding as i can , and altogether without passion or invectives . noble ven. it would be very hard for me to suspect any thing from you that should be disobliging ; but pray , sir , go on to your political discourse , for i am not so ignorant my self , but to know that the conservation of the national religion ( be it what it will ) is assential to the well ordering a state : and though in our city the doctrinals are very different from what are professed here , yet as to the government of the state , i believe you know that the pope or his priests have as little influence upon it , as your clergy have here , or in any part of the world. eng. gent. i avow it fully , sir , and with the favour you give will proceed . it cannot be denyed but that in former times popery has been very innocent here to the government , and that the clergy and the pope were so far from opposing our liberties , that they both sided with the barons to get a declaration of them by means of magna charta : it is true also , that if we were all papists , and that our state were the same , both as to property and empire , as it was 400 years ago , there would be but one inconvenience to have that religion national again in england , which is , that the clergy , quatenus such , had and will have a share in the soveraignty , and inferiour courts in their own power , called ecclesiastical ; this is , and ever will be a solecism in government , besides a manifest contradiction to the words of christ our saviour , who tells us , his kingdom is not of this world : and the truth is , if you look into the scriptures , you will find , that the apostles did not reckon that the religion they planted should be national in any country , and therefore have given no precepts to the magistrate to meddle in matters of faith and the worship of god ; but preach'd , that christians should yield them obedience in all lawfull things . there are many passages in holy writ which plainly declare , that the true believers and saints should be but a handful , and such as god had separated , and as it were taken out of the world ; which would not have been said by them , if they had believed that whole nations and people should have been true followers of christ , and of his flock : for certainly none of them are to be damn'd , and yet christ himself tells us , that few are saved , and bids us strive to get in at the strait gate ; and therefore i conceive it not to be imaginable , that either christ or his apostles did ever account that the true religion should be planted in the world by the framing of laws , catechisms , or creeds , by the soveraign powers and magistrates , whether you call them spiritual or temporal , but that it should have a progress suitable to its beginning : for it is visible that it had its original from the power and spirit of god , and came in against the stream , not onely without a numa pompilius , or a mahomet , to plant and establish it by humane constitutions and authority , but had all the laws of the world to oppose it , and all the bloudy tyrants of that age to persecute it , and to inflict exquisite torments on the professors of it , in nero's time ( which was very early ) the christians were offered a temple in rome , and in what other cities they pleased , to be built to jesus christ , and that the romans should receive him into the number of their gods ; but our religion being then in its purity , this was unanimously refused , for that such a god must have no companions , nor needed no temples , but must be worshipped in spirit and truth . the successors to these good christians were not so scrupulous ; for within some ages after , the priests to get riches and power , and the emperors to get and keep the empire ( for by this time the christians were grown numerous and powerful ) combined together to spoil our holy religion , to make it fit for the government of this world , & to introduce into it all the ceremonious follies and superstitions of the heathen ; and which is worse , the power of priests , both over the persons and consciences of men. i shall say no more of this , but refer you to innumerable authors who have treated of this subject , particularly to a french minister , who hath written a book , entituled , la religion catholique apostolique romaine instituee par nume pompile ; and to the incomparable machiavel in his posthume letter , printed lately in our language , with the translation of his works . but i have made a long digression ; and to come back again , shall onely desire you to take notice , when i say that anciently popery was no inconvenience in this kingdom , i mean onely politically , as the government then stood , and do not speak at all of the prejudice which mens souls did and will ever receive from the belief of those impious tenents , and the want of having the true gospel of jesus christ preached unto them , but living in perpetual superstition and idolatry : the consideration of these matters is not so proper to my present purpose , being to discourse onely of government . notwithstanding therefore , as i said before , that popery might have suited well enough with our old constitution , yet as to the present estate , which inclines to popularity , it would be wholly as inconsistent with it , and with the power of the keys , and the empire of priests ( especially where there is a forreign jurisdiction in the case ) as with the tyranny and arbitrary power of any prince in the world. i will add thus much in confirmation of the doctor 's assertion , that we ought to prevent the growth of popery , since it is now grown a dangerous faction here against the state. noble ven. how can that be , i beseech you , sir ? eng. gent. sir , i will make you judg of it your self ; i will say nothing of those foolish writings that have been put forth by mariana , emanuel sa , and some others , about the lawfulness of destroying princes and states in case of heresie , because i know all the conscientious and honest papists ( of which i know there are great numbers in the world ) do not only not hold , but even abhor such cursed tenents ; and do believe , that when the pope , by excommunication hath cut off any prince from the communion of the church , can go no further , nor ought to pretend a power to deprive him of his crown , or absolve his subjects from their oaths and obedience : but i shall confine my self to the present condition of our papists here . you know how dangerous it is for any kingdom or state to have a considerable , wealthy , flourishing party amongst them , whose interest it is to destroy the polity and government of the country where they live ; and therefore if our papists prove this party , you will not wonder why this people are so eager to depress them . this is our case : for in the beginning of queen elizabeths reign , there was an alteration of religion in our country , which did sufficiently enrage the holy father at rome , to see that this good cow would be milked no longer . he declares her an heretick and a bastard , ( his sanctity not having declared null that incestuous marriage which her father had contracted before with his brothers wife , and which that king had dissolved to marry her mother ) and afterwards excommunicated our queen , depriving her , as much as in him lay , of the kingdom ; some of the zealots of that party ( having a greater terrour for those thunder-bolts than i believe many have now ) began to conspire against her ; and plots grew at length so frequent , and so dangerous , that it was necessary ( as the parliaments then thought ) to secure the queen , by making severe laws against a people , who did not believe themselves her majesties subjects ; but on the contrary , many of them thought themselves in conscience obliged to oppose and destroy her : and although that excommunication , as also the pretended doubtfulness of the title ▪ both died with that renowned queen , yet a new desperate conspiracy against the king her successor and the whole parliament ensuing , not long after her decease , those rigorous laws have been so far from being repealed , that very many more , and far severer , have been since made , and are yet in force . now these laws make so great a distinction between protestants and papists , that whereas the former are by our government and laws , the freest people in the world , the latter are little better than slaves , are confined to such a distance from their houses , are not to come near the court , which being kept in the capital city , mostly deprives them from attending their necessary occasions ; they are to pay two third parts of their estates annually to the king , their priests are to suffer as traitors , and they as felons for harbouring them ; in fine , one of us , if he do not break the municipal laws for the good government of the country , need not fear the king's power , whereas their being what they are , is a breach of the law , and does put them into the princes hands to ruine them when he pleases ; nay , he is bound by oath to do it , and when he does it not , is complained against by his people , and parliaments take it amiss . now judge you , sir , whether it is not the interest of these people to desire and endeavour a change , whilest they remain under these discouragements , and whether they are not like to joyn with the prince ( whose connivance at the inexecution of those laws is the onely means and hope of their preservation ) whenever he shall undertake any thing for the increase of his own power , and the depressing his parliaments . noble ven. what you say is very undeniable , but then the remedy is very easie and obvious , as well as very just and honourable , which is the taking away those cruel laws , and if that were done they would be one people with you , and would have no necessity , and by consequence no desire to engreaten the king against the interest and liberty of their own country . eng. gent. you speak very well , and one of the reasons amongst many which i have , to desire a composure of all our troubles by a setled government , is , that i may see these people ( who are very considerable , most of them , for estates , birth and breeding ) live quietly under our good laws , and increase our trade and wealth with their expences here at home ; whereas now the severity of our laws against them , makes them spend their revenues abroad , and inrich other nations with the stock of england ; but as long as the state here is so unsetled as it is , our parliaments will never consent to countenance a party , who by the least favour and indulgence may make themselves able to bring in their own religion to be national , and so ruine our polity and liberties . noble ven. i wonder why you should think that possible ? eng. gent. first , sir , for the reason we first gave , which is the craziness of our polity , there being nothing more certain , than that both in the natural and also the politick body any sinister accident that intervenes , during a very diseased habit , may bring a dangerous alteration to the patient . an insurrection in a decayed government , a thing otherwise very inconsiderable , has proved very fatal , as i knew a slight flesh-wound bring a lusty man to his grave in our wars , for that he being extreamly infected with the french disease , could never procure the orifice to close ; so although the designs both at home and abroad , for altering our religion , would be very little formidable to a well-founded government , yet in such an one as we have now , it will require all our care to obviate such machinations . another reason is the little zeal that is left amongst the ordinary protestants , which zeal uses to be a great instrument of preserving the religion establish'd , as it did here in queen elizabeths time ; i will add the little credit the church of england hath amongst the people , most men being almost as angry with that popery which is left amongst us ( in surplices , copes , altars , cringings , bishops , ecclesiastical courts , and the whole hierarchy , besides an infinite number of useless , idle , superstitious ceremonies , and the ignorance and vitiousness of the clergy in general ) as they are with those dogma's that are abolished ; so that there is no hopes that popery can be kept out , but by a company of poor people called fanaticks , who are driven into corners as the first christians were ; and who only in truth conserve the purity of christian religion , as it was planted by christ and his apostles , and is contained in scripture . and this makes almost all sober men believe , that the national clergy , besides all other good qualities have this too , that they cannot hope to make their hierarchy subsist long against the scriptures , the hatred of mankind , and the interest of this people , but by introducing the roman religion , and getting a foreign head and supporter , which shall from time to time brave and hector the king and paliament in their favour and behalf , which yet would be of little advantage to them , if we had as firm and wise a government as you have at venice . another reason , and the greatest , why the romish religion ought to be very warily provided against at this time , is , that the lawful and undoubted heir to the crown , if his majesty should die without legitimate issue , is more than suspected to imbrace that faith ; which ( if it should please god to call the king , before there be any remedy applied to our distracted state ) would give a great opportunity ( by the power he would have in intervals of parliament ) either to introduce immediately that profession , with the help of our clergy , and other english and foreign aids , or else to make so fair a way for it , that a little time would perfect the work ; ●nd this is the more formidable , for that ●a very zealous and bigot 〈…〉 and therefore may be supposed to act any thing to that end , although it should manifestly appear to be contrary to his own interest and quiet ; so apt are those who give up their faith and the conduct of their lives to priests ( who to get to themselves empire , promise them the highest seats in heaven ; if they will sacrifice their lives , fortunes , and hopes , for the exaltation of their holy mother , and preventing the damnation of an innumerable company of souls which are not yet born ) to be led away with such erroneous and wild fancies . whereas philip the second of spain , the house of guise in france , and other great statesmen , have always made their own greatness their first aim , and used their zeal as an instrument of that ; and instead of being cozen'd by priests , have cheated them , and made them endeavour to preach them up to the empire of the world. so i have done with the growth of popery , and must conclude , that if that should be stopt in such manner , that there could not be one papist left in england , and yet our polity left in the same disorder that now afflicts it , we should not be one scruple the better for it , nor the more at quiet ; the growth and danger of popery not being the cause of our present distemper , but the effect of it : but as a good and setled government would not be at all the nearer for the destruction of popery , so popery and all the dangers and inconveniences of it would not only be further off , but would wholly vanish at the sight of such a reformation . and so we begin at the wrong end , when we begin with religion before we heal our breaches . i will borrow one similitude more , with our doctor 's favour , from his profession . i knew once a man given over by the physitians , of an incurable cachexia , which they said proceeded from the ill quality of the whole mass of blood , from great adustion , and from an ill habit of the whole body . the patient had very often painful fits of the chollick , which they said proceeded from the sharpness of the humour which caused the disease ; and , amongst the rest , had one fit which tormented him to that degree , that it was not expected he could out-live it ; yet the doctors delivered him from it in a small time : notwithstanding , soon after the man died of his first distemper . whereas if their art had arrived to have cured that ( which was the cause of the other ) the chollick had vanished of it self , and the patient recovered . i need make no application , nor shall need to say much of the succession of the crown ( which is my next province ) but this i have said already , that it is needless to make any provision against a popish successor if you rectifie your government ; and if you do not , all the care and circumspection you can use in that particular , will be useless and of none effect , and will but at last ( if it do not go off easily , and the next heir succeed peaceably , as is most likely , especially if the king live till the people's zeal and mettle is over ) end probably in a civil war about title ; and then the person deprived may come in with his sword in his hand , and bring in upon the point of it both the popish religion , and arbitrary power : which , though i believe he will not be able to maintain long ( for the reasons before alledged , ) yet that may make this generation miserable and unhappy . it will certainly be agreed by all lovers of their country , that popery must be kept from returning , and being national in this kingdom , as well for what concerns the honour and service of god , as the welfare and liberty of the people ; and i conceive there are two ways by which the parliament may endeavour to secure us against that danger ; the first by ordering such a change in the administration of our government , that whoever is prince , can never violate the laws , and then we may be very safe against popery ; our present laws being effectual enough to keep it out , and no new ones being like to be made in parliament that may introduce it ; and this remedy will be at the same time advantagious to us against the tyranny and incroachments of a protestant successor , so that we may call it an infallible remedy both against popery and arbitrary power . the second way is by making a law to disable any papist by name or otherwise , from inheriting the crown ; and this is certainly fallible , that is , may possibly not take place ( as i shall shew immediately ; ) and besides , it is not improbable that an heir to this kingdom in future times , may dissemble his religion , till he be seated in the throne ; or possibly be perverted to the roman faith after he is possest of it , when it may be too late to limit his prerogative in parliament ; and to oppose him without that , will i fear , be judged treason . doct. but sir , would you have the parliament do nothing , as things stand , to provide ( at least , as much as in them lies ) that whoever succeeds be a good protestant ? eng. gent. yes , i think it best in the first place to offer to his majesty the true remedy ; & if they find him averse to that , then to pursue the other which concerns the succession , because the people ( who are their principals , and give them their power ) do expect something extraordinary from them at this time ; and the most of them believe this last the only present means to save them from popery , which they judge ( and very justly ) will bring in with it a change of government . but then , i suppose , they may be encouraged to propose in the first place the true cure ; not only because that is infallible , as has been proved , but likewise because his majesty in probability will sooner consent to any reasonable demand towards the reforming of the government , and to the securing us that way , than to concur to the depriving his onely brother of the crown . and possibly this latter ( as i said before ) may be the only way the parliament can hope will prove effectual : for if you please to look but an age back into our story , you will find that henry the eighth did procure an act of parliament , which gave him power to dispose of the crown by his last will and testament ; and that he did accordingly make his said will , and by it devise the succession to his son edward the sixth , in the first place , and to the heirs of his body ; and for want of such , to his daughter mary , and to the heirs of her body ; and for want of which heirs , to his daughter elizabeth , our once soveraign of immortal and blessed memory , and the heirs of her body ; and for want of all such issue , to the right heirs of his younger sister , who was , before he made this will , married to charles brandon duke of suffolk , and had issue by him . by this testament he disinherited his elder sister , who was married in scotland ; and by that means did , as much as in him lay , exclude his majesty ( who now , by god's mercy , reigns over us ) as also his father and grandfather . and to make the case stronger , there passed an act long after , in the reign of queen elizabeth , that it should be treason during that queen's life , and a premunire afterwards , to assert that the imperial crown of england could not be disposed of by act of parliament : yet after the decease of that queen , there was no considerable opposition made to the peaceable reception and recognition of king iames of happy memory . and those who did make a little stir about the other title , as the lord cobham , sir walter rawleigh , and a few others , were apprehended & condemn'd according to law. and , notwithstanding that , since , in the reign of k. charles the first , there was a bloody civil war , in which men's minds were exasperated at a high rate ; yet in all the course of it , the original want of title was never objected against his late majesty . i do not urge this to aver that the parliament , with the king's consent , cannot do lawfully this , or any other great matter ; which would be an incurring the penalty of that law , and a solecism in the politicks : but to shew , that when the passions of men are quieted , and the reasons other than they were , it happens oftentimes that those acts which concern the succession fall to the ground of themselves , and that even without the sword , which in this case was never adoperated . and that therefore this remedy in our case may be likely never to take place , if it please god the king live till this nation be under other kind of circumstances . doct. sir , you say very well : but it seems to me , that the last parliament was in some kind of fault , if this be true that you say ; for i remember that my lord chancellor did once , during their sitting , in his majesty's name offer them to secure their religion and liberties any way they could advise of , so they would let alone meddling with the succession , and invited them to make any proposals they thought necessary to that end . eng. gent. hinc ille lachrimae . if this had been all , we might have been happy at this time ; but this gracious offer was in limine , accompanied with such conditions that made the parliament conjecture that it was only to perplex and divide them ; and did look upon it as an invention of some new romanza , ( counsellors and those too , possibly , influenced by the french ) to make them embrace the shaddow for the substance , and satisfying themselves with this appearance , to do their ordinary work of giving money , and be gone , and leave the business of the kingdom as they found it . for it was proposed , that whatsoever security we were to receive , should be both conditional and reversionable : that is , first , we should not be put into possession of this new charter ( be it what it will ) till after the death of his majesty who now is ; whereas such a provision is desirable , and indeed necessary for us for this only reason , that when that unfortunate hour comes , we might not be , in that confusion , unprovided of a calm , setled and orderly , as well as a legal way to keep out popery . whereas otherwise , if we be to take possession in that minute , it must either miscarry , or be gotten by a war , if it be true that possession be nine points of the law in other cases , it is in this the whole ten : and i should be very unwilling , in such a distraction , to have no sanctuary to fly to , but a piece of parchment kept in the pells ; and to have this too , as well as other advantages , in the power and possession of him in whose prejudice it was made : this had been almost as good an expedient to keep out popery , as the bill which was thrown out that parliament ; which provided , that in the reign of a king that should be a papist , the bishops should chuse one another upon vacancies . those counsellors who put my lord chancellor upon this proposal , were either very slender politicians themselves , or else thought the parliament so . if magna charta and the petition of right had not been to take place till after the decease of those princes who confirmed them , neither had the barons shed their blood to so good purpose , nor the members of the parliament in tertio caroli , deserved so glorious an imprisonment after it was ended . the other condition in this renowned proposal is , that all provision and security which is given us to preserve our religion , shall cease immediately , whenever the prince shall take a certain oath to be penned for that purpose ; and i leave it to all thinking men to determine what that will avail us , when we shall have a king of that profession over us , who shall not have so much zeal for his religion , as he who is now the next successor hath ; but shall possibly prefer his ambition , and his desire to get out of wardship , before the scruples of his confessor ; and yet may afterwards , by getting absolution for , and dispensation from such oaths and compliance , employ the power he gets himself , and the security he deprives us of , to introduce violently what worship and faith he pleases . this gracious offer had the fatality to disguist one of the best parliaments that ever sate , and the most loyal ; so that laying it aside , they fell upon the succession , the only thing they had then left , and were soon after dissolved , leaving the kingdom in a more distracted condition than they found it ; and this can no way be composed , but by mending the polity , so that whoever is king cannot ( be he never so inclined to it ) introduce popery , or destroy whatever religion shall be established : as you see in the example of the dutchy of hanover , whose prince some fourteen years since , was perverted to the roman church , went to rome to abjure heresie ( as they call the truth ) return'd home , where he lived and governed as he did before , without the least animosity of his subjects for his change , or any endeavour of his to introduce any in his government or people , and dying this last spring , left the peaceable and undisturbed rule of his subjects to the next successor , his brother the bishop of osnaburg , who is a protestant , and this because the polity of that dukedom has been conserved entire for many years , and is upon a right basis : and if our case were so , we should not onely be out of danger to have our religion altered ( as i said before ) whoever is king , but should in other things be in a happy and flourishing condition . but i have made a long and tedious digression to answer your demands : now 't is time you assist me to find the natural cure of all our mischiefs . doct. stay , sir , i confess my self to be wonderfully edified with your discourse hitherto , but you have said nothing yet of the duke of monmouth . eng. gent. i do not think you desire it , though you were pleased to mention such a thing , for i suppose you cannot think it possible , that this parliament ( which is now speedily to meet by his majesties gracious proclamation ) can ever suffer such a thing to be so much as debated amongst them . doct. sir , you have no reason to take that for granted , when you see what books are printed , what great and honourable persons frequent him in private , and countenance him in publick ; what shoals of the middle sort of people have in his progress this summer met him before he came into any great town , and what acclamations and bon-fires have been made in places where he lodged . eng. gent. these things , i must confess , shew how great a distemper the people are in , and the great reason we have to pray god of his mercy to put an end to it by a happy agreement in parliament . but certainly this proceeds only from the hatred they have to the next successour and his religion , and from the compassion they have to the duke of monmouth ( who as they suppose , hath suffered banishment and dis-favour at court , at his instance ) and not from any hopes of expectations that the parliament will countenance any pretence that can be made in his behalf to the succession . doct. it may be when we have discoursed of it , i shall be of your mind , ( as indeed i am enclined already ) but yet nothing in war is more dangerous than to contemn an enemy ; so in this argumentation that we use to secure our liberties , we must leave nothing unanswered that may stand in the way of that , especially the duke of monmouth's claim , which is pretended to confirm and fortifie them , for ( say some men ) if you set him up , he will presently pass all bills that shall concern the safety and interest of the people ; and so we shall be at rest for ever . eng. gent. well , i see i must be more tedious than i intended ; first then , the reasoning of these men you speak of , does in my apprehension , suppose a thing i cannot mention without horrour , which is , that this person should be admitted immediately to the possession of the crown to do all these fine matters ; for otherwise , if he must stay till the death of our soveraign who now reigns ( which i hope and pray will be many years ) possibly these delicate bills may never pass , nor he find hereafter the people in so good a humour to admit him to the reversion , which if it could be obtain'd ( as i think it impossible politically ) yet the possession must be kept by a standing army , and the next successour cannot have a better game to play , nor a better adversary to deal with , than one who leaps in over the heads of almost all the protestant princes families abroad , besides some papist who are greater ; and when we have been harrassed with wars , and the miseries that accompany it some few years , you shall have all these fine people , who now run after him , very weary of their new prince : i would not say any thing to disparage a person so highly born , and of so early merit ; but this i may say , that if a lawful title should be set on foot in his favour , and a thousand dutch hosts , and such like , should swear a marriage , yet no sober man , that is not blinded with prejudice , will believe , that our king ( whom none can deny to have an excellent understanding ) would ever marry a woman so much his inferiour as this great persons mother was ; and this at a time when his affairs were very low , and he had no visible or rational hopes to be restored to the possession of his kingdoms but by an assistance which might have been afforded him by means of some great foreign alliance . well , but to leave all this , do these men pretend that the duke of monmouth shall be declared successour to the crown in parliament , with the king 's concurence or without it ; if without it , you must make a war for it , and i am sure that no cause can be stated upon such a point , that will not make the assertors and undertakers of it be condemned by all the politicians and moralists of the world , and by the casuis t s of all religions , and so by consequence , it is like to be a very unsuccesful war. if you would have this declar'd with the king's consent , either you suppose the royal assent to be given , when the king has his liberty either to grant it , or not grant it , to dissolve the parliament , or not dissolve it , without ruine or prejudice to his affairs : if in the first case , it is plain he will not grant it , because he cannot do it without confessing his marriage to that duke's mother , which he hath already declared against in a very solemn manner , and caused it to be registred in chancery ; and which not only no good subject can chuse but believe , but which cannot be doubted by any rational person ; for it would be a very unnatural , and indeed a thing unheard of , that a father who had a son in lawful matrimony , and who was grown to perfection , and had signalized himself in the wars , and who was ever intirely beloved by him , should disinherit him by so solemn an asseveration ( which must be a false one too ) to cause his brother to succeed in his room . and whereas it is pretended by some , that his majesties danger from his brothers counsels and designs may draw from him something of this ; beside that they do not much complement the king in this , it is clear , his brother is not so popular , but that he may secure him when he pleases , without hazard , if there were any ground for such an apprehension . but we must in the next place suppose that the king's affairs were in such a posture , that he could deny the parliament nothing without very great mischief , and inconvenience to himself and the kingdom ; then i say , i doubt not , but the wisdom of the parliament will find out divers demands and requests to make to his majesty of greater benefit , and more necessary for the good of his people than this would be ; which draws after it not only a present unsetledness , but the probable hazard of misery and devastation for many years to come , as has been proved . so that as on the one side the parliament could not make a more unjustfiable war than upon this account , so they could not be dissolved upon any occasion wherein the people would not shew less discontent and resentment , and for which the courtiers would not hope to have a better pretext to strive in the next choice to make their arts and endeavours more successful in the election of members more suitable to their designs for the continuance of this present mis-government ; for if this parliament do mis-spend the peoples mettle , which is now up , in driving that nail which cannot go , they must look to have it cool , and so the ship of this commonwealth , which if they please may be now in a fair way of entering into a safe harbour , will be driven to sea again in a storm , and must hope for , and expect another favourable wind to save them ; and god knows when that may come . doct. but sir , there are others , who not minding whether the parliament will consider the duke of monmouths concern , so far as to debate it , do yet pretend , that there is great reason to keep up the peoples affections to him ; and possibly to foment the opinion they have of his title to the crown , to the end , that if the king should die re infectà , that is , before such time as the government is redrest , or the duke of york disabled by law to succeed , the people might have an head , under whose command and conduct they might stand upon their guard , till they had some way secured their government and religion . eng. gent. what you have started is not a thing that can safely be discoursed of , nor is it much material to our design , which is intended to speculate upon our government , and to shew how it is decayed : i have industriously avoided the argument of rebellion , as i find it coucht in modern polititians , because most princes hold , that all civil wars in mixt monarchies must be so , and a polititian , as well as an oratour , ought to be vir bonus , so ought to discourse nothing , how rational soever , in these points under a peaceable monarchy , which gives him protection , but what he would speak of his prince if all his councel were present . i will tell you only , that these authors hold , that nothing can be alledged to excuse the taking arms by any people in opposition to their prince from being crimen lesae majestatis , but a claim to a lawful jurisdiction , or co-ordination in the government , by which they may judg of , and defend their own rights , and so pretend to fight for , and defend the government ; for though all do acknowledg , that populi salus is , and ought to be the most supreme , or soveraign law in the world ; yet if we should make private persons , how numerous soever , judg of populi salus , we should have all the risings and rebellions that should ever be made , justified by that title , as happened in france , when la guerre du bien publique took that name , which was raised by the insatiable ambition of a few noble men , and by correspondency and confederacy with charles , son of the duke of burgundy , and other enemies to that crown . doct. but would you have our people do nothing then , if the king should be assassinated , or die of a natural death ? eng. gent. you ask me a very fine question , doctor : if i say , i would have the people stir in that case , then the king , and his laws take hold of me ; and if i should answer , that i would have them be quiet , the people would tear me in pieces for a iesuit , or at least , believe that i had no sense of the riligion , laws , and liberty of my countrey . de facto , i do suppose , that if the people do continue long in this heat which now possesseth them , and remain in such a passion at the time of the kings death without setling matters , they may probably fall into tumults and civil war , which makes it infinitely to be desired , and prayed for by all good english men , that during the quiet and peace we injoy , by the blessing of his majesties life and happy reign , we might likewise be so wise and fortunate , as to provide for the safety and prosperity of the next generation . doct. but if you would not have the people in such a case , take the duke of monmouth for their head , what would you have them do ? eng. gent. doctor , you ask me very fine questions ; do not you know that machivel , the best and most honest of all the modern polititians , has suffered sufficiently by means of priests , and other ignorant persons , who do not understand his writings , and therefore impute to him the teaching subjects how they should rebel and conspire against their princes , which if he were in any kind guilty of , he would deserve all the reproaches that have been cast upon him , and ten times more ; and so should i , if i ventured to obey you in this . i am very confident , that if any man should come to you , to implore your skill in helping him to a drug that might quickly , and with the least fear of being suspected , dispatch an enemy of his , or some other , by whose death he was to be a gainer ; or some young lass that had gotten a surruptitious great belly , should come to you to teach her how to destroy the fruit ; i say , in this case you would scarce have had patience to hear these persons out ; much less would you have been so wicked to have in the least assisted them in their designs , no more than solon , lycurgus , periander , or any other of the sages could have been brought to have given their advice to any persons who should have begged it , to enable them to ruine and undermine the government of their own commonwealths . doct. sir , this reprehension would be very justly given me , if i had intended by this question to induce you to counsel me , or any other how to rebel ; my meaning was to desire you ( who have heretofore been very fortunate in prophesying concerning the events of our changes here ) to exercise your faculty a little at this time , and tell us , what is like to be the end of these destractions we are under , in case we shall not be so happy as to put a period to them by mending our government , and securing our religion and liberty in a regular way . eng. gent. doctor , i will keep the reputation of prophecy , which i have gained with you , and not hazard it with any new predictions , for fear they should miscarry ; yet i care not , if i gratifie your curiosity a little in the point , about which you first began to interrogate me , by presaging to you , that in case we should have troubles , and combustions here , after his majesties decease ( which god avert ) we must expect a very unsuccesful end of them , if we should be so rash and unadvised , as to make the great person we have been lately speaking of , our head ; and that nothing can be more dangerous and pernitious to us than such a choice . i have not in this discourse the least intention to except against , much less to disparage the personal worth of the duke of monmouth , which the world knows to be very great , but do believe that he hath courage and conduct proportionable to any imployment that can be conferred upon him , whether it be to manage arms , or counsels ; but my opinion is , that no person in his circumstance can be a proper head in this case ; for the people having been already put on upon his scent of the title to the crown , will be very hardly called off , and so will force the wiser men , who may design better things , to consent that he be proclaimed king immediately , except there be some other head , who by his power , wisdom , and authority , may restrain the forwardness of the multitude , and obviate the acts of some men , whose interest and hopes may prompt them to foment the humours of the people . now the consequences of hurrying a man to the throne so tumultuously , without the least deliberation , are very dismal ; and do not only not cure the politick distempers of our countrey , which we have talked so much of , but do infinitely augment it , and add to the desease our state labours under already ( which is a consumption ) a very violent feaver too ; i mean war at home , and from abroad , which must necessarily follow in a few years : nor is it possible to go back , when once we have made that step ; for our new king will call a parliament , which being summoned by his will , neither will nor can question his title or government , otherwise than by making addresses , and by presenting bills to him , as they do to his now majesty . nob. ven. it seems to me , that there needs nothing more than that ; for if he consent to all laws as shall be presented to him , you may reform your government sufficiently , or else it is your own fault . eng. gent. we have shewed already , and shall do more hereafter , that no laws can be executed till our government be mended ; and if you mean we should make such as should mend that ( besides that it would be a better method to capitulate that , before you make choice of your prince , as wise people have done in all ages , and the cardinals do at rome in the conclave before they choose their pope ) i say besides this , it is not to be taken for granted that any bills that tend to make considerable alterations in the administration , ( and such we have need of , as you will see anon ) would either in that case be offered or consented to ; both prince and people being so ready to cry out upon forty-one , and to be frighted with the name of a common-wealth , even now when we think popery is at the door ; which some people then will think farther off , and so not care to make so great alterations to keep it out ; besides the great men and favourites of the new prince will think it hard that their king should be so bounded and limited both in power and revenue , that he shall have no means to exercise his liberality towards them , and so may use their interest and eloquence in both houses to dissuade them from pressing so hard upon a prince who is a true zealous protestant , and has alwaies headed that party and who is justly admired , if not adored by the people ; and considering too that all the power they leave him , will serve but to enable him to defend us the better from popery and arbitrary power ; for which latter monarchy was first instituted . thus we may exercise during a parliament or two , love-tricks between the prince and his people , and imitate the hony-moon that continued for about two years after his majesties restauration till the ill management of affairs and the new grevances that shall arise ( which will be sure never to fail till our true cure be effected , notwithstanding the care of the new king and his councellors ) shall awaken the discontents of the people , and then they will curse the time in which they made this election of a prince , and the great men for not hindring them . then men will be reckoning up the discontents of the peers , sometime after they had made a rash choice of h. the 7th in the field , who ( had then no title ) when they saw how he made use of the power they gave him to lessen their greatness , and to fortifie himself upon their ruins ; when it comes to this , and that the governing party comes to be but a little faction , the people ( who never know the true cause of their distemper ) will be looking out abroad who has the lawful title ( if the next heir be not in the meantime with an army of english and strangers in the field here , as is most likely ) and look upon the prince of orange , or the next of kin , as their future saviour ( in case the duke be dead in the mean time , and so the cause of all their distrust taken away ) thus most men , not only discontented persons , but the people in general , lookt upon his majesty that now is , as their future deliverer during our late distractions , when his condition was so weak that he had scarce wherewithall to subsist , and his enemies powerful at home and victorious abroad , which will not be i fear , our case . i prophesy then ( because you will have me use this word ) that if nobles or people make any such unfortunate choice as this during the distractions we may be in upon his majesties death , we shall not only miss our cure , or have it deferred till another government make it ; but remain in the confusion we now suffer under ; and besides , that shall be sure to feel , first or last , the calamity of a civil and foreign war , and in the mean time to be in perpetual fear of it , and suffer all the burden and charge which is necessary to provide for it , besides all the other ill consequences of a standing army . to conclude , i assure you in the faith of a christian , that i have made this discourse solely and singly out of zeal and affection to the interest of my countrey , and not at all with the least intention to favour or promote the cause or interest of the d. of york , or to disparage the duke of monmouth , from whom i never received the least unkindness , nor ever had the honour to be in his company ; and to whom i shall ever pay respect suitable to his high birth and merit . noble ven. well , sir , your reasoning in this point has extreamly satisfied me ; and the doctor , i suppose , was so before , as he averred ; therefore pray let us go on where we left . eng. gent. i cannot take so much upon me as to be dictator in the method of our cure , since either of you is a thousand times better qualified for such an office , and therefore shall henceforth desire to be an auditor . doct. pray , sir , let us not spend time in compliments , but be pleased to proceed in this business , and we doubt not but as you have hitherto wonderfully delighted us , so you will gratifie us in concluding it . eng. gent. i see i must obey you , but pray help me , and tell me in the first place , whether you do not both believe , that as the causa causarum of all our distractions is ( as has been proved ) the breach of our government ; so that the immediate causes are two : first , the great distrust on both sides between the king and his people and parliament ; the first fearing that his power will be so lessened by degrees , that at length it will not be able to keep the crown upon his head : and the latter seeing all things in disorder , and that the laws are not executed ( which is the second of the two causes ) fear the king intends to change the government , and be arbitrary . noble ven. i am a stranger , but ( though i never reflected so much upon the original cause , as i have done since i heard you discourse of it ) yet i ever thought that those two were the causes of the unquietness of this kingdom : i mean the jealousie between the king and his people , and the inexecution of the great laws of calling parliaments annually , and letting them sit to dispatch their affairs : i understand this in the time of his majesties grand-father , and father , more than in his own reign . eng. gent. then whoever can absolutely lay these two causes asleep for ever , will arrive to a perfect cure ; which i conceive no way of doing , but that the king have a great deal more power or a great deal less : and you know that what goes out of the king must go into the people , and so vice versa : insomuch that the people must have a great deal more power , or a great deal less : now it is no question , but either of these two , would rather increase their power than diminish it ; so that if this cannot be made up by the wisdom of this age , we may see in the next , that both the king will endeavour to be altogether without a parliament , and the parliament to be without a king. doct. i begin to smell , that you would be nibbling at the pretence which some had before his majesties restauration , of a commonwealth or democracy . eng. gent. no , i abhor the thoughts of wishing , much less endeavouring any such thing , during these circumstances we are now in ; that is , under oaths of obedience to a lawful king. and truly if any themistocles should make to me such a proposal , i should give the same judgment concerning it , that aristides did in such a case . the story is short ; after the war between the greeks and the persians was ended , and xerxes driven out of greece , the whole fleet of the grecian confederates ( except that of athens which was gone home ) lay in a great arsenal ( such as were then in use ) upon the coast of attica ; during their abode there , themistocles harrangues one day the people of athens ( as was then the custome ) and tells them , that he had a design in his head , which would be of infinite profit and advantage to the commonwealth ; but that it could not be executed without the order and authority of them , and that it did likewise require secresie ; and if it were declared there in the market place , where strangers as well as citizens might be present , it could not be concealed , and therefore proposed it to their consideration what should be done in it : it was at length concluded that themistocles should propose it to aristides , and if he did next morning acquaint the people that he gave his approbation to it , it should be proceeded in : themistocles informs him that the whole fleet of their confederates in the war against the medes had betaken themselves to the great arsenal upon their coast , where they might be easily fired , and then the athenians would remain absolute masters of the sea , and so give law to all greece ; when aristides came the next day to deliver his judgment to the people , he told them that the business proposed by themistocles , was indeed very advantageous , and profitable to the athenians ; but withal , the most wicked and villanous attempt that ever was undertaken ; upon which it was wholly laid aside . and the same judgment do i give , doctor , of your democracy at this time . but to return to the place where i was , i do belive that this difference may easily be terminated very fairly , and that our house need not be pulled down , and a new one built ; but may be very easily repair'd , so that it may last many hundred years . noble ven. i begin to perceive that you aim at this , that the king must give the people more power , as henry the third , and king iohn did , or the parliament must give the king more , as you said they did in france in the time of lewis the eleventh ; or else that it will come in time to a war again . eng. gent. you may please to know , that in all times hitherto , the parliament never demanded any thing of the king , wherein the interest and government of the kingdom was concerned ( excepting acts of pardon ) but they founded their demands upon their right , not only because it might seem unreasonable for them to be earnest with him to give them that which was his own , but also because they cannot chuse but know , that all powers which are fundamentally and lawfully in the crown , were placed there upon the first institution of our government , to capacitate the prince to govern and protect his people : so that for the parliament to seek to take from him such authority , were to be felo de se , as we call a self-homicide ; but as in some distempers of the body the head suffers as well as the inferiour parts , so that it is not possible for it , to order , direct and provide for the whole body as its office requires , since the wisdom and power which is placed there , is given by god to that end ; in which case , though the distemper of the body may begin from the disease of some other part , or from the mass of blood or putrefaction of other humours ; yet since that noble part is so affected by it , that reason and discourse fails , therefore to restore this again , remedies must be apply'd to , and possibly humours or vapours drawn from the head it self , that so it may be able to govern and reign over the body as it did before , or else the whole man , like a slave , must be ruled and guided ab extrinseco , that is by some keeper : so it is now with us , in our politick disease , where granting ( if you please ) that the distemper does not proceed from the head , but the corruption of other parts , yet in the cure , applications must be made to the head as well as to the members , if we mean poor england shall recover its former perfect health ; and therefore it will be found , perhaps , essential to our being , to ask something ( in the condition we now are ) to which the king as yet may have a right ; and which except he please to part with , the phenomena of government cannot be salved ; that is , our laws cannot be executed ; nor magna charta it self made practicable ; and so both prince and people , that is , the polity of england , must die of this disease , or by this delirium must be governed , ab extrinseco , and fall to the lot of some foregin power . noble ven. but , sir , since the business is come to this dilemma , why may not the king ask more power of the parliament , as well as they of him ? eng. gent. no question but our present councellours and courtiers would be nibbling at that bait again , if they had another parliament that would take pensions for their votes ; but in one that is come fresh from the people , and understand their sense and grievances very well , i hardly believe they will attempt it ; for both council and parliament must needs know by this time-a-day , that the cause of all our distractions coming ( as has been said an hundred times ) from the king 's having a greater power already than the condition of property at this present can admit , without confusion and disorder ; it is not like to mend matters for them to give him more , except they will deliver up to him at the same instant their possessions , and right to their lands , and become naturally and politically his slaves . noble ven. since there must be a voluntary parting with power , i fear your cure will prove long and ineffectul , and we reconcilers shall , i fear , prove like our devout cappuchin at venice ; this poor mans name was fra. barnardino da udine , and was esteemed a very holy man , as well as an excellent preacher , insomuch that he was appointed to preach the lent sermons in one of our principal churches , which he performed at the begining with so much eloquence , and applause , that the church was daily crouded three hours before the sermon was to begin ; the esteem and veneration this poor fryar was in , elevated his spirit a little too high to be contained within the bounds of reason ; but before his delirium was perceived , he told his auditory one day , that the true devotion of that people , and the care they had to come to hear his word preached , had been so acceptable to god and to the virgine , that they had vouchsafed to inspire him with the knowledg of an expedient , which he did not doubt , but would make men happy & just even in this life , & that the flesh should no longer iust against the spirit ; but that he would not acquaint them with it at that present , because something was to be done on their parts to make them capable of this great blessing , which was to pray zealously for a happy success upon his endeavours , and to fast , and to visit the churches to that end ; therefore he desired them to come the wednesday following to be made acquainted with this blessed expedient . you may imagine how desirous our people were , to hear something more of this fifth-monarchy ; i will shorten my story , and tell you nothing of what crouding there was all night , and what quarrelling for places in the church ; nor with what difficulty the saffi , who were sent by the magistrate to keep the paece , and to make way for the preacher to get into the pulpit , did both ; but up he got , and after a long preamable of desiring more prayers , and addressing himself to our senate to mediate with the pope , that a week might be set apart for a jubilee and fasting three days all over the christian world , to storm heaven with masses , prayers , fasting and almes to prosper his designs ; he began to open the matter , that the cause of all the wickedness and sin , and by consequence of all the miseries and affliction which is in the world , arising from the enmity which is between god and the devil , by which means god was often cross'd in his intentions of good to mankind here , and hereafter , the devil by his temptations making us uncapable of the mercy and favour of our creator ; therefore he had a design ( with the helps before mentioned ) to mediate with almighty god , that he would pardon the devil , and receive him into his favour again after so long a time of banishment and imprisonment ; and not to take all his power from him , but to leave him so much as might do good to man , and not hurt ; which he doubted not but he would imploy that way , after such reconciliation was made , which his faith would not let him question . you may judge what the numerous auditory thought of this ; i can only tell you , that he had a different fort of company at his return , from what he had when he came , for the men left him to the boys , who with great hoops instead of acclamations , brought him to the gondola , which conveyed him to the redentor , where he lodged ; and i never had the curiosity to enquire what became of him after . doct. i thank you heartily for this intermess ; i see you have learnt something in england : for , i assure you , we have been these twenty years turning this , and all serious discourses into ridicule ; but yet your similitude is very pat ; for in every parliament that has been in england these sixty years , we have had notable contests between the seed of the serpent , and the seed of the woman . eng. gent. well sir , we have had a michael here in our age , who has driven out lucifer , and restored the true deity to his power : but where omnipotency is wanting ( which differs the frier's case and mine ) the devil of civil war and confusion may get up again , if he be not laid by prudence and vertue , and better conjurers than any we have yet at court. noble ven. well gentlemen , i hope you have pardoned me for my farce . but , to be a little more serious , pray tell me how you will induce the king to give up so much of his right as may serve your turn ? would you have the parliament make war with him again ? eng. gent. there cannot , nor ought to be , any change , but by his majesty's free consent ; for besides , that a war is to be abhorred by all men that love their country , any contest of that kind in this case ( viz. to take away the least part of the kings right ) could be justified by no man living . i say , besides that , a civil war has miscarried in our days , which was founded ( at least pretendedly ) upon defence of the people's own rights : in which , although they had as clear a victory in the end , as ever any contest upon earth had , yet could they never reap the least advantage in the world by it : but went from one tyranny to another , from barebones parliament , to cromwell's reign ; from that , to a committee of safety ; leaving those grave men , who managed affairs at the beginning , amazed to see new men , and new principles governing england . and this induced them to co-operate to bring things back just where they were before the war. therefore this remedy will be either none , or worse than the disease : it not being now as it was in the barons time , when the lord who led out his men , could bring them back again when he pleased , and rule them in the mean time , being his vassals . but now there is no man of so much credit , but that one who behaves himself bravely in the war , shall out-vye him ; and , possibly , be able to do what he pleases with the army and the government : and in this corrupt age , it is ten to one , he will rather do hurt than good with the power he acquires . but because you ask me how we would perswade the king to this ? i answer , by the parliament's humbly remonstrating to his majesty , that it is his own interest , preservation , quiet and true greatness , to put an end to the distractions of his subjects , and that it cannot be done any other way , and to desire him to enter into debate with some men authorized by them , to see if there can be any other means than what they shall offer to compose things ; if they find there may , then to embrace it , otherwise to insist upon their own proposals : and if in the end they cannot obtain those requests , which they think the only essential means to preserve their country , then to beg their dismission , that they may not stay , and be partakers in the ruin of it . now , my reasons why the king will please to grant this , after the thorough discussing of it , are two . first , because all great princes have ever made up matters with their subjects upon such contests , without coming to extremities . the two greatest , and most valiant of our princes , were edward the first , and his grandchild edward the third : these had very great demands made them by parliaments , and granted them all ; as you may see upon the statute-book . edward the second , and richard the second , on the contrary , refused all things till they were brought to extremity . there is a memorable example in the greek story of theopompus king of sparta ; whose subjects finding the government in disorder for want of some persons that might be a check upon the great power of the king , proposed to him the creation of the ephores ( officers who made that city so great and famous afterwards ) . the king finding by their reasons ( which were unanswerable , as i think ours now are ) , that the whole government of sparta was near its ruin , without such a cure ; and considering that he had more to lose in that disorder than others , freely granted their desires ; for which being derided by his wife , who asked him what a kind of monarchy he would leave to his son ? answered , a very good one , because it will be a very lasting one . which brings on my second reason , for which i believe the king will grant these things ; because he cannot any way mend himself , nor his condition , if he do not . noble ven. you have very fully convinced me of two things : first , that we have no reason to expect or believe that the parliament will ever increase the kings power : and then , that the king cannot by any way found himself a new , and more absolute monarchy , except he can alter the condition of property , which i think we may take for granted to be impossible . but yet , i know not why we may not suppose that ( although he cannot establish to all posterity such an empire ) he may , notwithstanding , change the government at the present ; and calling parliaments no more , administer it by force , as it is done in france , for some good time . eng. gent. in france it has been a long work ; and although that tyranny was begun , as has been said , by petition from the states themselves , not to be assembled any more ; yet the kings since , in time of great distraction , have thoughr fit to convocate them again ; as they did in the civil wars thrice : once at orleans , and twice at blois . i would not repeat what i have so tediously discoursed of concerning france already , but only to intreat you to remember that our nation has no such poor and numerous gentry , which draw better revenues from the king's purse , than they can from their own estates ; all our country people consisting of rich nobility and gentry , of wealthy yeomen , and of poor younger brothers who have little or nothing , and can never raise their companies , if they should get commissions , without their elder brothers assistance amongst his tenants , or else with the free consent and desire of the people , which , in this case , would hardly be afforded them . but we will suppose there be idle people enough to make an army , and that the king has money enough to arm and raise them : and i will grant too , to avoid tediousness ( although i do not think it possible ) that the people will at the first , for fear , receive them into their houses , and quarter them against law ; nay , pay the money which shall be by illegal edicts , imposed upon the subjects to pay them ; yet is it possible an army can continue any time to enslave their own country ? can they resist the prayers , or the curses of their fathers , brothers , wives , mothers , sisters , and of all persons wherever they frequent ? upon this account all the greek tyrants were of very short continuance ; who being in chief magistracy and credit in their commonwealths , by means of soldiers and satellites , usurped the soveraignty . but did ever any of them , excepting dionysius , leave it to his son ? who was driven out within less than a year after his fathers death . many armies of the natives have destroyed tyrannies : so the decemvirate was ruined at rome , the tarquins expelled before that : our own country has been a stage , even in our time , where this tragedy has been sufficiently acted ; for the army , after the war was done , fearing the monarchy should be restored again , held councils , got agitators ; and though there were often very severe executions upon the ring-leaders , did at length , by their perseverance , necessitate their officers to joyn with them ( having many good head-pieces of the party to advise them ) ; and so broke all treaties . and the parliament too , adhering to a small party of them who consented to lay aside kingly government , and afterwards drove them away too , fearing they would continue to govern in oligarchy . i am far from approving this way they used , in which they broke all laws , divine and humane , political and moral : but i urge it only to shew how easily an army of natives is to be deluded with the name of liberty , and brought to pull down any thing which their ring-leaders tell them tends to enslaving their country . 't is true , this army was afterwards cheated by their general ; who without their knowledge , much less consent , one morning , suddenly made himself tyrant of his country . it as true , that their reputation ( not their arms ) supported him in that state for some time ; but it is certain that they did very often , and to the last , refuse to be instrumental to levy moneys , though for their own pay : and so he , against his will , was fain to call from time to time parliamentary conventions . and it is most certain that he did , in the sickness of which he died , often complain that his army would not go a step farther with him : and , de facto , some months after his death , they did dethrone his son , and restore the remainder of the old parliament , upon promise made to them in secret ( by the demogogues of that assembly ) that a commonwealth should be speedily framed and setled . noble ven. sir , i am satisfied that an army raised here on a sudden , and which never saw an enemy , could not be brought to act such high things for the ruin of their own government ; nor possibly , would be any way able to resist the fury and insurrection of the people . but what say you of a forreign army , raised by your king abroad , and brought over , whose officers and soldiers shall have no acquaintance or relations amongst the people here ? eng. gent. all forces of that kind must be either auxiliaries or mercenaries : auxiliaries are such as are sent by some neighbour prince or state , with their own colours , and paid by themselves : though possibly , the prince who demands them may furnish the money . these usually return home again , when the occasion , for which they were demanded , is over : but whether they do or not , if they be not mixed and over-ballanced with forces which depend upon the prince who calls them , but that the whole weight and power lies in them , they will certainly , first or last , seize that country for their own soveraign . and as for mercenaries , they must be raised ( 't is true ) with the money of the prince who needs them , but by the authority and credit of some great persons who are to lead and command them : and these , in all occasions , have made their own commander prince ; as f. sforza at milan drove out by this trick the visconti , ancient dukes of that state ; and the mamalukes in egypt made themselves a military commonwealth . so that the way of an army here would either be no remedy at all , or one very much worse than the disease to the prince himself . noble ven. well sir , i begin to be of opinion , that any thing the king can grant the parliament ( especially such a parliament as this is , which consists of men of very great estates , and so can have no interest to desire troubles ) will not be so inconvenient to him , as to endeavour to break the government by force . but why may he not , for this time , by soothing them , and offering them great alliances abroad for the interest of england , and ballancing matters in europe more eaven than they have been ; and , in fine , by offering them a war with the french , to which nation they have so great a hatred ; lay them asleep , and get good store of money , and stave off this severe cure you speak of , at least , for some time longer ? eng. gent. there has been something of this done too lately ; and there is a gentleman lies in the tower , who is to answer for it . but you may please to understand , that there is scarce any amongst the middle sort of people , much less within the walls of the house of commons , who do not perfectly know , that we can have no alliance with any nation in the world that will signifie any thing to them , or to our selves , till our government be redressed and new modelled . and therefore , though there were an army landed in this island , yet that we must begin there , before we are sit to repulse them , or defend our selves . and the fear and sense of this people universally is , that if we should have any war , either for our own concerns , or for those of our allies , whilst matters remain as they do at home , it would certainly come to this pass , that either being beaten , we should subject this kingdom to an invasion , at a time when we are in a very ill condition to repell it ; or else , if we were victorious , that our courtiers and counsellors in fragrante ( or as the french cry , d'emble ) , would employ that mettle and good fortune to try some such conclusions at home as we have been discoursing of . and therefore , if any war should be undertaken without parliament , you should see the people rejoyce as much at any disaster our forces should receive , as they did when the scots seized the four northern counties in 1639. or before that , when we were beaten at the isle of rhee , or when we had any loss in the last war with holland . and this joy is not so unnatural as it may seem to those who do not consider the cause of it ; which is the breach of our old government , and the necessity our governors are under to make some new experiments : and the fear we are in , that any prosperity may make them able to try them , either with effect , or at least with impunity . which consideration made a court-droll say lately to his majesty , ( who seemed to wonder why his subjects hated the french so much ) ; sir , it is because you love them , and espouse their interest : and if you would discover this truth clearly , you may please to make war with the king of france ; and then you shall see , that this people will not only love them , take their parts , and wish them success ; but will exceedingly rejoyce when they are victorious in sinking your ships , or defeating your forces . and this is sufficient to answer your proposal for alliances abroad , and for a war with france . besides this ( to wind all up in a word ) it is not to be imagined , that so good and wise a prince as we have at this time should ever be induced ( when he comes to understand perfectly his own condition ) to let his own interest ( granting his power to be so , which is very false ) contest with the safety and preservation of his people , for which only it was given him ; or that he will be any way tenacious of such prerogatives , as now , by a natural revolution of political circumstances , are so far from continuing useful to his governing the people , that they are the only remora and obstacle of all government , settlement and order . for his majesty must needs know , that all forms of regulating mankind under laws were ordained by god and man , for the happiness and security of the governed , and not for the interest and greatness of those who rule ; unless where there is melior natura in the case . so god governs man for his own glory only , and men reign over beasts for their own use and service ; and where an absolute prince rules over his own servants whom he feeds and pays ( as we have said ) , or the master of a great and numerous family governs his houshold ; they are both bound by the law of god and nature , and by their own interest , to do them justice , and not insaevire or tyranize over them , more than the necessity of preserving their empire and authority requires . doct. but sir , considering the difficulty which will be found in the king , and possibly in the parliament too , to come up to so great an alteration at the first , and the danger that may happen by our remaining long in this unsetled condition , which does hourly expose us to innumerable hazards , both at home , and from abroad ; why may we not begin , and lay the foundation now , by removing all his majesty's present council by parliament ; which is no new thing , but hath been often practised in many kings reigns ? eng. gent. first , the council , that is , the privy council which you mean , is no part of our government , as we may have occasion to shew hereafter ; nor is the king obliged by any fundamental law , or by any act of parliament to hearken to their advice , or so much as to ask it ; and if you should make one on purpose , besides that it would not be so effectual as what we may propose , it would be full as hard to go down either with king or parliament . but besides all this , you would see some of these counsellours so nominated by parliament , perhaps prove honest , and then they would be forced to withdraw as some lately did , because they found , i suppose , that till the administration be alter'd , it is impossible that their councils can be imbraced , or any thing be acted by them which may tend to the good of their country ; those who have not so great a sence of honour and integrity , will be presently corrupted by their own interest , whilst the prince is left in possession of all those baits and means to answer such mens ectpectations : it being most certain , that if you have a musty vessel , and by consequence dislike the beer which comes out of it , and draw it out , causing the barrel to be immediately fill'd with good and sound liquor , it is certain by experience , that both your new drink , and all that ever you shall put into the cask , till it be taken in pieces , and the pipes shaved , and new model'd , will be full as musty , and unsavoury as the first which you found fault with . noble ven. now , sir , i think we are at an end of our questions , and i for my part am convinced , that as the king cannot better himself any way by falling out with his people at this time , so that his goodness and wisdom is such , that he will rather chuse to imitate the most glorious and generous of his predecessors , as edward the first , and edward the third , than those who were of less worth , and more unfortunate , as edward the second , and richard the second . and therefore we are now ready to hear what you would think fit to ask of so excellent a prince . eng. gent. i never undertook to be so presumptuous ; there is a parliament to sit speedily , and certainly they are the fittest every way to search into such matters ; and to anticipate their wisdom would be unreasonable , and might give them just offence . but because all this tittle tattle may not go for nothing , i shall presume to give you my thoughts , how the cure must be wrought , without descending to particulars . the cause immediate ( as we have said ) of our disease , is the inexecution of our laws ; and it is most true , that when that is alter'd for the better , and that all our laws are duly executed , we are in health ; for as we can never have the entire benefit of them , till our government is upon a right basis ; so whenever we enjoy this happiness , to have the full benefit of those constitutions , which were made by our ancestors for our safe and orderly living , our government is upon a right basis ; therefore we must enquire into the cause why our laws are not executed , & when you have found and taken away that cause , all is well . the cause can be no other than this , that the king is told , and does believe , that most of these great charters or rights of the people , of which we now chiefly treat , are against his majesties interest , though this be very false ( as has been said ) yet we will not dispute it at this time , but take it for granted , so that the king having the supreme execution of the laws in his hand , cannot be reasonably supposed to be willing to execute them whenever he can chuse whether he will do it or no ; it being natural for every man not to do any thing against his own interest when he can help it ; now when you have thought well what it should be that gives the king a liberty to chuse whether any part of the law shall be currant or no , you will find that it is the great power the king enjoys in the government ; when the parliament hath discovered this , they will no doubt demand of his majesty an abatement of his royal prerogative in those matters only which concern our enjoyment of our all , that is our lives , liberties and estates , and leave his royal power entire and untoucht in all the other branches of it ; when this is done , we shall be as if some great heroe had performed the adventure of dissolving the inchantment we have been under so many years . and all our statutes from the highest to the lowest , from magna charta to that for burying in woollen , will be current , and we shall neither fear the bringing in popery , nor arbitrary power in the intervals of parliament , neither will there be any dissentions in them ; all causes of factions between the country and court-party being entirely abolisht ; so that the people shall have no reason to distrust their prince , nor he them . doct. you make us a fine golden age ; but after all this , will you not be pleased to shew us a small prospect of this canaan , or country of rest ; will you not vouchsafe to particularize a little what powers there are in the king , which you would have discontinued ? would you have such prerogatives abolished , or placed elsewhere ? eng. gent. there can be no government if they be abolished . but i will not be like a man who refuses to sing amongst his friends at their entreaty , because he has an ill voice ; i will rather suffer my self to be laught at by you in delivering my small judgment in this matter , but still with this protestation , that i do believe that an infinity of men better qualifi'd than my self for such sublime matters , and much more the house of commons , who represent the wisdom as well as the power of this kingdom , may find out a far better way , than my poor parts and capacity can suggest . the powers then which now being in the crown do hinder the execution of our laws , and prevent by consequence our happiness and settlement , are four ; the absolute power of making war and peace , treaties and alliances with all nations in the world , by which means , by ignorant councellours , or wicked ministers , many of our former kings have made confederations and wars , very contrary , and destructive to the interest of england , and by the unfortunate management of them , have often put the kingdom in great hazard of invasion : besides that , as long as there is a distinction made between the court-party and that of the country , there will ever be a jealousie in the people , that those wicked councellours ( who may think they can be safe no other way ) will make alliances with powerful princes , in which there may be a secret article by which those princes shall stipulate to assist them with forces upon a short warning to curb the parliament , and possibly to change the government . and this apprehension in the people will be the less unreasonable , because oliver cromwel ( the great pattern of some of our courtiers ) is notoriously known to have inserted an article in his treaty with cardinal mazzarin , during this king of france's minority , that he should be assisted with ten thousand men from france upon occasion to preserve and defend him in his usurped government , against his majesty that now is , or the people of england , or in fine , his own army , whose revolt he often feared . the second great prerogative the king enjoys , is the sole disposal and ordering of the militia by sea and land , raising forces , garisoning and fortifying places , setting out ships of war , so far as he can do all this without putting taxations upon the people ; and this not only in the intervals of parliament , but even during their session ; so that they cannot raise the train-bands of the country or city to guard themselves , or secure the peace of the kingdom . the third point is , that it is in his majesties power to nominate and appoint as he pleases , and for what time he thinks fit , all the officers of the kingdom that are of trust or profit , both civil , military , and ecclesiastical , ( as they will be called ) except where there is ius patronatus ; these two last powers may furnish a prince who will hearken to ill designing councellours , with the means either of invading the government by force , or by his judges and other creatures undermining it by fraud ; especially by enjoying the fourth advantage , which is the laying out and imploying , as he pleases , all the publick revenues of the crown or kingdom , and that without having any regard ( except he thinks fit ) to the necessity of the navy , or any other thing that concerns the safety of the publick . so that all these four great powers , as things now stand , may be adoperated at any time , as well to destroy and ruine the good order and government of the state , as to preserve and support it , as they ought to do . nob. ven. but if you divest the king of these powers , will you have the parliament sit always to govern these matters ? eng. gent. sir , i would not divest the king of them , much less would i have the parliament assume them , or perpetuate their sitting : they are a body more fitted to make laws , and punish the breakers of them , than to execute them . i would have them therefore petition his majesty by way of bill , that he will please to exercise these four great magnalia of government , with the consent of four several councils to be appointed for that end , and not otherwise ; that is , with the consent of the major part of them , if any of them dissent . in all which councils his majesty , or who he pleases to appoint , shall preside ; the councils to be named in parliament ; first all the number , and every year afterwards a third part : so each year a third part shall go out , and a recruit of an equal number come in : and in three years they shall be all new , and no person to come into that council , or any other of the four , till he have kept out of any of them full three years , being as long as he was in . and this i learnt from your quarantia's at venice : and the use is excellent ; for being in such a circulation , and sure to have their intervals of power , they will neither grow so insolent as to brave their king , nor will the prince have any occasion to corrupt them , although he had the means to do it , which in this new model he cannot have . these men in their several councils should have no other instructions , but to dispose of all things , and act in their several charges , for the interest and glory of england ; and shall be answerable to parliament , from time to time , for any malicious or advised misdemeanor : only that council which manages the publick revenue , shall ( besides a very copious and honourable revenue which shall be left to his majesty's disposal for his own entertainment , as belongs to the splendor and majesty of the government ) have instructions to serve his majesty ( if he pleases to command them , and not otherwise ) in the regulating and ordering his oeconomy and houshold ; and if they shall see it necessary , for extraordinary occasions of treating foreign princes and ambassadors , or presenting them , and the like ostentation of greatness ; to consent with his majesty moderately to charge the revenue to that end . i verily believe that this expedient is much more effectual than either the iustitia of aragon was , or the ephores of sparta : who being to check the king almost in every thing , without having any share in his councils , or understanding them , could not chuse but make a sullen posture of affairs ; whereas these both seem , and really are the king's ministers , only obliged by parliament to act faithfully and honestly ; to which , even without that , all other councellors are bound by oath . as for the other council , now called the privy council , the king may still please to continue to nominate them at his pleasure , so they act nothing in any of the matters properly within the jurisdiction of these four councils , but meddle with the affairs of merchants , plantations , charters , and other matters , to which the regal power extendeth . and provided that his majesty call none of the persons employed in these other four councils during their being so , nor that this council do any way intermeddle with any affairs , criminal or civil , which are to be decided by law , and do belong to the jurisdictions of other courts or magistrates , they being no established judicatory , or congregation , which either our government or laws do take notice of ( as was said before ) but persons congregated by the king , as his friends and faithful subjects , to give him their opinion in the execution of his regal office. as for example , the king does exercise , at this time , a negative voice as to bills presented to him by the parliament , which he claims by right ; no man ever said that the privy council had a negative voice ; yet former kings did not only as their advice as to the passing or not passing of such bills , but often decided the matter by their votes ; which , although it be a high presumption in them , when they venture to give him council contrary to what is given him by his greatest council , yet never any of them have been questioned for it ; being looked upon as private men , who speak according to the best of their cunning , and such as have no publick capacity at all . but if this be not so , and that this council have some foundation in law , and some publick capacity , i wish in this new settlement it may be made otherwise , and that his majesty please to take their counsel in private ; but summon no persons to appear before them ; much less give them authority to send for in custody , or imprison any subject , which may as well be done by the judges and magistrates ; who , if secrecy be required , may as well be sworn to secrecy as these gentlemen ; and i believe can keep counsel as well , and give it too . nob. ven. but would you have none to manage state-affairs , none imprisoned for secret conspiracies , and kept till they can be fully discovered ? you have made an act here lately about imprisonments , that every person shall have his habeas corpus , i think you call it : so that no man , for what occasion soever , can lie in prison above a night , but the cause must be revealed , though there be great cause for the concealing it . eng. gent. this act you mention , and a great many more which we have to the same purpose , that is , against illegal imprisonments , shews that for a long time the power over men's persons has been exercised ( under his majesty ) by such as were very likely , rather to employ it ill than well ; ( that is ) would rather imprison ten men for honourable actions ; such as standing for the people's rights in parliament , refusing to pay illegal taxes , and the like ; than one for projecting and inventing illegal monopolies , or any other kind of oppressing the people . this made first magna charta , then the petition of right , and divers other acts besides this last , take that power quite away , and make the law and the judges the only disposers of the liberties of our persons . and it may be , when the parliament shall see the fruit of this alteration we are now discoursing of , and that state-affairs are in better hands , they may think fit to provide that a return , or warrant of imprisonment from one of these four councils ( which i suppose will have a power of commitment given them , as to persons appearing delinquents before them ) wherein it shall be expressed , that if the publick is like to suffer or be defrauded , if the matter be immediately divulged ; i say in this case , the parliament may please to make it lawful for the judge to delay the bailing of him for some small time , because it is not to be judged , that these councellours so chosen , and so instructed , and to continue so small a time , will use this power ill ; especially being accountable for any abusing of it to the next parliament . and i suppose the parliament , amongst other provisions in this behalf , will require that there shall be a register kept of all the votes of these several councils , with the names as well of those who consented , as of such who dissented : and as to the former part of your question , whether i would have none to manage state affairs ; i think there are very few state affair that do not concern either peace and war , and treaties abroad , the management of the arms , militia , and posse comitatus at home ; the management of all the publick moneys , and the election of all officers whatsoever ; the other parts , of state affairs , which are making and repealing of laws , punishing high crimes against the state , with levying and proportioning all manner of impositions upon the people , this is reserved to the parliament it self ; and the execution of all laws to the judges , and magistrates ; and i can think of no other affairs of state than these . doct. do you intend that the council for chusing officers shall elect them of the king's houshold , that is , his menial servants ? eng. gent. no , that were unreasonable , except any of them have any jurisdiction in the kingdom , or any place or preheminence in parliament annexed to such office ; but in these things which concern the powers and jurisdictions of these several councils ( wherein , la guardia della laberta , as machiavil calls it , is now to be placed ) i shall not persume to say any thing , but assure your self , if ever it come to that , it will be very well digested in parliament , they being very good at contriving such matters , and making them practicable , as well as at performing all other matters that concern the interest and greatness of the kingdom . doct. i have thought that the ephores of sparta were an admirable magistracy , not only for the interest of the people , but likewise for the preservation of the authority of the kings , and of their lives too ; for plutarch observes that the cities of mesene and argos had the same government with lacedemon , and yet for want of erecting such an authority as was in the ephores , they were not only perpetually in broils amongst themselves , and for that reason ever beaten by their enemies , whereas the spartans were always victorious , but even their kings were the most miserable of men , being often call'd in question judicially , and so lost their lives , and many of them murdered by insurrections of the people : and at last in both these cities , the kings were driven out , their families extirpated , the territory new divided , and the government turn'd into a democracy . and i ever thought that this expedient you propose ( for i have heard you discourse of it often before now ) would prove a more safe , and a more noble reformation than the institution of the ephores was , and that a prince who is a lover of his country , who is gracious , wise and just , ( such a one as it has pleased god to send us at this time ) shall be ten times more absolute when this regulation is made , than ever he was or could be before ; and that whatsoever he proposes in any of these councils will be received as a law , nay , as an oracle : and on the other side , ill and weak princes shall have no possibility of corrupting men , or doing either themselves or their people any kind of harm or mischief : but have you done now ? eng. gent. no , sir , when this provision is made for the execution of the laws , ( which i think very effectual , not to say infallible ) although it is not to be doubted , but that there will be from time to time many excellent laws enacted ; yet two i would have passed immediately , the one concerning the whole regulation of the elections to parliament , which we need very much , and no doubt but it will be well done ; that part of it which is necessary to go hand in hand with our settlement , and which indeed must be part of it , is , that a parliament be elected every year at a certain day , and that without any writ or summons , the people meeting of course at the time appointed in the usual place ( as they do in parishes at the church-house to chuse officers ) and that the sheriffs be there ready to preside and to certifie the election . and that the parliament so chosen shall meet at the time appointed , and sit and adjuorn as their business is more or less urgent : but still setting yet a time for their coming together again ; but if there shall be a necessity ( by reason of invasion or some other cause ) for their assembling sooner , then the king to call the councellors of these four councels all together , and with the consent of the major part of them , intimate their meeting sooner ; but when the day day comes for the annual meeting of another parliament , they must be understood to be dissolved in law , without any other ceremony , and the new one to take their place . doct. i would have this considered too , and provided for , that no election should be made of any person who had not the majority of the electors present to vote for him ; so the writ orders it , and so reason dictates ; for else , how can he be said to represent the county , if not a fifth part have consented to his choice , as happens sometimes , and may do oftener ? for where seven or eight stand for one vacant place , as i have know in our last long parliament , where the votes being set in columns , he who has had most votes , has not exceeded four hundred of above two thousand who were present . noble ven. this is a strange way ; i thought you had put every man by himself , as we do in our government , and as i understood they do in the house of commons , when there is any nomination , and then , if he has not the major part , he is rejected . eng. gent. this is very material , and indeed essential ; but i make no doubt , but if this project should come in play in parliament , this and all other particulars ( which would be both needless and tedious to discourse of here ) will be well and effectually provided for . the next act i would have passed , should be concerning the house of peers , that as i take it for granted , that there will be a clause in the bill concerning elections , that no new boroughs shall be enabled to send members to parliament , except they shall be capacitated thereunto by an act ; so it being of the same necessity as to the liberty of parliament , that the peers ( who do and must enjoy both a negative and deliberative voice in all parliamentary transactions , except what concern levying of money originally ) be exempted from depending absolutely upon the prince , and that therefore it be declared by act , for the future , that no peer shall be made but by act of parliament , and then that it be hereditary in his male line . noble ven. i am not yet fully satisfied how you can order your matters concerning this house of peers , nor do i see how the contests between the house of commons and them , can be so laid asleep but that they will arise again : besides the house of commons must necessarily be extreamly concerned to find the house of peers , which consists of private persons , though very great and honourable ones , in an instant dash all that they have been so long hammering for the good of all the people of england whom they represent ; were it not better now , you are upon so great alterations , to make an annual elective senate , or at least one wherein the members should be but for life , and not hereditary . eng. gent. by no means , sir , the less change the better , and in this case the metaphysical maxime is more true than in any , viz. entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate ; for great alterations fright men , and puzzle them , and there is no need of it at all in this case . i have told you before , that there is a necessity of a senate , and how short this government would be without it , and how confused in the mean time ; the roman senate was hereditary amongst the patricii , except the censor left any of them out of the roll during his magistracy , for some very great and scandalous offence ; and in that case too there was an appeal to the people , as in all other causes , witness the case of lucius quintius and many others . to shew that there can be no need of such a change here as you speak of , you may please to consider , that all differences between the several parts of any government , come upon the account of interest ; now when this settlement is made , the house of peers , and the house of commons , can have no interest to dissent ; for as to all things of private interest , that is , the rights of peers , both during the sitting of parliaments , and in the intervals , is left to their own house to judge of , as it is to the house of commons to judge of their own priviledges ; and as for the contest of the peers jurisdiction as to appeals from courts of equity ; besides that i would have that setled in the act which should pass concerning the lords house ; i believe it will never happen more , when the government is upon a right foundation ; it having been hitherto fomented by two different parties , the court-party sometimes blowing up that difference to break the session , lest some good bills for the people should pass , or that the king by rejecting them , might discontent his people ; to avoid which dilemma , there needed no more , but to procure some person to prosecute his appeal before the lords ; some honest patriots afterwards possibly might use the same policy which they learnt from the courtiers , to quash some bill very destructive , in which they were out-voted in the commons house ; otherwise it is so far from the interest of the commons to hinder appeals from courts of equity , that there is none amongst them , but know we are almost destroyed for want of it : and when they have considered well , and that some such reformation as this shall take place ; they will find that it can never be placed in a more honourable and unbyas'd judicatory than this ; and i could wish that even in the intermission of parliamentary sessions , the whole peerage of england , as many of them as can conveniently be in town , may sit in their judicial capacities , and hear appeals in equity , as well as judge upon writs of errour . now as to your other objection ( which is indeed of great weight ) that the house of commons must needs take it ill , that the lords should frustrate their endeavours for the peoples good by their negative ; if you consider one thing , the force of this objection will vanish ; which is , that when this new constitution shall be admitted , the lords cannot have any interest or temptation to differ with the commons , in any thing wherein the publick good is concerned , but are obliged by all the ties in the world , to run the same course and fortune with the commons , their interest being exactly the same ; so that if there be any dissenting upon bills between the two houses , when each of them shall think their own expedient conduces most to the advantage of the publick ; this difference will ever be decided by right reason at conferences ; and the lords may as well convince the commons , as be convinced by them ; and these contests are and ever will be of admirable use and benefit to the commonwealth ; the reason why it is otherwise now , and that the house of peers is made use of to hinder many bills from passing , that are supposed to be for the ease of the people , is , that the great counsellors and officers which sit in that house , do suggest ( whether true or false ) that it is against his majesties will and interest that such an act should pass , whereupon it has found obstruction ; but hereafter if our expedient take place it cannot be so , first , because our king himself cannot have any designs going ( as was proved before ) which shall make it his advantage to hinder any good intended his people , whose prosperity then will be his own . and then because in a short time , the peers being made by act of parliament , will consist of the best men of england both for parts and estates , and those who are already made , if any of them have small estates , the king if he had the interest , would not have the means to corrupt them , the publick moneys , and the great offices being to be dispensed in another manner than formerly ; so their lordships will have no motive in the world to steer their votes and councils , but their own honour and conscience , and the preservation and prosperity of their country . so that it would be both needless and unjust to pretend any change of this kind . besides , this alteration in the administration of our government being proposed to be done by the unanimous consent of king , lords , and commons , and not otherwise , it would be very preposterous to believe , that the peers would depose themselves of their hereditary rights , and betake themselves to the hopes of being elected ; it is true , they have lost the power they had over the commons , but that has not been taken from them by any law , no more than it was given them by any ; but is fallen by the course of nature , as has been shewn at large ; but though they cannot lead the commons by their tenures , as formerly , yet there is no reason or colour that they should lose their co-ordination , which i am sure they have by law , and by the fundamental constitution of the government ; and which is so far from being prejudicial to a lasting settlement ( as was said ) that it infinitely contributes to it , and prevents the confusion which would destroy it . if i should have proposed any thing in this discourse which should have intrenched upon the king 's hereditary right , or that should have hindred the majesty and greatness of these kingdoms from being represented by his royal person , i should have made your story of the capuchine fryar very applicable to me . noble ven. i see you have not forgiven me that novel yet ; but pray give me leave to ask you one question : why do you make the election of great officers , to be by a small secret council , that had been more proper for a numerous assembly ; as it is in most commonwealths ? eng. gent. it is so in democracies , and was so in sparta , and is done by your great council in venice ; but we are not making such a kind of government , but rectifying an ancient monarchy , and giving the prince some help in the administration of that great branch of his regality ; besides , it is sufficient , that our parliament chuses these councils , ( that is always understood the lords and commons , with the kings consent ) besides , it is possible , that if such a regulation as this come in debate amongst them , the parliament will reserve to it self the approbation of the great officers , as chancellor , judges , general officers of an army , and the like ; and that such shall not have a settlement in those charges , till they are accordingly allowed of ; but may in the mean time exercise them . as to particulars , i shall always refer you to what the parliament will judge fit to order in the case ; but if you have any thing to object , or to shew in general , that some such regulation as this cannot be effectual towards the putting our distracted country into better order ; i shall think my self oblig'd to answer you , if you can have patience to hear me , and are not weary already ; as you may very well be . noble ven. i shall certainly never be weary of such discourse ; however i shall give you no further trouble in this matter ; for i am very fully satisfied , that such reformation , if it could be compassed , would not only unite all parties , but make you very flourishing at home , and very great abroad : but have you any hopes that such a thing will ever come into debate ? what do the parliament-men say to it ? eng. gent. i never had any discourse to this purpose , either with any lord , or member of the commons house , otherwise than as possibly some of these notions might fall in at ordinary conversation : for i do not intend to intrench upon the office of god , to teach our senatours wisdom . i have known some men so full of their own notions , that they went up and down sputtering them in every mans face they met ; some went to great men during our late troubles ; nay , to the king himself , to offer their expedients from revelation . two men i was acquainted with , of which one had an invention to reconcile differences in religion ; the other had a project for a bank of lands to lye as a security for summs of money lent ; both these were persons of great parts and fancy ; but yet so troublesome at all times , and in all companies , that i have often been forced to repeat an excellent proverb of your country : god deliver me from a man that has but one business ; and i assure you there is no mans reputation that i envy less , than i do that of such persons ; and therefore you may please to believe that i have not imitated them in scattering these notions , nor can i prophesie whether any such apprehensions as these will ever come into the heads of those men who are our true physitians . but yet to answer your question , and give you my conjecture ; i believe that we are not ripe yet for any great reform ; not only because we are a very debauch'd people ; i do not only mean that we are given to whoring , drinking , gaming and idleness ; but chiefly that we have a politique debauch , which is a neglect of all things that concern the publick welfare , and a setting up our own private interest against it ; i say , this is not all , for then the polity of no country could be redrest : for every commonwealth that is out of order , has ever all these debauches we speak of , as consequences of their loose state. but there are two other considerations which induce me to fear that our cure is not yet near . the first is , because most of the wise and grave men of this kingdom are very silent , and will not open their budget upon any terms : and although they dislike the present condition we are in as much as any men , and see the precipice it leads us to , yet will never open their mouths to prescribe a cure ; but being asked what they would advise , give a shrug like your country-men . there was a very considerable gentleman as most in england , both for birth , parts , and estate , who being a member of the parliament that was called , 1640. continued all the war with them ; and by his wisdom and eloquence ( which were both very great ) promoted very much their affairs . when the factions began between the presbyters and independents , he joyned cordially with the latter , so far as to give his affirmative to the vote of no addresses ; that is , to an order made in the house of commons , to send no more messages to the king , nor to receive any from him . afterwards , when an assault was made upon the house by the army , and divers of the members taken violently away , and secluded ; he disliking it ( though he were none of them ) voluntarily absented himself , and continued retired ; being exceedingly averse to a democratical government , which was then declared for , till cromwell's usurpation ; and being infinitely courted by him , absolutely refused to accept of any employment under him , or to give him the least counsel . when cromwell was dead , and a parliament called by his son , or rather by the army , the chief officers of which did , from the beginning , whisper into the ears of the leading members , that if they could make an honest government , they should be stood by ( as the word then was ) by the army . this gentleman , at that time , neither would be elected into that parliament , nor give the least advice to any other person that was ; but kept himself still upon the reserve . insomuch that it was generally believed , that although he had ever been opposite to the late king 's coming to the government again , though upon propositions ; yet he might hanker after the restoration of his majesty that now is . but that apprehension appeared groundless when it came to the pinch : for being consulted as an oracle by the then general monk , whether he should restore the monarchy again or no , would make no answer , nor give him the least advice ; and , de facto , hath ever since kept himself from publick business ; although , upon the banishment of my lord of clarendon , he was visited by one of the greatest persons in england , and one in as much esteem with his majesty as any whatsoever , and desired to accept of some great employment near the king ; which he absolutely refusing , the same person , not a stranger to him , but well known by him , begged of him to give his advice how his majesty ( who desired nothing more than to unite all his people together , and repair the breaches which the civil war had caused , now my lord clarendon was gone , who by his counsels kept those wounds open ) might perform that honourable and gracious work : but still this gentleman made his excuses . and , in short , neither then , nor at any time before or after ( excepting when he sate in the long parliament of the year 40. ) neither during the distracted times , nor since his majesty's return , when they seemed more reposed , would ever be brought , either by any private intimate friend , or by any person in publick employment , to give the least judgment of our affairs , or the least counsel to mend them , though he was not shye of declaring his dislike of matters as they went. and yet this gentleman was not only by repute , and esteem a wise man , but was really so , as it appeared by his management of business , and drawing declarations , when he was contented to act ; as also by his exceeding prudent managing of his own fortune , which was very great , and his honourable living and providing for his family ; his daughters having been all marryed to the best men in england ; and his eldest son to the most accomplisht lady in the world. i dare assure you , there are above an hundred such men in england , though not altogether of that eminency . noble ven. methinks these persons are altogether as bad an extreme as the loquacious men you spoke of hefore . i remember when i went to school , our master , amongst other common-places in the commendation of silence , would tell us of a latine saying , that a fool whilst he held his peace did not differ from a wise man ; but truly i think we may as truly say , that a wise man whilst he is silent does not differ from a fool ; for how great soever his wisdom is , it can neither get him credit , nor otherwise advantage himself , his friend , nor his country . but let me not divert you from your other point . eng. gent. the next reason i have to make me fear that such an expedient as we have been talking of , will not be proposed suddenly , is the great distrust the parliament has of men , which will make most members shy of venturing at such matters , which being very new , at the first motion are not perfectly understood , at least to such as have not been versed in authors who have written of the politicks ; and therefore the mover may be suspected of having been set on by the court-party to puzzle them , and so to divert , by offering new expedients , some smart mettlesome debates they may be upon concerning the succession to the crown , or other high matters : for it is the nature of all popular counsels ( even the wisest that ever were , witness the people of rome and athens , which machiavil so much extols ) in turbulent times , to like discourses that heighten their passions , and blow up their indignation , better than them that endeavour to rectifie their judgments , and tend to provide for their safety . and the truth is , our parliament is very much to be excused , or rather justified in this distrust they have of persons , since there hath been of late so many and so successful attempts used by the late great ministers , to debauch the most eminent members of the commons-house , by pensions and offices ; and therefore it would wonderfully conduce to the good of the common-wealth , and to the composing our disordered state , if there were men of so high and unquestionable a reputation , that they were above all suspicion and distrust , and so might venture upon bold , that is ( in this case ) moderate counsels , for the saving of their country . such men there were in the parliament of 1640. at least twenty or thirty , who having stood their ground in seven parliaments before , which in the two last kings reigns had been dissolved abruptly and in wrath , and having resisted the fear of imprisonment and great fines for their love to england , as well , as the temptation of money and offices to betray it , both inferred by the wicked councellours of that age , tending both to the ruine of our just rights , and the detriment of their masters affairs ; i say , having constantly , and with great magnanimity and honour made proof of their integrity , they had acquired so great a reputation , that not only the parliament , but even almost the whole people stuck to them , and were swayed by them in actions of a much higher nature than any are now discoursed of , without fear of being deserted , or as we say , left in the lurch , as the people of france often are by their grandees , when they raise little civil wars to get great places , which as soon as they are offered , they lay down arms , and leave their followers to be hang'd ; but although these two reasons of the silence of some wise men , and the want of reputation in others , does give us but a sad prospect of our land of promise , yet we have one consideration , which does incourage us to hope better things ere long . and that is the infallible certainty that we cannot long continue as we are , and that we can never meliorate , but by some such principles , as we have been here all this while discoursing of , and that without such helps and succours as may be drawn from thence , we must go from one distraction to another , till we come into a civil war , and in the close of it be certainly a prey to the king of france , who ( on which side it matters not ) will be a gamester , and sweep stakes at last ; the world not being now equally ballanced between two princes alike powerful , as it was during our last civil war ; and if as well this danger , as the only means to prevent it , be understood in time , ( as no doubt it will ) we shall be the happiest and the greatest nation in the world in a little time ; and in the mean time , enjoy the best and most just easie government of any people upon earth . if you ask me whether i could have offer'd any thing that i thought better than this , i will answer you as solon did a philosopher , who askt him whether he could not have made a better government for athens ? yes , but that his was the best , that the people would or could receive . and now i believe you will bear me witness , that i have not treated you as a wise man would have done in silence ; but it is time to put an end to this tittle-tattle which has nauseated you for three days together . noble ven. i hope you think better of our judgments than so ; but i believe you may very well be weary . doct. i am sure the parish priests are often thanked for their pains , when they have neither taken half so much as you have , nor profited their auditory the hundredth part so much . eng. gent. the answer to thank you for your pains , is always , thank you , sir , for your patience ; and so i do very humbly both of you . noble ven. pray , sir , when do you leave the town ? eng. gent. not till you leave the kingdom . i intend to see you , if please god , aboard the yacht at gravesend . noble ven. i should be ashamed to put you to that trouble . eng. gent. i should be much more troubled if i should not do it ; in the mean time i take my leave of you for this time , and hope to wait on you again to morrow . what , doctor , you stay to consult about the convalescence ? adieu to you both . doct. farewell , sir. nullum numen abest si sit prudentia . finis . remains of sir walter raleigh ... selections. 1657 raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. 1657 approx. 379 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 184 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2005-12 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a57532 wing r180 wing r176_partial estc r20762 12404554 ocm 12404554 61340 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a57532) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 61340) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 289:15) remains of sir walter raleigh ... selections. 1657 raleigh, walter, sir, 1552?-1618. vaughan, robert. [15], 202, [12], 122 p. : port. printed for william sheares, iunior ..., london : 1657. sir walter raleigh's portrait signed: ro. vaughan. "a mere reissue of the 'maxims of state,' 1656 (wing r176), with the omission of the 'observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander,' and the addition of 'the prerogative of parliaments'"--sabin 67577. includes the t.p. of the 1656 edition of "maxims of state." reproduction of original in british library. (from t.p.) maxims of state -advise to his son : his sons advise to his father -his sceptick -observation concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulency of cities -his letters to divers persons of quality -the prerogative of parliaments. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published 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make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng england and wales. -parliament. political science -early works to 1800. 2000-00 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2001-06 spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images 2001-09 tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread 2005-06 john latta text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion ●am marti , quam mercurio . the ho. ble and learned knight sr. walter raleigh . ro : vaughan sculp . remains of s ir walter raleigh ; viz. maxims of state. advise to his son : his sons advise to his father . his sceptick . observation concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulency of cities . his letters to divers persons of quality . with the prerogative of parliaments , being a dispute between a counsellour of state and a justice of peace . london , printed for william sheares iunior , in westminster hall. 1657. maxims of state . with instructions to his son , and the sons advice to his aged father . whereunto is added observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander and other nations , proving that our sea and land commodities inrich and strengthen other countries against our own . by sir walter raleigh . london . printed for will. shears junior at the blue bible in bedford street in covent-garden . 1656 , the contents . of government . page 1 of policie . 2 of monarchie . 3 of aristocracie , or senatorie state. 5 of free state , or popular state. 6 of tyrannie . 7 of olygarchie , or the government of a few . ibid. of a common-wealth . 8 of causes of states , and common-wealths in generall . 10 of founding a state. ibid. of causes preserving state or common-wealth . 15 of mysteries or sophisms . ibid. of axioms or rules of preserving a state. 1-9 rules for preserving of a kingdom hereditarie 25 rules for preserving of a kingdom conquered 25 kingdoms hereditarie are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . ibid. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by rules . 10 35 rules politick of tyrants . 41 sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . 42 sophisms of the sophisticall , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state. 46 of preservation of an aristocracie . 53 of preservation of an olygarchie , by sophisms ibid. of preservation of an olygarchie , by rules . ibid. of conversion of states in generall . 59 causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : generall and particular . ibid. particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . 60 of sedition . 61 causes of sedition are of two sorts . ibid. of alteration without violence . 64 a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the storie . 67 old age is not ever unfit for publick gouernment , ibid. example of the like practice in charls the fifth . 68 of observation for the affirmative and the negative . ibid. of defence for david in marrying abishag . 70 politicall nobility . of ado●ijah aspiring to the kingdom 71 observations . of ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . 73 politicall prince . 75 the table of the chapters containd in sr walter raleigh's instructions to his son . chap. page . virtuous persons to be made choice of friends . great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . wisest men have been abused by flatterers . pr●v●●e quarrels to be avoided . three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . what sort of servants are most fit to be entertained . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . riches not to be sought by evil means . ibid. what inconveniences happen to such as delight in wine . let god be thy protectour and directour in all thy actions . the sceptick doth neither affirm , neither deny any position but doubteth of it , and proposeth his reason against that which is affirmed or denied , to justifie his not consenting . observations concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulencie of cities . safetie for defence of the people and their goods in and near a town . causes that concern the magnificencie of a citie . that the seat of government is upheld by the two great pillars thereof , viz. civile justice , and martiall policie , which are framed out of husbandry , merchandise , and gentry of this kingdom . sir raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood before his journey to guiana . to his wife from guiana . to sir ralph winwood . to his wife copied out of his own hand writing . to his wife after condemnation . to king james at his return from guiana . his third letter to secretary winwood . his letter to prince henry touching the modell of a ship. his speech immediately before he was beheaded . sir vvalter raleigh observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander and other nations , proving that our sea and land commodities inrich and strengthen other countreys against our own . finis . maxims of state . of government . government is of two sorts . 1. p rivate , of himself . sobriety . of his family ; called oeconomy . 2. publick , of the common-wealth , called p●licy a man must first govern himself , ere he be fit to govern a family : and his family , e're he be fit to bear the government in the common-wealth . of policie . policie is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , o● form of government , wherein it is setled for the publick good . state , is the frame or set order of common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , especially o● the chief and sovereign governour that commandeth the rest . the state of sovereignty consisteth in five points . 1. making or anulling of laws . 2. creating and disposing of magistrates . 3. power over life and death . 4. making of war , or peace . 5. highest or last appeal . where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the state. these five points of state , rest either in , 1. one monarchie or kingdom . 2. some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an aristocracie . 3. many , called a free-state , or popular state. these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and lawfull states . these 3. degenerate into 3. other governments viz. 1. monarchie into 1. tyrrannie . 2. aristocracie , into 2. oligarchie . 3. popular state , into 3. common-wealth or government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a common-wealth by an usurped nick-name . these all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are called bastard governments . i monarchie . a monarchie , or kingdom , is the government of a state by one head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchie , or kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right or possession of them , viz. 1. hereditary , by descent , as the english french , &c. 2. elective , by suffrage of the other orders , of some of them , as the p●loni●● 3. 〈◊〉 , or of both kinds , viz. descent , yet not tied to the next bloud , as the ancient jewish state. monarchies are of two sorts touching their power , or authority , viz. 1. int●re . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both peace and war , doth by law & cust●● appertain to the prince , as in the ●●●gest kingdom , where the prince hat● power to make laws league , & wa● to create magistrates ; to pardon life of appeal , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , th●● have a suffrage in making laws , y●● ever subject to the princes pleasure nor negative will. 2. 〈◊〉 or restrained , that ha●● no full power in all the points or matters of state , as the military king that hath not the sovereignty in time peace , as the making of laws , & but in war only , as the p●loni●● kings . ii. aristocracy , or senatory state. an aristocracie is the government of a common-wealth by some ●ompetent number of the better sort , ●referred for wisdom and other virtues ●f the publick good . 1. aristocracie are of three sorts , viz. there the senatours are chosen , for virtu , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . 2. virtue , and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman , when some of the ●enatours were fetched from the ●ough , and some from the schools 3. vir●ue and wealth more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an oligarchie , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . iii. free-state , or popular state. the popular state is the government of a state by the choisest sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts , viz. w th due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort in every just state , some part of the government is , or ought to be imparted to the people ; as in a kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making laws ; and somtimes also , in levying of arms ( if the charge be great , and the prince forced to borrow help of his subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in iudicial matters , may in part be referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many enemies to the present state. for which cause , tyrants , which allow the people , no manner of ●ealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and wea●ons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , ●● in rushland , turkey , &c. iv. tyrannie . a tyrannie is the swerving , or distorting of a monarchie , or the government of one , tending not the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , & his followers . as in the russ & turkish government , where the state and wealth of other orders , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the king or emperour . this is the worst of all the ●astard states because it is the pervering of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchie , which resembleth the sovereign government of god himself . v. oligarchie , or the government of a few . an oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an aristocracie ; or the government of some few , that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without any respect of the publick good . the chief end of these governours , is their own greatness and enriching . and therefore their manner is , to prepare fit means to uphold their estate . this state is not wholly so bad , as if the tyrannie , and yet worse than the common wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . vi. common wealth . a common-wealth is the swerving of depravation of a free , or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the ba●e and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the oligarchie , and common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings between them . for that the richer or nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equall with the rich or noble , touching their libertie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour , as touching government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich , noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , virtuous , va●ant , &c. and so have fit parts to govern a state. the severall states are sometimes mixed , and inter-wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . so in the roman state , the people had their plebescita , and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chief rule . so in the venetian state , the duke seemeth to represent a monarch , and the senate to be his councell : yet the duke hath no power in state matters , but is like a head set on by art , that beareth no brain . and so that state is senatorica●l or aristocraticall . causes of states and common-wealths in general . causes of states , or of common-wealths are of 3. sorts , viz. 1. founding , or setling a state where to be considered . 1. measure . 2. parts , and their qualities . 2. preserving a state. 3. changing , and altering a state. founding a state. in founding a state are to be considered 2. things . 1. proportion . 2. parts . proportion , is a just measure or mediocritie of the state , whereby it is framed & kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a monarch be not too monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the russe kings ; nor aristocratical , that is over●mated or eclipsed by the nobilitie , as the scottish kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . that aristocracie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government , the venetians and sometimes the ro●● allowed the people to elect certain magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plebiscita , &c. so a free state or common-wealth that it is not over popular , viz. that it depress not too much the richer , wiser , nor leaneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and masteries of that state. that they seek no alteration of the present state. the reason , because the moderate states in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause or grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and 〈◊〉 , which they see in others that 〈◊〉 the state ; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick government . parts or partakers of publick government , are 1. councel or senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to war and peace , magistrates , &c. in admi●ting of whom there ought to be a mo●● special care , that they may be men expert in matter of policie , because it i● their trade and vo●ation , as men use to chuse pilots , and masters of ships , such as know the art of navigation , and no● husband men , &c. and so the contrarie . 2. magistrates and officers , which are to be executioners of that which consulted , and found to be expedient for the common-wealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of magistrate than they be such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out t● whom , and in what manner they be chosen . 3. judges ; to determine in civil and criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of judgement and judicial proceeding . in magistrates are to be observed . 1. kinds of magistrates . 1. civil . 1. superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the state , as consuls for a year , and not perpetual dictatours in a senatorie state. praetors & censors , that over-see manners & orders of the people . for a kingdom lieutenant of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatours of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth that take care for their education for civil and warlike exercise . clarks of the market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual . ed●●es for buildings , streets , bounds . questours , or treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick treasury . a●u●●ies , or recorders , which keep the publick record . goalers to keep prison and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. 1. as bishops or pastours , elders , wardens . 2. time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not heredetary in a kingdom . yearly in an aristocracie , or half yearly in a free-state . 3. manner of choice , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by lot. 2. eclesiastical . causes preserving a state , or common-wealth . in preserving of states a things required . 1 mysteries , or sophisms 1. general to all states . 2. particular for every several state. 2. rules , or actions . 1. general , for all states . 2. particular , for every state. mysteries , or sophisms . mysteries , or sophisms of state , are certain secret practices , either for the avoiding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the prefent state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of two sorts . 1. generall : that pertain to all states ; as first to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the common-wealth , do not exceed both in quantity and quality . in quantity , as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the state or common-wealth can bear . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights bear down he scale : so in common-wealths , that part of degree that excelleth the rest in quality and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of ●tate . secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of nobility and gentry , and the base rascal , and beggarly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firm , when both the extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracie of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . to these two points , the particular rules in sophisms of every common-wealth , are to be applied . 2. particular : that serve for preservation of every common wealth , in that form of state wherein it is setled as in a kingdom . that the nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the princes court , under presence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and be as hostages for the good hehaviour , and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . to that end serves the persian practice , in having a band , or train of the satrapa's children , and other nobles to attend the court ; which was well imitated by our train of he●●●●●r , if they were of the nobler sort . again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his subjects and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : so in an oligarchie , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms , ( viz. they compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their assemblie , for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercises , making an execution of laws , & . by that means seemin ; to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sort to be absent , and to neglect those assemblies under pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings : yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are casily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies , with the tendiousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those consultations , by which means , the richer sort do still , govern the state , with the peoples liking , and good contentment . aixoms . axioms or rules of preserving the state are , 1. general , that serve for all common-wealths . 2. particular , that serve for every several state. general rules . 1. the first and principal rule of policie to be observed in all states , is to profess , & practise , & maintain the true worship & religio of almighty god prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all government . the axiom , that god be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurb to humane policy ; as in the jews common-wealth : that all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship god four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c. 2. to avoid the causes of conversion , whereby states are over thrown , that are set down in the title of conversions ; for that common wealth ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , and are so cured by contrary medicines . 3. to take heed , that no magistrate be created or continued , contrarie to the laws and policie of that state. as that in a se●at● , there be not created a perpetual dictaetor , as caesar in rome . in a kingdom , that there be no senate , or convention of equall power with the prince in state matters , as in poland . 4. to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrarie practise , as to advance popular persons in a kingdom , or aristocracie . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurreth or altereth the present state. 5. to that end to have certain officers to pay abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present state , but desire rather to bee under some other form , or kind of government . 6. to take heed that magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which especially to be observed in that common wealth , which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; for if the magistrate gain nothing but his common fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . but if the magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debat'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the german oligarchies continue to firm for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor . 7. to take heed that the state , as it is setled and maintained , be not over-strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdom be not too monarchicall , nor a p●●ul● state too p●●u●ar : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes ) yield of his right touching honour , and bahave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popularly with the common people , which is the cause that some common wealths , though they be very simply , and un kilfully set , yet continue firm , because the magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect toward , the rest that are without honour ; and therefore some kind of moderate popularity is to be used in every common-wealth . 8. to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of laws , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every severall state. for the desease and a teration of a common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in policie . 9. to provide , that that part be ever the greater in number and power , which favours the state as now it stands . this is to be observed as a very oracle in all common-wealths . 10. to observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed , or decay overmuch . as first for preferments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if any be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where these sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . and it that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtue and faithfulness , we are fully assined , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and over charged with wealth , to use the sophisms of a popular state , viz to send him on embassages , and forreign negotiations , or imploy him in some office that hath great charges , and little honour , &c. to which end , the f●●●●ful served in some common-wealths . 11 to suppress the factions , and quarrels of the nobles , and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions . 12. to increase or remit the common taxes and contributions ; according to the wealth , or want of the people and commonwealth . if the people be increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may be increased . if they be poor , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffick , &c. to forbear taxes and impositions , or to take little . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophisms that serve for impositions , are these , and other of like sort , to pretend business of great charge , as war , building of ships making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealings needs no pretences . 13. to provide that the discipline & training of youth of the better sort to such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdom , the sons of noble men to be attendant at the court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the prince . in the senatory state , that the sons o● the senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in learning , langues , and nartiall exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and c●nt any wise , in a popular state. 14. to take heed , least their sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that state , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and be with great secrecie . particular rules . rules and axioms , for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . conquered . kingdoms hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering . 1. himself , viz. by the tempering and moderation of the princes answer and prerogative . for the less and more temperate their power and state is the more firm , and stable is their kingdom and government ; because they seem to be further off from a master like , and tyrannte all empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree , to wit , the nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy . 2. nobility , &c. by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the realm , or state can bear , as the scottish kingdom , and sometime the english , when the realm was overcharged with the number of dukes , earls , and other noble ; whereby the authority of the prince was eclipsed , and the realm troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excel in honour , power , or wealth , as that he resemble another king within the kingdom , as the house of lancaster within this realm . to that end , not to load any with too much honour or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatnesse , and high fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinit examples in all states . the sophisms for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . if any great person be to be abated , not do real with him by calumniation or forged ●atter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the ●●chiav●an place , which besides the injustice , an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . not to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate 〈◊〉 in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . not to banish him into forreign countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with forreign states , whereof great danger may ●n●e , as in the example of ●ortulanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophisms , viz. to abate their greatnesse by degrees , as david joabs , fa●●●●a bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great , or greater honour , to shadow , ●● over-mate the greatnesse of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by ●●vefer●●● , rewards , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the common wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the state. 3. people , viz. so to order and behave himself that he be loved , and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly fear home conspirac●es , or forreign invation , she be firmly loved of this own people . that reason , for that the rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , not any refuge , being discovered & put to flight , ●t the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . this may be affected by the prince , the use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed have and contempt ; viz. if he seem as tutor , or a father to love the people and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his kingdom ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people than is peace . 4. if he shew himself oftentime graciously , yet with state and majestie to his people , and receive complaint of his suppliants , and such like . 5. if he sit himself sometimes in open courts , and place of ●ustice that he may seem to have a care of i●●stice among his people . if he bestow many benefits and graces upon that citie , which he maketh the seat of his l●●●● , and to make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his kingdom , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the sun in the middle of heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . if he go in progress many times to see his provinces , especially , those that are remite . 6 if he gratifie his cou●tiers and ●●●●ians in that sort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt & injury of his people , as with m●n●●ol●es , and such like . 7 if he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the french kings , who for that purpose , as may seem , have erected their court at paris , which acquitteth the prince from grudge and envy , both with the nobles and the scope . 8. if he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his exchequer , or other officer . 9. if he avoid all such things as may breed h●tre● or contempt of his person which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , unconstant , hard , cruel , esteminate , fearfull , and ●asterdly , &c. but contrariwise religious , grave , just valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machiavilian policie , with far the better means to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . 10. if the prince be well furnished with warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home . 11. if he provide so much as lieth in him , that his neighbour kingdoms grow not over much in power and dominior ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . an oversight of the christian princes towards the king of spain . 12 if he get him intelligencers by reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his state. or at least have some of his own lydging abroad about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other pretence ; which must be men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turn . 13. to observe the laws of his country , and not to encounter them with his prerogate , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their comm●d●t●es , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . 14. to provide especially , that that part , which favoureth the state as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change . 15. to make speciall choise of good and sound men to bear the place of magistrates , especially of such as assist the pr●●●●● on cou●sels , and policie● , and not to lean overmuch to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of ma●li●● who teacheth , that a prince can have no good ●●●●sul , except it be in himself ; his reason , ●● use if he use the 〈…〉 is in dang●r to be over w 〈…〉 d by him ; and if he counsel with more , then he shall be 〈…〉 in opi●i●●s . as if a prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the judgement of all his c●nc●llours in any point of po●●●● , or of so many as he himself thinke he good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choise of the best , without any distraction of binding himself to the direction of one . for the proverb is true . that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and consultations of a senatory state is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the ●●●t , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : and yet every mean may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his 〈…〉 e. 16. the prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publick justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of sol●man , which may seem the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publick justice , after the manner of the ancient kings that sate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some speciall causes may be selected , which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the prince in private , with the help and advice o● his learned councell , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the prince himself ; at least , the prince is to take accompt of every minister of publick justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the iusticers also to be more carefull in performing of their duties . 17. to be moderate in his taxes , and in positions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , to do it by parliament , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his subjects , than an exaction by him . 18. to stop small beginnings ; unto this end to compound the dissentions that rise amongst the nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whose common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons , war , and the late wars of france , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the ●●●●o● faction , and the other nobility . 19. to stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negligent of armour , and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false alarm , when there is need indeed . 20 to have speciall care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in martiall exercise , contrary to the practise of many princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state. ii. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these means . first , if they have been subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions , as have his own countrey , it is an easie matter to retain such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condition , do easily s●ole , and combine themselves together , so much the rather , if the people of that countrey have served before , and were not accustomed to their own liberty , wherein especially is to be observed , that the laws and customs of that purchased countrey be not altered nor innovated , or at least it be done by little and little . so the b●rgundians and oquitans were annexed to france . the reason , because partlty they have been accustomed to serve , and partly , for that they will not easily agree about any other to be their prince , if the bloud royall be cas● extinguished . as for the invasion of a forreign countrey , where into the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living : it is not the part of a just civil prince , much less a christian prince to enforce such a countrey : and therefore , the machiavillian practises in this case , to make sure work by extiguishing wholly the bloud royall , is lewd and impertinent : the like is to be said of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession . a thing not onely against christian religion , but it is inhumane injustice , cruel , and barbarous . 2. the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives be transplanted into some other place , and our colonies , consisting of so many as shall be thought meet , be planted there in some part of the province , castls , forts , and havens , seized upon , and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch , which transplanted 10. jews : and of the romans in france , tribes of the germany , britain , & other places . the reason : 1. for that otherwise forces of horse and foot , are to be maintained within the province● , which cannot be done without great charge . 2. for that the whole province is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the army with victual , carriages , &c. 3. for that colonies are more sure and faithfull , than the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former seats , they have no means to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to be quiet . the turks practise in asia , where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the souldiers , whom they call timari●tae . that the prince have his seat and his residence , in his new purchase , especially , for a time , till things be well setled ; especially if the province be great and large , as the turks in greece : the reasons ; 1. because the presence of the prince availeth much to keep things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects 2. they conceive that they have refuge by the princes presence , if they be oppressed by the lieutenants , and inferiour governours : where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . 3. because being present , he seeth and heareth what is thought & attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent he cannot do , or not do in time . 4. if the prince himself cannot be present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes savour , and not to natives , or other of their own subjects , that are gracious for their nobility , or virtue ; especially , if the province be great , and somewhat far distant , which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects , as for such governours , as depend wholly upon the princes savour , being not born , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty , and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers , to keep them in subjection , and not for any ill will 5. to have the children of the chief noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping , the more the bettter : for that no bond is stronger , than that of nature , to contain the parents and allies in obedience , and they the rest . 6 to alter the laws but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behoovefull for the establishing of the present government . 6. to keep the people quiet and peaceable , and well affected so much as may be , that they may seem by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather than a tyrant ; for the common-people , if they enjoy peace , and be not distracted nor drawn from their businesse , nor exacted upon beyond measure , are easily contained under obedience ; yet notwithstanding , they are to be dis-used from the practise of arms , and other exercises which increase courage , and be weakened of armor , that they have neither spirit , nor will to rebell . 7. if there be any faction in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part , and to combine with it , as caes●r in fr●nce . 8. to look well to the borders , and confining p●ovinces , and if any rule there of great , or equall power to himself , to joyn leage with some other borde●●● , tho●gh of lesse strength , to hinder he at●empts : if any should be ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth , often , that a countrey infested by one neighbour prince , calleth in another , of as great , or greater power , to assist and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the ●●●mans were call●d into g●●● , by the aet●●ians ; the ●●●●ns , by the britai●s , the danes , by the saxon● . 9. to leave their titles and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority , wholly to his own . 10. not to put much trust , nor to practise too often the s●p●●sm of policie , especially those that appertain to a tyrannicall state , which are soon detected by men of iudgement , and so being discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser , and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very ill effects . the s●●●●● of tyrants , are rather to be known , than practised , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannicall states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politick of tyrants . rules practised by tyrants are of 2. sorts , viz. 1. barbarous , and professed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves , without others help , as in the turkish , and russe government . 2. sophisticall , and dissembled ; as in some states that are reputed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet setled , nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and help of others , and so are forced to be politick sophisters . i. sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . to expell and banish out of his countrey all honest means , where . by his people may attain to learning , wisdom , valour and other virtues , that they might be fit for that estate , and servile condition . for that these two , learning , and martiall exercise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : viz wisdom , and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding , can hardly endure a servile state. to this end , to forbid learning of liberall arts , and martiall exercise ; as in the russe government so julian the apostata dealt with the christians . contrariwise , to use his people to base occupations , and mechanicall arts , to keep them from idlenesse , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sorted , and so made unfit for great enterprises . so the egyptian kings dealt with the hebrews ; so the russe emperour with his russe people : and charls the fifth with the netherlanders , when he purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . 2. to make sure to him , and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other means , especially . his guard , or praetorian band ; that being partakers of the spoil and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firm to it ; as the turk , his janizarie ; the russe , his boyarens , &c. 3. to unarm his people of weapons , money , and all means , whereby they may resist his power ; and to that end , to have his set and ordinary exactions &c. once in two , three , or four years , and sometimes yearly , as the ●●rk and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must 〈…〉 ed as his flock of sheep , viz. their people taken from them , least it overlade ● , and grow too heavy ; that they are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven the thicker it would grew . and if there be any of extraordinary wealth , to borrow of them in the mean while , till the tax come about , or upon some divised matter , to confiscate their goods , as the common practise is of the ●uss● and turk . 4. to be still in wars , to the end , his people may need a captain ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearly against the tartar , p●lonian , and sweden , &c. 5. to cut off such as excell the rest in wealth , favour , or nobility ; or be of a pregnant , or aspiring wit , and so are fearfull to a tyrant ; and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turk his b●shae● ; and the russe , his r●zzes . 6. to forbid guilds , brotherhoods , feastings and other assemblies among the people , that they have no means or opportunity to conspire , or confer together of publick matters , or to maintain love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practice . 7. to have their beagles , or l●stener in every corner , & parts of the realm ; especially , in places that are more suspect , to learn what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , and take away such ●s mislike their s●●● . 8. to make schism , and division among his subjects , viz. to set one noble man against another , and one richman against another , that through fact on & disagreement among themselves they may be weakened , and attempt nothing against him , and by this means entertaining whispering , and complaints , he may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the zemsky , and the 〈◊〉 . 9. to have strangers for his guard , and to entertain parasites , and other base and ●ervile fellows , not too wise , and yet subtile , that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men can not flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises and such like , may be contracted into one or two , viz. to bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt , or to alter the present state the use is caution , not imitation . ii. sophisms of the sophillicall , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state. 1. to make shew of a good king , by observing a temper and mediocrity in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end , it is necessary , that this subtile tyrant , be a cunning polititian , or a machiavilian at the least , and that he be taken so to be , for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded , and is thought thereby : not unworthy for to govern others . 2. to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , and habit , and other demeanour . 3. to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end , to seem loath to exact tributes , and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is : to that end to procure such war as can bring no danger toward his state , and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on , that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list . and thereof to imploy some in his publick service , the rest to hoord upon his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes , as edward the fourth in his wars against france , when have levied a great sum of money throughout his realm , especially of the londoners , he went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . 4. sometimes to give an account by open speech , and publick writing , of the expence of such taxes and impositions , as he hath received of his subjects , that he may seem to be a good husband and frugal , and not a robbe of the common-wealth . 5. to that end , to bestow some cost upon publick buildings , or some other work for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chief cities of his realm , that so he may seem a benefactour , & have a delight in the adorning of his country , or doing some good for it . 6. to forbid feastings , and other meetings , which increase love , and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses , to that end the curficu bell was first ordained by william the conquerour , to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour . 7. to take heed that no one grow to be over-great , but rather , many equally great , that they may envy , and contend one with another ; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort , to do it warily and by degrees ; if quite to wreck him , and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull tryal , after the manner of his country ; and if he proceed so far with any or great power and estimation , as to do him contumely , or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace , are things contrarie unto houour , which great spirits do most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , than to any thankfulnesse , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismission : true in ath●ists , but not in true christian nobility . 8. to unarm his people , and store up their weapons , under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth . and then to arm with them such , and so many as he shall think meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . 9. to make schism or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine not together , and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints , may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter against them both , when it listeth him to call them to an account . 10. to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially , about womens matters , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath been the ruin of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of tarquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices , duke of florence , aloisus of placen●●a , rodericus , king of spain , &c. 11. to that end , to be moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely that he be not seen ; for that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own . 12. to reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any speciall action for the common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem , they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a free-state . 13. all rewards and things gratefull , to come from himself , but all punishments , exactions , and things ungratefull , to come from his officers , and publick ministers ; and when he hath effected what he would by them , if he see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . 14. to pretend great care of religion , and of serving god , ( which hath been the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people do less fear any hurt from those , whom they do think virtuous and religious , nor attempt likely to do them hurt , for that they think that god protects them . 15. to have a strong and sure guard of forreign souldiers , and to bind them by good turns , that they having at least profit , may depend upon him and the present state ; as caeligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practised by lawfull kings , as by the french king. 16. to procure that other great persons be in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause they be forced to defend the tyrant , for their own safetie . 17. to take part , and to joyn himself with the stronger part ; if the common people , and mean degree be the stronger , to joyn with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyn with them . for so that part with his own strengh , will be ever able to overmatch the other . 18. so to frame his manners and whole behaviour , as that he may seem , if not perfectly good , yet tolerably evil , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hypocriticall tyrants are to be known , that they may be avoided , and met withall , and not drawn into imitation . preservation of an aristocracie . rules to preserve a senatory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that preserve a kingdom . preservation of an oligarchie , by sophisms . rules . 1. in consultations and assemblies about publick affairs , to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies , and councels ; but to impose a fine upon the richer sort , if they omit that duty . on the other side , to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to bear with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , and not be hindered in their trades , and earnings . 2. in election of magistrates , and officers : to suffer the poorer sort to vow , and abjure the bearing of office , under colour of sparing them , or to enjoyn some great charge , as incident to the office , which the poor cannot bear . but to impose some great fine upon those that be rich , if they refuse to bear office , being elect unto it . 3. in judiciall matters : in like manner to order , that the people may be absent from publick trials , under pretence of following their businesse . but the richer to be present , and to compel them by fines , to frequent the court. 4. in warlike exercise and arms : that the poor be not forced to have armor , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to be drawn from their trades by martiall exercises ; but to compel the richer sort to keep their proportion of armor , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in war-like matters , &c. 5. to have special care of instructing their children in liberal arts , policy , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequency , and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer , is preserved by discipline , and good order of governours . 6. to provide good store of warlike furniture , especially of horse & horsemen , and of armed men , viz. pike , &c. which are proper to the gentry , as shot , and light furniture are for a popular company . 7. to put in practise some points of a popular state ; viz. to lade no one man with too much preferment ; to make yearly or half years magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatness , to abate him by the sophisms fit for this state. 8. to comit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters , which both rendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they reap some relief , and benefit by it . 9. to the same end , to contract marriages among themselves ; the rich with the rich , &c. 10 in some things which concern not the p●i●ts , and matters of state , as electing magistrates , making laws , &c. to give an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common people , and not to do , as in some oligarchies they were wont ; viz. to swear against the people , to suppresse and bridle them but rather contrary , to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall do no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of severe punishment . for other atioms that preserve this state , they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular , and tyrannicall state ; for the strict kind of oligarchie is kin to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophisms . rules or axiom . 1. in publick assemblies and consultations about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publick iustice , & exercise of arms , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an oligarchie . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those assemblies , magistrates , offices , warlike exercise , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to be spared , and not to be forced by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . 2. to make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to swear against them , as the manner hath been in some popular state ; but rather to prefer them in all other matters , that concern not the state and publick government . 3. to elect magistrates from among the commons by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . 4. to take heed , that no man bear office twice , except it be military , where the pay , & salary , &c. is to be reserved in their own hands , to be disposed of by a common councel , &c. and to see that no man be too highly preferred . 5. that no magistracy be perpetual , but as short as may be , to wit , for a year , half a year , &c. 6. to compel magistrates , when their time expireth , to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publickly before the commons . 7. to have publick salaries and allowance of their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearly dividents for the common people , and such as have most need among them . 8. to make judges of all matters out of all sorts , so they have some aptness to perform that duty . 9. to provide that publick iudgements and trials be not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilators , as the law of requital , &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby many times the popular state is turned into an oligarchie , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civil law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad senatus-consultum tarpthanum , l. 1. de calumniatoribus . 10. in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publick assemblies be not after : because they want salary for pleaders and oratours ; and if they be rich ; yet to be wary , that all the revenue be not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distributions of the common revenue among the multitude , is like a purse or barrel without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs . 11. if the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next countrey places , and to provide above all , that none do live idely , but be set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farms and coppie holds , such decayed citizens . 12. to be well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is be for the continuance thereof : and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer or common treasury , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it be practised , confiscations , & fines of the common people would be frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in general . conversation of a state , is the declining of the common wealth either to some other form of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god. causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . general , ( viz. ) 1. want of religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sins that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of s●u● , ●lizz●ah , the iewish state ; the four monarchies , and all other . 2. want of wisdom and good councel to keep the state , the prince , nobles , and people in good temper , and due proportion , according to their several order and degrees . 3. want of iustice either in administration ( as ill laws , or ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should be , or there bestowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be 4. want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self , viz. of provision , as armor , money , captains , souldiers , &c. execution , when the means or provision is not used , of all used . 5. particular : to be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules , that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealth . particular causes of conversion of states , are of two sorts . 1. forreign : by the over greatness of invasion of some forreign kingdom or other state of meaner power , having a part within our own , which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state : this falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a forreign state. 2. domestick . sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of armes against the superiour power , quasi ditio secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . 1. general liberty . riches . when they , that are of equal qualitie in a common-wealth , or do take themselves so to be , are not regarded equally in all or in any of the these three . or , when they are so unequal in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with less respect than those that be of less defect in these three things , or in any of them . honour . 1. in the chief : couetousness or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chief , encreaseth his substace & revenue beyond measure , either with the publick or ( private calamitie , whereby the governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in oligarchie ) or the other degrees conspite together , and make quarrel against the chief , as in kingdoms : the examples of ●at tyl●r , jack straw , &c. 2. in the ●●●●f : injury , when great spirits , and of great power , are greatly wronged & dishonoured , or take themselves to be , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earl of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . 3. preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have over-much , and so wax proud and aspire higher or have more or lesse , than they deserve , as they suppose , and so in envy and disdain , seck innovation on by open faction , so caesar , &c. 4. some great necessity or calamity ; so xerxes after the foil of his great army . and senacherib after the losse of 185. in one night . 2. particular . 1. envy , when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar. 2. fear , viz. of danger when one or more dispatch the prince by secret practice or force , to prevent his own danger , as artabanus did xerxes . 2. lust or lechery , as tarquinius , superbus , by brutus ; pisistrati●●ae , by armoaius ; appiu● by virginiu● . 4. contempt , for vile quality & base behaviour , as sardana●alus , by ●●aces , dionysius the younger by dion . 5. contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit , who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula by chaereas . 6. hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mithridates , anobar●anes alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; 1. excess of the state ; when by degrees the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was , or should have been setled , and exceedeth in power , riches , and absoluteness in his kind , by the ambition & covetousness of the chiefe immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c applying all to his own benefit , without respect of other degrees & so in the end changeth it self into another state or form of government , as a kingdom into a tyrannie , an oligarchy into an aristocracy . 2. excess , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one or more in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or virtue ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the sovereignty : by which means , popular states grow into oligarchies ; and oligarchies and aristocracies into monarchies . for which cause the athenians and some other free states , made their laws of ostro●ismos , to banish any for a time that should excell , though it were in virtue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , 't is better to take heed as the beginning to prevent the means , that none should grow to that heigth and excellency , than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the storie . david being seventy years of age , was of wisdome , memory , &c. sufficient to govern his kingdom ; 1. reg. cap. 1. old age is not ever unfit for publick government . david being of great years , and so having a cold , dry , and impotent body , married with abishag , a fair maid , of the best complexion through the whole realm , to revive his body and prolong his life , 1. reg. chap. 1. vers . 3. example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of bodie , by the advise of his nobles and phisitians , married a young maid called abishag , to warm and preserve his old bodie . observation . whether david did well in marrying a maid ? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man , to marrie a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old , worn , and decrepite woman , to marrie a young and lustie man. for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is society and mutual comfort ; but there may be societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young partie ergo 'tis lawful . answ. societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage ; but none of the principal ends of marriage : which are : 1. procreation of children , and so the continuance of mankind . 2. the avoiding of fornication . as for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man , woman and woman , where no marriage is , and therefore no proper ends of marriage . the negative , arg 1. that conjunction , which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ordained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old impotent , and young partie hath no respect to the right end , for which marriage was ordained by god. therefore it is no lawful marriage . 2. no contract , wherein the partie contracting , bindeth himself to an impossible condition , or to do that which he cannot do , is good or lawfull . but the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young partie , bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot do , viz. to perform the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull , for the same cause , the civil law determineth a nullity in these marriages , except the woman know before the infirmitie of the man , in which case she can have no wrong , being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent , because volenti non fit injuria : — in legem julian . de adulteriis leg . si uxor , &c. it provideth further , for the more certainty of the infirmatie , that three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men that have been infirm at the first , by reason of sicknesse , or some other accident , afterwards proved to be sufficient : de repudiis leg , in causis . defence for david , in marrying abishag . it was rather a medicine , than a marriage , without any evil , or disordered affection . 2. it was by the perswasion of his nobles , and physitians . 3. it was for the publick good , to prolong the life of a worthy prince . 4. it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmity , and to what end she was married unto him ; who if she di● it for the common good , and for ●●●●tes sake , having withall the gift of continency , she is to be commended ; if for ambition , or some vain respect , it is her own , and not davids fault . politicall nobilitie . adonijah aspiring to the kingdom . first , took the advantage of davids affection and kindnesse towards him , and make him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crown . fourthly , got him chariots , hors-men , and foot men , and a guard to make shew of state. fifthly , being a comly , and goodly person , made a popular shew of himself , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himself in faction joab , the generall of the army , who was in displeasure for murthering of abner , and amaza , and feared that david would supply b●najah in his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferment of zadok . seventhly , bad meetings with them , and other his confederates under pretence of a vow , and offering at the fountain of raguel , in the confines of judea . eigthly , made a shew of religion by sacrificing , &c. ninthly , made himself familiar with the nobles and people , and entertained them with feasting . tenthly , drew into his part the chief officers of the court , and servants to the king , by rewards , familiarity , &c. eleventhly , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as he knew would take part with him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . twelfthly , had ionathan a favourite of the court , and near about the king to give him intelligent , if any thing were discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himself was in hand about his practise . observations . ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . first , they wind into the princes favour by service , officiousnesse , flatterie , &c. to ●lant him in a good o●●●●on of that loyaltie and faithfulnesse , hereby to make him him secure of their practises . 2. they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotencie , negligence , sex , &c. and work upon that be disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his state , and government . 3. they blaz their title , and claim to the crown , ( if they have any with their friends and favourites . 4. they provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces , and furniture for the wars , make much of god souldiers and have a pretence ( if it be espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to be in readinesse against forreign enemies , &c. 5 they make open shew of their best qualities , and comlinesse of their persons ( which though it be vain as a dumb shew , it is very effectuall to win the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rule of the election of kings , in the b●es common wealth ; think that forma est digna imperare ) activitie , nobilaie , ancestrie , &c. 6 to have their blazers abroad to see out their virtues , and to prepare their friends in every province . 7. to draw into their part , and make sure unto them of the chief peers , and men of best quality , such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers , and the militarie men , and most subtile and politick , especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the state. 8. to have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place , not too near , nor too far off but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . 9. to take up a shew , and pretence of religion more than before , and beyond the practise of their former life . 10 they use popular courtesie ( which in a great person is very effectuall ) feasting , liberality , gaming , &c. 11. to be over liberal , & win to them by gifts familiaritie , &c. the chief officers of the court , and governours of state. 12. to have some near about the prince , to keep them in credit , and common suspition , if any arise . 13. to disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the prince , & present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all means they can , and to conceal the designs from them , left they be discovered before they be too ripe . 14. to have some spie near about the prince , to advertise them if any inckling suspition arise , whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolom , 2 sam. 16. and of cyrus minor in xenophon ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . cap. 1. politicall prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisdom , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet grown into age , grew withall into contempt , & had many both of his nobles , & common people , that fell from him ; first with absolom , then with adoniiab , who affected the kingdom , and rebelled against him : for remedie whereof , he stirred up himself to publick actions , which might shew his vigour & sufficiencie to manage the affairs of his kingdom . 1. after the victorie against absolom , he forced himself to forbes mourning , and shewed himself to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son. 2. after the victorie , he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to jerusalem , which was a renowing , and re-establishing of him , 2 sam. 19. 12. 3. he gave an experiment of his power and authoritie , by deposing a person of great author 〈…〉 estimation , to wit ioab , general captain of the armie , and advancing amasa to his place . 4 he sent kind pssages to ierusalem , and to other chief and head towns , and special men of iudea , his contributes , puting them of their alliance with him with these word , that they were of his own flesh and bloud , with protestarian of his special love and affection towards them , 〈…〉 them with the like kindness 〈…〉 towards him . 5. he ●●mbled a parliament of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and took occasion upon the ●●●●g●●ing of his successour , to commend into them he succession of his house , into the con●inuance and maintenance of gods ●●●mor in and ●●● good the established and gave a gr●ve and publick charge to his su●cessour n●w designed , ●uc●ing the manner of his government , and maintaining of religion , 1. chron. 12. 13. 6. he feared his 〈…〉 and munificence in congesting matter for building of the temple , as gold , silver , brasse , &c. and caused it to be published and mad known to the parliament and whole nation , 1. chron. 22. 13. 7. he revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to every church officer his place and function . 8. he suppressed the faction of adonijah , and ordained solomon his successor , 1 kings 1. 21. by these means he retained his majestie and authority in his old age , as appeareth by the effect ; for that being bed rid , he suppressed the faction of adonijah , ( which was grown mighty , and was set on foot ) with his bare commandment , and signification of his pleasure , and so be died in peace . finis . sir walter raleigh's instrvctions to his sonne : and to posteritie . corrected , & enlarged according to the authours own copie . london , printed for w. shears junior , and are to be sold at the blue bible in covent-garden . 1656. sir walter raleigh , to his son . chap. i. virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends . there is nothing more becomming any wise man , than to make choice of friends , for by them thou shalt be judged what thou art : let them therefore be wise and virtuous , and none of those that follow thee for gain ; but make election ra● the of thy betters , than thy inferiours , shunning always such as are poore and reedy : for of thou givest twenty gifts , and refuse to do the like but once , all that thou hast done will be lost , and such men will becom thy mortal enemies : take also especial care , that thou never trust any friend or servant , with any matter that may endanget thme estate ; for so shalt thou make thy felt a bond-slave to him that thou t●●●●●● and leave thy self always , to his mercy : and be sure of this , thou shalt never find a friend in thy young years , whose conditions and qualities will please thee after thou comest to more discretion and judgement , and then all thou givest is lost , and all wherein thou shalt trust such a one , will be discovered . such therefore as are thy inferiours , will follow thee but to eate thee out , and when thou leavest to seed them , they wil hate thee ; and such kind of men , if thou preserve thy estate , will always be had : and if thy friends be of better quality than thyself , thou mayest be sure of two things : the first , that they will be more carefull to keep thy counsel , because they have more to loethen thou hast : the second , they will esteem thee for thy self , and not for that which thou doest possesse ; but if thou be subject to any great vanity or ill ( from which i hope god will blesse thee ) then therein trust no man ; for every mans folly ought to be his greatest secret and although i perswade thee to associate thy self with thy betters , or at least with thy peers , yet remember always that thou venter not thy estate with any of those great ones , that shall attempt unlawfull things , for such men labour for themselves , and not for thee ; thou shalt be sure to part with them in the danger , but not in the honour ; and to venture a sure estate in present , in hope of a better in future , is meer madnesse : and great men forget such as have done them service , when they have obtained what they would , and will rather hate thee for saying thou hast been a mean of their advancement , than acknowledge it . i could give thee a thousand examples , and i my self know it , and have tasted it in all the course of my life ; when thou shalt read and observe the stories of all nations , thou shalt find innumerable examples of the like : let thy love therefore be to the best , so long as they do well ; but take heed that thou love god , thy countrey , thy prince , and thine own estate , before all others : for the fancies of men change , and he that loves to day , hateth to morrow ; but let reason be thy school-mistresse , which shall ever guide thee aright . chap. ii. great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . the next and greatest care ought to be in the choice of a wife , and the onely danger therein , is beauty , by which all men in all ages , wise and foolish , have been betrayed . and though i know it vain to the reasons or arguments , to disswade thee from being captivated therewith there being few or none , that ever resisted that witchery ; yet i cannot ●●me to warn thee , as of other things , which may be thy ruin and destruction . for the present time , it is true , that every 〈◊〉 prefers his fantasie in that 〈…〉 before all other worldly des 〈…〉 the care of honour , credit , and safety in respect thereof ; but remember , that though these affections do not last , yet the bond of marriage dureth to the end of thy life ; and therefore better to be borne withall in a mistress , than in a wife , for when thy humour shall change , thou art yet free to chuse again ( if thou give thy self that vain liberty . ) remember secondly , that if thou marry for beauty , thou bindest thy self for all thy life for that , which perchance will neither last nor please thee one year ; and when thou hast it , it will be to thee of no price at all , for the degree dieth when it is attained , & the affection perisheth , when it is satisfied . remember , when thou wert a sucking child , that then thou didst love thy nurse , and that thou wert fond of her , after a while thou didst love thy drienurse , and didst forget the other , after that thou didst also despise her ; so will it be with thee in thy liking in elder years ; and therefore , though thou canst not forbear to love , yet forbear to link , and after a while thou shalt find an alteration in thy self , & see another far more pleasing than the first , second , or third love : yet i wish thee above all the rest , have a care thou dost not marry an uncomely woman for any respect ; for comelinesse in children is riches , if nothing else be left them . and if thou have care for the races of horses , and other beasts , value the shape and comelinesse of thy children , before alliances or riches : have care therefore of both together , for if thou have a fair wife , and a poor one , if thine own estate be not great , assure thy self that love abideth not with want ; for she is thy companion of plenty and honour , for i never yet knew a poor woman exceeding fair , that was not made dishonest by one or other in the end . this b●●●sh●●● taught her son s●lomon ; favour is de●●●tfull , and beauty is ●●an t●● : she saith further , that a wise woman ove●seeth the ways of our houshold , and cat●th use the bread of ●●lenesse have therefore ever more care , that thou be beloved of thy wife , rather than thy self besotted on her ; and thou shalt judge of her love by these two observations : first , if thou perceive she have care of thy estate , and exercise her self therein ; the other , if she study to please thee , and be sweet unto thee in conversation , without thy instruction , for love needs no teaching , nor precept . on the other side , be not sower or stern to thy wife , for cruelty engendereth no other thing than hatred : let her have equall part of thy estate whilest thou livest , it thou find her sparing and honest ; but what thou givest after thy death , remember that thou givest it to a stranger , and most times to an enemy , for he that shall marry thy wife , will despise thee , thy memory , and thine , and shall possesse the quiet of thy labours , the fruit which thou hast planted , enjoy thy love , and spend with joy and ease what thou hast spared , and gotten with care and travel : yet always remember that thou leave not thy wife to be a shame unto thee after thou art dead , but that she may live according to thy estate ; especially , if thou hast few children , and them provided for . but howsoever it be , or whatsoever thou find , leave thy wife no more than of necessity thou must , but onely during her widowhood ; for if she love again , let her not enjoy her second love in the same bed wherein she loved thee , nor fl●e to future pleasures with those feathers which death hath pulled from thy wings ; but leave thy estate to thy house and children , in which thou livest upon earth whilest it lasteth . to conclude , wives were ordained to continue the generation of men , not to transferre them , and diminish them , either in continuance or ability ; and therfore thy house and estate , which liueth in thy son , and not in thy wife , is to be preferred . let thy time of marriage be in thy young and strong years ; for believe it , ever the young wife betrayeth the old husband , and she that had thee not in thy flower , will despise thee in thy fall , and thou shalt be unto her but a captivity and sorrow . thy best time will be towards thirty , for as the younger times are unfit , either to chuse or to govern a wife and family ; so if thou stay long , thou shalt hardly see the education of thy children , which being left to strangers , are in effect lost , and better were it to be unborn , than ill bred ; for thereby thy posterity shall either perish , or remain a shame to thy name and family . furthermore , if it be late ere thou take a wife , thou shalt spend the prime and summer of thy life with harlots , destroy thy health , impoverish thy estate , and endanger thy life ; and be sure of this , that how many mistresses soever thou hast , so many enemies thou shalt purchase to thy self ; for there never was any such affection , which ended not in hatred or disdain . remember the saying of solomon , there is a way which seemeth right to a man , but the issues thereof are the wages of death ; for howsoever a lewd woman please thee for a time , thou wilt hate her in the end , and she will study to destroy thee . if thou canst not abstain from them in thy vain and unbridled times , yet remember that thou sowest on the lands & dost mingle the vital bloud with corruption , and purchasest diseases , repentance , and hatred onely . bestow therefore thy youth so , that thou mayest have comfort to remember it , when it hath forsaken thee and not sigh and grieve at the account thereof : whilest thou art young thou wile think it will never have an end ; but behold , the longest day hath his evening , and that thou shalt enjoy it but once , that it never turns again , use it therefore as the spring time , which soon departeth , and wherein thou oughtest to plant , and sow all provisions for a long and happy life . chap. iii. wisest men have been abused by flatterers . take care thou be not made a fool , by flatterers , for even the wisest men are abused by these . know therefore , that flatterers are the worst kind of traitours ; for they will strengthen thy imperfections , encourage thee in all evil , correct thee in nothing , but so shadow and paint all thy vices , and follies , as thou shalt never , by their will , discern evil from good , or vice from virtue . and because all men are apt to flatter themselves , to entertain the additions of other mens praises is most perillous . do not therefore praise thy self , except thou wile be counted a vain glorious fool , neither take delight in the praises of other men except thou deserve it , and receive it from such as are worthy and honest , and will withall warn thee of thy faults ; for flatterers have never any virtue , they are ever base , creeping , cowardly persons . a flatterer is said to be a beast that biteth smiling , it is said by isaiah in this manner : my people , they that praise thee seduce thee , and disorder th● paths of thy feet ; and david desired god to cut out the tongue of a flatterer . but it is hard to know them from friends , so are they obsequious and full of protestations ; for as a wolf resembles a dog , so doth a flatterer a friend . a flatterer is compared to an ape , who because she cannot defend the house like a dog , labour as an ox , or bear burdens as a horse , doth therefore yee play tricks , and prouoke laughter : thou mayest be sure that he that will in private tell thee thy faults , is thy friend , for he adventures thy mislike , and doth hazard thy hatred ; for there are few men that can endure it , every man for the most part delighting in self-praise , which is one of the most uniuersall follies which bewitcheth mankind . chap. iv. private quarrels to be avoided . be carefull to avoid publick disputations at feast , or at tables , among cholerick or quarrelsom persons ; and eschew evermore to be acquainted or familiar with ruffians , for thou shalt be in as much danger in contending with a brawler in a private quarrel , as in a battel , wherein thou mayest get honour to thy self and safety to thy prince and countrey ; but if thou be once engaged , carry thy self bravely , that they may fear thee after . to shun therefore private fight , be well advised in thy words and behaviour , for honour and shame is in the talk , and the tongue of a man causeth him to fall . iest not openly at those that are simple , but remember how much thou art bound to god , who hath made thee wiser . defame not any woman publickly , though thou know her to be evil ; for those that are faulty cannot endure to be taxed but will seek to be avenged of thee , and those that are not guilty cannot endure unjust reproch . and as there is nothing more shamefull and dishonest , than to do wrong , so truth it self cutteth his throat that carrieth her publikly in every place . remember the divine , saying , he that keepeth his mouth , keepeth his life . do therefore right to all men where it may profit them , and thou shalt thereby get much love , and forbear to speak evil things of men , though it be tru● ( if thou be not constrained ) and thereby thou shalt avoid malice and revenge . do not accuse any man of any crime , if it be not to save thy self , thy prince , or countrey , for there is nothing more dishonourable ( next to treason it self ) than to be an accuser notwithstanding i would not have thee for any respect loose thy reputation , or endure publick disgrace , for better it were not to live , than to live a coward , if the offence proceed not from thy selfe ; if it do , it shall be better to compound it upon good terms , than to hazard thy self ; for if thou overcome , thou art vnder the cruelty of the law , if thou art overcome , thou art dead or dishonoured . if thou therefore contend , or discourse in argument ; let it be with wise and sober men , of whom thou mayest learn by reasoning , and not with ignorant persons , for thou shalt thereby in trust those that will not thank thee , and utter , what they have learned from thee , for their own . but if thou know more that other men , utter it when it may do thee honour , and not in assemblies of ignorant and common persons . speaking much also , is a sign of vanity ; for he that is lavish in words , is a niggard in deeds ; and as solomon saith , the mouth of a wise men is in his heart , the heart of a fool is in his mouth , because what he knoweth or thinketh , he uttereth : and by thy words and discourses , men will judge thee . for as socrates saith , such as thy words are , such will thy affections be esteemed ; and such will thy deeds as thy a●●ct●●●s , and such thy life as thy deeds . therefore be advised what thou dost discourse of , what thou maintainest ; whether touching religion , state , or vanity ; for it thou erie in the first , thou shalt be accounted profane ; if in the second , dangerous ; if in the third , indiscreet and foolish : he that cannot refrain from much speaking , is like a citie without walls , and lesse pains in the world a man cannot take , than to hold his tongue ; therefore , if thou observest this rule in all assemblies , thou shalt seldom erre ; restrain thy choller , hearken much , and speak little ; for the tongue is the instrument of the greatest good and greatest evil that is done in the world . according to solomon , life and death are in the power of the tongue : and as euripide , truly affirmeth , every unbrialed tongue , in the end shall find it self unfortunate ; for in all that ever i observed in the course of worldly things , i ever found that mens fortunes are oftner made by their tongues than by their virtues , and more mens fortunes overthrown thereby also , than by their vices . and to conclude , all quarrels , mischief , hatred , and destruction , ariseth from unadvised speech , and in much speech there are many errours , out of which thy enemies shall ever take the most dangerous advantage . and as thou shalt be happy , if thou thy self observe these things , so shall it be most profitable for thee to avoid their companies that erre in that kind , and not to hearken to tale-bearers , to inquisitive persons , and such as busie themselves with other mens estates , that creep into houses as spies , to learn news which concerns them not ; for assure thy self such persons are most base and unworthy , and i never knew any of them prosper , or respected amongst worthy or wise men . take heed also that thou be not found a liar ; for a lying spirit is hatefull both to god and man. a liar is commonly a coward ; for he dares not avow truth . a liar is trusted of no man he can have no credit , neither in publick nor private ; and if there were no more arguments than thee , know that our lord in s. john saith that it is a vice proper to satan , lying being opposite to the nature of god , which consisteth in truth ; and the gain of lying is nothing else , but not to be trusted of any , nor to be believed when we say the truth . it is said in the proverbs , that god hateth false lips ; and he that speaketh lips , shall perish . thus thou mayest see and find in all the books of god , how odious and contrary to god a liar is ; and for the world , believe it , that it never did any man good ( except in the extremity of saving life ; ) for a liar is of a base , unworthy , and cowardly spirit . chap. v. three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . amongst all other things of the world , take care of thy estate , which thou shalt ever preserve , if thou observe three things ; first , that thou know what thou hast , what every thing is worth that thou hast , and to see that thou art not wasted by thy servants and officers . the second is , that thou never spend any thing before thou have it ; for borrowing is the canker and death of every mans estate . the third is , that thou suffer not thy self to be wounded for other mens faults , and scourged for other mens offences ; which is , to be surety for another ; for thereby millions of men have been beggered and destroyed , paying the reckoning of other mens riot , and the charge of other mens folly and prodigality ; if thou smart , smart for thine own sins , and above all things , be not made an ass to carry the burdens of other men : if any friend desire thee to be his surety , give him a patt of what thou hast to spare , if he press thee farther , he is not thy friend at all , for friendship rather chooseth harm to it self , than offereth it : if thou be bound for a stranger , thou art a fool ; if for a merchant , thou puttest thy estate to learn to swim : if for a church-man , he hath no inheritance : if for a lawyer , he will find an evasion by a syllable or word , to abuse thee : if for a poor man , thou must pay it thy self : if for a rich man , it need not : therefore from suretiship , as from a man slayer , or enchanter , bless thy self ; for the best profit and return wil be this , that if thou force him for whom thou art bound , to pay it himself , he will become thy enemy , if thou use to pay it thy self , thou wilt be a beggar ; and believe thy father in this , and print it in thy thought , that what virtue soever thou hast be it never so manifold , if thou be poor withall , thou , and thy qualities shall be despised : besides , poverty is oft times sent as a curse of god , it is a shame amongst men , an imprisonment of the mind , a vexation of every worthy spirit ; thou shalt neither help thy self nor others , thou shalt drown thee in all thy virtues , having no means to shew them , thou shalt be a burthen , and an eye-sore to thy friends , every man will fear thy company , thou shalt be driven basely to beg , and depend on others , to flatter unworthy men , to make dishonest shifts ; and to conclude , poverty provokes a man to do infamous and detested deeds : let no vanity therefore , or perswasion draw thee to that worst of wordly miseries . if thou be rich , it will give thee pleasure in health , comfort in sickness , keep thy mind and body free , save thee from many perils , relieve thee in thy elder years , believe the poor , and thy honest friends , and give means to thy posterity to live , and defend themselves , and thine own fame , where it is said in the proverbs , that he shall be sore vexed that is surety for a stranger , and he that hateth suretiship is sure . it is further said , the poor is hated even of his own neighbour , but the rich have many friends . lend not to him that is mightier than thy self , for if thou lendest him , count it but lost ; be not surety above thy power , for if thou be surety , think to pay it . chap. vi. what sort of servants are fittest to be entertained . let thy servants be such as thou mayest command , and entertain none about thee but yeomen , to whom thou givest wages ; for those that will serve thee without thy hire , will cost thee treble as much as they that know thy fare : if thou trust any servant with thy purse , be sure thou take his account ere thou sleep ; for if thou put it off , thou wilt then afterwards , for tediousness , neglect it . i my self have thereby lost more than i am worth . and whatsoever thy servant gaineth thereby , he will never thank thee , but laugh thy simplicity to scorn ; and besides , t is the way to make thy servants thieves , which else would be honest . chap. vii . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . exceed not in the humour of rags and braverie ; for these will soon wear out of fashion : but money in thy purse will ever be in fashion ; and no man is esteemed for gay garments , but by fools and women . chap. viii . riches not to be sought by evil means . on the other side , take heed that thou seek not riches basely , nor attain them by evil means , destroy no man for his wealth , nor take any thing from the poor ; for the crie and complaint thereof will pierce the heavens . and it is most detestable before god , and most dishonourable before worthy men , to wrest any thing from the needy and labouring soul. god will never prosper thee in ought , if thou offend therein : but use thy poor neighbours and tenants well , pine not them and their children , to adde superfluity and needlesse expences to thy self . he that hath pitie on another mans sorrow , shall be free from it himself ; and he that delighteth ●n , and scorneth the misery of another , shall one time or other fall into it himself . remember this precept , he that hath mercy on the poor , tenact unto the lord , and the lord will recom 〈…〉 wh●●● he h●●h given . i do not understand those for poor , which are vagabonds and beggers , but those that labour to live , such as are old and cannot travell , such poor widows and fatherlesse children as are ordered to be relieved , and the poor tenants that travell to pay their rents , and are driven to poverty by mischance , and not by riot or carelesse expences ; on such have thou compassion , and god will blesse thee for it . make not the hungry soul sorrowfull , defer not thy gift to the needy , for if he curse thee in the bitternesse of his soul , his prayer shall be heard of him that made him . chap. ix . what inconveniences happen to such as delight in wine . take especiall care that thou delight not in wine , for there never was any man that came to honour or preferment that loved it ; for it transformeth a man into a beast , decayeth health , poisoneth the breath , destroyeth naturall heat , brings a mans stomach to an artificiall heat , deformeth the face , rotteth the teeth , and to conclude , maketh a man contemptible , soon old , and despised of all wise and worthy men ; hated in thy servants , in thy self and companions ; for it is a bewitching and infectious vice , and remember my words , that it were better for a man to be subject to any vice , than to it , for all other vanities and sins are recovered , but a drunkard will never shake off the delight of beastlinesse ; for the longer it possesseth a man , the more he will delight in it , and the elder he groweth , the more he shall be subject to it ; for it dulleth the spirits , and destroyeth the body , as ivie doth the old tree ; or as the worm that engendereth in the kernel of the nut. take heed therefore that such a curelesse canker possesse not thy youth , nor such a beastly infection thy old age ; for then shall all thy life be but as the life of a beast , and after thy death , thou shalt only leave a shamefull infamy to thy posterity , who shall study to forget that such a one was their father . anacharsis saith , the first draught serveth for health , the second for pleasure , the third for shame , the sourth for madnesse ; but in youth there is not so much as one draught permitted ; for it putteth fire to fire ; and wasteth the naturall heat and seed of generation . and therefore , except thou desire to hasten thine end , take this for a generall rule , that thou never add any artificiall heat to thy body by wine or spice , untill thou find that time hath decayed thy naturall heat , and the sooner thou beginne ● to help nature , the sooner she will forsake thee , and trust altogether to art : who have misfortune , saith solomon who have sorrow and grief , who have trouble wihout fighting , stripes without cause , and faintness of ey●● ? even they that sit or wine , and drain themselves to empty ca●s : plines saith , wine maketh the hand quivering , the eyes waterie , the night unquiet , lewd dreams , a stinking breath in the morning , and an utter forgetfulness of all things . whosoever loveth wine , shall not be trusted of any man ; for he cannot keep a secret . wine maketh a man not onely a beast , but a mad man ; and if thou love it , thy own wife , thy children , and thy friends will despise thee . in drink men care not what they say , what offence they give , they forget comliness , commit disorders ; and to conclude , offend all virtuous and honest company , and god most of all ; to whom we daily pray for health , and a life free from pain : and yer by drunkenness , and gluttony , ( which is the drunkenness of feeding ) we draw on , saith hesiod , a swift , hasty , untimely , cruel , and an infamous old age . and s. augustine describeth drunkenness in this manner : ebrietas est blandus doemon , dulce venenum suave peccatum ; quam , qui habet , seipsum non habet ; quam qui facit , peccatum non facit , sed ipsi est peccatum . drunkenness is a flattering devil , a sweet poison , a plea an t sin ; which whosoever hath , hath not himself , which whosoever doth commit , doth not commit sin , but he himself is wholly sin . innocentius saith , quid turpius ebrioso cut sator in ore , tremor in corpore , qui promit stulta , promit occul●a , cui mens alienatur , facies transformatur , nullum secretum ubi regnat ebrie●as , & quid non aliud designat malum , foecundi calices quem non fecere disertum ? what is filthier than a drunken man to whom there is stink in the mouth , trembling in the bodie ; which uttereth foolish things , and revealeth secret things ; whose mind is alienate , and face transformed ? whom have not plentifull cups made eloquent and talking ? when diogenes saw a house to be sold , whereof the owner was given to drink , i thought at the last , quoth diogenes , he would spue out a whole house ; sciebam inquit , quod domus tandem evomeret . chap. x. let god be thy protectour and directour in all thy actions . now for the world , i know it too well , to perswade thee to dive into the practices thereof , rather stand upon thine own guard against all that tempt thee thereunto , or may practise upon thee in thy conscience , thy reputation , or thy purse ; resolve that no man is wise or safe , but he that is honest . serve god , let him be the authour of all thy actions , commend all thy endeavours to him that must either wither or prosper them , please him with prayer , lest if he frown , ●e confound all thy fortunes and labours , like the drops of rain on the sandy ground : let my experienced advice , and fatherly instructions , sink deep into thy heart . so god direct thee in all his ways , and fill thy heart with his grace . finis . the dutifull advice of a loving son to his aged father . sir , i humbly beseech you , both in respect of the honour of god , your duty to his church , and the comfort of your own soul , that you seriously consider in what tearms you stand ; and weigh your self in a christian ballance ; taking for your counterpoise the judgements of god : take heed in time that the word tekel , written of old against belshazzar , and interpreted by daniel , be not verified in you , whose exposition was , you have been poized in the scale , and found of too light weight . remember that you are now in the waining , and the date of your pilgrimage well nigh expired , and now that it behoveth you to look towards your countrey , your forces languisheth , your senses impair , your body droops , and on every side the ruinous cottage of your faint and feeble flesh , threateneth the fall : and having so many harbirgers of death to premonish you of your end , how can you but prepare for so dreadfull a stranger . the young man may die quickly , but the old man cannot live long : the young mans life by casualty may be abridged , but the old mans by no physick can be long adjourned , and therefore if green years should sometimes think of the grave the thoughts of old age should continually dwell in the same . the prerogative of infancy is innocency ; of child-hood , reverence ; of man-hood , maturity ; and of old age , wisdom . and seeing then that the chiefest properties of wisdom , are to be mindfull of things past , carefull for things present , and provident for things to come : use now the priviledge of natures talent , to the benefit of your own soul , and procure hereafter to be wise in well doing , and watchfull in the fore-sight of future harms . to serve the world you are now unable , and though you were able , yet you have little cause to be willing , seeing that it never gave you but an unhappy welcome , a hurtfull entertainment , and now doth abandon you with an unfortunate fare-well . you have long sowed in a field of flint , which could bring nothing forth but a crop of cares , and afflictions of spirit , rewarding your labours with remorse , and affording for your gain , eternal danger . it is now more than a seasonable time to alter the course of so unthriving a husbandry , and to enter into the efild of gods church , in which , sowing the seed of repentant sorrow , and watering them with the tears of humble contrition , you may hereafter reap a more beneficial harvest , and gather the fruits of everlasting comfort remember , i pray you , that your spring is spent , your summer over-past , you are now arrived at the fall of the leaf ; yea , and winter colours have long since stained your hoary head . be not carelesse ( saith saint augustine ) though our loving lord bear long with offenders ; for the longer he stays , not finding amendment , the sorer he will scourge when be comes to iudgement : and his patience in so long forbearing , is only to lend us respite to repent , and not any wise to enlarge us leisure to sin . he that is tossed with variety of storms , and cannot come to his desired port , maketh not much way , but is much turmoyled . so , he that hath passed many years , and purchased little profit , hath a long being , but a short life : for , life is more to be measured by well doing , than by number of years ; seeing that most men by many days do but procure meny deaths , and others in short space attain to the life of infinite ages ; what is the body without the soul , but a corrupt carkasse ? and what is the soul without god , but a sepulchre of sin ? if god be the way , the life , and the truth , he that goeth without him , strayeth ; and he that liveth without him , dieth ; and he that is not taught by him , erreth . well ( saith saint augustine ) god is our true and chiefest life , from whom to revolt , is to fall ; to whom to return , is to rise ; and in whom to stay , is to stand sure . god is he , from whom to depart , is to die ; to whom to repair , is to revive ; and in whom to dwell , is life for ever . be not then of the number of those that begin not to live , till they be ready to die : and then after a foes desert , come to crave of god a friends entertainment . some there be that think to snatch heaven in a moment , which the best can scarce attain unto in the maintainance of many years ; and when they have glutted themselves with worldly delights , would jump from di●e diet to lazarus crown , from the service of satan , to the solace of a saint . but be you well assured , that god is not so penurious of friends , as to hold himself and his kingdom saleable for the refuse and reversions of their lives , who have sacrificed the principall thereof to his enemies , and their own bruitish lust ; then onely ceasing to offend , when the ability of offending is taken from them . true it is , that a thief may be saved upon the crosse and mercy found at the last gasp : but w●l ( saith s. augustine ) though it be possible , yet it is scarce credible , that he in death should find favour , whose whole life deserved death ; and that the repentance should be more excepted , that more for fear of hell , and love of himself , than for the love of god , and loathsomnesse of sin , crieth for mercy . wherefore , good sir , make no longer delays ; but being so near the breaking up of your mortall house , take time before extremity , to pacifie gods anger . though you suffer the bud to be blasted , though you permitted the fruits to be perished , and the leaves to drie up ; yea , though you let the boughs to wither , and the body of your tree to grow to decay , yet ( alas ) keep life in the root , for fear left the whole tree become fewel for hell fire ; for surely where the tree falleth , there it shall lie , whether towards the south or to the north , to heaven , or to hell ; and such sap as it bringeth forth , such fruit shall it ever bear . death hath alreadie filed from you the better part of your natural forces , and left you now to be lees , and remissalls of your wearyish and dying days . the remainder whereof , as it cannot be long , so doth it warn you speedily to ransom your former losses ; for what is age , but the calends of death ? & what importeth your present weakness , but an earnest of your approaching dissolution ? you are now imbarked in your finall voyage , and not far from the stint and period of your course . be not therefore unprovided of such appurtenances as are behooveful in so perplexed and perrilous a journey ; death it self is very fearfull , but much more terrible in respect of the judgement it summoneth us unto . if you were now laid upon departing bed , burthened with the heavie load of your former trespasses , and gored with the sting and prick of a festered conscience ; if you felt the cramp of death wresting your heart-strings , and ready to make the ruefull divorce between body and soul : if you lay panting for breath , and swimming in a cold and pale sweat , wearied with strugling against your deadly pangs , o what would you give for an hours repentance ; at what rate would you value a days contrition ? then worlds would be worth less in respect of a little respite , a short truce would seem more precious then the treasuries of an empire , nothing would be so much esteemed as a short time of truce , which now by days , and months , and years , is most lavishly misspent . oh how deeply would it wound your woefull heart when looking back into your former life , you considered many hainous and horrible offences committed , many pious works , and godly deeds omitted , and neither of both repented , your service to god promised , and not performed . oh how unconsolably were your case , your friends being fled , your senses affrighted , your thoughts amazed , your memory decayed , and your whole mind agast , and no part able to perform what it should ; but onely your guilty conscience pestered with sin , that would continually upbraid you with many bitter accusations . oh what would you think then , being stopped out of this mortall weed , and turned out both of service and house-room of this wicked world , you are forced to enter into uncouth and strange paths , and with unknown and ugly company , to be convented before a most severe judge , carrying in your conscience your inditement , written in a perfect register of all your misdeeds , when you shall fee him prepared to give sentence upon you , against whom you have so often transgressed , and the same to be your umpire , whom by so many offences you have made your enemie , when not onely the devil , but even the angels would plead against you and your own self , in despight of your self , be your own most sharp appeacher . oh what would you do in these dreadfull exigents , when you saw the ghastly dragon , and huge gulph of hell , breaking out with most fearfull flames , when you heard the weeping , wailing , and gnashing of teeth ; the rage of those hellish monsters , the horrour of the place , the terr●●● of the company , and the eternity of all those torments . would you then think them wise that mould delay into weighty matters , and idlely play away the time allotted , to prevent these intolerable calamities ? would you then count it secure , to nurse ●n your own bosom so many serpents as sins ? and to foster in your soul so many malicious accusers , as mortall and horrible offences ? would you not think one life too little to repent in for so many , and so great iniquities , every one whereof were enough to throw you into those unspeakable and intolerable torments . and why then ( alas ! ) do you not at the least devote that small remnant , and surplusage of those your later days , procuring to make an atonement with god , and to free your soul and conscience from that corruption , which by your fall hath crept into it . those very eyes that behold , and read this discourse , those very ears that are attentive to hear it , and that very understanding that considereth and conceiveth it , shall be cited as certain witnesses of these rehearsed things . in your own body shall you experience these deadly agonies , and in your soul shall you feelingly find these terrible fears ; yea , and your present estate , is in danger of the deepest harms , if you do not the sooner recover your self into that fold and family of gods faithfull servants . what have you gotten by being so long a customer to the world , but false ware , suitable to the shop of such a merchant , whose traffick is toyl , whose wealth is trash , and whose gain is miserie ? what interest have you reaped , that might equall your detriment in grace and virtue ? or what could you find in the vale of tears , that was answerable to the favour of god , with losse whereof , you were contented to but it ? you cannot now be inveigled with the passions of youth , which making a partiality of things , sets no distance between counterfeit and currant , for these are now worn out of force , by tract of time are fallen into reproof , by triall of their folly . oh let not the crazie cowardnesse of flesh and bloud , daunt the prowesse of an intelligent person , who by his wisdom cannot but discern how much more cause there is , and how much more needfull it is to serve god , than this wicked world . but if it be the ungrounded presumption of the mercy of god , and the hope of his assistance at the last plunge ( which indeed is the ordinary lure of the devil ) to reclaim sinners from the pursuit of repentance . alas , that is too palpable a collusion to mislead a found and serviceable man , howsoever it may prevail with sick and ill-affected judgements : who would rely upon eternall affairs , upon the gliding slipperinesse , and running streams of our uncertain life ? who , but one of distempered wits , would offer fraud to the decipherer of all thoughts ; with whom dissemble we may to our cost , but to deceive him , is impossible . shall we esteem it cunning to rob the time from him , and bestow it on his enemies , who keepeth tale of the least minutes , and will examine in the end how every moment hath been imployed . it is a preposterous kind of policie , in any wise conceit to fight against god , till our weapons be blunted , our forces consumed , our limbs impotent , and our best time spent ; and then when we fall for faintness , and have fought our selves almost dead , to presume on his mercy . oh! no , no , the wounds of his most sacred body , so often rubbed , and renewed by our sins and every part and parcel of our bodies so divers , and sundry ways abused , will be then as so many whet-stones and incentives , to edge and exasperate his most just revenge against us . it is a strange piece of art , and a very exorb tant course , when the ship is sound , the pylot well , the marriners strong , the gale favourable , & the sea calm ; to ly idlely at the road , burning so seasonable weather : and when the ship leaketh , the pylot sick , the marriners faint , the storms boysterous , and the seas a turmoyl of outragious surges , then to launch forth , ( hoise up sail ) and set out for a long voyage into a far countrey . yet such is the skill of these evening repenters , who though in the soundness of their health , and perfect use of their reason , they cannot resolve to cut the cables , and weigh the anchour that with-holds them from god. neverthelesse , they feed themselves with a strong perswasion , that when they are astonied , their wits distracted , the understanding dusked , and the bodies and souls wracked , and tormented with the throbs and gripes of a mortall sicknesse ; then forsooth they will begin to think of their weightiest matters , and become sudden saints , when they are scarce able to behave themselves like reasonable creatures . no , no , if neither the canon , civil , nor the common law will allow that man ( perished in judgement ) should make any testament of his temporall substance ; how can he that is animated with inward garboyls of an unsetled conscience , distrained with the wringing fits of his dying flesh , maimed in all his ability , and circled in on every side with many and strange incumberances , be thought of due discretion to dispose or his chiefest jewell , which is his soul ? and to dispatch the whole manage of all eternity , and of the treasures of heaven , in so short of spurt ? no no , they that will loyter in seed-time , and begin to sow when others reap ; they that will riot out their health , and beg●n to cast their accounts when they are scarce able to speak ; they that will slumber out the day , and enter their journey when the light doth fail them ; let them blame their own folly , if they die in debt , and be eternall beggers , and fall head-long into the lap of endlesse perdition . let such listen to s. cyprian's lesson ; let , saith he , the grievousnesse of our sore be the measure of our sorrow ; let a deep wound hive a deep and diligent cure ; let no mans contrition be lesse than his crime . finis . sir raleigh's sceptick . the sceptick doth neither affirm , neither deny any position : but doubteth of it , and opposeth his reasons against that which is affirmed , or denied , to justifie his not-consenting . his first reason ariseth , from the consideration of the great difference amongst living creatures , both in the matter and manner of their generations , and the several constitutions of their bodies . some living creatures are by copulation , and some without it : & that either by fire , as crickets in fornaces ; or corrupt water , as gnats ; or slime , as frogs ; or dirt , as worms ; or herbs , as canker-worms some of ashes , as beetles ; some of trees , as the worms psen●● bred in the wild fig-tree ; some of living creatures putrified , as bees of bulls , and wasps of horses . by copulation many creatures are brought forth alive , as man ; some in the egg , as birds some in an unshapen piece of flesh , as bears . these great differences cannot but cause a divers and contrary temperament , and qualitie in those creatures , and consequently , a great diversity in their phantasie and conceit ; so that they apprehend one and the same object , yet they must do it after a divers manner : for is it not absurd to affirm , that creatures differ so much in temperature , and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the same object ? but this will more plainly appear , if the instruments of sense in the body be observed : for we shall find , that as these instruments are affected and disposed , so doth the imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it . that very object which seemeth unto us white , unto them which have the iaundise seemeth pale , and red unto those whose eyes are bloud-shot . forsomuch then as living creatures have some white , some pale , some red eyes why should not one and the same object seem to some white , to some red , to some pale ? if a man rub his 〈◊〉 , the figure of that which he beholdeth seemeth long or narrow ; is it then not likely , that those creatures which have a long and slanting pupill of the eye , as goats , foxes , cats , &c. do convey the fashion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination , than those that have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pupils do ? who knoweth not , that a glasse presenteth the outward , 〈…〉 , or greater according to the making of the glasse ? if it be hollow , the object seemeth smaller than it is , if the glasse be crooked , then the object seemeth long and narrow . and glasses there be , which present the head of him that looketh in them , downwards , and the heels upwards . now then , seeing the eye , which is the instrument of sight , in some living creatures is more outward , in some more hollow , in some plain , in some greater , in some lesse ; it is very probable , that fishes man , lions , and dogs , whose eyes so much differ , do not conceive the self same object after the same manner , but diversly , according to the diversitie of the eye , which offereth it unto the phantasie . the same reason holdeth in touching ; for seemeth it not absurd to think , that those creatures which are covered with shels , those which are covered with scales , those which are covered with hairs , and those which are smooth , should all be alike sensible in touching ? and every one of them conveigh the image , or q●ali●ie of the same object which they touch in the very same degree of heat or cold , of driness or moisture , roughness or smoothness , unto the imagination ? so might 't be shewed in hearing : for how can we think that the ear which hath a narrow passage , & the ear which hath an open & wide passage , do receive the same sound in the same degree ? or that the ear whose inside is full of hair , doth hear in the same just measure , that the ear doth whose inside is smooth ? since experience sheweth , that if we stop , or half stop our ears , the sound cometh not to us in the same manner & degree , that it doth if our ears be open . the like may be thought of smelling : for man himself abounding with fleagm , is otherwise affected in smelling , than he is , if the pu●s about the head be f●ll of bloud ; and many things afford a delightfull smell to some living creatures , which smel to other living creatures seemeth not to be so . in the tast the same reason appeareth ; for to a rough and dri-tongue , that everything seemeth bitter ( as in an aga ) which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be so , ●ivers creatures then having tongues drier , or moister , according to their severall temperatures , when they tast the same thing , must needs conceit it to be according as the instrument of their tast is affected , either bitter , or sweet , &c. for even as the hand in the striking of the harp , though the stroak be one , yet causeth a found , sometimes high , sometimes base , according to the quality of the string that is strucken : even so one and the same outward object is diversly judged of , and conceited , according to the several and divers qualities of the instrument of sense , which conveieth it to the imagination . oyntment is pleasing to man ; but beetles and bees cannot abide t. oyl to man is profitable ; but it killeth bees and wasps . cicuta feedeth quails , & henbane sows ; but both of these hurt man. if a man eat ants he is sick ; but the bear being sick , recovereth by eating them . if then one and the very same thing to the red eye seem red , to another pale , and white to another : if one and the same thing , seem not hot or cold , drie or moist , in the same degree to the severall creatures which touch it : if one and the self-same sound seem more thrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear , and more base to him that hath an open ear : if the same thing , at the same time , seem to afford a pleasant and displeasant smell to divers and severall creatures : if that seem bitter in tast to one , which to another seemeth sweet , that to one hurtfull , which to another seemeth healthfull : i may report how these things appear divers to severall creatures , and seem to produce divers effects . but what they are in their own nature , whether red or white , bitter or sweet , healthfull or hurtfull , i cannot tell . for why should i presume to profer my conceit and imagination , in affirming that a thing is thus , or thus , in its own nature , because it seemeth to me to be so , before the conceit of other living creatures , who may as well think it to be otherwise in each one nature , because it appeareth otherwise to them than it doth to me ? they are living creatures as well as i : why then should i condemn their conceit and phantasie , concerning any thing , more than they may mine ? they may be in the truth and i in errour , as well as i in truth , and they err . if my conceit must be believed before theirs , great reason that it be proved to be truer than theirs . and this proof must be either by demonstration , or without it . without it none will believe . certainly , if by demonstration , then this demonstration must seem to be true , or not seem to be true . if it seem to be true , then will it be a question , whether it be so indeed as it seemeth to be ; and to alleadge that for a certain proof , which is uncertain and questionable , seemeth absurd . if it be said , that the imagination of man judgeth riuer of outward object , than the imagination of other living creatures doth , and therefore to be credited above others , ( besides that which is already said , ) this is easily refuted by comparing of man with other creatures . it is confessed , the dog excelleth man in smell , and in hearing : and whereas there is said to be a two-fold discourse , one of the mind , another of the tongue and that of the mind is said to be exercised in chasing that which is convenient , and refusing that which is hurtfull in knowledge , justice , and thankfulnesse : this creature chuseth his food , refuseth the whip , fawneth on his master , defer dath his house , revengeth himself of these strangers that hurt him . and 〈◊〉 mentioneth are●● , the dog of u●y●ses , who knew his master , having been from home so many years , that at his return , all the people of his house had forgot him . this creature , saith chr●sipp●● , is not void of logick : for when in following any beast , he cometh to three severall ways , he smelleth to the one , and then to the second ; and if he find that the beast which he pursueth he not fled one of these 2 ways , he presently without smelling any further to it , taketh the third way : which , saith the same philosopher , is as it he reasoned thus , the beast must be gone either this , or this , or the other way ; but neither this nor this ; eage , the third : and so away he runneth . if we consider his skill in physick , it is sufficient to help himself : if he be wounded with a dart , he useth the help of his teeth to take it out , of his tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption : he seemeth to be well acquainted with the precept of hipp●crates , who saith , that the rest of the foot is the physick of the foot , and therefore if his foot he hurt , he ho doth it up that it may rest : if he be sick , he giveth himself a vomit by eating of grasse , and recovereth himself . the dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse . now outward speech is not needfull to make a creature reasonable , else a dumb man were an unreasonable creature . and do not philosophers themselves reject this as an enemie to knowledge ? and therefore they are silent when they are instructed ; and yet even as barbarous and strange people of speech , but we understand it not , neither do we perceive any great difference in their words : but a difference there seemeth to be , and they do expresse their thoughts and meanings one to another by those words . even so those creatures , which are commonly called unreasonable , do seem to parlie one with another ; and by their speech to understand one the other . do not binds by one kind of speech call their young ones , and by another cause them to hide themselves ? do they not by their severall voices expresse their severall passions of joy , of grief , of fear in such manner , that their fellows understand them ? do they not by their voice foreshew things to come ? but we will return to that creature we first did instance in . the dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth , another when he howleth , another when he is beaten , and another when he is angry . these creatures then are not void of outward speech . if then these creatures excell man in sense , and are equall to him in inward and outward discourse , why should not their conceits and imaginations conveigh the outward object in as true a manner as ours ? and if so , then seeing their imaginations are divers , and they conceit it diversly according to their divers temperaments , i may tell what the outward object seemeth to me ; but what it seemeth to other creatures , or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me , or any other of them , i know not . but be it granted , that the iudgement of man in this case , is to be preferred before the iudgement of beasts ; yet in men there is great difference ; both in respect of the outward shape , and also of the temperature of their bodies : for the bodie of the suth an differeth in shape from the bodie of the 〈◊〉 : the reason of it ariseth ( say the dogmaticks ) from a predominan use of humours in the one more than in the other ; and as severall humours are predominant , so are the phantasies and conceits severally framed and effected . so that our countrey-men delight in one thing , the indian not in that , but in another which we regard not . this would not be , if their conceits and ours were both a like ; for then we should like that which they do , and they would dislike that which we would dislike . it is evident also , that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies , else why should some more easily digest bief than shel-fish ; and other be mad for the time , if they drink wine ? there was an old woman about arbeus , which drunk three drams of c●●u●● ( every dream weighin , sixtie barley corns , and eight drams to an ounce ) without hurt . ●●sis , without hurt , took four drams of popple ; and 〈◊〉 , which was gentleman-sewer to alexander , was very cold when he stood in the sun , or in a hot bath , but very hot when he stand in the shadow . al 〈…〉 felt no pain if a scorpion stung him . and the psill● ( a people in ly●●● , whole bodies are venom to serpents ) if they be stung by serpents , or asps , receive no hurt at all . the ethiopians , which inhabit the river hynaspis , do eat serpents and scorpions without danger . 〈◊〉 a chirurgian , at the smell of a sturgeon , would be for the time mad . a●dron of argos , was so little thirstie , that without want of drink , he travelled through the hot and dry countrey of lybia . tiberius caesar would see very well in the dark . aristotle mentioneth of thratius , who said , that the image of a man went always before him . if then it be so , that there be such differences in men , this must be by reason of the divers temperatures they have , and divers disposition of their conceit and imagination ; for , if one hate , and another love the very same thing , it must be that their phantasies differ , else all would love it , or all would hate it . these men then , may tell how these things seem to them good , or bad ; but what they are in their own nature they cannot tell . if we will heathen to mens opinions , concerning one and the same matter , thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it , we shall find this to be impossible ; for , either we must believe what all men say of it , or what some men only say of it . to believe what all men say of one & the same thing , is not possible ; for then we shall believe contrarieties ; for some men say , that that very thing is pleasant , which other say is displeasant . if it be said , we must believe onely some men , then let it be shewed who those some men are ; for the platonists will believe plato , but the epicures epicurus , the phytagorians pythagoras , & other philosophers the masters of their own sects : so that it is doubtfull , to which of all these we shall give credit . if it be said , that we must credit the greatest number ; this seemeth childish : for there may be amongst other nations a greater number which denie that very point , which the greatest number with us do affirm : so that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed . this argument seemeth to be further confirmed , if the differences of the senses of hearing , seeing , smelling , touching , and tasting be considered ; for that the senses differ , it seemeth plain . painted tables ( in which the art of slanting is used ) appear to the eye , as if the parts of them were some higher , and some lower than the other , but to the touch they seem not to be so . honey seemeth to the tongue sweet , but unpleasant to the eye : so oyntment doth recreate the smell , but it offendeth the tast. rain-water is profitable to the eyes , but it hurteth the lungs . we may tell then , how these things seem to our severall senses , but what they are in their own nature we cannot tell : for why should not a man credit any one of his senses as well as the other ? every object seemeth to be presented diversly unto the severall instruments of sense . an apple to the touch seemeth smooth , sweet to the smell , and to the eye yellow ; but whether the apple have one of these qualities onely , or more than these qualities , who can tell ? the organ hath many pipes , all which are filled with the same blast of wind , varied according to the capacitie of the severall pipes which receive it : even so the qualitie of the apple may be but one , and this one quality may be varied , & seem yellow to the eye , to the touch smooth , and sweet to the smell , by reason of the divers instruments of the sense , which apprehend this one quality diversly . it may be also , that an apple hath many qualities besides ; but we are not able to conceive them all , because we want fit means and instruments to apprehend them . for suppose that some man is born blind , and deaf , and yet can touch , smell , and tast ; this man will not think that there is any thing , which may be seen or heard , because he wanteth the senses of hearing and seeing ; he will onely think there are those qualities in the object , which by reason of his three senses he conceiveth : even so the apple may have many more qualities ; but we cannot come to know them , because we want fit instruments for that purpose . if it be replied , that nature hath ordained as many instruments of sense , as there are sensible objects ; i demand , what nature ? for there is a confused controversie about the very essence of nature . some affirming it to be one thing , others another , few a greeing : so that what the quality of an apple is , or whether it hath one qualitie or many , i know not . let a man also consider , how many things that are separated , and by themselves , appear to differ from that which they seem to be , when they are in a mass or lump the scrapings of the goats horn seems white , but in the horn they seem black , but in the lump white . the stone toenaru , being polished , seemeth white , but unpolished & rough it seemeth yellow . sands being separated , appear rough to the touch , but a great heap , soft . i may then report , how these things appear , but whether they are so indeed , i know not . sir raleigh's observations concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulencie of cities . that the onely way to civilize and reform the savage and barbarous lives , and corrupt manners of such people , is , 1 to be dealt withall by gentle and loving conversation among them , to attain to the knowledge of their language , and of the multitude of their special discommodities and inconveniences in their manner of living 2 the next is to get an admired reputation amongst them , upon a solid and true foundation of pietie , iustice , and wisdom , conjoyned with fortitude and power . 3 the third is , discreetly to possess them with a knowledge of the condition of their own estate . thus o●phe● and amph●● , were said to draw after them the beast of the field , &c. and this must be first wrought by a visible representation , of the certaintie , truth , and sinceritie of these , together with the felicitie of a reformed estate . all which is but to give foundation , bottom , and firm footing unto action , and to prepare them to receive wholesom and good advise , for the future profit and felicitie of themselves and their posteritie . for the more commodious effecting of this reformation in a rude and barbarous people , they are to be perswaded to withdraw and unite themselves into severall colonies ; that by it an interchangeable communication and commerce of all things may more commodiously be had , and that they may so live together in civilitie , for the better succour and welfare of one another : and thereby they may more easily be instructed in the christian faith , and governed under the magistrates and ministers of the king , or other superiour power , under whom this r●so that on is sought . which course the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that 〈◊〉 took , after he had taken upon him the government of the 〈…〉 , whereby he united all the people into one citie , that before lived dispersedly in many villages . the like is put in practice at this day by the ●●r●●gales and jesuits , that they may with less difficultie and hinderance reform the rough behaviour , and savage life of the people of brazile , who dwell scattered and dispersed in cave , and cottages made of boughs & leaves of the palm-trees . alexander the great built more than seventie cities : selev●us built three cities , called ●pame● , to the honour of his wife ; and five called l●●●●ca , in memorie of his mother ; and fire called seleac● , to the honour of himself . safetie for defence of the people and their goods , in and near the town . in the situation of cities , there is to be required a place of safetie , by some natural strength , commod ousness for navigation , and conduct , for the attaining of plentie of all good things , for the sustenance & comfort of mans life , and to draw trade and entercourse of other nations ; as if the same be situate in such ●ort , as many people have need to repair thither for some natural commoditie or other of the countrey , which by traffick and transportation of cōmodities , whereof they have more plentie than will supplie their own necessitie , or for receiving of things whereof they have carcitie . and much better will it be , if the place afford some notable commoditie of it self , from whence other nations may more readily , and at better rate attain the same : likewise , and withall , be so fertil , pleasant , and healthfull of it self , that it may afford plentie of good things , for the delight and confort of the inhabitants . in former times great nations , kings and potentates have endured sharp conflicts , and held it high policie , by all means to increase then cities , with multitudes of inhabitants . and to this end the romans ever furnished themselves with strength and power , to make their neighbour-people , of necessitie , willing to draw themselves to rome to dwell , and overthrow their towns and villages of mean strength , down to the ground . so did they for this cause utterly destroy many cities , bringing always the vanquished captives to rome , for the augmentation of that citie . romulus , after a mighty fight with the sabines , condescended to peace , upon condition that ●●●●●s their king should come with all their people to dwell at rome : ●at●●● did accept , and made choice of the capitol , and the mount quirmalis for his seat and p●llace . the same course h●ld tamberlane the great , whereby he enlarged the great samar●anda , still bringing unto it , the richest and wealthiest citizens he had subdued . and the ottoman● , to make the citie constantinople rich and great , brought to it many thousand families , especially artificers out of the subdued cities ; as mahome● the great from tr●bizond , selim the first from cairo , and seliman from ●aurk . authoritie and necessitie , without the consideration of the conveniencies , and commodiousness of situation above mentioned , are of small moment in the foundation of a citie ; thereby onely it would be unlikely , either to grow or continue in magnificencie or opulencie : for it profit , height , and delight go not companions therewith , no authoritie or necessitie can retain much people or wealth . but of the place whereupon a citie is to be founded , be commodious for the aforesaid conveniences , which help greatly for the felicitie of this life ; then , no doubt , the same is likely to draw much abundance of people and riches unto the same , whereby it may , by the help of arts and industrie , in time , become magnificent & glorious . unto the good estate , greatness , and glorie of a citie , those things hereafter mentioned do greatly avail , and are of much importance , viz. religion , which is of such force and might , to amplifie cities and dominions , and of such attractive virtue to replenish the same with people and wealth , and to hold them in due obedience , as none can be more ; for without adoration of some dietie , no common wealth can subsist . witness , jerusalem rome , constantinople and all other cities that have been famous for the prosession of religion , or divine worship and no marvel , for there is not any thing in this world of more efficacie & force to allure and draw to it the hearts of men , than god. which is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he is carefully defined , and continually sought for of all creatures ; for all regard him as their last end and refuge . light things apply themselves upwards , heavy things downwards ; the heavens to revolution , the herbs to flowers , trees to bear fruit , beasts to present their kind and man in seeking his tranquilitie and everlasting glory but forasmuch as god is of so high a nature as the sense and understanding of man cannot conceive it , every man directly turns himself to that place where he leaves some print of his power , or declares some sign of his assistance . and to such persons whom he seemeth more especially to have revealed himself . academies , & schools of learning with convenient immunities and privileges for scholars , and means for recreation for delight , are of great importance to enlarge and enrich a citie : for asmuch as men long for honour and profit , and of arts & liberal sciences some bring certain wealth to men , and some promotions & preterments to honourable functions : for by this means , not onely young men , & those that are desirous of learning and virtue in the same common-wealth , will be retained in their own countrey , but also strangers will be drawn home to them . and the more will this be available if occasion be given to scholars and students , to rise to degrees of honour and preferment by their learned exercises , and that by the policie of the same citie , good wits be accounted of , and rewarded well : that the same academies and schools be stored with plentie of doctours and learned men , of great same and reputation . courts of iustice , with due execution of the same in a citie , do much enable , enlarge , & enrich it ; for it fasteneth a great liking in a citie to virtuous men , and such as be wealthie , that therein they may be free , and in safetie from the violence of the oppressions of covetous and wicked men : and there will be rather resort thither to inhabit , or traffick there as occasions may minister unto them . and many others that have cause of suite will repair thither , whereas they may be sure to find iudgement and iustice duely executed , whereby the citie must needs be enlarged and enriched : for our lives , and all that ever we have are in the hands of iustice : so that if iustice be not administred amongst men , in vain is there any societie and commerce , or any other thing can be profitable or safe ; so much is love and charitie failed , and iniquitie increased upon the face of the earth . the excellencie and multitude likewise of artificers exercising their manuall arts and trades , do marvellously increase and enrich a state , whereof some are necessary , some commodious for a civil life , other some are of pomp and ornament , and other some of delicacie and curiositie , whereof doth follow con course of people that labour and work , and current money which doth enrich and supply materials for labourers , and work-men , buying and selling , transportation from place to place , which doth imploy and increase the artificious and cunning parts of the wit of man ; and this art and exquisitnesse of work manship and skill is so powerfull herein , that to far excels the simple commodities and materials that nature produceth ; and is alone sufficient of it self to make a citie or state , both magnificient and glorious : and the daily experience we have in these our dayes , and in former times , doth manifestly approve the same , and make evident without all contradiction . some naturall benefits that a citie also may have for the excellency of art , or work manship of some special commodities above any other place , either through the qualitie of the water , or other matter whatsoever , or some hidden mysterie of the inhabitants in working thereof , may be a great help for the enlargement and enriching of a citie . the command of a countrie that affordeth some proper commoditie , is of it self sufficient mightily to bring a citie to great wealth , and to advance it to great power , and draweth thereby dependence and concourse , much advantageous also , as well for the publick weal , as the private person . a citie also may be lord of much merchandize and traffick , by means of the commodious situation to many nations , to whom it serveth and hath relation to , as ware houses , roomth and store-houses , by reason whereof , the nations adjoyning do use to resort thereunto to make their provisions of such things . and this consisteth in the largenesse of the ports , the fitnesse of the gulphs and creeks of the seas , in the navigable rivers and channels , and the plain and safe ways that leadeth to the citie , or that come , our turn by or near it . priviledge and freedom from customs and exactions ' , doth greatly increase the trade , and draw inhabitants to a citie , whereby the same may become both rich and powerfull ; whereof the ma●ts and fairs , and markets bear good witnesse , which are frequented with great concourse of people , tradesmen and merchants , for no other respect , but that they are there free and frank from customs and exactions . and the cities in flanders are lively testimonies hereof , where the customs are very small . by reason whereof , all such as have erected new cities in times past to draw concourse of people unto it , have granted large immunities , and priviledges at the least , to the first inhabitants thereof the like have they done that have restored cities emptied with plague , consumed with wars , or afflicted with famin , or some other scourge of god. in respect whereof , freedom of cities hath been often granted to such as would with their families , inhabit there , or would bring corn and other necessaries for provision of victual . the romans , to increase their cities , made the towns that well deserved of them ( which they after called municiple ) to be partakers of their franchises and priviledges . the first means the romans used to allure people to make their habitations rather in rome than else where , was the opening the sanctuarie , & giving libertie and freedom to all that would come unto them . in respect whereof , there flocked thither , with their goods , numbers of people that were either racked with exactions , thrust out of their habitations , or unsafe , or unsure for their lives in their own countreys for religion sake . the very same reason in a manner hath increased so much the citie of geneva : for as much as it hath offered entertainment to all commers out of france and italie , that have either forsaken , or been exiled their countreys for religions sake . likewise , triumphs , goodly buildings , battels on the water fights of sword-players , hunting of wild beasts , publick shows and sights , plays solemnized with great pomp and preparation , and many other such things do draw the curious people to a citie inspeakably , which leaves behind them much treasure , and for such cause will rather settle themselves to inhabit there , than in other places . this was also the devise of rome in her infancy to enlarge herself . the causes that concern the magnificencie of a citie . to confirm a citie in her greatness , justice , peace , and pleantie are the undoubted means : for justice assureth every man his own peace causeth all arts and negotiation whatsoever to flourish : and plentie of food and victuall , that sustaineth the life of man with ease and much contentment . to conclude , all those things that cause the greatnesse of a citie , are also fit to conserve the same . sir walter raleigh's seat of government . that the seat of government is up 〈…〉 y the two great pillars thereof , viz. civile iustice , and martiall policie , which are framed out of husbandrie , merchandize , and gentry of this kingdom . they say , that the goodliest cedars which grow on the high mountains of liban●s , thrust their roots between the clifts of hard rocks , the better to bear them selves against the strong storms that blow there . as nature hath instructed those kings of trees , so hath reason taught the kings of men , to ●oot themselves in the hardie hearts of their faithfull subjects . and as those kings of trees have large tops , so have the kings of men large crowns ; whereof as the first would soon be broken from their bodies , were they not underborn by many branches ; o would the other easily tytter , were they not fastened on their heads , with the strong chains of civil justice and martial discipline . 1. for the administration of the first , even god himself hath given direction , judge and officers shalt thou make , which shall judge the people with righteous judgement . 2 the second is grounded on the first laws of the world and nature , that force is to be repelled by force . yea moses in the 10 of exodus , and elsewhere , hath delivered us many laws & policies of war. but as we have heard of the neglect and abuse in both , so have we heatd of the decline and ruine of many kingdoms & states long before our days : for that policie hath never yet prevailed ( though it hath served for a short season ) where the counterfeit hath been sold for the natural , and the outward shew and formalitie for the substance . of the emperour charls the fourth , the writers of that age witness , that he used but the name of justice and good order , being more learned in the law than in doing right , and that he had by far , more knowledge than conscience . certainly the unjust magistrate that fancieth to himself a solid and untransparable bodie of gold , every ordinarie wit can vitrifie , and make transparent pierce , and discern their corruptions ; howsoever , because not daring , they cover their knowledge , but in the mean while it is also true , that constrained dissimulation , either in the proud heart , or in the oppressed , either in publick estates , or in private persons , where the fear of god is not prevalent , doth in all the leisure of her lurking , but sharpen her teeth , the voluntarie being no less base , than the forced malitious . thus it fared between the barons of england and their kings , between the lords of switzerland & their people , between the sicilians and the french between the dolphin and john of burgoign , between charl the ninth and the french protestants , and between henry the third , his successor , and the lords of guise , hereof in place of more particulars , the whole world may serve for examples . it is a difficult piece of geographie to delinate and lay out the bounds of authority ; but it is easie enough cōceive the best use of it , and by which it hath maintained it self in lasting happiness , t hath ever acquired more honour by perswading , than by beating ; for as the bonds of reason and love are immortal , so do all other chains or cords , both rust●e & rot noble parts of their own royal and politick bodies . but we will forbear for a while to stretch this first string of civil justice ; for in respect of the first sort of men , to wit , of those that live by their own labour , they have never been displeased where they have been suffered to enjoy the fruit of their own travels , meum & tuum , mine & thine is all wherein they seek their certaintie & protection . true it is , that they are the fruit-trees of the land , which god in deuteronomie commanded to be spared , they gather honey , and hardly enjoy the wax , and break the ground with great labour , giving the best of their grain to the easefull & idle . for the second sort , which are the merchants , as the first feed the kingdome , so do these enrich it , yea their trades , especially those which are forcible , are not the least part of our martiall policie , as hereafter proved ; and to do them right , they have in all ages and times assisted the kings of this land , not onely with great sums of money , but with great fleets of ships in all their enterprises beyond the seas . the second have seldome or never offended their princes , to enjoy their trades at home upon tolerable conditions , hath ever contented them for the injuries received from other nations , give them but the commission of reprisal , they will either right themselves , or sit down with their own losse without complaint . 3. the third sort , which are the gentrie of england , these being neither seated in the lowest grounds , and thereby subject to the biting of every beast , nor in the highest mountains , & thereby in danger to be torn with tempest ; but the valleys between both , have their parts in the inferiour iustice , & being spread over all , are the garrisons of good order throughout the realm . sir walter raleigh's letters . sir walter raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood , before his iourney to guiana . honourable sir , i was lately perswaded , by two gentlemen , my ancient friends , to acquaint your honour with some offers of mine , made heretofore for a journey to guiana , who were of opinion , that it would be better understood now , than when it was first propounded , which advice having surmounted my dispair , i have presumed to send unto your honour the copies of those letters which i then wrote , both to his majestie , and to the treasurer ceuill , wherein as well the reasons that first moved me are remembered , as the objections by him made are briefly answered . what i know of the riches of that place , not by hear say , but what mine eyes hath seen , i have said it often , but it was then to no end : because those that had the greatest trust , were resolved not to believe it , not because they doubted the truth , but because they doubted my disposition towards themselves ; where ( if god had blessed me in the enterprise ) i had recovered his majesties favour and good opinion . other cause than this , or other suspition they never had any . our late worthy prince of wales was extream curious in searching out the nature of my offences , the queens majestie hath informed her self from the beginning . the king of denmark at both times of his being here was throughly satisfied of my innocencie , they would otherwise never have moved his majestie on my behalf . the wife , the brother , and the son of a king , do not use to sue for men suspect ; but sir , since they all have done it out of their charitie , and but with references to me alone . your honour ( whose respect hath onely relation to his majesties service ) strengthened by the example of those princes , may with the more hardnesse do the like , being princes to whom his majesties good estate is not lesse dear ; and all men that shall oppugne it , no lesse hatefull , then to the king himself . it is true sir , that his majestie hath sometimes answered , that his councel knew me better than he did ; meaning some two or three of them , and it was indeed my infelicitie ; for had his majestie known me , i had never been here where i now am : or had i known his majestie , they had never been so long there where they now are . his majestie not knowing of me hath been my ruine , and his majestie misknowing of them , hath been the ruine of a goodly part of his estate : but they are all of them now , some living and some dying , come to his majesties knowledge . but sir , how little soever his majestie knew me , and how much soever he believed them , yet have i been bound to his majestie both for my life , and all that remains , of which , but for his majestie , nor life , nor ought else had remained . in this respect sir , i am bound to yield up the same life , and all i have for his majesties service ; to die for the king , and not by the king , is all the ambition i have in the world . walter raleigh . sir raleigh's letter to his wife , from guiana . sweet heart , i can yet write unto you but with a weak hand , for i have suffered the most violent calenture for fifteen days , that ever man did , and lived : but god that gave me a strong heart in all my adversities , hath also now strengthened it in the hell fire of heat . we have had two most grievous sicknesses in our ship , of which fourtie two have died , and there are yet many sick . but having recovered the land of guiana , this 12 of november , i hope we shall recover them . we are yet two hundred men , and the rest of our fleet are reasonable strong , strong enough i hope to perform what we have undertaken , if the diligent care at london , to make our strength known to the spanish king by his ambassadour , have not taught the spanish king to fortifie all the enterances against us ; howsoever we must make the adventure , and if we perish , it shall be no honour for england , nor gain for his majestie to loose among many other , an hundred as valiant gentlemen as england hath in it . of captain bayl●●s base coming from us at the canaries , see a letter of kemishes to mr cory , & of the unnatural weather , storms & rains and winds , he hath in the same letter , given a touch of the way that hath ever been sailed in fourteen days , now hardly performed in fourtie days ; god i trust , will give us comfort in that which is to come . in passage to the canaries , i stayed at gomerah , where i took water in peace , because the countrey durst not denie it me ; i received there of an english race , a present of oranges , lemmons , quinces , & pome-granates without which i could not have lived ; those i preserved in fresh sands , and i have of them yet to my great refreshing . your son had never so good health , having no distemper in all the heat under the line . all my servants have escaped but crab and my cook , yet all have had the sickness . crofts and march , and the rest are all well . remember my service to my lord carew , and mr secretarie winwood . i write not to them , for i can write of nought but miseries : yet of men of sort , we have lost our serjeant major , captain pigott , and his lieuetenant , captain edward hastings , who would have died at home , for both his liver , spleen and brains were rotten . my sons lieuetenant payton and my cosin mr. hews , mr. mordant , mr. gardiner . mr. hayward , captain jennings the merchant , kemish of london , and the master chyrurgion , mr. refiner , mr. moor the governour of the barmoudas . our provost marsh. w. steed , lieutenant vescie , but to mine inestimable grief , hammon and talb●t . by the next i trust you shall hear better of us , in gods hands we were , and in him we trust , this bearer , captain alley , for his infirmitie of his head i have sent back , an honest valiant man , he can deliver you all that is past . commend me to my worthy friends at loathbury , sr john leigh and mr. bow●r , whose nephew knevil is well , and to my cosin blundell , and my most devoted and humble service to her majestie . to tell you that i might be here king of the indi●n , were a vanitie , but my name hath still lived among them ; here they feed me with fresh meat , and all that the countrey yields , all offer to obey me . commend me to poor carew my son . from galliana in guiana , the 14 of november . sir raleigh's letter to sir ralph winwood . sir , as i have not hitherto given you any account of our proceedings and passages towards the indes , so have i no other subject to write of , than of the greatest misfortunes that ever befell any man : for whereas , for the first , all those that navigate between cape de vera and america , do passe between fifteen or twentie days at most , we found the wind so contrary , and which are also contrary to nature so many storms and rains , as we spent six weeks in the passage , by reason whereof , and that in so great heat we wanted water : for at the isle prano of cape de vero , we lost our anchours and cables , and our water casks , being driven from the island with a hu●●●icano , and were like all to have perished . great sicknesse fell amongst us , and carried away great numbers of our ablest men both for sea and land . the 17 of november , we had sight of guiana , and soon after came to anchour in five degrees at the river gallian● , here we staid till the fourth of december , landed our sick men , set up the barges and shallops , which were brought out of england in quarters , washed our ships , and took in fresh water , being sed and cherished by the indians of my old acquaintance , with a great deal of love and respect , my self being in the hands of death these 6 weeks , and was not able otherwise to move than as i was carried in a chair , gave order to 5 small ships to sail into orinoque , having captain kemts for their conductor towards the mynes , and in those five ships five companies of 50 under the command of captain parker , and captain north , brethren to the lord mounteagle and the lord north , valiant gentlemen , and of infinite patience for the labour , hunger , and heat which they have endured , my son had the third company captain thornix of kent the fourth company , captain chidlez , by his lieutenant , the fifth : but as my sergeant major captain peggot of the low countreys died in the former miserable passage , so my lieutenant sir warham s. letter lay sick without hope of life , and the charge conferred on my nephew george raleigh , who had also served long with infinite commendations ; but by reason of my absence , and of sir warhams was not so well obeyed as the enterprize required . as they passed up the river , the spaniard began the war , and shot at us both with their ordinance and muskets , whereupon the companies were forced to charge them , and soon after beat them out of the town . in the assault , my son ( more desirous of honour than safetie ) was slain , with whom ( to say truth ) all the respects of this world have taken end in me . and although these five captains had as weak companies as ever followed valiant leaders , yet were there amongst them some twentie or thirtie valiant adventurous gentlemen , and of singular courage , as of my sons companie , mr. knivet , mr. hammon , mr. longwirth , mr. iohn pleasington ; his officers , sir iohn hamden ; mr. simon leak corporall of the field , mr. hammon the elder brother , mr. nicholas of buckingham , mr. roberts of kent , mr. perin , mr. tresham , mr. mullinax , mr. winter and his brother , mr. wray , mr. miles herbart , mr. bradshavv , capt. hill , and others . sir , i have set down the names of these gentlemen , to the end , that if his majestie shall have cause to use their service , it may please you to take notice of them for very sufficient gentlemen . the other five ships staid at trinidads , having no other port capable for them near guiana . the second ship was commanded by my vice admirall capt. john pennington , of whom ( to do him right ) he is one of the sufficientest gentlemen for the sea that england hath . the third by sir warham s. leiger , an exceeding valiant and worthy gentleman . the fourth by sr john fern the fifth by captain chidley of devon. with these five ships i daily attended their armado of spain , which had they set upon us , our force divided , the one half in orinoque , an hundred and fiftie miles from us , we had not onely been torn in pieces , but all those in the river had also perished , being of no force at all for the sea fight ; for we had resolved to have been burnt by their sides , had the armado arrived : but belike , they staid for us at ma●g●●t , by which they knew we must passe towards the indies : for it pleased his majestie to value us at so little , as to command me upon my alleageance , to set down under my hand the countrey , and the river by which i was to enter it ; to set down the number of my men , and burthen of my ships , and what ordinance every ship carried , which being known to the spanish ambassadour , and by him to the king of spain , a dispatch was made , and letters sent from madrid , before my departure out of the thames ; for his first letter sent by a barque of advise , was dated the 19 of march 1617. at madrid , which letter i have here inclosed sent to your honour , the rest i reserve , not knowing whether they may be intercepted or not . the second by the king , dated the second of may , sent also by a coronel of diego de polo●eque , governour of guiana , elderedo and trinidado . the third by the bishop of portricho , and delivered to po●oni●que the 15 of july , at trinidado . and the fourth was sent from the farmer and secretary of his customs in the indies . at the same time , by that of the kings hand , sent by the bishop , there was also a commission for the speedie levying of three hundred souldiers , and ten pieces of ordinance to be sent frō portricho , for the defence of guiana , an hundred & fiftie from nuevo rémo de grando , under the command of captain anthony musica , and the other hundred and fiftie from portricho , to be conducted by c. franc. laudio . now sir , if all that have traded to the indies since his majesties time knew that the spaniards have flayed alive all the poor men which they have taken , being but merchant men , what death and cruel torment shall we expect if they conquer us ? certainly they have hitherto failed grosly , being set out thence as we were , both for number , time , and place . lastly , to make an apologie for not working the myne , ( although i know his majestie expects ) whom i am to satisfie so much , as my self , having lost my son , and my estate in the enterprise , yet it is true , that the spaniards took more care to defend the passage leading unto it , than they did the town , which by the kings instructiōs they might easily do , the countreys being aspera & nemosa . but it is true , that when capt. kemish found the river low , and that he could not approach the banks in most places near the myne by a mile , and where he found a discent , a volley of muskets come from the woods upon the boat , and slew two rowers , and hurt fix others , and shot a valiant gentleman of captain thornix , of which wound he languisheth to this day . he , to wit , kemish , following his own advice , thought that it was in vain to discover the myne ; for he gave me this for an excuse at his return , that the companies of english in the town of s. thome were not able to defend it , against the daily and nightly assaults of the spaniards , that the passages to the mynes , were thick and unpassable woods , and that the myne being discovered , they had no men to work it , did not discover it at all : for it is true , the spaniards having two gold mynes near the town , the one possessed by pedro rodrigo de paran , the second by harmian frotinio , the third of silver , by captain francisco , for the want of negroes to work them : for as the indians cannot be constrained by a law of charls the fifth , so the spaniards will not , nor can endure the labour of those mynes , whatsoever the bragadochio , the spanish ambassador saith . i shall prove under the proprietors hand , by the custom-book , and the kings quinto , of which i recovered an ingot or two : i shall also make it appear to any prince or state that will undertake it , how easily those mynes , and five or six more of them may be possessed , and the most of them in those parts , which never have as yet been attempted by any , nor by any passage to them , nor ever discovered by the english , french , or dutch. but at kemish his return from orinoque , when i rejected his counsel and his course , and told him that he had undone me ; and wounded my credit with the king past recovery , he slew himself : for i told him , that seeing my son was slain , i cared not if i had lost an hundred more in opening of the myne , so my credit had been saved : for i protest before god , had not capt. whitney ( to whom i gave more countenance than to all the captains of my fleet ) run from me at the granadoes , and carried another ship with him of captain woldestons . i would have left my body at s. thomes by my sons , or have brought with me out of that or other mynes , so much gold oar , as should have satisfied the king. i propounded no vain thing ; what shall become of me i know not , i am unpardoned in england , and my poor estate consumed , and whether any prince will give me bread or no i know not . i desire your honour to hold me in your good opinino , to remember my service to my lord of ar●undel and pembrook , to take some pity on my poor wife , to whom i dare not write for renewing her sorrow for her son ; and beseech you to give a copie of this to my lord 〈◊〉 : for to a broken mind , a sick bodie , and weak eyes , it is a torment to write many letters . i have found many things of importance for discovering the state and weaknesse of the indies , which if i live , i shall here after impart unto your honour , to whom i shall remain a faithfull servant . walter raleigh sir raleigh's letter sent to his wife , copied out of his own hand writing . i was loath to write , because i know not how to comfort you , and god knows , i never knew what sorrow meant till now . all that i can say to you is , that you must obey the will and providence of god , and remember , that the queens majestie bare the losse of prince henry with a magnanimous heart , and the ladie harrington of her son . comfort your heart ( dearest bess ) i shall sorrow for us both , i shall for now the lesse , because i have not long to sorrow , because not long to live . i refer you to mr. secretarie winwoods letter , who will give you a copie of it , if you send for it , therein you shall know what hath passed ; i have written that letter , for my brains are broken , and it is a torment for me to write , and especially of misery . i have desired mr. secretarie to give my lord carew a copie of his letter . i have clensed my ship of sick men , and sent them home ; i hope god will send us somewhat before we return . you shall hear from me if i live , from the new found land , where i mean to make clean my ships and revictual ; for i have tobacco enough to pay for it . the lord blesse and comfort you , that you may bear patiently the death of your valiant son this 22. of march , from the isle of christophers , yours walter raleigh . yours walter raleigh . post-script . i protest before the majestie of god , that as sir francis drake , and sir john hawkins died heart broken when they failed of their enterprise , i could willingly do the like , did i not contend against sorrow for your sake , in hope to provide somewhat for you and to comfort and relieve you . if i live to return , resolve your self that it is the care for you that hath strengthened my heart . it is true that kemish might have gone directly to the myne , and meant it , but after my sons death , he made them believe he knew not the way , and excused himself upon want of water in the river , and counter feiting many impediments left it unfound . when he came back , i told him he had undone me , and that my credit was lost for ever ; he answered , that when any son was lost , and that he left me so weak , that he resolved not to find me alive , he had no reason to enrich a companie of rascals , who after my sons death made no account of him . he further told me that the english sent up into guiana , could hardly defend the spanish town of s. thome which they had taken , and therefore for them to passe through thick woods it was impossible , and more impossible to have victuall brought them into the mountains and it is true , that the governour diego polo●eqe , and other four captains being slain , whereof wat flew one , plessington , wa●s servant , and john of moroc●urs , one of his men , slew other two . i say five of them slain in the enterance of the town , the rest went off in a whole bodie , and took more care to defend the passages to their mynes ( of which they had three within a league of the town , besides a myne that was about five miles off ) than they did of the town it self . yet kemish at the first was resolved to go to the myne ; but when he came to the banck-side to land , and had two of his men slain outright from the bank , and six other hurt , and captain thornix shot in the head , of which wound , and the accident thereof , he hath pined away those twelve weeks . now when kemish came back and gave me the former reasons which moved him not to open the myne , the one the death of my son , a second the weaknesse of the english , and their impossibilities to work and to be victualled ; a third that it were a folly to discover it for the spaniards ; and lastly my weaknesse and being unpardoned ; and that i rejected all these his arguments , and told him , that i must leave him to himself to resolve it to the king and state , he shut up himself into his cabbin , and shot himself with a pocket pistol which broke one of , his ribs , and finding that he had not prevailed , he thrust a long knife under his short ribs up to the handle and died . thus much i have written to mr secretarie , to whose letters i refer you to know the truth . i did after the sealing break open the letter again , to let you know in brief the state of that business , which i pray you impart to my lord of northumberland , and silvanus sco●y . for the rest , there was never poor man so exposed to slaughter as i was ; for being commanded upon mine alleagiance to set down not onely the coū-trey but the very river by which i was to enter it , to name my ships number , men , and my artillerie . this now was sent by the spanish ambassador to his master the king of spain , the king wrote his letters to all parts of the indies , especially to the governour palamago of guiana , elderado , and trinidado , of which the first letter bore date 19 of march 16●7 , at ma●rill , when i had not yet left the thames , which letter i have sent ot mr secretarie . i have also other letters of the kings which i reserve , and one of the councels . the king also sent a commission to leave three hundred souldiers out of his garrisons of ●nie regno de granado è portricho , with ten pieces of brasle ordinance to entertain us ; he also prepared an army by sea to set upon us . if were too long to tell you how we were preserved , if i live i shall make it known ; my brains are broken , and i cannot write much , i live yet , and i told you why . witney for whom i sold all my plate at plymouth , and to whom i gave more credit and countenance than to all the captains of my fleet , ran from me at the granadoes , and wolleston with him , so as i have now but five ships , and out of those i have sent some into my fly boat , a sabble of idle rascals , which i know will not spare to wound me , but i care not . i am sure there is never a base slave in all the fleet hath taken the pain and care that i have done , that have slept so little , and travelled so much , my friends will not believe them , and for the rest i care not ; god in heaven blesse you and strengthen your heart . sir raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood . sir , since the death of kemish , it is contessed by the serjeant major , and others of his inward friends , that he told them that he could have brought them unto the myne within two hours march from the riverside ; but because my son was slain my self unpardoned , and not like to live , he had no reason to open the myne either for the spaniard or for the king ; they answered , that the king ( though i were not pardoned ) had granted my heart under the great sea. he replyed , that the grant to me was to no man , non ens in the law , and therefore of no force ; this discourse they had , which i knew not of till after his death : but when i was resolved to write unto your honour , he prayed me to joyn with him in excusing his not going to the myne , i answered him i would not do it ; but if my self could satisfie the king and state , that he had reason not to open it , i should be glad of it : but for my part , i must avow that he knew it , and that he might with loss have done it ; other excuses i would not frame : he told me that he would wait on me presently , and give me better satisfaction : but i was no sooner come from him into my cabbin , but i heard a pistol go over my head , and sending to know who shot it , word was brought me that kemish shot it out of his cabbin window to cleanse it ; his boy going into his cabbin , found him lying upon his bed with much bloud by him , and looking in his face saw him dead ; the pistol being but little , did but crack his rib , but turning him over found a long knife in his bodie , all but the handle . sir i have sent into england with my cosin harbert ( a very valiant honest gentleman ) divers unworthy persons , good for nothing neither by sea nor land , and though it was at their own suit , yet i know they will wrong me in all that they can . i beseech your honour , that the scorn of men may not be believed of me , who have taken more pains , and suffered more than the meanest rascall in the ship ; these being gone , i shall be able to keep the sea untill the end of august , with some four reasonable good ships . sir , wheresoever god shall permit me to arrive in any part of europe , i will not fail to let your honour know what we have done , till then , and ever i rest your honours servant w. raleigh . sir walter raleigh's letter to king james , at his return from gviana . may it please your most excellent maiestie , if in my journey outward bound , i had my men murthered at the islands , & yet spared to take revenge , if i did discharge some spanish barks taken without spoil , if i so bear all parts of the spanish indies , wherein i might have taken twentie of their downs on the sea coasts , and did onely follow the enterprize i undertook for guiana , where without any directions from me , a spanish village was burnt , which was new set up within three miles of the myne by your majesties favour . i find no reason why the spanish ambassador should complain of me . if it were lawfull for the spaniards to murther twentie six english men , tying them back to back , and then cutting their throats , when they had traded with them whole moneth , and came to them on the land without so much as one sword , and that it may not be lawfull to your majesties subjects , being charged first by them , to repell force by force , we may justly say , o miserable english ! if p●●●●● and ●●e●●●m took campe●●● and other places in the honduras , seated in the heart of the spanish indies burnt towns , and killed the spaniards , and had nothing said unto them at this return , and my self forbore to look into the i●●●●as ; because i would not offend , i may as justly say , o miserable sir walter raleigh ! if i have spent my poor estate , lost my son , suffered by sicknesse and otherwise a world of miseries ; if i have resisted with manifest hazard of my life , the robberies and spoils , with which my companions would have made me rich , if when i was poor , i would have made my self rich , if when i have gotten my liberty , which all men and nature it self do much prize , i voluntarily lost it , if when i was sure of my life , i rendered it again , if i might elsewhere where have sold my ship and goods , and put five or six thousand pounds in my purse , and yet brought her into england , i beseech your majestie to believe , that all this i have done , because it should not be said to your majestie , that your majestie had given libertie and trust to a man whose end was but the recoverie of his libertie , and who had betrayed your majesties trust . my mutiniers told me , that if i returned from england i should be undone , but i believed in your majesties goodnesse more than in all their being arguments . sure , i am the first that being free and able to enrich my self ; yet hath embraced povertie and perill . and as sure i am , that my example shall make me the last : but your majesties wisdom and goodnesse i have made my judges , who have ever been , and shall ever be , your majesties most humble vassal walter raleigh . sir raleighs's letter to his wife , after his condemnaetion . you shall receive ( my dear wife ) my last words in these my last lines ; my love i send you , that you may keep when i am dead , and my counsell , that you may remember it when i am no more . i would not with my will present you sorrows ( dear bess ) let them go to the grave with me , and be buried in the dust . and seing that it is not the will of god that i shall see you any more , bear my destruction patiently , and with an heart like your self . first i send you all the thanks which my heart can conceive , or my words expresse , for your many travels and cares for me , which though they have not taken effect as you wished , yet my debt to you is not the lesse ; but pay it i never shall in this world . secondly , i beseech you , for the love you bare me living , that you do not hide your self many days , but by your travels seek to help my miserable fortunes , and the right of your poor child , your mourning cannot avail me that am but dust . thirdly , you shall understand , that my lands were conveyed ( bona fide ) to my child , the writings were drawn at midsummer was twelve moneths , as divers can witness , and i trust my bloud will quench their malice who desired my slaughter , that they will not seek also to kill you and yours with extream poverty . to what friend to direct you i know not , for all mine have left me in the true time of triall . most sorrie am i , that being thus surprised by death , i can leave you no better estate , god hath prevented all my determinations , that great god which worketh all in all , and if you can live free from want , care for no more , for the rest is but a vanitie : love god and begin betimes , in him you shall find true , everlasting , and endlesse comfort , when you have travelled and wearied your self with all sorts of worldly cogitations you shall sit down by sorrow in the end teach your son also to serve and fear god whilest he is young , that the fear of god may grow up in him ; then will god be an husband to you , and a father to him , an husband and a father , that can never be taken from you . baylie oweth me a thousand pounds , and arvan six hundred ; in j●rnesey also have much owing me . ( dear wife ) i beseech you , for my souls sake , pay all poor men . when i am dead , no doubt you shall be much sought unto for the world thinks i was very rich ; have a care to the fair pretences of men , for no greater miserie can befall you in this life , than to become a prey unto the world , and after to be despised . i speak ( god knows ) not to disswade you from marriage , for it will be best for you , both in respect of god and the world . as for me , i am no more yours , nor you mine , death hath cut us asunder , and god hath divided me from the world , and you from me . remember your poor child for his fathers sake , who loved you in his happiest estate . i sued for my life , but ( god knows ) it was for you and yours that i desired it : for , know it , ( my dear wife ) your child is the child of a true man , who in his own respect despiseth death and his mishapen and ugly forms . i cannot write much , ( god knows ) how hardly i steal this time when all sleep , and it is also time for me to separate my thoughts from the world . beg my dead body , which living was denied you , and either lay it in s●●●b●rn or in exceter church by my father and mother . i can say no more , time and death calleth me away . the everlasting god , powerfull , infinite , and inscrutable god almightie , who is goodnesse it self , the true light and life , keep you and yours , and have mercy upon me , and forgive my persecutors and false accusers , and send us to meet in his glorious kingdom . my dear wife farewell , blesse my boy , pray for me , and let my true god hold you both in his arms. yours that was , but now not mine own walter raleigh . sir raleigh's letter to prince henry , touching the model of a ship. most excellent prince , if the ship your highness intends to build , be bigger than the victorie , then her beams , which are laid overthwart from side to side will not serve again , and many other of her timbers and other stuff , will not serve , whereas if she be a size less , the timber of the old ship will serve well to the building of a new . if she be bigger she will be of less use , go very deep to water , and of mightie charge , our channels decaying every year , less nimble , less mannyable , and seldom to be used grande navio grande satica saith the spaniard . a ship of six hundred tuns , will carrie as good ordinance as a ship of twelve hundred tuns , and where the greater hath double her ordinance , the less will turn her broad side twice , before the great ship can wind once , and so no advantage in that over-plus of guns . the lesser will go over clear where the greater shall stick and perish ; the lesser will come and go , leave or take , and is yare , whereas the greater is slow , unmanyable , and ever full of encumber . in a well conditioned ship , these things are chiefly required . 1. that she be strong built . 2. swift in sail . 3. stout-sided . 4. that her ports be so laid , as that she may carry out her guns all weathers . 5. that she hull and trie well . 6. that she stay well , when boarding , or turning on a wind is required . to make her strong , consisteth in the care and truth of the work-man ; to make her swift , is to give her a large run , or way forward , and so afterward , done by act and just proportion , and that in laying out of her bowes before , and quarters behind ; the ship-wright be sure , that she neither sink nor hang into the water , but lie clear and a●ove it , wherein ship-wrights do often fail , and then is the speed in sailing utterly spoiled . that she be stout-sided , the same is provided by a long bearing floar , and by sharing off from above waters to the low ●●edge of the ports , which done , then will she carry out her ordinance all we●thers . to make her to hull and to trie well , which i● called a good sea-ship , there are two things principally to be regarded , the one that she have a good draught of water , the other that she be not overcharged : and this is seldom done in the kings ships , and therefore we are forced to lye , or trie in them with our main course and mizen , which with a deep keel and standing streak , she would perform . the extream length of a ship makes her unapt to stay , especially if she be floatie and want sharpnesse of way forward . and it is most true , that such over-long ships , are fitter for the narrow seas in summer , than for the ocean , or long voyages : and therefore an hundred foot by the keel , and thirtie five foot broad is a good proportion for a great ship. it is to be noted , that all ships sharp before , not having a long floar , will fall rough into the sea from a billow , and take in water over head and ears ; and the same quality have all narrow-quartered ships to sink after the tail . the high charging of ships , is that that brings many ill qualities , it makes them extream lee-ward , makes them sink deep into the seas , makes them labour sore in foul weather , and oft-times overset . safety is more to be respected than shews , or nicenesse for ease ; in sea journeys both cannot well stand together , and therefore the most necessary is to be chosen . two decks and an half is enough , and no building at all above that , but a low masters cabbin . our masters and mariners will say , that the ships will bear more well enough ; and true it is , if none but ordinary mariners served in them . but men of better sort , unused to such a life , cannot so well endure the rowling and tumbling from side to side , where the seas are never so little grown , which comes by high charging . besides those high cabbin works aloft , are very dangerous in sight , to tear men with their splinters . above all other things , have care that the great guns be four foot clear above water when all lading is in , or else these best pieces are idle sea : for if the ports lie lower , and be open it is dangerous ; and by that default was a goodly ship , and many gallant gentlemen lost , in the days of henry the eigth , before the isle of wight , in a ship called by the name of mary-rose . sir walter raleighs pilgrimage . give me my scallop shell of quiet . my staff of faith to walk upon ; my scrip of joy immortall diet ; my bottle of salvation . my gown of glorie ( hopes true gage ) and thus i le take my pilgrimage . bloud must be my bodies onely balmer , no other balm will there be given whil'st my soul , like a quiet palmer , travelleth towards the land of heaven over the silver mountains where springs the nectar fountains , there i will kisse the bowl of blisse , and drink mine everlasting fill upon every milken hill . my soul will be a drie before , but after , it will thirst no more . i le take them first to quench my thirst , and tast of nectars suckets , at those clear wells where sweetnesse dwells , drawn up by saints in chrystal buckets . then by that happy blestfull day , more peacefull pilgrims i shall see , that have cast off their rags of clay , and walk apparelled fresh like me , and when our bo●les and all we are fill'd with immortalitie , then the blessed parts wee 'l travell , strow'd with rubies thick as gravell , sealings of diamonds , saphire flowers , high walls of coral , and pearly bowers . from thence to heavens bribeless hall , where no corrupted voices brawl , no conscience molten into gold , no forg'd accuser bought or sold , no cause deferr'd , no vain-spent iourny , for there , christ is the kings attorney , who pleads for all without degrees , and he hath angels , but no fees : and when the twelve grand-million iury of our sins , with direfull furie , 'gainst our souls black verdicts give , christ pleads his death , & then we live. be thou my speaker [ taintless pleader , unblotted lawyer , true proceeder . ] thou would'st salvation even for alms , not with a bribed lawyers palms . and this is mine eternall plea to him that made heaven , earth & sea , that since my flesh must die so soon , and want a head to dine next noon , iust at the stroak , when my veins start & spread , set on my soul an everlasting head. then am i ready , like a palmer fit to tread those blest paths which before i writ . of death & iudgement , heaven & hell , who oft doth think , must needs die wel . sir raleigh's verses ; found in his bible in the gate-house at westminster . even such is time , which takes in trust our youth , our ioye , and all we have , and pays us nought but age and dust , when in the dark and silent grave : when we have wandred all our ways , shuts up the storie o● our days : and from which grave , & earth , & dust , the lord shall raise me up i trust . sir w. raleigh , on the snuff of a candle the night before he died . cowards fear to die , but courage stout , rather than live in snuff , wil be put out . sir walter raleigh's speech immediately before he was beheaded . upon simon and judes day , the lieutenant of the tower had a warrant to bring his prisoner to the kings-bench . w 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , where the attorney generall demanded execution , according to the iudgement pronou●ced against him at w 〈…〉 , the lord chief iustice caused the indictment . verdict and iudgement to be read , and after asked him , what he could say , why he should not die according to the law ; his answer was , that this fifteen years he had lived by the meer mercy of the king , and did now wonder how his mercy was turned into iustice , he not knowing any thing wherein he had provoked his majesties displeasure , and did hope , that he was clear from that iudgement by the kings commission in making him generall of the voyage to guiana , for ( as he conceived ) the words , to his trusty and well beloved subject , &c. did in themselves imply a pardon . but master attorney told him , these words were not sufficient for that purpose . whereupon he desired the opinion of the court , to which the lord chief iustice replied , it was no pardon in law. then began sir walter raleigh to make a long description of the events and ends of his voyage , but he was interrupted by the chief iustice , who told him , that it was not for any offence committed there , but for his first fact that he was now called in question , and thereupon told him , that seeing he must prepare to die he would not add affliction to affliction , nor aggravate his fault , knowing him to be a man full of misery ; but with the good samaritane administer oyl and wine for the comfort of his distressed soul. you have been a generall , and a great commander , imitate therefore that noble captain , who thrusting himself into the middest of a battell , cried aloud , mors me expect●t , & ego mortem expectabo , as you should not contemn so to do , nor should you fear death , the one sheweth too much boldnesse , the other no lesse cowardize , so with some other few instructions the court arose , and sir walter was committed into the hands of the sheriff of middlesex , who presently conveyed him to the gate house in westminster . upon thursday morning this couragious , although committed knight , was brought before the parliament-house , where there was a scaffold erected for his beheading : yet it was doubted over-night that he should be hanged , but it fell out otherwise . he had no sooner mounted the scaffold , but with a chearfull countenance and andaunted look , he saluted the companie . his attire was a wrought night-cap , a ruff band , a hair-coloured sattin doublet , with a black wrought waste-coat under it , a pair of black cut taffery breeches , a pair of ash-coloured silk stockings & a wrought black velvet night gown ; putting off his hat , he directed his speech to the lords present , as followeth . my honourable lords , and the rest of my good friends that come to see me die , know , that i much rejoyce that it hath pleased god to bring me from darknesse to night , and in freeing me from the tower , wherein i might have died in disgrace , by letting me love to come to this place , where though i lose my life , yet i shall clear some false accusations , unjustly laid to my charge , and leave behind me a testimony of a true heart , both to my king and country . two things there are which have exceedingly possest and provoked his majesties indignation against me , viz. a confederacie , or combination with france , and disloyall and disobedient words of my prince . for the first , his majestie had some cause , h●●●gh groundes upon a weak foundation , to suspect mine inclination to the french action , for not long before my departure from england , the french agent took occasion , passing by my house , to visit me , had some conference , during the time of his abode , onely concerning my voyage , and nothing else , i take god to witnesse . another suspition is had of me , because i did labour to make an escape from plymouth to france , i cannot deny , but that willingly , when i heard a rumour , that there was no hope of my life upon my return to london , i would have escaped so the safeguard of my life , and not for any ill intent or conspiracie against the state. the like reason of suspition arose , in that i perswaded sir lewis steakly , my guardian , to flee with me from london to france , but my answer to this is , as to the other , that onely for my safeguard , and thought else , was my intent , as i shall answer before the almightie . it is alleadged , that i seigned my self sick and in art made my body full of blisters when i was at salisbury . true it is , i did to ; the reason was , because i hoped thereb● to defer my coming before the king and councell , and so by delaying , might have gaine time to have got my pardon . i have an example out of scripture for my warrant , that in case of necessity , and for the safeguard of my life , david seigned himself foolish and mad , yet it was not imputed to him for sin . concerning the second imputation laid to my charge , that i should speak scandalous and reprochfull words of my prince , there is no witnesse against me but onely one , and he a chimicall french man , whom i entertained , rather for his iests than his iudgement : this man to incroach himself into the favour of the lords , and gaping after some great reward , hath falsely accused me of seditions speeches against his majestie ; against whom , if i did either speak , or think a thought hurtfull or prejudiciall , the lord blot me out of the book of life . it is not a time to flatter or fear princes , for i am a subject to none but death ? therefore have a charitable conceit of me . that i know to swear is an offence , to swear falsly at any time is a great sin , but to swear false before the presence of almightie god , before whom i am forthwith to appear , were an offence unpardonable ; therefore think me not now rashly , or untruly to confirm , or protest any thing . as for other objections , in that i was brought perforce into england , that i carried sixteen thousand pounds in money out of england with me , more than i i made known ; that i should receive letters from the french king , and such like , with many protestations he utterly denied . finis . the prerogative of parliaments in england . proved in a dialogue between a counsellour of state , and a iustice of peace . written by the worthy knight . sir walter raleigh . dedicated to that part of the parliament now assembled . preserved to be now happily ( in these distracted times ) published . london , printed for william sheares iunior , in westminster hall. 1657. to the king . most gracious soveraign : those that are supprest and helpelesse are commonly silent , wishing that the common ill in all sort might be with their particular misfortunes : which disposition , as it is uncharitable in all men , so would it be in me more dogge-like then man-like , to bite the stone that strooke me : ( to wit ) the borrowed authority of my soveraigne misinformed , seeing their armes and hunds that flang it , are most of them already rotten . for i must confesse it ever , that they are debts , and not discontentments , that your majesty hath laid upon me ; the debts and obligation of a friendlesse adversity , farre more payable in all kinds , then those of the prosperous : all which , nor the least of them , though i cannot discharge , i may yet endeavour it . and notwithstanding my restraint hath retrenched all wayes , as well the wayes of labour and will , as of all other imployments , yet hath it left with me my cogitations , then which i have nothing else to offer on the altar of my love. of those ( most gracious soveraigne ) i have used some part in the following dispute , between a counsellour of estate , and a iustice of peace , the one disswading , the other perswading the calling of a parliament . in all which , since the norman conquest ( at the least so many , as histories have gathered ) i have in some things in the following dialogue presented your majesty with the contentions and successes . some things there are , and those of the greatest , which because they ought first to be resolved on , i thought fit to range them in the front of the rest , to the end your majesty may be pleased to examine your own great and princely heare of their acceptance , or refusall . the first is , that supposition , that your majesties subjects give nothing but with adjuction of their own interest , interlacing in one , and the same act your majesties reliefe , and their own liberties ; not that your majesties piety was ever suspected , but because the best princes are ever the least jealous , your majesty judging others by your self , who have abused your majesties trust . the fear'd continuance of the like abuse may perswade the provision but this caution , how ever it seemeth at first sight , your majesty shall perceive by many examples following but frivolous . the bonds of subjects to their kings should alwayes be wrought out of iron , the bonds of kings unto subjects but with cobwebs . this it is ( most renowned soveraigne ) that this trafficke of assurances hath been often urged , of which , if the conditions had been easie , our kings have as easily kept them ; if hard and prejudiciall , either to their honours or estates , the creditours have been paid their debts whith their own presumption . for all binding of a king by law upon the advantage of his necessity , makes the breach it self lawfull in a king , his charters and all other instruments being no other then the surviuing witnesses of unconstrained will : princeps non subjicitur nifi sua voluntate libera , mero motu & certa scientia : necessary words in all the grants of a king witnessing that the same grants were given freely and knowingly . the second resolution will rest in your majesty , leaving the new impositions , all monopolies , and other grievances of the people to the consideration of the house , provided , that your majesties revenue be not abated , which if your majesty shall refuse , it is thought that the disputes will last long , and the issues will be doubtfull : and on the contrary if your majesty vouchsafe it , it may perchance be stiled a yeelding , which seemeth by the sound to brave the regalty . but ( mose excellent prince ) what other is it to th' eares of the wise , but as the sound of a trumpet , having blasted forth a false alarme , becomes but common aire ? shall the head yeeld to the feete ? certainly it ought , when they are grieved , for wisdome will rather regard the commodity , then object the disgrace , seeing if the feet lye in fetters , the head cannot be freed , and where the feet feele but their own paines , the head doth not onely suffer by participiation , but withall by consideration of the evill . certainly the point of honour well weighed hath nothing in it to even the ballance , for by your majesties favour , your majesty doth not yeeld either to any person , or to any power , but to a dispute onely , in which the proposition and minor prove nothing without a conclusion , which no other person or power can make , but a majesty : yea this in henry the third his time was called a wisedome incomparable . for , the king raised again , recovery his authority : for , being in that extremity as he was driven with the queen and his children , cum abbatibus & prioribus satis humilibus hospitia quaerere & prandia : for the rest , may it please your majesty to consider that there can nothing befall your majesty in matters of affaires more unfortunately , then the commons of parliament with ill successe : a dishonour so perswasive and adventurous as it will not onely find arguments ; but it will take the leading of all enemies that shall offer themselves against your majesties estate . le tabourin de la paurete ne faict poinct de breuct : of which dangerous disease in princes , the remedy doth chiefly consist in the love of the people , which how it may be had & held , no man knowes better then your majesty ; how to loose it , all men know , and know that it is lost by nothing more then by the defence of others in wrong doing . the onely motives of mischances that ever come to kings of this land since the conquest . it is onely love ( most renowned soveraign ) must prepare the way for your majesties following desires . it is love which obeyes , which suffers , which gives , which stickes at nothing ; which love , as well of your majesties people , as the love of god to your majesty , that it may alwayes hold shall be the continuall prayers of your majesties most humble vassall , walter ralegh . a dialogue between a counsellour of state , and a justice of peace . counsellour . now sir , what think you of m. s. iohns tryall in star-chamber ? i know that the bruit ranne that he was hardly dealt withall , because he was imprisoned in the tower , seeing his disswasion from granting a benevolence to the king was warranted by the law. justice . surely sir it was made manifest at the hearing , that m. s. iohn was rather in love with his own letter ; he confessed he had seen your lordships letter , before hee wrote his to the major of marleborough , and in your lordships letter , there was not a word whereto the statutes by mr. sr. iohn alleadged , had reference ; for those statutes did condemn the gathering of money from the subject , under title of a free gift ; whereas a fift , a sixt , a tenth , &c. was set down and required . but my good lord , though divers shires have given to his majestie , some more , some lesse , what is this to the kings debt ? couns. wee know it well enough , but we have many other projects . iust . it is true my good lord : but your lordship will find , that when by these you have drawn many petty summes from the subjects , and those sometimes spent as fast as they are gathered , his majesty being nothing enabled thereby , when you shall be forced to demand your great aide , the the countrey will excuse it self in regard of their former payments . couns. what mean you by the great aide ? just . i mean the aide of parliament . couns. by parliament , i would fain know the man that durst perswade the king unto it , for if it should succeed ill , in what case were he ? just . you say well for your self my lord , and perchance you that are lovers of your selves ( under pardon ) do follow the advice of the late duke of alva , who was ever opposite to all resolutions in businesse of importance ; for if the things enterprised succeeded well , the advice never came in question ; if ill , ( whereto great undertakings are commonly subject ) he then made his advantage by remembring his countrey councell : but my good lord , these reserved polititians are not the best servants , for he that is bound to adventure his life for his master , is also bound to adventure his advice , keep not back councell ( saith ecclesiasticus ) when it may do good . couns. but sir , i speak it not in other respect then i think it dangerous for the king to assemble the three estates , for thereby have our former kings alwayes lost somewhat of their prerogatives . and because that you shall not think that i speak it at randome , i will begin with elder times , wherein the first contention began betwixt the kings of this land and their subjects in parliament . iust . your lordship shall do me a singular favour . couns. you know that the kings of england had no formal parliament till about the 18. year of hen. the first , for in his 17 year for the marriage of his daughter , the king raised a tax upon every hide of land by the advice of his privy councell alone . but you may remember how the subjects soon after the establishment of this parliament , began to stand upon termes with the king , and drew from him by strong hand and the sword the great charter . just . your lordship sayes well , they drew from the king the great charter by the sword , and hereof the parliament cannot be accused , but the lords . couns. you say well , but it was after the establishment of the parliament , and by colour of it , that they had so great daring , for before that time they could not endure to hear of sr. edwards lawes , but resisted the confirmation in all they could , although by those lawes the subjects of this iland were no lesse free than any of all europe . just . my good lord , the reason is manifest ; for while the normans and other of the french that followed conquerour made spoyle of the english , they would not endure that any thing but the will of the conquerour should stand for law : but after a difcent or two when themselves were become english , and found themselves beaten with their own rods , they then began to favour the difference between subjection and slavery , and insist upon the law , meum & tuum , and to be able to say unto themselves , hoc sac & vives : yea that the conquering english in ireland did the like , your lordship knowes it better than i. couns. i think you guesse aright : and to the end the subject may know that being a faithfull servant to his prince he might enjoy his own life , and paying to his prince what belongs to a soveraigne , the remainder was his own to dispose . henry the first to content his vassals gave them the great charter , and the charter of forrests . just . what reason then had k. iohn to deny the confirmation . couns. he did not , but he on the contrary confirmed both the charters with additions , & required the pope whom he had them made his superior to strengthen him with a golden bul. just . but your honour knowes , that it was not long after , that he repented himself . couns. it is rrue , and he had reason so to do for the barons refused to follow him into france , as they ought to have done , and to say true , this great charter upon which you insist so much , was not originally granted regally aud freely ; for henry the first did usurpe the kingdome , and therefore the better to assure himself against robert his eldest brother , hee flattered the nobility and people with those charters . yea king iohn that confirmed them , had the like respect for arthur duke of britain , was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom iohn usurped . and so to conclude , these charters had their originall from kings de facto but not de jure . just . but king iohn confirmed the charter after the death of his nephew arthur , when he was then rex de jure also . couns. it is true , for he durst do no other , standing accursed , whereby few or none obeyed him , for his nobility refused to follow him into scotland , and he had so grieved the people by pulling down all the parke pales before harvest , to the end his deere might spoil the corn ; and by seizing the temporalities of so many bishopricks into his hands , and chiefly for practising the death of the duke of britain his nephew , as also having lost normandy to the french , so as the hearts of all men were turned from him . iust . nay by your favour my lord , king iohn restored k. edwards laws after his absolution , and wrote his letters in the 15. of his reigne to all sheriffes countermanding all former oppressions , yea this he did notwithstanding the lords refused to follow him into france . couns. pardon me , he did not restore king edwards lawes then , nor yet confirmed the charters , but he promised upon his absolution to doe both : but after his return out of france , in his 16. year he denyed it , because without such a promise he had not obtained restitution , his promise being constrained , and not voluntary . iust . but what think you ? was hee not bound in honour to performe it . couns. certainly no , for it was determined the case of king francis the first of france , that all promises by him made , whilest he was in the hands of charles the fift his enemy , were void , by reason the judge of honour , which tells us he durst doe no other . just . but king iohn was not in prison . couns. yet for all that , restraint is imprisonment , yea , fear it self is imprisonment , and the king was subject to both : i know there is nothing more kingly in a king than the performance of his word ; but yet of a word freely and voluntarily given . neither was the charter of henry the first so published , that all men might plead it for their advantage but a charter was left ( in deposito ) in the hands of the archbishop of canterbury for the time , and so to his successours . stephen langthon , who was ever a traytor to the king , produced this charter , and shewed it to the barons , thereby encouraging them to make war against the king. neither was it the old charter simply the barons sought to have confirmed , but they presented unto the king other articles and orders , tending to the alteration of the whole commonwealth , which when the king refused to signe , the barons presently put themselves into the field , and in rebellious and outragious fashion sent the king word , except he confirmed them , they would not desist from making war against him , till he had satisfied them therein . and in conclusion , the king being betrayed of all his nobility , in effect was forced to grant the charter of magna charta , and charta de forestis , at such time as he was invironed with an army in the meadowes of staynes , which harters being procured by force , pope innocent afterward disavowed , and threatned to curse the barons if they submitted not themselves as they ought to their soveraigne lord , which when the lords refused to obey , the king entertained an army of strangers for his own defence , wherewith having mastered and beaten the barons , they called in lewes of france ( a most unnaturall resolution ) to be their king neither was magna charta a law in the 19. of henry the 2d . but simply a charter which hee confirmed in the 21. of his reigne , and made it a law in the 25. according to littletons opinion . thus much for the beginning of the great cbarter , which had first an obscure birth from usurpation , and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . just . i cannot deny but that all your lordship hath said is true ; but seeing the charters were afterwards so many times confirmed by parliament and made lawes , and that there is nothing in them unequall or prejudicial to the king , doth not your honour think it reason they should be observed ? couns. yes , and observed they are in all that the state of a king can permit , for no man is destroyed but by the lawes of the land , no man disseized of his inheritance but by the lawes of the land , imprisoned they are by the prerogative where the king hath cause to suspect their loyalty : for were it otherwise , the king should never come to the knowledge of any conspiracy or treason against his person or state , and being imprisoned , yet doth not any man suffer death but by the law of the land . just . but may it please your lordship , were not cornewallis , sharpe , and hoskins imprisoned , being no suspition of treason there ? couns. they were ; but it cost them nothing . just . and what got the king by it ? for in the conclusion ( besides the murmure of the people ) cornewallis , sharpe , and hoskins having greatly overshot themselves , and repented them , a fine of 5 or 600l. was laid on his majesty for their offences , for so much their diet cost his majesty . couns. i know who gave the advice , sure i am that it was none of mine : but thus i say , if you consult your memory , you shall find that those kings which did in their own times comfirme the magna charta , did not onely imprison , but they caused of their nobility and others to be slain without hearing or tryall , just . my good lord , if you will give me leave to speak freely , i say , that they are not well advised that perswade the king not to admit the magna charta with the former reservations . for as the king can never lose a farthing by it as i shall prove anon : so except england were as naples is , and kept by garrisons of another nation , it is impossible for a king of england to greaten and inrich himself by any way so assuredly , as by the love of his people : for by one rebellion the king hath more losse then by a hundred years observance of magna charta , for therein have our kings been forced to compound with roagues and rebels , and to pardon them , yea the state of the king , the mouarchie , the nobility have been endangered by them . couns. well sir , let that passe , why should not our kings raise mony as the kings of france do by their letters and edicts onely ? for since the time of lewes the 11. of whom it is said , that he freed the french kings of their wardship , the french kings have seldome assembled the states for any contribution . just . i will tell you why : the strength of england doth consist of the people and yeomanry , the pefants of france have no courage nor armes : in france every village and burrough hath a castle , which the french call chasteau villain , every good city hath a good cittadell , the king hath the regiments of his guards and his men at armes alwayes in pay ; yea the nobility of france in whom the strength of france consists , doe alwayes assist the king in those leavies , because themselves being free , they made the same leavies upon ther tennants . but my lord , if you marke it , france was never free in effect from civill wars , and lately it was endangered either to be conquered by the spaniard , or to be cantonized by the rebellious french themselves , since that freedome of wardship . but my good lord , to leave this digression , that wherein i would willingly satisfie your lordship , is , that the kings of england have never received losse by parliament , or prejudice . couns. no sir , you shall find that the subjects in parliament have decreed great things to the disadvantage and dishonour of our kings in former times . just . my good lord , to avoid confusion , i will make a short repitition of them all , & then your lordship may object where you see cause ; and i doubt not but to give your lordship satisfaction . in the sixt year of henry the 3d there was no dispute , the house gave the king two shillings of every plough land within england , and in the end of the same year he had escuage payed him ( to wit ) for every knights fee two marks in silver . in the fifth year of that king , the lords demaunded the confirmation of the great charter which the kings councell for that time present excused , alleadging that those priviledges , were exhorted by force during the kings minoritie , and yet the king was pleased to send forth his writ to the sheriffes of every countrey , requiring them to certifie what those liberties were , and how used , and in exchange of the lords demaund , because they pressed him so violently , the king required all the castles and places which the lords held of his , and had held in the time of his father , with those manors and lordships which they had heretofore wrested from the crown , which at that time ( the king being provided of forces ) they durst not deny , in the 14 year he had the 15. peny of all goods given him , upon condition to confirme the great charter : for by reason of the wars in france , and the losse of rochett , he was them enforced to consent to the lords in all they demanded , in the tenth of his reigne he fined the city of london at 50000. marks , because they had received lewis of france , in the 11. year in the parliament at oxford , he revoked the great charter , being granted when he was under age , and governed by the earle of pembroke and the bishop of winchester , in this 11. year the earles of cornewall and chester , marshall , edward earle of pembroke , gilbert earle of gloucester , warren , hereford , ferrars , and warwick , and others rebelled against the king , and constrained him to yeeld unto them in what they demaunded for their particular interest , which rebellion being appeased , he sayled into france , and in his 15. year he had a 15th of the temporality , and a disme and a half of the spirituality , and withall escuage of every knights fee. couns. but what say you to the parliament of westminster in the 16th . of the king , where notwithstanding the wars of france and his great charge in repulsing the welsh rebels , he was flatly denyed the subsidy demanded . iust . i confesse , my lord , that the house excused themselves by reason of their poverty , and the lords taking of armes ; in the next year it was manifest that the house was practised aganst the king : and was it not so , my good lord , think you in our two last parliaments , for in the first even those whom his majesty trusted most , betrayed him in the union , and in the second there were other of the great ones ran counter . but your lordship spake of dangers of parliaments , in this , my lord , there was a denyall , but there was no danger at all : but to returne where i left , what got the lords by practizing the house at that time ? i say that those that brake this staffe upon the king , were overturned with the counterbuffe , for he resumed all those lands which he had given in his minority , he called all his exacting officers to accompt , he found them all faulty , he examined the corruption of other magistrates , and from all these he drew sufficient money to satisfie his present necessity ; whereby he not onely spared his people , but highly contented them with an act of so great iustice : yea hubert earle of kent , the chief iustice whom he had most trusted , and most advanced , was found as false to the king as any one of the rest . and for conclusion in the end of that year at the assembly of the states at lambeth , the king had the fortieth part of every mans goods given him freely toward his debts , for the people , who the same year had refused to give the king any thing , when they saw he had squeased those spunges of the common-wealth , they willingly yeelded to give him satisfaction . couns. but i pray you what became of this hubert , whom the king had favoured above all men , betraying his majesty as he did . iust . there were many that perswaded the king to put him to death , but he could not be drawn to consent , but the king seized upon his estate which was great ; yet in the end he left him a sufficient portion , and gave him his life because he had done great service in former times : for this majesty , though he tooke advantage of his vice , yet he forgot not to have consideration of his vertue . and upon this occasion it was that the king , betrayed by those whom he most trusted , entertained strangers , and gave them their offices and the charge of his castles and strong places in england . couns. but the drawing in of those strangers was the cause that marshall earle of pembroke moved war against the king. just . it is true , my good lord , but he was soon after slain in ireland , and his whole masculine race , ten yeares extinguished , though there were five sons of them , and marshal . being dead , who was the mover and ring-leader of that war , the king pardoned the rest of the lords that had assisted marshall . couns. what reason had the king so to doe ? just . because he was perswaded , that they loved his person , and only hated those corrupt counsellors , that then bare the greatest sway under him , as also because they were the best men of war he had , whom if he destroyed , having war with the french , he had wanted commanders to have served him . couns. but what reason had the lords to take armes ? just . because the king entertained the poictovins , were not they the kings vassals also ? should the spaniards rebell , because the spanish king trusts to the neapolitans , fortagues , millanoies , and other nations his vassals , seeing those that are governed by the vice-royes and deputies , are in policy to be well entertained & to be employed , who would otherwise devise how to free themselves ; whereas , being trusted and imployed by their prince , they entertain themselves with the hopes that other the kings vassals do , if the king had called in the spaniards , or other nations , not his subjects , the nobilitie of england had reason of grief . couns. but what people did ever serve the king of england more faithfully then the gascoynes did , even to the last of the conquest of that duchie ? iust . your lordship sayes well , and i am of that opinion , that if it had pleased the queen of eng. to have drawn some of the chief of the irish nobilitie into eng. and by exchange to have made them good free-holders in eng. she had saved above 2. millions of pounds , which were consumed in times of those rebellions . for what held the great gascoigne firme to the crown of england ( of whom the duke of espernon married the inheritrix ) but his earldome of kendall in england , whereof the duke of espernon ( in right of his wife ) beares the title to this day ? and to the same end i take it , hath iames our soveraign lord given lands to divers of the nobilitie of scotland . and if i were worthy to advise your lordship , i should think that your lordship should do the king great service , to put him in mind to prohibite all the scottish nation to alienate and sell away their inheritance here ; for they selling , they not only give cause to the english to complain , that the treasure of england is transported into scotland , but his majestie is thereby also frustrated of making both nations one , and of assuring the service and obedience of the scots in future . couns. you say well for though those of scotland that are advanced and enriched by the kings majesties will , no doubt serve him faithfully , yet how their heires and successors , having no inheritance to lose in england , may be seduced , is uncertain . but let us go on with our parliament . and what say you to the denyall , in the 26th . year of his reigne , even when the king was invited to come into france by the earle of march , who had married his mother , and who promised to assist the king in the conquest of many places lost ? iust . it is true my good lord , that a subsidie was then denied , and the reasons are delivered in english histories , and indeed the king not long before had spent much treasure in aiding the duke of britain to no purpose ; for he drew over the king but to draw on good conditions for himself , as the earle of march his father in law now did : as the english barons did invite lewes of france not long before , as in elder times all the kings and states had done , and in late years the leaguers of france entertained the spaniards , and the french protestants and netherlands , queen elizabeth , not with any purpose to greaten those that aide them , but to purchase to themselves an advantageous peace . but what say the histories to this denyall ? they say , with a world of payments there mentioned , that the king had drawn the nobility drie . and besides , that whereas not long before great summes of money were given , and the same appointed to be kept in four castles , and not to be expended but by the advice of the peeres ; it was beleeved , that the same treasure was yet unspent . couns. good sir you have said enough ; judge you whether it were not a dishonour to the king to be so tyed , as not to expend his treasure but by other mens advice , as it were by their licence . iust . surely , my lord , the king was well advised to take the money upon any condition , and they were fooles that propounded the restraint ; for it doth not appear , that the king took any great heed to those overseers : kings are bound by their pietie , and by no other obligation . in queen maries time , when it was thought that she was with child , it was propounded in parliament , that the rule of the realme should be given to king philip , during the minoritie of the hoped prince or princesse ; and the king offered his assurance in great summes of money , to relinquish the government at such time as the prince or princesse should be of age : at which motion , when all else were silent in the house , lord da●res ( who was none of the wisest ) asked who shall sue the kings bonds ? which ended the dispute , ( for what other bond is between a king and his vassals , then the bond of the kings faith ? ) but , my good lord , the king , notwithstanding the denyall at that time , was with gifts from particular persons , and otherwise , supplyed for proceeding of his journey for that time into france ; he took with him 30 caskes filled with silver and coyne , which was a great treasure in those dayes . and lastly , notwithstanding the first denyall , in the kings absence he had escuage granted him ( to wit ) 20s . of every knights fee. couns. what say you then to the 28th year of that king , in which when the king demanded reliefe , the states would not consent , except the the same former order had bin taken for the appointing of 4 overseers for the treasure : as also that the lord chief iustice and the l. chancelor should be chosen by the states , with some barons of the exchequer and other officers . just . my good lord , admit the king had yeelded their demands , then whatsoever had been ordained by those magistrates to the dislike of the common-wealth , the people had been without remedie , whereas while the king made them , they had their appeal and other remedies . but those demands vanished , and in the end the king had escuage given him , without any of their conditions . it is an excellent vertue in a king to have patience , and to give way to the furie of mens passions . the whale when he is strucken by the fisherman , growes into that furie , that he cannot be resisted : but will overthrow all the ships and barkes that come into his way ; but when he hath tumbled a while , he is drawn to the shore with a twin'd thred . couns. what say you then to the parliament in the 29th . of that king ? iust . i say , that the commons being unable to pay , the king relieves himself upon the richer sort : and so it likewise happened in the 33. of that king , in which he was relieved chiefly by the citie of london . but , my good lord , in the parliament in london in the 38th year , he had given him the tenth of all the revenues of the church for 3 years , and three marks of every knights fee throughout the kingdome , upon his promise and oath upon the observing of magna charta , but in the end of the same year , the king being then in france , he was denyed the aides which he required . what is this to the danger of a parliament ? especially at this time they had reason to refuse , they had given so great a summe in the beginning of the same year . and again ; because it was known that the king had but pretended war with the king of castile , with whom he had secretly contracted an alliance , and concluded a marriage betwixt his son edward and the lady elenor. these false fires do but fright children , and it commonly falls out , that when the cause given is known to be false , the necessitie pretended is thought to be fained . royall dealing hath evermore royall successe : and as the king was denyed in the eight and thirtieth year , so was he denyed in the nine and thirtieth year , because the nobilitie and the people saw it plainely , that the k. was abused by the pope , who as well in despite to manfred bastard son to the emperour frederick the second : as to cozen the king and to waste him , would needes bestow on the king the kingdome of sicily ; to recover which the king sent all the treasure he could borrow or scrape to the pope , and withall gave him letters of credence , for to take up what he could in italy , the king binding himself for the payment . now , my good lord , the wisdome of princes is seen in nothing more then in their enterprises . so how unpleasing it was to the state of england to consume the treasure of the land , and in the conquest of sicily so far off , and otherwise , for that the english had lost normandie under their noses , and so many goodly parts of france , of their own proper inheritances : the reason of the denyall is as well to be considered as the denyall . couns. was not the king also denyed a subsidie in the fortie first of his reigne ? iust . no , my lord : for although the king required money as before , for the impossible conquest of sicily , yet the house offered to give 52000 marks , which whether he refused or accepted , is uncertain : and whilst the king dreamed of sicily , the welsh invaded and spoyled the borders of england ; for in the parliament of london , when the king urged the house for the prosecuting the conquest of sicily , the lords utterly disliking the attempt , urged the prosecuting of the welshmen : which parliament being proroged did again assemble at oxford , and was called the mad parliament , which was no other then an assembly of rebels , for the royal assent of the king which gives life to all lawes , form'd by the three estates , was not a royall assent , when both the king and the prince were constrained to yeeld to the lords . a contrained consent is the consent of a captive and not of a king and therefore there was nothing done their either legally or royally . for if it be not properly a parliament where the subject is not free , certainely it can be none where the king is bound , for all kingly rule was taken from the king , and twelve peeres appointed , and as some writers have it 24. peeres , to governe the realme , and therefore the assembly made by iack straw and other rebels may aswell be called a parliament as that of oxford . principis nomen habere , non est esse princeps , for thereby was the k. driven not only to compound all quarrels with the french , but to have meanes to be revenged on the rebell lords : but he quitted his right to normandy , anjou and mayne . couns. but sir , what needed this extremity , seeing the lords required but the confirmation of the former charter , which was not prejudiciall to the king to grant ? just . yes my good lord , but they insulted upon the king , and would not suffer him to enter into his own castles , they put down the purveyor of the meat for the maintenance of his house : as if the king had been a bankrupt , and gave order that without ready money he should not take up a chicken . and though there is nothing against the royalty of a king in these charters ( the kings of england being kings of freemen and not of slaves ) yet it is so contrary to the nature of a king to be forced even to those things which may be to his advantage , as the king had some reason to seek the dispensation of his oath from the pope , and to draw in strangers for his own defence : yea jure salvo coronae nostrae is intended inclusively in all oathes and promises exacted from a soveraigne . couns. but you cannot be ignorant how dangerous a thing it is to call in other nations both for the spoil they make , as also , because they have often held the possession of the best places with which they have been trusted . just . it is true my good lord , that there is nothing so dangerous for a king as to be constrained and held as prisoner to his vassals , for by that , edward the second , and richard the second lost their kingdomes and their lives . and for calling in of strangers , was not king edward the sixth driven to call in strangers against the rebels in norfolke , cornwall , oxfordshire and elsewhere ? have not the kings of scotland been oftentimes constrained to entertain strangers against the kings of england : and the king of england at this time had he not bin diverse times assisted by the kings of scotland & had bin endangered to have been expelled for ever . couns. but yet you know those kings were deposed by parliament . just . yea my good lord being prisoners , being out of possession , and being in their hands that were princes of the blood and pretenders . it is an old countrey proverbe , ( that might overcomes right ) a weak title that weares a strong sword , commonly prevailes against a strong title that weares but a weak one , otherwise philip the second had never been duke of portugal , nor duke of millayne , nor king of naples & sicily . but good lord , errores non sunt trahendi in exemplum . i speak of regall , peaceable , and lawfull parliaments . the king at this time was but a king is name , for glocester , leicester and chichester made choise of other nine , to whom the rule of the realme was committed , and the prince was forced to purchase his liberty from the earle of leicester , by giving for his ransome the countey pallatine of chester . but my lord let us judge of those occasions by their events what became of this proud earle ? was he not soon after slain in evesham ? was he not left naked in the field , and left a shamfull spectacle , his head being cut off from his shoulders , his privie parts from his body , and laid on each side of his nose ? and did not god extinguish his race , after which in a lawfull parliament at westminster ( confirmed in a following parliament of westminster ) were not all the lords that followed leycester disinheried ? and when that fool glocester after the death of leycester ( whom he had formerly forsaken ) made himself the head of a second rebellion , and called in strangers , for which not long before he had cried out against the king , was not he in the end , after that he had seen the slaughter of so many of the barons , the spoil of their castles , and lordships constrained to submit himself , as all the survivers did , of which they that sped best , payed their fines and ransomes , the king reserving his younger son , the earledomes of leycester and derby . couns. well sir , we have disputed this king to the grave , though it be true , that he out-lived all his enemies , and brought them to confusion , yet those examples did not terrifie their successors , but the earle marshall , and hereford , threatned king edward the first , with a new war. iust . they did so , but after the death of hereford , the earle marshall repented himself , and to gain the kings favour , he made him heir of all his lands . but what is this to the parliament ? for there was never king of this land had more given him for the time of his raign , then edward the son of henry the third had . couns. how doth that appear ? just . in this sort my good lord , in this kings third year he had given him the fifteenth part of all goods . in his sixt year a twentyeth . in his twelfth year a twentyeth , in his fourteenth year he had escuage ( to wit ) forty shillings of every knights fee , in this eighteenth year he had the eleventh part of all moveable goods within the kingdome , in his nineteenth year the tenth part of all church livings in england , scotland and ireland ; for six years , by agreement from the pope , in his three and twentieth year he raised a taxe upon wool and fels , and on a day caused all the religious houses to be searched , and all the treasure in them to be seized and brought to his coffers , excusing himself by laying the fault upon his treasurer , he had also in the end of the same year , of all goods of all burgesses , and of the commons the 10th part , in the 25th year of the parliament of st. edmundsbury , he had an 18th part of the goods of the burgesses , and of the people in generall , the tenth part . he had also the same year by putting the clergie out of his protection a fifth part of their goods , and in the same year he set a great taxe upon woolls , to wit , from half a marke to 40s . upon every sack , whereupon the earle marshall , and the earle of hereford refusing to attend the king into flanders , pretended the greevances of the people . put in the end the king having pardoned them , and confirmed the great charter , he had the ninth penny of all goods from the lords and commons of the clergie , in the south he had the tenth penny , and in the north the fift penny . in the two and thirtyeth year he had a subsedy freely granted . in the three and thirtyeth year he confirmed the great charter of his own royall disposition , and the states to shew their thankfulnesse , gave the king for one year , the fift part of all the revenues of the land , and of the citizens the sixt part of their goods . and in the same year the king used the inquisition called trai le baston . by which all justices and other magistrates were grievously fined that had used extortion or bribery , or had otherwise misdemeaned themselves to the great contentation of the people . this commission likewise did enquire of entruders , barators , and all other the like vermine , whereby the king gathered a great masse of treasure with a great deal of love . now for the whole raigne of this king , who governed england 35 years , there was not any parliament to his prejudice . couns. but there was taking of armes by marshall and hereford . just . that 's true , but why was that ? because the king , notwithstanding all that was given him by parliament , did lay the greatest taxes that ever king did without their consent . but what lost the king by those lords ? one of them gave the king all his lands , the other dyed in disgrace . couns. but what say you to the parliament in edward the seconds time his successor : did not the house of parliament banish peirce gaveston whom the king favoured ? just . but what was this gaveston but an esquier of gascoine , formerly banisht the realme by king edward the first , for corrupting the prince edward , now raigning . and the whole kingdome fearing and detesting his venemous disposition , they besought his majestie to cast him off , which the king performed by an act of his own , and not by act of parliament , yea gavestones own father in law , the earle of glocester , was one of the chiefest of the lords that procured it . and yet finding the kings affection to folow him so strongly , they all consented to have him recalled . after which when his credit so encreased , that he dispised and set at naught all the ancient nobility , and not onely perswaded the king to all manner of outrages and riots , but withall transported what he lifted of the kings treasure , and iewels : the lords urged his banishment the second time , but neither was the first nor second banishment forced by act of parliament , but by the forceable lords his enemies . lastly he being recalled by the king , the earle of lancaster caused his head to be stricken off , when those of his party had taken him prisoner . by which presumptuous act , the earle and the rest of his company committed treason and murder : treason by raising an army without warrant , murder by taking away the life of the kings subject . after which gaveston being dead , the spencers got possession of the kings favour , though the younger of them was placed about the king , by the lords themselves . couns. what say you then to the parliament held at london about the sixt year of that king. just . i say that king was not bound to performe the acts of this parliament , because the lords being too strong for the king , inforced his consent , for these be the words of our own history . they wrested to much beyond the bounds of reason . couns. what say you to the parliaments of the white wands in the 13th of the king. just . i say the lords that were so moved , came with an army , and by strong hand surprized the king , they constrained , ( saith the story ) the rest of the lords and compelled many of the bishops to consent unto them , yea it saith further , that the king durst not but grant to all that they required , ( to wit ) for the banishment of the spencers . yea they were so insolent that they refused to lodge the queen comming through kent in the castle of leedes , and sent her to provide her lodging where she could get it so late in the night , for which notwithstanding some that kept her out were soon after taken and hang'd , and therefore your lordship cannot call this a parliament for the reasons before alleadged . but my lord what became of these lawgivers to the king , even when they were greatest , a knight of the north called andrew herkeley , assembled the forces of the countrey , overthrew them and their army , slew the earle of hereford , and other barons , took their generall thomas earle of lancaster , the kings cozen germane at that time possessed of five earledomes , the lords clifford , talbort , moubray , maudiut , willington , warren , lord darcy , withers , knevill , leybourne , bekes , lovell , fitz williams , watervild , and divers other barons , knights and esquiers , and soon after the lord percy , and the lord warren took the lords baldsemere , and the lord audley , the lord teis , gifford , tucoet , and many others that fled from the battaile , the most of which past under the hands of the hangman , for constraining the king under colour and name of a parliament . but this your good lordship may judge , to whom , those tumultuous assemblies ( which our histories , falsely call parliaments have been dangerous , the king in the end ever prevailed , and the lords lost their lives , and estates . after which the spencers in their banishment at york , in the 15th of the king , were restored to the honors and estates , and therein the king had a subsedy given him the sixt penny of goods throughout england , ireland , and wales . couns. yet you see the spencers were soon after dissolved . iust . it is true my lord , but that is nothing to our subject of parliament , they may thank their own insolencie , for they branded and dispised the queen , whom they ought to have honored as the kings wife ; they were also exceeding greedy , and built themselves upon other mens ruines , they were ambitious and exceeding malicious , whereupon that came , that when chamberlain spencer was hang'd in hereford , a part of the 24th psalm was written over his head : quid gloriaris in malitia potens ? couns. well sir , you have all this while excused your self upon the strength and rebellions of the lords , but what say you now to king edward the third , in whose time ( and during the time of this victorious king , no man durst take armes or rebell ) the three estates did him the greatest affront that ever king received or endured , therefore i conclude where i began , that these parliaments are dangerous for a king , just . to answer your lordship in order , may it please you first to call to mind , what was given this great king by his subjects before the dispute betwixt him and the house happened , which was in his latter dayes , from his first year to his fift year , there was nothing given the king by his subjects , in his eight year at the parliament at london a tenth and a fifteenth was granted , in his tenth year he ceased upon the italians goods here in england to his own use , with all the goods of the monkes cluniackes and others , of the order of the cistertians . in the eleaventh year , he had given him by parliament a notable relief , the one half of the woolls throughout england , and of the clergy all their woolls , after which , in the end of the year he had granted in his parliament at westminster , forty shillings upon every sack of wooll , and for every 30 wooll fels forty shillings , for every last of leatherne , as much , and for all other merchandizes after the same rate . the king promising that this years gathering ended , he would thenceforth content himself with the old custome , he had over and above this great aide the eight part of all goods of all citizens and burgesses ; and of other as of forreigne merchants , and such as lived not of the gain of breeding of sheep and cattell the fifteenth of their goods . nay my lord : this was not all , though more then ever was granted to any king , for the same parliament bestowed on the king the ninth sheaf of all the corn within the land , the ninth fleece , and the ninth lambe for two years next following ; now what think your lordship of this parliament . couns. i say they were honest men . iust . and i say , the people are as loving to their king now , as ever they were , if they be honestly and wisely dealt withall , and so his majesty hath found them in his last two parliaments , if his majestie had not been betrayed by those whom he most trusted . couns. but i pray you sir , who shall a king trust , if he may not rust those whom he hath so greatly advanced ? just . i will tell your lordship whom the king may trust . couns. who are they ? iust . his own reason , and his own excellent iudgement which have not deceived him in any thing , wherein his majesty hath been pleased to exercise them , take councell of thine heart ( saith the book of wisedome ) for there is none more faithfull unto thee then it . couns. it is true , but his majesty found that those wanted no judgement whom he trusted , and how could his majestie divine of their honesties ? just . will you pardon me if i speak freely , for if i speak out of love , which ( as solomon saith ) covereth all trespasses , the truth is , that his majestie would never beleeve any man that spake against them , and they knew it well enough , which gave them boldnesse to do what they did . couns. what was that ? just . even , my good lord , to ruine the kings estate so far as the state of so great a king may be ruin'd by men ambitious and greedy without proportion . it had been a brave increase of revenue , my lord , to have raysed 50000l . land of the kings to 20000l . revenue , and to raise the revenue of wards to 20000l . more 40000l . added to the rest of his majesties estate , had so enabled his majestie , as he could never have wanted . and my good lord , it had been an honest service to the king , to have added 7000l . lands of the lord cobhams , woods and goods being worth 30000l . more . couns. i know not the reason why it was not done . just . neither doth your lordship , perchance know the reason why the 10000l . offer'd by swinnerton for a fine of the french wines , was by the then lord treasurer conferr'd on devonshire and his mistris . couns. what moved the treasurer to reject and crosse that raising of the kings lands ? just . the reason , my good lord is manifest , for had the land been raised , then had the king known when he had given or exchanged land , what he had given or exchanged . couns. what hurt had been to the treasurer whose office is truely to informe the king of the value of all that he giveth ? just . so he did when it did not concerne himself nor his particular , for he could never admit any one peece of a good manour to passe in my lord aubignes book of 1000l . and , till he himself had bought , and then all the remaining flowers of the crowne were called out . now had the treasurer suffer'd the kings lands to have been raised , how could his lordship have made choice of the old ●ents , as well in that book of my lord aubigne , as in exchange of theobalds , or which he took hatfield in it , which the greatest subject , or favorite queen elizabeth had never durst have named unto her by way of gift or exchange . nay my lord , so many other goodly mannors have passed from his majestie , as the very heart of the kingdome mourneth to remember it , and the eyes of the kingdome shedde teares continually at the beholding it : yea the soul of the kingdome is heavy unto death with the consideration thereof , that so magnanimous a prince , should suffer himself to be so abused . couns. but sir you know that cobhams lands were entayled upon his cofens . just . yea my lord , but during the lives and races of george prook his children , it had been the kings , that is to say , for ever in effect , but to wrest the king , and to draw the inheritance upon himself , he perswaded his majestie to relinquish his interest for a pretty summe of mony ; and that there might be no counterworking , he sent prook 6000 l. to make friends whereof lord hume had 2000l . back again , buckhurst and barwick had the other 4000 l. and the treasurer and his heires the masse of land forever . couns. what then i pray you came to the king by this great consiscation . iust . my lord , the kings majestie by all those goodly possessions , woods and goods looseth 500l by the year which he giveth in pension to cobham , to maintain him in prison . couns. certainly , even in conscience they should have reserved so much of the land in the crown , as to have given cobham meat and apparell , and not made themselves so great gainers , and the king 500l . ( per annum ) looser by the bargain , but it 's past : consilium non est eorum quae fieri nequeunt . just . take the rest of the sentence , my lord : sed consilium versatur in iis quae sunt in nostra potestate . it is yet , my good lord , in potestate regis , to right himself . but this is not all my lord ; and i fear me , knowing your lordships love to the king , it would put you in a feaver to hear all , i will therefore go on with my parliaments . couns. i pray do so , and amongst the rest , i pray you what say you to the parliament holden at iondon in the fifteenth year of king edward the third ? iust i say there was nothing concluded therein to the prejudice of the king . it is true , that a little before the sitting of the house , the king displaced his chancellour and his treasurer , and most of all his iudges and officers of the exchequer , and committed many of them to prison , because they did not supply him with money , being beyond the seas , for the rest , the states assembled , besought the king that the lawes of the two charters might be observed , and that the great officers of the crowne might be chosen by parliament . couns but what successe had these petitions . iust . the charters were observed , as before , and so they will be ever , and the other petition was rejected , the king being pleas'd , notwithstanding , that the great officers , should take an oath in parliament to do iustice. now for the parliament of westminster , in the 17th year of the king , the king had three markes and a half for every sack of wooll , transported ; and in his 18th he had a 10th of the clergie , and a 15th of the laity for one year . his majestie forbare after this to charge his subjects with any more payments , untill the 29th of his reigne , when there was given the king by parliament 50 for every sack of wool transported for six yeares , by which grant , the king received a thousand markes a day , a greater matter then a thousand pounds in these dayes , and a 1000l . a day amounts to 365000l . a year , which was one of the greatest presents that ever was given to a king of this land . for besides the cheapenesse of all things in that age , the kings souldiers had but 3d. a day wages , a man at armes 6d . a knight but 2s . in the parliament at westminster , in the 33th year he had 26s . 8d . for every sack of wooll transported , & in the 42th year 3 dismes and 3 fifteens . in his 45th year he had ●0000l of the laity , and because the spiritualty disputed it , and did not pay so much , the king chang'd his chancellour , treasurer , & privy seal being bishops , and placed lay men in their roome . couns. it seems that in those dayes the kings were no longer in love with their great chancellors , then when they deserved well of them . just . no my lord , they were not , and that was the reason they were well served , and it was the custome then , and in many ages after , to change the treasurer & the chancellour every 3 years , and withall to hear all mens complaints against them . couns. but by this often change , the saying is verified , that there is no inheritance in the favour of kings . he that keepeth the figge-tree ( saith solomon ) shall eate the fruit thereof ; for reason it is that the servant live by the master . just . my lord , you say well in both , but had the subject an inheritance in the princes favour , where the prince hath no inheritance in the subjects fidelity , then were kings in more unhappy estate then common persons , for the rest , solomon meaneth not , that he that keepeth the figge tree should surfet , though he meant he should eat , he meant not he should break the branches in gathering the figs , or eat the ripe ; and leave the rotten for the owner of the tree ; for what saith he in the following chapter , he saith that he that maketh hast to be ●ich , cannot be innocent . and before that , he saith , that the end of an inheritance hastily gotten , cannot be blessed . your lordship hath heard of few or none great with kings , that have not used their power to oppresse , that have not growne insolent and hatefull to the people ; yea , insolent towards those princes that advanced them . couns. yet you see that princes can change their fancies . iust . yea my lord , when favorites change their faith , when they forget that how familiar soever kings make themselves with their vassals , yet they are kings : he that provoketh a king to anger ( saith solomon ) sinneth against his own soul. and he further saith , that pride goeth before distruction , and a high mind before afall . i say therefore , that in discharging those lucifers , how dear soever they have been , kings make the world know that they have more of iudgement then of passion , yea they thereby offer a satisfactory sacrifice to all their people , too great benefits of subjects to their king , where the mind is blown up with their own deservings , and to great benefits of kings conferr'd upon their subjects , where the mind is not qualified with a great deal of modesty are equally dangerous . of this later and insolenter , had king richard the second delivered up to iustice but three or four , he had still held the love of the people , and thereby his life and estate . couns. well , i pray you go on with your parliaments . iust . the life of this great king edward drawes to an end , so do the parliaments of this time , wherein 50 years raigne , he never received any affront , for in his 49th year he had a disme and a fifteen granted him freely . couns. but sir it is an old saying , that all is well that ends well , iudge you whether that in his 50th . year in parliament at westminster he received not an affront , when the house urged the king to remove and discharge from his presence the duke of lancaster , the lord latimer his chamberlaine , sir richard sturry , and others whom the king favoured and trusted . nay , they pressed the king to thrust a certain lady out of court , which at that time bare the greatest sway therein . iust . i will with patience answer your lordship to the full , and first your lordship may remember by that which i even now said , that never king had so many gifts as this king had from his subjects , and it hath never grieved the subjects of england to give to their king , but when they knew there was a devouring lady , that had her share in all things that passed , and the duke of lancaster was as scraping as shee , that the chancellour did eat up the people as fast as either of them both . it grieved the subjects to feed these cormorants . but my lord there are two things by which the kings of england have been prest , ( to wit ) by their subjects , and by their own necessities . the lords in former times were farre stronger , more warlike , better followed , living in their countries , then now they are . your lordship may remember in your reading , that there were many earles could bring into the field a thousand barbed horses , many a baron 5. or 600. barbed horses , whereas now very few of them can furnish twenty fit to serve the king. but to say the truth my lord , the iustices of peace in england , have oppos'd the injusticers of war in england , the kings writ runs over all , and the great seal of england , with that of the next constables will serve the turn to affront the greatest lords in england , that shall move against the king. the force therefore by which our kings in former times were troubled is vanisht away . but the necessities remain . the people therefore in these later ages , are no lesse to be pleased then the peeres , for as the later are become lesse , so by reason of the trayning through england , the commons have all the weapons in their hand . couns. and was it not so ever ? iust . no my good lord ; for the noblemen had in their armories , to furnish some them a thousand , some two thousand , some three thousand men , whereas now there are not many that can arme fifty . couns. can you blame them ? but i will onely answer for my self , between you and me be it spoken , i hold it not safe to mantain so great an armory or stable , it might cause me , or any other nobleman to be suspected , as the preparing of some innovation . iust . why so my lord , rather to be commended as preparing against all danger of innovation . couns. it should be so , but call your observation to accompt , and you shall find it as i say , for ( indeed ) such a jealousie hath been held ever since the time of the civill wars , over the military greatness of our nobles , as made them have little will to bend their studies that wayes : wherefore let every man provide according as he is rated in the muster book , you understand me . iust . very well my lord , as what might be replyed in the perceiving so much ; i have ever ( to deal plainly and freely with your lordship ) more fear'd at home popular violence , then all the forreine that can be made , for it can never be in the power of any forraigne prince , without a papisticall party , rather to disorder or endanger his majesties estate . couns. by this it seems , it is no lesse dangerous for a king to leave the power in the people , then in the nobility . iust . my good lord , the wisdome of our own age , is the foolishnesse of another , the time present ought not to be preferr'd to the policy that was , but the policy that was , to the time present ; so that the power of the nobility being now withered , and the power of the people in the flower , the care to content them would not be neglected , the way to win them often practized , or at least to defend them from oppression . the motive of all dangers that ever this monarchy hath undergone , should be carefully heeded , for this maxime hath no posterne , potestas humana radicatur in voluntatibus hominum . and now my lord , for king edward , it is true , though he were not subject to force , yet was he subject to necessity , which because it was violent , he gave way unto it , potestas ( saith pithagoras ) juxta necessitatem habitat . and it is true , that at the request of the house he discharged and put from him those before named , which done , he had the greatest gift ( but one ) that ever he received in all his dayes ( to wit ) from every person , man and woman , above the age of fourteen years 4d . of old mony , which made many millions of groats , worth 61. of our mony . this he had in generall , besides he had of every benificed priest , 12d . and of the nobility and gentry . i know not how much , for it is not set down . now my good lord , what lost the king by satisfying the desires of the parliament house , for assoon as he had the money in purse , he recalled the lords , and restored them , and who durst call the king to accompt , when the assembly were dissolued . where the word of a king is , there is power ( saith ecclesiasticus ) who shall say unto him , what doest thou ! saith the same author , for every purpose there is a time and judgement , the king gave way to the time , and his judgement perswaded him to yeeld to necessity , consularius nemo melior est quam tempus . couns. but yet you see the king was forc'd to yeeld to their demaunds . just . doth your lordship remember the saying of monsier de lange , that he that hath the profit of the war , hath also the honour of the war , whether it be by battaile or retreate , the king you see had the profit of the parliament , and therefore the honour also , what other end had the king then to supply his wants . a wise man hath evermore respect unto his ends : and the king also knew that it was the love that the people bare him , that they urged the removing of those lords , there was no man among them that sought himself in that desire , but they all sought the king , as by the successe it appeared . my good lord , hath it not been ordinary in england and in france to yeeld to the demaunds of rebels , did not king richard the second graunt pardon to the outragious rogues and murtherers that followed iack straw , and wat t●ler , after they had murthered his chancellor , his treasurer , chief iustice , and others , brake open his exchequer , and committed all manner of outrages and villanies , and why did he do it , but to avoid a greater danger : i say the kings have then yeelded to those that hated them and their estates , ( to wit ) to pernicious rebels . and yet without dishonour , shall it be called dishonour for the king to yeeld to honest desires of his subjects . no my lord , those that tell the king those tales , fear their own dishonour , and not the kings ; for the honour of the king is supreame , and being guarded by iustice and piety , it cannot receive neither wound nor stain . couns. but sir , what cause have any about our king to fear a parliament ? iust . the same cause that the earle of suffolke had in richard the seconds time , and the treasurer fartham , with others , for these great officers being generally hated for abusing both the king and the subject , at the request of the states were discharged , and others put in their roomes . coun . and was not this a dishonour to the king ? iust . certainly no , for king richard knew that his grandfather had done the like , and though the king was in his heart utterly against it , yet had he the profit of this exchange ; for suffolke was fined at 20000 markes , and 1000l . lands . couns. well sir , we will speak of those that fear the parliament some other time , but i pray you go on with that , that happened in the troublesome raigne of richard the second who succeeded , the grandfather being dead . iust . that king my good lord , was one of the most unfortunate princes that ever england had , he was cruell , extreame prodigall , and wholly carryed away with his two minions , suffolk , and the duke of ireland , by whose ill advice and others , he was in danger to have lost his estate ; which in the end ( being led by men of the like temper ) he miserably lost . but for his subsedies he had given him in his first year being under age two tenths , and two fifteenes : in which parliament , alice peirce , who was removed in king edwards time , with lancaster , latimer , and sturry , were confiscate and banished in his second year at the parliament at glocester , the king had a marke upon every sack of wooll , and 6d . the pound upon wards . in his third year at the parliament at winchester , the commons were spared , and a subsedy given by the better sort , the dukes gave 20 markes , and earles 6 markes , bishoppes and abbots with myters six markes , every marke 35. 4d . and every knight , iustice , esquire , shrieve , person , vicar , & chaplaine , paid proportionably according to their estates . couns. this me thinks was no great matter . iust . it is true my lord , but a little mony went far in those dayes : i my self once moved it in parliament in the time of queen elizabeth , who desired much to spare the common people , & i did it by her commandement ; but when we cast up the subsedy books , we found the summe but small , when the 30l . men were left out . in the beginning of his fourth year , a tenth with a fifteen were granted upon condition , that for one whole year no subsedies should be demanded ; but this promise was as suddenly forgotten as made , for in the end of that year , the great subsedy of poll mony was granted in the parliament at northampton . couns. yea but there followed the terrible rebellion of baker , straw , and others , leister , wrais , and others . iust . that was not the fault of the parliament my lord , it is manifest that the subsedy given was not the cause ; for it is plain that the bondmen of england began it , because the were girevously prest by their lords in their tenure of villenage , as also for the hatred they bate to the lawyers and atturneyes : for the story of those times say , that they destroyed the houses and mannors of men of law , & such lawyers as they caught , slew them , and beheaded the lord chief iustice , which commotion being once begun , the head mony was by other rebels pretended : a fire is often kindled with a little straw , which oftentimes takes hold of greater timber , & consumes the whole building : and that this rebellion was begun by the discontented slaves ( whereof there have been many in elder times the like ) is manifest by the charter of manumission , which the king granted in hec verba , rich. dei gratid &c. sciatis quod de gratiâ nostrâ spirituali manumissimus , &c. to which seeing the king was constrained by force of armes , he revoked the letters pattents , and made them voide , the same revocation being strengthened by the parliament ensuing , in which the king had given him a subsedy upon woolls , called a maletot : in the same fourth year was the lord treasurer discharged of his office , and hales lord of st. iohns chosen in his place , in his fift year was the treasurer again changed , and the staffe given to segrave , and the lord chancellour was also changed , and the staffe given to the lord scroope : which lord scroope was again in the beginning of his sixt year turned off , and the king after that he had for a while kept the seal in his own hand , gave it to the bishop of london , from whom it was soon after taken and bestowed on the earle of suffolke , who they say had abused the king , and converted the kings treasure to his own use . to this the king condiscended , and though ( saith walsingham ) he deserved to loose his life and goods , yet he had the favour to go at liberty upon good sureties , and because the king was but young , & that the reliefe granted was committed to the trust of the earle of arundell for the furnishing of the kings navy against the french. couns. yet you see it was a dishonour to the king to have his beloved chancellour removed . iust . truly no , for the king had both his fine 1000l . lands and asubsedy to boot . and though for the present it pleased the king to fancy a man all the world hated ( the kings passion overcomming his judgement ) yet it cannot be call'd a dishonour , for the king is to believe the generall counsell of the kingdome , and to preser it before his affection , especially when suffolke was proved to be false even to the king ; for were it otherwise love and affection might be called a frenzie and a madnesse , for it is the nature of humane passions , that the love bred by fidelity , doth change it self into hatred , when the fidelity is first changed into falshood . couns. but you see there were thirteen lords chosen in the parliament , to have the oversight of the government under the king. iust . no my lord , it was to have the oversight of those officers , which ( saith the story ) had imbezeled , lewdly wasted , and prodigally spent the kings treasure , for to the commission to those lords , or to any six of them , joyn'd with the kings counsell , was one of the most royall and most profitable that ever he did , if he had bin constant to himself . but my good lord , man is the cause of his own misery , for i will repeat the substance of the commission granted by the king , and confirmed by parliament , which , whether it had bin profitable for the king to have prosecured , your lordship may judge . the preamble hath these words : whereas our sovereigne lord the king perceiveth by the grievous complaints of the lords and commons of this realme , that the rents , profits , and revenues of this realme , by the singular and insufficient councell and evill government , as well of some his late great officers and others , &c. are so much withdrawen , wasted , given , granted , alienated , destroyed , and evill dispended , that he is so much impoverished and void of treasure and goods , and the substance of the crown so much diminished and destroyed , that his estate may not honorably be sustained as appertaineth . the king of his free will at the request of the lords and commons , hath ordained william archbishop of canterbury and others with his chancellour , treasurer , keeper of his privy seal , to survey and examine as well the estate and governance of his house , &c. as of all the rents , and profits , and revenues that to him appertaineth , and to be due , or ought to appertain and be due , &c. and all manner of gifts , grants , alienations and confirmations made by him of lands , tenements , rents , &c. bargained and sold to the prejudice of him and his crown , &c. and of his jewels & goods which were his grandfathers at the time of his death , &c. and where they be become . this is in effect the substance of the commission , which your lordship may read at large in the book of statutes , this commission being enacted in the tenth year of the kings reigne . now if such a commission were in these dayes granted to the faithfull men that have no interest in the sales , gifts nor purchases , nor in the keeping of the jewells at the queens death , nor in the obtaining , grants of the kings best lands , i cannot say what may be recovered , and justly recovered ; and what say your lordship , was not this a noble act for the king , if it had been followed to effect ? couns. i cannot tell whether it were or no , for it gave power to the commissiouers to examine all the grants . iust . why my lord , doth the king grant any thing , that shames at the examination ? are not the kings grants on record ? couns. but by your leave , it is some dishonour to a king , to have his judgement called in question . iust . that is true my lord , but in this , or whensoever the like shall be granted in the future , the kings judgement is not examined , but their knavery that abused the king. nay by your favour , the contrary is true , that when a king will suffer himself to be eaten up by a company of petty fellows , by himself raised , therein both the judgement and courage is disputed , and if your lordship will disdain it at your own servants hands , much more ought the great heart of a king to disdain it . and surely my lord , it is a greater treason ( though it undercreep the law ) to tear from the crown the ornaments thereof : and it is an infalliable maxime , that he that loves not his majesties estate , loves not his person . couns. how came it then , that the act was not executed ? iust . because these , against whom it was granted , perswaded the king to the contrary : as the duke of ireland , suffolk , the chief iustice tresilian , and others , yea , that which was lawfully done by the king , and the great councell of the kingdome , was ( by the mastery which ireland , suffolk , and tresilian had over the kings affections ) broken and disavowed . those that devised to relieve the king , not by any private invention , but by generall councell , were by a private and partiall assembly adjudged traitors , and the most honest iudges of the land , enforced to subscribe to that judgement . in so much that iudge belknap plainly told the duke of ireland , and the earl of suffolk , when he was constrained to set his hand , plainly told these lords , that he wanted but a rope , that he might therewith receive a reward for his subscription . and in this councell of nottingham was hatched the ruine of those which governed the king , of the iudges by them constrained , of the lords that loved the king , and sought a reformation , and of the king himself ; for though the king found by all the shrieves of the shires , that the people would not fight against the lords , whom they thought to bee most faithfull unto the king , when the citizens of london made the same answer , being at that time able to arme 50000. men , and told the major that they would never fight against the kings friends , and defenders of the realme , when the lord ralph passet , who was near the king , told the king boldly that he would not adventure to have his head broken for the duke of irelands pleasure , when the lord of london told the earle of suffolk in the kings presence , that he was not worthy to live , &c. yet would the king in the defence of the destroyers of his estate , lay ambushes to intrap the lords , when they came upon his faith , yea when all was pacified , and that the king by his proclamation had clear'd the lords , and promised to produce ireland , suffolk , and the archbishop of yorke , tresiltan , and bramber , to answer at the next parliament , these men confest , that they durst not appear ; and when suffolk fled to callice , and the duke of ireland to chester , the king caused an army to be leavied in lancashire , for the safe conduct of the duke of ireland to his presence , when as the duke being encountered by the lords , ranne like a coward from his company , and fled into holland . after this was holden a parliament , which was called that wrought wonders . in the eleventh year of this king , wherein the fornamed lords , the duke of ireland and the rest , were condemned and confiscate , the chief iustice hanged with many others , the rest of the iudges condemned , and banisht , and a 10. and a 15. given to the king , couns. but good sir : the king was first besieged in the tower of london , and the lords came to the parliament , and no man durst contradict them . iust . certainly in raising an army , they committed treason , and though it appear , that they all loved the king , ( for they did him no harm , having him in their power ) yet our law doth construe all leavying of war without the kings commission , and all force raised to be intended for the death and destruction of the king , not attending the sequell . and it is so judged upon good reason , for every unlawfull and ill action is supposed to be accompanied with an ill intent . and besides , those lords used too great cruelty , in procuring the sentence of death against divers of the kings servants , who were bound to follow and obey their master and soveraigne lord , in that he commanded . couns. it is true , and they were also greatly to blame to cause then so many seconds to be put to death , seeing the principalls , ireland , suffolk , and york , had escaped them , and what reason had they to seek to enform the state by strong hand , was not the kings estate as dear to himself , as to them ? he that maketh a king know his errour mannerly and private , and gives him the best advice , he is discharged before god and his own conscience . the lords might have ●●tired themselves , when they saw they could not prevail , and have left the king to his own wayes , who had more to lose then they had . iust . my lord , the taking of arms cannot be excused in respect of the law , but this might be said for the lords that the king being under yeares , and being wholly governed by their enemies , and the enemies of the kingdome , and because by those evil mens perswasions , it was advised , how the lords should have been murthered at a feast in london , they were excusable during the kings minority to stand upon their guard against their particular enemies . but we will passe it over & go on with our parliaments that followed , whereof that of cambridge in the kings 12th year was the next , therein the king had given him a 10th and a 15th , after which being 20. yeares of age rechanged ( saith h. kinghton ) his treasurer , his chancellour , the iustices of either bench , the clerk of the privy seal and others , and took the government into his own hands . he also took the admirals place from the earl of arundell , and in his room he placed the earl of huntingdon in the yeare following , which was the 13th year of the k. in the parliament at westminster there was given to the king upon every sack of wooll 14s . and 6d . in the gound upon other merchandise , couns. but by your leave , the king was restrained this parliament , that he might not dispose of , but a third part of the money gathered . iust . no my lord , by your favour . but true it is that part of this mony was by the kings consent assigned towards the wars , but yet left in the lord treasurers hands , and my lord it would be a great ease , and a great saving to his majesty our lord and master , if it pleased him to make his assignations upon some part of his revenewes , by which he might have 1000l . upon every 10000l . and save himself a great deale of clamour . for seeing of necessity the navy must be maintained , and that those poor men as well carpenters as ship-keepers must be paid , it were better for his majesty to give an assignation to the treasurer of his navy for the receiving of so much as is called ordinary , then to discontent those poor men , who being made desperate beggars , may perchance be corrupted by them that lye in wait to destroy the kings estate . and if his majesty did the like in all other payements , especially where the necessity of such as are to receive , cannot possible give dayes , his majesty might then in a little rowle behold his receipts and expences , he might quiet his heart when all necessaries were provided for , and then dispose the rest at his pleasure . and my good lord , how excellently and easily might this have been done , if the 400000l . had been raised as aforesaid upon the kings lands , and wards i say that his majesties house , his navy , his guards , his pensioners , his munition , his ambassadors and all else of ordinary charge might have been defrayed , and a great summe left for his majesties casuall expences and rewards , i will not say they were not in love with the kings estate , but i say they were unfortunately borne for the king that crost it . couns. well sir , i would it had been otherwise , but for the assignments , there are among us that will not willingly indure it . charity begins with it self , shall we hinder our selves of 50000l . per annum to save the king 20 ? no sir , what will become of our new years gifts , our presents and gratuities ? we can now say to those rhat have warrants for money , that there is not a penny in the exchequer , but the king gives it away unto the scots faster then it comes in . iust . my lord you say well , at least you say the truth , that such are some of our answers , and hence comes that generall murmure to all men that have money to receive , i say that there is not a penny given to that nation ; be it for service or otherwise but is spread over all the kingdome : yea they gather notes , and take copies of all the privy seals and warrants that his majesty hath given for the money for the scots , that they may shew them in parliament . but of his majesties gifts to the english , there is no bruit though they may be tenne times as much as the scots . and yet my good lord , howsoever they be thus answered that to them sue for money out of the echequer , it is due to them for 10. or 12. or 20. in the hundred , abated according to their qualities that shew , they are alwaies furnished . for conclusion , if it would please god to put into the kings heart to make their assignations , it would save him many a pound , and gain him many a prayer , and a great deal of love , for it grieveth every honest mans heart to see the abundance which even the petty officers in the exchequer , and others gather both from the king and subject , and to see a world of poore men runne after rhe king for their ordinary wages . couns. well , well , did you never hear this old tale , that when there was a great contentation about the weather the seamen complaining of contrary windes , when those of the high countreys desired rain , and those of the valleys sunshining dayes , iupiter sent them word by mercury , then , when they had all done , the weather should be as it had been , and it shall ever fall out so with them that complain , the course of payments shall be as they have been , what care we what petty fellows say ? or what care we for your papers ? have not we the kings eares , who dares contest with us ? though we cannot be revenged on such as you are for telling the truth , yet upon some other pretence , wee 'le clap you up , and you shall sue to us ere you get out . nay wee 'le make you confesse that you were deceived in your projects , and eat your own words : learn this of me sir , that as a little good fortune is better then a great deal of virtue : so the least authority hath advantage over the greatest wit , was he not the wisest man that said the battel was not the strongest , nor yet bread for the wise , nor riches to men of understanding , nor favour to men of knowledge : but what time and chance came to them all . iust . it is well for your lordship that it is so . but qu : elizabeth would set the reason of a mean man , before the authority of the greatest councellor she had , and by her patience therein she raised upon the usuall and ordinary customes of london without any new imposition above 50000l a year , for though the treasurer burleigh , and the earle of leicester and secretary walshingham , all three pensioners to customer smith , did set themselves against a poor waiter of the custome-house called carwarden , and commanded the groomes of the privy chamber not to give him accesse , yet the queen sent for him , and gave him countenance against them all . it would not serve the turn , my lord , with her ; when your lordships would tell her , that the disgracing her great officers by hearing the complaints of busie heads , was a dishonour to her self , but she had alwayes this answer , that if any men complain unjustly against a magistrate , it were reason he should be severely punished , if justly , shee was queen of the small , as well as of the great , and would hear their complaints . for my good lord , a prince that suffereth himself to be besieged , forsaketh one of the greatest regalities belonging to a monarchie , to wit , the last appeal , or as the trench call it , le dernier resort . couns. well sir , this from the matter , i pray you go on . iust . then my lord , in the kings 15. year he had a tenth and a fifteen graunted in parliament of london . and that same year there vvas a great councell called at stamford to vvhich diverse men vvere sent for , of diverse counties besides the nobility , of vvhich the king took advice vvhether he should continue the vvar , or make a finall end vvith the french. couns. what needed the king to take the advice of any but of his ovvn councell in matter of peace or vvarre . iust . yea my lord , for it is said in the proverbs , where are many counsellers , there is health . and if the king had made the vvarre by a generall consent , the kingdome in generall vvere bound to maintain the vvarre , and they could not then say when the king required aid , that he undertook a needlesse vvarre . couns. you say vvell , but i pray you go on . iust . after the subsedy in the 15. yeare , the king desired to borrovv 10000l . of the londoners , vvhich they refused to lend . couns. and vvas not the king greatly troubled there vvith . iust . yea but the king troubled the londoners soon aftar , for the king took the advantage of a ryot made upon the bishop of salisbury his men , sent for the major , and other the ablest citizens , comitted the major to prison in the castle of windsor , and others to other castles , and made a lord warden of this citie , till in the end vvhat vvith 10000l . ready money , and other rich presents , instead of lending 10000l . it cost them 2000l . betvveen the fifteenth yeare and tvventieth yeare , he had tvvo aides given him in the parliaments of winchester and westminster : and this later vvas given to furnish the kings journey into ireland , to establish that estate vvhich vvas greatly shaken since the death of the kings grandfather , vvho received thence yearly 30000l . and during the kings stay in ireland he had a 10th and a 5th granted . couns. and good reason , for the king had in his army 4000. horse and 30000. foot . iust . that by your favour , vvas the kings savity : for great armies do rather devour themselves then destroy enemies . such an army , ( vvhereof the fourth part vvould have conquered all ireland ) vvas in respect of ireland such an army as xerxes led into greece in this tvventieth yeare , vvherein he had a tenth of the clergy , vvas the great conspiracy of the kings unkle , the duke of glocester , and of moubrey , arundell , nottingham , and warvvick , the archbishop of canterbury and the abbbot of westminster , and others vvho in the one and tvventieth yeare of the king vvere all redeemed by parliament , and vvhat thinks your lordship , vvas not this assemble of the 3. states for the kings estate , vvherein he so prevailed , that he not onely overthrevv those popular lords , but besides ( the english chronicle saith , the king so vvrought and brought things about , that he obtained the power of both houses to be granted to certain persons , to 15. noblemen and gentlemen , or to seven of them . couns. sir , whether the king wrought well or il i cannot judge , but our chronicles say , that many things were done in this parliament , to the displeasure of no small number of people , to wit , for that diverse rightfull heires were disinherited of their lands and livings , with which wrongfull doings the people were much offended , so that the king with those that were about him , and chief in counsell , came into great infamy & slander . iust . my good lord , if your lordship will pardon mee , i am of opinion that those parliaments wherein the kings of this land have satisfied the people , as they have been ever prosperous , so where the king hath restrained the house , the contrary hath happened , for the kings atchievments in this parliament , were the ready preparations to his ruine . cov . you mean by the generall discontentment that followed , and because the king did not proceed legally with glocester and others . why sir , this was not the first time that the kings of england have done things without the counsell of the land : yea , contrary to the law . iust . it is true my lord in some particulars , as even at this time the duke of glocester was made away at call●ce by strong hand , without any lawfull triall : for he was a man so beloved of the people and so allied , having the dukes of lancaster , and york his brethren , the duke of aumarle , and the duke of hereford his nephewes , the great earles of arundell and warwicke , with diverse other of his part in the conspiracy , as the king durst not trie him according to the law : for at the triall of arundell and warwicke , the king was forced to entertaine a petty army about him . and though the duke was greatly lamented , yet it cannot be denyed but that he was then a traytor to the king and was it not so my lord with the duke of guise : your lordship doth remember the spur-gald proverb , that necessitie hath no law : and my good lord , it is the practice of doing wrong , and of generall wrongs done , that brings danger , and not where kings are prest in this or that particular , for there is great difference between naturall cruelty and accidentall . and therefore it was machiavels advice , that all that a king did in that kind , he shall do at once , and by his mercies afterwards make the world know that his cruelty was not affected . and my lord take this for a generall rule , that the immortall policy of a state cannot admit any law or priviledge whatsoever , but in some particular or other , the same is necessarily broken , yea in an aristocratia or popular estate , which vaunts so much of equality and common right , more outrage hath been committed then in any christian monarchy . couns. but whence came this hatred between the duke and the king his nephew . iust . my lord , the dukes constraining the king , when he was young , stuck in the kings heart , and now the dukes proud speech to the king when he had rendred brest formerly engaged to the duke brittain , kindled again these coales that were not altogether extinguished , for he used these words : your grace ought to put your body in great pain to winne a strong hold or town by feats of armes , ere you take upon you to sell or deliver any town gotten by the manhood and strong hand and policy of your noble progenitors . whereat , saith the story , the king changed his countenance , &c. and to say truth , it was a proud and maisterly speech of the duke ; besides that inclusively he taxed him of sloath and cowardise , as if he had never put himself to the adventure of winning such a place , undutifull words of a subject do often take deeper root then the memory of ill deeds do : the duke of biron found it when the king had him at advantage . yea the late earle of essex told queen elizabeth that her conditions was as crooked as her carkasse : but it cost him his head , which his insurrection had not cost him , but for that speech , who will say unto a king ( saith iob ) thou art wicked . certainly it is the same thing to say unto a lady , thou art crooked ( and perchance more ) as to say unto a king that he is wicked , and to say that he is a coward , or to use any other words of disgrace , it is one and the same errour . couns. but what say you for arundell , a brave and valiant man , who had the kings pardon of his contempt during his minority . iust . my good lord , the parliament which you say disputes the kings prerogative , did quite contrary , and destroyed the kings charter and pardon formerly given to arundell . and my good lord , do you remember , that at the parliament that wrought wonders , when these lords compounded that parliament , as the king did this , they were so mercilesse towards all , that they thought their enemies , as the earle of arundell most insolently suffered the qu : to kneel unto him three houres for the saving of one of her servants , and that scorne of his manebat alto mente repostum . and to say the truth , it is more barbarous & unpardonable then any act that ever he did to permit the wife of his soveraign to kneel to him being the kings vassell . for if he had saved the lords servant freely at her first request , as it is like enough that the qu : would also have saved him , miseris succurrens paria obtenibis aliquando : for your lordship sees that the earle of warwicke who was as farre in the treason as any of the rest , was pardoned . it was also at this parliament that the duke of hereford accused moubray duke of norfolke , and that the duke of hereford sonne to the duke of lancaster , was banished to the kings confusion , as your lordship well knows . couns. i know it well and god knows that the king had then a silly and weak councell about him , that perswaded him to banish a prince of the bloud , a most valiant man , and the best beloved of the people , in generall of any man living , especially considering that the king gave every day more then other offence to his subjects . for besides that he fined the inhabitants that assisted the lords in his minority ( of the 17. shires ) which offence he had long before pardoned , his blank charters , and letting the realme to farme to meon persons , by whom he was wholly advised , increased the peoples hatred towards the present government . iust . you say well my l. princes of an ill destiny do alwayes follow the worst counsell , or at least imbrace the best after opportunity is lost , qui consilia non ex suo corde sed alienis viribus colligunt , non animo sed auribus cogillant . and this was not the least grief of the subject in generall , that those men had the greatest part of the spoil of the commonwealth , which neither by virtue , valour or counsell could adde any thing unto it : nihil est sordidius , nihil crudelius ( saith anto : pius ) quamsi remp. i● arrode , qui nihil in eam suo labore conferent . couns. indeed the letting to farm the realm was very grievous to the subject . iust . will your lordship pardon me if i tell you that the letting to farm of his majesties customes ( the greatest revenue of the realm ) is not very pleasing . couns. and why i pray you , doth not the king thereby raise his profits every third yeare , & one farmer outbids another to the kings advantage iust . it is true my lord , but it grieves the subject to pay custome to the subject , for what mighty men are those farmers become , and if those farmers get many thousands every yeare , as the world knows they do , why should they not now ( being men of infinite wealth ) declare unto the king upon oath , what they have gained , and henceforth become the kings collectours of his custome , did not queen elizabeth who was reputed both a wise and juft princesse , after she had brought customer smith from 14000l . a yeare to 42000l . a yeare , made him lay down a recompence for that which he had gotten ? and if these farmers do give no recompence , let them yet present the king with the truth of their receivings and profits . but my lord for conclusion , after bullingbrook arriving in england with a small troop : notwithstanding the king at his landing out of ireland , had a sufficient and willing army : yet he wanting courage to defend his right gave leave to all his souldiers to depart , and put himself into his hands that cast him into his grave . couns. yet you see he was depos'd by parliament . iust . aswell may your lordship say he was knock't in the head by parliament , for your lordship knows that if king richard had ever escaped out of their fingers that deposed him , the next parliament would have made all the deposers traitours and rebels , and that justly . in which parliament , or rather unlawfull assembly , there appeared but one honest man , to wit , the b. of carlile , who scorned his life , and estate , in respect of right and his allegiance , and defended the right of his soveraigne lord against the kings elect and his partakers . couns. well i pray goe on with the parliaments held in the time of his successor henry the fourth . iust . this king had in his third year a subsedv , and in his fift a tenth of the clergy without a parllament ; in his sixt year he had so great a subsedie , as the house required there might be no record thereof left to posterity , for the house gave him 20s . of every knights fee , and of every 20l. land , 20d . and 12d . the pouud of goods . couns. yea in the end of this year , the parliament prest the king to annex unto the crown all temporall possessions belonging to church-men within the land , which at that time , was the third foot of all england . but the bishops made friends , and in the end saved their estates . iust . by this you see , my lord , that cromwell was not the first that thought on such a business . and if king henry the 8. had reserved the abbeyes , and other church lands , which he had given at the time , the revenue of the crown of england , had exceeded the revenue of the crown of spaine , with both the indies , whereas used as it was , ( a little enriched the crown ) served but to make a number of pettifoggers , and other gentlemen . couns. but what had the king in steed of this great revenue iust . he had a 15th of the commons , and tenth , and a half of the clergy , and withall , all pensions graunted by king edward , and king richard were made void . it was also moved that all crown lands formerly given ( at least given by king edw : and king richard ) should be taken back . couns. what think you of that , sir ? would it not have been a dishonour to the king ? and would not his successors have done the like to those that the king had advanced ? iust . i cannot answer your lordship , but by distinguishing , for where the kings had given land for services , and had not been over reached in his gifts , there it had been a dishonour to the king , to have made void the graunts of his predecessors , or his graunts , but all those graunts of the kings , wherein they were deceived , the very custome and policy of england makes them voyd at this day . couns. how mean you that , for his majestie hath given a great deal of land among us since he came into england , and would it stand with the k. honour to take it from us again . iust . yea my lord , very well with the kings honour , if your lordship , or any lord else , have under the name of 100l . land a year , gotten 500l . land , and so after that rate . couns. i will never believe that his majesty will ever doe any such thing . iust . and i believe as your lordship doth , but we spake e're while of those that disswaded the king from calling it a parliament : and your lordship asked me the reason , why any man should disswade it , or fear it , to which , this place gives me an opportunity to make your lordship answer , for though his majesty will of himself never question those grants yet when the commons shall make humble petition to the king in parliament , that it will please his majesty to assist them in his relief , with that which ought to be his own , which , if it will please his majesty to yeild unto the house will most willingly furnish & supply the rest , with what grace can his majesty deny that honest suit of theirs , the like having been done in many kings times before ? this proceeding may good lord , my perchance prove all your phrases of the kings honour , false english. couns. but this cannot concern many , and for my self , i am sure it concerns me little . iust . it is true my lord , & there are not many that disswade his majestie from a parliament . co. but they are great ones , a few of which will serve the turn wel enough . iust . but my lord , be they never so great ( as great as gyants ) yet if they disswade the king from his ready and assured way of his subsistence , they must devise how the k. may be elsewhere supplied , for they otherwise ●●nne into a dangerous fortune . couns. hold you contented sir , the king needs no great disswasion . iust . my lord , learn of me , that ●here is none of you all , than can ●erce the king. it is an essentiall property of a man truely wise , not to o●en all the boxes of his bosome , even ●o those that are near'st & dear'st unto him , for when a man is discovered to the very bottome , he is after the lesse esteemed . i dare undertake , that when your lordship hath served the king twice twelve years more , you will find , that his majesty hath reserved somewhat beyond all your capacities , his majesty hath great reason to put off the parliament , at his last refuge , and in the mean time , to make tryall of all your loves to serve him , for his majesty hath had good experience , how well you can serve your selves : but when the king finds , that the building of your own fortunes and factions , hath been the diligent studies , and the service of his majesty , but the exercises of your leasures : he may then perchance cast himself upon the generall love of his people , of which ( i trust ) he shall never be deceived , and leave as many of your lordships as have pilfered from the crown , to their examination . couns. well sir , i take no great pleasure in this dispute , goe on pray . iust . in that kings 5th year , he had also a subsedy , which is got by holding the house together from easter to christmas , and would not suffer them to depart . he had also a subsedy in his ninth year . in his eleventh year the commons did again presse the king to take all the temporalities of the church men into his hands , which they proved sufficient to maintain 150. earls , 1500. knights , and 6400. esquiers , with a hundred hospitals , but they not prevailing , gave the king a subsedy . as for the notorious prince , henry the fift , i find , that he had given him in his second year 300000. markes , and after that two other subsedies , one in his fifth year , another in his ninth , without any disputes . in the time of his successor henry the sixt , there were not many subsedies . in this third year , he had a subsedy of a tunnage and poundage . and here ( saith iohn stow ) began those payements , which we call customes , because the payement was continued , whereas before that time it was granted but for a year two or three , according to the kings occasions . he had also an ayde & gathering of money in his fourth year , and the like in his tenth year , and in his thirteenth year a 15th he had also a fifteenth for the conveying of the queen out of france into england . in the twenty eight year of that king was the act of resumption of all honours , towns , castles , signeuries , villages , manors , lands , tenements , rents , reversions , fees , &c. but because the wages of the kings servants , were by the strictness of the act also restrained , this act of resumption was expounded in the parliament at reading the 31th year of the kings reigne . couns. i perceive that those 〈◊〉 of resumption were ordinary in former times ; for king stephen resumed the lands , which in former times he had given to make friends during the civill wars . and henry the second resumed all ( without exception ) which king stephen had not resumed ; for although king stephen took back a great deal , yet he suffered his trustiest servants to enjoy his gift . iust . yes my lord , and in after times also ; for this was not the last , nor shall be the last , i hope . and judge you my lord , whether the parliaments doe not only serve the king , whatsoever is said to the contrary ; for as all king henry the 6. gifts & graunts were made void by the duke of york when he was in possession of the kingdome by parliament . so in the time of k. h. when k. edw. was beaten out again , the parliament of westminster made all his acts voyd , made him and all his followers traytors , and gave the king many of their heads & lands . the parliaments of england do alwayes serve the king in possession . it served rich. the second to condemne the popular lords . it served bollingbrooke to depose rich. when edw. the 4. had the scepter , it made them all beggars that had followed h. the 6. and it did the like for h. when edw. was driven out . the parliaments are as the friendship of this world is , which alwayes followeth prosperity . for king edw. the 4. after that he was possessed of the crown , he had in his 13. year a subsedy freely given him : and in the year following he took a benevolence through england , which arbitrary taking from the people , served that ambitious traytor the duke of bucks . after the kings death was a plausible argument to perswade the multitude , that they should not permit ( saith sir thomas moore ) his line to raigne any longer upon them . couns. well sir , what say you to the parliament of richard the third his time ? iust . i find but one , and therein he made diverse good laws . for king henry the seventh in the beginning of his third year he had by parliament an ayde granted unto him , towards the relief of the duke of brittain , then assailed by the french king. and although the king did not enter into the warre , but by the advice of the three estates , who did willingly contribute : yet those northern men which loved richard the third , raised rebellion under colour of the money impos'd , and murthered the earle of northumberland whom the king employed in that collection . by which your lordship sees , that it hath not been for taxes and impositions alone , that the ill disposed have taken armes ; but even for those payments which have been appointed by parliament . couns. and what became of these rebels ? iust . they were fairly hang'd , & the money levied notwithstanding in the kings first year he gathered a marvailous great masse of money , by a benevolence , taking pattern by this kind of levie from edw. 4th . but the king caused it first to be moved in parliament where it was allowed , because the poorer sort were therein spared . yet it is true that the king used some art , for in his letters he declared that he would measure every mans affections by his gifts . in the thirteenth year he had also a subsedy , whereupon the cornish men took armes , as the northern men of the bishoprick had done in the third year of the king , couns. it is without example , that ever the people have rebelled for any thing granted by parliament , save in this kings dayes . iust . your lordship must consider , that he was not over much beloved , for he took many advantages upon the people and the nobility both . couns. and i pray you what say they now of the new impositions lately laid by the kings majesty ? do they say that they are justly or unjustly laid ? iust . to impose upon all things brought into the kingdome is very ancient : which imposing when it hath been continued a certain time , is then called customes , because the subjects are accustomed to pay it , and yet the great taxe upon wine is still called impost , because it was imposed after the ordinary rate of payement , had lasted many years . but we do now a dayes understand those things to be impositions , which are raised by the command of princes , without the advice of the common-wealth , though ( as i take it ) much of that which is now called custome , was at the first imposed by prerogative royall : now whether it be time or consent that makes them just , i cannot define , were they just because new , and not justified yet by time , or unjust because they want a generall consent : yet is this rule of aristotle verified in respect of his majestie : minus timent homines in justum pati à principe quem cultorem dei putant . yea my lord , they are also the more willingly borne , because all the world knows they are no new invention of the kings . and if those that advised his majestie to impose them , had raised his lands ( as it was offered them ) to 20000l . more then it was , and his wards to asmuch as aforesaid , they had done him farre more acceptable service . but they had their own ends in refusing the one , and accepting the other . if the land had been raised , they could not have selected the best of it for themselves : if the impositions had not been laid , some of them could not have their silks , other pieces in farme , which indeed grieved the subject ten times more then that which his majestie enjoyeth . but certainly they made a great advantage that were the advisers , for if any tumult had followed his majesty , ready way had been to have delivered them over to the people . couns. but think you that the king would have delivered them if any troubles had followed ? iust . i know not my lord , it was machiavels counsell to caesar borgia to doe it , and king h the 8. delivered up empson and dudley : yea the same king , when the great cardinall woolsey , who governed the king and all his estate , had ( by requiring the sixt part of every mans goods for the king ) raised a rebellion , the king i say disavowed him absolutely , that had not the dukes of norfolk and suffolk appeased the people , the cardinall had sung no more masse : for these are the words of our story : the king then came to westminster to the cardinals palace , and assembled there a great councell , in which he protested , that his mind was never to aske any thing of his commons which might sound to the breach of his laws . wherefore he then willed them to know by whose means they were so strictly given forth . now my lord , how the cardinall would have shifted himself , by saying , i had the opinion of the iudges , had not the rebellion been appeased , i greatly doubt . couns. but good sir , you blanch my question , and answer me by examples . i aske you whether or no in any such tumult , the people pretending against any one or two great officers , the king should deliver them , or defend them ? iust . my good lord , the people have not stayed for the kings delivery , neither in england , nor in france : your lordship knows how the chancellour , treasurer , and chief iustice , with many others at severall times have been used by the rebels : and the marshals , constables , and treasurers in france , have been cut in pieces in charles the sixt his time . now to your lordships question , i say that where any man shall give a king perilous advice , as may either cause a rebellion , or draw the peoples love from the king , i say , that a king shall be advised to banish him : but if the king do absolutely command his servant to do any thing displeasing to the common-wealth , and to his own perill , there is the king bond in honour to defend him . but my good lord for conclusion , there is no man in england that will lay any invention ether grievous or against law upon the kings majesty : and therefore your lordships must share it amongst you . couns. for my part , i had no hand in it , ( i think ) ingram was be that propounded it to the treasurer . iust . alas , my good lord , every poor waiter in the custome-house , or every promooter might have done it , there is no invention in these things , to lay impositions , and sell the kings lands , are poor and common devices . it is true that ingram and his fellows are odious men , and therefore his majesty pleas'd the people greatly to put him from the coffership . it is better for a prince to use such a kind of men , then to countenance them , hangmen are necessary in a common wealth : yet in the netherlands , none but a hangmans sonne will marry a hangmans daughter . now my lord , the last gathering which henry the seventh made , was in his twentieth year , wherein he had another benevolence both of the clergy and laity , a part of which taken of the poorer sort , he ordained by his testament that it should be restored . and for king henry the eight , although he was left in a most plentifull estate , yet he wonderfully prest his people with great payments , for in the beginning of his time it was infinite that he spent in masking and tilting , banquetting , and other vanities , before he was entred into the most consuming expence of the most fond and fruitlesse warre that ever king undertook . in his fourth yeare he had one of the greatest subsedies that ever was granted ; for besides two fifteens and two dismes , he used davids law of capitation or head money , and had of every duke ten marks , of every earl five pounds , of every lord four pounds , of every knight four marks and every man rated at 8l . in goods , 4. marks , and so after the rate : yea every man that was valued but at 401 paid 12d , and every man and woman above 15. yeares 4d . he had also in his sixt yeare divers subsedies granted him . in his fourteenth their was a tenth demanded of every mans goods , but it was moderated . in the parliament following , the clergie gave the king the half of their spirituall livings for one yeare , and of the laity there was demanded 800000l , which could not be leavied in england , but it was a marvellous great gift that the king had given him at that time . in the kings seventeenth yeare was the rebellion before spoken of , wherein the king disavowed the cardinall : in his seventeenth yeare he had the tenth and fifteenth given by parliament , which were before that time paid to the pope . and before that also , the moneys that the king borrowed in his fifteenth yeare were forgiven him by parliament in his seventeenth yeare . in his 35. yeare a subsedy was granted of 4d . the pound of every man worth in goods from 20s . to 5l , from 5l . to 10l . and upwards of every pound 2s . and all strangers , denisens and others doubled this summe strangers not being inhabitants above 16. yeares 4d . a head . all that had lands , fees , and annuities , from 20. to 5. and so double as they did for goods : and the clergy gave 6d . the pound . in the thirty seventh yeare , a benevolence was taken not voluntary , but rated by commissioners , which because one of the aldermen refused to pay , he was sent for a souldier into scotland . he had also another great subsedy of six shillings the pound of the clergy , and two shillings eight pence of the goods of the laity , and four shillings the pound upon lands . in the second yeare of edward the sixt , the parliament gave the king an aid of twelve pence the pound of goods of his naturall subjects , and two shillings the pound of strangers , and this to continue for three yeares , and by the statute of the second and third of edward the sixt , it may appear , the same parliament did also give a second aid , as followeth , ( to wit ) of every ewe kept in severall pastures , 3d : of every weather kept as aforesaid 2d : of every sheep kept in the common , 1d , ob . the house gave the king also 8d . the pound of every woollen cloath made for the sale throughout england for three years . in the third and fourt , of the king , by reason of the troublesome gathering of the poly money upon sheep , and the tax upon cloath , this act of subsedy was repeal'd , and other relief given the king , and in the seventh yeare he had a subsedy and two fifteens . in the first yeare of queen mary , tunnage and poundage were granted . in the second yeare a subsedy was given to king philip , and to the queen , she had also a third subsedy in annis 4. & 5. eliz. reg , now my lord , for the parliaments of the late queens time , in which there was nothing new , neither head money , nor sheep money , nor escuage , nor any of these kinds of payments was required , but onely the ordinary subsedies , and those as easily graunted as demanded , i shall not need to trouble your lordship with any of them , neither can i inform your lordship of all the passages and acts which have passed , for they are not extant , nor printed . couns. no , it were but time lost to speak of the latter , and by those that are already remembred , we may judge of the rest , for those of the greatest importance are publick . but i pray you deal freely with me , what you think would be done for his majesty , if he should call a parliament at this time , or what would be required at his majesties hands ? iust . the first thing that would be required , would be the same that was required by the commons in the thirteenth yeare of hen. the eight ( to wit ) that if any man of the commons house should speak more largely , then of duty he ought to do , all such offences to be pardoned , and that to be of record . couns. so might every companion speak of the king what they list . iust . no my lord , the reverence which a vassall oweth to his soveraigne , is alwaies intended for every speech , howsoever it must import the good of the king , and his estate , and so long it may be easily pardoned , otherwise not ; for in queen elizabeths time , who gave freedome of speech in all parliaments , when wentworth made those motions , that were but supposed dangerous to the queens estate , he was imprisoned in the tower , notwithstanding the priviledge of the house , and there died . couns. what say you to the scicilian vespers remembred in the last parliament ? iust . i say , he repented him heartily that used that speech , and indeed besides that , it was seditious , this example held not : the french in scicily usurped that kingdome , they neither kept law nor faith , they took away the inheritance of the inhabitants , they took from them their wives , and ravished their daughters , committing all other insolencies that could be imagined . the kings majesty is the naturall lord of england , his vassals of scotland obey the english laws , if they break them , they are punished without respect . yea his majesty put one of his barons to a shamefull death , for being consenting onely to the death of a common fencer : and which of these ever did or durst commit any outrage in england , but to say the truth , the opinion of packing the last , was the cause of the contention and disorder that happened . couns. why sir ? do you not think it best to compound a parliament of the kings servants and others , that shall in all obey the kings desires ? iust . certainly no , for it hath never succeeded well , neither on the kings part , nor on the subjects , as by the parliament before-remembred your lordship may gather , for from such a composition do arise all jealousies , and all contentions . it was practized in elder times , to the great trouble of the kingdome , and to the losse and ruine of many . it was of latter time used by king henry the eight , but every way to his disadvantage . when the king leaves himself to his people , they assure themselves that they are trusted and beloved of their king , and there was never any assembly so barborus , as not to answer the love and trust of their king. henry the sixt when his estate was in effect utterly overthrown , and utterly impoverished at the humble request of his treasurer made the same known to the house : or other wise , using the treasurers own words . he humbly desired the king to take his staffe , that he might save his wardship . couns. but you know , they will presently be in hand with those impositions , which the king hath laid by his own royall prerogative . iust . perchance not my lord ; but rather with those impositions that have been by some of your lordships laid upon the king , which did not some of your lordships fear more then you do the impositions laid upon the subjects , you would never disswade his majesty from a parliament : for no man doubted , but that his majesty was advised to lay those impositions by his councell , and for particular things on which they were laid , the advice came from petty fellows ( though now great ones ) belonging to the custome-house . now my lord , what prejudice hath his majesty ( his revenue being kept up ) if the impositions that were laid by the generall councell of the kingdome , which takes off all grudging and complaint . couns. yea sir , but that which is done by the king , with the advice of his private or privy councell , is done by the kings absolute power . iust . and by whose power it is done in parliament , but by the kings absolute power ? mistake it not my lord : the three estates do but advise , as the privy councell doth , which advice if the king imbrace , it becomes the kings own act in the one , and the kings law in the other , for without the kings acceptation , both the publick and private advices be but as empty egg shels : and what doth his majesty lose if some of those things , which concerns the poorer sort to be made free again , and the revenue kept up upon that which is superfluous ? is it a losse to the king to be beloved of the commons ? if it be revenue which the king seeks , is it not better to take it of those that laugh , then of those that cry ? yea if all be conten to pay upon moderation & change of the species : is it not more honourable and more safe for the king , that the subject pay by perswasion , then to have them constrained ? if they be contented to whip themselves for the king , were it not better to give them the rod into their hands , then to commit them to the executioner ? certainly it is farre more happy for a soveraigne prince , that a subject open his purse willingly , then that the same be opened by violence . besides , that when impositions are laid by parliament , they are gathered by the authority of the law , which ( as aforesaid ) rejecteth all complaints , and stoppeth every mutinous mouth : it shall ever be my prayer that the king embrace the councel of honour and safety , and let other princes imbrace that of force . couns. but good sir , it is his prerogative which the king stands upon , & it is the prerogative of the kings , that the parliaments do all diminish . iust . if your lordship would pardon me , i would say then , that your lordships objection against parliaments is ridiculous . in former parliaments three things have been supposed dishonour of the king. the first , that the subjects have conditioned with the king , when the king hath needed them , to have the great charter confirmed : the second , that the estates have made treasurers for the necessary and profitable disbursing of those sums by them given , to the end , that the kings , to whom they were given , should expend them for their own defence , & for the defence of the common-wealth : the third , that these have prest the king to discharge some great officers of the crown , and to elect others . as touching the first my lord , i would fain learn what disadvantage the kings of this land have had by confirming the great charter , the breach of which have served onely men of your lordships rank , to assist their own passions , and to punish and imprison at their own discretion the kings poor subjects . concerning their private hatred , with the colour of the kings service , for the kings majestie take no mans inheritance , ( as i have said before ) nor any mans life , but the law of the land , according to the charter . neither doth his majesty imprison any man ( matter of practice , which concerns , the preservation of his estate excepted ) but by the law of the land . and yet he useth his prerogative as all the kings of england have ever used to : for the supream reason cause to practise many things without the advice of the law . as insurrections and rebellions , it useth the marshall , and not the common law , without any breach of the charter , the intent of the charter considered truely . neither hath any subject made complaint , or been grieved , in that the kings of this land , for their own safeties , and preservation of their estates , have used their prerogatives , the great ensigne , on which there is written soli deo. and my good lord , was not buckingham in england , and byron in france condemned , their peers uncalled ? and withall , was not byron utterly ( contrary to the custome & priviledges of the french ) denyed an advocate to assist his defence ? for where lawes forecast cannot provide remedies for future dangers , princes are forced to assist themselves by their prerogatives . but that which hath been ever grievous , and the cause of many troubles , very dangerous is , that your lordships abusing the reasons of state , do punish and imprison the k. subjects at your pleasure . it is you my lords , that when subjects have sometimes need of the kings prerogative , do then use the strength of the law , and when they require the law , you afflict them with the prerogative , and tread the great charter ( which hath been confirmed by 16 acts of parliament ) under your feet , as a torn parchment or waste paper ? . couns. good sir , which of us do in this sort break the great charter ? perchance you mean , that we have advised the king to lay the new impositious . iust . no my lord : there is nothing in the great charter against impositions : and besides that , necessity doth perswade them . and if necessity do in somewhat excuse a private man à fortiori , it may then excuse a prince . again the kings majesty hath profit and increase of revenue by the impositions . but there are of your lordships ( contrarie to the direct letter of the charter ) that imprison the kings subjects and deny them the benefit of the law , to the kings disprofit . and what do you otherwise thereby ( if the impositions be in any sort grievous ) but renovare dolores ? and with all digg out of the dust the long buried memorie of the subjects former intentions with their kings . couns. what mean you by that ? iust . i will tell your lordship when i dare , in the mean time it is enough for me , to put your lordship in mind , that all the estates in the world , in the offence of the people , have either had profit or necessity to perswade them to adventure it , of which , if neither be urgent , and yet the subject exceedingly grieved , your lordship may conjecture , that the house will be humble suitors for a redresse . and if it be a maxime in policy to please the people in all things indifferent , and never suffer them to be beaten , but for the kings benefit ( for there are no blows forgotten with the smart but those ) then i say to make them vassals to vassals , is but to batter down those mastering buildings , erected by k henry the 7. & fortified by his son , by which the people the gentry of england were brought to depend upon the king alone . yea my good lord , our late dear soveraign q. eliz. kept them up , & to their advantage , as wel repaired as ever prince did defend me , & spend me , faith the irish churle . couns. then you think that this violent breach of the charter will be the cause of seeking the conformation of it in the next parliament , which otherwise could never have bin moved . iust . i know not my good lord perchance not , for if the house presse the king to graunt unto them all that is theirs by the law , they cannot ( in iustice ) refuse the king all that is his by the law. and where will be the issue of such a contention ? i dare not divine , but sure i am that it will tend to the prejudice both of the king and subject . couns. if they dispute not their own liberties , why should they then the kings liberties , which we call his prerogative . iust . among so many and so divers spirits , no man can foretell what may be propounded , but howsoever , if the matter be not slightly handled on the kings behalf , these disputes will soon dissolve for the king hath so little need of his prerogative , & so great advantage by the lawes , as the fear of imparing the one , to wit , the prerogative , is so impossible , and the burthen of the other , to wit , the law , so weighty , as but by a branch of the kings prerogative , namely , of his remission and pardon , the subject is no way able to undergo it . this my lord is no matter of flourish that i have said , but it is the truth , and unanswerable . couns. but to execute the laws very severely , would be very grievous . iust . why my lord , are the laws grievous which our selves have required of our kings ? and are the prerogatives also which our kings have reserved to themselves also grievous ? how can such a people then be well pleased ? and if your lordship confess that the lawes give too much , why does your lordship urge the prerogative that gives more ? nay i will be bold to say it , that except the lawes were better observed , the prerogative of a religious prince hath manifold lesse perils then the letter of the law hath . now my lord , for the second & third , to wit , for the appointing of treasures , and removing of councellors , our kings have evermore laught them to scorn that have prest either of these , & after the parliament dissolved , took the money of the treasurers of the parliament and recalled & restored the officers discharged , or else they have been contented , that some such persons should be removed at the request of the whole kingdom , which they themselves out of their noble natures , would not seem willing to remove . couns. well sir , would you notwithstanding all these arguments advise his majesty to call a parliament ? iust . it belongs to your lordships who enjoy the kings favour , & are chosen for your able wisedome to advise the k. it were a strange boldnesse in a poor and private person , to advise kings , attended with so understanding a councell . but be like your lorpships have conceived some other way , how money may be gotten otherwise . if any trouble should happen , your lordship knows , that then there were nothing so dangerous for a k as to be without money : a parliament cannot assemble in haste , but present dangers require hasty remedies . it will be no time then to discontent the subjects by using any unordinary wayes . couns. well sir , all this notwithstanding we dare not advise the king to call a parliament , for if it should succeed ill , we that advise , should fall into the kings disgrace . and if the king be driven into any extremity , we can say to the king that because we found it extremely unpleasing to his majesty to hear of a parliament , we thought it no good manners to make such a motion . iust . my lord , to the first let me tell you , that there was never any just prince that hath taken any advantage of the successe of councels , which have been founded on reason , to fear that , were to fear the losse of the bell , more then the losse of the steeple , and were also the way to beat all men from the studies of the kings service . but for the second , where you say you can excuse your selves upon the kings own protesting against a parliament , the king upon better consideration may encounter that fineness of yours . couns. how i pray you ? iust . even by declaring himself to be indifferent , by calling your lordships together , and by delivering unto you that he heares how his loving subjects in generall are willing to supply him , if it please him to call a parliament , for that was the common answer to all the sheriffes in england , when the late benevolence was commanded . in which respect , and because you come short in all your projects , & because it is a thing most dangerous for a king to be without treasure , he requires such of you , as either mislike , or rather fear a parliment , to set down your reasous in writing , which you either mislike , or feared it . and such as with and desire it , to set down answers to your objections : and so shall the king prevent the calling or not calling on his majesty , as some of your great councellers have done in many other things shrinking up their shoulders , and saying , the k. will have it so . couns. well sir , it grows late , & i will bid you farewell , onely you shall take well with you this advice of mine , that in all that you have said against our greatest , those men in the end shall be your iudges in their own cause , you that trouble your self with reformation ; are like to be well rewarded hereof you may assure your self , that we will never allow of any invention how profitable soever , unlesse it proceed , or seem to proceed from our selves . iust . if then my lord , we may presume to say that princes may be unhappy in any thing , certainly they are unhappy in nothing more then in suffering themselves to be so inclosed . again , if we may believe pliny , who tels us , that 't is an ill signe of prosperity in any kingdome or state , where such as deserve well , find no other recompence then the contentment of their own conseiences , a farre worse signe is it where the justly accused shall take revenge of the just accuser . but my good lord , there is this hope remaining , that seeing he hath been abused by them he trusted most , he will not for the future dishonour of his judgement ( so well informed by his own experience ) as to expose such of his vassals as have had no other motives to serve him , then simply the love of his person and his estate ) to their revenge , who have onely been moved by the love of their own fortunes , and their glory . couns. but good sir , the king hath not been deceived by all . iust . no my lord , neither have all been trusted , neither doth the world accuse all , but believe , that there be among your lordships very just and worthy men , aswell of the nobility as others , but those though most honoured in the common-wealth , yet have not been most imployed : your lordship knows it well enough , that three or 4 of your lordships have thought your hands strong enough to beat up alone the weightiest affairs in the commonwealth , and strong enough , all the land have found them to beat down whom they pleased . couns. i understand you , but how shall it appear that they have onely sought themselves . iust . there needs no perspective glasse to discern it , for neither in the treaties of peace and warre , in matters of revenue , and matters of trade , any thing hath hapned either of love or of judgement . no my lord , there is not any one action of theirs eminent , great or small , the greatnesse of themselves onely excepted . co. it is all one , your papers can neither answer nor reply , we can . besides you tell the king no news in delivering these complaints , for he knows as much as can be told him . iust . for the first my lord , whereas he hath once the reasons of things delivered him , your lordships shall need to be well advised , in their answers there is no sophistry will serve the turn , where the iudge , & the understanding are both supreme . for the second , to say that his majesty knows , and cares not , that my lord were but to despaire all his faithfull subjects . but by your favour my lord , we see it is contrary , we find now that there is no such singular power as there hath been , iustice is described with a balance in her hand , holding it even , and it hangs as even now as ever it did in any kings dayes , for singular authority begets but generall oppression . couns. howsoever it be , that 's nothing to you , that gave no interest in the kings favour , nor perchance in his opinion , and concerning such a one , the misliking , or but misconceiving of any one hard word , phrase , or sentence , will give argument to the king either to condemne or reject the whole discourse . and howsoever his majesty may neglect your informations , you may be sure that others ( at whom you point will not neglect their revenges , you will therefore confesse it ( when it is too late ) that you are exceeding sory that you have not followed my advise . remember cardinall woolsey , who lost all men for the kings service , & when their malice ( whom he grieved ) had out-lived the kings affection , you know what became of him as vvell as i. iust . yea , my lord , i know it well , that malice hath a longer life , than either love or thankfulnesse hath , for as we alwaies take more care to put off pain , than to enjoy pleasure , because the one hath no intermission , & with the other we are often satisfied , so it is in the smart of iniury & the memory of good turns : wrongs are written in marble : benefits are ( sometimes ) acknowledged , rarely requited . but my lord , we shall do the k. great wrong , to judge him by common rules , or ordinary examples , for seeing his majesty hath greatly enriched and advanced those that have but pretended his service , no man needs to doubt of his goodnesse towards those that shall performe any thing worthy reward . nay , the not taking knowledge of those of his own vassals that have done him wrong , is more to be lamented , than the relinquishing of those that do him right , is to be supected . i am therefore , my good lo : held to my resolution by these 2 , besides the former . the 1 , that god would never have blest him with so many years , and in so many actions , yea in all his actions , had he paid his honest servants with evill for good . the 2d . where your lordship tels me , that i will be sorry for not following your advice , i pray your lordship to believe , that i am no way subject to the common sorrowing of worldly men , this maxime of plato being true , dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus nascuntur . but for my body , my mind values it at nothing . couns. what is it then you hope for or seek ? iust . neither riches , nor honour , or thanks , but i onely to seek to satisfie his majesty ( which i would have been glad to have done in matters of more importance that i have lived and will die an honest man. finis . the authors epitaph , made by himself . even such is time , which takes in wast our youth , and ioy 's , and all we have , and payes us but with age and dust , which be the dark and silent grave , when we have wandred all our wayes , struts up the story of our dayes : and from which earth and grave , & dust , the lord shall raise me up i trust . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a57532-e1580 chief . other degrees . other degrees . notes for div a57532-e14260 seeing . touching . hearing . smelling . tasting . notes for div a57532-e15050 situation for safety & plenty . multitude of inhabitants . religigion . academies . courts of justice . artificers . privledge . the first devises of rome to allure strangers as is sanctuarie . triumps notes for div a57532-e16210 huband men . merchant . gentry . notes for div a57532-e20760 two things s● w. raleigh accused of . effata regalia. aphorismes [brace] divine, moral, politick. scattered in the books, speeches, letters, &c. of charles the first, king of great brittain, &c. / now faithfully collected and published by richard watson, fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge. charles i, king of england, 1600-1649. 1661 approx. 456 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 251 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2008-09 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a78780 wing c2302 thomason e1843_1 estc r204018 99863750 99863750 115964 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a78780) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 115964) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; 230:e1843[1]) effata regalia. aphorismes [brace] divine, moral, politick. scattered in the books, speeches, letters, &c. of charles the first, king of great brittain, &c. / now faithfully collected and published by richard watson, fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge. charles i, king of england, 1600-1649. watson, richard, 1612-1685. [36], 106 [i.e. 306], [14], 217-299, [5], 301-354, [6] p. printed for robert horn at the turks head near the royal exchange, london, : 1661. the words "divine, .. politick." are bracketed together on title page. "icon animæ basilicæ" and "caroli imi monita & observata britannica" each have separate dated title page; pagination and register are continuous. first p. 306 misnumbered 106. the last three leaves are blank. reproduction of the original in the british library. 1. effata regalia -2. icon animæ bsilicæ [sic] -3. monita & observata britannica. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to 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if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng charles -i, -king of england, 1600-1649 -early works to 1800. political science -quotations, maxims, etc. -early works to 1800. christian life -quotations, maxims,etc -early works to 1800. 2007-04 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2007-04 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2007-05 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2007-05 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion effata regalia . aphorismes divine , moral , politick . scattered in the books , speeches , letters , &c. of charles the first , king of great brittain , &c. now faithfully collected and published by richard watson , fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge . quid utilius potui , quam tot sententias in unum conducere , pulcras , acres , & itame salus amet , ad salutem natas generis humani ? j. lips . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . simplic . in epictel . london , printed for robert horn at the turks head near the royal exchange 1661. 1. effata regalia . 2. icon animae bsilicae . 3. monita & observata britannica . to the right honourable and most noble lord wentworth , earl of kildare , &c. my lord , i cannot forget , nor yet forbear gratefully to recognizance that most kind and noble violence your lordship vouchsaf'd to practise upon me in a foreign country , where the guilt of many years undeserved exile had rendred me morosely jealous of all that had more lately breathed in english air ; and the conscience of discharging faithfully my duty in that trust , which with much affection , and obligation , was committed to me , had made me somewhat obstinate in my retirement , and half a separatist from conversation , what honour or advantage soever might be obtained by it , until your lordships more than gracious condescention had rais'd my blush at what before i esteem'd my vertue ; and your more than peremptory commands forced me to the honourable fruition of that happiness , whereof i should have been most ambitious , in a near aquaintance with your excellencies , such as i confess unfeignedly , i more admired upon my experience , and infallible observation , than i could have credited upon the most authentick character might have been given me by any whom your lordship earlier admitted to that discovery which had no veil : all which , though i must not here enumerate to affected minutes ; nor wind up , though without slattery , to the strain of reproach ▪ yet there are three i shall not omit to instance , if to no other purpose , at least ( which implies no doubt ) to oblige your lordship to perseverance , the apostasie from each being no less desperate , than frequent ; and that from one or two , sometime so countenanced or rewarded , as it has almost the impudence to plead merit , which should beg a pardon ; and to expect to have what should be most abhorred , and detested , either imitated , or commended . the first , my lord , was your conscientious and earnest care to be better satisfied in the grounds and reason of that religion , which you did , and were most inclinable to profess , and practise , when most persecuted and depressed ; and , this effected , your humble and obsequious resignation to the canon of our church , and that in some particulars , wherein few persons , ever prejudiced , have been counselable ; and such as were not , thought unnecessary ▪ or , because of desuetude , improper to be observed . the second , was your lordships generous and loyal resolution , in a time difficult to be taken , and no less dangerous to be owned , to adventure life , upon any reasonable and justifiable occasion at an age , but then mature for the gust of worldly pleasures ; and a noble estate , into the possession whereof you were but newly entered , whensoever both , or either , might be hop'd effectual toward the restitution of your banished , and every way injured king ; wherein although your lordship are most happily prevented by the powerfull hand of heaven , which , without humane assistance , has over-rul'd the change ; and , by some sweeter influence than that of a mar●ial star , hath softened the most obdurate hearts of aged rebels to a capacity of peace , and the impression of allegiance to their prince that brought it home to their doors , with so much clemency , and such munificence , as scarcely has been , or ere will be parallel'd , if posterity should play the wanton in bloud for the like reward : yet i cannot but erect upon that sincerity of your intention ( which i humbly crave your leave , without arrogance , thus publickly to attest ) a monument of honour to your lordships name and person , unto which i wish all the indulgence of royal favour , that can be expected , or may be hoped from him , who is more likely to be endowed with power , and plenty , answerable to the greater objects he has for royal bounty , and more causes for sumptuous magnificence and state , than ever had any of our preceding britannike kings . the third was your most intent and affectionate endeavour ( in the privacy you could possibly reconcile to the eminence of your honour , and the importunity of that nation ) to recover what the malignity of times , accompanied with an inveigling discouragement to all select and exquisite studies , had in part deprived you of , and wherein you had been prevented , to improve your knowledg to a degree worthy your high birth and fortune , and necessary to the future interest you may have in affairs of state , and regency of your country : unto which by the ascendent promptness of your lordships parts , and faculties , such your quickness of apprehension , variety of fancy , solidity of judgment , tenacity of memory , and all else that nature could furnish ( as if in design ) you might easily have attained , and may yet , the sphear of science you have in your aim , if your engagements otherwise could leave you free for that steady method , and those early hours , which you were prone , my lord , most exemplarily to observe , as also for the choyce of a person qualified with learning , loyalty , prudence , and integrity , for that your lordships service and assistance , and such a one , whensoever you find him , i dare assure , will be as much obliged by the singular ingenuity and peculiar sweetness of your lordships disposition ; as by the nobleness of your entertainment , to advance your purpose . for so much , or so little , as you were pleas'd , my lord , to make me concerned in it , when you found me otherwise imploy'd abroad , i confess i never was more satisfied in any thing of like nature , than when i could suggest at any time what won upon your opinion , or would be of improvement to your studies in the use . nor was i thus affected only while your stay was on the other side ; but easily induced to promise , and earnest enough to performe , some part of the same duty after your lordships departure thence . the collection i at present dedicate with much assurance , unto your honour , i am not now to certifie you , was first attempted , in compliance with your lordships kindness for such maximes , and corollaries , and sententious brevets , which by ordinary observation , and less considerable essayes , i had sufficiently discovered : and when you please to remember how much you expressed your self transported with the first sheets i sent you over , you will not wonder that the little manual , i first intended , is become a volume ; that i have reviewed and passed beyond the principal book , to a general survey of all the writings i hear of published in the name of that most wise , and now , indeed , by the merit of his intellectual , and moral ; christian , and regal ; active and passive vertues , most glorious king. the benefit i mean you by it , my lord , is not only the too-late-admiring the superexcellency of that royal soul , which was the casket of such jewels , the treasury of such divine and humane wisdom , as if he had been heir of all the concealed riches of this sort , that had been amass'd for solomon , or since for the whole succession of emperours among the greeks ; nor to give you some short diversion between the periods of your studies , or stages of your lordships most serious and urgent business ; but your modelling and forming by it , at your choicest and severest hours , a christian canon both for a practick and contemplative holy life ; a litle rationale of the doctrine and discipline of that church , into the communion whereof , ( after an unavoidable conflict , and intrinsic contestation , with the importunity of presbyterian , independent , anabaptistical , and other fallacies , the principles of all which sects and heresies had been for many years lowdly sounded by the trumpet of a bloudy rebellion in your lordships ears ) with how much devout affection , with what profess'd satisfaction , and resolution you know , you enter'd ; the best exemplar and fairest copy that was ere presented unto the princes , and great peers of the world , for regulating their councels , words , and actions , by conscience , reason , honour ; for your abominating all sacriledg , as that which would be the cancer no less of your soul , than your estate ; chusing rather , if put upon it , to part with your inheritance , than with so much breath as may form your vote to the prophaning and sequestring , what the religious charity of your ancestors dedicated to pious uses ; of adhering inseparably to the holy order of episcopacy , never questioned by any , but such wretches , as had desperately plunged themselves into either heresie , schisme , sacriledg , or rebellion ; a caveat , never to make the counterfeit of religious zeal , serve the purpose of ambition ; nor to torture your king's conscience , under a pretence to ease your own ; a monitory , how much the prudence of nobles may fix a due temperament in the commons , as likewise how their chief interest consists in their fidelity to the crown , not in their ignoble compliance with any factious party of the people . a perpetual memorial of the affronts and injuries done to so excellent a king , no otherwise now to be repaired and recompensated , than by paying and exacting all possible duty and allegiance , accumulating all honour , and state , and wealth , that each one can contribute to his royal successour , who , it may be hoped , will persevere in the happy government of his nations , according to the incomparable maxims of piety and policy , that are scattered in those sacred oracular books and papers , composed not according to plato's ideas , or other speculative conceits and fancies , but out of divine emanations , by what means , in what manner , instilled , need not be enquired ; out of the various alternate experiments of a flourishing and fading condition , a calm and stormy season of his reign ; a quiet , and scrupulous , a self-clearing , and sometimes , a self-condemning , disposition of conscience ; the sense of love and loyalty from some , of rebellion and malice from other of his subjects ; the several events from prudent results , and mistakes , in his councel ; the flattery and folly , the sincerity and sapience , in the diversity of his nobles ; the learning and ignorance , zeal and moderation , luke-warmness and absolute coldness , in his clergy ; the steady resolution and giddiness of his commons ; the courage and cowardise , the conscientious care and negligence of his s●ldiers ; the liberty and restraint , the entredeux or state of indifference , such as may be call'd the royal durance , or free imprisonment of his person ; the apprehensions of a violent death , and hope of a kind reconciling deliverance ; finally , such variety of all sorts in himself and others , that were , or should have been under his majesties dominion , that no prince of like natural endowments , of so just and pious inclinations , had such religious , civil , and military advantages , to raise such a fabrick of policy and religion , such a structure of lawes and counsells , of secur'd assertions , and weigh'd experiments , as by which not only the princes and people of our age , at whose ports and palaces the rumours and terrours of our troubles have arriv'd ; but all posterity may prevent , if they please to regard and practise whatsoever misery and mischief the infernal spirits of discord and confusion , may intend them . all these , my lord , and many more ( which i leave to your own discovery ) being the natural issue of emolument from the book ; my advice is , that you would improve and multiply them in each particular , by your lordships reading , and hearing , and observing , applying to each oracle or apharism , here presented , whatsoever may occur , relating with any significancy , unto it , whether in ancient or modern history ; in the policy of our own or other nations ; in the relations and discourses of wise and understanding men ; in the practises right or wrong , of any whomsoever your lordship may have reason and opportunity to regard . this done , my lord , and ought else your lordship may see necessary , if after some few years resolution , i have the honour to kiss your hand , i shall expect , with much confidence , your lordships thanks , which i desire not before you shall have reapt the profit of my pains ; and become sensible of the service done you by this collection ( how affectedly indigested soere it be ) toward the regulating your life ; whether in publick imployment , or private conversation ; toward the confirming you in the still-opposed , still undermined , religion of our church ; toward your conduct of any government , or command , you may have in your country , and your influence upon the well or ill-affected people there ; toward the honour may be , i hope , conferred upon you , for promoting the interest of the crown to the very uttermost extent and efficacy of your own : and after all , above all toward your reward in heaven , for your devotion to god , and fidelity to your king , which no man wisheth you , with more affectionate unfeigned zeal , than , my lord , your lordships most humble servant . richard watson . from my friends lodgings , in doctor 's commons . february 21. 1660 . -61 . to the reader . friend , having in my epistle dedicatory shewed at large the worth and use of the ensuing book , i have the less wherewith to trouble you , if that it self do not , before you read it . for although you see the design was laid in order to the private benefit and satisfaction of the noble lord , to whom addressed : yet since it becomes thus publick , i shall plainly tell you , that the common neglect i discovered ( and is by the booksellers themselves confessed ) of the most excellent piece that ever passed a monarch's pen , was a principal incentive to me , to put it again , thus trasformed , upon the world. alas ! it may easily enough be judged what has brought the original , and with whom , into disrepute ; the cry of blood is lowd , and summons the least guilt de profundis , from the depth of conscience , though the very centre , to a sentence upon it self , and what an unsufferable torture 't is , either to look upon the lively pourtraicture of that king , or hear him speak , though but in his papers , whom with axe , or pen , or tongue , or wishfull thought , they murder'd ; or negatively in not detesting , not decrying , not invective-writing , not preventive-acting , were accessory in the least degree , they alone that committed the fault , and feel the pain , can truly tell . this courtesie i have therefore done them , who would needs turn away from the salve , because it signifies they have a sore ; they are hereby no more concerned , as to what is past , than any of the antipodes , under the government of a king. the aphorismes are general , and applicable to any kingdom ; in many of which those subjects that mean to act , may read their duty , and they that do not , may expect their doom . i at first had done as simplicius saith arrian had , with those of epictetus , collected only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the most seasonable , the most necessary , and the most motive , or operative upon the minds of men ; wherewith being so much affected , i thought the book very well worth review , as loth to leave ought behind that might have the like efficacy by the sense , though not altogether the same acuteness in the conceipt , nor elegance in the language : by which gleaning , or recollection , i recover'd many as fair and full eares as those i had before bound up in the sheaf , many aphorismes no less considerable , no less deserving an intent regard . some others if you find coincident with those of the first rank , as some you will , i pray know that the same passed me not unobserved , but having some difference in expression , though little or none in sense , they were ad led the more to oblige you , and to effect that prevalency upon you , which your hast from the former might not admit . such ( if any such there be ) as may seem flat and ordinary , they are to be set to my account , who confess my self so indulgent in my reverence of the royal authour , that nothing of his could fall so low in my esteem . others , that are not many , but borrowed , and made english , i have entituled to the high translatour , whose authority gives more weight to 'em , and more they penetrate press'd by him. in sententiâ ut penetret , valde facit robustae alicujus , & receptae auctoritatis pondus . that all were not reduc'd to heads , and ranged under common places , has reason , such as i think not fit to be mention'd here : you may know that the learned grotius ( who was wont neither to spare , nor to lose his pains ) has done the like in a greater volume . as it is , if you be not more curious , than obsequious , in what concerns you either to know , or practise , you will have for what to thank me , who confirm you in your religion and loyalty , or lead you gently to it by a royal hand . i have one thing more to require of you , that you make not too much hast to censure me , for imposing that upon you , as his majesty's , which may appear compos'd by me : some such aphorismes indeed there are , for which some little change , the inserting of some few words , was necessary to give them as well the form , as force , of rules , or dictates ; in which if you take no less pains to justifie , than i did to avoid , your censure , you will find it frustrate , and me guilty of nought but more endeavours , than you have desires , for your own advantage , wherewith i wish you well . a table shewing where the centuries begin . cent. 1 beginneth pag. 1 cent. 2 beginneth pag. 22 cent. 3 beginneth pag. 44 cent. 4 beginneth pag. 67 cent. 5 beginneth pag. 87 cent. 6 beginneth pag. 110 cent. 7 beginneth pag. 138 cent. 8 beginneth pag. 161 cent. 9 beginneth pag. 194 cent. 10 beginneth pag. 231 cent. 11 beginneth pag. 265 cent. 12 beginneth pag. 293 effata regalia . the first century . 1. the weight of reason will counterpoise the overballancings of any factions . 2. the gravity and discretion of gentlemen may alay and fix the commons to a due temperament . 3 the interest of a king and his children give him many obligations to seek and preserve the love and welfare of his subjects . 4 the love and welfare of subjects is the only temporal blessing left to the ambition of just monarchs as their greatest honour and safety , next gods protection . 5 wherein a king lessens his prerogative , he may gain a recompence in the affections of his subjects . 6 no flames of civil dissentions are more dangerous , then those which make religious pretensions ground of factions . 7 kings should not suffer their own judgments to be overborn more by others importunities , then their arguments . 8 the great abilities of lords may make a prince more afraid , then ashamed , to employ them in the greatest affairs of state. 9 officers of state , moving in an high sphere , and with a vigorous lustre , must needs raise many envious exhalations , capable to cast a cloud upon their brightest merit and integrity . 10 between a kings unsatisfiedness in himself , and a seeming necessity of satisfying the importunity of some people , it discovers more a fear of men then of god , to prefer what is safe , before what seemeth just . 11 a king is not to prefer the outward peace of his kingdoms with men , to the inward exactness of conscience before god. 12 it is a bad exchange , for a king to wound his own conscience , thereby to salve state-sores ; to calm the stormes of popular discontents , by stirring up a tempest in his own bosom . 13 there is a fallacy in that maxime , better one man perish though unjustly ) then the people be displeased or destroyed . 14 ' the best rule of policy is , to prefer the doing of justice before all enjoyments , and the peace of conscience , before the preservation of kingdoms . 15 many are terrified by tumults to concurre with the condemning party , rather then satisfied , that of right they ought so to do . 16 a king ought to be more afraid to take away a mans life unjustly then to lose his own . 17 suspicions , not raised out of malice , are not in reason to be smothered . 18 no present impunity , or popular vindication , will be subterfuge to men guilty of evil machinations , sufficient to rescue them from the exact tribunals of god and their own consciences . 19 there is an after unavoidable judgment which shal rejudg what among men is but corruptly decided , or give the final sentence , if not at all . 20 it is a better resolution , rather to bear repulse with patience , then to use hazardous extremities . 21 it is one of the most convincing arguments , that there is a god , while his power sets bounds to the raging of the sea : and no less , that he restrains the madness of the people . 22 nothing port ends more gods displeasur against a nation , then when he suffers the confluence and clamors of the vulgar to pass all boundaries of lawes and reverence to authoritie . 23 nothing more to be feared , and less to be used by wise men , then tumultuary confluxes of meane and rude people , who are taught , first to petition , then to protest , then to dictate , at last to command and over-awe . 24 whoever hath most mind to bring forth confusion and ruin upon a church and state , useth the midwifery of the peoples tumults . 25 what good man had not rather want any thing he most desires then to obtain it by unlawful and irreligious means . 26 mens passions , and gods directions seldom agree . 27 violent designs and motions must have sutable engines : such as too much attend their owne ends , seldom confine themselves to gods means . 28 force must crowd in , what reason will not lead . 29 it is no strange thing for the sea to rage , when strong winds blow upon it ; nor for multitudes to become insolent , when they have men of some reputation for parts and piety to set them on . 30 such is some mens stupid tie , that they fear no inconvenience . 31 such is some mens petulancy that they joy to see their betters shamefully outraged and abused , while they know their owne security consists in vulgar s●attery . 32 a kings withdrawing , may give time for the ebbing of tumultuous fury , and others regaining some degrees of modesty and sober sense . 33 it is a hardiness beyond true valour , for a wise man to set himselfe against the breaking in of a sea . 34 a gallant man had rather ●ight to great disadvantages for number and place in the field , in an orderly way , then shuffle with an undisciplined rabble . 35 it is safest to withdraw from the daily baitings of tumults , not knowing whether their fury and discontent may not flie so high as ●● worry and tear those in pieces whom as yet they but play with in their pawes . 36 a king is not bound to prostitute the majestie of his place and person , the safety of his queen and children to those who are prone to insult most , when they have objects and opportunities most capable of their rudeness and petulancy . 37 the just avenger of all disorders many times makes men and cities see their sinn● in the glass of their punishment . 38 it is more then an even lay , that men may one day see themselvs punished by that way they offended . 39 as swine are to gardens and orderly plantations , so are tumults to parliaments , and plebeian concourses to publick councels turning all into disorders and sordid confusions . 40 god orders our disorders , and magnifies his wisdom most , when our follies and miseries are most discovered . 41 such is some mens activity , that they will needs make work rather then want it ; and chuse to be doing amisse , rather then do nothing . 42 good subjects will never think it just or fit , that their kings condition should be worse by his bettering theirs . 43 some men know not so well with moderation to use , as with earnestness to desire advantages of doing good or evil . 44 the kings interest lies more then any mans in the due execuexecution and vigour of preserved laws . 45 a king ought not to desire more then the law gives him , and less the meanest subject should not have . 46 it is ingratitude , unworthy of honour , that the more is granted them by their king , the less he should have and enjoy with them . 47 a king may count himselfe undiminished by his largest concessions , if by them he gains and confirms the love of his people . 48 the peoples love may increase toward their king , as they have more leisure , and lesse prejudice . 49 people may be miserable in this only , that some mens ambition will not give them leave to enjoy what their king intends for their good . 50 a king may be mistaken when perswaded , that he cannot grant too much , or distrust too little , to men that being professedly his subjects , pretend singular piety , and religious strictness . 51 it argues a very short sight of things , and extreme fatuity of mind in a king , to bind his owne hands at the request of his subjects , when he shortly meanes to use a sword against them . 52 it would be a course full of sinne , as well as of hazard , and dishonour , for a king to go about the cutting up of that by the sword , which he had lately planted to his subjects and his own content . 53 some men fear where no fear is , whose security consists in scaring others . 54 a king may repent his letting some men go up to the pinnacle of the temple , when it doth prove a temptation to them to cast him downe headlong . 55 as many kingdomes as the divel shewed our saviour , and th●● glory of them ( if they could be at once enjoyed by ambitious . people ) are not worth the gaining by wayes of sinful ingratitude and dishonor , which hazards a soul worth more worlds then this hath kingdomes . 56 it is no strange thing for men left to their own passions , either to do much evil themselves , or abuse the over-much goodnesse of others . 57 an ungrateful surfet of others goodness is the most desperate and incurable disease . 58 there may be an error in a king of too charitable a judgement , without any sinne of his will ▪ 59 a king may be sorry to see other mens eyes evil because his is good . 60 to be forced to sea by a storm unprovided of tackling and victual , is better then to venture splitting or sinking on a lee-shore . 61 some mens hydropick insatiableness is such as no fountain of royal bounty is able to overcome ; so resolved , they seem either utterly to exhaust it , or barbarously to obstruct it . 62 it ceases to be a councel , when not reason is used , as to men , to perswade ; but force and terror , as to beasts , to drive and compel men to assent to what ever tumultuary patrons shall project . 63 he deserves to be a slave without pity or redemption , that is content to have the rational soveraignty of his soul , and liberty of his will and words captivated by force and terror . 64. kingdomes are not so considerable as to preserve them with the forfeiture of that freedom which cannot be denied to a king , because it belongs to him , as a man and christian . 65 a king is to owne the dictates of none but god to be above him , as obliging him to consent . 66 better for a king to die enjoying the empire of his soul , which subjects him onely to god , so farre as by reason or religion he directs him ; then live with the title of a king , if it should carry such a vassalage with it , as not to suffer him to use his reason and conscience in what he declares as a king to like or dislike . 67 a king is not conscientiously tied to go against his conscience in consenting to such new proposals as his reason , justice , honour and religion bids him deny . 68 so tender some men are of their being subject to arbitrary government , that they care not with how much dishonour and absurdity they make their king the only man that must be subject to the will of others . 69 no man can think it other then the badge and method of slavery , by savage rudenesse , and importunate obtrusions of violence , to have the mist of his error and passion dispelled , which is a shadow of reason , and must serve those that are destitute of the substance . 70 that man cannot be blamable to god or man , who seriously endeavours to see the best reason of things , and faithfully followes what he takes for reason . 71 the uprightness of intentions will excuse the possible fallings of understanding . 72 if a pilot at sea cannot see the pole-star , it can be no fault in him to steere his course by such starres as do best appeare to him . 73 it argues those men to be concious of their defects of reason , and convincing arguments , who call in the assistance of meer force to carry on the weakness of their counsels and proposals . 74 nothing should please a king more , then when his judgment so concurres with that of his prudent subjects , as he may with a good conscience consent unto them . 75 where no absolute and moral necessity of reason , but temporary convenience in point of honour is to be considered , a king may chuse rather to deny himself then his councel , as preferring that which they think necessary for his people , before what he sees but convenient for himselfe . 76 a king should permit no man to gain his consent to that , wherein his heart gives his tongue or hand the lie . 77 a king should rather chuse to wear a crown of thorns , with his saviour , then to exchange that of gold for one of lead , whose embased flexibleness shall be forced to bend and complie to the various , and oft contrary , dictates of any factions . 78. no resolution more worthy a christian king , then to preferre his conscience before his kingdomes . 79. the meits of a deserving lady wil be her better protection from the barbaritie of savage indians , then from the subtiltie of some malicious christians . 80. all justice , so well as affection , commands a king to study the securitie of his vertuous queen , who is onely in danger for his sake . 81. a king can perish but halfe , if his queen be preserved . 82. a king , in his queenes memory , and their hopefull posterity , may survive the malice of his enemies should be satiated with his bloud . 83 as god is able to punish the faults of princes , so no less severely to revenge the injuries done to them by those who ought to have made good that safety which the lawes chiefly provide for them . 84 common civility is in vain expected from those that dispute their loyalty . 85 it cannot be safe to a king to tarry among them who are shaking hands with their allegeance , under pretence of laying faster hold on their religion . 86 't is pity the noble and peaceful foul of a queen should see , much more suffer the rudenesse of those who must make up their want of justice with inhumanity and impudence . 87 the sympathy of a queen in the afflictions of her king will make her vertues shine with greater lustre , as starres in the darkest nights ; and assure the envious world , that she loves him , not his fortunes . 88 kings need not much to blame the unkindness of the generality and vulgar , when those who have eaten of their bread , & been enriched with their bounty , have scornfully lift up themselvs against them , and those of their own houshold are become their enemies . 89 some think to satisfie all obligations to duty by their corban of religion ; and can less endure to see then to sin against their benefactors , as wel as their soveraigns . 90 no malice can banish a beloved queen from her kings heart . 91 a kings enemies may envy , but they can never deprive him of the enjoiment of her vertues , while he enjoyes himself . 92 it is among the wicked maximes of bold and disloyal undertakers , that bad actions must alwayes be seconded by worse , & rather not be begun , then not carried on : for they think the retreat more dangerous then the assault , and hate repentance more then perseverance in the fault . 93 it is the best policie , with patience to bear what one cannot remedy . 94 to be transported with no disdaine or emotion of passion in greatest injuries , is the temper that best becomes a christian , as coming nearest to the great example of christ . 95 better for a monarch to remember he is a christian then a king 96 what the height of a king tempteth to revenge , the humility of a christian teacheth to forgive . 97 what the majesty of a king might justly abhor , the charity of a christian is willing to forbear . 98 the excess of impotent passions injures a man more then his greatest enemies can . 99 apostacy unto loyalty some men account the most unpardonable sin . 100 the superstitious sowrness which some men pretend to in matters of religion , so darkens their judgment , that they cannot see any thing of sinne and rebellion in the meanes they use with intents to reform . the second century . 1 some men think all is gold of piety which doth but glister with a shew of zeale and fervencie . 2 down-right temptations of ambition have no cloak or cheat of religion to impose upon themselves or other . 3 clemency is a debt which kings ought to pay to those that crave it , when they have cause to believe they wil not after abuse it . 4 god suffers us not to pay any thing for his mercy , but only prayrs and promises . 5 the rude demeanor of a subject toward his soveraign carries alwaies its own vengeance , as an unseparable shadow with it . 6 those oft prove the most fatal and implacable executioners of vengeance , who were the first imployers in rebellion . 7 no punishment so stains a mans honor , as wilful perpetrations of unworthy actions . 8 posterity not engaged in the sactions of present times , have the most impartial reflections on the actions . 9 a rebellious army is but tumults listed and enrolled to a better order , but as bad an end . 10 a kings recess from tumultuous subjects , gives them considence that he may be conquered . 11 a king having a soul invincible , is sure , through gods grace , to become conqueror , when constant to fear him more than man. 12. they will oppose by force , who have not reason to convince . 13. they confess their own weakness , as to truth and justice , who chuse rather to contend by armies , then by arguments . 14 a king may be made glorious , if no other way , by his sufferings . 15 it is a hard and disputable choice for a king that loves his people and desires their love , either to kill his own subjects , or to be killed by them . 16 the hazards and miseries of civil war , are but sad fruits for a king to reap after a long , just , peaceable , plenteous and religious reign . 17 the hazards of war are equal , nor doth the cannon know any respect of persons . 18 a kings person is in vaine excepted , by a parenthesis of words , when many hands are armed against him with swords . 19. unnatural motions are often the productions of a surfeit of peace , wantonness of minds , or private discontents . 20. ambition and faction easily find , or make , causes of quarrell . 21. what seems just to one man ▪ may not seem so to another . 22. there is an instinct in all creatures to preserve themselves . 23. it hath been esteem'd delinquency in some prudent men not to be over-aw'd with tumu'ts and their patrons , nor compell'd to ab●● by their suffrages or presence the designs of those men who agitate innovations and ruine both in church and state. 24 the least hath more evil in it then the greatest affliction . 25. what is religious & apostolical , & so very sacred & divine , is not to be dispensed with , or destroyed , when what is only of civil favour and priviledg of honor , granted to men of holy order , may , with their consent who are concerned in it , be annulled . 26 the noise and shew of piety , and heat for reformation and religion , may easily so fil men with prejudice , that all equality and clearnesse of judgement may be obstructed . 27 a kings innocency and unpreparedness to assert his rights and honours , makes him the more guilty in the esteem of disloyal subjects . 28 prayers and tears , the chiefest armies of the ancient christians , may setve a good mans turn , if not to conquer , as a souldier , yet to suffer as a martyr . 29 he that made the greedy ravens to be elias caterers , may also make rebells surprisall of outward force and defence , an opportunity to shew their king the speciall support of his power and protection . 30 what a pious king wants in the hands of force and power , he hath in the wings of faith and prayer . 31 the surfeit of too much power , which some men greedily seize on , may make a commonwealth sick both of it and them , when they cannot well digest it . 32 soveraigne power in subjects seldom agrees with the stomachs of fellow-subjects . 33 a king having the sole actual disposing of the militia , can not protect his people further then they protect him and themselves . 34 the use of the militia is mutuall betweene king and people . 35. such is the violence and fraud of some men , that being conscious to their own evill merits and designes , they will needs perswade the world , that none but wolves are fit to be trusted with the custody of the shepheard and his flock . 36. it can be secure neither for king nor subject , if both be not in such a way as the law hath entrusted the publick safety and wellfare . 37. all law is at last resolved to the just and necessary rights of the crown in point of power , while thereby it is best protected . 38. the honour and justice due to a kings successours forbid him to yeild to an alienation of power from them . 39. although a king may be content to eclipse his own beames , to satisfie their feares , who think they must needs be scorched or blinded if he should shine in the full lustre of kingly power : yet he ought never to consent to put out the sun of soveraignty to all posterity and succeeding kings . 40. the many-headed hydra of government , as it makes a shew to the people to have more eyes to foresee , so they will find it hath more mouths too , which must be satisfied . 41. in a right monarchy , counsell may be in many as the senses , but the supreme power can be but in one as the head . 42. those men are guilty of enforced perjury , who compell their king to take a new and strange way of discharging his trust by seeming to desert it , of protecting his subjects by exposing himselfe to danger or dishonour for their safety and quiet . 43. the sword and militia are but weake defenses against the stroakes of divine vengeance , which will overtake , or of mens own consciences , which alwaies attend injurious perpetrations . 44. god is able by his being with a king abundantly to compensate to him , as he did to job , what ever honour , power or liberty the caldeans , the sabeans , or the devil himselfe can deprive him of . 45 the hearts of subjects are the greatest treasure and best ammunition of a king. 46 rebels that disarme their king , and study to rob him of his subjects love , cannot deprive him of his innocence , or gods mercy , nor obstruct his way to heaven . 47 a king cannot buy his own safety and his peoples peace at too deare a rate , unlesse by parting with conscience and honour . 48 a king , rather than part with his conscience and honour , ought to chuse to be as miserable and inglorious as his enemies can make or wish him . 49. whatsoever subjects propund unto their king , ought not to be obtruded with the point of the sword , nor urged with the injuries of war. 50. when a king declares unto his subjects , he cannot yield to them without violating his conscience ; there may be some better method of peace , than by making war upon his soul. 51. when subjects require any thing of their king , they ought to offer somewhat by way of gratefull exchange of honour or requital of those favours he hath , or may yet grant them . 52. it is more princely and divine to be on the giving part . 53. the jewel of conscience is incommunicable , whose loss nothing can repair or requite . 54. a kings yielding too much , makes subjects over-confident he will deny nothing . 55. the love of truth and inward tranquillity ought to have more influence upon a king , than the love he hath of his peoples peace . 56. inward quiet of conscience ought to be dearer to a king , then his kingdome . 57. some things which a king might approve , yet in honour and policy are at some time to be denied , to some men , least he should seem not to da●e to deny any thing , and give too much encouragement to unreasonable demands or importunities . 58. for a king to bind himself to a general and implicite consent to whatever subjects shall desire or propound , were a latitude of blind obedience never expected of any freeman , not fit to be required of any man , much less of a king. 59. a king may possibly exceed any of his own subjects as much in wisdome , as he doth in place and power . 60. for a king to yield implicite consent to all , were as if sampson should have consented not only to bind his own hands , and cut off his hair , but to put out his own eyes , that the philistines might with the more safety mock and abuse him . 61. to exclude all power of denial , seems an arrogancy ill-becoming them that pretend addresses by petition . 62. it were very foolish and absurd , to ask what , another having not liberty to deny , neither hath power to grant . 63. it can be no other then extreme injury , to confine a kings reason to a necessity of granting all subjects have a mind to ask ; whose minds may be different from the soverain's , both in reason and honour ; as may be their aims , and are their qualities . 64. subjects propositions may soon prove violent oppositions , if once they gain to be necessary impositions upon the regal authority . 65. no man seeks to limit and confine his king in reason , who hath not a secret aim to share with him , or usurpe upon him in power and dominion . 66. nature , law , reason and religion , bind a king ( in the first place ) to preserve himself , without which 't is impossible to preserve his people according to his place . 67. factions in the state , and schismes in the church , get confidence by vulgar clamours , and assistance to demand , not only tolerations of themselves , but also abolition of the lawes against them , and a total extirpation of that government whose rights they made . 68. some moderate propositions are by cunning demanders used like waste paper , wherein their unreasonable ones are wrapped up , to present them somewhat more handsomely . 69. there is nothing so monstrous , which some fancies are not prone to long for . 70. they abuse themselves , who believe all good which is guilded with shews of zeal and reformation . 71. popular clamours and tumults serve to give life and strength to the infinite activity of those men , who study with all diligence and policy , to improve present distractions to their innovating designs . 72. armies of propositions , having little of judgment , reason , justice and religion , taking their rise from tumult and faction , must be backt and seconded with armies of souldiers . 73. a king is to weigh the reason and justice , not regard the number and power of contesting subjects . 74. tumults can be no other then the hounds that attend the cry and hollow of those men , who hunt after factions and private designs , to the ruine of the church and state. 75. if the straitness of a kings conscience will not give him leave to swallow down such camels as others do of sacriledg and jnjustice both to god and man , they have no more cause to quarrel with him then for this , that his throat is not so wide as theirs . 76. nothing of passion , or peevishness , or list to contradict , or vanity to shew a negative power , should have any byas upon the judgment of a king , to make him gratifie his will by denying any thing which his reason and conscience commands him not . 77. a king should not consent to more than reason , justice , honour and religion perswade him to be for gods glory , the church's good , his peoples welfare , and his own peace . 78. although many mens loyalty and prudence be terrified from giving their king that true and faithfull councell which they are able and willing to impart , and he may want ; yet none can hinder him from craving the councel of that mighty councellor , who can both suggest what is best , and incline his heart stedfastly to follow it . 79. it is no news for some subjects to fight , not only without their kings commission , but against his command and person too , yet all the while to pretend they fight by his authority , and for his safety . 80. rebels do alwayes this honour to their king , to think moderate injuries not proportionate to him , nor competent tryals either of his patience under them , or his pardon of them . 81. some with exquisite malice mix the gall and vinegar of falsity and contempt , with the cup of their kings affliction , charging him not only with untruths , but such as wherein he hath the greatest share of loss and dishonour by what is committed . 82. that king is a cyclopick monster , whom nothing will serve to eat and drink , but the flesh and bloud of his own subjects . 83. some think they cannot do well but in evil times , nor so cunningly as in laying the odium of those sad events on others , wherewith themselves are most pleased , and whereof they have been not the least occasion . 84. preposterous rigour , and unreasonable severity , may be not the least incentive that kindles and blowes up into horrid slames the sparks of discontent , which want not predisposed fewel for rebellion , where dispair being added to former discontents , and the fear of utter extirpation to wonted oppressions , it is easie to provoke to an open rebellion a people prone to break out to all exorbitant violence , by some principles of their religion , and the natural desires of liberty . 85. some men of covetous zeal , and uncharitable fury , think it a great argument of the truth of their religion , to endure no other but their own . 86. it is preposterous and unevangelical zeal , to chuse rather to use all extremities which may drive men to desperate obstinacy , than to apply moderate remedies . 87. some kind of zeal counts all mercifull moderation , lukewarmness , and had rather be cruel , than counted cold ; and is not seldome more greedy to kill the bear for his skin , than for any harm he hath done . 88. the confiscation of mens estates pleaseth some better , as being more beneficial , than the charity of saving their lives , or reforming their errours . 89. some men have better skill to let bloud , than to stanch it . 90. men prepared to misconstrue the actions of their soveraign , have more credulity to what is false and evill , than love or charity to what is true and good . 91. a king hath no judge but god above him . 92. god doth not therefore deny a kings innocence , because he is pleased so farre to try his patience , as he did his servant jobs . 93. swarms of reproaches issue out of some mens mouths and hearts , as easily as smoke or sparks do out of a furnace . 94. men conscious of their own depth of wickedness , are loath to believe any man not to be as bad as themselves . 95. it is kingly to do well , and hear ill . 96. a king ought to look upon the effusion of his subjects bloud , as exhausted out of his own veins . 97. royal bounty emboldens some men , to ask and act beyond all bounds of modesty and gratitude . 98. a king should not let any mans ingratitude , or inconstancy , make him repent of what he granted for the publick good . 99. where violence is used for innovation in religion , many feel the misery of the means , before they reap the benefit of the end . 100. it can not but seem either passion , or some self-seeking , more than true zeal , and pious discresion , for any forraign state or church to prescribe such medicine only to others , which themselves have used rather successfully than commendably . the third century . 1 the same physick in different constitutions , will have different opperations : that may kill one , which doth but cure another . 2. it is not so proper to hew out religious reformations by the sword , as to polish them by fair and equal disputations among those that are most concern'd in the differences , whom not force but reason , ought to convince . 3. mens consciences can receive little satisfaction in those points , which are maintained rather by souldiers fighting in the field , than scholars disputing in free and learned synods . 4. in matters of religion , those truths gain most on mens judgments and consciences , which are least urged with secular violence . 5. secular violence weakens truth , which prejudices , and is unreasonable to be used , till such means of rational conviction hath been applied , as leaving no excuse for ignorance , condemns mens obstinacy to deserved penalties . 6. there is too much of man , to have much of christ , when his pretended institutions are caried on , or begun , with the temptations of covetousness or ambition . 7. wise and learned men think , that nothing hath more marks of schisme and sectarisme than the presbyterian way . 8. a king is not to repeal the laws & constitutions of the church till he sees more rational and religious motives than soldiers use to carry in their knapsacks . 9. a king ought to esteem the church above the state , the glory of christ above his own , and the salvation of mens souls , above the preservation of their bodies and estates . 10. no men may , without sin and presumption , forcibly endeavour to cast the churches under their kings care and tuition into the moulds they have fancied and fashioned to their designs , till they have first gained his consent , and resolved both his and other mens consciences by the strength of their reasons . 11. violent motions , which are neither manly , christian , nor loyall , should neither ●●ake nor settle the religion of king or subject , who knowes what religion means . 12. the proper engine of faction is force . 13. force is the arbitratour of beasts , not of reasonable men , much less of humble christians and loyal subjects in matter of religion . 14. men are prone to have such high conceits of themselves , that they care not what cost they lay out upon their opinions , especially those that have some temptation of gain to recompence their losses and hazards . 15. men jealous of the justifiableness of their doings and designs before god , never think they have humane strength enough to carry their work on , seem it never so plausible to the people . 16. what can not be justified in law or religion , had need be fortified with power . 17. such is the inconstancy that attends all minds engaged in violent motion , that whom some of them one while earnestly invite to come into their assistance , others of them soon after are weary of , and with nauseating cast them out . 18. much of gods justice , and mans folly , will at length be discovered through all the filmes and pretensions of religion , in which politicians wrap up their designs . 19. in vain do men hope , to build their piety on the ruins of loyalty . 20. neither those considerations nor disigns , can be durable , when subjects make bankrupt of their allegeance , under pretence of setting up a quicker trade for religion . 21. all reason and policy will teach , that the chief interest of subjects consist's in their fidelity to the crown , not in their serviceableness to any party of the people , to the neglect and betraying of their kings safety and honour , for their own advantages . 22. the less cause a king hath to trust men , the more should he apply himself to god. 23. it is hard for men to be engaged by no less than swearing for or against those things , which are of no clear morall necessity , but very disputable . 24. in points disputable the application of oaths can hardly be made , and enjoined , with that judgment and certainty in one's self , or that charity and candour to others of different opinion , as religion requires . 25. religion never refuses fair and aequable deliberations , yea , and dissentions too , in matters only probable . 26. the enjoining of oaths upon people must needs , in things doubtfull , be dangerous , as , in things unlawfull , damnable and no less superfluous , where former religious and legal engagements bound men sufficiently to all necessary duties . ; 27. ambitious minds never think they have laid snares and ginnes enough , to catch and hold the vulgar credulity . 28. by politick and seemingly pious stratagems of oaths , ambitious minds think to keep the populacy fast to their party under the terrour of perjury . 29. after-contracts devised , and imposed , by a few men , in a declared party , without the kings consent , without power or precedent from god's or man's lawes , can never be thought by judicious men , sufficient either to absolve , or slacken , the moral and eternal bonds of duty , which lye upon all subjects consciences , both to god and their king. 30. ambiguous , dangerous and authorized novelties , are not to be preferred before known and sworn duties , which are dispensable , both to god and king. 31. later vowes , oaths , or leagues , can never blot out the former gravings and characters , which by just and lawfull oaths have been made upon the souls of men . 32. considerations , by way of solemn leagues and covenants , are the common roads used in all factious and powerfull perturbations of state or church . 33. formalities of extraordinary zeal and piety are never more studied ond elaborate , than when politicians most agitate desperate designs against all that is setled or sacred in religion and lawes . 34. religion and lawes with the scrues of cunning politicians , are wrested by secret steps , and less sensible degrees , from their known rule , and wonted practise , to comply with the humors of those men , who aim to subdue all to their own will and power , under the disguises of holy combinations . 35. the cords and wit hs of solemn leagues and covenants , ( framed more out of policy than piety ) will hold mens consciences no longer than force attends and twists them . 36. every man soon growes his own pope , and easily absolves himself of those ties , which not the commands of god's word , or the lawes of the land , but only the subtilty and terrour of a party casts upon him . 37. illegall wayes of covenanting , seldom or never intend the engaging men more to duties , but to parties . 38. it is not regarded how men keep covenants in point of piety pretended , provided they adhaere firmly to the party and design intended . 39. imposers of politick covenants make them like manna , agreable to every mans palate and rellish who will but swallow them . 40. naboth's vineyard made him the only blasphemer of his city , and fit to dye . 41. while the breath of religion fills the sails , profit is the compass , by which factious men steer their course in all seditious commotions . 42. church-lands and revenues , issuing chiefly from the crown , are held of it , and legally can revert only to the crown , with the kings consent . 43. no necessity should drive a king to invade or sell the priests lands , which both pharaohs divinity , and josephs true piety abhorr'd to do . 44. it is unjust both in the eye of reason and religion , to deprive the most sacred employment of all due incouragements , and like hard-harted phara●h , to withdraw the straw and increase the task . 45. some pursue the oppressed church to the red sea of a civil war , where nothing but a miracle can save it . 46. a christian king ought to esteem it his greatest title to be call'd , and his chiefest glory to be the defender of the church , both in its true faith , and its just fruitions , equally abhorring sacriledge and apostacy . 47. a king ought rather to live on the churches almes , than violently to take the bread out of bishops and ministers mouths . 48. they are but golden calves that must be serv'd , when jeroboam consecrates the meanest of the people to be priests . 49. a king can not so much as pray god to prevent the sad consequences which will inevitably follow the parity and poverty of ministers both in church and state. because , 50. it is no less than a mo●●ing and tempting of god , to desire him to hinder those mischiefs whose occasions and remedies are in our own power . 51. there are wayes enough to repair the breaches of the state , without the ruins of the church . 52. as a king should be a restorer of the state , so not an opressour of the church , under the pretence of publick debts . 53. if a good king had not his own innocency and god's protection , it were hard for him to stand out against those stratagems and conflicts of malice , which by falsities seek to oppress the truth , and by jealousies to supply the defect of real causes , which might seem to justifie unjust engagements against him . 54. the worst effects or open hostility , come short of what is in disloyal close designs . 55. a king should more willingly lose his crown , than his credit ; nor should his kingdom be so dear to him , as his reputation and honour . 56. a good name is the embalming of princes , and a sweet consecrating of them to an eternity of love and gratitude among posterity . 57. foul and false aspersions are secret engins employed against peoples love of their king ; that undermining their opinion and value of him , his enemies and theirs may at once blow up their affections , and batter down their loyalty . 58. the detriment of a kings honor ( by calumnies ) should not be so afflictive to him , as the sin and danger of his peoples souls . 59. peoples eyes once blinded with mists of suspitions , are soon misled into the most desperate precipices of actions , wherein they do not only not consider their sin and danger , but glory in their zealous adventures . 60. mislead people imagine they then fear god most , when they least honour their king , and are most ambitious to merit the name of his destroyers . 61. a king's pity ought to be above his anger . 62. a king's passions should never prevail against himself , as to exclude his most compassionate prayers for them whom devout errours , more than their own malice have betrayed to a most religious rebellion . 63. it is a generous charity in a king , to interpret that his subjects in armes fight against his supposed errours , not his person , intending to mend him , not to end him . 64. it is somewhat above humanity in a king , not more willingly to forgive the seductions in his subjects , which occasioned their loyal injuries , then to be ambitious , by all princely merits , to redeem them from their just suspicions , and reward them for their good intentions . 65. a king should be too conscious to his own affections toward the generality of his people , to suspect theirs to him . 66. a king should never gratifie the spightfulness of a few with any sinister thoughts of their allegeance , whom pious frauds have seduced . 67. a king should never be perswaded to make so bad interpretatations of most of his subjects actions , as to judge otherwise than that possibly they may be erroneous , but not haeretical , in point of loyalty . 68. a king should have as sharp a sense of the injuries done to his subjects , as those done to himself , their well fares being inseparable . 69. seduced subjects in this suffer more than their king , that they are animated to injure at once both themselves and him . 70. a king sometimes hath such enemies among his subjects as to whose malice it is not enough that he is afflicted , unless by those whose prosperity he earnestly desires , and whose seduction he heartily deplores . 71. a king for restoring tranquility unto his people , might willingly be the jonah , if he foresees not evidently that by the divided interest of theirs and his enemies , as by contrary winds the storm of their miseries would be rather increased than allayed . 72. a king should rather prevent his peoples ruine , than rule over them . 73. a king should not be so ambitious of that dominion , which is but his right , as of his peoples happiness , if it could but expiate or countervail such a way of obtaining it , by the highest injuries of subjects committed against their soveraign . 74. a king should rather suffer all the miseries of life , and dye many deaths , than shamefully to desert , or dishonourably to betray , his own just rights and soveraignty , thereby to gratifie the ambition , or justifie the malice of his enemies . 75. a king ought to put as great a difference between the malice of his enemies , and other mens mistakes , as between an ordinary ague , and the plague ; or the itch of novelty , and the leprosie of disloyalty . 76. as liars need have good memories , so malicious persons need good inventions , that their calumnies may fit every man's fancy ; and what their reproaches want of truth , they may make up with number and shew . 77. a king should have more patience to bear , and charity to forgive , than leisure to answer , the many false aspersions which men may cast upon him . 78. it gives mens malice too much pleasure , for a king to take notice or remember what they say , or object . 79. when a king confutes calumnies , it should be more for his subjects satisfaction , than his own vindication . 80. mens evil maners , and seared consciences , will soon enough confute , and revenge , the black and false scandals which they cast upon their king. 81. rebels credit and reputation may be blasted by the breath of that same furnace of popular obliquy and detraction , which they study to heat and inflame to the highest degree of infamy , and therein seek to cast and consume their king's name and honour . 82. they are misperswaded who think these two utterly inconsistent , to be at once loyal to their king , and truly religious toward god. 83. some popular preachers think it no sin to lye for god , and what they call gods cause , cursing all that will not curse with them . 84. such men look so much at , and cry up the goodness of the end propounded , that they consider not the lawfulness of the means used , nor the depth of that mischief chiefly plotted , and intended . 85. the weakness of these mens judgments , must be made up by their clamours and activity . 86. it is a great part of some mens religion , to scandalize their king and his , thinking theirs cannot be true , if they cry not down his as false . 87. a king fights not against his own religion , who imployes subjects of different perswasions to maintain it . 88. differences of perswasion in matters of religion , may easily fall out , where there is the sameness of duty , allegeance and subjection . 79. when a king confutes calumnies , it should be more for his subjects satisfaction , than his own vindication . 80. mens evil maners , and seared consciences , will soon enough confute , and revenge , the black and false scandals which they cast upon their king. 81. rebels credit and reputation may be blasted by the breath of that same furnace of popular obliquy and detraction , which they study to heat and inflame to the highest degree of infamy , and therein seek to cast and consume their king's name and honour . 82. they are misperswaded who think these two utterly inconsistent , to be at once loyal to their king , and truly religious toward god. 83. some popular preachers think it no sin to lye for god , and what they call gods cause , cursing all that will not curse with them . 84. such men look so much at , and cry up the goodness of the end propounded , that they consider not the lawfulness of the means used , nor the depth of that misch●ef chiefly plotted , and intended . 85. the weakness of these mens judgments , must be made up by their clamours and activity . 86. it is a great part of some mens religion , to scandalize their king and his , thinking theirs cannot be true , if they cry not down his as false . 87. a king ights not against his own religion , who imployes subjects of different perswasions to maintain it . 88. differences of perswasion in matters of religion , may easily fall out , where there is the sameness of duty , allegeance and subjection . 89. different professions in point of religion , cannot take away the community of relations , either to parents , or to princes . 90. it is lawfull for a king in exigents to use the aid of any his subjects , of what perswasion soever . 91. it were a very impertinent and unseasonable scruple in a king , then to dispute the points of different beliefs in his subjects , when he is disputed with by swords points and when he needs the help of his subjects as men , no less than their prayers as christians . ; 92. the noise of a kings evil counsellers is a usefull device for those , who are impatient any mens councels but their own should be followed in church or state. 93. bold subjects give counsels more like a drench that must be forced down , than a draught which might be fairly and leisurely dran●● if their king liked it . 94. moderate men are sorry to see their king prone to injure himself out of a zeal to relieve his subjects . 95. truly humble christians will so highly prize the reward of persecutions , as rather not to be relieved , than be revenged , so as to be bereaved of that crown of christian patience , which attends humble and injur'd sufferers . 96. men are not more prone to desire liberty , than unapt to bear it in the popular sence , which is , to do what every man liketh best . 97. the divinest liberty is , to will what men should , and to do what they so will , according to reason , lawes and religion . 98. good men count the bounds of the lawes their ornament and protection , others their manacles ●● oppression . 99. it is not just that any man should expect the reward and benefit of the law , who despiseth its rule and direction . 100. he that seeks an unreasonable liberty , justly loseth his safety . the fourth century . 1. those men are the best preservers of their true liberty , who allow themselves the least licentiousness against , or beyond the lawes . 2. it is impossible chose men should be really tender of their fellow-subjects liberties , who have the hardiness to use their king with severe restraints . 3. a resolv'd king , restrain'd by subjects , will rather perish , tha● complain to those , who want nothing to compleat their mirth and triumph , but such musick . 4. conscientious tenderness attended with proud and arrogant activity , seeks to hatch every egge of different opinion to a faction or schisme . 5. lawes and scepters of monarchs should not intrench on god's soveraignty , which is the only king of mens consciences . 6. god gives no men liberty to break the law established , further than with meekness and patience they are content to suffer the penalties annexed , rather than perturb the publick peace . 7. some men , in the necessities of their fortunes , distrust gods providence , as well as their own merits . 8. never were any princes more glorious than those whom god hath suffer'd to be tried in the fornace of afflictions by their injurious subjects . 9. some men speak against their king rather what they wish , than what they believe , or know . 10. rude and scandalous pamphlets , like fire in great conflagrations , fly up and down , to set all places on like flames . 11. it is no wonder if men , not fearing god , should not honour their king. 12. god hath graven such characters of divine authority , and sacred power , upon kings , as none may , without sin , seek to blot them out . 13. from god alone , are all traditions of true glory and majesty that is in kings . 14. no news to have all innovations ushered in with the name of reformations in church and state. 15. the pride of those that study novelties , can hardly allow any share or degree of wisdom or godliness to former times . 16. for set and prescribed forms of publick prayer , there is no doubt but that wholsome words being known and fitted to mens understandings , are soonest received into their hearts , and aptest to excite and carry along with them , judicious and fervent affections . 17. constant forms of prayers are not more likely to slat and hinder the spirit of prayer and devotion , than unpraemeditated and confused variety to distract and lose it . 18. slight and easie legerdemain will serve to delude the vulgar . 19. no men are prone to be greater tyrants , and more rigorous exactors upon others to conform to their illegal novelties , than such whose pride was formerly least disposed to the obedience of lawfull constitutions , and whose licentious humours most pretended conscientious liberties . 21. it is impossible for a prince to preserve the state in quiet , unless he hath such an influence upon churchmen , and they such a dependance on him , as may best restrain the seditious exorbitancies of ministers tongues , who with the keyes of heaven , have so far the keyes of the peoples hearts , as they prevail much by the oratory to let in , or shut out both peace and loyalty . 21. the want of government is that which the church can no more dispence with in point of well-being , than the want of the word and sacrament in point of being . 22. scripture is the best rule , and the church's universal practise the best commentary of religion . 23. no frame of church-government is more agreable both to reason and religion , than that which is paternal not magisterial . 24. faction and confusion , emulations and contempts , are prone to arise among equals in power and function . 25. inconstancy is a great prejudice against novelty . 26. the stream of times , and the prevalency of parties , overpowreth the judgements of some men . 27. ministers may find as great a difference , in point of thriving , between the favour of the people , and of princes , as plants do between being watered by hand , or by the sweet and liberal dews of heaven . 28. the tenuity and contempt of clergy-men will soon let them see , what a poor carcass they are when parted from the influence of that head , to whose supremacy they have been sworn . 29. a little moderation may prevent great mischiefs . 30. discretion , without passion , might easily reform whatever the rust of times , or indulgence of lawes or corruption of manners may have brought upon the government of the church . 31. it is a gross vulgar errour , to impute , or revenge upon , functions , the faults of times or persons . 32. respect and observance , even in peacefull times , is hardly paid to any governors by the measure of their vertues , so much as by that of their estates . 33. poverty and meanness expose men in authority to the contempt of licentious minds and manners . 34. there is an innate principle of vicious oppression in all men , against those that seem to reprove , or restrain them . 34. no design or passion is to be gratified with the least perverting of truth . 36. devout minds restore to god in giving to his church and prophets , through whose hands he graciously accepts even a cup of cold water , as a libation to himself . 37. that oath may be with judgment broken , which erroneously was taken . 38. what a king thinks in his judgment best , he may not think so absolutely necessary for all places , and at all times . 39. it is far better to hold to primitive and uniform antiquity , than to comply with divided novelty . 40. the way of treaties is as a retiring from fighting like beasts , to arguing like men , whose strength should be more in their understandings than in their limbs . 41. a king may have greater confidence of his reason , than his sword. 42. it is no diminution of a king to prevent [ arming ] subjects with expresses of his desires , and importunities to treat . 43. it is an office not only of humanity , rather to use reason than force , but also of christianity , to seek peace and ensue it . 44. the events of all war , by the sword , are very dubious , and of a civil war uncomfortable ; the end hardly recompensing , and late repairing , the mischief of the means . 45. a monarch cannot part with his honour , as a king , nor with his conscience , as a christian . 46. jealousies are not so easily allayed , as they are raised . 47. some men are more afraid to retreat from violent engagements , than to engage . 48. what is wanting in equity , must be made up in pertinacy . 49. such as have little to enjoy in peace , or to lose in war [ if ill-disposed ] study to render the very name of peace odious and suspected . 50. in church affairs , a king having so many strict ties of conscience upon him , hath least liberty of prudence . 51. it argues much softness and infirmity of mind in a king , rather to part with gods truth , than man's peace and rather to lose the church's honour , than cross some mens factious humours . ; 52. some men have that height , as to interpret all fair condescendings as arguments of feebleness , and glory most in an unflexible stifness , when they see others most supple , and inclinable to them . 53. it is a grand maxime with some men , alwayes to ask their king something which in reason and honour must be denied , that they may have some colour to refuse all that is in other things granted , setting peace at as high a rate as the worst effects of war. 54. some men endeavour first to make their king destroy himself by dishonourable concessions , that so they may have the less to do . 55. the highest tide of success should not set a king above a treaty with his subjects , nor the lowest ebbe below a fight . 56. it is no sign of true valour , to be prodigal of mens lives , rather than be drawn to produce our own reasons , or subscribe to other mens . 57. what kings cannot get by their treaties , they may gain by their prayers . 58. the various successes of civil war , should afford a king variety of good meditations . 59. a kings sins sometimes prevail against the justice of his cause . 60. rebels may be punished by the prosperity which hardens them to continue that injustice by open hostility , which was begun by riotous tumults . 61. personal and private sins , may oftimes over-ballance the justice of publick engagements . 62. god accounts not every gallant man ( in the worlds esteem ) a fit instrument to assert in the way of war , a righteous cause . 63. the more men are prone to arrogate to their own skil , valour and strength , the less doth god ordinarily work by them for his own glory . 64. event of success , can never state the justice of any cause ▪ nor the peace of mens consciences , nor the eternal fate of their souls . 65. the ties of subjects to god , the church , and their king , lye upon their souls , both for obedience to , and just assistance of their soveraign . 66. they who lose their lives in a just cause , have the destruction of their bodies sanctified as a means to save their souls . 67. rebels are more afraid to encounter the many pregnant reasons , which conflict with , and accuse them in , their own thoughts , than they oft are in a desperate bravery to fight against the forces given by god to their king. 68. it is far more honourable and comfortable , to suffer for good lawes , than to prosper in their ruine and subversion . 69. the defects of piety may blast the endeavours of loyalty , when men are not as faithfull to god and their own souls , as to their king. 70. a good king , in a civil war , should never have any victory on his subjects , without his sorrow , nor , when he suffers a defeat , despair of gods mercy and defence . 71. a king should never desire such victories , as may seem to conquer , but only restore , the lawes and liberties of his people . 72. a king should wish no greater advantages by a civil war , than to bring his enemies to moderation , and his friends to peace . 73. a king should be afraid of the temptation of an absolute conquest ; and never pray more for victory over his subjects , than over himself . 74. the different events of a civil war , are but the methods of divine justice , by contrary winds to winnow us : that by punishing our sins , he might purge them from us ; and by deferring peace , he might prepare us more to prize , and better to use so great a blessing . 75. a kings conscience of his innocence may forbid him to fear a war , but the love of his kingdomes command him ( if possible ) to avoid it . 76. a king may commit an errour in giving advantages to some men , by confirming their power , which they know not to use with that modesty and gratitude as becomes their loyalty , and his confidence . 77. a king sometimes by yielding less may be opposed less , and by denying more , be more obeyed . 78. when we conquer gods patience by our sins , we are condemn'd by mutual conquerings to destroy one another in a civil war , where the most prosperous successes on either side impair the wellfare of the whole . 79. those victories are still miserable , that leave our sins nnsubdued , flushing our pride , and animating to continue injuries . 80. peace it self is not desirable , til repentance have prepared us for it . 81. when we fight more against our selves , and less against god , we shall cease fighting against one another . 82. no glory is more to be envied , than that of due reforming either church or state , when deformities are such , that the perturbation and novelty are not like to exceed the benefit of reforming . 83. the setling of religion ought to be the first rule and standard of reforming . 84. it is a great miscariage , when popular clamours and fury are allowed the reputation of zeal and the publick sense . 85. freedome , moderation , and impartiality , are the best tempers of reforming counsels and endeavours . 86. what is acted by factions , cannot but offend more than please . 87. where the scripture is not clear and punctual in precepts , there the constant and universal practise of the church , in things not contrary to reason , faith , or maners , or any positive command , is the best rule that christians can follow . 88. the vulgar are taken with novelties as children with babies , very much , but not very long . 89. if there were as much of christ's spirit , for meekness , wisdome and charity in mens hearts , as there is of his name used in the pretensions to reform all to christs , it would certainly obtain more of gods blessing , and produce more of christs glory , the churches good , the honour of religion , and the unity of christians . 90. publick reformers had need first act in private , and practise that on their own hearts , which they purpose to try on others . 91. deformities within will soon betray the pretenders of publick reformations to such private designs , as must needs hinder the publick good . 92. the right methods of reforming the church , cannot subsist with that of perturbing the civil state. 93. religion cannot be justly advanced by depressing loyalty , which is one of the chiefest ingredients and ornaments of true religion : for , next to fear god , is honour the king. 94. christ's kingdom may be set up , without pulling down the kings and men will not in impartial times appear good christians , that approve not themselves good subjects . ; 95. as good ends cannot justifie evil means , so , nor will evil beginnings ever bring forth good conclusions ; unless god by a miracle of mercy , create light out of darkness , order out of confusions , and peace out of passions . 96. the greatest experiments of virtue and nobleness are discovered in the greatest advantages against an enemy , and the greatest obligations are those which are put upon us by them , from whom we could least have expected them . 97. bees will gather honey where the spider sucks poyson . 98. subjects can hardly be happy , if their king be miserable ; or enjoy their peace and liberties , while he is oppressed . 99. a king should not only with patience bear indignities , but with charity forgive them . 100. subjects captivate their king , that allow him not the liberty of his own thoughts , and are unwilling he should follow the light of his own conscience . the fifth century . 1. it is unreasonable for subjects to expect the king should think their couns●ls good for him , who maintain a war against him . 2. prosperity gains the greatest esteem and applause among the vulgar , as adversity exposeth to their greatest slighting and disrespect . 3. good fortune is not alwayes the shadow of vertue and justice ; but oftner attends vitious and injurious actions as to this world . 4. no secular advantages seem sufficient to that cause , which begun with tumults , depends chiefly upon the reputation with the vulgar . 5. rebels think no victories so effectual to their designs , as those that most rout and wast their kings credit with his people . 6. the taking away a kings credit , is but a necessary preparation to the taking away of his life and his kingdomes . 7. it is an exquisite method of rebels cunning and cruel●y , to compel their king first to follow the funerals of his honour , and then destroy him . 8. few mens consciences are so stupid , as not to inflict upon them some secret impressions of that shame and dishonour which attends all unworthy actions , have they never so much of publick flattery and popular countenance . 9. chams curse of being servant of servants , must needs be on them , who seek by dishonourable actions to please the vulgar ; and confirm by ignoble acts , their dependance upon the people . 10. what providence denies to force , it may grant to prudence . 11. when necessity is a king's counsellor , his confidence in a rebellious people may disarm and overcome them ; and the rendring his person to them , engage their affections to him . 12. god must be a kings chiefest guard ; and his conscience both his counsellor , and his comforter . 13. no necessities should compel a king to desert his ●●●●ur , or swerve from his judg●●●● . 14. an univ●●sal confidence put in dissembling subjects , may make them ashamed not to be really such , as they ought and profess to be . 15. so various are all humane affairs , and so necessitous may the state of princes be , that their greatest danger may be in their supposed safety ; and their safety in their suposed danger . 16. a king ought not in rebellious times , to be less solicitous for his friends safety , than his own ; and he may chuse to venture himself upon further hazards , rather than expose their resolute loyalty to all extremity . 17. it is some skil in play , to know when a game is lost ; better fairly to give over , than to contest in vain . 18. a king that casts himself upon the kindness of subjects that have fought against him , must study to reinforce his judgment , and fortifie his mind with reason and religion that he may not seem to offer up his souls liberty , or make his conscience their captive . ; 19. no success should darken or disguise truth to a king , who in the greatest necessity , should no less conform his words unto his inward dictates , than if they had been , as the words of a king ought to be among loyal subjects , full of power . 20. reason is the divinest power : a king should never think himself weakned , while he may make full and free use of that . 21. no eclipse of outward fortune should rob a king of the light of reason . 22. what god denies of outward strength to a distressed king , his grace may supply with inward resolutions , not morosity to deny what is fit to be granted ; but not to grant any thing , which reason and religion bids him deny . 23. a king should never think himself less th●n himself , while he is able to preserve the integrity of his conscience , when the only jewel left him worth keeping . 24. when kings are deceiv'd in their confidence , it is but an essay which god will have them make of man's uncertainty , the more to fix them on himself , who never faileth them that trust in him . 25. though the reeds of aegypt break under the hand of him that leans on them ; yet the rock of israel will be an everlasting stay and defence . 26. when a king retires to god , he most enjoyes himself , which he loseth while he lets out his hopes to others . 27. solitude and captivity gives a king leisure enough to study the worlds vanity and inconstancy . 28. a king need not care much to be reckoned among the unfortunate , if he be not in the black list of irreligious and sacrilegious princes . 29. no restraint should ensnare a kings soul in sin , nor gain that of him which may make his enemies more insolent , his friends ashamed , or his name accursed . 30. they have no great cause to triumph , that have got a king's person into their power , whose soul remains his own . 31. should a king grant what unreasonable men desire , he should be such as they wish him , not more a king , and far less both man and christian . 32. restraint ought not to obtain that of a king , which tumults and armes could not , wherein though there be little safety , yet it hath not more of danger . 33. the fear of men should never be a kings snare : nor should the love of any liberty entangle his soul. 34. better others betray a king , than himself : and that the price of his liberty should be his conscience . 35. the greatest injuries a king's enemies seek to inflict upon him , cannot be without his own consent . 36. while a king can deny with reason , he shall defeat the greatest impressions of rebels malice , who neither know how to use worthily what is already granted , nor what to require more of him but this , that he would seem willing to help , then to destroy himself and his . 37. although rebels should destroy a king , yet let him give them no cause to despise him . 38. neither liberty nor life are so dear to a king , as the peace of his conscience , the honour of his crownes , and the welfare of his people . 39. a king's word may more injure his people , than a war ; while he gratifies a few , to oppress all . 40. lawes may by god's blessing , revive with the loyalty of subjects , if a distressed king bury them not by his consent , and cover them not in the grave of dishonour and injustice , which some mens violence may have digged for them . 41. if captivity or death must be the price of the lawes redemption , a king should not grudge to pay it . 42. no condition can make a king miserable , which carieth not with it his souls , his peoples , and posterities thraldom . 43. a monarch should rather hazard the ruine of one king , than confirm many tyrants over his people . 44 a distressed king may by the learning , piety and prayers of his chaplains , be either better enabled to sustain the want of all other enjoyments , or better sitted for the recovery and use of them in god's good time . 45. a king may reap , by the pious help of his chaplains , a spiritual harvest of grace amidst the thornes , and after the plowings of temporal crosses . 46. when rebels confine their king to solitude , they adde a wilderness of temptations , especialy if they obtrude company upon him more sad than solitude it self . 47. the evil policy of men forbids all just restitution , lest they should confess an injurous usurpation . 48. though the justice of the law deprive prisoners of worldly comforts , yet the mercy of religion allowes them the benefit of their clergy , as not aiming at once to destroy their bodies , and to damn their souls . 49. to deny a king the ghostly comfort of his chaplains , seems a greater rigour and barbarity than is used to the meanest prisoners , and greatest malefactors . 50. a kings agony may be relieved by the presence of one good angel , such as is a learned , godly and discreet divine . 51. rebels , that envy the being a king , will encline to lothe his being a christian , and while they seek to deprive him of all things else , will be afraid he should save his soul. 52. some remedies are worse than the disease , and some comforters more miserable than misery it self ; when like jobs friends , they seek not to fortifie one's mind with patience , but perswade a man , by betraying his own innocency , to despair of god's mercy ; and by justifying their injuries , to strengthen the hands , and harden the hearts of insolent enemies . 53. a king looking upon clergy-men as orphans , and under the sacrilegious eyes of many cruel and rapacious reformers , ought in duty to appear as a father , and a patron of them and the church . 54. it is better to seem undevout , and to hear no mens prayers , than to be forced , or seem to comply with those petitions , to which the heart cannot consent , nor the tongue say amen , without contradicting a man's own understanding , or belying his own soul. 55. in publick devotions , a king should countenance neither prophane boldness , nor pious non-sense ; but such an humble and judicious gravity , as shewes the speaker to be at once consideate both of god's majesty , the church's honor , and his own vileness , both knowing what things god allowes him to ask , and in what maner it becomes a sinner to supplicate the divine mercy for himself and others . 56. a king should equally be scandaliz'd with all prayers that sound either imperiously , or rudely and passionately ; as either wanting humility to god , or charity to men , or respect to the duty . 57. a king should better be pleased , as with studied and premeditated sermons , so with such publick forms of prayer as are fitted to the church's and every christian's daily and common necessities ; because he is better assured what he may joyn his heart unto , than he can be of any man's extemporary sufficiency . 58. extemporary sufficiency , as it need not wholely be excluded from publick occasions , so is it to be allow'd its just liberty and use in private and devout retirements ; where neither the solemnity of the duty , nor the modest regard to others , do require so great exactness , as to the outward maner of performance . 59. the light of understanding , and the fervency of affection , are the main and most necessary requisites both in constant and occasional , solitary and social devotions . 60. a great part of some mens piety , hangs upon the popular pin of railing against , and contemning the liturgy of a church . 61. a king should rather be condemned to the woe of vae soli , than to that of vae vobis hypocritis , by seeming to pray what he does not approve . 62. it is infinitely more glorious to convert souls to gods church by the word , than to conquer men to a subjection by the sword. 63. the gifts and prayers of the clergy , are to be look't upon as more praevalent than a king 's , or other men's , by how much they flow from minds more enlightned , and affections less distracted , than those which are encombred with secular affairs . 64. a greater blessing and acceptableness attends those duties which are rightly perform'd , as proper to , and within the limits of that calling , to which god and the church have especially designed and consecrated some men . 65. confusion in religion will as certainly follow every man's turning priest or preacher , as it will in the state , where every man affects to rule as king. 66. a king may bear with more grief and impatience the want of his chaplains , than of any other his servants , and next ( if not beyond in some things ) to the being sequestred from his wife and children since from these , indeed more of humane and temporary affections ; but from those more of heavenly and eternal improvements may be expected . ; 67. in the inforced ( not neglected ) want of ordinary means , god is wont to afford extraordinary supplies of his gifts and graces . 68. a king that in solitude , has gods spirit to teach him and help his infirmities in prayer , reading and meditation will need no other either oratour or instructer . 69. some little practise wil serve that man , who only seeks to represent a part of honesty and honour . 70. a king cannot be so low , but he is considerable : adding weight to that party where he appears . 71. when the excentrique and irregular motion of the times cannot well be resisted , nor quieted ; better swim down such a stream , than in vain to strive against it . 72. impossible it is for lines to be drawn from the center , and not to divide from each other , so much the wider , by how much they go farther from the point of union . 73. professed patrons for the peoples liberties , cannot be utterly against the liberty of their king : what they demand for their own conscience , they cannot in reason deny to his . 74. novel injunctions cannot well be stamped with the authority of lawes , without the kings consent . 75. men are hardly content with one sin , but adde sin to sin , til the later punish the former . 76. power is above all rule , order and law ; where men look more to present advantages , than their consciences , and the unchangeable rules of justice ; while they are judges of others , they are forced to condemn themselves . 77. vengeance oft pursues and overtakes them that thought to have escaped and fortified themselves most impregnably against it , both by their multitude and compliance . 78. whom the lawes cannot , god will punish , by their own crimes and hands . 79. fatal blindness frequently attends and punisheth wilfullness , so that men shall not be able at least to prevent their sorrowes , who would not timely repent of their sins , nor shall they be suffered to enjoy the comforts , who securely neglect the counsels belonging to their peace . 80. brethren in iniquity , are not far from becoming insolent enemies , there being nothing harder than to keep ill men long in one mind . 81. it is not possible to gain a ●air period for those motions which go rather in a round and circle of fancy , than in a right line of reason tending to the law , the only center of publick consistency . 82. men are much more happy when subject to known lawes , than to the various wills of any men , seem they never so plausible at first . 83. vulgar compliance with any illegal and extravagant wayes , like violent motions in nature , soon growes weary of it self , and ends in a refractory fullenness . 84. peoples rebounds are oft in their faces , who first put them upon those violent strokes . 85. a king may so far esteem the valour and gallantry some time shewed by an army which hath fought against him , as to concur toward a just satisfying their demands of pay and indemnity ; and to wish he may never want such men to maintain himself , his lawes and kingdome in such a peace as wherein they may enjoy their share and proportion so much as any men . 86. it is some kind of deceiving and lessening the injury of a kings long restraint , when he finds his leisure and solitude have produced something worthy of himself , and usefull to his successour . 87. in civil warres , a kings cause is not to be measured by the success , nor his judgment of things by his misfortunes . 88. it is an advantage of wisdom to a young prince , to have begun & spent some years of discretion in the experience of troubles , and exercise of patience . 89. in troubles piety and all virtues , both moral and political are commonly better planted to a thriving ( as trees set in winter ) than in the warmth and serenity of times . 90. the delights which usually attend princes courts in time of peace and plenty , are prone either to root up all plants of true virtue and honor , or to be contented only with some leaves and withering formalities of them . 91. princes should alwayes remember they are born , and by providence designed to the publick good . 92. flatteries are as unseparable from prosperous princes , as flies ate from fruit in summer , whom adversity , like cold weather , drives away . 93. charles le bon , a more glorious name for a prince , than le grand better for him and his people he be good , than great . ; 94. the early exercise of gods graces and gifts bestowed upon princes may best weed out all vicious inclinations , and dispose them to such princely endowments and imployments , which will most gain the love , and intend the welfare of those over whom god may place them . 95. a prince ought to begin and end with god , who is king of kings , the soveraign disposer of the kingdomes of the world. 96. the best government , and highest soveraignty a prince can attain to is , to be subject to god , that the scepter of his word and spirit may rule in his heart . 97. the true glory of princes consists in advancing gods glory in the maintenance of true religion , and the church's good ; also in the dispensation of civil power , with justice and honour to the publick peace . 98. piety will make a prince prosperous ; at least it will keep him from being miserable . 99. he is not much a loser , that loseth all , yet saveth his own soul at last . 100. a kings affliction is gods physick , having that in healthfulness which it wants in pleasure . the sixth century . 1. a prince at mature age , ought if satisfied in his own judgment and reason , seal to that sacred bond which education hath written , that it may be judiciously his own religion , and not other mens custom , or tradition , which he professeth . 2. a princes fixation in matters of religion , is not more necessary for his souls , than his kingdoms peace . 3. the devil of rebellion doth commonly turn himself into an angel of reformation , and the old serpent can pretent new lights . 4. when some mens consciences accuse them for sedition and faction , they stop its mouth with the name and noise of religion , when piety pleads for peace and patience , they cry out zeal . 5. unless a king in point of religion be well setled , he shall never want temptations to destroy him and his under pretensions of reforming . 6. reforming matters of religion seems even to the worst men as the best and most auspicious beginning of their worst desfgns . 7. some reformers of religion hope to cover their irreligious deformities whereto they are conscious , by a severity of censuring other mens opinions or actions . 8. a king ought to take heed of abetting any factions , or applying to any publick discriminations in matters of religion , contrary to what is in his judgment , and the church well setled . 9. a king 's partial adhering as head to any one side , gains him not so great advantages in some mens hearts ( who are prone to be of their kings religion ) as it loseth them in others , who think themselves and their profession first despised , than persecuted by him . 10. a king should take such a course , as may either with calmness and charity quite remove seeming differeces in religion , and offenses by impartiality , or to order affairs in point of power , that he shall not need to fear or flatter any faction . 11. if a king stand in need of any faction , he may have flatterrd ( that affects him not ) or must stand to their courtesie , he is undone ; the serpent will devour the dove . 12. a king may never expect less of loyalty , justice , or humanity , than from those who engage into religious rebellion . 13. religious rebels make their interest alwayes gods. 14. ambitious policies march under the colours of piety , not only with greatest security , but applause , as to the populacy . 15. a king may hear jacobs voice from such religious reformers , but he will feel they have esau's hands . 16. as ill humors fall to the disaffected part , which causeth inflammations ; so all affectors of novelties adhere to that side , which hath the most remarkable and specious note of difference in point of religion . 17. nothing ought to seem little or despicable to a king in matters which concern religion and the church's peace , so as to neglect a speedy reformation , and effectual suppression . 18. errors and schismes which seem at first but as a hand-breadth , by seditious spirits , as by strong winds are soon made to cover and darken the whole heaven . 19. a king should never charge his head with such a crown , as shall by its heaviness oppress the whole body , the weakness of whose parts cannot return any thing of strength , honour or safety to the head , but a necessary debilitation and ruine . 20. a kings prerogative is best shewed and exercised in remitting rather than exacting the rigour of the lawes ; there being nothing worse than legal tyranny . 21. tumults , armies and prisons , are not the best arguments to convince the testimony of a king's conscience . 22. it is not safe for a king to gratifie any faction with the perturbation of the lawes , in which is wrap't up the publick interest , and the good of the community . 23. a king should never repose so much upon any mans single counsel , fidelity and discretion , in managing affairs of the first magnitude ( that is , matters of religion and justice ) as to create in himself or others , a difference of his own judgment , which is likely to be alwayes more constant and impartial to the interests of his crown and kingdom , than any mans . 24. a king should beware of exasperating any factions by the crossness and ●●●●erity of some mens passions , humors , or private opinions , imployed by him , grounded only upon the differences in lesser matters , which are but the skirts and suburbs of religion . 25. a charitable connivence and christian toleration , often dissipates the strength of factions , which rougher opposition fortifies , and puts the despised and opressed party into such combinations , as may most enable them to get a full revenge on those they count their persecutors , who are commonly assisted by that vulgar commiseration , which attends all that are said to suffer under the notion of religion . 26. a king is not to connive at or tolerate any faction that amounts to an insolent opposition of lawes and government , or religion established , as to the essentials of them , such ●●●tions and minings are intolerab●e . 27. a king must alwayes keep up solid piety , and those fundamental truths ( which mend both hearts and lives of men ) with impartial favour and justice . 28. a king must take heed that outward circumstances and formalities of religion devour not all , or the best encouragements of learning , industry and piety . 29. a king ought with an equal eye and impartial hand , to distribute favours and rewards to all men , as he finds them for their real goodness , both in abilities and fidelities worthy and capable of them . 30. a king by rewarding men of best deserts , shall be sure to gain himself the hearts of the best , and the most too , who though they be not good themselves , yet are glad to see the severer wayes of vertue at any time sweetned by temporal rewards . 31. combin●●●●actions have no sooner by force subdued what they counted their common enemy , and are secured from that fear , but they are divided to so high a rivalry , as sets them more at defiance against each other , than against their first antagonists . 32. time will dissipate all factions , when once the rough horns of private mens covetous and ambitious designs shall discover themselves , which were at first wrapt up and hidden under the soft and smooth pretensions of religion , reformation and liberty . 33. as the wolfe is not less cruel , so he will be more justly hated , when he shall appear no better than a wolfe under sheeps clothing . 34. to undeceive the seduced vulgar , who in simplicity follow disguises , as a king needs no palliations , if he study really to exceed in true and const●●● demonstrations of goodness , piety , and virtue towards the people , even all those men that make the greatest noise and ostentations of religion : so shall he neither fear any detection , as they do , who have but the face and mask of goodness ; nor shall he frustrate the just expectations of his people , who cannot in reason promise themselves so much good from any subjects novelties , as from the virtuous constancy of their king. 35. none are greater oppressours of vulgar estates , liberties , and consciences , than those men that entitle themselves the patrons and vindicators of them , only to usurpe power over them . 36. no passion should betray a prince to any study of revenge upon those , whose own sin and folly will sufficiently punish them in due time . 37. so soon as the forked arrow of factious emulations is drawn out , use all princely arts and clemency to heal the wounds ; that the smart of the cure , may not equal the anguish of the hurt . 38. acts of indempnity and oblivion , when desired and accepted , are to be granted not only as acts of state-policy and necessity , but of christian charity and choise . 39. they that deprive a king of all , cannot of a power to forgive them ; and to have a heart to do it , is a greater argument of gods love to him , than any prosperity can be . 40. none will be more loyal and faithfull to an injur'd king , than those subjects , who , sensible of their errours and his sufferings , will feell in their own souls most vehement motives to repentance , and earnest desires to make some reparations for their former defects . 41. as the quality of a king sets him beyond a duel with any subject ; so the nobleness of his mind must raise him above the meditating any revenge , or executing his anger upon the many . 42. the more conscious a king shall be to his own merits upon his people , the more prone he will be to expect all love and loyalty from them , and to inflict no punishment upon them for former miscariages . 43. an injur'd king will have more inward complacency in pardoning one , than in punishing a thousand . 44. we cannot merit of god , but by his own mercy . 45. counterfeit and disorderly zeal ought not to abate a king's value and esteem of true piety : both of them are to be known by their fruits . 46. the sweetness of the vine and figtree is not to be despised , though the brambles and thornes should pretend to bear figs and grapes , thereby to rule over the trees . 47. the publick interest consists in the mutual and common good both of prince and people . 48. we must not sterve our selves , because some men have surfeited of wholsom food . 49. god sometimes punisheth rebellious subjects with continuance in their sin , and suffers them to be deluded with the prosperity of their wickedness . 53. gods grace may teach and enable an injur'd king to want , as well as to wear a crown , which is not worth taking up , or enjoying , upon sordid , dishonourable , and irreligious termes . 51. let a king keep himself to true principles of piety , vertue , and honour ; he shall never want a kingdom . 52. it is a principal point of honour in a yong king , to deferre all respect , love , and pretection to the queen dowager his mother , especially if with magnanimity and patience she hath sufferr'd for , and with , his royal father , and himself . 53. a captive king , in the midst of rebellious subjects , may be wrapt up and fortified in his own innocency and god's grace . 54. the bloud of a king destroy'd by rebels , will cry aloud for vengeance to heaven , and they who shed it , will have inward horrour for their first tormenter , and not escape exemplary judgments . 55. they that repent of any defects in their duty toward the royal father , may be found truly zealous to repay with interest , the loyalty and love which was due to him , unto their king his son . 56. the mask of religion on the face of rebellion , will not long serve to hide the men's deformities that use it . 57. mislead subjects may learn by their miseries , that religion to their god , and loyalty to their king , cannot be parted without both their sin and their infelicity . 58. god may honour a king , not only with the scepter and government of realms , but also with the suffering many indignities , and an untimely death for them , while he studies to preserve the rights of the church , the power of his lawes , the honour of his crown , the priviledges of parliaments , the liberties of his people , and his own conscience , which is dearer to him than a thousand kingdoms . 59. a captive king hath as much cause as leisure to meditate upon , and prepare for his death ; there being but few steps between the prisons and graves of princes . 60. it is gods indulgence which gives him the space , but mans cruelty , that gives him the sad occasions for those thoughts . 61. a king in the hands of rebels , besides the common burthen of mortality , which lies upon him , as a man , bears the heavy load of other mens ambitions , fears , jealousies , and cruel passions , whose envy or enmity against him , makes their own lives seem deadly to them , while he enjoyes any part of his . 62. a kings prosperity should not make him a stranger to the contemplations of mortality . 63. the thoughts of death are never unseasonable , since prosperity alwayes is uncertain . 64. death is an eclipse , which oft hapneth as well in clear as clowdy dayes . 65. a king by long and sharp adversity , may have so reconciled within himself those natural antipathies between life and death , which are in all men , that the common terrours of the later may be dispelled , and the special horrour of it much allayed . 66. a king , to whom a violent death approaching is represented by the policy of cruel and implacable enemies , with all terrible aggravations may look upon those things as unpoysonous , though sharp , since his redeemer hath either pulled them out , or given him the antidote of his death against them , which as to the immaturity , unjustice , shame , scorn and cruelty of it , exceeded whatever a threatned king can fear . 67. a pious king never finds so much the life of religion , the feast of a good conscience , and the brazen wall of a judicious integrity and constancy , as when he comes to a close conflict with the thoughts of death . 68. though a king be not so old , as to be weary of life , it is happy for him , if he be not so bad as to be either afraid to dye , or asham'd to live . 69. it is the greatest glory of a christians life to dye dayly , in conquering by a lively faith , and patient hope of a better life , those partial and quotidian deaths , which kill by piece-meals , and make men over-live their own fates , while we are deprived of health , honour , liberty , power , credit , safety , or estate , and those other comforts of dearest relations , which are as the life of our lives . 70. a king lives in nothing temporal so much , as in the love and good will of his people . 71. a king should not think that life too long or tedious , wherein god gives him any opportunities , if not to do , yet to suffer with such christian patience and magnanimity in a good cause , as are the greatest honour of his life , and the best improvement of his death . 72. in point of true christian valour , it argues pusillanimity to desire to dye out of weariness of life , and a want of that heroike greatness of spirit which becomes a christian , in the patient and generous sustaining those afflictions , which as shadowes , necessarily attend us , while we are in this body , and which are less'ned or enlarged as the sun of our prosperity moves higher or lower , whose total absence is best recompensed with the dew of heaven . 73. the assaults of affliction may be terrible , like sampson's lyon , but they yield much sweetness to those that dare encounter and overcome them , who know how to over-live the witherings of their gourds without discontent or peevishness , while they may yet converse with god. 74. the life of a pious king is the object of the devils and wicked mens malice , but yet under god's sole custody and disposal . 75. we must not by seeming prepared to dye , think to flatter god for longer life . 76. triumphing enemies who are solemnely cruel , adde ( as those did who crucified christ ) the mockery of justice to the cruelty of malice . 77. that a king may be destroyed , as with greater pomp and artifice , so with less pity , it is but a necessary policy to make his death appear as an act of justice , done by subjects upon their soveraign , who know that no law of god or man invests them with any power of judicature without him , much less against him ; and who being sworn and bound by all that is sacred before god and man , to endeavour his preservation , must pretend justice to cover their perjury . 78. it is a sad fate for any man , to have his enemies to be accusers , parties and judges , but most desperate when this is acted by the insolence of subjects against their soveraign , wherein those who have had the chiefest hand , and are most guilty of contriving the publick troubles , must by shedding his bloud , seem to wash their own hands of that innocent bloud , whereof they are most evidently guilty before god and man , if not in their own consciences too , while they carry on unreasonable demands , first by tumults , after by armies . 79. nothing makes mean spirits more cowardly cruel in managing their usurped power against their lawfull superiours , than the guilt of their unjust usurpation . 80. specious and popular pretensions of justice against delinquents are applyed only to disguize at first the monstrousness of their designs , who despair of possessing the power and profits of the vineyard , till the heir , whose right it is , be cast out and slain . 81. it may be accounted by rebels a kings greatest fault , that he will not either destroy himself with the church and state by his word ; or not suffer them to do in unresisted by the sword , whose covetous ambition , no concessions of his can either satisfie or abate . 82. some men think that kingdom of brambles which they seek to erect , not likely to thrive , till watered with the royal bloud of those , whose right the kingdom is . 83. a king's innocency will find him both his protector , and his advocate , who is his only judg. 84. the greatest patrons of law , justice , order , and religion on earth , are exposed to as many dangers , as there be either men or devils which love confusion . 85. god will not suffer men long to prosper in their babel , who build it with the bones , and cement it with the bloud of their kings . 86. a king destin'd to death by rebels , may be confident they will find avengers of it among themselves ; and that the injuries he hath sustained from them , shall be first punished by them , who agreed in nothing so much , as in opposing him . 87. the impatience of rebels to bear the loud cry of their kings bloud will make them think no way better to expiate it , than by shedding theirs , who with them most thirsted after his . 88. god will not suffer them to go unpunished , whose confoederacy in sin was their only security . 89. a king 's greatest conquest of death , is from the power of the love of christ , who hath swallowed up death in the victory of his resurrection , and the glory of his ascension . 90. royal charity is the noblest revenge upon , and victory over a king's destroyers . 91. the will of rebels and regicides seems to be their only rule , their power the measure , and their success the exactor of what they please to call justice , while they flatter themselves with the fancy of their own safety , by the kings danger , and the security of their lives-designs , by his death : forgetting , that the greatest temptations to sin , are wrapped up in seeming prosperities ; so the severest vengeances of god are then most accomplished , when men are suffered to complete their wicked purposes . 92. when the will of god hath confined and concluded that of a devoted king , he shall have the pleasure of dying without any pleasure of desired vengeance . 93. the glory attending the death of a king sacrificed to the will of his revolted subjects , surpasseth all he could enjoy or conceive in life . 94. the sharp and necessary tyrany of king-destroyers , sufficiently confute the calumnies of tyranny against him . 95. subjects ought to know how to excuse their soveraign's failings as a man , and yet to retain and pay their duty to him as their king ; there being no religious necessity binding any subjects by pretending to punish , infinitely to exceed the faults and errours of their princes . 96. rebels may often see the proportions of their evil dealings against their king in the measure of gods retaliations upon them , who cannot hope long to enjoy their own thumbs and to●s , having under pretense of paring his nails , been so cruel as to cut off his chiefest strength . 97. the punishment of the more insolent and obstinate rebels may be like korah and his complices ( at once mutining against both prince and priest ) in such a method of divine justice , as is not ordinary ; the earth of the lowest and meanest people opening upon them , and swallowing them up in a just disdain of their ill-gotten , and worse-used authority ; upon whose support and strength they chiefly depended for their building and establishing their designs against their king , the church and state. 98. it is a fallacy in them who from worldly success ( rather like sophisters than sound christians ) draw those popular conclusions for gods approbation of their actions , whose wise prudence oft permits many events , which his revealed word , the only clear , safe and fixed rule of good actions and good conveniences , in no sort approves . 99. a good king may be confident that the justice of his cause , and clearness of his conscience , before god , and toward his people , will carry him as much above rebels in gods decision , as their successes may have lifted them above him in the vulgar opinion . 100. many times those undertakings of men , are lifted up to heaven in the prosperity and applause of the world , whose rise is from hell , as to the injuriousness and oppression of the design . the seventh century . 1. the prosperous winds which oft fill the sails of pirates , doth not justifie their piracy and rapine . 2. the prayers and patience of a king's friends and loving subjects , coutribute much to the sweetning of that bitter cup given him by them , whose hands are unjustly and barbarously lifted up against him . 3. as to the last event , a murther'd king may seem to owe more to his enemies , than his friends , while those put a period to the sins and sorrows attending this miserable life , wherewith these desire he might still contend . 4. if a good king suffer's a violent death with his saviour , it is but mortality crowned with martyrdom , where the debt of death which he owes for sin to nature , shall be raised as a gift of faith and patience offered to god. 5. the trophees of a king's charity will be more glorious and durable over rebels , than their ill-managed victories over him . 6. they whose sin is prosperous , had need be penitent , that they may be pardoned . 7. we are to look upon the temporal destruction of the greatest king , as farre less deprecable , than the eternal damnation of the meanest subject . 8. it is very strange , that mariners can find no other means to appease the storm themselves have raised , but by drowning their pilate . 9. they who themselves seem , and teach others to despair of their king's salvation , only discover this , that they do not much desire it . 10. uncharitable and cruel restraints of a king from spiritual assistance of chaplains , may rather enlarge , than any way obstruct his access to the throne of heaven . 11. when large pretenses prove but the shadows of weak performances , then the greatest labours produce the smallest effects . 12. when a period is put to a work of great concernment , all mens ears do ( as it were ) hunger till they are satisfied in their expectations . 13. no grants give satisfaction to them that pursue their own ambitious ends , more than the welfare of a miserable land. 14. it is an unutterable misery for him that hath ruled like a king , to be ruled like a slave . 15. a king knowes not what to grant , when after his concessions to subjects that have required all , they know not what to ask . 16. they who pretend zeal , when their thoughts are filled with bloud , are but wolves in sheeps clothing . 17. rebels that endeavour to rule by the sword , shall at last fall by it , for faction is the mother of ruine . 18. they that are of such a weather-cock-like disposition , love nothing but mutabilities . 19. much variety doth confound the senses , and makes them still hate one folly , and fall in love with another . 20. time is the best cure for faction : for it will at length ( like a spreading leprosie ) infect the whole body of the kingdom , and make it so odious , that at last they will hate themselves for love of that , and like a fish , for love of the bait , be catch'd with the hook . 21. it is not expedient for an army , to contradict the votes of a kingdom , endeavou●ing by pretending for lawes and liberties , to subvert both . 22. the time will come , when the very clouds shall drop down vengeance upon the heads of those that barrocado themselves against the proceedings of peace . 23. a resolute king in captivity is arm'd against the fury of rebellious subjects , having a breast to receive the arrowes of their envy , and a heart possest with patience to sustain them . 24. to god nothing is so great that it may resist ; nor so small , that it is contemned . 25. a king may rather desire his faults should be corrected by the hand of god , than that his ununjust enemies should be the ministers of god's justice . 26. let calamity be the exercise , but not the overthrow of a kings virtue . 27. the permitting a wrong way of god's worship to be set up , to the injury of the right before establish'd and practis'd , will bring shame and grief to a king by his own confession , that he therein followed the perswasions of worldly wisdom , forsaking the dictates of a right informed conscience . 28. they who have been false to their king , to those that gave them power , and in likelihood to their own souls , may be forgiven by him , but never trusted . 29. it is an humor becoming an impartial king , to be still partial for that side which he imagines suffer for the weakness of those that maintain it . 30. a king should suffer a divine who would rectifie his supposed errour , no less than a physician , to take his own way of cu●e . 31. as to the profession of religion , the king is happy , who condemns not himself in that thing which he allowes . 32. he that changeth for the better , ought to be sure it be better , before he change . 33. inconstancy in religion , without cause and colour , is both sin and shame . 34. there is much difference between permission and approbation . 35. if the practise of the primitive church , and the universal consent of the fathers be not a convincing argument , when the interpretation of the scripture is dou●●full , nothing is . 36. the interpretation of private spirits is the mother of all sects , and will bring , where permitted , kingdoms to confusion . 37. another mans will is as weak a ground for a king to build his faith on , as his own education . 38. when a general counce● cannot be had , several kingdomes may reform themselves . 39. rebels never wanted wr●ters to maintain their unjust actions . 40. all popular reformation is little better than rebellion . 41. no authority is lawfull , but that which is either directly given , or at least approved by god. 42. the church having any discipline not conformed to the civil policy , can neither flouris● , nor be happy . 43. church-ambition doth not at all terminate in seeking to be pope , it being no point of humility to endeavour to be independent of kings . 44. papacy in a multitude may be as dangerous , as in one . 45. many things may be avowable upon necessity , which otherwayes are unlawfull . 46. in points not fit to be discussed , instances , as well as comparisons , are odious . 47. reason epitomised , weighs as much with wise men , as at large . 48. one may lean on anothers arm , who leans more on his judgment . 49. the soundness of religion is not to be tried by dint of sword , nor must we judg of her truths , by the prosperity of events . 50. when men sit down to discourse or argue , reason should take her seat with them , and , though she be no judg , have her place , if not above their faith , in their arguments . 51. the envious mans seeds , are tares , although the husbandman knowes not when they were sown . 52. the child is not to be pour tractured greater than the nurse , nor the bishops power made to outreach the king 's , who is the nursing father of the church . 53. unity may consist in this ▪ when many sheaves lye in one mans field that belong to him , or be caried into his barn , though they be not bundled up in a rick with one cock-sheave above the rest . 54. a sum divided into several parcels is not broke , while the owner hath all in his possession . 55. whilst arguments do multiply , time lessens . 56. the seed of the word wherein is gods holy spirit , being sowen in the heart , inlivened by the heat of faith , and watered with the tears of repentance , soon fructifies without any further circumstance . 57. it is no strange thing to see errour triumph in antiquity , and flourish fair ensigns in the face of truth . 58. it will do no good to keep possession of the keyes , when the lock is changed . 59. though the catholick church is the white in that butt of earth at which we all must aim ; yet the scripture is the heart , centre , or peg in the midst of that white that holds it up , from whence we must measure . 60. that which must determine truth , must not be fallible . 61. when a king fears affairs of councel will meet with s●me passion and prejudice in other men , it is best for him to resolve they shall find least of them in himself . 62. mens well-meaning ●eal must be guided by such rules of moderation , as are best both to preserve and restore the health of states and kingdoms . 63. a king should intend not only to oblige his friends , but his enemies also , exceeding even the desires of those that have been factiously discontented , if they do but pretend to any modest and sober sense . 64. the odium and o●fences which some mens rigour or remissness in church and state may have contracted upon a kings government , he should resolve to expiate by such lawes and regulations for the future , as may not only rectifie what was amiss in practise , but supply what was defective i● the constitution . 65. no man should have a greater zeal to see religion setled and preserved in truth , unity and order , than the king whom it most concerns both in piety and policy . 66. a king's confidence in others may betray himself and his kingdomes to those advantages which some men seek for , who want nothing but power and occasion to do mischief . 67. when our sins ar● ripe , there is no preventing of god's justice from reaping that glory in our calamities , which we robb'd him of in our prosperity . 68. great abilities in a minister of state , may be prone to create in him great confidence of undertakings , and this is like enough to betray him to great errours , and many enemies . 69. though a king cannot in his judgment approve all a minister of state hath done , driven ( it may be ) by the necessity of times and the temper of that people he is set over more than lead by his own disposition to any height and rigour of actions ; yet he may not be convinced of any such criminousness in him , as willing to expose his life to the strokes of justice , and malice of his enemies . 70. when a king bears the touch of conscience , with great régret , for any act of so sinfull frailty , as discovers more a fear of man than of god , as a sign of his repentance , he should often with sorrow confess the same both to god and men. 71. no man is worthy to bear the name and place of god on earth , who will not avoid inconveniences of state by acts of so high injustice , as no publick convenience can expiate or compensate . 72. in all likelihood a king can never suffer with his people greater calamities ( yet with greater comfort ) by vindicating the innocency of his minister , at least by denying to sign any destructive bill , according to that justice which his conscience suggesteth to him ; than he wil do after he shall have gratified some mens unthankfull importunities with so cruel a favour . 73. it may be observed by a king , that those who counsel him to sign a destructive bill to an innocent minister of state , are so far from receiving the rewards of such ingratiatings with the people , that no me● are harrassed and crushed more than they ; when he is least vexed by them , who counsels the king not to consent against the vote of his own conscience . 74. a king fully conscious to his soul , of permitting an innocent minister of state to be destroyed , may so much the more welcome those judgments god hath pleased to send upon him , as he may hope them to be a means which his mercy hath sanctified so to him , as to repent of that unjust act , and for the future not to do the like . 75. nothing should more fortifie a king●s resolutions against al● violent importunities ▪ which seek to gain consent from him to acts wherein his conscience is unsatisfied , than the sharp touches he may have had for some such he before hath yeilded to . 76. when a king's enemies , of his own people , load his act of justice , because extraordinary in the method , with obloquies and exasperations , in touchy times it will fill indifferent men with great jealousies and fears ; yea , and many of his friends will resent it as a motion rising rather from passion , than reason ▪ and not guided with such discretion as the times require ▪ 77. though a king be furnish'd with just motives and pregnant grounds to proceed against any subjects , so that there needs nothing to the evidence he can produce against those he chargeth , save a free and legal tryal ; let that be all he desireth . 78. a king should not yield to any temptation of displeasure or revenge against the persons of his subjects , further than he has discovered the unlawfull correspondencies they have used , and engagements they have made to embroyl his kingdoms . 79. probabilities may be sufficient to raise jealousies in any king's heart , who is not wholely stupid and neglective of the publick peace . 80. a fair and legal tryal of men called in question by their king , can amount to no worse effect , than either to do him and his kingdom right in case they be guilty ; of else to clear their innocency , and remove his suspitions . 81. when once people have learned to think hard thoughts again●t their king , they will afterward abundantly vent them by words and deeds . 82. not any thing ( except our sins ) more ominously presageth al● the miseries incident to a kingdom by civil war , then tumults in the capital city of it , which , when at their height , are not like a storm at sea , ( which yet wants not its terrour ) but like an earthquake , shaking the ve●y foundations of all ; than which nothing in the world hath more of horrour . 83. in popular tumults , a short sit , or two , of shaking , as an ague , may pass away ; but when once they become a quotidian fever , allwayes increasing to higher inflammations , impatient of any mitigation , restraint , or remission , they threaten ruine . 84. an unsafe guard may too easily be entertain'd by such as scare themselves , and others , with unnecessary fears . 85. such great demagogues , and patrons of tumults , as send for them to flatter and embolden them , to direct and tune their clamorous importunities , god will in his due time let them see , that those are no fit means to be used for attaining his ends . 86. they are no wise statesmen , who own people in tumults to be their friends , commending their courage , zeal , and industry ; which to sober men can seem no better than that of the devil , who goes about seeking whom he may deceive and devour , 87. it is not alwayes an effect of pusillanimity in a man , for popular terrours to deser● his publick station . 88. when popular tumults are become as the breaking in of a sea ; for a king to resist at present , threatens imminent danger ; but to withdraw , gives it space to spend its fury , and gains him a sitter time to repair the breach . 89. a king , by all means to decline a civil war , may in many particulars deny himself , especially haveing no army to flie unto for protetection , or vindication . 90. a king should resolve to hear reason in all things , and to consent to it so far as he can comprehend it . 91. when unquiet people with unpassionate representations reflect upon any , not more princely , than friendly contributions , which their king may have granted towards the perpetuating of their happiness , he need not despair of recovering their love and loyalty unto him . 92. the loyal and cleared affections of mis-led people , will strive to return such retributions of honour and love to their injur'd king , or his posterity , as may fully compensate both the acts of his confidence in and his sufferings for them . 93. it is the injury of all injuries , wherewith some malicious people load their king , while they calumniate him as a wilfull and resolved occasioner , of his own and his subjects miseries . 94. a king ought not to repine at an establishment of his own making ; nor endeavour by force and open hostility to undo what by his royal assent he hath done . 95. a king may have a sense of injuries from his subjects , yet not such , as to think them worth vindicating by a war. 96. a king is compelled ●● injure him●elf by his subjects , not using favours with the same candor , wherewith they were conferred . 97. tumults are prone to threaten to abuse all acts of grace , and turn them into wantonness . 98. their own fears , whose black arts raise up turbulent spirit● ▪ may force them to conjure them down again . 99. though a king have iustly resented any indignities put upon him , he may be in no capacity to take just revenge in a hostile and warlike way upon those , whom he knowes to be well fortified in the love of the meaner sort of the people . 100. a king should long for nothing more , than that himself and his subjects may quietly enjoy the fru●ts of his own condescendings . the eighth century . 1. a king that knowes well the sincerity and uprightness of his own heart , in passing from himself what may exceed the very thoughts of former times , although he seem less a politician to men , yet may need no secret distinctions or evasions before god. 2. though a king may be content , to recede much from his own interests and personal rights , of which he conceives himself to be master ; yet in what concerns truth , justice , the rights of the church , and his crown , together with the general good of his kindoms ( all which he is bound to preserve as much as morally lies in him ) here he ought to be fixt and resolute . 3. a king , by no necessity , should be brought to affirm that to men , which in his conscience he denied before god. 4. for protestants to force their queen , because of the romane religion , to withdraw for her safety , as it will be little to the ador●ing of their profession ; so it may occasion a further alienation of mind , and divorce of affections in her from it . 5. an afflicted king can give no better instance of a steady affection unto his queen , than by professing himself content to be tossed , weather-beaten , and shipwrackt , so as she may be safe in harbour . 6. the policy of rebels finds it sometimes necessary to their designs , by scandalous articles , and all irreverent demeanour , to seek to drive their queen out of the kingdom , lest by the influence of her example , eminent for love , as a wife , and loyalty as a subject , she should convert to , or retein in their love and loyalty to their king , all those , whom they have a purpose to pervert . 7. some acts there are of so rude disloyalty , that a king 's greatest enemies have scarce confidence enough to abet , or own . 8. rebels that design the destruction of their king , will first make overt essayes , by possessing themselves of towns , how patiently he can bear the loss of his kingdoms . 9. a good king so injur'd , will be more affected with shame and sorrow for others ; then with anger for himself ; nor will the affront done to him , trouble him so much as their sin , which admits no colour or excuse . 10. they who have effrontery enough ro commit or countenance , will hardly contein themselves within the compass of one unworthy act , but the hand of that cloud will soon overspread the whole kingdom , and cast all into disorder and darkness . 11. one act of publick rebellion , may give a wise king to see clearly through all the pious disguises , and soft palliations of some men , whose words , though smoother than oyl , will prove very swords . 12. against the swords point is the defence of a good conscience . 13. were it not that the excess of our impotent passions , gave our enemies malice a full impression on our souls , it could not reach very far , nor do us much hurt . 14. it is observable how god sometimes so pleades and avengeth the cause of an injur'd king , in the eye of the world , that the most willfully blind , cannot avoid the displeasure to see it , and with some remorse and fear to own it , as a mutable stroke and prediction of divine vengeance . 15. it hath been known , that a leading rebel , unreproached , unthreatned , uncursed , by any language or secret imprecation of the king , only blasted with the conscience of his own wickedness , and falling from one inconstancy to another , no● long after has paid his own and his eldest sons heads , as forfeitures of their disloyalty , to those men , from whom he might have expected another reward , than so to divide their heads from their bodies , whose hearts with them were divided from their king. 16. a solitary vengeance will no● alwayes serve the turn ; the cutting off one head in a family , is not enough to expiate the asfront done to the head of a common weal. 17. the eldest son has been known to be involued in the punishment , as he was infected with the sin of the father against the father of his country : root and branch god cuts off in one day . 18. a king ought not to rejoyce in the ruine of any eminent rebel , ( though it were such as could give the greatest thirst for revenge a full draught , as if executed by them , who first employed him against his soveraign ) but rather pity him , especially if he thinks he acted against the light of his conscience . 19. signal rebels are not allwayes suffer'd to accomplish their repentance , when they begin to have inclinations toward it , and a reparation of their duty , but fall unhap●ily sometimes into the hands of their justice , who first imployed them , and not the mercy of the king they have offended . 20. it is no fault in a king , to be as willing to forgive a rebel , as he can ask favour of him . 21. that gentleman is to be pitied ( even by the king he has offended ) that becomes a notable monument of unprosperous disloyalty , a sad and unfortunate spectacle to the world. 22. a king should love the inward peace of his conscience , before any outward tranquillity . 23. some miscariages in government , may escape , rather through ill counsel of some men driving on their private ends , or the peevishness of others envying the publick should be managed without them , or the hidden and insuperable necessities of state , than any propensity of the king himself , either to injuriousness , or oppression . 24. those rebels must have more confidence in their cannon , then in their gause , whom their king can freely ask , whose innocent bloud during my reign have i shed , to satisfie my lust , anger , or covetousness ? what widows or orphans tears can witness against me , the just cry of which must now be avenged with my own bloud ? 25. some men are not willing to believe their king , lest they should condemn themselves . 26. to allay the insolency of tumults , it may conduce , if the king withdraw . 27. a king is hardly treated , when urged with an army , and constrained either to hazard his own and his kingdoms ruine by his defence , or prostrate his conscience to the blind obedience of those men , whose zealous superstition thinks , or pretends , they cannot do god and the church a greater service , than utterly to destroy that primitive , apostolical , and anciently universal government of the church by bishops . 28. it is no just occasion taken , to persecute with the injuries of an army , for not suffering tamely the injuries of tumults . 29. it is no plausible design for importunate subjects to raise an army , either to stop their kings mouth , or force his cconsent . 30. a king should think his innocency no whit prejudiced , or darkened , in the midst of many unfortunate successes of a civil war on his side . 31. how untruly a king is charged with the first raising an army , and beginning a civil war , the eyes that only pity him , and the loyal hearts that dare only pray for him , may witness , especially when not so many are on his side , as the men in armes listed against him . 32. a kings unpreparedness for a civil war , though it may well dishearten those that would help him , while it argues ( truly ) his unwillingness to fight ; yet it testifies for him , that he is set on the defensive part , having so little hopes or power to offend others , that he has none to defend himself , or to preserve what is his own for their proreption . 33. no man can doubt , but rebbels prevent the king in their purposes , as well as their injuries , who are much aforehand in their preparations against him , and surprisals of his strength . 34. when men of loyalty are over-awd by the numbers and terrours of the rebellious ; such as are not for the rebels , dare not be for the king. 35. when rebels prevent their king by surprising his castles , forts , armes and navy , with the militia , it is so far best for him , that it may drive him from putting his trust in the arm of flesh , and wholly to cast himself into the protection of the living god , who can save by few , or none , as well as by many . 36. it is height of charity and generosity of spirit in a disarmed king , to reckon the want of the militia not so much in reference to his own protection , as his peoples . 37. the many and sore opressions of loyal subjects may grieve an afflicted king , when he is above his own . 38. it is a strange method the men must take , who will needs resolve their riddle of making a glorious king , by taking away kingly power . even as if he should become a support to his friends , and a terrour to his enemies , by being unable to succour the one , or suppress the other . 39. it is a strange design some men have , who propose the new-modelling of soveraignty and kingship , as without any reality of power , so without any necessity of subjection and obedience . 40. a king should be much willing to bury all jealousies in his people of him , and to live above all jealousies of them , as to himself . 41. no concession of the king 's , how vast and large soever will be satisfactory to those men who seem enemies not to him only , but to all monarchy , being resolved to transmit to posterity such jealousies of the crown , as they should never permit it to enjoy its just and necessary rights , in point of power . 42. civility and duty ( no less than justice and honour ) should forbid subjests to ask of their king an alienation of power from himself and his posterity . 43. a distressed king should by no act of his prejudice or obstruct his successours just recovery of their rights from unjust usurpations and extorsions . 44. a king under restraint must not be prevail'd with to leave his subjects in a condition wholly desperate for the future , so as by a law to be ever subjected to many factious distractions . 45. when men have tryed the horrours and malignant in●luence which will certainly follow their king 's inforced darkness and eclipse , they will at length more esteem and welcome the restored glory and blessing of the suns light . 46. in the conflicts of civil war , and advantages of power , the peoples safety and quiet cannot be effected , but by some side yielding ; to which the greatest love of the publick peace , and the firmest assurance of god's protection ( arising from a good conscience ) may more invite a just and pious king , than can be expected from rebellious mens fears , which arising from the injustice of their actions , ( though never so successfull ) yet dare not adventure their authors upon any other way of safty , than that of the sword and militia . 47. a good king in civil afflictions is not to think that he can want any thing which providential necessity is pleased to take from him , in order to his peoples tranquillity , and god's glory , whose protection is sufficient for him . 48. such unreasonable propositions as are inconsistent with being either a king , or a good christian , while he has any mastery of his reason , he cannot consent unto . 49. for a distressed king to oblige himself by a general and implicite consent , to what ever unreasonable subjects shall desire , or propound , were as if sampson should have consented not only to bind his own hands , and cut off his hair , but to put out his own eyes , that the philistians might with the more safety mock and abuse him , which they chose rather to do , than quite to destroy him , when he was become so tame an object , and ●it occasion for their sport and scorn . 50. they who pretend to make their addresses in an humble and loyal way of petitioning , by that sufficiently confess their own inferiority , which obligeth them to rest if not satisfied , yet quieted with such an answer , as the will and reason of their superiour thinks sit to give . 51. a freedom and power to consent , or dissent , belongs to a monarch in reason , as a man , and in honour , as a soveraign king. 52. for a king to trust to their moderation , who pretend to it , but have it not , and abandon his own discretion , would be to verifie what representations they may have made of him to the world. that he is fitter to be their pupil , than their prince . 53. a prudent king should not be so confident of his own sufficiency , as not willingly to admit the counsel of others ; nor yet so diffident of himself , as brutishly to submit to any mens dictates , and at once to betray the soveraignty of reason in his soul , and the majesty of his own crown to any of his subjects . 54. a king ought to have one septenary , or seven years experience of yong statesmen , how well they can govern themselves , before he trusts them with any power to govern his people for him . 55. a king should be very foolish indeed , and unfaithfull in his trust , to put the reigns of both reason and government , wholly out of his own , into their hands , whose driving is too much like jehu's , and whose forwardness to ascend the throne of supremacy pretends more of phaethon , than of phoebus . 56. if subjects will take the liberty of sending propositions unto their soveraign , they ought to be such as these . 1. that any good lawes antiquated by the course of times , or overlay'd by the corruption of maners , may be restored to their vigour and due execution . 2. that any evil customes praeter-legal , and abuses personal , may be removed , 3. that if any injuries have been done by the king and others to the commonweal , they may be repaired . 4. such equable offertures should be tendred to him , wherein the advantages of his crown being considered by them , he may fairly be induced to condescend to what tends to his subjects good , without any great diminution of himself . 5. such moderate desires of due reformation , of what is indeed amiss in church and state , as may still preserve the foundation and essentials of government in both , not shake and quite overthrow either of them , without any regard to the lawes in force , the wisdom and piety of their ancestors , the ancient and universal practice of christian churches , the rights and priviledges of particular men . 6. some considerable thing should be offered in lieu or in the room of what they would have destroyed , which may at once reach the good end of the others institution , and also supply its pretended defects , reformits abuses , and satisfie sober and wise men , not with soft and specious words , pretending zeal and special piety , but with pregnant and solid reasons both divine and humane , which may justifie the abruptness and necessity of vast alterations . 57. a king cannot be well counsell'd by his parliament , if in the members of it , there be not so much learning , reason , religion , and just moderation , as to know how to sever betweem the use and the abuse of things , the institution , and the corruption , the government , and the misgovernment , the primitive patterns and the alterations or blottings of after-copies . 58. though armies of souldiers may prevail against a king's person , yet armies of unreasonable propositions which they would enforce , should never overcome him further than he sees cause , it behoving him not to look at their number and power , so much , as to weigh their reason and justic● . 59. it is hard at first either to discern the rise , or apply the remedy to a precipitant rebellion . 60. in civil wars and massacres , the sea of bloud cruelly and barbarously shed , is enough to drown any man in ete●nal both infamy and misery , whom god finds the malicious authour or instigatour of its effusion . 61. it is a most unhappy advantage to some mens malice against their king , that when they bave impudence enough to lay any thing to his charge , any bloudy opportunity should be offer'd them , with which he must be aspersed , although nothing can be more abhorred to him , than what is full of sin against god , disloyalty to himself , and destructive to his subjects . 62. the blame of bloudy and rebellious protestants must needs he greater than that of papists , by how much their principles are more for obedience to princes . 63. the goodness of mens intentions will not excuse the scandal and contagion of their examples . 64. the king's interest ties as much in the common welfare of his subjects , as some mens doth in their perturbations . 65. although a king can with truth wash his hands in innocency as to any guilt in a commotion objected to him , yet he should wash them in his tears , at the sad apprehensions he ought to have , to see it spread so far , and make such waste . 66. distractions and jealousies at home , make most men who are better politicians than christians , rather intent to their own safety , or to the designs they are driving , than to the relief of their fellow subjects abroad , though every day inhumanly butchered and massacred , whose tears and bloud might , if nothing else , quench , or at least for a time repress and smother any sparks of civil dissensions and jealousies , which some men industriously scatter in the kingdom where they are . 67. they who themselves have rebellious intentions or inclinations , are unwilling to part with their king upon any hazardous expedition , though to the suppressing that force which opposeth their interest , being either afraid he should have any one kingdom quieted ; or being loth to shoot at any mark less than him ; or that any should have the glory of his destruction but themselves . 68. next to the sin of those who begin a rebellion , theirs must needs be who either hinder the speedy suppressing of it by domestick dissentions , or divert the aids , or exasperate the rebbels to the most desperate resolutions and actions , by threatning all extremities not only to the known heads and chief incendiaries , but even to the whole community of a nation , resolving to destroy root and branch , men , women , and children , without any regard to those usual pleas for mercy , which conquerours not wholly barbarous are wont to hear from their own breasts , in behalf of those , whose opressive faces , rather than their malice engaged them ; or whose imbecillity for sex and age was such , as they could neither lift up a ●and against them , nor distinguish between their right hand and their left . 69. preposterous and unevangelical was that zeal of the rebuked disciples , who would go no lower in their revenge , than to call for fire from heaven upon whole cities , for the repulse or neglect of a few ; as was that of jacobs sons , whom the father both blamed and cursed for it . and so is theirs who are for utter extirpation of all , and more than all that have opposed them , that will extinguish a nation for the misdemeanours and injuries of a provoked and incensed party . 70. even in the case of rebellion , moderate remedies are rather to be applied than extreme severity , such as may punish some with exemplary justice , yet disarm others with tenders of mercy upon their submission , and the king's protection of them from furious and factious persons , though met in parliament , who would soon drown them , if they refused to swim down the popular stream with them . 71. a king hath enough to do to look to his own conscience , and the faithfull discharge of his trust . he has no leisure to make prolix apologies against injurious calumnies and reproaches . 72. a king that can hear with patience as bad as his worst enemies can falsly say , may hope still to do better than they deserve or desire he should . 73. by great effusions of subjects bloud in civil wars , no man is so much weakened as their king. 74. which king may hope , though mens unsatiable cruelty never will , yet the mercy of god will at length say to his justice , it is enough . 75. when god's mercifull justice intends not the utter confusion , but the cure ; the abatement of mens sins , not the desolating of nations , he will command the sword of civil wars to sheath it self . 76. a king of divers nations , may incurre the the censure or misconstruction of one , while he gratifies the active spirits among them of the other , so far as that he seems to many , to prefer the desires of that party , before his own interest and honour . 77. religion and liberty are common and vulgar flourishes , to disguise an other errand of that army , which invades their own kings territories , to make him and his church to write after them and theirs , though it were in bloudy characters . 78. presbytery seeks to suppress and render odious , under the names of sects , schisms , or heresies , several parties , which if they can get but numbers , strength and opportunity , may according to presbyteries opinion and pattern set up their wayes by the like methods of violence , representing a wonderful necessity thereof to avoid the further miseries of war , which they may first begin , and engage themselves to continue , until they obtain their end . 79. when god hath first taken us off from the folly of our opinions , and fury of our passion , he hath many wayes to teach us those rules of true reason , and peaceable wisdome , which is from above , tending most to his glory , and his church's good . 80. they that have any true touches of conscience , will not endeavour to carry on the best designs , ( much less such as are , and will be daily more apparently factious and ambitious ) by any unlawfull means , under the title of a covenant . 81. ties by leagues and covenants are either superfluous and vain , when men were sufficiently tied before ; or fraudulent and injurious , if by such after-ligaments they find the imposers really ayming to dissolve or suspend their former just and necessary obligations . 82. factious men , to whom it is enough if they get but the reputation of a seeming encrease to their party , little romember , that god is not mocked . 83. against the church , the king , or the publick peace , no mans lawfull calling can engage him . 84. the so●● and servile temper of some divines , dispose them in alterations of religion and government to sudden acting and compliance , contrary to their former judgments , profession and practise . 85. no man should be more forward than a king himself to carry on all due reformation , with mature judgment , and a good conscience in what things he shall ( after impartial advice ) be by god's word and right reason , convinced to be amiss . 86. crowns and kingdoms have a period with the life of their king : but reputation and honour may survive to a glorious kind of immortality , when he is dead and gone . 87. a king should never permit the malice of his enemies to deprive him of that comfort , which his confidence in the generality of his people gives him . 88. what a king may bear from foreign enemies , he cannot so well from his own subjects , who next his children are dear unto him . 89. nothing could give a king more cause to suspect and search his own innocency , than when he observes many who made great professions of singular piety forward to engage against him . 90. when many professours of singular piety engage with persons that take arms against their king , it gives to vulgar minds so bad a reflection upon him and his cause , as if it had been impossible to adhere to him , and not with all part from god , to think or speak well of him , and not to blaspheme god. 91. truly learned and religious men will endeavour to be so well satisfied in the cause of their injur'd king's sufferings , as that they may chose rather to suffer with him , than forsake him. 92. when popular preachers ( though but in hypocrisie and falshood ) urge religious pretensions against their king , it is not strange that the same to many well-minded men should be a great temptation to oppose him. 93. when a king useth the assistance of subjects of a different profession from him , they are most ready to interpret it a sighting against religion , who least of all men care whom they imploy , or what they say and do , so they may prevail . 94. so eager are some men in giving their soveraign better counsel , than what they pretend he hath before heark'ned to , that they will not give him leave to take it with freedom , as a man , nor honour , as a king. 95. no men should be more willing to complain , than the king be to redress what he sees in reason to have been either done , or advis'd amiss . 96. they who of pretended sufferers become zealous actors in persecution , deprive themselves of the comfort and reward , whatsoever they before expected . 97. the noise and ostentation of liberty , is the design and artifice some men use to withdraw the peoples affections from their king. 98. a good king should be so far from desiring to oppress , as not to envy his subjects that liberty , which is all he ought desire to enjoy himself , viz. to will nothing , but according to reason , lawes and religion . 99. lords and gentlemen which assist their king in a civil war , would not be so prodigal of their liberties , if they suspected he would infringe them , as with their lives and fortunes to help on the inslaving of themseves and their posterities . 100. as to civil importunities none but such as desire to drive on their ambitious and covetous design over the ruines of church and state , prince , peers , and people , will ever desire greater freedom than good lawes allow . the ninth century . 1. such men as thirst after novelties , or despair to relieve the necessities of their fortunes , or satisfie their ambition in peaceable times , become principal impulsives to popular commotions . 2. rebels will blast the best government of the best king with all the odious reproaches which impotent malice can invent , and expose him to all those contempts , which may most diminish the majesty of a king , and encrease the ungratefull insolencies of his people . 3. a king who is well assured that his innocency is clear before god , in point of any calumnies rebellious subjects do object , may prophesie , that his reputation shall like the sun ( after owles and bats have had their freedom in the night and darker times ) rise and recover it self to such a degree of spendour , as those feral birds shall be grieved to behold , and unable to bear . 4. a king cannot so much suffer in point of honour by rude and scandalous pamphlets , as those men do , who having power , and pretending to so much piety , are so forgetfull of their duty to god and him , as not to vindicate the majesty of their king against any of those , who contrary to the precept of god , and precedents of angels , speak evil of dignities , and bring railing accusations against those who are honoured with the name of gods. 5. they will easily contemn such shadows of god as kings are , who reverence not that supreme and adorable majesty , in comparison of whom all the glory of men and angels is but obscurity . 6. they who seek to gain reputation with the vulgar for their extraordinary parts and piety , must needs undo whatever was formerly setled never so well and wisely . 7. i could never see any reason , why any christian should abhor , or be forbidden to use the same forms of prayer , since he prayes to the same god , believes in the same saviour , professeth the same truths , reads the same scriptures , hath the same duties upon him , and feels the same daily wants , for the most part both inward and outward , which are common to the whole church . 8. a serious sense of that inconvenience in the church which unavoidably followes every mans several maner of officiating , no doubt , first occasioned the wisdom and piety of the ancient churches , to remedy those mischiefs by the use of constant liturgies of publick composure . 9. it was either the tumultuariness of people , or the factiousness and pride of presbyters , or the covetousness of some states and princes , that of late years gave occasion to some mens wits to invent new models of church-government , and proposed them under the specious titles of christs government , scepter and kingdom , the better to serve their turns to whom the change was beneficial . 10. as the full and constant testimony of all histories may sufficiently convince unbiased men , that the primitive churches were undoubtedly governed by the apostles and their immediate successours , the first and best bishops : so it cannot in reason or charity be supposed , that all churches in the world should either be ignorant of the rule by them prescribed , or so soon deviate from their divine and holy pattern . 11. since the first age , for 1500 years , not one example can be produced of any setled church wherein were many ministers and congrations , which had not some bishop above them , under whose jurisdiction and government they were . 12. use is the great arbitratour of words , and master of language . 13. not only in religion , but also in right reason , and the true nature of governments , it cannot be thought that an orderly subordination among presbyters , or ministers , should be any more against christianity , than it is in all secular and civil governments , where parity breeds confusion and faction . 14. i can no more believe that such order is inconsistent with true religion , than good features are with beauty , or numbers with harmony . 15. it is not likely , that god who appointed several orders , and a prelacy , in the government of his church , among the jewish priests , should abhor , or forbid them , among christian ministers , who have as much of the principles of schism and division as other men . 16. i conceive it was not the favour of princes , or ambition of presbyters , but the wisdom and piety of the apostles , that first setled bishops in the church ; which authority they constantly used , and injoyed in those times which were purest for religion , though sharpest for persecution . 17. tyranny becomes no christians , least of all churchmen . 18. the late reformed churches whose examples are obtruded for not retaining bishops , the necessity of times and affairs rather excuseth , than commendeth for their inconformity to all antiquity . 19. i could never see any reason , why churches orderly reformed and governed by bishops , should be forced to conform to those few , rather than to the catholick example of all ancient churches , which needed no reformation . 20. it is no point of wisdom or charity , where christians differ ( as many do in some points ) there to widen the differences , and at once to give all the christian world ( except a handfull of some protestants ) so great a scandal in point of church-government , as to change it ; whom though you may convince of their errours in some points of doctrine , yet you shall never perswade them , that to compleat their reformation , they must necessarily desert , and wholly cast off , that government , which they , and all before them , have ever owned as catholick , primitive , and apostolical . 21. never schismaticks , nor hereticks , ( except the arians ) have strayed from the unity and conformity of the church in point of government , ever having bishops above presbyters . 22. among those that have endeavoured or effected a change in the government of the church , such as have rendred themselves guilty of inconstancy , cause a great prejudice against their novelty in the opinion of their king , whose consent they would have . 23. their facility and levity is never to be excused , whose learning or integrity cannot in charity be so far doubted , as if they understood not what before they did , or as if they conformed to episcopal government contrary to their consciences , and yet the same men , before ever the point had any free and impartial debate , contrary to their former oaths and practice , against their obedience to their lawes in force , and against their kings consent , have not only quite cried down the government by bishops , but have approved and encouraged the violent and most illegal stripping bishops and other churchmen of all their due authority and revenues , the selling away , and utter alienation of those church lands from any ecclesiastical uses . 24. the desertors of episcopacy will at last appear the greatest enemies to , and betrayers of , their own interest , whose folly will become a punishment unto it self . for , 25. presbytery is never so considerable or effectual , as when it is joyned to , and crowned with episcopacy . 26. those secular additamen●● and ornaments of authority , civil honour and estate , which christian princes in all countryes have annexed to bishops and church men , are to be lookt upon but as just reward● of their learning and piety , who are fit to be in any degree of church-government ; also enablements to works of charity and hospitality , meet strenthnings of their authority in point of respect , and observance . 27. i would have such men bishops , as are most worthy of those encouragements , and be ablest to use them . 28. a kings good intention , whose judgment faild at any time , makes his errour venial . 29. it is neither just for subjects , nor pious for christians , by violents and indignities , with servile restraints to seek to force their king and soveraign , against the well-laid gounds of his judgment , to consent to any their weak and divided novelties , touching the government of the church . 30. i could never see any probable shew in true reason and in scripture for the government of the church otherwise than by bishops , the greatest pretenders of a different sense , either contenting themselves with the examples of some churches in their infancy and solitude , when one presbyter might serve one congregation , in a city or countrey ; or else denying these most evident truths : 1. that the apostles were bishops over those presbyters they ordained , as well as over the churches they planted . 2. that government being necessary for the churches wellbeing , when multiplied and sociated , must also necessarily descend from the apostles to others , after the example of that power and superiority they had above others , which could not end with their persons , since the use and ends of such government still continue . 31. ignorance , superstition , a●varice , revenge , with other disorderly and disloyal passions , have so blown up some mens minds against episcopal government in the church , that what they want of reasons or primitive patterns , they supply with violence and oppression . 32. some mens zeal for bishops lands , houses , and revenues , hath set them on work to eat up episcopacy . 33. a king solemnly obliged by an oath , agreable to his judgment , to preserve episcopal government , and the rights of the church , hath a particular engagement , above other men , so to do . 34. the said king being daily by the best disquisition of truth , more confirmed in the reason and religion of that to which he is sworn , no man that wisheth not his damnation , can perswade him at once to so notorious and combined sins , as those of sacriledg and perjury , in parting with episcopacy . 35. men of ambitious covetousness and secrilegious cruelty , will torture with their king , both church and state , in civil dissentions , till ( if he have not an invincible resolution ) he shall not be forced to consent and declare , that he does approve what ( god knowes ) he utterly dislikes , and in his soul abhors . 36. should a king , pressed by imperious subjects , shamefully and dishonouraly give his consent to any bold demand , against reason , justice , and religion ; yet should he not by so doing , satisfie the divided interests and opinions of those parties ( if any such be among them ) which contend with each other , as well as both against him. 37. the abuses of episcopacy deserve to be extirpated as much as the use retained . 38. a right episcopacy doth at once satisfie all just desires and interests of good bishops , humble presbyters , and sober people ; so as church-affairs should be managed neither with tyranny , parity , nor popularity ; neither bishops ejected , nor presbyters despised , nor people oppressed . 39. a king that can seldom get opportunities to treat with subjects in armes against him , should yet never want either desire or disposition to it , having greater considence of his reason than his sword. 40. a king should very unwillingly be compelled to defend himself with arms against his subjects , and very willingly embrace any thing tending unto peace . 41. no success should ever enhaunce with a king the price of peace between him and his subjects , which should be as earnestly desired by him as any man , though he be like to pay dearer than any man for it , so he reserve his honour and his conscience . 42. a king should condescend to the desires of his subjects as far as reason , honour and conscience will give him leave , having special regard to those differences that are essential to the security or prosperity of his people . to deny some other demands , may be the greatest justice to himself , and favour to his subjects . 43. a king willing to condescend to the setling of church-affairs , so as he may give satisfaction to all men , must have a care not to comply with such whom faction , covetousness , or superstition , may have engaged more than any true zeal , charity , or love of reformation . 44. although a king may be content to yield to all that may seem to advance true piety ; yet he must seek to continue what is necessary in point of order , maintenance , and authority to the church's government , especially if he be perswaded that it is most agreable to the true principles of all government raised to its full stature and perfection , as also to the primitive apostolical pattern , and the practise of the universal church conform thereto . 45. the king is very excusable both before god and all unpassionate men , for the distance between him and subjects in arms against him , that in treaties and transactions , endeavoureth no less the restauration of peace to his people , than the preservation of his own crowns to his posterity . 46. if such treaties give occasion to any mans further restiveness , it is imputable to their own depraved tempers , not to any concessions or negations of their king , who has alwayes the content of what he offered , and they the regret and blame for what they refused . 47. a king may presage the unsuccessfulness of any treaty with his subjects , among whom he finds an unwillingness to treat , that implying some things to be gained by the sword , whose unreasonableness they are loth to have fairly scanned , being more proper to be acted by soldiers , than by counselors . 48. when god gives a king victory over his subjects in armes against him , it is to try him , that he may know how with moderation and thanks , to own and use his power , who is the only true lord of hosts , able when he pleases , to repress the confidence of those who fight against him , though with great advantage for power and numbers . 49. a king , who for small beginnings on his part at length is attended on by an army , wherewith ▪ he may encounter his rebellious subjects , has this comfort , that he is not wholly forsaken by his peoples love , or gods protection . 50. when god at any time permits the same king to be worsted by his enemies , it is to exercise his patience , and teach him not to trust in the arme of flesh , but in the living god. 51. they who fight against their king , are forced to slie to the shifts of some pretended fears , and wild fundamentals of state ( as they use to call them ) which actually overthrow the present fabrick both of church and state. 52. the imaginary reasons which rebels alledg for self defence , are commonly most impertinent , and such as will fit any faction that hath but power and confidence enough to second with the sword all their demands against the present lawes and governours . 53. lawes and governours can never be such as some side or other will not find fault with , so as to urge what they call a reformation of them to a rebellion against them . 54. they are parasitick preachers , that dare call those martyrs , who died fighting against their king , the lawes , their oaths , and right religion established . for , 55. sober christians know , than the glorious title of martyr can with truth be applied only to those who seriously prefer god's truth and their duty , in all the foresaid particulars , before their lives , and all that is dear to them in this world. 56. the wounds and temporal ruines of those loyal subjects who are slain in civil wars , serve as a gracious opportunity for their eternal health and happiness , while the evident approach of death , through god's grace , effectually disposeth their hearts to such humility , faith and repentance , which together with the rectitude of their engagement fully prepares them for a better life than that which their enemies brutish and disloyal firceness can deprive them of , or without repentance hope to enjoy . 57. those rebels who may have often the better against their king's side in the field , will never have so at the bar of god's tribunal , or their own consciences . 58. the condition of loyal subjects ( in a civil war ) though conquered , and dying for their king , no question is infinitely more to be chosen by a sober man ( that duly values his duty , his soul , and eternity , beyond the enjoyments of this present life ) than the most triumphant glory , wherein their and their kings enemies supervive , who can hardly avoid to be daily tormented by that horrid guilt , wherewith their suspicious , or convicted consciences do pursue them . 59. in the safety and preservation of a king and good lawes established all honest men , cannot but think the wellfare of their country to consist . 60. not any shews , or truth of piety on their side who take armes against their king , are sufficient to dispense with , or expiate , the defects of their duty and loyalty to him , which have so pregnant convictions on mens consciences , that even profaner men are moved by the sense of them to venter their lives for him. 61. when providence gives a good king , or denies him victory , his desire should be neither to boast of his power , nor to charge god foolishly ; but to believe that at last he will make all things to work together for his good . 62. a king 's often messages for peace with his subjects , will shew that he delighteth not in war ; as his gracious concessions will sufficiently testifie , how willingly he would have prevented it ; and his total unpreparedness for it , how little he intended it . 63. when king and subjects are once engaged in a civil war , it may be too late to review the occasions thereof , but not to wish a happy conclusion of so unhapy beginnings ; nor to believe that the inevitable fate of their sins was such as would no longer suffer the divine justice to be quiet . 64. a king is not to desire that any man should be further subject to him , than he and all his people may be subject to god. 65. the passions and opinions of men , are not to be gratified with partiality , and popular compliance to the detriment of the publick , and scandal of religion . 66. it is a sad spectacle for all sober men and their soveraign , to behold the dissolutions of all order and government in a church ; many novelties , and schisms , and corrupt opinions ; many undecencies and confusions in sacred administrations all sacrilegious invasions upon the rights and revenues of a church ▪ much contempt and oppression of the clergy ; many injurious diminutions and persecutings of the king , to follow ( as showers do warm gleams ) the talk of reformation , which yet has been a known artifice to disguise some mens effecting all the fore-mentioned mischief , who have pretended authority , and been possessed of power to accomplish it . 67. the studies to please some parties , whose fury is accompted zeal , may injure all . 68. a king may offer to put all differences in church-affairs and religion to the free consultation of a synod or convocation rightly chosen , the results of whose counsels as they will include the votes of all ; so it s like they may give most satisfaction to all . 69. an assembly of divines applied ( though by a parliament ) in an unwonted way , to advise of church-affairs , being not legally convened and chosen , not acting in the name of all the clergy of a kingdom ; not doing any thing with freedom and impartiality ; being limited , and confined , if not overaw'd , to do and declare what they do , is to be so far disliked , nor can it be accounted the representative of a church . 70. many men cried up for learning and piety , met together in an assembly , being not left to the liberty of their own suffrages , have been prevail'd upon by the influence of contrary factions , who made secret encroachments of hopes and fears , to comply with great and dangerous innovations in the church , without any regard to their own former judgment and practise , or to the common interest and honour of the clergy , and in them of order , learning , and religion , against examples of all ancient churches , the lawes in force , and their soveraign's consent . 71. a king's consent ought never to be gained in any point against a pregnant light that shines in his understanding . 72. a due reformation will easily follow moderate counsels , and give content even to many divines who have been led on with much gravity and formality , to carry on other mens designs , which they may discover , though they dare not but smother their frustrations and discontents . 73. the specious and popular titles of christ's government , throne , scepter and kingdom , also the noise of a through reformation , may as easily be fined on new models , as fair colours may be put to ill-favoured figures . 74. christ's kingdom certainly is not divided nor hath two faces , as some reforming parties have had at least . 75. the breaking of church-windows , which time had sufficiently defaced : 2. the putting down of crosses , which were but civil , not religious marks : 3. the defacing of monuments , and inscriptions of the dead , which served but to put posterity in mind to thank god for that clearer light wherein they live : 4. the leaving of ministers to their liberties , and private abilities in the publick service of god , where no christian can tell to what he may say amen , nor what adventure he may make of seeming , at least , to consent to the errours , blasphemies , and ridiculous undecencies , which bold and ignorant men list to vent in their prayers , preaching , and other offices : 5. the setting forth of old catechisms , and confessions of faith new-drest , importing as much as if there had been no sound or clear doctrine of faith in the church , before a long consultation had matured their thoughts touching the first principles of religion . all these , and the like , are the effects of poular , specious , and deceitfull reformations . 76. it were to be wished , that some most pretending reformers had made it their unanimous work , to do god's work , and not their own ; they had not ( as now they have ) left all things more deformed , than when they began , in point of piety , morality , charity , and good order . 77. they who think that the government of a church and state , fixed by many lawes and long customs , will not run into their new molds , endeavour to melt it first in the fire of a civil war , by the advantages of which they resolve , if they prevail , to make their king and all his subjects fall down and worship the images they shall form and set up . 78. christ's government will confirm the king's , not overthrow it , if as he owns his from christ , so he desires to rule for his glory , and his churches good . 79. had some men truly intended christ's government , or known what is meant in their hearts , they could never have been so ill governed in their words and actions , both against their king , and one another . 80. the freedom and secresie of a king 's private letters , especially unto his queen , commands a civility from all men , nor is there any thing more inhumane , than to expose them ( if taken ) to publick view . 81. the king that studies to approve his heart to god's omniscience , may be content ( if providence will have it so ) that even his private letters , if taken by his subjects in arms against him , should be discovered to the world , though without any those dresses , or popular captations which some of them use in their speeches and expressions . 82. unquiet subjects , many times take armes against a just , prudent , and innocent king , into whose most retired thoughts , if they could by any means have a clear sight , they might discover how they are divided between the love and care he hath , not more to preserve his own rights , than to procure their peace and happiness , and an extreme grief to see them both deceived and destroyed . 83. no man can blame a king that by all fair and just correspondencies endeavours to avoid the pressures of his enemies , though his own subjects . 84. some mens design , like absoloms , is by enormous actions to widen differences between a king and his subjects , and exasperate all sides to such distances , as may make all reconciliation desperate . 85. a king under the misfortune of having his letters taken by subjects in armes against him , hath much quiet and satisfaction within himself , when the integrity of his intentions is not jealous of any injury his expressions can do them ; for , 86. although the confidence of privacy may admit of greater freedom in writing letters , which may be liable to envious exceptions ; yet it is best for a king , when the innocence of his chief purposes , cannot be so stained or misinterpreted by his enemies , as not to let all men see , that he wisheth nothing more than a happy composure of differences with justice and honour , not more to his own than his peoples content , who have any sparks of love , or loyalty , left in them . 87. it repaireth somewhat a king's misfortune , that his private letters being taken by his subjects in armes against him , cannot gratifie their malice , further than to let them see his constancy to his wife , the lawes , and right religion he professeth ; as likewise to convince them , that he can both mind , and act his own and his kingdoms affairs , so as becomes a prince ; especially , if his enemies have before been very loath it should be believed of him ; as if he were wholly confined to the dictates and directions of others , whom they please to brand with the names of evil counsellours . 88. it is the policy of rebels , to seek by all means to smother and extinguish all sparkes of love , respect and loyalty of the people to their king , that they may never kindle again so as to recover his , the lawes , and the kingdoms liberties , which they seek to overthrow . 89. god's unerring and impartial justice can , and will over-rule the most perverse wills and designs of men . he is able , and will turn even the worst of an innocent king's enemies thoughts , and actions to his good . 90. civility and humanity most become such as pretend to religion , which they ought to pay to all men , beside that respect and honour they owe to their king. 91. they who do but remember how god blest the modest respect , and filial tenderness , which noah's sons bare to their father , can never expect the divine approbation of any their undecent actions toward their king. 92. their malicious intentions can never be either excusable , or prosperous , who think by any unhandsome means to expose their king to the highest reproach and contempt of his people , forgetting that duty of modest concealment ; which they owe to the father of their countrey , in case they should discover any real uncomeliness . 93. they who by publishing their king 's private letters think to render him as a vile person , not fit to be trusted , or considered under any notion of majesty , will see themselves mistaken , when god makes him , as he did david , more respected in the hearts of many , who become better satisfied by knowing what he writ , than by learning what they maliciously interpret and report . 94. although god gives kingdoms , yet sometimes his providence permits that the king hath not any place left in them , where he may with safety and honour rest his head : shewing him , that himself is the safest refuge , and the strongest tower of defence , in which he may put his trust . 95. a king in extremities should look not to man so much as to god , who will have it so , that he may wholly cast himself and his distressed affairs upon god's mercy , who hath both hearts and hands of all men in his dispose . 96. necessity may sometimes command a king to withdraw from his chiefest strength , and adventure upon their loyalty , who first began his troubles , whom god happily may make a means honourably to compose them 97. when necessity constrains a king to cast himself upon them , who though they besiege him in his garrison , and encounter him in the field , yet profess , they fight not against him , but for him ; he puts himself to resolve the riddle of their loyalty , and gives them opportunity to let the world see , they mean not what they do , but what they say . 98. god sees it sometimes not enough to desert a king of all military power to defend himself , but to put him upon using their power , who seem to fight against him , yet ought in duty to defend him . 99. when a king finds it necessary to leave those that have adhered to him , he may hope such a method of peace may be more prosperous than that of war , both to stop the effusion of blood , and the wounds that were made before . 100. a king should never trust any nation of his subjects further than to men , that if they betray him , he may justifie to all the world they have not deceiv'd him : and if they sell him at any dear rate , he should be only sorry that his price should be so much above his saviours . the tenth century . 1. god sometimes sees t is fit to deprive a king of wife , children , army , friends , and freedom , that he may be wholy his , who alone is all . 2. a king should never permit them who have got his person , to gain his consent against his conscience . 3. a king's denial of unjust demands made by subjects in armes against him , which they call obstinacy , he may know god acounts honest constancy , which reason and religion , as well a honour , forbid him to recede . 4. it is evident sometimes , that subjects , who pretend to fight against evil counsellours with their king , , fight indeed against a good conscience within him : and whatsoever they may say of course , intend not to bring him to his parliament , till they have brought his mind to their obedience . 5. after-times may see what the blindness of that age will not , wherein is both practis'd and countenanced subjects fighting against their soveraign , whom , if they have a good king , god may at length shew , that he chuseth rather to suffer for them , than with them . 6. when providence is pleased to deprive a king of all other civil comforts , and secular attendants , the absence of them all may best be supplied by the attendance of such his chaplains , whom for their functions he reverenceth , and for their fidelity may have cause to love . 7. as a king never needs , so he should never desire more the service and assistance of clergy-men judiciously pious , and soberly devout , than when by misfortune sequesterd from civil comforts , and secular attendants . 8. a distressed king cannot think some divines , though he respects them for that worth and piety which may be in them , proper to be his present comforters and physicions , who have had a great influence in occasioning the publick calamities in his kingdoms , and inflicting the wounds he hath upon himself . 9. the spirits of those divines , whose judgments stand at a distance from their king , or in jealousie of him , or in opposition against him , cannot so harmoniously accord with his , or his with theirs , either in prayer , or other holy duties , as is meet and most comfortable , whose golden rule , and bond of perfection , consists in that of mutual love and charity . 10. the king , who is much a friend to all church-men , that have any thing in them beseeming that sacred function , will , if there be cause , hazard his own interest upon conscience and constancy to maintain their rights . 11. such clergy-men who so unhandsomely requite their king , as to desert him in his calamity , when their loyalty and constancy is most required , may live to repent no less for his sufferings , than their own ungratefull errours , and that injurious contempt and meanness which they bring upon their calling and persons . 12. an afflicted king , though he pities all clergy-men that desert him , and despiseth none of a different opinion from his , yet sure he may take leave to make choise of some for his special attendants , who are best approved in his judgment , and most sutable to his affection . 13. a king imprisoned by his subjects , to whom they will not permit the attendance of his chaplains , can make no more charitable construction of their denial , than that they esteem him sufficient himself to discharge his duty to god as a priest , though not to men as a prince . 14. i think both offices , regal and sacerdotal , might well become the same person , as anciently they were under one name , and the united rights of primogeniture . 15. a king cannot follow better presidents , if he be able , than those two eminent david and solemon , not more famous for their scepter and crowns , than one was for devout psalms and prayers ; the other for his divine parables and preaching ; whence the one merited and assumed the name of a prophet , the other a preacher , titles of greater honour , where rightly placed , than any of those the roman emperours affected from the nations they subdued . but , 16. since the order of god's wisdome and providence , hath for the most part alwayes distinguished the gifts and offices of kings and priests ; of princes and preachers , both in the jewish and christian churches , an imprisoned king may be sorry to find himself reduced to the necessity of being both , or injoying neither . 17. as a soveraign owes his clergy the protection of a christian king ; so he should desire to enjoy from them the benefit of their gifts and prayers . 18. however , as the spiritual government , by which the devout soul is subject to christ , and through his merits daily offers it self and its services to god , every private believer is a king and priest , invested with the honour of a royal priesthood , yet he is not thereby constituted priest or preacher , as to the outward polity of the church . 19. a king's consciousness to his spiritual defects , may make him more prize and desire those pious assistances which , especially in any his exigencies , holy and good ministers , either bishops or presbyters , may afford him . 20. the king is reduced to great extremities , to whom by god's pleasure and permission to his subjects , nothing is left but his life for them to take from him ; and nothing more to desire of them , which might little seem to provoke their jealousies and offence to deny him , ( as some have done ) than this of having some means afforded him , for his souls comfort and support . 21. when a king , reduced to extremity by his subjects , makes choice of chaplains to assist him , that are men no way scandalous , and every way eminent for their learning and piety , no less than for their loyalty , no exceptions imaginable can be made against them , but only this , that they may seem too able , and too well affected toward him and his service . 22. a king should count his misfortunes the greater by far , when they light also upon the young prince his son , and any others whom he may have cause to love so well as himself : and of whose unmerited sufferings he should have a greater sense than of his own . 23. the different education of princes , hath different success when they come to exercise their government : the evidence of which holy writ affords us in the contemplation of david and rehoboam : the one prepared by many afflictions for a flourishing kingdom ; the other softned by the unparallel'd prosperity of solomon's court , and so by flatteries corrupted to the great diminution both of peace , honour , and kingdom . 24. a distressed king may trust , that god will graciously direct all the black lines of affliction , which he pleaseth to draw on him to the centre of true happiness , if by them he be drawn neerer of god. 25. when a yong prince shall attain the crown whereof his father was injuriously devested ; he ought first to do justice to god , his own soul , and his church , in the profession and prosecution both of truth and unity in religion ; the next main hinge on which his prosperity will depend and move being that of civil justice , he is to administer to his people . 26. when a good king is persecuted by his own subjects for the preservation of a right religion and just lawes established , he may ( without vanity ) turn the reproach of his sufferings , as to the world's censure , into the honour of a kind of martyrdome , as to the testimony of his own conscience . 27. since a distressed king knowes not how god will deal with him , as to a removal of the pressures and indignities which his justice , even by the very unjust hands of some of his own subjects may have been pleased to lay upon him , he should not be much solicitous , what wrong he suffers from man , while he retains in his soul what he believes is right before god. 28. in civil dissentions between king and subjects , though he offer all for reformation and safely that in reason , honour and conscience he can ; yet he must reserve whatsoever he cannot consent unto , without an irreparable injury to his own soul , the chruch , and his people , and the next undoubted heir of his kingdoms . 29. no difficulties are insuperable to divine providence . 30. when a yong prince , after his fathers decease , comes to the government of kingdoms , which tumults and civil wars had put into disorder , he ought seriously to consider the former real or objected miscariages which might occasion his troubles , that so he may avoid his own . 31. by the sun-shine of god's mercy , and the splendour of a princes virtues , whole mountains of congealed factions may be thawed and dissipated . 32. acts of indempnity and oblivion should by an indulgent king be offered to so great a latitude , as may include all that can but suspect themselves to be any way obnoxious to the lawes , and which may serve to exclude all future jealousies and insecurities . 33. if god see fit to restore an injur'd king to the enjoyment of his kingdoms , he ought then to let the prince his son fully understand the things that belong to god's glory , his own honour , and the kingdoms peace . 34. a charitable king , though injur'd by his subjects , for the future peace of his kingdoms , should encourage the prince his successour to be as confident as himself , that the most part of all sides , who have done amiss , have done so not out of malice , but misinformation or misapprehension of things . 35. whatsoever good the royal father intended to church , or state , in times uncapable of it , should be performed by the prince his son , when possessed of his kingdom and power . 36. it is a prayer and benediction worthy of an afflicted king that god would after his decease so bless the prince his son and successour , as to establish his kingdoms in righteousness , his soul in true religion , and his honour in the love of god and his people . 37. though god permit disloyalty to be perfected by the destruction of a king ; yet he may make his memory and name live ever in his son , as of his father that lov'd him , and a king under whom his kingdoms flourished for a time . 38. a king in affliction should believe god's power , and have hope of his will to restore him to his rights , despairing neither of his mercy , nor of his peoples love and pity . 39. although a king 's domestick enemies use all the the poyson of falsity , and violence of hostility to destroy first the love and loyalty which is in his subjects ; and then all that content of life in him , which from these he chiefly enjoyed ; yet they may fail of their end , and after the many deaths the king suffers for the good will of his people , he may not be wholly dead , till their further malice and cruelty take that little of life too , the husk and shell ( as it were ) which they had only left him. 40. although that a king must die as a man , is certain ; that he may die a king by the hands of his own subjects , a violent , sodain , barbarous death , in the strength of his years , in the midst of his kingdoms , his friends and loving subjects being helpless spectatours ; his enemies insolent revilers and triumphers over him , living , dying , and dead ; may sometimes be probable in humane reason , nought else being to be hoped for , as to mans cruelty ; yet he is not to despair of god's infinite mercy . 41. it is not easie for a depressed king to contend with those many horrours of death , wherewith god may suffer him to be tempted ; which may be equally horrid , either in the suddenness of a barbarous assasination , or in the solemn cruelty of an unjust sentence , and publick execution . 42. a king under such a sad apprehension , must humbly desire to depend upon god , and to submit to his will both in life and death , in what order soever he is pleased to lay them out to him . 43. all soveraigns are obliged to own god as king of kings , not only for the eminency of his power and majesty above them , but also for that singular care and protection which he hath over them , in the many dangers they are expos'd unto . 44. god many times so pleads the cause of that king which he permits to be in the power of disloyal and bloudy-minded subjects , that he shewes him the sad confusions following his destruction presaged and confirmed to him , by those he lives to see in his troubles ; and god gives his enemies cause to fear , that he will both further divide , and by mutual vengeance afterward destroy them . 45. it may be the king's comfort who is wronged , and dethroned by his subjects , that god gives him not only the honour to imitate christ's example in suffering for righteousness sake , though obscured by the foulest charges of tyranny and injustice , but the charity both to forgive them , and pray for them , that god would not impute his bloud to them , further than to convince them what need they have of christ's bloud to wash their souls from the guilt of shedding his . 46. the unfortunate king that sees himself destin'd to be murther'd by his cruel subjects , may bless god , if he has the heart to pray , not so much that the bitter cup of a violent death may pass from him , as that of his wrath may pass from all those whose hands by deserting him are sprinkled , or by acting and consenting to his death are embrued with his bloud . 47. rebellious subjects cannot deprive a king of more than he may be content to lose , when god sees fit by their hands , to take it from him , whose mercy he is to believe , will more than iufinitely recompence what ever by mans injustice , he is pleased to deprive him of . 48. a miserable king shall not want the heavy and envied crowns of this world , when god hath mercifully crowned and consummated his graces with glory , and exchanged the shadowes of his earthly kingdoms among men for the substance of that heavenly kingdom with himself . 49. a good king overpower'd by rebbels , may notwithstanding be perswaded within himself , that he is happy in the judicious love of the ablest and best of his subjects , who may not only pity and pray for him , but may be content even to dy with him , or for him . 50. no subjects that pretend to punish , can reasonably therein exceed the errours of their princes , especially where more than sufficient satisfaction hath been made to the publick , the enjoyment of which private ambitions may have frustrated . 51. an injur'd king's chiefest comfort in death consists in his peace made with god ; before whose exact tribunal he need not fear to appear , as to any cause long-disputed by the sword between him and his causeless enemies . 52. a good king may look upon it with infinite more content and quiet of soul , to have been worsted in his enforced contestation for , and vindication of the just lawes of his land , the freedom and honour of his parliaments , the rights of his crown , the just liberty of his subjects , and the true christian religion in its doctrines , government , and due encouragements , than if he had with the greatest advantages of success evercome them all . 53. the king that suffers for christ , as he is the authour of truth , order , and peace , being forced to contend against errour , faction and confusion , shall through christ enabling him , be more than conquerour in the end . 54. although any violent death of an unfortunate king be the wages of his own sin , as from god , and the effect of others sins , as men , both against god and him ; yet , as he may hope his own sins are so remitted , that they shall be no ingredients to imbitter the cup of his death ; so should he desire god to pardon their sins who are most guilty of his destruction ; or that his temporal death unjustly inflicted by them , may not be reveng'd by god●s just inflicting eternal death upon them . 55. an unfortunate king , though us'd like jonas , should wish no other , than the safe-bringing of the ship to shore , when they have cast him over-board . 56. the cruelty of a devoted king's enemies cannot prevent his preparation , whose malice , by god's mercy , he may in this defeat , that they shall not have the satisfaction to have destroyed his soul with his body . 57. conversation is the chief joy , or vexation , of a king's life . 58. the conversation a king has in his troubles can be no way satisfactory or usefull , when some about him are too wise , others too foolish ; some too busie , others too reserved , many fantastick . 59. a king much delighted with the conversation of his vertuous queen , is hard to be pleased by any else about him , when forced to part from her , but not less to be pitied by her , who is the only cure for that disease . 60. a vertuous queen's kindness is as necessary to comfort the heart of her king who is separated from her by his troubles or misfortunes , as her assistance is for his affairs . 61. a king full fraught with expectation , need pray god to send him a good unlading , especially when some blow of importance is to be given between his and the rebels army in the field . 62. although a king cannot brag of store of mony in his wars ; yet a sharp sword alwayes hinders starving at least . 63. in civil wars , the king may make as good a shift with an empty purse as the rebels . 64. a generous queen whose affection to her king is truly grounded , will be in as much ( if not more ) trouble to find his reputation , as his life in danger . 65. when distractions in religion arise amongst rebels , and general is set against general in point of command , a treaty with their king may be most desireable , and not to be refused by him , when all means used to procure it , shall be consistent with his royal honour and safety , and all else unquestionably councelable considered . 66. when rebels , confident of their power , or obstinate in their purpose , become somewhat difficult to be brought into a treaty , the sound of their king 's coming to them may have some force of popular rhetorick to obtain it ; of , if refused , it may bring much prejudice to them , and be advantageous to their king. 67. when foolish or malicious peope shall interpret their king's desire , to treat with rebels to proceed from fear or folly ; he is to joyn such conditions with the proposition of it , as may be found to be most of the chief ingredients of an honourable and safe peace . 68. a king may prudently yield to a treaty with rebels in their quarters , so that the conditions save any aspersion of dishonour , if factious spirits about him are likely to infuse their malignity in his own . 69. when a king in some apprehension , expresseth his inclination to treat with rebels , from whence false malicious rumours may give trouble to his absent queen ; although he judge himself secure in her thoughts from suspecting him guilty of any baseness ; yet he may hold it necessary to send her some account , to the end she may make others know as well as her self this , which ought to be a certain truth , that no danger of death or misery ( which he may think much worse ) should make him do any thing unworthy of her love . 70. in times of rebellion , when diverse men propose several recompences to themselves for their pains and hazard with their king , the recovery of the company of a loyal and vertuous queen , may be the only reward the said king will expect and wish for himself . 71. a king in no extremity , should make a peace with rebels by abandoning his friends , or such a one as will not stand with his honour and safety . 72. although a king cannot part with the patrimony of the church , yet whatsoever shall be offered for rectifying abuses , if any hath crept in , or yet for the ease of tender consciences ( so that it endammage not the foundation ) he may be content to hear , and should be ready to give a gracious answer thereunto . 73. as it is the king's duty to protect the church , so it is the churches to assist the king in the maintenance of his just authority . 74. a king should be alwayes carefull to keep the dependency of his clergy entirely upon his crown , without which it will scarcely sit fast upon his head . 75. after conscience , the militia is certainly the fittest subject for a king's quarrel , the kingly power without it being but as a shadow , and therefore upon no means in any treaty to be quitted . 76. in the time of civil war , news at home may be too good to be told in the court of a foreign prince , though a friend to the king attacqued by his rebellious subjects : there being certainly as much dexterity in publishing of newes , as in matters which at first sight may seem of greater difficulty ; for , as the engaged king would not have his friends think that all assistance bestowed upon him were in vain●● so would he not have them believe that he needed no help , least they should under hand assist any rebels , to keep the ballance of dissention amongst them equal . 77. the good of ignorance of a friends danger by a storm is not known , before certain assurance of his [ or her ] escape . 78. it is not the least of a king's misfortunes , that his vertuous queen should run much hazard for his sake . 79. although a queen have expressed so much love to her distressed king as he may think impossible to be repay'd by any thing he can do , much less by words : yet his royal heart being full of affection for her , admiration of her , and impatient passion of gratitude unto her , he ought to say something , leaving the rest to be read by her , out of her own noble heart . 80. when rebels have once found means to build credit on the peoples opinion , they can proceed under pretence of reformation of religion to dissolve the government of a church . 81. politick rebels under pretence of ill ministers and councellours of estate , know how to invade the majesty of their soveraign in the prerogatives of his crown , and by pretending to remove them , to invest in themselves the domination of all ministries of estate , withdraw their king's revenues into their own hands , and confirm themselves in an absolute power of disposing all . 82. a king by his declarations , setting forth the sinister proceedings of any faction against him , discovering their designs of innovating the government , and falsifying the scandals they had imputed to him , hath the advantage generally to undeceive his people , and to draw to him the nobility and gentry of his kingdom . 83. when a great sedition is raised in one kingdom , the king may not imprudently resolve [ at adventure ] to put himself freely and cleerly , on the love and affections of his subjects in any other , the honour and safety whereof lies nearly at the stake . 84. in rebellious or seditious times , the king may justly expect support from the loyal part of his subjects , till the common safety be secured . 85. when people of one kingdom invade their king in his other , two things are chiefly considerable by his great councel for the safety and security thereof . 1. the chasing out the rebels . 2. his satisfying the just grievances of those that adhere unto him , wherein he should promise to concur heartily and clearly with them , that all the world may see his intentions have ever been , and will be , to make that a glorious and flourishing kingdom . 86. the dishonour and mischief must needs be great , if for want of mony , a king's army be disbanded before the rebels be put out of his kingdom they invaded . 87. some men , more moliciously than ignorantly will put no difference between reformation , and alteration of government . 88. what part soever of a king's revenue is found illegal , or heavy to the subjects , a king should be willing to lay down , trusting in their affections . 89. it is not fit for a king to argue the business of high treason which toucheth his principal minister of state , though his parliament countenance it , if in his conscience he cannot condemn him : nor is a parliament to expect , that a positive doctrine should best become the mouth of a prince . 90. if a king cannot condemn ( as a parliament would have him ) his minister of state of high treason , yet cannot say , he can clear him of misdemeanours , the said parliament may find out a way to satisfie justice , and their own fears , and not press his conscience . 91. although a king to satisfie the people , would do great matters , yet in that of conscience , so tender a thing is it , neither fear , nor any other respect whatsoever , should ever make him go against it . 92. a king should omit no occasion , whereby he may shew that affection to his people , which he desires his people would shew to him. 93. it is but the mark of a king's confidence , to put himself wholly upon the love and affection of his people , for his subsistence . 94. a king should never have other design , but to win the affections of his people by his justice in his government . 95. a good king can do nothing with more cheerfullness , than to give his people a general satisfaction , not offering to endeer himself unto them by word ( which should not be his way ) but by acts of setling their religion and just liberties , before he proceeds to any other . 96. it is no prejudice for a king a little to misreckon in time , if not deceived in his end to settle an unquiet nation of his subjects . 97. a king ought to seek his peoples happiness , their flourishing being his greatest glory , and their affections his greatest strength . 98. a soveraign ought to take that care of his son , which shall justifie him to god as a father , and to his dominions as a king. 99. a king ought to assure upon his honour , that he has no thought but peace and justice to his people , which he should by all fair means seek to preserve and maintain , relying upon the goodness and providence of god for the preservation of himself and rights . 100. in ambiguous times , a kings fears should be greater for the religion he professeth , his people , and lawes , than for his own rights and safety . the eleventh century . 1. it is a high thing to tax a king with breach of promise . 2. a parliament may have worse informations , than the king counsels , against which they except . 3. the king of whom the militia is demanded by his parliament , is not to part with it for an hour● nor should that be demanded of a king , wherewith his wife and children are not to be trusted . 4. a king is not to punish or discourage his people for petitioning to him in an humble way , though the subject do not agree with his sense . 5. a king sometimes cannot satisfie his people in a debt due to the country , when all the water goes not to the right mill. 6. when lawes are altered by any other authority , than that by which they were made , the foundations of the peoples happiness are destroyed . 7. when the king is oppressed , and his just kights taken from him , it is impossible for the subjects liberties and properties to be preserved . 8. errours and mistakes among loyal subjects proceeding from misinformation , are removed with more satisfaction and ease to them , than they were received . 9. a king should hold it a piece of his duty , to take the utmost pains he can , fully to inform and undeceive his people ; and rather to prevent crimes , than to punish them . 10. persons of ill dispositions take as great pains to do mischief , and to bring confusion , as good men should for peace and happiness in a kingdom . 11. when a good king sends such propositions of peace and accommodation to his parliament that contested with him , as to which he may expect they should with alacrity submit , if the unexcusable enemies of peace be not strong enough to prevail , he may reasonably hope to have no other use of his loyal peoples affections , but in their prayers , not needing their assistance , when he requireth nothing that with more justice can be denied him , than his crown or life be taken from him. 12. when the religion , liberty-lawes , which are good subjects priviledg and protection , become the quarrel between a king and any his people in rebellion , the taking his towns , ships , armies and money from him , should not dishearten him ; the concurrence and affection of his people with god's blessing will supply and recover all . 13. in time of rebellion , when any country or province have shewed much forwardness , and made great expressions of their affections to the king , he should never be satisfied with himself , till he have found some way to fix a mark of favour and estimation upon the same , which may tell posterity how good subjects , and how much gentlemen they have been . 14. the memory of any signal loyalty shewed by persons or provinces to the royal father , should grow up in a just acknowledgment with his sons . 15. in times of distraction , unquiet spirits will be abroad , and every day throw in new accidents to disturb and confound the publick peace . 16. rebellion that at first but fortifies it self in a town , will at length rise to that insolence , as not to be any longer confined within the walls , but make sallies out to exercise murder , cruelty and rapine upon the persons and possessions of good subjects . 17. the sad effects of counterfeit fears and jealousies in a parliament are such , as no men can tell the least good they do , nor the least evill they prevent . 18. the king against whom all advantages will be taken by persons disaffected to him , should take heed where he comes , that no eminent disorder or damage befall any man by any person of his train , or under his protection . 19. where a party of people have shewed themselves eminently loyal to their king , the fullest testimony of his affection to them , and to the peace of their county may be this , to pass over the considerations of honour and reproach , and not permit a provocation to provoke him to make that place be the seat of his war. 20. no honest man can imagine that his king will ever sit down under a bold and unexcusable treason . 21. a king wholly cast upon the affections of his people , having no hope but in the blessing and assistance of god , the justness of his cause , and the love of his subjects , to recover what is taken from him and them , may expect a good issue , the rather in that they are equal losers with him. 22. when a king desires nothing of his people , but what is necessary to be done for the preservation of god's true religion , the lawes of the land , the liberty of the subject , and the very being of his kingdom , he has reason to look for a speedy and effectual compliance with his demands . 23. a king has no reason to suspect the courage and resolution of those his subjects , whose conscience and loyalty have brought them to him , to fight for their religion , their king , and the lawes of their land , especially when they are to meet with no enemies but traytors , schismaticks , and atheïsts , such as desire to destroy both church and state , and who have before condemned them to ruine for being loyal to their king. 24. it gives courage to the soldier , when his king satisfies him that the cause is just , wherein he means to make use of his valour . 25. if the time of war , and the great necessity and straits a king is driven to , beget any violation of those lawes to which he hath consented , he may hope it shall be imputed by god and man to the authors of the war , and not to him , if so he hath earnestly laboured for the preservation of the peace of his kingdom . 26. the residence of an army is not usually pleasant to any place , and that of a distressed king caries more fear with it , who , it may be thought , must only live upon the aid and relief of his people . 27. it is not prudence in loyal subjects , to suffer a good cause to be lost , for want of supplying their king with that which will be taken from them by those who pursue him with violence . 28. whilst ill men sacrifice their money , plate , and utmost industry to destroy the commonwealth , good men should be no less liberal to preserve it . 29. when it hath pleased god to bless a king with success in a war , he should remember the assistance every particular man gave him , to his advantage . 30. however a king succeeds in his wars , it will be honour and comfort to his loyal subjects , that with some charge and trouble to themselves , they did their part to support their king , and preserve the kingdom . 31. the people that have been awed by a rebellious army , will be more prone to express their affections to their king , with that courage which becomes them , when his residence shall be so near , that his power shall have an influence upon the country for their protection . 32. no man should have more power to fright people from their loyalty , than their king have to restore them to it . 33. loyal subjects , in assisting their king , defend themselves , who may be sure the sword which is drawn against him , will destroy them , if he defend them not . 34. it will be a shame for people to venture nothing for their king , who ventures his life for them . 35. in a civil war , whatsoever good people shall be willing freely to contribute , their king should take kindly from them : and whatsoever they lend him , he should , having passed the word of a king , see justly repayed to them . 36. a king should take especial notice , of such who are backward to contribute in a time of visible necessity . 37. when a king considers the publick interests and concernments of his parliament in the happiness and honour of the nation , and their particular sufferings in a rebellion for their affection and loyalty unto him , he must look upon them as the most competent considerers , and counsellours , how to manage and improve the condition all are in , his and their condition being so equall that the same violence hath oppress'd them all . 38. it will be in vain for them who have informed the world by divers set battels against their king ▪ to boast how tender they have been for the safety of his person . 39. it will be hard for a king , who is to struggle with many defects and necessities , to keep a strict discipline among his soldiers . 40. guilt and despair make rebels sometimes more wicked than they at first intended to be . 41. a king should have no greater sadness for those who are his ill subjects , than he hath joy and comfort in their affections and fidelities , who are his good . 42. license and disorder in an army , will discredit , and may destroy the best cause . 43. subjects ought to remember , that moneys are the nerves of war , and accordingly expedite supplies to their king , when he needs them . 44. there is no profession a king hath made for the defence and maintenance of right religion , lawes and liberties , which he should not inviolably observe . 45. a king's opinion , wherein he differs from his subjects in parliament , should not be like the lawes of the medes and persians , unalterable , being not infallible . 46. nothing should so much afflict a king , as the sense-and feeling he has of the sufferings of his subjects , and the miseries that hang over his kingdoms , when drawn upon them by those , who ( upon pretenses of good ) violently pursue their own interests and ends . 47. such men may be supposed most apt and likely to maintain their power by blood and rapine , who have only got it by oppression and injustice . 48. civil dissentions that are desperate , may encourage and invite a foreign enemy to make a prey of the whole nation where they are . 49. plague , pestilence and famine , will be the inevitable attendants of unnatural contentions between a king and his people . 50. a kingdom being infested with civil war , so general a habit of uncharitableness and cruelty is contracted throughout , that even peace it self will not restore the peace to their old temper and security . 51. in the time of a civil war , the king should be so deeply sensible of the miseries and calamities of his kingdom , and the grievous sufferings of his subjects , as most earnestly to desire that some expedient may be found out , which by the blessing of god , may prevent the further effusion of blood , and restore the nation to peace , from the earnest and constant endeavouring of which , as no discouragement given him on the contrary part should make him cease , so no success on his own should ever divert him. 52. all men , who pretend to goodness , must desire peace : and all men know treaties to be the best and most christian way to procure it . 53. a king can never condescend unto what is absolutely destructive to that just power , which by the lawes of god , and the land , he is born unto . 54. as a king should make no other demands but such as he believes confidently to be just , and much conducing to the tranquillity of the people : so should he be most willing to condescend to them in whatsoever shall be really for their good and happiness . 55. except a king and people have reciprocal care each of other , neither can be happy . 56. a king should never dissemble , nor hide his conscience , when his consent is desired to the alteration of religion , wherewith he is unsatisfied . 57. in times of distraction and division between king and people , if the king be so unfortunate as to sall into their hands , it is ●it for him to be attended by some of his chaplains , whose opinions as clergy-men , he ought to esteem and reverence , not only for the exercise of his conscience , but also for clearing of his judgment concerning the emergent differences in religion . 58. a restrained king , cannot , as he ought , take in consideration the alterations in religion , that may be offered him , without the help of his chaplains or divines , because he can never judge rightly of , or be altered in any thing of his opinion , so long as any ordinary way of finding out the truth is denied him ; but when that is granted him , he should not strive for victory in argument , but seek and submit to truth ( according to that judgment which god hath given him ) alwayes holding it his best and greatest conquest , to give contentment to his people in all things which he conceives not to be against his conscience or honour . 59. a king under such restraint as he is not master of those ordinary actions , which are the undoubted rights of any free-born man , is not in case fit to make concessions , for give answers to his revolted subjects . 60. a king under what restraint soever , should not give his consent to any propositions made to him by his revolted subjects , that require the disclaiming that reason which god hath given him to judge by , for the good of him and his people , and the putting a great violence upon his conscience . 61. it were easie for a distressed king , who intended to wind himself out of troubles by indirect means , readily to consent to whatsoever is proposed to him , and afterward choose his time to break all , alledging that forced concessions are not to be kept : for which he would not incur a hard censure from indifferent men . 62. maximes of fallacy are not to be the guides of a king's actions in extremity . 63. it is held by some unlawfull for any man , and most base in a king , to recede from his promises , for having been obtained by force , or he under restraint . note ] according as the promises may be ; which if unjust and injurious , are not to be adher'd to . 64. a general act of oblivion is the best bond of peace . 65. the wisdom of several kingdoms , hath usually and happily in all ages granted general pardons , whereby the numerous discontentments of many persons and families otherwise exposed to ruine , might not become fuel to new disorders , or seeds to future troubles 66. perpetual dishonour must cleve to that king , who to obtain liberty or other advantage to himself , shall abandon those persons of condition and fortune , that out of a sense of duty have engaged themselves with and for him in his civil wars . 67. liberty being that which in all times hath been the common theme , and desire of all men , common reason shewes , that kings less than any should endure captivity . 68. a king may with patience endure a tedious restraint , so long as he has any hope , that that sort of his suffering may conduce to the peace of his kingdoms , or the hindering of more effusion of blood . 69. a king under restraint , finding by too certain proofs , that his continued patience would not only turn to his personal ruine , but likewise be of much more prejudice than furtherance to the publick good , is bound , as well by natural ; as political obligations , to seek his safety , by retiring himself ( if he can ) for some time from the publick view both of his friends and enemies . 70. no indifferent man can judg but a king has just cause to free himself from the hands of those who change their principles with their condition , and who are not ashamed openly to intend the destruction of his nobility , and with whom the levellers doctrine is rather countenanced than punished . 71. no reasonable man can think , that god will bless those , who refuse to hear their own king when they have him under restraint . 72. although a king may withdraw himself from the ill usage of such his subjects as keep him under restraint , and are deaf to the importunities of his reasonable desires : yet when he may be heard with freedom , honour , and safety , he should instantly break forth through the cloud of his retirement , and shew himself really to be pater patriae . 73. when a king is willing to give ease to the consciences of others , there is no reason why he alone , and those of his judgment , should be pressed to a violation of theirs . 74. it is the definition , not names of things , which make them rightly known . 75. without means to perform , no propsition can take effect . 76. a king , to whom honour , freedom , and safety is not allowed , can no more treat with his subjects that have usurped his power , than a blind man judge of colours , or one run a race , who hath both his feet tied together . 77. a king of two different nations should yield to none in either kingdom , for being truly and zealously affected for the good and honour of both , and his resolution should be never to be partial for either to the prejudice of the other . 78. mercy is as inherent and inseparable to a king as justice . 79. a king should never abuse the love of his loyal subjects , by any power wherewith god shall enable him , to the least violation of the least of their liberties , or the diminution of those immunities which he before had granted them , though they be beyond the acts of his predecessours . 80. in time of civil war , whosoever behaves not himself like a good subject to his king in his kingdom , should not ( if the king can help it ) receive the benefit , and advantage of being his subject in any other ; but all foreign princes should know , that as such a person hath parted with his loyalty to his king , so he must not hope for any security by him , that some example may be made , how easie it is for a king to punish their disloyalty abroad , who for a time may avoid their own king's justice at home . 81. in time of civil war , such who have by weakness and misunderstanding , or through fear and apprehension of danger been so far transported , as to contribute and consent to horrid intestine dissentions , should , by their free and liberal assistance of their king , express , that their former errours proceeded from weakness , not from malice . 82. the experience subjects have of their king's religion , justice , and love of his people , should not suffer them to believe any horrid scandals laid upon him : and their affection , loyalty , and jealousie of his honour , should disdain to be made instruments to oppress their native soveraign , by assisting an odious rebellion . 83. a king's obligation is both in conscience and honour , neither to abandon god's cause , injure his successours , nor forsake his friends . 84. a king so distressed in civil wars , as he cannot flatter himself with expectation of good success , may rest satisfied in this , to end his dayes with honour and a good conscience , which obligeth him to continue his endeavours , in not despairing that god may in due time avenge his own cause . 85. a king in extremity , is not to be deserted by his friends , though he that stayes with him , must expect and resolve , either to dye for a good cause , or ( which is worse ) to live as miserable in maintaining it , as the violence of insulting rebels can make him . 86. as the best foundation of loyalty is christianity ; so true christianity teaches perfect loyalty : for , without this reciprocation , neither is truly what they pretend to be . 87. a king should chuse such commissioners for any treaty with rebels , as will neither be threatned nor disputed from the grounds he hath given them . 88. wherein rebels strain to justifie their breaking off treaties with their king , bare asseverations , without proofs , cannot , i am sure , satisfie any judicious reader . 89. the penners of seditious pamphlets , to justifie the cause of rebels , seek more to take the ears of the ignorant multitude with big words , and bold assertions , than to satisfie rational men with real proofs or true arguments . 90. bare asseverations which bold rebels often make even against what they see , will not get credit with any , but such who abandon their judgments to an implicit faith. 91. the determinations of all the parliaments in the world , cannot make a thing just or necessary , if it be not so of it self . 92. when the reasons upon which the laying by of a king's authority is grounded , are not particularly mentioned for the worlds satisfaction ( if possible ) but involved in general big words , it seems that it is their force of armes , who do it , more than that of reason which they trust to , for procuring of obedience to their determinations , or belief to what they say . 93. it is evident , that the demands of bold rebels have alwayes increased with their good fortune . 94. a king must in no extremity , howsoever pressed to it by rebels , resolve to live in quiet , without honour , and to give his people peace without safety , by abandoning them to an arbitrary unlimited power . 95. reason will hardly maintain those who are afraid of her . 96. indifferent men may often judge of a king's innocency by their way of accusation , who rebel against him ; for those who lay such high crimes to his charge , as the breach of oathes , vowes , protestations , and imprecations , would not spare to bring their proofs if they had any . 97. it is a wrong to a king's innocency , to seek to clear him of such slanders , for which there are no proofs alledged : for malice being once detected , is best answered with neglect and silence . 98. although affection should not so blind one , as to say that his king never erred ; yet , as when a just debt is paid , bonds ought to be cancelled : so grievances , be they never so just , being once redressed , ought no more to be objected as errours : and it is no paradox to affirm , that truths , this way told , are no better than slanders . 99. it is most certain by experience , that they who make no conscience of rebelling , will make less of lying , when it is for their advantage . 100. it is the artifice of rebels , not only to endeavour to make fables pass for currant coin , but likewise to seek to blind mens judgements with false inferences upon some truths . the twelfth century . 1. it cannot be warranted by justice , that any man should be slandred , yet denyed the sight thereof , and so far from being permitted to answer , that if he have erred , there should be no way left him to acknowledg , or mend it . 2. it cannot be made appear , that our saviour and the apostles did so leave the church at liberty , as they might totally alter or change the church government at their pleasure . 3. mens conjectures can breed but a humane faith . 4. the post-scripts of st. paul's epistles though we lay no great weight upon them , yet they are to be held of great antiquity , and therefore such as in question of fact , where there appears no strong evidence to weaken their belief , ought not to be lightly rejected . 5. although faith , as it is an assent unto truth supernatural , or of divine revelation , reacheth no further than the scriptures yet in matters of fact , humane testimonies may beget a faith , though humane , yet certain and infallible . ; 6. it is not to be conceived , that the accessions , or additions , granted by the favour of princes , for the enlarging of the power , or priviledges of bishops , have made , or indeed can make , the government really and substantially to differ from what formerly it was , no more than the addition of armes or ornaments can make a body really , and substantially , to differ from it self naked or divested of the same : nor can it be thought either necessary , or yet expedient , that the elections of the bishops , and some other circumstantials touching their persons or office , should be in all respects the same under christian princes , as it was when christians lived among pagans , and under persecution . 7. it is well worthy the studies and endeavours of divines of both opinions , laying aside emulation and private interests , to reduce episcopacy , and presbytery , into such a well proportioned form of superiority and subordination , as may best resemble the apostolical and primitive times , so far forth as the different condition of the times , and the exigents of all considerable circumstances will admit , so as the power of church-government , in the particular of ordination , which is meerly spiritual , may remain authoritative in the bishop , but that power not to be exercised without the concurrence , or assistance , of the presbytery . 8. other powers of government , which belong to jurisdiction , though they are in the bishops , yet the outward exercise of them may be ordered and disposed , or limited by the soveraign power , to which by the lawes of the place , and the acknowledgment of the clergy , they are subordinate . 9. the succession of bishops is the best clue , the most certain and ready way by which to find out their original . 10. it hath been often sound , that mutual returns of long answers and replies , have rather multiplied disputes by starting new questions , than informed the conscience , by removing former scruples . 11. in former times , under pagan princes , the church was a distinct body of it self , divided from the common-wealth , and so was to be governed by its own rules and rulers . the bishops therefore of those times , though they had no outward coercive power over mens persons or estates , yet in as much as every christian man , when he became a member of the church , did ipso facto , and by that his own voluntary act , put himself under their government , they exercised a very large power of jurisdiction● in spiritualibus , in making ecclesiastical canons , receiving accusations , conventing the accused , examining of witnesses , judging of crimes , excluding such as they found guilty of scandalous offences from the lord's supper , enjoyning penances upon them , casting them out of the church , receiving them again upon their repentance , &c. and all this they exercised as well over presbyters , as others : but after that the church , under christian princes , began to be incorporated into the common-wealth , whereupon there must of necessity follow a complication of the civil and ecclesiastical powers , the jurisdiction of bishops ( in the outward exercise of it ) was subordinate unto , and limited by the supreme civil power . 12. although there be no cause to dislike their opinion , who derive the episcopal power originally from christ himself , without whose warrant the apostles would not either have exercised it themselvs , or derived it to others ; yet for that the practise in them is so clear and evident , and the warrant from him expressed but in general terms , ( as my father sent me , so send i you , and the like ) we may chuse rather to fix the claim of the power upon that practise as the more evidential way , than upon the warrant , which by reason of the generality of expression would bear more dispute . 13. arguments drawn from names , and words , and conjectural expositions of scripture , are subject to such frailties , as in debate will give little satisfaction to his judgment and conscience , that requites it . 14. the testimonies of so many writers , ancient , and modern , as have been produced for the scripture-original of bishops , may be conceived of so great importance in a question of this nature , that we are bound both in charity and reason to believe , that so many men , of such quality , would not have asserted the same with so much confidence , but upon very good ground . 15. one witness for the affirmative ought to be of more value , than ten for the negative ; and the testimony of one person that is not interessed , than of an hundred that are . 16. a prince to shew the greatness of his mind , is rather to conquer his enemies by pardoning , than by punishing . 17. a king may expect not to be ceusur'd for having parted with too much of his right , when the price and commodity is so great , such as security to himself , and peace to his people . 18. a prudent parliament ought to remember how usefull a king's power is to a peoples liberty . 19. a prince is never to affect more greatness or prerogative , than what is really and intrinsecally for the good of his subjects , not satisfaction of favourites . 20. a prince that so useth his prerogative , will never want means to be a father to all , and a bountifull prince to any he would be extraordinarily gracious unto . 21. all men trust their treasure where it returns them interest . 22. if princes like the sea , receive , and repay , all the fresh streams and rivers trust them with , they will not grudge , but pride themselves , to make them up an ocean . 23. subjects , who have learnt , that victories over their princes , are but triumphs over themselves , will be more unwilling to hearken to changes afterward . 24. a distressed king may best learn to own himself , by retiring into himself , and therefore can the better digest what befalls him , not doubting but god can restrain his enemies malice , and turn their fierceness unto his praise . 25. if god give an injur'd king success against rebels , he ought to use it humbly , and far from revenge ▪ 26. if god restore an exil'd king to his right upon hard conditions , whatsoever he promiseth , he ought to keep . 27. those men who have forced lawes , which they were bound to observe , will find their triumphs full of troubles . 28. a prince is not to think any thing in this world worth obtaining by foul and unjust means . 29. no earthly power can justly call a king in question as a delinquent . 30. a good king will not without shewing a reason seek to impose a belief upon his subjects . 31. there is no proceeding just against any man , but what is warranted either by god's lawes , or the municipal lawes of the country where he lives . 32. the true liberty of subjects consists not in the power of government , but in living under such lawes , such a government , as may give themselves the best assurance of their lives , and propriety of their goods . 33. the king who has a trust committed to him by god , by old and lawfull descent , must not betray it , to answer to a new unlawfull authority . 34. it is a great sin for subjects , to withstand lawfull authority , as it is to submit to an authority tyrannical , or any other wayes unlawfull . 35. a hasty sentence once past , may be sooner repented , than recalled ▪ 36. it is in vain , for a king to be a sceptick , by denying the power rebels have , when greater than he can resist . 37. a hasty judgment , passed upon the life of a king , may bring on that trouble and perpetual inconveniency to a kingdom , that the child which is then unborn may repent it . 38. god many times does pay justice by an unjust sentence . 39. conquest is never just , except there be a good just cause , either for matter of wrong of just title , and then they that go beyond it , the first quarrel that they have to it , is it that makes unjust at the end what was just at first . 40. sole matter of conquest is a great robbery . 41. those magistrates or officers will never be right , nor will god ever prosper them , who give not god his due , their king his due , and the people their due . 42. the regulating a church rightly , according to holy scripture , is , to give god his due , a national synod , freely called , freely debating among themselves , must settle the church , if out of order , when that every opinion is freely , and clearly heard . 43. a subject and a soveraign are clean different things ; and a share in government is nothing pertaining to the people . finis . to the reader . friend , this century may be complete , and others added , when more of his sacred majesty's writings shall be published . which advertisement i pray take with you , as you proceed to the other titles , under which you may apprehend the like defect at the end . icon animae basilicae : the pourtraiture of a royal soul , drawn from the transcendent meditations of king charles i. by richard watson . habebat perfectum animum ad summam sui adductus , supra quam nihil est nis● mens dei , ex qua pars & in hoc pectus mortale de fluxit , quod nunquam magis divinum est , quàm ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat , & scit in hoc natum hominem , ut vitâ defungeretur . senec. epist . 120. london , printed for robert horn , 1661. to the reader . friend , philo the jew tels us , that tharra among the hebrews , and socrates among the greeks , were men so noted for meditation and retirement within themselves , that whosoever in aftertime , by such a reflex knowledge , could give an exact character of his soul , had that name as a title of hon●r in each nation . if you do right to this piece , apart presented unto your view , you must needs acknowledg that not any of our britannike kings ha's done a design , by which he merited to have his name transmitted to posterity with that advantage , as charles the first ; who in a time of such distraction , when most of his subjects acted by a very uncertain light ; some of them mistook themselves , and others took great pains to disguise and lay counterfeit colours upon their conscience , drew so exquisite a pourtraicture of a pious and prudent prince , as it appears most evident , he then took not first the pencil in hand to practise , but began to exercise , in the very dawn of his reason , what skill he perfected in the glory and luster of his reign , though he copied it not for his royal successours , and religious subjects , until the approaching twilight , or setting of his sun in bloud . the picture is not here exposed , to be onely lookt upon by a curious eye , to have the hand commended , and then the curtain drawn ; what more is mean't , will best be known by such as seriously intend to imitate , and have a devout ambition , by a like looking into their souls , and meditating on their duties , in their several capacities , to deserve the honour of that great name , which ought to be held venerable among us in all succeeding ages . of which number i wish you one , and my self likewise , your humble servant , richard watson . cent. 1 beginneth pag. 217 cent. 2 beginneth pag. 241 cent. 3 beginneth pag. 265 cent. 4 beginneth pag. 294 errata . the reader is desired to mend the following escapes , and whomsoever he censures , to impute neither mistake nor negligence to the collectour . title page read basilicae . epistle dedicatory . page 1 r. recognize . p. 24 r. i● after some few years revolution , &c. effata regalia . century 1. num . 2. r. allay . n 6 r the grounds . n 30 r stupidity . n 73 r conscious . n 77 r saviour . n 79 r merits . n 82 r though they should be satiated . n 86 r soul of a queen . century 2. n ● r praie●● . n 28 r ●ay serve n 49 r propound . n 75 r streightness . n 90 r false & evil . century 3 n 5 r with prejud●ces . n 20 r considerations , nor designs n 81 r oblequie . cent. 4 n 31 r upon functions . n 89 r to christs rule . cent. 5 n 22 r not ●orosely . cent. 6 n 10 r differences in religion , and offences , by &c. n 23 r a di●●●dence o● his own judgment n 66 r aggravations , n 91 r that as the greatest temptations , &c. cent. 7 n 8 r their pilot. n 71 r who will avoid . cent. 8. n 32 r from their pr●reption . n 49 r philistims . n 55 r portends . cent. 9 n 11 r congregations . n 35 r he shall be forced to consent , &c. n 73 r fixed on new models . cent. 10 n 3 r from which reason &c. cent. 11 , n 7 r rights n 50 r will not restore the people , &c. icon auimae basilicae . century 2. num . 64 ● shall be . n 88 r to a happy , &c n 93 ● inclined . n 97 ● we ●ad need , &c cent. 3 n 54 r the handful of ●eal . cent. 4 n 18 ● findeth . monita , &c britannica . cent. 1. n 13 r of differing , &c. n 35 r unto the king. n 48 r he may suspect . n 81 r spirit of prayer . n 91 r lest being n 941 of sound . cent. 2 n 22 r the draught . icon animae basilicae . the pour traicture of a royal soul . the first century . 1. resolutions of future reforming , do not alwayes satisfie gods justice , nor prevent his vengeance for former miscariages . 2. when out sins have overlai'd our hopes , we are taught to depend on gods mercies to forgive , not on our purpose to amend . 3. god often vindicates his glory by his judgments , and shews us how unsafe it is to offend him , upon presumptions afterwards to please him . 4. for want of timely repentance of our sins , god gives us cause to repent of those remedies we too late apply . 5. when god gives us the benefit of our afflictions and his chastisements , we may dare account them the strokes not of an enemy , but a father , whose rod , as well as his staf , may comfort us . 6. gods grace is infinitely better with our sufferings , than our peace could be with our sins . 7. when god that over-rules our counsels , over-rules also our hearts , the worse things we suffer by his justice , the better we may be by his mercy . 8. sin may turn our antidotes into poyson ; and grace return our poyson into antidotes . 9. an act of sinful compliance , hath greater aggravations in a king , than any man ; especially when without the least temptation of envy or malice , he consents to the destruction of a peer , or meaner subject , whom by his place he ought to have preserved . 10. god sees the contradiction between a king's heart and his hand , against whom the sin is more immediate , when he signs any man's death , unsatisfied that he hath deserved it . 11. a king may learn righteousness by god's judgments , and see his own frailty in god's justice . 12. a king ought to prefer justice , which is the will of god , before all contrary clamours , which do but discover the injurious will of man. 13. it is once too much , that a king has once been overcome , to please his subjects by displeasing of god. 14. a king by divine permission , going against his reason of conscience , for any reason of state , highly sins against the god of reason , and judg of consciences . 15. god's free spirit supports the will of a king , and subjects it to none but the divine light of reason , justice and religion , which shine in his soul. 16. god desireth truth in the inward parts of kings , and integrity in their outward expressions . 17. when god hears the voyce of our saviour's bloud before the cry of others undeservedly shed , he speaks to king and people , in the voice of joy and gladness , which makes the bones he had broken rejoyce in his salvation 18. a king purposing violence or oppression against the innocent , may expect the enemy to persecute his soul , to tread his life to the ground , and to lay his honour in the dust . 19. god that sees not as man sees , lookes beyond all popular appearances , searches the heart , and tryes the reins , and brings to light things hidden in the dark . 20. a kings afflictions cannot be esteemed by wise and godly men any argument of his sin , in shedding bloud he would have saved , more than their impunity among good men is any sure token of their innocency that forc't him to it . 21. a king may expect god's protection from the privy conspiracies , and open violence of bloudy and unreasonable men , according to the uprightness of his heart , and the innocency of his hands in the matter of bloud , or destruction of his subjects . 22. in time of civil dissensions , a king may most safely flie to god as his refuge and defence , who rules the raging of the sea , and the madness of the people . 23. a king should look upon his own sins , and the sins of his people ( which are the tumults of their souls against god ) as the just cause of popular inundations , permitted by god to over-bear all the banks of loyalty , modesty , lawes , justice and religion . 24. god can rebuke the rebellious beasts of the people , and deliver his king from the rudeness and strivings of the multitude . 25. it becomes king and people , as men and christians , unpassionately to see the light of reason and religion ; and with all due order and gravity to follow it . 26. a charitable king will wish his rebellious people a timely sense and sorrow , that shame here , and not suffering hereafter , may be the punishment of their sin. 27. when god shall set bounds to our passions by reason , to our errours by truth , to our seditions by lawes duly executed , and to our schismes by charity , then we may be as jerusalem , a city at unity in it self . 28. a king in distress , should still appeal to his god , whose all-discerning justice sees through all the disguises of mens pretensions , and deceitfull darknesses of their hearts . 29. a king to whom god gave a heart to grant much to his subjects , may need a heart fitted to suffer much from them . 30. gods grace may teach a king , wisely to enjoy as well the frustratings as the fullfillings of his best hopes , and most specious desires . 31. a king sometimes , while he thinks to allay others fears , may raise his own ; and by setling them , unsettle himself . 32. evil for good is a bad requital ; and hatred for the good will of a king to his people . 33. a king needs god for his pilot in such a dark and dangerous storm , as neither admits his return to the port whence he set out , nor his making any other with that safety and honour which he designed . 34. it is easie for god , to keep a king safe in the love and confidence of his people . 35. a king needs god for his guardian amidst the unjust hatred and jealousies of them whom he suffers so far to prevail , as to pervert and abuse his acts of greatest indulgence to , and assurance of them . 36. a penitent king ought to know no favours of his can make others more guilty than himself may be in abusing those many and great ones which god had conferred upon him . 37. a king in time of publick calamity by civil dissensions , should ask of god such repentance for himself and his people as he will accept , and such grace as they may not abuse . 38. the king is happy , who can make a right use of others abuses , and by their failings of him , reflect with a reforming displeasure , upon his own offemces against god. 39. although a king for his own sins , be by other mens sins deprived of temporal blessings , yet he may be happy to enjoy the comfort of god's mercies , which often raise the greatest sufferers , to be the most glorious saints . 40. it is god's will a king should preserve a native , rational , and religious freedom . 41. god requires of kings , to submit their understandings and wills unto his , whose wisdom and goodness can neither erre , nor misguide them . 42. god requires of kings , so far to deny their carnal reason , in order to his sacred mysteries and commands , that they should believe and obey , rather than dispute them . 43. god expects from kings only such a reasonable service of him , as not to do any thing for him against their consciences . 44. as to the desires of men , god enjoins kings to try all things by the touch-stone of reason and lawes , which are the rules of civil justice , and to declare their consents to that only which their judgments approve . 45. kings should be very unwilling to desert that place in which god hath set them , and whereto the affairs of their kingdoms do call them . 46. a king may be content , for his peoples good , to deny himself , in what god hath subjected to his disposal . 47. the unthankfull importunities , and tumultuary violence of some mens immoderate demands , should never betray a king to that dangerous and unmanly slavery , as to make him strengthen them by his consent in those things , which he thinks in his conscience to be against god's glory , the good of his subjects , and the discharge of his own duty to reason and justice . 48. a king should be willing to suffer the greatest indignities and injuries rebellious people press upon him , rather than commit the least sin against his conscience . 49. the just liberties of people may well be preserved in fair and equal wayes , without the slavery of their king's soul. 50. he whom god hath invested by his favours in the power of a christian king , should not subject his reason to other mens passions and designs , which seem unreasonable , unjust and irreligious unto him . 51. the way of truth and justice , will bring a distressed king at last to peace and happiness with god , though for them he hath much trouble among men . 52. a king and queen scattered on earth by their despightfull and deadly enemies , may be prepared by their sufferings for god's presence . 53. though a king's difference from his queen in some things , as to religion , may be his greatest temporal infelicity ; yet the sincerity of their affections , which desire to seek , find , and to embrace every truth , given by god , may be acceptable unto him . 54. it is happy for king and queen different in religion , when either ignorance of what is necessary to be known , or unbelief , or disobedience to what they know , becomes their misery , or their wilfull default . 55. the great scandal of subjects professing the same true religion with their king , may be an hinderance to the dissenting queen , in the love of some truth god would have her to learn ; or may harden her in some errour he would have cleared to her . 56. a king 's own and his parties constancy , is the best antidote against the poyson of their example that gave such scandal . 57. the truth of that religion the king propfesseth represented with all the beauties of humility , loyalty , charity and peaceableness , as the proper fruits and ornaments thereof , may prevail much upon the judgment of his dissenting queen ; as the odious disguises of levity , schism , heresie , novelty , cruelty and disloyalty , which any men's practises put upon it , may intend her aversion from it . 58. god's sacred and saving truths , cleared from all rust and dross of humane mixtures , gain belief , love , and obedience to them , as his . 59. god beheld in the glass of his truth , in those mercies which he hath offered unto us in his only son and our saviour , inviteth us to serve him in all those holy duties , which most agree with his holy doctrine , and most imitable example . 60. the experience a king and queen separated by rebels , have of the vanity and uncertainty of all humane glory and greatness , in their scatterings and eclipses , should make them both so much the more ambitious to be invested in those durable honours and perfections , which are only to be found in god , and obtained through christ . 61. a king ought not to gratifie his passion by any secret pleasure in his death or destruction , who hath thereby satisfied the injury he did him , lest he make divine vengeance his , and consider the affront against himself more than the sin against god. 62. god often pleads the cause of kings before the sons of men , by making without their desire and endeavours , the mischief of rebels return on their own heads , and their violent dealing come down on their own pates . 63. an injur'd king in charity should pray that god's justice prevent not the objects and opportunities of his mercy , but that they who have most offended him may live and be forgiven by him , in that their offenses bear a proportion with his trespasses , for which he hopes forgiveness from god. 64. a king should pray for his rebellious subjects , that god lay not their sins to their charge for condemnation , but to their conscience for amendment . 65. god's exemplary vengeance shew'd in the destruction of any eminent rebel , is as the lighting of a thunderbolt , which by so severe a punishment of one , should be a terrour to all . 66. it may be wish'd , that they who know not they have done amiss , might have their sin discover'd to them ; and that they who sin of malicious wickedness , might be scared . 67. they who prevent gods judgments by their true repentance , shall escape the strokes of his eternal vengeance . 68. mercy and truth met together , are the best supporters of a royal throne : as righteousness and peace kissing each other the chief ornaments of a flo●rishing crown . 69. god sees clearly through all the cloudings of humane affairs , and judges without prejudice , his unerrable judgment having eternally his omniscience for its guide . 70. it is time for a king to call upon god , when the proud rise against him , and the assemblies of violent men seek after his soul , who have not set god before their eyes . 71. a king should have no passion , nor design , to embroyl his kingdome in a civil war , to which he has the least temptation , as knowing he must adventure more than any , and gain least of any by it . 72. a king ought to deplore and study to divert the necessity of a civil war , unless he will be thought so prodigally thirsty of his subjects bloud , as to venture his own life , which were better spent to save , than to destroy his people . 73. a king in time of rebellion , needs much of gods grace with patience to bear the afflictions , but much more to sustain the reproaches of men , especially if they make the war his , which they have raised themselves . 74. the confidence of some mens false tongues is such , that they would make a king almost suspect his own innocence . 75. a king whose innocency is known unto god , may be content ( at least by his silence ) to take upon him the imputed guilt before men , if by that he can allay the malice of his enemies , and redeem his people from the miseries of war. 76. god will find out bloudy and deceitfull men , many of whom live not half their dayes , in which they promised themselves the enjoyment of the fruits of their violent and wicked counsels . 77. god will save a king that 's his servant , and in due time scatter the people that delight in war. 78. it is time for god to arise and lift up himself , when the king's enemies rage and increase , conceiving mischief , travailing with iniquity , and bringing forth falshood . 79. the design of a civil war is either to destroy the king's person , or force his judgment , and to make him renege his conscience , and gods truth . 80. a king may be driven to cross david's choice , and desire rather to fall into the hands of men , by denying them ( though their mercies be cruel ) than into the hands of god , by sinning against his conscience , and in that against him who is a consuming fire : it being better they destroy him , than god damn him . 81. if nothing but a king's bloud will satisfie his enemies , or quench the flames of his kingdom , or god's temporal justice , he should be content , if it be gods will , that it be shed by the hands of his subjects . 82. when the bloud of a king , though a sinner , is wash'd with the bloud of his innocent and peace-maing redeemer , gods justice will therein find not only a temporary expiation , but an eternal plenary satisfaction , both for the king's sins , and his peoples . 83. a king that hath god on his side , has more with him than can be against him . 84. none in heaven or earth is desireable by a king in comparison of god , who in the loss of all , may be more than all to him . 85. when people are encouraged to fight against their king under the pretense of sighting for him , he may cast his eyes up to heaven , he has no other power to oppose them . 86. god needs no help , nor the king , having his , if not to conquer , at least to suffer , 87. if god delights not in a king's safety and prosperity , he ought to render himself up to be reduced to what god will have him , whose judgments oft begin with his own children . 88. a king should be content to be nothing , that god may be all . 89. god , who teacheth , that no king can be saved by the multitude of an host , can yet save him by the multitude of his mercies , being lord of hosts , and the father of mercies . 90. a king distressed on every side , having god on his side , need not fear what man can do unto him . 91. a king ought to give god's justice the glory of his distress 92. gods mercy must have the glory of a king's deliverance from them that persecute his soul. 93. any king that hath fought against god ( whose subject he is ) by his sins , and robbed him of his glory , god may justly strip of his strength by his own subjects , and eclipse his glory likewise . 94. the king whose hope and only refuge fails him , shall to his grief , hear his enemies soon say , there is no help for him in his god. 95. the king's footsteps will slip , whose goings god holds not up in his paths . 96. a king favoured by god , is kept as the apple of his eye , and hid under the shadow of his wings . 97. god has marveilous loving kindness to shew , and a right hand by which to save a king that puts his trust in him , from those that rise up against him ; from the wicked that oppress him ; from his deadly enemies that compass him about . 98. the path of life leads to god's presence , where is fullness of joy , and at his right hand are pleasures for evermore . 99. god is the first and eternal reason , whose wisdom is fortified with omnipotency . 100. god's method of grace to a king his servant is , first to furnish him with clear discoveries of truth , reason , and justice in his understanding , then so to confirm his will and resolution to adhere to them , that no terrours , injuries , or oppressions of his enemies , may ever inforce him against those rules which god by them hath planted in his conscience . the second century . 1. god never made a king that should be less than a man and not dare to say yea , or nay , as he sees cause ; which freedom is not denied to the meanest creature that hath the use of reason , and liberty of speech . 2. that cannot be blameable in a king , which is commendable veracity and constancy in others . 3. it is open partiality and injustice , for seditious subjects to deny that freedom to their king , which god hath given to all men , and which themselves pertinaciously challenge to themselves . 4. god can guide a distressed king by an unerring rule , through the perplexed lubyrinths of his own thoughts and other mens proposals , which he may have some cause to suspect , are purposely cast as snares , that by his granting or denying them , he might be more entangled in those difficulties , wherewith they lye in wait to afflict him . 5. a kings own sinfull passions may cloud or divert gods sacred suggestions . 6. a king should propund to himself gods glory for his end , gods word for his rule , and then resign himself to gods will. 7. a king can hardly please all , he need not care to please some men ; if he may be happy to please god , he need not fear whom he displeaseth . 8. god maketh the wisdom of the world foolishness , and taketh in their own devises , such as are wise in their own conceits . 9. a king made wise by god's truth , for god's honour , his kingdoms general good , and his own souls salvation , need not much regard the worlds opinion , or diminution of him . 10. the less wisdom ill-affected subjects are willing to impute to their king , the more they shall be convinced of god's wisdom directing him , while he denies nothing sit to be granted , out of crossness , or humor ; nor grants any thing which is to be denied out of any fear or flattery of men . 11. a king ought to take care he become not guilty , or unhappy , by willing or inconsiderate advancing any mens designs which are injurious to the publick good , while he confirms them by his consent ; nor must he be any occasion to hinder or defraud the publick of what is best , by any morose or perverse dissentings . 12. a king ought to be so humbly charitable , as to follow their advice , when it appears to be for the publick good , of whose affections to him he may have but few evidences to assure him . 13. god can as well bless honest errours , as blast fraudulent counsels . 14. since kings themselves must give an account of every evil and idle word in private , at god's tribunal ; they ought to be much more caresull of those solemn declarations of their mind , which are like to have the greatest influence upon the publick , either for woe , or weal. 15. the less unreasonable subjects consider what they ask , the more solicitous should a king be what he answers . 16. in time of civil war , though a king 's own and his people's pressures are grievous , and peace would be very pleasing ; yet should he not avoid the one , nor purchase the other with the least expence or wast of his conscience , whereof god alone is deservedly more master than himself . 17. so much cruelty among christians is acted under the colour of religion , as if we could not be christians , unless we crucifie one another . 18. if a king and his people love not god's truth as they ought , and practise it in charity , god may justly suffer a spirit of errour and bitterness , of mutual and mortal hatred to rise among them . 19. god who forgives wherein we sin , may sanctifie what we suffer . 20. repentance must be our recovery ( by god's mercy ) when our great sins have been our ruine . 21. the miseries a king and his kingdom have suffered being great , they may desire god so to account them , but withal , that their sins may appear to then consciences , as they are represented in the glass of god's judgments ; for god never punisheth small failings with severe afflictions . 22. they should farther desire , that their sins may be ever more grievous to them than god's judgments ; and be more willing to repent , than to be relieved : first asking of god the peace of penitent consciences , and then the tranquillity of united kingdoms . 23. god can drown the sins of a king and people at civil wars in the sea of our saviours bloud , and through the red sea of their own bloud bring them at last to a state of piety , peace , and plenty . 24. a king 's publick relations to all , make him share in all his subjects sufferings ; of which he ought to have such a pious sense , as becomes a christian king , and a loving father of his people . 25. god can make the scandalous and unjust reproaches cast upon a good king be as a breath , more to kindle his compassion , and give him grace to heap charitable coles of fire upon their heads to melt them , whose malice or cruel zeal hath kindled , or hindred the quenching of those flames , which may have much wasted his kingdomes . 26. ignorance or errour may sill men with rebellious and destructive principles , which they act under an opinion , that they do god good service . for these a king ought to pray god to lead them in the wayes of his saving truths . 27. a king may pray for the hand of god's justice to be against those , who maliciously and despightfully have raised , or fomented , cruel and desperate wars against him . 28. god is far from destroying the innocent with the guilty , and erronious with the malicious . 29. god that had pity on nineveh for the many children that were therein , will not easily give over the whole stock of a populous and seduced nation , to the wrath of those whose covetousness makes them cruel ; nor to their anger , which is too fierce , and therefore justly cursed . 30. god many times is pleased , in the midst of the furnace of his severe justice , to preserve a posterity , which may praise him for his mercy . 31. god will not deal with his king , according to man's unjust reproaches , but according to the iunocency of his hands in his sight . 32. if a king have desired or delighted in the wofull day of his kingdomes calamities ; if he have not earnestly studied , and faithfully endeavoured , the preventing and composing of the bloudy distractions in his kingdome , it is just that god's hand be against him and his fathers house . 33. a king that hath enemies enough of men , if his conscience do witness his integrity , may conditionally dare to imprecate god's curse upon him and his , to gain the world's opinion of his innocency , which god himself knowes right well ; provided that he trust not to his own merit , but gods mercies . 34. when the troubles of a king's soul are enlarged , it is the lord that must bring him out of his distress . 35. pious simpliciy is the best policy in a king. 36. they who have too much of the serpents subtilty , forget the doves innocency . 37. though hand joyn in hand , a king ( by gods assistance ) should never let them prevail against his soul , to the betraying of his conscience and honour . 38. god having turn'd the hearts of the men of judah and israel , they restored david with as much loyal zeal , as they did with inconstancy , and eargerness , pursue him . 39. a depressed king , in whom god preserves the love of his truth and uprightness , need not despair of his subjects affections returning towards him . 40. god can soon cause the overflowing seas to ebbe , and retire back again to the bounds which he has appointed for them . 41. he can as soon make them ashamed who trangress without a cause , and turn them back that persecute the soul of their king. 42. integrity and uprightness will preserve a king in distress , that waits upon the lord. 43. from just , moral , and indispensable bonds , which god's word in the lawes of a kingdom , have laid upon the consciences of men , no pretensions of piety and reformation are sufficient to absolve them , or engage them to any contrary practises . 44. nothing violent and injurious , can be religious . 45. god allowes no mans committing sacriledg , under the zeal of abhorring idols . 46. sacrilegious designs have sometimes the countenance of religious ties . 47. the wisest of kings hath taught all his successours , that it is a snare to take things that are holy , and after vowes to make enquiry . 48. a king ought never to consent to perjurious and sacriligious rapines , which set upon him the brand and curse to all posterity , of robbing god and his church of what his divine bounty had given , and his clemency had accepted , wherewith to encourage learning and religion . 49. though a king's treasures be exhausted , his revenues diminished , and his debts increased ; yet should he never be tempted to use prophane reparations , least a coal from god's altar set such a fire on his throne and conscience , as will be hardly quenched , 50. though the state recover by god's blessing of peace , yet the church is not likely in times where the charity of most men is grown cold , and their religion illiberal . 51. when god continues to those that serve him and his church all those incouragements , which by the will of pious donors , and the justice of the lawes are due unto them , they ought to deserve and use them aright to god's glory and the relief of the poor ; that his priests may be cloathed with righteousness , and the poor may be satisfied with bread . 52. rather than holy things should be given to swine , or the church's bread to dogs let them go about the city , grin like a dog , and grudg that they are not satisfied . ; 53. let those sacred morsels , which some men have by violence devoured , neither digest with them , nor theirs : let them be as naboth's vineyard to ahab , gall in their mouths , rottenness to their names , a moth to their families , and a sting to their consciences . 54. break in sunder , ô lord , all violent and sacrilegious confederations to do wickedly and injuriously . 55. divide their hearts and tongues who have bandyed together against the church and state , that the folly of such may be manifest to all men , and proceed no farther . 56. a king whose righteous dealing is favoured by god , in the mercies of the most high never shall miscary . 57. a king who is made the object of popular reproach , has his soul among lions , among them that are set on fire , even the sons of men , whose teeth are spears and arrowes , and their tongue a sharp sword . 58. those sons of men , that turn their kings glory into shame , love vanity , and seek after lies . 59. when wicked men on every side are set to reproach their king , if god hold his peace , the kings enemies will prevail against him , and lay his honour in the dust . 60. god shall destroy them that speak lies against their king ; and will abhor both the bloud-thirsty and deceitfull men . 61. god can make the kings righteousness appear as the light ; and his innocency to shine forth as the sun at noon-day . 62. a good king should pray , that god would not suffer his silence to betray his innocence , nor his displeasure his patience ; but that after his saviour's example , being reviled , he may not revile again ; and being cursed by his enemies , he may bless them . 63. god would not suffer shemei's tongue to go unpunished , whose judgments on david might seem to justifie his disdainfull reproaches . 64. hot burning coals of eternal fire should be the reward of false , and lying tongues against their king. 65. a king's prayer and patience should be as water to cool and quench their tongues , who are set on fire with the fire of hell , and tormented with those malicious flames . 66. the king is happy that can refute and put to silence mens evil speaking , by well-doing ; praying that they may not enjoy the fruit of their lips , but of his prayer , for their repentance , and god's pardon . 67. a king ought to learn david's patience and hezekia's devotion , that he may look to god's mercy through mens malice , and see his justice in their sin . 68. even sheba's seditious speeches , rabshekah's railing , and shemei's cursing , may provoke as a king 's humble prayer to god , so god's renewed blessing toward him . 69. though men curse , god may bless , and the afflicted king shall be blessed , and made a blessing to his people : and so the stone which some builders refuse , may become the head-stone of the corner . 70. if god look not down from heaven and save , the reproach of some men would swallow up their king. 71. god can hide the king in the secret of his presence from the pride of men , and keep him from the strife of tongues . 72. god's mercies are full of variety , and yet of constancy . 73. god denieth us not a new and fresh sense of our old and daily wants , nor despiseth renewed affections joined to constant expressions . 74. the matters of our prayers ought to be agreeable to god's will , which is alwayes the same ; and the fervency of our spirits , to the motions of his holy spirit in us . 75. god's spiritual perfections are such , as he is neither to be pleased with affected novelties for matter or manner , nor offended with the pious constancy of our petitions in them both . 76. a pious moderation of mens judgments is most commendable in matters of religion , that their ignorance may not offend others , nor their opinion of their own abilities tempt them to deprive others of what they may lawfully and devoutly use to help their infirmities . 77. the advantage of errour consists in novelty and variety ; as of truth , in unity and constancy . 78. the church is sometimes pest'red with errours , and deformed with undecencies in god's service , nnder the pretense of variety and novelty ; as deprived of truth , unity , and order , under this fallacy , that constancy is the cause of formality . 79. if god keep us from formal hypocrisie in our hearts , we know that praying to him , or praising of him ( with david and other holy men ) in the same formes , cannot hurt us . 80. if god gives us wisdom to amend what is amiss within us there will be less to amend without us . 81. the effects of blind zeal , and over-bold devotion , are such as god evermore defend , and deliver his church from them . 82. such should be the uprightness and tenderness of a king , whom god hath set to be a defender of the faith , and a protector of his church , as by no violence to be overborn against his conscience . 83. the deformation of the church , as to that government which derived from the apostles , had been retained in purest and primitive times , began when the revenues of the church became the object of secular envy , which still seeks to rob it of the incouragements of learning and religion . 84. a christian king should be as the good samaritan , compassionate and helpfull to god's afflicted church , which when some men have wounded and robbed , others pass by without regard either to pity , or relieve . 85. as the kings power is from god , so should he use it for god. 86. though a soveraign be not suffered to be master of his other rights as a king , yet should he preserve that liberty of reason , love of religion , and the churches welfare , which are fixed in his conscience as a christian . 87. sacriledg invades those temporal blessings which god's providence hath bestowed on his church for his glory . 88. some mens sins and errours deserve god's just permission to let in the wild boar , and the subtile foxes , to wast and deform his vineyard , which his right hand hath planted , and the dew of heaven so long watered a happy and flourishing estate . 89. his memory is cursed who bears the infamous brand to all posterity of being the first christian king in his kingdom who consented to the oppression of god's church , and the fathers of it ; whose errours he should rather , like constantine , cover with silence , and reform with meekness , than expose their persons and sacred functions to vulgar contempt . 90. their counsels bring forth and continue violent confusions , by a precipitant destroying the ancient boundaries of the churches peace , who mean to let in all manner of errours , schismes and disorders . 91. the god of order and of truth , doth in his own good time abate the malice , asswage the rage , and confound all the mischievous devices of his , the king 's , and his churches enemies . 92. the god of reason , and of peace , disdains not to treat with sinners , preventing them with offers of atonement , and beseeching them to be reconciled with himself ; abounding in mercy to save them , whom he wants not power or justice to destroy . 93. when god softens our hearts by the bloud of our redeemer , and perswades us to accept of peace with him ; then , as men and christians , are we enclied to procure and preserve peace among our selves . 94. a king should be content to be overcome , when god will have it so . 95. the noblest victory is over a man's self and his enemies by patience ; which was christ's conquest , and may well become a christian king. 96. god between both his hands , the right sometimes supporting , and the left afflicting , fashioneth us to that frame of piety he liketh best . 97. whe had need ask god forgiveness for the pride that attends our prosperous , and the repinings which follow our disastrous events . 98. when we go forth in our own strength , god withdraws his , and goes not forth with our armies . 99. let god be all , when we are something , and when we are nothing , that he may have the glory when we are in a victorious or inglorious condition . 100. it is hard measure , for a king to suffer evil from his subjects to whom he intends nothing but good ; and he cannot but suffer in those evils which they compel him to inflict upon them , punishing himself in their punishments . the third century . 1. a king , against whom his subjects take up armes , both in conquering , and being conquered , is still a sufferer ; in which case he needs a double portion of god's spirit , which only can be sufficient for him . 2. a king , in time of civil war , as he is most afflicted , so ought he to be most reformed , that he may be not only happy to see an end of the civil distractions , but a chief instrument to restore and establish a firm and blessed peace to his kingdoms . 3. the pious ambitions of all divided parties , should be , to overcome each other with reason , moderation , and such self denial , as becomes those , who consider that their mutual divisions are their common distractions , and the union of all is every good mans chiefest interest . 4. god for the sins of our peace , brings upon us the miseries of civil war , and for the sins of war , sometimes thinks fit to deny us the blessing of peace , so keeping us in a circulation of miseries ; yet even then he gives the king , if his servant , and all loyal , though afflicted subjects , to enjoy that peace , which the world can neither give to them , nor take from them . 5. god will not impute to a good king the bloud of his own subjects , which with infinite unwillingness and grief may have been shed by him , in his just and necessary defence , but will wash him in that pretious bloud which hath been shed for him by his great peace-maker , jesus christ , who will redeem him out of all his troubles . for , 6. the triumphing of the wicked is but short , and the joy of hypocrites is but for a moment . 7. god who alone can give us beauty for ashes , and truth for hypocrisie , will not suffer us to be miserably deluded with pharisaical washings , instead of christian reformings . 8. our great deformities being within , we ought to be the severest censurers , and first reformers of our own souls . 9. rash and cruel reformers bring deformities upon church and state. 10. factions kindle fires under the pretense of reforming . 11. god shewes the world by some mens divisions and confusions , what is the pravity of their intentions , and weakeness of their judgments . 12. they whom god's providence shall entrust with so great , good , and necessary a work , as is a christian and charitable reformation , ought to use such methods as wherein nothing of ambition , revenge , covetousness , or sacriledg , may have any influence upon their counsels . 13. inward piety may best teach king and people how to use the blessing of outward peace . 14. god whose wise and all-disposing providence ordereth the greatest contingencies of humane affairs , may make a king see the constancy of his mercies to him , in the greatest advantages god seems to ▪ give the malice of a king's enemies against him . 15. as god did blast the counsel of achitophel , turning it to david's good and his own ruine ; so can he defeat their design who intend by publishing ought they intercept of their king 's , nothing else but to render him more odious and contemptible to his people . 16. god can make the evil men imagine , and displeasure they intend against their king , so to return on their own heads , that they may be ashamed and covered with their own confusion , as with a cloak . 17. when the king's enemies use all means to cloud his honour , to pervert his purposes , and to slander the footsteps of god's anointed , god can give the king an heart content to be dishonoured for his sake , and his church's good . 18. when a king hath a fixed purpose to honour god , then god will honour him , either by restoring to him the enjoyment of that power and majesty which he had suffered some men to seek to deprive him of ; or by bestowing on him that crown of christian patience , which knowes how to serve him in honour , or dishonour ; in good report , or evil . 19. if god , who is the fountain of goodness and honour , cloathed with excellent majesty , make the king to partake of his excellency for wisdome , justice and mercy ; he shall not want that degree of honour and majesty which becomes the place , in which god hath set him , who is the lifter up of his head , and his salvation . 20. when a king knowes not what to do , his eyes must be toward god , who is the soveraign of our souls , and the only commander of our consciences ; to the protection of whose mercy , he must still commend himself . 21. god who hath preserved a king in the day of battel , can afterward shew his strength in his weakness . 22. god will be to a good king in his darkest night , a pillar of fire to enlighten and direct him ; in the day of his hottest affliction a pillar of cloud to overshadow and protect him ; he will be to him both a sun and a shield . 23. a king must not by any perversness of will , but through just perswasions of honour , reason and religion , hazard his person , peace and safety , against those that by force seek to wrest them from him . 24. a king's resolutions should not abate with his outward forces , having a good conscience to accompany him in his solitude and desertions . 25. a king must not betray the powers of reason , and that fortress of his soul , which he is intrusted to keep for god. 26. the king whom god leads in the paths of his righteousness , he will shew his salvation . 27. wh●n a kings wayes please god , god will make his enemies to be at peace with him . 28. when god who is infinitely good and great , is with the king , his presence is better than life ; and his service is perfect freedom . 29. the soveraign whom god ownes for his servant , shall never have cause to complain for want of that liberty which becometh a man , a christian , and a king. 30. a soveraign should desire to be blessed by god with reason , as a man ; with religion , as a christian ; and with constancy in justice , as a king. 31. though god suffer a king to be stript of all outward ornaments , yet he may preserve him ever in those enjoyments , wherein he may enjoy himself , and which cannot be taken from him against his will. 32. no fire of affliction should boyl over a king's passion to any impatience , or sordid fears . 33. though many say of an afflicted king , there is no help for him ; yet if god lift up the light of his countenance upon him , he shall neither want safety , liberty , nor majesty . 34. when a king's strength is scattered , his expectation from men defeated , his person restrained : if god be not far from him , his enemies shall not prevail too much against him . 35. when a king is become a wonder , and a scorn to many , god may be his helper and defender . 36. when god shewes any token upon an injur'd king for good , then they that hate him are ashamed , because the lord hath holpen and comforted him . 37. when god establisheth a king with his free spirit , he may do and suffer god's will , as he would have him . 38. god will be mercifull to that king , whose soul trusteth in him , and who makes his refuge in the shadow of god's wings , until all calamities be overpast . 39. a good king , though god kill him , will trust in his mercy , and his saviours merits . 40. so long as an afflicted king knoweth that his redeemer liveth , though god lead him through the vail and shadow of death , yet shall he fear no ill . 41. when a captive king is restrained to solitary prayers , what he wants of his chaplains help , god can supply with the more immediate assistances of his spirit , which alone will both enlighten his darkness , and quicken his dulness . 42. god who is the sun of righteousness , the sacred fountain of heavenly light and heat , can at once clear and warm the king's heart , both by instructing of him , and interceding for him . 43. god is all fullness ; from god is all-sufficiency ; by god is all acceptance ; god is company enough , and comfort enough ; god is king of the king ; god can be also his prophet , and his priest ; rule him ; teach him , pray in him , for him , and be ever with him . 44. the single wrestlings of jacob prevailed with god in that sacred duel , when he had none to second him but god himself ; who did assist jacob with power to overcome him , and by a welcome violence to wrest a blessing from him . the same assistance and success can god give , as he pleaseth , to the solitary prayers and devout contentions of a captive king. 45. the joint and sociated devotions of others , is a blessing unto a king , their fervency inflaming the coldness of his affections towards god , when they go up to , or meet in god's house with the voice of joy and gladness , worshiping god in the unity of spirits , and with the bond of peace . 46. a king ought to ask god forgiveness if guilty of neglect , and not improving the happy opportunities he had to meet priest and people in god's church . 47. a king sequester'd from the opportunities of publick worship , and private ass●stance of his chaplains , is as a pelican in the wilderness , a sparrow on the house top , and as a coal scattered from all those pious glowings , and devout reflections , which might best kindle , preserve and encrease the holy fire of divine graces , on the altar of his heart , whence the sacrifice of prayers , and incense of prayses might be duly offered up to god. 48. god that breaketh not the bruised reed , nor qu●ncheth the smoking flax , will not despise the weakness of a king's prayers , nor the smotherings of his soul in an uncomfortable loneness , to which he is constrained by some mens uncharitable denials of those helps , which he may much want , and no less desire . 49. the hardness of rebels hearts should occasion the softnings of a captive king 's to god , and for them ; their hatred should kindle his love ; their unreasonable denials of his religious desires , should the more excite his prayers unto god ; their inexorable deafness may encline god's ear to him , who is a god easie to be entreated . 50. god's ear is not heavy , that it cannot , nor his heart hard , that it will not hear ; nor his hand shortned that it cannot help a king , his suppliant in a desolate condition . 51. though god permit men to deprive a king of those outward means which he hath appointed in his church ; yet they cannot debar him from the communion of that inward grace which god alone breaths into humble hearts . 52. when god hath once made a king humble , he will teach him , he will hear him , he will help him ; for , the broken and contrite heart , god will not despise . 53. god can make a king in solitude , at once , his temple , his priest , his sacrifice , and his altar ; while from an humble heart he ( alone ) daily offers up , in holy meditations , fervent prayers , and unfeigned tears to god , who prepareth him for himself , dwelleth in him , and accepteth of him . 54. god who did cause by secret supplies , and miraculous infusions , that the handfull of meat in the vessel should not spend , nor the little oyle in the cruise fail the widow , during the time of drought and dearth , will look on a good king's soul , when as a widow , it is desolate and forsaken , will not permit those saving truths he had formerly learned , then to fail his memory ; nor the sweet effusions of his spirit , which he had sometime felt , then to be wanting to his heart , in the famine of ordinary and wholsome food , for the refreshing of his soul. 55. a captive king in solitude , may rather chuse to want the memory of the saving truths he had learned , or the sense of spiritual comforts he had formerly felt , than to feed from those hands , who mingle his bread with ashes , and his wine with gall , rather tormenting , than teaching him , whose mouths are proner to bitter reproaches of him , then to hearty prayers for him . 56. they who wrest the holy scriptures to their kings destruction , ( which are clear for their subjection , and his preservation ) hazard their souls damnation . 57. some men ( under the colour of long prayers ) have sought to devour the houses of their brethren , their king , and their god. 58. a distressed king may pray against their wickedness , whose very balms break his head , and their cordials oppress his heart , that he may be delivered from the poyson under their tongues , from the snares of their lips ; from the fire and the swords of their words ; and all those loyal and religious hearts , who desire and delight in the prosperity of his soul , and who seek by their prayers to relieve the sadness and solitude of their king. 59. though a distressed king may chance to say in his hast , that he is cast out of the sight of god's eyes ; nevertheless god may hear the voice of his supplication , when he cries unto him . 60. if the lord would be extreme to mark what is done amiss , who could abide it ? but there is mercy with him , that he may be feared , and therefore it is that sinners flie unto him . 61. a king , in the acknowledgment of his sins before god , should reflect upon the aggravation of his condition , the eminency of his place adding weight to his offences . 62. a king ought to beseech god to forgive as his personal , so his peoples sins , which are so far his , as he hath not improved the power that god gave him to his glory , and his subjects good . 63. god may justly , as to his over-ruling hand , bring a soveraign , who in many things has rebelled against him , from the glory and freedom of a king , to be a prisoner to his own subjects . 64. though god may permit a king's person to be restrained , yet he may enlarge his heart to himself , and his grace toward him . 65. god may give the comforts and the sure mercies of david to the king , who comes far short of david's piety , yet equals david in afflictions . 66. god may make the penitent sense a king has of his sins , become an evidence to him , that he hath pardoned them . 67. the evils which at any time a king and his kingdom hath suffered , should not seem little to him , though god punisheth them not according to their sins . 68. when the sorrowes of a king's heart are enlarged , in the importunity of his prayers , if god bring him not out of his troubles , he may expostulate with him , as having forgotten to be gracious , and to have shut up his loving kindness in displeasure . 69. an afflicted king may utterly faint , if he believe not to see the goodness of the lord in the land of the living . 70. the sins of our prosperity many times deprive us of the benefit of our afflictions . 71. it is happy for us , if the fiery tryal of affliction consume the dross which in long peace , and plenty , we have contracted . 72. though god continue our miseries , yet if he withdraw not his grace , what is wanting of prosperity , may be made up in patience and repentance . 73. an afflicted king , from whom god's anger is not yet to be turn'd away , but his hand of justice must be stretched out still , in the exuberance of charity , and self-condemnation , will beseech god , it may be against him , and his fathers house , pleading the innocence of his people , and asking , what those sheep have done . 74. though the sufferings of a king satiate not the malice of his and the church's enemies , yet should their cruelty never exceed the measure of his charity . 75. an injur'd king should ask grace to banish all thoughts of revenge , that he may not lose the reward , nor god the glory of his patience . 76. a king to whom god hath given a heart to forgive such as have rebelled against him , should beseech god to forgive them what they have done against both god and king. 77. an afflicted king , whom god in mercy remembers , and his kingdomes , 1. in continuing the light of his gospel , and setling his true religion among them . 2. in restoring to them the benefit of the lawes , and the due execution of justice . 3. in suppressing the many schismes in church , and factions in state. 4. in restoring him and his to the ancient rights , and glory of his predecessours . 5. in turning the hearts of the people to god in piety , to the king in loyalty , and to one another in charity . 6. in quenching the flames , and withdrawing the fewel of civil wars . 7. in blessing king and people with the freedom of publick councels , and delivering the honour of parliament from the insolency of the vulgar . 8. in keeping the king from the great offence of exacting any thing against his conscience , and especially from consenting to sacrilegious rapines , and spoilings of god's church . 9. in restoring him to a capacity to glorifie god in doing good both to the church and state. 10. in bringing him again with peace , safety , and honour , to his chiefest city and parliament , if chased from them . 11. in putting again the sword of justice into his hand , to punish and protect . 1. the soul of the said king ought to praise god , and magnifie his name before his people . 2. to hold god's glory dearer to him than his crowns . 3. to make the advancement of true religion both in purity and power to be his chiefest care . 4. to rule his people with justice , and his kingdoms with equity . 5. to own ever to god's more immediate hand , as the rightfull succession , so the mercifull restauration of his kingdoms , and the glory of them . 6. to make all the world see this , and his very enemies enjoy the benefit hereof . 78. a restored king , as he should freely pardon , for christ's sake , those that have offended him in any kind : so his hand should never be against any man to revenge what is past in regard of any particular injury done to him . 79. when a king and people have been mutually punished in their unnatural divisions , the king should , for god's sake , and for the love of his redeemer , purpose this in his heart ; that he will use all means in the wayes of amnesty and indempnity , which may most fully remove all fears , and bury all jealousies in forgetfullness . 80. as a king's resolutions of truth and peace are toward his people : so may he expect god's mercies to be toward him and his . 81. god will hear the king's prayer , which goeth not out of feigned lips . 82. if a king commit the way of his soul to the lord , and trust in him , he shall bring his desire to pass . 83. a king ought not to charge god foolishly , who will not restore him and his ; but to bless his name , who hath given and taken away ; praying to god that his people and the church may be happy , if not by him , yet without him . 84. god , who is perfect unity in a sacred trinity , will in mercy behold king and people , whom his justice may have divided . 85. they who at any time have agreed to fight against their king , may as much need his prayers and pity , as he deliverance from their strivings , when ready to fight against one another to the continuance of the distractions of his kingdoms . 86. the wayes of peace consist not in the divided wills of parties , but in the point and due observation of the lawes . 87. a king should be willing to go whither god will lead him by his providence , desiring god to be ever with him , that he may see god's constancy in the worlds variety and changes . 88. the king whom god makes such as he would have him , may at last enjoy the safety and tranquillity which god alone can give him . 89. god's heavy wrath hangs justly over those populous cities , whose plenty addes fewel to their luxury ; whose wealth makes them wanton ; whose multitudes tempt them to security ; and their security exposeth them to unexpected miseries . 90. to whom god gives not eyes to see , hearts to consider , nor wills to embrace , and courage to act those things which belong to his glory and the publick peace ; their calamity comes upon them as an armed man. 91. rebellious cities and p●●●● cannot want enemies who ab●●●● in sin ; nor shall they be long undisarmed and undestroyed , who with a high hand persisting to fight against god , and the clear convictions of their own consciences , fight more against themselves , than ever they did against thier king ; their sins exposing them to gods justice , their riches to others injuries , their number to tumults , and their tumults to confusion . 92. a depressed king should have so much charity as to pray , that his fall be not their ruine who have with much forwardness helped to destroy him . 93. an injur'd king should not so much consider either what rebellious people have done , or he hath suffered , as to forget to imitate his crucified redeemer ; to plead their ignorance for their pardon , and , in his dying extremities , to pray to god his father to forgive them who know not what they did . 94. they who have denied tears to their king in his saddest condition , may need his prayers for god's grace to bestow them upon themselves , who the less they weep for him , the more cause they have to weep for themselves . 95. a king should pray that his bloud may not be upon them and their children , whom the fraud and faction of some , not the malice of all , have excited to crucifie him . 96. god can , and will , both exalt , and perfect , a good king by his sufferings , which have more in them of god's mercy , than of man's cruelty , or god's own justice . 97. god that is king of kings , who filleth heaven and earth , who is the fountain of eternal life , in whom is no shadow of death , is both the just afflicter of death upon us , and the mercifull saviour of us in it , and from it . 98. it is better for us to be dead to our selves , and live in god , than by living in our selves , to be deprived of god. 99. god can make the many bitter aggravations of a soveraign's violent death , as a man , and a king , the opportunities and advantages of his special graces and comforts in his soul , as a christian . 100. if god will be with the king , he shall neither fear , nor feel , any evil , though he walk through the valley of the shadow of death . the fourth century . 1. to contend with death , is the work of a weak and mortal man , to overcome it , is the grace of him alone who is the almighty and immortal god. 2. our saviour , who knowes what it is to dye with a king , as a man , can make the king to know what it is to pass through death to life with him his god. 3. let a distressed king say , though i dye , yet i know that thou my redeemer livest for ever : though thou slayest me , yet thou hast encouraged me to trust in thee for eternal life . 4. god's favour is better to a distressed king than life . 5. as god's omniscience discovers , so his omnipotence can defeat the designs of those , who have , or shall conspire the destruction of their king. 6. god can shew an injur'd king the goodness of his will through the wickedness of theirs that would destroy him . 7. god gives a distr●ssed king leave , as a man , to pray , that the cup [ of death ] may pass from him ; but he has taught him , as a christian , by the example of christ , to adde , not my will , but thine be done . 8. god , by resolving the king's will into his own , can make them both become one . 9. the desire of life should not be so great in a distressed king , as that of doing or suffering god's will in either life , or death . 10. god can make a king content to leave the worlds nothing , that he may come really to enjoy all in him , who hath made christ unto him , in life gain , and in death advantage . 11. though the destroyers of their king forget their duty to god and him , yet he ought to beseech god not to forget to be mercifull to them . 12. there is no profit in a king's bloud , nor in gaining his kingdoms from him , if they lose their own souls that do it . 13. an injur'd king ought to pray for such as have not only resisted his just power , but wholely usurped and turned it against ●im , that though they may have d●served , yet that they may not rece●ve , damnation to themselves . 14. god that made his son a saviour to many that crucifi●d him , while at once he suffered violently by them , and yet willingly for them , will at the instance of a devoted king , hear the voyce of christ's bloud call louder for regicides , than the cry of the king's bloud against them . 15. let a king pray for his murtherers , that god would prepare them for his mercy by due convictions of their sin , and not let them at once deceive and damn their own souls by fallacious p●etensions of justice in destroying him , while the conscience of their unjust usurpation of their king's power chiefly tempts them to use all extremities against him . 16. the mercies of regicides are very false , and so very cruel unto their king , who , while they pretend to preserve him , meditate nothing but his ruine . 17. god can deal with bloud-thirsty and deceitfull men otherwise than they deserve , by overcoming their cruelty with his compassion , and the charity of their devoted king. 18. when god maketh inquisition for royal bloud , the souls which he sindeth penitent , though polluted , he can sprinkle with the bloud of his son , and then the destroying angel shall pass over them . 19. though regicides in design think any kingdom on earth too little to entertain at once both themselves and their king ; yet he ought to pray that the capacious kingdom of god's infinite mercy may at last receive them both . 20. when king and people be reconciled in the bloud of the same redeemer , they shall come at last to live far above the ambitious desires which begat mortal enmities between them . 21. when the hands of regicides shall be heaviest and cruellest upon their king , if he fall into the armes of god's tender and eternal mercies , he shall be safe . 22. what is cut off of a king's life in the miserable moment of a violent death , may be repayed in god's ever-blessed eternity . 23. the king , whose eyes have seen gods salvation , shall depart in peace . finis . caroli i mi monita & observata britannica . the prudential advice and observations of king charles i. relating to the policie of his britannike kingdoms . collected and published by richard watson . homer odys : ● . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — . london , printed for robert horn , 1661. to the reader . friend , although the aphorismes , in the two former divisions , are made generall , to serve the good purpose of any prince , and his people , to whom the like calamities are incident , as were the sad experiments of our own , which prompted the spirit of wisdome to their production ; yet the guilt of our sinnes , and remembrance of our sufferings , will make us easily sensible of their more peculiar reflexion upon our selves . this century , with the surplusage , points so directly upon our kingdome , as we have no way to avoid the seasonable importunity of the counsel and instruction ; and , knowing what it cost his majesty that left it , are inexcusably miserable , if we put not the best value upon it by our observance . we hear much of book-cases , and precedents , in contests and pleadings for mens personal propriety ; i know no reason , why such rules , and instances , as these , should not be alike positive , and prevalent for publick interest , the prerogative of the king , and priviledges of the church . one calls the sword , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the souldier should ever have ready and at hand ; i could wish this might be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the king-and parliament-mans manuall , not so much to reproach him with the unworthiness of some of his factious predecessours , as to instruct him , by the fatality of such examples , to a future sobriety in his votes , and moderation in his publick desires , or demands . if you and i cannot help the extravagant deviations , that may yet hereafter willfully be made from the assured steadiness of this royal canon ; we may at least be satisfied in our own aversion from the ordinances of men , that imagine mischief for law , and betray their trust , to the second ruine of their country , à dieu . your servant , richard watson . c. i. monita , &c. britannica . the first century . 1. the kings of england should call their parliaments , not more by others advice , and the necessity of their affairs , than by their own choice and inclination . 2. the right way of parliaments is most safe for the crown , and best pleasing to the people . 3. when some mens distempers study to kindle sparks in parliaments , the king may hope to extinguish them by forbearing to convene for some years . 4. the king resolving with himself to give all just satisfaction to modest and sober desires , and to redress all publick grievances in church and state , may hope by his freedom , and the members moderation , to prevent all misunderstandings , and miscariages in the parliament he calls . 5. elections of parliament men , are many times carried in many places with partiality and popular heat . 6. the king knowing best the largeness of his own heart toward his peoples good and just contentment , may please himself in the hopes of a good and firm understanding , which by a parliament may grow between him and them . 7. the king should resolve to reform what by free and full advice in parliament he is convinced to be amiss ; and to grant what ever his reason and conscience tells him is sit to be desired . 8. though the king resolve not to imploy in his affairs a questiond minister of state against the advice of his parliament ; yet he should not have any hand in his death , of whose guiltlesness he is better assured , than any man living can be . 9. the peoples clamours for justice in exorbitance of fury is not to be regarded , when they mean thereby the king and two houses of parliament should vote as they would have them . 10. a tumultuous parliaments after-act vacating the authority of the precedent for future imitation [ in case of bloud ] sufficiently tells the world , that some remorse toucheth them that are most implacable against the person , as if knowing he had hard measure , and such as they would be very loth should be repeted to themselves . 11. the tenderness and regret the king may find in his soul , for having had any hand though very unwillingly ) in shedding one man's bloud unjustly ( though under the colour and formalities of justice , and pretenses of avoyding publick mischief ) may be hop'd to be some evidence before god and man to all posterity ; that he is far from bearing justly the vast load and guilt of all the bloud shed in an unhappy civil war , as his rebels charge upon him . to overawe the freedom of the houses of parliament , or to weaken their just authority by any violent impressions upon them , is a design unworthy of the king , who shall not need so rough assistance , if he have justice and reason on his side . 13. popular tumults are not the best removers of obstructions in parliaments , which rather infringe all freedome or differing in votes , and debating matters with reason and candor . 14. when the obstinacy of men in parliament , resolved to discharge their consciences , must be subdued by tumults , it may be feared , that by the same all factious , seditious , and scismatical proposals against government ecclesiastical , or civil , will be backed and abetted till they prevail . 15. the riot and impatience of popular tumults is such , that they will not stay the ripening and season of counsels , or fair production of acts , in the order , gravity , and deliberateness , besitting a parliament ; but will rip up with barbarous cruelty , and forcibly cut out abortive votes , such as their inviters , and incouragers most fancy . 16. when tumults are become so insolent , that there is no securing of the king's freedom in parliament , nor of his very person in the streets , he is not bound by his presence to provoke them to higher boldness and contempts . 17. when , and only when , parliaments , in their first election , and constitution , sit full and free , as in all reason , honour , and religion , they ought to be , things may be so carried , as will give no less content to all good men , than they wish or expect . 18. it may prove unhappy to convene a parliament , where the place affords the greatest confluence of various and vitious humours . 19. the king , when he calls a parliament , should purpose to contribute what in justice , reason , honour , and conscience , he can , to the happy success of it ; nor should it have any other design in him , but the general good of his kingdoms . 20. triennial parliaments , in a kingdom , as gentle and seasonable physick , might ( if well applied ) prevent any distempers from getting head , or prevailing , especially if the remedy prove not a disease beyond all remedy . 21. some men , when they meet in parliament , occasion more work than they find to do , by undoing so much as they find well done to their hands . 22. the perpetuating a parliament is an act of highest confidence , whereby a king hopes to shut out and lock the dore , upon all present jealousies , and future mistakes , but intends not thereby to exclude himself , as some may requite him . 23. those subjects are unworthy of an indulgent king , who deceive his extreme confidence by ill using any act of grace wherein he declares so much to trust them , as to deny himself in a high point of his prerogative . 24. a continual parliament by preserving lawes in their due execution and vigour ( but no otherwise ) may be thought , until experiment shew a fallacy , the best means to keep the commonweal in tune . 25. the agreeing votes of the major part in both houses of parliament are not , by any law , or reason , conclusive to the judgment of their king ; nor do they carry with them his consent , whom they in no kind represent . 26. the king is not further bound to agree with the votes of both houses , then he sees them agree with the will of god , with his just rights , as a king , and the general good of his people . 27. the members of parliament , as many men , are seldom of one mind ; and it is oft seen , that the major part of them are not the right . 28. the majesty of the crown of england is not bound by any coronation oath to consent to whatever its ▪ subjects in parliament shall require . 29. the coronation oath is discharged by the king 's governing by such lawes as his people with the house of peers have chosen , and himself hath consented unto . 30. the king should give no ear to the importunity of his parliament , when , instead of reason and publick concernments , they obtrude nothing but what makes for the interest of parties , and flowes from the partialities of private wills and passions . 31. every subject is bound to stand to the sentence of parliament according to law. 32. where an orderly guard is granted unto the parliament , no account in reason can be given for the not suppressing tumults , but only to oppress both the king 's and the two houses freedom of declaring and voting according to every mans conscience . 33. the king should not by power protect any against the justice of parliament . 34. it is justifiable for men in parliament to withdraw , who fear the partiality of their trial ( warned by any sad president ) while the vulgar threaten to be their oppressours , and judgers of their judges . 35. when factious tumults overbear not the freedom and honour of the two houses ; but they assert their justice against them , and make the way open for all the members quietly to come and declare their consciences , no man should be so dear unto their king , as whom he should have the least inclination to advise either to withdraw himself , or deny appearing upon their summons . 36. though the king may approve ( in some cases ) mens generous constancy and cautiousness ; yet further than that he should never allow any mans refractoriness against the priviledges and orders of the houses , to whom he ought to wish nothing more than safety , fullness , and freedom . 37. those men that despair in fair and parliamentary wayes by free deliberations , and votes , to gain the concurrence of the major part of lords and commons , betake themselves ( when they have interest ) by the desperate activity of factious tumults , to sift and terrifie away all those members , whom they see to be of contrary minds to their purposes . 28. bishops ought to enjoy their ancient places , and undoubted priviledges in the house of peers . 39. bills in parliament are not to be brought on by tumultuary clamours and schismatical terrours , and passed when both houses are sufficiently thinned and over-awed . 40. the king , beside the grounds he may have in his own judgment , has also a most strickt and indispensable oath upon his conscience , to preserve the order of bishops , and the rights of the church to which most sacrilegious and abhorred perjury , most unbeseeming a christian king , should he ever , by giving his consent , be betrayed , he might account it infinitely greater misery , than any had , or could befall him ; 41. the king puts much to the adventure , who by satisfying the fears and importunities of unquiet subjects , both to secure his friends , and overcome his enemies , to gain the peace of all , deprives himself of a sole power to help or hurt any , yielding the militia to be disposed of as the two houses shall think sit . 42. the militia is the king 's undoubted right , no less than the crown . 43. the king should not desire to be safer than he wisheth the parliament and his people . 44. the new modelling of soveraignty and kingship , makes the majesty of the kings of england hang like mahomet's tomb , by a magnetique charme , between the power and priviledges of the two houses , in an ayery imagination of regality . 45. the body of parliament , as the moon from the sun , receiveth its chiefest light from the king. 46. parliament-men may remember that they sit there as their kings subjects , not superiours , called to be his counsellors not dictatours : their summons extends to recommend their advice , not to command his duty . 47. when the two houses have once been in the wardship of tumults , their propositions are not to be hearkned to , until they shall have sued out their livery , and effectually redeem'd themselves . 48. when the king's judgment tells him , that any propositions sent to him are the results of the major part of their votes , who exercise their freedom , as well as they have right to sit in parliament , ( and not before ) he may expect his own judgment for not speedily and fully concurring with every one of them . 49. the king cannot allow the wisdom of his parliament such a completeness and inerrability as to exclude himself . 50. a parliament , without the concurrent reason of the king , cannot beget , or bring forth , any one complete and authoritative act of publick wisdom which makes the lawes . 51. a king may satisfie his parliament and his people ; but for fear or flattery to gratifie any faction , how potent soever , were to nourish the disease , and oppress the body . 52. the end of calling a parliament , being to use their advice that sit , the king ought to have charity enough to think there are wise men among them , and humility enough to think it fit he should in some things hearken to them , whose counsel he may want . 53. the suns influence is not more necessary in all natures productions , then the king's concurrence in all lawes . 54. we are to take heed of , and beware the old leaven of innovations masked under the name of reformation , which heaved at , and sometime threatned , both prince and parliament in queen elizabeth's and king james's dayes . 55. reason , honour , and safety , both of church and state , command the king to chew such morsels as a factious parliament may present him with , before he lets them down . 56. the king hath not any ground of credulity to induce him fully to submit to all the desires of those men , who will not admit , or do refuse , and neglect to vindicate the freedom of their own and others sitting and voting in parliament . 57. i know not any such tough and malignant humours in the constitution of the english church , which gentler applications , than those of an army , raised by their scotch fellow subjects , might not easily remove . 58. if the scotch sole presbytery were proved to be the only institution of jesus christ yet were it hard to prove , that christ had given subjects commission by the sword to set it up in any kingdom , without the soveraigns consent . ; 59. if presbytery in the supremacy of subjects be an institution of christ , it is the first and onely point of christianity that was to be planted and watered with christian bloud . 60. the many learned and pious churchmen in england , who have been alwayes bred up in , and conformable to the government of episcopacy , cannot so soon renounce both their former opinion and practise , only because a party of the scots will needs by force assist a like party of english , either to drive all ministers as sheep into the common fold of ●resbytery , or destroy them , at least fleece them , by depriving them of the benefit of their flock . 61. what respect and obedience christ and his apostles payd to the chief governours of states , where they lived , is very clear in the gospel but that he or they ever commanded to set such a parity of presbyters , and in such a way as some scots endeavour , is not very disputable . ; 62. the effusions of blood shed for the advancement of scotch presbitery runs in a stream contrary to that of the primitive planters both of christianity and episcopacy , which was with patient sheding of their own bloud , not violent drawing other mens . 63. wise and learned men think , that nothing hath more markes of schism and sectarism than the presbyterian way . 64. the presbyterian scots are not to be hired at the ordinary rate of auxiliaries nothing will induce them to engage , till those that call them in have pawned their souls to them , by a solemn league and covenant ; 65. some pretenders , of late , to reformation , have intended mainly the abasing of episcopacy into presbytery , and the robbing the church of its lands and revenues . 66. the bishops and church-men , as the fattest deer , must be destroyed , when the other rascal-herd of schisms , heresies , &c. being lean may ( by these men ) enjoy the benefit of toleration . 67. if the poverty of scotland might , yet the plenty of england cannot excuse the envy and rapine of the churches rights and revenues . 68. there is not any exception to which the best kings may be so liable in the opinion of them who are resolved to oppose them , as too great a fixedness in that religion , whose judicious and solid grounds , both from scripture and antiquity , will not give his conscience leave to approve , or consent to , those many dangerous and divided innovations which their bold ignorance would needs obtrude upon him and his people . 69. there is not such an oglio or medley of various religions in the world again , as those men entertain in their service , who find most fault with the king that adheres to the establishment of the church without any scruple as to the diversity of their sects and opinions 70. it hath been a foul and indeleble shame for such as would be counted protestants , to inforce their lord and king , a declared protestant , to a necessary use of papists or any other , who did but their duty to help him to defend himself . 71. the papists have had a greater sense of their allegeance than many protestant professours who seem to have learned , and to practise , the worst principles of the worst papists . ; 72. the king is not to justifie beyond humane errours and frailties himself , or his councellours , who may have been subject to some miscarriages , yet such as were far more reparable by second and better thoughts , than those enormous extravagances , wherewith some men have wildred and almost quite lost both church and state. 73. the event of things may make evident to the people , that should the king follow the worst counsels that his worst counsellours might have the boldness to offer him , or himself any inclination to use , he could not bring both church and state in three flourishing kingdoms to such a chaos of confusions , & hell of miseries , as some have done , who most clamour against his counsels , out of which they can not , or will not , in the midst of their many great advantages , redeem either him or his subjects . 74. some mens unsatiable desires of revenge upon the king , his court , and his clergy may wholely beguile both church and state of the benefit of any either retractations or concessions he may have made . 75. some men being conscious to their own formality in the use of our publick liturgy , have thought they fully expiated their sin of not using it aright , by laying all the blame upon it , and a total rejection of it as a dead letter , thereby to excuse the deadness of their hearts . 76. i do not see any reason , why christians should be weary of a well-composed liturgy ( as i hold ours to be ) more than of all other things , wherein the constancy abates nothing of the excellency and usefullness . 77. sure , we may as well before hand know what we pray , as to whom we pray , and in what words , as to what sense when we desire the same things , what hinders we may not use the same words . ; 78. i ever thought , that the proud oftentations of mens abilities for invention , and the vain affectations of ●ariety for expression● in publick prayer , or any sacred administrations , merits a greater brand of sin , than that which they call coldness and barrenness : nor are men in those novelties less subject to formal and superficial tempers ( as to their hearts ) than in the use of constant forms , where not the words , but mens hearts , are to blame . 79. i make no doubt but a man may be very formal in the most extemporary variety , and very fervently devout in the most wonted expressions . nor is god more a god of variety than of constancy . 80. i am not against a grave , modest , discreet and humble use of ministers gifts , even in publick , the better to fit and excite their own and the peoples affections to the present occasions . 81. i know no necessity why private and single abilities should quite justle out and deprive the church of the joint abilities and concurrent gifts of many learned and godly men , such as the composers of the service-book were , who may in all reason be thought to have more gifts and graces enabling them to compose with serious deliberation and concurrent advice such forms of prayers , as may best fit the churches common wants , inform the hearers understanding , and stir up that siduciciary and fervent application of their spirits ( wherein consists the very life and soul of prayer , and that so much pretended spirits of prayer ) than any private man by his solitary abilities can be presumed to have . 82. what such mens solitary abilities are many times ( even there where they make a great noise and shew ) the affectations ▪ emptiness , impertinency , ●udeness , confusions , flatness , levity , obscurity , vaine and ridulous repetitions , the sensless and oft-times blasphemous expressions , all these burthened with a most tedious and intolerable length , do fufficiently convince all men , but those who glory in that pharisaïcal way . 83. men must be strangely impudent and flatterers of themselves not to have an infinite shame of what they so do and say , in things of so sacred a nature , before god and the church , after so ridiculous and indeed prophane a manner . 84. in sacramental administrations , ministers own forms , to be used constantly , are not like to be so sound or comprehensive of the nature of the duty , as forms of publick composure . 85. in sacramental administrations and the like , every time to affect new expressions , when the subject is the same , can hardly be presumed in any mans greatest sufficiences not to want ( many times ) much of that compleatness , order , and gravity , becoming those duties , which by the mean , are exposed at every celebration to every ministers private infirmities , indispositions , errours , disorders , and defects , both for judgment and expression . 86. the want of a constant liturgy of publick composure this church will sufficiently feel , when the unhappy fruits of many mens ungoverned ignorance and confident defects shall be discovered in a multitude of errours , schismes , disorders , and uncharitable distractions in religion . 87. the innovations which law , reason , and religion forbids , must not be brought in and abetted , much less so obtruded as wholly to justle out the publick liturgy of the church . 88. the severity of those men is partial and inexcusable , who cried out of the rigour of lawes and bishops , which suffered them not to use the liberty of conscience , which they deny others , having the power in their hands . 89. they who suddenly changed the liturgy into a directory , seem to have thought that the spirit needed help for invention , though not for expressions . 90. matter prescribed doth as much stint and obstruct the spirit , as if it were clothed in and confined to fit words . 91. this matter of the publick liturgy is of so popular a nature , as some men knew it would not bear learned and sober debates , least being convinced by the evidence of reason , as well as lawes , they should have been driven either to sin more against their knowledg , by taking it away , or to displease some faction of the people , by continuing the use of it . 92. they that use such severity as not to suffer , without penalty , any to use the common-prayer-book publickly , although their consciences bind them to it , as a duty of piety to god , and obedience to the lawes , i believe have offended more considerable men ▪ not only for their numbers and estates , but for their weighty and judicious piety , than those are , whose weakness or giddiness they sought to gratifie by taking it away . 93. one of the greatest faults some men found with the common prayer book , i believe was this , that it taught them to pray so oft for their king to which petitions they had not loyalty enough to say amen , nor yet charity enough to forbear reproaches , and even cursings of him in their own forms , instead of praying for him. ; 94. i wish their r●pentance may be their only punishment , that seeing the mischiess which the disuse of publ●ck liturgies hath produced , they may restore that credit , use , and reverence to them , which by the ancient churches were given to set forms if sound and wholesome words . 95. to such as have any jealousie , that the king is earnest and resolute to maintain the church-government by bishops , not so much out of piety as policy and reason of state , this may be said , that he being ( as king ) intrusted by god and the lawes with the good both of church and state , there is no reason he should give up , or weaken , by any change , that power and influence which in right and reason he ought to have over both . 96. as the king is not to incline to bishops for any use to be made of their votes in state-affairs so neither should he think any bishops worthy to sit in the house of peers , who would not vote according to his conscience . ; 97. the king must in charity be thought desirous to preserve that government in its right constitution , as a matter of religion , wherein his judgment is fully satisfied , that it has of all other both the fullest scripture-grounds , and , until the last century , the constant practise of all christian churches . 98. the king that has no temptation to invite him to alter the government of bishops ( that he may have a title to their estates ) will not easily believe their pretended grounds to any new wayes , who desire a change . 99. some there are , who by popular heaps of weak light , and unlearned teachers , seek to overlay and smother the pregnancy and authority of that power of episcopal government , which beyond all equivocation and vulgar fallacy of names , is most convincingly set forth , both by scripture , and all after-histories of the church . 100. the king should have fair grounds both from scripture , canons and ecclesiastical examples , whereon to state his judgment for episcopal government , and not permit any policy of state , or obstinacy of will , or partiality of affection either to the men , or their function , to fix him. the second century . 1. all the churches in the christian world , which presbyterians , or independants , can pretend to , are by so much fewer than others governed by bishops , as those in my three kingdoms will equalize ( i think ) if not exceed . 2. oppression will necessarily follow both the presbyterian parity , which makes all ministers equal ; and the independant inferiority , which sets their pastors below the people . 3. the britannike bishops are as legally invested in their estates , as any who seek to deprive them : and they having by no law been convicted of those crimes which might forfeit their estates and livelihoods , the king , without many personal injustices to many worthy men , can give up neither their order , nor revenue . 4. those subjects in vain pretend to tenderness of conscience and reformation , who can at once tell the king , that his coronation-oath binds him to consent to whatsoever they shall propound to him , though contrary to all the rational and religious freedom which every man ought to preserve ; and at the same time perswade him , that he must , and ought to dispense with , and roundly break , that part of his oath which binds him ● agreeable to the best light of reason and religion he hath ) to maintain the government and legal rights of the church . 5. it were strange , the king's oath should be valid in that part which both himself and all men in their own case esteem injurious and unreasonable , as being against the very natural and essential liberty of their souls , yet it should be invalid and to be broken in another clause , wherein he thinks himself justly obliged both to god and man. 6. i cannot find that in any reformed churches ( whose patterns are so cryed up and obtruded upon the churches under my dominions ) that either learning or religion , works of piety or charity , have so flourished , beyond what they have done in my kingdoms , by god's blessing , which might make me believe either presbytery , or independancy , have a more benign influence upon the church and mens hearts and lives , than episcopacy in its right constitution . 7. they who take part with the king in a civil war , have clearly , and undoubtedly , for their justification , the word of god , and the lawes of the land , together with their own oathes ; all requiring obedience to his just commands ; but to none other under heaven without him , or against him , in the point of raising armes . 8. the king should be well pleased with his parliaments intentions , to reform what the indulgence of times and corruption of manners may have depraved . 9. the king may be willing to grant , or restore to presbytery what with reason or discretion it can pretend to in a conjuncture with episcopacy : but , for that wholly to invade the power , and by the sword to arrogate , and quite abrogate the authority of episcopacy , is neither just , as to that ancient order , nor safe for presbytery , nor yet any way convenient for this church or state. 10. the contentions between the presbyterians and independants in the britannike churches , have been the struglings of those twins which one womb enclosed , the yonger striving to prevail against the elder what the presbyterians hunted after , the independants sought , and caught for themselves . ; 11. that the builders of babel should from division fall to confusion , is no wonder : but for those that pretend to build jerusalem to divide their tongues and hands , is but an ill omen , and sounds too like the fury of those zelots , whose intestine bitterness and divisions , were the greatest occasion of the last fatal destruction of that city . 12. the independants in this seemd more ingenuous than the presbyterian rigour , who sometimes complaining of exacting their conformity to lawes became the greatest exactors of other mens submission to their novel injunctions . 13. the king should alwayes wish so well to parliament and city , that he should be sorry to see them do , or suffer , any thing unworthy such great and considerable bodies in this kingdom . 14. when such bodies become restive and refractory against soveraignty , the king may be glad to see them scared and humbled , by tumults or otherwise , but not broken by that shaking ; of whom he should never have so ill a thought , as to despair of their loyalty to him , which mistakes may eclipse , but he should never believe malice can quite put out . 15. when parliament or city are not only divided , and separated from the king , but brought to intestine confusion within themselves , he should look upon them as christ did sometime over jerusalem , as objects of his prayers , and tears , with compassionate grief , as foreseeing those severer scatterings which will certainly befal such as wantonly refuse to be gathered to their duty . 16. the best profession of religion i have ever esteemed that of the church of england , as coming nearest to gods word for doctrine , and to the primitive examples for government , with some little amendment , which i have often offered , though in vain . 17. all the lesser factions at first were officious servants to presbytery , their great master : till time , and military success , discovering to each their peculiar advantages , invited them to part stakes , and leaving the joynt stock of uniform religion , pretended each to drive for their party the trade of profits and preferments , to the breaking and undoing , not only of the church and state , but even of presbytery it self , which seemed , and hoped , at first , to have ingrossed all . 18. in the administration of justice , the settled lawes of the britannike kingdoms are the most excellent rules the king can govern by , which by an admirable temperament give very much to subjects industry , liberty and happiness ▪ and yet reserve enough to the majesty and prerogative of any king , who owns his people as subjects , not as slaves ; whose subjection , as it preserves their property , peace and safety , so it will never diminish his rights , nor their ingenuous liberties , which consist in the injoyment of the fruits of their industry , and the benefit of those lawes , to which themselves have consented . 19. no subjects can , without an high degree of guilt , and sin , devest the king of those enjoyments , which the lawes have assigned to him. 20. the king , in uncertain times , is to require and entreat the prince his son , as his father , and his king , that he never suffer his heart to receive the least check against , or disaffection from , the true religion established in the church of england . 21. after trial , much search , and many disputes , i conclude the religion of the church of england to be the best in the world , not only in the community , as christian , but also in the special notion , as reformed , keeping the middle way between the pomp of superstitious tyranny , and the meanness of fantastick anarchy . 22. the drought being excellent , as to the main , both for doctrine , and government in the church of england , some lines ( as in very good figures ) may happily need some sweetning , or polishing , which might have easily been done by a safe and gentle hand , if some mens precipitancy had not violently demanded such rude alterations , as would have quite destroyed all the beauty , and proportions of the whole . 23. the king is not to entertain any aversation or dislike of parliaments , which in their right constitution with freedom , and honour , will never injure , or diminish , his greatness , but will rather be as interchangings of love , loyalty , and confidence between a prince , and his people . 24. the sad effects that have issued from the insolencies of popular dictates , and tumultuary impressions , should make parliaments more cautious to preserve that freedom and honour , which belong to such assemblies . 25. nothing can be more happy for all , than in fair , grave , and honourable wayes , to contribute their councels in common , enacting all things by publick consent , without tyranny , or tumults . 26. after the storm of civil dissension and war , wherein the folly and wickedness of some men have so far ruined , as to leave nothing intire in church or state , to the crown , the nobility , the clergy , or the commons , either as to lawes , liberties , estates , order , honour , conscience or lives , the yong prince that succeeds , should be an anchor , or harbour rather to the tossed and weather-beaten kingdoms , a repairer of the ruines by his wisdom , justice , piety , and valour . 27. the king cannot ( in what extremity soever ) suffer any diminution of the churches patrimony , or alienation of it , it being without paradventure sacriledg ▪ and likewise contrary to his coronation-oath . 28. the government of the church , according to its constitution in england , is a chief column , and support , to the monarchy and crown . 29. the greatest means to make a parliament happy is , that the king on his part , and the members thereof on theirs , lay aside all suspicion one of another . 30. the navy , and forts , are the walls and defence of this kingdom , which if out of order , all men may easily judge what encouragement it will be to our enemies , and what disheartning to our friends . 31. the king can no way consent that the voyces of bishops in parliament should be taken away , which they have enjoy'd since , and before , the conquest , and is one of the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom . 32. often parliaments is the fittest mean to keep correspondency between the king and his people . 33. neither queen elizabeth , nor [ my father ] king james did ever avow , that any priest , in their time , was executed meerly for religion : the inconveniences that by this severity may fall to the king's subjects , and other protestants abroad , ought to be considered by any parliament that presses it . 34. the parliament that takes the government all in pieces , must do like a skillfull watchmaker , to make clean his watch , who takes it asunder , puts it again together , but leaves not out one pin , if he means to have it go better . 35. the parliament ought not to wish more , than they can shew the king the way how conveniently it may be done . 36. it is the great expression of trust the king has in the affections of his parliament unto him , when before they do any thing for him , he puts a confidence in them by his gracious concessions . 37. if any person durst be so impudent as to move the king to alter the lawes , he ought to put such a mark upon him , as from which all posterity might know his intention was ever to govern by the law , and no otherwise . 38. that parliament is not to alledg against the king his deceiving their expectation in the time of his return ( having departed with their consent ) who as much , and more , have deceived him in the condition , for proceeding in his affairs . 39. when the king sends a serjeant at armes to his parliament ; he may expect obedience , not a message . 40. in cases of treason , no person hath a priviledg by being a member of the parliament . 41. the king should alwayes be as tender of any thing which may advance the true protestant religion , protect , and preserve , the lawes of the land , and defend the just priviledg and freedom of parliaments , as of his life , or his crown . 42. when the king calls his parliament together to be witnesses of his actions , and privy to his intentions , it may be certainly believed , he has not the least thought , disagreeing with the happiness , and security of his kingdom . 43. a loyal parliaments concurrence with the king , it may be hoped , will so far prevail over the hearts and understandings of the whole kingdom ( who must look upon the members , as persons naturally , and originally , trusted by and for them ) that it will be above the reach and malice of those , who sometimes have too great an influence upon the people , to discredit the king 's most intire actions , and sincere promises , the members being the best witnesses for the one , and security for the other . 44. when the king , and his parliament , have both the same ends , there will be no other differences in the way , than what upon debate , and right understanding , will be easily adjusted . 45. let right religion ( in which all are most nearly concerned , and , without care of which , they must not look for god's blessing ) be vindicated and preserved ; let the king's honour , and rights ( which have an inseparable relation with the subjects interests ) be vindicated , and if ravish'd from him , restored ; let the subjects liberties , properties , priviledges , ( without which a good man should not desire to be a king ) be secured , and confirmed , and there is nothing the parliament can advise the king to , wherein he should not meet them , that together they may inform posterity , how much their trust and confidence in each other , is a better expedient for the peace and preservation of the kingdom , than fears and jealousies . 46. during any session of parliament , the king may expect ( as most proper for the duty of subjects ) that propositions for the remedies of evils ought rather to come to him , than from him ; yet such should be his fatherly care of his people , that he should rather lay by any particular respect of his own dignity , than that any time should be lost for the preventing of those threatning evils , which cannot admit the delayes of the ordinary proceedings in parliament . 47. that the subjects cannot be obliged to obey an act , order , or injunction of parliament , to which the king hath not given consent , is the king 's known and unquestionable priviledg , and , being so , is a priviledg of the kingdoms . 48. the kings power is invested in him by the law , and by that only he should desire to maintain it . 49. the king that gives away the militia , parts with the power of the sword , entrusted to him by god , and the lawes of the land , for the protection and government of his people , thereby at once devesting himself , and dis-inheriting his posterity of that right and prerogative of the crown , which is absolutely necessary to the kingly office , and so weakens monarchy in his kingdom , that little more than the name and shadow of it will remain . 50. for the abolishing arch-bishops , bishops , &c. a britannike soveraign cannot give his consent , as he is a christian , and a king. 51. the britannike kings have so inseparably woven the right of the church into the liberties of the rest of the subjects , as the government by arch-bishops , and bishops , cannot be abolished . 52. the king cannot consent to the alienation of church-lands , because it cannot be denied to be a sin of the highest sacriledg as also , that it subverts the intentions of so many pious donors , who have laid a heavy curse upon all such prophane violations . beside which matter of conscience , it will be a prejudice to the publick good , many of the subjects having the benefit of renuing leases at much easier rates , than if those possessions were in the hands of private men : nor is it to be omitted , the discouragement which it will be to all learning and industry , when such eminent rewards shall be taken away , which now lye open to the children of meanest persons . ; 53. the exercise of mercy should be no more pleasing to the king , than to see both houses of parliament consent for his sake , that he should moderate the severity of the law , in an important case . 54. no free-born subject of england can call life , or any thing he possesseth his own , if power , without right , dayly make new , and abrogate the old fundamental law of the land. 55. i am confident no learned lawyer will afirm , that an impeachment can lye against the king , all the lawes going in his name , and one of their maximes being , that the king can do no wrong . 56. the commons of england was never a court of judicature . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a78780-e330 vid. h. grot. ad cap. 1. proverb . notes for div a78780-e3070 1. lips . excerpt ex comoed. & tragoed . graec. the politicks of france by monsieur p.h. ... ; with reflections on the 4th and 5th chapters, wherein he censures the roman clergy and the hugonots, by the sr. l'ormegreny. traitté de la politique de france. english du chastelet, paul hay, marquis, b. ca. 1630. 1691 approx. 416 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 134 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2008-09 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a43118 wing h1202b estc r40961 19539182 ocm 19539182 109071 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a43118) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 109071) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 1689:15) the politicks of france by monsieur p.h. ... ; with reflections on the 4th and 5th chapters, wherein he censures the roman clergy and the hugonots, by the sr. l'ormegreny. traitté de la politique de france. english du chastelet, paul hay, marquis, b. ca. 1630. du moulin, peter, 1601-1684. reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france. the second edition. [8], 170, [5], 172-252 p., [1] leaf of plates : port. printed for thomas basset ..., london : 1691. translation of author's traitté de la politique de france. "reflections on the fourth chapter of the politics of france" has special t.p. sr. l'ormegregny is pseudonyum of peter du moulin. engraved frontispiece of king louis xiv opposite t.p. reproduction of original in the huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng louis -xiv, -king of france, 1638-1715. political science -early works to 1800. france -politics and government -1643-1715. 2006-10 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2006-11 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2007-05 robyn anspach sampled and proofread 2007-05 robyn anspach text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion pour mounsieur de c. sur son traitte de , la politique francoise . sixain , si donner de moyens au plus grand roy du monde , d'estre maistre absolu sur la terre & sur l'onde , c'est marque d'un esprit , & rare & marveilleux ; je puis dire en d'epit de toute la critique , que ce traitte de politique , ne fut dicte que par les dieux . to this effect . if that to give the great french king in hand , the means to sway o're all , both seas , and land ; if this be wit , ( which none can well deny ) then to the teeth of all critiques , i 'll maintain these politiques are wit , above the sky . louis xiv roy de france ▪ et de navarre . the politicks of france . by monsieur p. h. marquis of c. with reflections on the 4th and 5th chapters ; wherein he censures the roman clergy , and the hugonots ; by the sr. l'ormegregny . the second edition . london , printed for thomas basset , at the george in fleetstreet , 1691. sr. richard newdigate of arbury in the county of warwick baronet 1709 the authors epistle to the french king . sir , all the nations of the earth wait with impatience for the oracles which your majesties high wisdom disposeth it self to pronounce : and the whole vniverse , by submitting to the laws which you are about to give this kingdom , will declare , that you alone deserve to command all men . if the delphique priestess scrupled not to style lycurgus a god , for his having setled the spartans in order ; what must not fame say , when it shall publish your majesties august name ? future ages , sir , shall proclaim aloud what you perform in yours ; and report the splendour of your heroick virtue . happy the people who already find the effects of it ; but a thousand times happy they of your majesties subjects , whom you permit to offer at your feet some token of their admiration . you have often done me the honour to grant me this precious favour ; and i beseech with lowest respect , that you further please to accept the piece i now present you. it satisfies not the greatness of my zeal , that during the course of my life , i incessently speak of the passion i have for your service ; my writings must inform posterity of it after my death ; and the whole world ever know to what degree i am , sir , your majesties most humble , most obedient , and most faithful subject and servant , p. h. d. c. the preface . the bookseller will needs have a preface to encourage the sale of the book . now , for my part , i think there needs no other recommendation than its title ; for those that will not be induced to buy it , because 't is french , will not fail to have it for the sake of its politick's ; yet , if any should scruple laying out their money only on the credit of the title page , their scruple ( i doubt not ) will be removed , when they are told that the author of the growth of popery , says ; that this book is the measure of the french kings designs , and i 'm sure there 's none of us all that will be-grudge two shillings to be made privy to his councels . but if neither of these things , nor the credit it had in its native language , will cause the book to sell , i cann't imagine how a preface should do it ; for i know few ( if any ) that read the preface of a book they intend not to read also ; i have known some , indeed , read the book , and omit the preface , which i doubt would be the fate of this , should i make it long , i shall therefore only tell you how this scheme of the vast designs of the french king became publick , and so conclude . the author was a person bred up under mr. colebert , and to shew his abilities , he writ this treatise , and in manuscript presented it to the french king , which was favourably received ; but afterward , vanity prompting him to publish it in print , the king lookt upon him as one that had discovered his secrets , and turned his favour into frowns , caused him to be imprisoned in the bastile , where he continued a long time , and was not deliver'd thence , but to banishment , which , to those that read the preface , affords one encouragement more to read the book , since it discovers a secret which most men seek more after , and delight more in than wisdom or truth . the politicks of france . chap. i. 1. what the politicks are . 2. what their object , end , and means . 3. the different sorts of governments . 4. that monarchy is the best . the politicks are the art of governing states . the ancients have call'd 'em a royal and a most divine science , surpassing in excellency , and superior to all others . they have allow'd them the same precedence in practical learning , which the metaphysicks and theologie , have among the speculative . the means which the politicks prescribe , are comprised under the heads of an exact observance of religion , a doing justice in all cases ; a providing that the people be protected in the times of peace and war ; and a preserving the state in a just and laudable mediocrity , by exterminating the extremes of poverty and of riches . the politicks have three principal branches : namely , the three sorts of regular governments , in which men live under the authority of laws . the first is monarchy , in which one only prince doth command for the publick good . the second is aristocracy ; in which the honestest and wisest persons , being elected out of all the subjects , have the direction and administration of publick affairs . the third is democracy , in which all deliberations and orders are held , and do pass by the agency and vote of the people . the principal end to which a democracy tendeth , is liberty . that of an aristocracy , is riches and virtue . the end of a monarchy , is , the glory , the virtue , the riches , and the liberty of the country . a tyranny , the most dangerous of all vicious and unlawful governments , stands in direct opposition unto monarchy . a tyrant commandeth meerly for his own personal , not the publick profit : a king does the contrary . tyranny is destructive to the glory , the virtue , the riches , and the liberty of the people . an aristocracy often falls into an oligarchy ; and this happens when a determinate number of persons is no longer chosen out of the whole to govern , and the choice is made of the rich and noble only ; not generally out of all the citizens . sometimes there riseth up oligarchy , even within oligarchy ; and this comes to pass , when the magistrates are chosen of the noblest and richest of some preferred families , not of all the rich gentry . an aristocracy is in some sort an oligarchy , but much better than that which is simply such : forasmuch as in an aristocracy , justice is administred to persons of all ranks , according to desert ; which in an oligarchique state is not done . a well-temper'd aristocracy is of long duration , and seldom comes into the danger of suffering any change. an oligarchy , on the contrary , such as was the government of the decem-viri , or ten , at rome , and of the thirty at athens , is easily corrupted . for the persons who are in command , do frequently usurp a soveraign authority . such usurpation is not stiled a tyranny ; ( for this is of one alone ) but strictly a dynastie ; that is , a potentacy or power , violently assumed and retained , contrary to the disposition of the laws . the greeks ( whose the word dynastie is , ) do take it in this case , in an ill sense . an aristocracy and an oligarchy are dissolved , when some one among the rich , the noble , or the brave , does attain to an overgrown height . thus caesar became master of rome . the aristocracy is also in danger , when they that govern , come into contempt with the multitude , or are hated by them , so that the inferiors grow factious , and mutiny against them , as hapned at rome , when the tribunes of the people were first created . the apprehensions which the more than ordinary virtue of some excellent persons , gave the people of greece , caused the introducing of ostracisme among the athenians , and of petalisme at syracuse : punishments , but glorious for such as were condemn'd to them . a democracy likewise , sometimes , turns into an oligarchy . and that is , when the dregs of the ignorant people , seduced by evil orators , ( whom the greeks call demagogues , or , leaders of the people ) do dispose of affairs tumultuously , with uproar and violence , without respect to law or equity . thus the athenians seduced by their speakers , did put to death aristogenes , and other captains who had fought in company with thrasibulus , and gain'd a notable victory upon the lacedomonians , their enemies . obligarchies are the means sometimes that people lose their liberty : and fall into servitude . pisistratius became tyrant of athens that way , and dionysius of the syracusians . there are as various monarchies , aristocracies , and democracies , as there are different manners of men . but i have discours'd all this only cursorily ; and i design not any further to engage my self in these matters , my purpose being to speak precisely of the concerns of the french monarchy . there are two sorts of monarchy , unto which all regal governments , of whatever quality imaginable , are reduced ; whether elective , hereditary , barbarous , despotical , or any other . the first of these is entituled , the lacedemonian ; in which the king hath but a limited authority . the second aeconomical ; in which the king hath a sovereign and absolute power in his kingdom , as the father of a family hath in his house . 't is no longer a question , whether monarchy be the best government , the case having been often debated by politicians , and still decided for regality . and indeed it is of greatest antiquity , least susceptible of change ; most conform unto the government of god himself ; and not only represents the authority which a father exerciseth in his house , but it also necessarily occurs in an aristocracy , and in democracy it self . for , both in the one and the other of these states , the sovereignty is entirely one ; so that no single person can possess any the least parcel of it . in an aristocracy , no one of the senators is a sovereign ; but the whole senate being united of one accord , is king. in a democracy , no one of himself hath power to make the least ordinance ; the people assembled are the monarch . thus every where appears an indivisible sovereignty ; so conform to the laws of nature is monarchy . in fine , it may be said , that there never was aristocracy , but founded upon the corruptions and ruins of some monarchy : moreover , that tyranny , it 's direct contrary , is the worst of all governments . now from all that i have said , it follows by a necessary consequence , that the monarchique state is better than any other . chap. ii. 1. of the true good and happiness of states . 2. of the true good and happiness of a king. 3. how felicity may be acquired . things reckon'd under the notion of good , are of three sorts . corporal , as health , beauty , strength , agility , and the like . external , which we commonly call goods of fortune ; as birth , riches , dignities , reputation , friends , and such others . the third sort are those of the soul : these are simply and absolutely good , that is , good of themselves ; and so they can be no other but virtue alone . things accounted good are no further such indeed , than as they promote our felicity , and bring us to it ; corporal and external things are not instruments to effect this . but the good of the soul is the true happiness . felicity is not a simple habit ; otherwise a man asleep would be happy : but it consisteth in action , which is the true use of virtue . the soul makes us capable of living happily : for happiness is measured by virtue ▪ nor can we be counted happy , but proportionably as we are counted good . the intention of political science is , to bring to pass , that men lead their lives happily ; as i have observ'd in the precedent chapter . 't is therefore certain , that it requires they be actually virtuous . all that i have been discoursing is of constant and confesseth truth . whence clearly results , that the politicks consider virtue in a much more noble manner than ethicks do ; for these , confining themselves to the forming of idle speculations , can produce but an imperfect felicity , which the schools do call theoretical . the politicks on the contrary go further , and causing us to exercise virtue , do give us a practical , that is , solid and perfect felicity . in fine , it is not doubted , but the act is preferrable to the habit . besides , the ethical or moral discourses of virtue , can have no other aim , but at most , the welfare of particular persons ; which does not always produce that of the publick : and the politicks , regarding the welfare of an whole state , provide at once for that of each particular ; as a good pilot , in endeavouring the safety of his ship , procures necessarily , the safety of all that are embarqued in it . also , the care of the welfare of particular persons , seems to be beneath the politicks , except so far as it is necessary for the publick good . yet sometimes particular men must of force suffer for the publick good ; as when a malefactor is punished , and when some houses are pull'd down to save a town from fire , and from enemies . the happiness of a state is of the same quality with that of particular persons . for as we say , a man is happy when he hath strength , riches , and virtue ; in like manner we say a common-wealth is happy when it is potent , rich , and justly governed . a monarch is , in reference to his state , what the soul is to man. there is no doubt therefore , but that the proper goods of a king are those of the soul : and that he can possess no other . fortune being beneath a true soveraign , and extrinsick to him , cannot give him ought of that kind from gold or glory : all that he hath doth arise from his own virtue , his power , his treasures , and the various effects of beneficence which he holdeth in his hand , do not constitute his happiness : as god himself is not blessed by external blessings , but only confers them as a distribution made to his creatures , and that he may cause them by sensible means to experiment his goodness . the magnificence of a man renders him considerable , if his spirit in it be great and heroick . but it is not enough to have spoken of that which constitutes felicity , we must take some account of the means which conduce unto it . nature , constancy and reason , do contribute to endue us with virtue . the two former do enrich the mind , and dispose it to receive virtue ; then reason being cleared by the light of precepts , makes it spring up , and cultivates it . of all precepts , those of greatest efficacy are the political , which being indeed laws , do command and oblige men to obey , in a manner , blindly : necessitating and constraining us to live well , whether we will or no. 't is upon this ground it hath been said , that there lies no servitude at all in submitting to the power of the law ; and that it 's the proper act of men truly free , to reduce their inclinations , and subject their practice to the same : forasmuch as the conforming of life and manners to the impulses of virtue , which is always right , always uncorrupt , is in truth a setting our our selves at full liberty , and an enfranchisement from the empire of importunate and irregular passions . but of these general theses enough . it is time at length to enter upon the subject which occasion'd my taking up the design of this present treatise . chap. iii. 1. of the french monarchy . 2. of the situation and quality of france . 3. of the nature of the french. the monarchick government doth not more excell other governments , than the french monarchy doth all other monarchies on earth . it is hereditary , and for twelve whole ages there hath been seen reigning from male to male , upon the throne of france , the august posterity of meroue of charlemagne , and of hugh capet . for it is exactly proved , that these three races of our kings , are branches issued out of the same stock . this very succession , so legitimate as it hath been , and so long continued , makes at present the surest foundation of the welfare of the state ; and carries in it splendor , reputation and majesty . indeed to how many ills are elective kingdoms exposed ? how many cabals ? how many complottings ; and in truth , wars , are kept on foot by so many different agitations ? the one and the other roman empire , and the kingdom of the poles , do administer sensible proofs of this opinion . if the spartans heretofore did draw so great an advantage from the honour they had to be commanded by princes of the blood of hercules : the french have far greater cause to glory ; since in the catalogue of his majesties triumphant ancestors , there may be counted an hundred heroes greater than hercules himself . is there a monarch in the world , whose just power is more absolute , than that of our king ? and by consequent , is there a monarchy comparable to the french monarchy ? it is necessary that the power of a good king be not confin'd within other bounds than reason and equity do prescribe : otherwise there will ever be division between princes and people , to the ruin of them both . what a disorder would it be in man , if the eye or hand should fail of following the impulses of the soul ? this disobeying and rebellious member would prove dead , or seized with a palsie . if then the whole body should fall into an universal revolt against the spirit of man , all the symmetry , the order and oeconomy would be utterly defaced . thus the subjects in a monarchy , once ceasing to yield their king a full obedience , and the king ceasing to exercise his soveraign authority over them , the political ligatures are broken , the government is dissolved , by little and little all is reduced to extream calamities , and oft-times to anarchy , and an annihilation . such are the inconveniencies that occur in royalties of the lacedemonian kind , where the prince hath but a limited authority ; and if all that england suffer'd in the late times were pourtray'd here , it would be easie to observe of what importance it is unto the felicity of a monarchy , that the prince do in it command without restriction . in fine , the obedience of instrumental parts , as those of organical bodies , and the subjects of a state , is of so indispensible a necessity , that the common good and conservation of that whole , which they compose , depends upon it . in democracies , even the most tumultuous and disorderly , all must bow under the will of the multitude , though blind , ignorant and seduced : in like manner , the parts of the bodies of brutes must act by their motions , though they be in rage and madness . and the reason of this necessity is , that the body and the soul , which is the form thereof , are but one indivisible whole ; so a king and subjects are together but one whole , that is , one state. in fine , the french monarchy is accompanied with all the mixture that can be desired for a compleat and perfect government . the counsellors of state do compose an excellent oligarchy in it ; the parliaments , and other officers of judicature do form an aristocracy ; the provosts of merchants , the mayors , the consuls , and the general estates do represent rarely well limited democracy ; so that all the different modes of governing by laws , being united in the monarchy , do render it as excellent and consummate , as reason can propose . the regality of france is therefore of the oeconomick kind ; in which the king hath an absolute power in his state , as the father of a family in his house ; and though he govern at his pleasure , and without contradiction , it is always for the good of his kingdom : even as the master of an house does rule it with an entire authority , and incessantly provides for the accommodating of this family . there is nothing despotical nor barbarous in france , as in the states of the moscovites and turks . in short , our laws are holy and equitable , to a greater degree than in any common-wealth that ever was ; and they are conceived with so much prudence and judgement , that they are apt to make the people happy in the gentle times of peace , and enable them to triumph in the occasions of war. the situation and compactness of france are known to all the world ; so that it would be a needless labour , should i here expatiate , to shew the beauty and richness of our grounds and of our rivers : or declare how we abound in wine , in corn , in silk , in wools , in cloth , in wood , in cattle , in salt , in mines , and in money ; how necessary we are to our neighbours ; and to what degree we may forego their succors and their merchandise . i might justly be accus'd of a fondness for superfluous discourse , if i should particularly consider all these great advantages ; and as much , if i should speak of the pureness of the air , and the incredible number of inhabitants : the most ignorant having a full and an assured knowledge of ' em . i shall only say , that it need not be wondred at , if men whom fortune brings forth , and breeds up in so excellent a climate , be capable of handsomly contriving , and successfully executing the haughtiest enterprizes . in fine , it s an unspeakable satisfaction to a man that sets himself to treat of the politicks of france , that he may know the french , of all the people upon earth , are the most susceptible of learning , of policy , and of government . for if one consider the situation of the country , he may be assured , that the constellations of heaven are eminently favourable to it . the experience and skill of the ancients do inform us , that the situation of regions is the prime cause of the temperature of the men in 'em ; as it is of the quality of the plants and fruits which they produce . the laws of this state being so judicious as they are , do argue the wisdom of those that enacted them ; and of the people that accepted them ; whereof the long duration of the monarchy is a second proof . on the other hand , the great acts of the french do speak their valour . they serve in our age , for examples to all nations in matter of execution ; and not only so , but are as eminent likewise for their counsels : and they have choice of the best generals on earth to lead armies , as well as of the best soldiers . that heat and impetuosity which is taken to be visible in all their attempts , is an effect of their high courage ; and the confidence they shew , with somewhat less of restraint and respect than prudence could wish , can be imputed to nothing but their fearlesness : in fine , the emperor charles the fifth , declared with very much judgment , that the french seem'd to be fools , but were really wise . now , since we know what france is , let us examine what may most conduce to the well-governing of it , to the conserving it in plenty , and in reputation ; in what it may be augmented , and how its interests with the neighboring states ought to be secured . in a word , let us see what way may be taken to maintain the parts that compose it , in so regular an harmony , that they may all incessantly contribute to the weal of the monarchy . chap. iv. 1. of the clergy . 2. vseful means to obstruct frauds in beneficiary cases . 3. of the monastick religious of each seu. our ancestors have ever been great observers of religion . long before the coming of jesus christ , the druids were their priests , and had an entire direction , not only of affairs relating to the service of their false gods , but of those too which concern'd distributive justice ; even in the general assemblies held by all the gauls , whether for confirmation of peace , or for reconciliation of disagreeing parties , who might embroil the republiques , or whether the making of some common national enterprises was in question , still there was no resolution formed , but by their advice . no wonder then , if since the truth of the gospel appeared , and made known the holiness of christianity , the prelates have conserv'd so many prerogatives and considerations . they have been called to the royal counsels ; they have assisted at the decision of the most important affairs , they have every where hold the first rank ; much hath been attributed to their judgments , and the respect had for their character and dignity , hath gotten them great and signal priviledges , which have exempted them from contributing to the burthens of the state ; though at the same time wealth was heap'd upon them by alms and foundations . but as church-men , after the mode of the court of rome , use to convert whatever is freely granted them into a point of religion ; in such manner , that by little and little , they engage the tender consciences of the faithful in vain scruples , and possesses them with a superstitious fear of offending ; they have not been wanting to assert and maintain , that these exemptions and privileges were not liberally given them ; that kings did but settle them in possession of an advantage which was by divine right inseperable from their profession : that they , while men of war fought for the glory and liberty of their country , sufficiently did their part , in lifting up , as as was anciently done , their eyes and hands to god , to impetrate his powerful protection : that their arms were prayers , oblations , and penitence , which they never forbore to use for the publick safety ; that from the caves and deserts whither they retired , they sent up meterials to the highest heavens , which formed into thunder there , might fall back upon , and beat down the enemies of the french name . in fine , that if gentlemen gave their blood , and the people their sweat and labours for the welfare of the kingdom , they day and night did pour out tears at the feet of altars to disarm the wrath of god. upon such reasonings as these the ecclesiasticks have founded their pretences for possessing those goods , of which , publick and private piety had made them proprietors , without concerning themselves for what success the general affairs of the state might have . but this is not all , they have tried by divers reiterated attempts , to make themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction , and draw civil causes unto their tribunal : nor have they forgotten any pretext which they thought might promote this dangerous enterprise ; sometimes they have pleaded , that the church alone having right to judge of the validity of marriages , as being ▪ a sacrament , all that depended on 'em ought to be handled before ecclesiastick judges . sometimes again , that christians binding themselves in their contracts by an oath , the cognisance appertain'd to them . such kings as perceived that these attempts did tend to the overthrow of their authority , withstood them with a right kingly vigour . but what difficulties were there not of necessity to be overcome for a full attainment of their end ? and what resistance did not the church-men make to maintain themselves in so unreasonable an usurpation ? our history affords us examples of it , which i cannot call to mind without grief and wonder . their obstinacy hath gone so very far , that they have forced our kings to grant them declarations upon unequitable and disadvantageous conditions ; and so capitulate with them both for the tenths and acknowledgments of the lands which they possess ; as also for the rights of mortmain and indemnity . i cannot tell by what name i should call these proceedings . our sirs of the clergy could not doubt , but that being born subjects of the crown , nothing could release them of this duty ; and that the privileges which they have , or rather which they have invaded , being founded upon the holiness of their character , could not extend to these temporal goods , which always are the states . yet the old error is so potent , and their imagination so strongly prepossess'd for these immunities , that they can scarce acknowledge the kings sovereignty to this day . what clamour did they not raise about the arrest of the last commission of oyer in auvergne ? with what fervour did they charge their deputies to remonstrate to his majesty concerning it ? yet this arrest innovateth nothing ; but is , in all respects , conform to the prescript , and pursuant to the use of charles the viii . his pragmatique sanction , kings and emperors , never practis'd otherwise in such cases . nor can it be deny'd , but that religion coming , among others , under a political consideration ; and kings being protectors of the church , of its doctrine , and of its canons , it 's a part of their office to notifie to men the laws of god. the tables were consigned to the hands of moses , not to the hands of aaron ; and in the temple of god , the law of god was often heard by the people , from the mouth of their kings . 't is upon this account that melchisedec was both king and priest ; and 't is from this intention that the emperors confirmed the first synods , that they sometimes gave judgments contrary to sydonical decisions ; and that other christian princes have had liberty to receive , or not receive councils , though legitimate and universal . nothing is more consentaneous to perfect equity , than that the gentlemen of the clergy be obliged to contribute to the publick charges : they receive vast sums from the state ; and what they pay to the king out of 'em , amouts not to a sixth part of what they duly ought to pay . but to reduce them gently to reason , approaches must be made by degrees ; and in ways that may be to them unperceivable . first , they may be calmly told of the right of mortmain , which being part of the ancient inheritance of the crown cannot be alienated . they may ever and anon be put in mind , that residence is of divine right ; that it is unbecoming a prelate , or an ecclesiastick , to keep a great table , to have a multitude of pages , horses , dogs ; intimation may be made them , that the king intends to restore the ancient law of fiefs ; by which all sorts of persons concerned , are obliged to set forth , at any time , a certain number of soldiers , equipped and paid at their charge . in fine , they may be required to make a new valuation of ordinary rents . for what pretext will they have to complain , or be discontented ? can they find any fault at all in it if his majesty doth put things in their primitive state ; which is the foundation of all publick order and discipline ? other insinuative means may be set on work , which shall make no shew at first , yet may prove in the sequel , of incredible advantage to the king's affairs . while i speak here of the clergy , i pretend not to speak of any but bishops , canons , parish-priests , and chappellans . i know well , that taking the word clerus in its ancient latitude , it may be said to comprehend all christians : but i extend it not so much as to monasticks , who in truth were , at their rise , so far from having particular and conventual churches , as now they have , that they were reckoned laicks , that is , of the people , and had their places separate from the priests . whatever care kings hitherto could possibly take to hinder frauds in beneficiary matters , they have not been able to find means effectual for it : their prudence hath been still surmounted by the pravity of men , which never wanteh artifice and expedients in occasions that concern their profit . however , these frauds are of such a quality , and so important , in reference to the salvation of all christians , that the charitable sagacity of the laws ought to be indefatigably exercised about them : neither pains nor authority should be spared , in a design whose accomplishment is so necessary . and indeed , what mischief doth not follow ; for example , when a wicked man , by intrusion , gets possession of some benefice with cure of souls , all his sacerdotal functions are so many sacriledges ; ( for he is a suspended person , ipso facto ) all the absolutions he gives are null ; the fruits of the benefice cannot be his , because he is not the lawful guardian of it ; and so his appropriating them to his use , is a continued larceny ; for which he is indispensibly bound to make restitution . but be it a bishop that commits this act of intrusion ; and all the consecrations of priests which he shall solemnize are null , whence will result a nullity of all the absolutions those pretended priests shall give . what a concatenation of crimes ? what a dreadful series of evils , simonies , confidences , and other bad means which are used to finger benefices , do tend to the same consequences . sure , the cure of this malady , mortal to so many thousands of souls , is an atchievement worthy of a king. i am of opinion then , that to cut up the root of all these disorders , the king might create a secretary in his council of conscience ; and when this officer is in possession of his charge , a declaration of his majesties should come forth ; by which , to obviate the great abuses that have crept int-beneficiary matters , it should be ordained that all the benefices in the kingdom be registred by the said secretary of that council , and no dispatch there made until the deeds , upon which a benefice is claimed , have been seen and signed , and placed in the register by the same secretary , upon pain of the nullity of all that may have been petition'd for , and granted ; cognizance of all causes arising in consequence of this declaration , must be given to the grand council , and this addition of jurisdiction would facilitate the verification of it . this declaration would produce several advantages . one is , that there could be no more fraud used , in order to demissions , or to resignations ; and the bankers of the court of rome would no longer have means to promote the cheats of pretenders to benefices . another is , that the king would exactly know all that the church does possess in france ; which is a matter of extreme necessity , both for the regulating of the tenths , and also for other considerations . a third advantage would be , that in process of time this secretary of conscience might make a bank in the roman court , which is , to the king , of unspeakable consequence : for by this means , all the money that goes into italy out of france would be known ; and upon such knowledge it would be more easie for him to take his measures with the pope and colledge of cardinals . a fourth advantage is , that the king , by degrees , might become master of all the benefices of the kingdom , in the same manner as the pope is master of the bishopricks and abbies ; which would augment the royal authority . that i may explain my self , i will resume the thing from its original . in the first age of christianity , the first bishopricks were conferred without any bulls from the pope at all . afterward he bethought him , to send or write unto the chapters , who then chose the bishops , and recommended to them , to respect the merit of such or such a one , when they should proceed to the election . i think that alexander the iii. was the first inventer of these kind of letters ; and they were called bulls , because they were seal'd up with the pope's seal , ( bulla being latin for a seal . ) at the beginning , these letters which the popes thus sent , were but simple letters of favour and recommendation : but it hapning that the chapters reverenced them , and that here and there , at least , one , who had obtained them , was chosen ; all pretenders to bishopricks came to believe , that it was necessary to obtain them . thus , what was at first but , as hath been said , a recommendation , became at length a point of right and duty . such was its rise . now this being certain , there may be use made of the example : and thus , when a considerable benefice should be vacant , the king might order , that a letter be written to the patron , and some person recommended to his nomination . there is no cause to doubt , but the patron will nominate whom his majesty hath thus recommended ; so that insensibly it will grow a custom , to take the king's recommendations , as otherwhile persons did those of the popes ; and as the bulls became at length necessary for bishopricks and abbies , so the king's letters shall become necessary for all sorts of benefices , and he render himself master of all church-men . the king , in this , will have sufficient reason , because he being protector of religion , which is the prime pillar of every state , it is his interest to know whether they that shall be provided of benefices , be orthodox , and of good life ; lest they spread some bad doctrine among the people ; for heresies and scandals do cause division in the common-wealth , as well as schisms in the church . besides , it concerns the tranquillity of the state , that curates , who have the direction of consciences , be well-inclin'd for the good of the kingdom , and ready to keep particulr persons in their duty . to descend now unto the case of the monastick religious , and find out a way ( for rendring them useful to the state ) to take them off from that laziness and loathsome beggery in which they live , as also reduce them to such a number as may be proportionate to other ranks of men in the kingdom . it is to be noted , that there are three sorts of monasticks . the first is made up of the orders of s. augustin , s. benedict , s. bernard , and premonstrey . these are they that possess the bulkie riches of the church ; i mean the abbies and priories . the second sort comprehends the carthusians , the minimes , the coelestins , the feuillans , and some others , who possess goods with propriety , and beg not but by toleration . the third kind , is that of the meer mendicants , who subsist by alms , as do the jacobins , the cordeliers , the carmelites , and their branches , that is , the reform'd , as they term 'em , who are issued from them . these , notwithstanding their vow of monastick poverty , yet are not destitute of some foundations : but they plead for themselves , that the pope is proprietor of the goods , they do but take the profits ; which certainly is a vain and frivolous subtilty . the female religious being comprised under these three kinds , there is no need to make of them a separate article . there are too to many monks . it s an abuse so prejudicial to the kingdom , that the king can no longer dissemble it : it is time to take it seriously and effectually in hand . for monks live in single state , they raise no families , get no children , and so are barren grounds that bring forth no fruit to the crown . beside , the blind obedience by which they are tyed to the pleasure of the pope , doth form a foreign monarchy in the very bowels of france ; and into it they train along the credulous people , which is a thing of very great consequence . this politie is founded on the abusive and pernicious maxims of rome ; which too are purely political . for , that the obedience which monasticks give the pope , is religious , there is no colour to pretend : nor is there a christian but sees what his duty binds him to in this case ; and is altogether subject to his holiness in doctrinals , without need of making particular vows to oblige him . the name of religion in the matter , is but a phantasm , and a false pretext which the court of rome assumeth , to augment its temporal power , and to have its creatures in all quarters . by consequence the abuses ought to be retrenched , as was done by charlemagne in his time , and sundry other great kings . but for the effecting of this i should not at all advise , that the attempt be openly made . for that would be to draw upon the undertakers , the importune clamours of all the monks , and their zealots ; nay , to draw rome upon their backs , which might cost them some trouble . in fine , it would be to draw on them the people ; who are ever fond of novelties that surprise them , or are prejudicial to them , and always averse to those which they have foreseen , and are profitable for them . 't is therefore by-ways that must be taken . the first which seems to me fit to be pitcht upon , would be , to require of the monastick communities , that they dispatch missions unto america , and the indies , to convert the salvages , and administer the holy sacraments to christians . the monks , who are commonly imprudent , will strain to set forth the greatest number of their fraternity they possibly may , in hope to make considerable establishments ; thus there will be forwardness enough to embarque . the present juncture is advantageous for this design . for they are charged with more persons than they are able to maintain ; charity being evidently cooled toward them . a second means may be , to debar them the conversation of women . it is scandalous to see religious men receive visits from them in churches ; and there , in presence of the holy sacrament , spend whole afternoons with them . for remedy it might be ordained , that they should have parlours , where women might go to consult them . the thing is a point of deceney ; and parlours , the carthusian friars , and all nuns , generally have . the third means might be , that the fathers of such as enter into religion , should pay an annual pension to the order , by way of alms , during their sons life ; which is the practice in spain . this pension , some will say , causeth in spain an huge multiplication of monks . but 't is not the pension that fills the cloisters in that country ; 't is the licence the monks have to do what they please . in france they are not upon such terms . a fourth means , is to oblige the monasticks to abide in their convents , and not go abroad but very rarely , and for urgent affairs : so do the carthusians . a fifth , to embroil the monks with the bishops ; for which they are sufficiently disposed . a sixth , to prohibit that children of sixteen ( when as yet they know not what they do ) bind not themselves by vows , which engage them for the whole remainder of their lives : but remit that ceremony till their 22d . year of age. the seventh means would be to suppress that congregation , as they call it , among monastick persons , ( as for instance , there are the congregations of s. maur , ) and command , that the religious who make profession in an house , do there fix ; not coursing from lower britannie , for example , unto paris ; nor incessantly changing , as their wont is , unless some indispensible necessity does oblige to such changes . the carthusians keep in their houses , and run not from place to place : nuns do the same . the voyages of monks , and all their transmigrations , have no other end , but to get an universal acquaintance . beyond all this , it may be declared to the monks , ( at least its a thing that should be done in its season ) how that the king understands not their monastick profession does exempt them from his jurisdiction . thus the orders being purged from their impurities , will resume their ancient iustre , and be true seminaries of doctrine and sanctity . in fine , no person will doubt , but the king may take cognisance of all that concerns the external policy of the church ; because this is in such sort annexed to the government of states , that not a patriarch , nor even the pope himself , can make any regulation of it without his majesties consent . that reason of state which presseth for a retrenching of the number of monks , does also reflect upon nuns ; and that with the more justice , because the greatest part of young women , who become votaries , are driven thereunto by the violence of their kindred . there will never want just means to hinder this abuse from having a longer course . as for instance , young women may be declared incapable of making vows before 22 years of age at the least . it may be enacted , that they never shall be professed , [ i. e. setled of the order ] in the convent where they have had their education , either as pensionaries or novices . this would be well enacted . for oft-times the nuns , in hope to the gainers by their portions , do flatter the silly maidens , and persuade 'em to live with them . all kind of humane iuducements must be remov'd , and the inspirations of the holy ghost , left to their full operation . it may again be ordained , that recluses do take no money , as a portion , but only simple pensions yearly for life , and those likewise cautiously limited . a law too may be made , that the goods which might fall to a daughter from her parents , and her collateral kindred , should at their decease , fall to the state , and the king by representation , be invested with the same right to the goods of the deceased as this daughter had had , to recompence the publick for the loss sustained by a recluse , being incapacitated to raise a family . further , a general regulation might ▪ be made of all marriages of young women , with due respect had to the quality of each of 'em in particular ; and it might be ordered , that in case any of them would take up a religious life , they should carry as much with them into religion , as into the married state . for if the order was ▪ that daughters becoming votaries , should have less portions than those that married , fathers , so hugely covetous they are , would compell them to the cloister . but when they shall find no profit in taking this course , they will rather chuse to dispose of them in marriage , and make alliances by that means . this subject inclines me to say summarily , that the moderating of portions is a piece of the ancient civil law of the french , and of divers other nacions , in which daughters had nothing at all . thence it is as we see in the customs , that a nobleman is licensed to marry his daughter with a nosegay of roses , and she becomes disabled to pretend to any other portion , provided the match be suitable and fitting . this moderation is necessary : forasmuch , as the vast wealth which is given to daughters in marriage , does incommode the richest houses . moreover , gentlemen themselves would no more contract undue alliances ; and so the nobility recover their ancient esteem . young womens birth , their beauty , their discretion , their virtue , and their ability in the management of domestick affairs , would be to them instead of wealth . they would make it their care to lay up a rich stock of so many precious things , that perhaps it may one day come to pass , that men will , as heretofore they did , give money to have wives ; whereas at present , women do so to purchase husbands . i have spoken here of marriages occasionally ; i am well aware , that the matter ought to be reserved for another chapter . to conclude , it s a great ingredient of the glory of a king , to honour the holy see ; to love and protect the bishops , to maintain the gallican church in its liberties ; never suffer that any propositions be advanced any way , that may wound the authority of the canons ; and employ all the rigor of his ordinances a gainst persons , who shall have the rashness to publish a suspected or erroneous doctrine . additions to chap. iv. 1. that bishops ought to be near the king. 2. of the pension to be paid the order for a monk enter'd . 3. monasticks cannot alienate ; therefore neither sell a rent-charge . 4. they shall not have power to purchase . i have affirmed chap. 4. that bishops are obliged by command of god , unto residence . this is true : yet forasmuch as they are also the kings subjects , and royal dignity requireth , that his majesty have bishops about him , as the roman emperors after constantine had ; it is fit to ordain , that each bishop be at court three months every year , attending his majesty , to honour him ; during which time they may negotiote their affairs ; and the rest of the year abide fix'd in their diocesses ; the king assigning to each of them the months in which their presence will be needful . in the same chapter , i have said , that to prevent the vast number of monks it should be ordained , that the parents of such as enter into an order , should pay an annual pension to that order during the persons lives . the effect of this law would be , that such a pension being a monachal right in form of clericature given by act of state ; they that would have revenue enough to be monasticks , would have enough to be secular priests . and so persons , whose devotion should incline them to take orders , and consecrate themselves unto god , would rather chuse to remain seculars , than shut themselves up in a cloister all the remainder of their lives . now the more to fortifie this law , it should be added , that bishops make no more priests upon the title of poverty , upon penalty of maintaining them : the reason against it , as to secular priests , being as strong in reference to regulars ; because it is no less a disparagement to the clergy , that a priest monk do beg , and fall into extream poverty , ( which may happen ) than that one of the other rank do so . it is manifest , that monastick communities have no power to alienate any thing ; and that monks do daily re-enter into their estates , which they possessed heretofore . hence it follows , that neither can they charge them with any rents for money taken up : forasmuch as by these kind of contracts , they mortgage their lands : but to engage an estate in such a manner , is to make a kind of alienation . 't is a fetch of the benedictine monks to take up money for rent to be paid by them ; that so they may appear always poor , and have pretexts to solicite the liberality of devout people : also that they may have protectors , for the greater number of their creditors is , the greater is the number of persons interessed in their conservation . yet there is nothing more unjust than this custom : for there are monastick communities that owe more than all their goods , moveable and immoveable are worth . the monks care not though their house be ruin'd , nor though they ruine some of their creditors , provided themselves subsist . for by passing from one convent to another , they are quitted of all the debts they have created . it greatly concerns the publick to prohibit these kind of contracts , that monasticks may be kept from defrauding any man for the future ; and to decree , that the contractor shall pay the rents contracted for , and they bound to do it , both all in common , and each of them in particular : then , that the notaries be fined and declared incapable of bearing any office : or if insolvent , condemned to the gallies for 101 years : moreover , that the purchasers of such rents shall , for their part , pay a mulct of 3000 livres to his majesty , and the principal money be converted to his use . besides , it would be very fit to require all notaries , all creditors of monasticks and the monasticks themselves to make declaration of the sums and rents charged upon them , bring in the contracts for the same before commissioners nominated by the king to be registred , and this within a time expresly limited : which being once pass'd , no more shall be received ; and all contracts not registred , remain null , and as if they were cleared . this course would be very severe , but excellent to reduce the folk of the cloister to reason . there is an important observation to be made too , namely , that all the contracts which church men have made , are utterly null , unless their creditors can make it appear , that the money they lent did turn to the profit of the church , and that there was an authentick permission to make such contracts . this doctrine is a point of law ; for the church is ever a minor , and all that it possesseth hath come from the liberality of particular persons ; without whose consent , or at least the magistrates , and such as are capable of it , the ecclesiasticks can make no alterations in the estates they have received . so that the king may not only forbid contracts for the future ; but also declare those to be dissolved , which have been made heretofore , and discharge the monasteries of them . debts have been annulled for less reasons often . it must likewise be prohibited to monks , and to the church , to purchase any estate in land , or high-rents , upon pain of such contracts being null and void in law ; and the sellers and notaries incurring the forementioned penalties . our lords the prelates have lately bethought them , and resolved to compell such gentlemen as have chappels in their houses , where the sacrifice of the mass hath been at any time performed , to profane the said chappels , or endow them with land for the maintenance of a priest . this would be a means to gain the church more than two hundred thousand livres of rent at one blow ; wherefore it will be fit to ordain , that this enterprize of the bishops do not take effect ; except in case of chapels built hereafter , and built for other persons . chap. v. 1. of the hugonots ; and whether it be for the good of the state to put them out of france . 2. politick means to extirpate their heresie . 3. of their ancient confession of faith. a king cannot have a more illustrious object of his cares and application , than the preserving of that religion which he hath received from his ancestors in the states he governs : because diversity of belief of divine service , and of ceremony , doth divide his subjects , and breeds animosities among them : whence arise contentions , war , and in the end an universal defiance . unity of belief , on the contrary , knits men together ; and 't is seldom seen , but that fellow-subjects who call upon god in one and the same temple , and offer at the same altars , do also fight with the same arms , or under the same banners . if this maxim be generally true in christian politicks , and the religion we profess the only one , as it is , that we can savingly embrace , the princes are obliged to maintain it with all their might , and employ that soveraign power for the glory of the true god , which they hold of his goodness . the pagans , whose particular conduct was so prudent and just , and who have left us so many examples of wisdom and virtue , made it their principle , not to suffer in their republicks any novelty that thwarted the common and popular belief ; and they adher'd so peremptorily unto it , that they would not so much as permit any man to undeceive them of their errors . the books of numa pompilius , which had been found near his grave , and contained the ancient religion of rome , the senate caused to be burnt ; because the praetor rutilius , who had been commission'd to read them , affirmed upon oath , that the contents of e'm tended to subvert the religion which the people observed at that time . they refus'd , even to open their eyes unto the light of truth , though known to them , when they apprehended it would be novel to the people . they rather chose to stick to fables , which length of years had consecrated among them , and the multitude was through custom addicted to . thus too the athenians thought they did an act of necessary justice in condemning socrates to death , for having taken on him to persuade the people that there was but one only god. they knew however , that in truth this philosopher was the wonder of his time , the honour of the city , and of all greece : the discerning men amongst them were convinc'd of the solidity of this doctrine , and the sect of the stoicks made profession of it ; so that it must be confess'd , the fall of gentilism , and subversion of idols , is an effect of the hand of god , who alone can work miracles of grace and omnipotence . the kings , his majesties predecessors , have set themselves with unwearied diligence to preserve the catholick religion inviolable : they have never failed to be protectors of the apostolick see , and the church . they expelled the arrians ; they turned their arms , and exposed their lives against the albigenses ; they vanquish'd e'm ; they destroy'd e'm ; they punish'd the poor men of lions : in fine , they have provided that christianity receive no harm in any places unto which their authority extended . the last age produced a new monster to oppose the church . france saw him born in her bosom , and unhappily bred him up , with several complices of his impiety and revolt . history will tell posterity how much blood was shed during the course of well nigh fourscore years to quell this dangerous sect : and the world well know , that the zeal there was to reduce hereticks to their duty , did take up the reigns of six of our kings ; the glory of cutting off the last head of this hydra , being reserved for his present majesty . but it is expedient to see what weapons must be used for an execution so long expected . there is no cause to doubt , but that upon the principles of christianity , and maxims of policy , its necessary to reduce all the kings subjects to one and the same belief : and though they that make profession of the pretended reformed religion , be now without arms , without strong-holds , without treasure , without an head , and without allies ; yet they are not out of case to be feared . they still retain a remembrance of their boldness , and by-pass'd rebellions : they look back on the towns they once seized , and out of which they could not be driven but by force of arms , as if they were their proper inheritance , and had been unjustly pluck'd out of their hands ; they bear in their hearts the same aversion for order and discipline , that they ever had ; and their minds are always inclining to revolt , and to confusion and anarchy ▪ it disquiets them not to think who shall head them ; they have soldiers of their own number , whom they can advance to be captains by giving them authority to command e'm . they persuade themselves , that if they were in arms , they should want neither money nor friends . they believe , that the glory of the king attracts as much envy on him as admiration ; and that his virtue raiseth in his neighbours no less anger than terrour . in short , there is ground to think , that he will have more than an hundred thousand men of his enemies in the heart of his state , while there are huguenots in france ; they too , perhaps , do but wait an occasion to make their musters . thus they are perpetual obstacles to the designs that might be formed ; and though weak , may nothwithstanding be dreaded . 't is true , the honest men of their communion do well know , that they cannot be in a calmer repose than they now enjoy by the grace of the king , and under the security of his edicts ▪ but in these matters the multitude carries it . these are a torrent , that by its rapidity , overturns rocks which seems unmoveable . it will be said , that the good treatment which the huguenots receive , doth preserve the friendship of the german princes for france ; and if favourable justice should be no longer done them , the king would lose the most potent and most considerable of his allies . this discourse is but a found , and void of all substance of reason : for , beside that the princes of germany are not of the religion of our hereticks ; they need not the kings protection for maintaining the huguenots in their pretended liberty of conscience : but the french arms securing them against the power of austria , and principally of the emperor , who hath divers pretensions upon them ; they cannot recede from the alliance they have made with his majesty ; nor will they do it , though the last man of the huguenots was brought to the scaffold : nay , forasmuch as the kings forces are so useful to all those protestants , it will would be their interest not at all to arm themselves for the huguenots preservation , but far otherwise , even to promote their expulsion out of france : and the reason is , because if this party were in a condition to raise stirs , the king would have his hands full of work to repress them : and so his forces being dissipated , the emperor might take his time to enlarge his domination : the thing that charles the fifth did , when francis the first was not in a possibility to succour the princes . it being therefore certain , that the liberty of germany hath its support and prop in the arms of the king ; they are not sollicitous there for the affairs of the huguenots in france : and since the protestants ▪ of the empire are knit to his majesty by other engagements than those of religion , they will continue the same deportment ; and his majesty on his part , will always have the same reasons to succour them , though the time should come that he should have no more huguenots in his kingdom . no succour neither may they hope for from england ; that 's a state too weak to make any trial of strength against france : all the english there are must pass the sea ; and the isle be disfurnish'd of soldiers and provisions ; yet this all would be nothing to purpose : mean time their affairs would lie expos'd to the levity and lunacy of the people . holland and swedeland are of like consideration ; and they both have other interests to negotiate with the king , than those of the huguenots . denmark is defective in power . the calvinists mount unto a strain of policy above ordinary , when they would have us believe , that whatever is not of the roman communion is of the opinion of charenton : the lutherans of germany , notwithstanding , sympathize with them less than with us . thus the king hath nothing to be afraid of from the pretended allies of the huguenots . yet these men , as i have already said , are to be feared ; and they would be seen stoutly to bestir themselves , if some extraordinary commotion should happen in france , as a civil war , or some great invasion by foreign enemies ; in such a juncture they would do as they did in the war of paris : they took up arms , and respectively protested they were for the kings service ; but if the peace had not been soon made , they would not have forborn to think themselves necessary ; and to make all the propositions that they could imagine advantageous to their party . they would have re-demanded their places of security ; they would have press'd for a restoring of their temples , for an augmentation of their pretended priviledges , and for a free exercise of their religion : and , according to their good old custom , have uttered complaints and menaces . but if by ill chance a victorious army of strangers , whether catholicks or religionaries , should enter the kingdom , the king must resolve to see the hereticks declare against him , or else content them in all their pretensions , which would prove an engaging of his state in like calamities , as our fathers in their time saw . it ought to be ordained , that they shall exactly follow their ancient confession of faith which was permitted them in france ; and that such as vary from it , shall be no longer reckon'd in the number of those of the protestant reformed religion , who have liberty of conscience given them . these huguenots have no ground at all to plead the edict of nantes so loudly and bravingly as they do : they extorted it by violence , and with sword in hand : yet was it but an interim , an order taken , until they should inform themselves of the truth ; which they have had time enough to do . but did they not violate it themselves by the war of languedock , that other of sevennes ; and again by that of rochelle ? nay , they call'd the enemies of the state unto their succour , and took a course to bring fire and sword into all parts of the kingdom . shortly , in matter of government , that which is good at one time , is frequently not so at another ; all things must be accommodated to the general rule of policy , which is , that the good of states be incessantly procured . when the edict of pacification was accorded , there was provision made for the welfare of france : if that welfare does now require that the edict be revoked , there is no remedy , revoked it must be , or neglected . from all this which i have said it follows , that the king hath most just cause to secure himself from the professors of the protestant reformed religion , and put them into such a state , as he may have nothing to apprehend from their particular . perhaps it will be said , that 't is expedient there be huguenots in france , because they oblige the church-men to study , and to live with the greater circumspection , and a more exact observance of the rules of their profession . but this consideration is not worth the considering . the church of god will never be supported by these humane means . he is in the midst of it , and governs it himself by his holy spirit , which animateth and filleth it . at whatever time there shall be no more huguenots in france , there will be fewer bad , and a greater number of good men ; which the king should particularly desire ; since states are always sustained by people that love virtue , &c. it passeth therefore for certain , that it is fit the king do disable the religionaties , as to their doing any harm , and as to their giving cause of suspicion . it remaineth to examine what way may most readily and most commodiously lead unto this end . i would not advise that these people of the other religion should be compell'd to depart out of france , as the moors were out of spain ; which proved in the sequel , so prejudicial to the whole country . 't would be a piece of inhumanity to drive the huguenots in that manner : they are christians , though separated from the body of the church : besides , this course would deprive the state of not a few good families , and put the unhappy numbers of e'm out of all hope of conversion and salvation : so that the king , in this concern , should do well as seems to me , to imitate the church , the common parent of all christians ; who , in the remedies she prepareth , ever mingleth mildness and mercy , with justice , and compassion with correction . the first means then which the king might employ , should be to provide , that the huguenots might frequent the coversation of the catholicks with more familiarity than they do . for by this coversation they would , in time , be undeceiv'd of the opinion with which they are pre-possess'd , that we hate them ; they would put off the aversion they have for us ; they would know our deportment ; and be informed of our doctrine in the points that offend them ; because they understand not the mysteries of them ; which would induce them to confess , as st. augustin did on the like occasion , that the church does not teach things as they once thought it did . nothing is to my understanding , or can be , more effectual for the conversion of the hereticks , than this frequent conversation ; it is not possible , but that at length , the spirit of men should yield unto impression ; the plumage of the eagle , 't is said , consumes that of other birds ; light dissipates darkness , truth triumphs over falshood . the second means should be , to confer a recompence of honour upon converts ; and to make a stock for this purpose , which might never fail . i should think it would be none of the best course to exclude the huguenots from all employments ; they must enter into lesser offices , though not at all into the greater . the reason is , because if they be put off from all kind of publick business , they will accustom themselves to tarry at home idle , and their ambition will be extinguish'd in such sort , as perhaps they will make it a point of religion to do nothing ; whereas being taken to ordinary offices , they will habituate themselves to a living among catholicks , and their ambition will awaken , when they shall compare themselves with their superiours . the third means i offer is , to select some particular men , and create them such business referring to religion , as may constrain them to attend the council , and keep following the court. business of that kind may be started to gentlemen , upon the exercise they have in their houses . there is not one of them but is obnoxious to a process in that case ; and the bishops will , with joy , be the prosecutors . besides , the king's procureur ( or attorney ) general is concern'd to know , whether marriages , baptisms , and burials , be solemniz'd with due accurateness in these private houses ; and whether good and faithful registers of them be kept or no : great defects herein being easily supposeable , the same will be just matter of complaint against the owners , as negligent in observing the concession made them , of having exercise in their castles . the like may be done , if others , contrary to the edict , be admitted to these preachings beside the domesticks . a fourth means would be , to oblige the religionists to put again in due state the ancient chappels of their houses , which they have demolish'd or prophan'd ; the pursuance whereof ought to be by the diligence of each bishop in his diocess . there must not be made a common affair of it to all the huguenots in general , but divers particulars only be fix'd upon . and the thing it self is as reasonable as any . for they had no right to destroy temples that had been all along destin'd to divine service , according to the religion of the king , receiv'd by all the kingdom , and also profess'd by our progenitors . the fifth means is , that when an affair of such quality as i mention'd , comes before the council , the deputies which the huguenots have at court in the name of them all , be not permitted to intervene in it . there are 3 reasons for the putting by of these interventions : the first is , that the huguenots cannot constitute a body in france , nor assemble without the kings express permission . the second , that private and particular affairs ought not to be set up in the rank of those that are general and publick . the third , that the king will do justice without their intervention . the deputation should not be all at once abrogated out-right ; but no regard must be had to what the deputies represent in the name of all the party . the sixth means should be , that the king do take effectual order the huguenots may no longer have their dwellings , nor their exercise in places not royal ; at least such as have any lords of the protestant reformed religion for proprietors . as for example , vitrey in bretannie , belongs to monsieur the prince de tarante , who is of that religion ; and it belongs to him by a demise made him of it by monsieur de la tremouille . the huguenots have there a temple and a religious exercise : this town they must exchange , and have another for it given them ; reasons will not be wanting to colour such permutations : there is nothing that may contribute more to their conversion . for it will be an incredible displeasure to them to live among people with whom they have no acquaintance , nor any union , either by interest or blood. a seventh means is , to suppress by natural death , all huguenot counsellors . the chambers of the edict are now of no more use . the eighth is , to give them for their synods catholick commissaries ; such as are somewhat vers'd in the controversies , and have the skill to favour the wranglings that are continually among them . these commissaries were heretofore all of them catholicks . particular synods , when petition'd for , must not be deny'd them ; but national ones should never be granted : and at the close of all their sydonal assemblies , money should be demanded of the ministers for the king's affairs , by way of loan or of tenths , or under some other pretexts . the ninth means is , to get them prosecuted for their common debts , and so cause them to sell , by decree , some of their temples , which sure cannot be judged to be in mortmain , or un-alienable . a tenth is , to prohibit that any subject go out of the kingdom without the king's permission . for the huguenots must not depart out of france ; and they will be compris'd under a general prohibition . the eleventh is , to take order the confessors may intimate to the poorer sort of catholicks , that it is a point of conscience to serve huguenots . the twelfth is , to oblige them on a political account , unto an abstinence from flesh , upon those days which the catholicks do so observe , in like manner as they are already obliged to heed the festivals , out of respect to the publick religion : then hereupon , severely punish such as shall transgress in the one or the other of these two things . the thirteenth means is , to endeavour the marrying of catholicks to the huguenots , and cause the children issuing from such marriages , to be educated in the roman religion . a fourteenth may be , to hinder the huguenots from selling any estate they have in land : for this kind of possession does tye them to the interests of the state. the fifteenth and last , is , to change the place of that academy which they have at saumur , and fix it in some other town , as vange , or beaufort . there is a president for such a change in the translation of the like academy from montauban to pullaurens . the pretext for drawing them out of saumur is , that this town being a pass on the loire , and maintaining the communication of divers great provinces , the king cannot be too well secured of it : beside , this planting an academy at saumur , is an usurpation ; the huguenots having never had a patent for it . it would signifie nothing , should the huguenots alledge , that they have it for a place of security : for they are now as the king 's other subjects be , who do not at all demand any . what would come of it , if all collective bodies should demand places of security ? 't is a madness . further yet , it might be declared , that proponents , who aspire to the office of ministers , should be obliged to teach a course of philosophy , or two years in theology . thus there would be fewer ministers than there are ; and at length , their number being diminished , the number of huguenots would infallibly diminish also . the king might likewise ordain , that the proponents should be examin'd in presence of such commissioners as he should please to appoint ; to the end they might undergo a rigorous trial. for his majesty is concern'd , that these ministers be perfectly well studied , left they prove promoters of sedition , and not pastors . at the time of their examination , the same proponents should be oblig'd to answer all the catholick doctors in any controversial questions they should think fit to move . the huguenots cannot refuse this proposition ; because their proponents ought to be prepared in all matters : and since the huguenots affirm , that their ministers are their bishops , there must no person be a minister who hath not attained to the age of twenty seven years at least . these are summarily the humane means that seem to me most conducible to the conversion of the professors of the protestant reformed religion . chap. vi. 1. what nobility is . 2. of the nobles of france , of their degrees , and the ranks of gentlemen . 3. of the orders of knighthood . 4. in what respects gentlemen may be useful to the king. having examined what relates to the clergy , the first of the three orders that compose the body politick of france ; it is time to speak of the second , which is that of the nobility : nobility is a quality that renders the possessors of it generous , and secretly disly disposeth their soul unto an affection for honourable things . the virtue of ancestors does make this excellent impression of nobility upon persons ; and there is in seminal matter , i know not what spirituous and energetical principle , that transmitteth and propagateth the inclinations of parents unto their descendants : as is obvious to remark ; not only in men , and in all the animals , which have a natural generation ; but also in plants , and in things evidently most inanimate . this ancestral virtue , verily , gives us the first tincture in order to a right noble accomplishment ; and every man issued from great and illustrious bersonages , does continually feel a kind of elastick impulse in the secret recesses of his heart , which thrusts him on to imitate them ▪ and their memory spurs him on to glory , and brave actions : but if through negligence , or the degeneracy of an ill nature , it so comes to pass , that he answers not the hope which the grandeur of his progenitors gave ground to conceive of his deportment ; in this case , all the lustre of their ancient reputation which environ'd him from the instant of his birth , and whether he will or no , accompany'd him all along the course of his life , it does , i say , by making him be noted , for ( nobilitas a noscendo dicitur ) but promote his shame , and the more conspicuously shew his defects unto the augmenting and justifying a contempt of his person . thus an actual virtue is necessary for gentlemen , that they may be able to bear up the weight of their condition , which otherwise presseth them quite down . the greater the rank and honor of their house is , the greater their dishonor ; and so much the deeper that precipice into which their dissoluteness doth cast them . there are usually noted three kinds of nobility . the first is a nobleness of blood : when the source of a great extraction is hidden in the obscurity of a long succession of years , and cannot now be discovered . this kind is in greatest esteem among men : and indeed we call things that are left us of this quality , venerable , and do bear a sort of religious respect to them : we are generally possess'd too with a perswasion , that whatever is unknown , is full full of mysteries ; hence objects of such a nature are apt to surprise us ; and we hereupon are awed at them , and do admire them . such effects , the greatness of an unsearchable high-descending pedigree does produce . nor need we much scruple to affirm , that this kind is the only proper and genuine nobility ; and that the two others are only nobilitations . what difference is made between a person noble , and one ennobled , is familiarly known . this first kind of nobility is thought to require a possession of the virtue of ancestors , and withal , a possession of their wealth ; this too in so essential a manner , that if each of them be not joyntly possess'd , the nobility is extinct . we daily see proofs that evince the justice and the truth of this notion . be it intimated by the way , that the virtue here mention'd is the military art. the second kind of nobility , is that which takes its rise from offices and eminent employments , unto which the laws have annexed this mark of honour . the third is acquir'd by the prince's letters , which are called letters of nobilitation . it is a right peculiar to the kind to give such letters ; as the roman panegyrist once said to the emperor trajan . it belongs not but to caesar to create a nobility . it is for none but the king to honour brave aud valiant subjects with this quality . this third and last kind is least considered : because the person who acquires it , hath not the virtue of ancestors for a foundation and caution of his own . yet it is sometimes more considerable than either of the two others ; and marius in salust had great reason to tell the gentlemen of rome ; that he had rather begin the nobility of his race , than faintly continue it , or unworthily lose it ; and that it was more glorious for him to transmit to his posterity a sparkling virtue , hard to be follow'd , than plod slowly on upon the slight , and almost effaced tracks of a common virtue which his ancestors had left him . in all these three kinds of nobility , there must be the personal virtue of the person invested with 'em : for when all is done , it is but virtue that confers effective worth . all nations have had a particular esteem for nobility , nor can any well-order'd common-wealth be named , which hath not invented some singular mark of honour to make it conspicuous . the french in this point , have surpass'd and out-done all people upon earth ; as for the first , antiquity , caesar observes , that the nobles , that is , the gentlemen , had among the gauls , as much power over the plebeians , as masters at rome had over their slaves . after gaul was reduced to the state of a province , nobility preserved its ancient prerogatives ; and the emperors knowing , that the nobles loved glory , and sought it above all things , stiled them honorati , and gave them an absolute precedency in all assemblies of the gauls . for the romans had thought it necessary to weaken the authority of the druids . in the time of christianity the same order was continued ; and the nobility gave their suffrage apart in the election of bishops , expresly before the people ; yea , even before the clergy themselves . upon the declining of the empire , the gentlemen did , in france , judge the causes of their equals ; and hence , without doubt , came into use the parliaments , courts and assemblies , which our kings held of their peers and barons ; that is , of the qualify'd gentlemen of their kingdom , when a case of some peer or grandee of the state was to be tried . the nobles were distinguish'd anciently from plebeians , by their hair , which they wore long , for a mark of their ancient liberty ; and when any one of them committed a fault that was unbeseeming his birth , the rest sentenc'd him to depart the country , or cut off his hair ; this was therefore a no less punishment than exile . in charlemagne's time , the gentlemen of france named themselves franks , by way of excellence . in fine , the french nobility hath alwavs had such an high degree of excellency , and so great a pre-eminence , that it was preferr'd in all cases ; as when vacant bishopricks or abbies were to be provided for ; or when the principal magistracy and seats of judicature were to be fill'd up , or the government of important places , warlike imployment , and the leading of armies , were to be dispoled of . to conclude this matter , it may be affirm'd , that kings did take the gentlemen into a partnership with themselves , as i may term it , in the regality ; they honour'd them with part of their power , by conferring on them fiefs , and by entrusting them with the charge of doing justice , and of commissioning officers to that end . hereupon it was necessary to put a gradual difference between gentlemen themselves : nor is it indeed sufficient that they all have so many excellent prerogatives above the vulgar , or common sort , as we call them . for nature is alike in every man , and all men are born equal . fortune on the contrary , and virtue , distinguish one from another . but natural reason requires there be order in all things . 't is order that makes the beauty and symmetry of the universe . now as a musical consort doth not make a perfect harmony , but by a diversity of notes ; so a political state can be neither comely nor compleat , unless there be a difference between the parts that compose it . i know that nobility , being as philosophers call it , an inherent quality , does lodge with its whole essence , in each of its subjects : as the quality of a soldier is , for its essence , in the person of a corporal , as well as of a captain or general officer . yet there is a great distance , and many intervening degrees , between a general and the meanest musquetier in an army . thus the meanest gentleman in the kingdom is noble ; and to speak after the common proverb , is noble as well as the king ; but the one is severed from the other by an immense graduation . so , though all gentlemen be equal in nobility , yet they are not so in riches , in lands , in alliance , in friends , in offices , in authority , in age , and in reputation . again , they are not equal in spirit , in knowledge , in experience , nor in wisdom ; therefore it hath been with much prudence ordered , that they should have some external marks of these differences ; and for this end , there have been created princes , dukes , counts , marquesses , barons , knights , batchelers , esquires ; leave hath been given them to bear helmets and crowns upon their armories : in short , no pains have been spared to find out things that might any way adorn their quality ; and their valour hath been publickly rewarded , for an excitement of others to a generous emulation . here , i cannot forbear to blame those gentlemen who give themselves the title of knights , of marquesses , or of counts , by their own private authority . this is a shameful usurpation ; and so far from heightening the luster of nobility , that it injures them . for a gentleman who takes upon him the quality of a marquess , and well knows he is none , makes a perpetual lye , a thing directly contrary to his honour , and to the profession he makes , of being a devoted constant defender of truth . beside , this huge number of marquesses , lords and knights , does bring those qualities into contempt ; and is a cause , that true marquesses are not considered now , as they of right ought to be . 't is therefore extreamly important , that provision be speedily made in the case . for this confusion destroys the usefulness of those dignities , they being such as his majesty should keep in his own hand , and husband them with deliberation and frugality ; that they might be distributed on occasion , to men of honour , and such as have evidenced a zeal for his service , and for the good of his kingdom ; that the persons also to whom they are granted , might fully enjoy them , with all the advantages and prerogatives that are by custom annexed to them . i will not omit , that it is necessary to give the nolity the greatest respect that may be ; to the end , that citizens may conceive the greater desire to become gentlemen ; which should be granted them , when they have rais'd themselves to a worthiness of it , either by just acquiring a remarkable estate , or doing some illustrious exploit in war. the whole constitution of the nobility is military : nevertheless there have been instituted in france , particular orders of knighthood , of which , the king is grand master himself ; and into which he admitteth such gentlemen as he accounts most worthy of it . such are the orders of the holy ghost , and of st. michael . there are others , of which the king is barely protector ; the order of s. lazarus is of that nature . but this is of no great advantage to the state : because all beneficences , all favours , all honours and employments , should come directly and immediately from the hand and bounty of the king. for the continuation therefore of this order of s. lazarus , his majesty might unite the grand mastership of it to the regality , as the king of spain does . chap. vii . 1. of the third estate . 2. of the husbandmen . 3. of artificers . 4. of merchants . my beginning to treat of the three orders of the body politick of france , as the clergy and the nobility , leaving the third estate to be last spoken of , is a method like theirs , who having some edifice to examine , do begin at the top ; and settle to consider the upper stories , before they look on the foundations . in truth , the people are the basis upon which all republiques have their standing . 't is they that manure the ground , and cause it to bear fruit. 't is they that pay the subsidies ; that breed workmen , and furnish the merchants . yet that which we call the third estate , does not consist of peasants , or the meer rural sort ; 't is principally the freemen , and communalties of towns , and officers of justice , that compose it . this third estate was not called to the general assemblies of the gauls , either in the time of the romans , or during the first and second race of our kings ; it was well forward in the third before they had that priviledge . i believe , not until the reign of philip the fair. but it is not upon this matter that i am now to insist . however , in speaking of the third estate , the whole popular body is to be consider'd ; and it may be divided into three parties of men ; namely , husbandmen , artificers , and merchants . of the officers of justice we will speak in the next chapter . the least-infected , and best party of the people , is the husband-men that daily labour ; which takes up their heads and hands , all the year long without intermission , keeps them in simplicity and obedience . there cannot be too great a number of 'em ; especially not in france , by reason of the fertility of the country ; and our corn being transported into foreign parts , we ought to make great stores of it , and have as much as may be in a readiness . exact care must be taken , that these men may always be in a condition to take pains : and that they have but little converse with townsmen , whose little labour , and other manners , might corrupt their innocence . and , that ease and plenty do not render them insolent . for there is nothing more dangerous and insufferable , than a sort of rich peasants . no less care must be taken , that an extream penury do not reduce them to extream misery . for too great poverty lying on them , they no longer have either men or cattle : they are ty'd up to ill diet , lodge on the ground : suffer hunger and cold : their children perish for want of food ; there are epidemical diseases bred among them ; they are not succour'd ; they dye away : by this means the country is dispeopled ; and being void of inhabitants , the grounds are unhusbanded , and abandoned . when i shall come to discourse of the finances ▪ i will point out a way to preserve country-people in a moderately-commodious estate : at present i will only say , that it would be to very good purpose to create a superintendant of husbandry ; who should have his eye on those affairs , and see , that the grounds be cultivated , vineyards well kept , and meadows fitly ordered : in like manner as there are masters of waters , and forests , who take care that the woods be not damnifi'd ; and surveyors for the high-ways ; and in fine , jurats for every craft . the second party of the popular order , is the handicrafts-men , or artificers ; these are no less useful to the state than any other . for , besides that manufactures do keep men at work , and engage them ; they are the cause that the silk , the wool , the skins , the flax , the timber , and the other commodities that grow in france , are made use of ; and that country people have the means to barter these things , and put them off ; especially being wrought into wares not made in foreign parts , we shall grow to be further principal manufacturers , as we already are of hats for spain , and stuffs for all europe : which is a matter of exceeding great consequence : and in process of time , when the work is once on foot , things will pass from hand to hand , and oft-times go out of the kingdom . all this quickens trade , and makes money pass to and fro : which promoteth the publick , and therewithall at once , every ones private welfare . 't is not enough to have husband-men and artificers in a kingdom ▪ there must of necessity be merchants also : for without their industry , the artificers shops would be stores never emptied ; the granaries would remain full of corn ; and the cellars , of wines ; and nothing be gone . we will more largely treat of this , when we come to the article of commerce . chap. viii . 1. of officers of justice . 2. of parliments , and other supreme courts . 3. of presidial courts . 4. of the king's council . 5. vseful means for the good of the state , in relation to officers of justice . 6. of sollicitations . if men were entirely just to one another , and each of 'em ( in the phrase of one of the greatest greek philosophers ) a law unto himself ; there would need neither law nor magistrate to keep them in perfect tranquility . but nature being corrupted , we no longer consult that original righteousness , which is inseparable from reason , and which without intermission , inwardly presseth us to render to all their due , as exactly , as we would should be done to ourselves . always self-love , often necessity , sometimes hatred , avarice , or one passion or other , does blind us , and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable law ; in such sort also , that we suffer ourselves to be transported unto excesses hard to be believed . we equally use fraud and force to content our injustice and irregular desires . whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise men , to form , as may be said , a new reason , which they called law. but because laws are of no use , except they be armed with correction to punish such as despise them ; and have some soul , and living principle ; therefore magistrates have been created ▪ who are to pronounce the oracles which those laws inspire , to put the laws in execution , and maintain the authority of them . these officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent men in a state ; and if common-wealths be duly regulated ; ordinarily the rich are preferred before the poor , and nobles before plebeians ; because 't is supposed they have a greater measure of knowledge and virtue ; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things , in which a necessitous condition , and a mean extraction , might engage them . thus ministers of justice in france , call'd men of the robe , are in truth necessary in publick society . for if there was no evil-doer , laws and magistrates would be of no more use , than joyners , and the doors they make for the security of houses , if there were no thieves : whereas , should not a man in a whole kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity ; there must nevertheless be priests for religion ; soldiers for defence against foreign invasions that might happen ; and people who may some of 'em till the ground ; others apply themselves to trades and manufactures , that men cannot be without . so that these three sorts of persons are inseparable from a common-wealth ; and they make up the three estates we have spoken of , which have been receiv'd without any contest . yet it seems , that of late , the parliaments have sought to infuse into some green heads , that they compos'd a fourth order in the kingdom ; and the same , not only distinct from the other three , but altogether superiour to them , by reason of their sovereignty , and of the power they have to deliberate upon the pleasure and edicts of the king. if they should not be brought off from this opinion , perhaps they would draw the other sovereign courts and officers of judicature into the same error ; an union of them all not being deniable : because otherwise the affair of justice would in france , form two bodies ; which may not be . but from allowing this fourth body in the state , namely that of justice , a ridiculous inconvenience would follow ; to wit , that a sergeant ( or catchpole ) of a village , would be a member of a body superior to that of the nobility ; and by consequence , in some sort , superior to a marquis . for in matter of hierarchy , the last of a more excellent order , is greater than the first of a less excellent one : as the lowest of the arch-angels , is greater than the highest of the angels . but to clear the difficulty before us , it must be remembred , that heretofore in france , the estates which were called parliaments , did assemble twice a year for two considerations : one was , to judge of appeals , that were made from judgments pass'd by inferior officers . the other , to give the king counsel when he demanded their opinion about government of the state. for alway , during the first and second race , the king 's did dispose of publick affairs , as of peace and war ; and this is so much a truth , that if those ancient parliaments had had the disposing of the state , they would never have suffered , that the children of lewis , when they had divided the kingdom among them , should have fallen to make war one upon another ; which could tend to nothing but a publick desolation . they would as little have permitted the enmities of brize , haudet , and fredegonde . in like manner under the second race , they would not have endured that the sons of lewis the mild , should act such outrages on their father , that charles the bald should have given neustria to the normans . in the third race , that lewis the gross should have ruin'd so many great lords ; who made up the greatest-part of the parliaments : that lewis the younger should have yielded up guienne by the divorce of eleanore : that the count of burgundy , and the duke of britannie , and some others , should have leagu'd together against queen blanche . in fine , there are thousand and a thousand examples in history , which ▪ do evidence that these kings always had the free and sovereign administration of their state : nor will there one be found to prove , that the parliaments ever contradicted them . they presented themselves at the feet of their princes , with petitions , and humble remonstrances : they made no resistance , nor exercis'd authority . so that our king 's have been king's indeed , always absolute masters ▪ and for proof hereof , it will be sufficient to look into all the statutes ; there it may be seen how they spake , and what part the estates had in them . the principal end of parliaments therefore was , to the end the law-suits of particular persons ; and people perceiving that appeals brought to them were received , and sentences invalidated ; many , to try opinions in their cases once again , became appellants : by this means affairs were multiply'd ; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the kingdom , deputies of the general parliament were appointed , they also stiled parliaments , and to be ambulatory . the commission they had , was sometimes for three months , sometimes for six , according to exigence of state ; but alway by the command and letters of the king. these parliaments went into the provinces , to judge the causes that were brought them ; almost in like manner as we now see done at the extraordinary sessions : which instead of diminishing the number of causes to be dispatch'd , as had been conceiv'd , really augmented them . philip the fair saw cause to make such a parliament sedentary at paris , another at rouen , a third at thoulouse ; and succeeding kings establish'd others in other cities , as they are at present . from this faithful account it resulteth , that the parliaments are not a fourth body in the state ; but be extracted out of the three ancient orders ; at first they were taken out of the clergy and nobility only : because the commons at that time were not considerable afterwards , these also were received in . other sovereign societies are but images of these parliaments . as to the sovereignty of the parliaments themselves , it neither is , nor ever was other , than an emination of the sovereignty of the king , in whom that quality is natural , and indivisible . the parliaments can pretend to no more than his majesty may please to impart to them . the sale of offices of judicature having been introduc'd , there follow'd divers creations of new officers , both in matter of the revenue , and also in that of justice : among others , those of presidial courts were instituted : which perhaps was done , only out of a pecuniary interest ; a needless degree of jarisdiction being thereby set up , and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the kings subjects . these courts are so many petty parliaments , in judging supreamly , and finally in some cases : yet by the trick of petty-fogging practice , ways are found to get appeals from judgment pass'd , to be received , and new processes begun , to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd . there have been in all times , chief judges in towns ; as bailiffs and seneschals ; a thing of indispensible necessity for keeping the people in order : all the fault that can be found in it , is by reason of their number , which certainly is excessive . 't is not enough that the king hath parliaments and other officers to determinate differenamong his subjects : there must also be a counsel about his majesty ; by whose advice , he may correct all ill administration of justice ; may reverse all sentences given against the mind and intention of the statutes ; and maintain order through the whole extent of his state. this counsel is the sacrarium of the monarchy : and the persons admitted into it , who may justly be stiled the eyes , the ears and hands of the prince ) ought to have a profound knowledge in affairs , acquired by long and approved experiences : they must love the kingdom , the kingly power , and the king's person . they are the seminary , whence are taken intendants of provinces , ambassadors and ministers for negotiations with strangers . the counsel is compos'd at present of gownmen only . it would not be much amiss , nay , on the contrary , it would be very well done : if the king pleased to communicate this honour unto other professions , when there were found persons capable of it : because this preference gives the gentlemen of the long robe too much authority ; whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already ; much rather , than of conferring any new advantage upon them , as we shall shew hereafter . as for the royal privy council , in which secret affairs are debated , and which ought to be of very few persons , that matters may be kept in silence , and not untimously divulged ; i will not speak of it in this place ; nor say , in what manner it ought to be composed : because this depends upon the pleasure of the master of it ; and each king takes a different course in it . there have been princes who committed the principal care of all affairs to one single person : and france hath seen , for instance , the cardinals of amboise and richlieu . others have parted employments , and shared them among as many persons as there were different affairs . so did king henry the fourth . this , in my opinion , was the more wisely done ; for that in matter of government , the great secret is to divide authority , and hold the ballance even between a plurality of persons . history teacheth us of what consequence it was to our kings of the first race ; that they had but one maire of the palace ; and how dear it cost their posterity . upon a like reason of state the roman emperors divided the charge of the praetorian prefect . but ministers , whatever for number , must for qualification , be men of virtue and approved sufficiency : they likewise , after the manner of the aegyptians , ought to be reprehended and punish'd for all that the king does amiss , and contrary to law. the incredible number of the ministers of justices in france , is in truth , somewhat monstrous ; neither is there any disorder in the state , more pressing , or requiring a more speedy application of the royal authority . the truth is , if a man consider this multitude of magistrates , will he not have ground to say , that the french are extream hard to be governed , seeing so many great personages are employed in governing them ? again , it may be said , that this nation , so ▪ illustrious by the glory of its actions , and by so many victories wherewith its arms have been honoured , is yet incapable of virtuous inclinations ; since there is need of force to reduce them to the rule of the laws : though god never gave men a more precious present . on the other hand , can it be affirmed , that our legislators wanted wisdom , or did not sufficiently shew it in making the laws ? yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of law-suits , whereof the vexation is a grievance to the kingdom , may not a man perswade himself , that equity is banish'd thence , and upright dealing utterly discarded ? should it then hereupon be taken for granted , that the private sort in france are not good condition'd people ; can it be imagin'd that the publick government is any thing reasonable and proper for its due ends ? but if a man proceed to penetrate further into the internals of the state , and there behold what a desolation the corrupting of justice hath made , loosning and breaking the most sacred ties of friendship ; in fine , if he observe how the monarchy hath often been in danger of subversion , will he not wonder that the publick fortune hath held out , and families been born up in the storms that have so many times turmoild them ? the excessively great multitude of officers , being the principal cause whence so many mischiefs take their rise ; the remedy must be first apply'd thereto . and this remedy is nothing else , but such a retrenchment as is expedient , or , to say better , necessary to be made . the fewer officers of justice there are , the more soldiers and artificers , and merchants , and the fewer litigious actions will be . for it is manifest that business of that kind has ever multiply'd , as the number of officers hath been augmented : in like manner , as the more physicians , the more patients . to arrive at the end propos'd , it would be convenient , that after mature deliberation upon the estate of france , the number of its inhabitants , and the quantity of law-business , it be advisedly stated in the king's council , what number of officers were fit to be reserved , and of what quality they should be ; then that the rest be suppress'd gradually , as the persons dye away , or at once by a declaration . what , in my opinion , might particularly be done , is as follows . first , the presidial courts being compos'd of officers that are needless to the state , a charge unto the people ; having also but a novel interloping jurisdiction , the fruit of an evil counsel given to king henry ii. and a mere invention to get money ; the extinction of them is not to be doubted of ; but effected by a substraction of the officers annuities . by this means the king will save that pay , which amounts unto a sum considerable to the state ; and the royal jurisdictions , each in its precinct , may do what those presidials , upon which they depend , are wont to do . the presidial clerks place , its being engaged , ( or bound for security to one or other ) as is usual , should not hinder the execution of this . aflair : and when by decease there are no more officers left , care shall be taken of the concern of those to whom the places were engaged , the regulating whereof will by that time have no difficulty in it . secondly , of sergeants , two thirds wholly must be suppress'd . in the third place , all proctors , that are not advocates ; and a certain number of advocates should be appointed in each parliament and jurisdiction , who might do the office of proctors . this is not incompatible . for the thing is already in use many parts of france . the benefit of this regulation is manifest ; in that the proctors are very ignorant that have but a slight tincture of practice ; yet out of covetousness they often draw up writings for their clients , and make them pay as dear for 'em , as if the best advocate had taken the pains . mean time these writings , for the most part , are nothing worth ; and the poor suitors frequently lose good causes , through the naughtiness of their proctors , and for want of being well defended . again , such an order taken , another advantage would accrue , namely , that advocates being proctors , they will be obliged to follow what the judges shall prescribe them ; whereas at present they make a jest of it , and will not plead but when they please . there cannot be a regulation made in france more profitable in matter of justice ; and if the king , in a necessity of state , would make a money matter of it , which might at any time be done , there would be rais'd out of it , for all france , more than 20 millions . but it had need be gone about with a great deal of address . a third advantage by this regulation is , that all advocates being proctors , there would no more slip into the court a sort of young men , who shelter their ignorance and idleness under a lawyers gown and a square cap. in the fourth place , all the masters of requests belonging to the palace , or court ( of justice ) of france , should be supprest . and the truth is , it seems to me a contradiction , that these officers should be counsellors of supreme courts , yet not impowred to judge any thing supreamly . but that the commoners of the king's houshold and other priviledged persons , may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the committimus , power must be given them by special priviledge , to commence their actions , and prosecute them in a chamber of enquests . i say , by special priviledge , because i know the parliaments take no cognizance ordinarily , save of appeals : but in the case now expres'd , this special priviledge shall superadd to them this new kind of jurisdiction . and it will be highly advantageous to those commoners and priviledg'd persons ; for by this ▪ expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one trial , and finally end their business . it is to be noted here , that the first stating of cases , in order to an hearing , is not so incompetent to parliaments , but that they do the thing for substance , upon demands incidentally made . yet this is meant only in behalf of priviledged persons , and all such as claim the right of a committimus . fifthly , the judges provosts of towns are to be suppress'd , and they laid to the seneschalsies and bayliwicks . for , what are so many different officers in one and the same town good for ? in a sixth place , all the courts of the aids should be united to the parliaments ; and this done , when the officers of the supream court in each kind , have been reduc'd to the number which it s judged meet to retain . i will say more of this in the chapter of the finances . seventhly , all the elections are to be suppress'd , and the assessing of parishes , done by the treasurers of france ; of the seneschalsies , by the lieutenant of the province . i shall speak more plainly of it in the chapter of the finances and taxes . where also the suppression of store-houses of salt , and of the gabells , shall be treated of in the article of gabells . besides , the chamber of the treasury , and the court of moneys , should be joyned to the chamber of accompts ; and half of all the chambers be suppress'd likewise . for thirty officers may do all that the chamber of accompts , the treasury , and the court of monies now do , in fine , it is for the king's service , and the good of the state , that all the presidents places be suppress'd , as well those of superior courts , as of others : and the office of presidents be discharged by commission . 't is to be consider'd ▪ that this new order would much augment the king's authority . for what will not counsellors do to obtain a commission to preside ? and having obtained it , what will they not further do to keep and confirm themselves in it ? 't is pertinent to recall to mind here , that the mighty prince philip the fair , at his making the parliament sedentary , made the count of burgundy first president of it . and that anciently , the first president of the chamber of accompts was the chief butler of france : likewise , that at that time , and long after , the chancellors of france were of the church , or of the sword ; and great dignities not given to men of the robe privatively . which being done since , without doubt gives them too much credit , and leaves the nobility too little . it is important that the thing be not continued , but on the contrary , all restored to primitive order . as for country courts , 't is fit they be narrowly limited , and brought to be meerly predial and dominial ; that is , for rents and the fealties of lordships : not capable of determining an inventory , or receiving a suit between parties , for more than three livres . to conclude , the shortning of proceedings in law , would much conduce to the reduction of officers . let it not be objected , that this reduction of officers , and such a multitude of suppressions , will ruin a multitude of families . for though it were so , yet should not the thing be stuck at ; the reformation of a state being concern'd : nor is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt , when the weal of the publick is in question , god himself , who is king of kings , and eternally just , how many men did he destroy by that universal deluge for the reformation of the universe ? how many isralites did he cut off in the wilderness , to save the gross of the people ? there is plenty of examples in this kind , and soveraigns have a right to do like things with like justice , when the general welfare of their subjects is concern'd . kings are eagles , to whom god gives his thunder-bolts to carry : the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of god , whose images and instruments they are . to conclude , it 's a thing which cannot be dissembled , that the parliaments , constituting an aristocratick government in part , as they do , are quite contrary to monarchick government . aristocracy is adverse to regality ; because of all governments it comes nearest to it . as , to use the very terms of hesiod , a potter envies , and is against a potter . be it remembred here briefly , that theopompus king of sparta having created the ephori , at last after a great deal of time , cleomenes was fain to put them to death ; when they had slain king agis . the senate becoming too potent , overthrew the first roman monarchy , and in one word , what hath our age seen in the trial of chenailles ? and what did a former in that of chancellor poyet ? a second source from which the evils of litigious suits do arise , is the sale of magistracies . the emperor alexander severus sound this mischief in his empire ; it having been introduced by domician . s. lewis saw cause to weed the abuse out of his kingdom ; it having got in through the confusion and trouble of some precedent reigns . it will be glorious for the king to do in his state what the emperour severus and s. lewis did in theirs , with greatest glory to their memory . but as policy requires , that in such enterprises , way be made by degrees , and greatest events brought on by small beginnings : so it is necessary here , to proceed leisurely , and with measured steps . the fixation of offices hath been much advanced already : for though what hath been done seemed to signifie an authorizing the sale of them : yet in truth , there hath been ground gotten . to continue the work , and bring it to perfection , there must a decree pass , or a declaration be made , and publish'd at the seal , by which the king declares , that he purposeth no longer to admit any opposition in matter of title to offices . this is just ; for the king ought to be ever master , and have the liberty to bestow the charges of his kingdom on whom he pleaseth , and thinks worthy of ' em . thus no one will be alarm'd : but this declaration will extend unto the price it self , by a consequence easily deducible ; namely , since the principal and essential right to offices consisteth in the title , and the price is but an accessory , as they term it : 't is reasonable , that the price alway follow the law of the title : as the title to a benefice brings in the revenue of it ; and as in marriage , the validity of the sacrament makes the validity of the contract , and of the civil effects . thus receiving no more opposition at the seal for the title ; there neither will be any in reference to the price : and hence it will come to pass , in tract of time , that offices will be no longer security for money ; which will diminish the price of them , and insensibly bring it to nothing . but it is very just too , that the mortgaging of offices , as hath been done hitherto , be obstructed for the future . for the officer may dye before he hath paid the paulette ; whereby his office is extinct ; or if of grace the king revives it , the value of what ariseth from the casualty , is much less than the sum for which the thing was engag'd : so that there must loss certainly accrue . but if the king make a new creation of an officer , all engagements are gone : for 't is then no longer the office that formerly it was . let it not be said , that without the sale of offices , the casualties will be worth the king nothing . for the contrary is true : and if the casualties be worth him two millions , by reason of that sale of them , his majesty will make four millions of 'em , if they be no longer saleable . forasmuch as in this case , they will be no longer hereditary ; and being no more hereditary , they will revert to the king upon the decease of every titulary : and so the king may dispose of 'em in favour of the person that is most acceptable to him , and if it please his majesty , the new admitted officer may fine to the coffers of his treasury royal , as the officers of gentlemen do to the profit of the monasticks . as to the objection , that by such suppression of officers and jurisdictions , and taking away the sale of offices , the king will lose the revenue of many of his clerks places , and of the paulette ; the answer is easie ; for as to the clerks places suppress'd , the king will be recompenc'd by the greater value of those that shall remain ; and as for the paulette , the retrenchment of the wages of the officers suppress'd , will be much more considerable . a third cause of vexatious law-driving is , that offices of judicature are gainful to those that execute them . an evil this , the dangerousest of any that can affect a state ; for all becomes suspected , all becomes corrupt where profit is to be made ; avarice and ambition creep in ; justice , uprightness , and truth , depart : whereupon we may conclude with the ancient proverb , that money doth many things which the devil cannot do . for an entrance upon a reformation in this matter , it would be good to ordain , first , that judges not the kings , should take no more spices . secondly , that judges in the royal courts should not decree executions for their attendance against the parties that are in contest . thirdly , that if spices , ( or fees upon sentence obtained ) be allowed , the parties shall give what they will , as the former custom was , and not be compelled . fourthly , that there be no more transacting by commissaries in sovereign courts . judges should be forbidden to admit any sollicitation from parties at law , even though it be but to let them know the difficulties of their affairs , and put them in a way to clear the same . for a judge ought not to be prayed to do his office , in favour of a man whose case is good , much less of one whose case is bad . chap. ix . 1. of some general orders in government . 2. of punishment and recompence . 3. of royal virtues . in the chapters now dispatch'd , i have inserted many things which may be of use for the kings service , for the general good of his state , and of every of his subjects in particular . in the chapters that are to follow , others very considerable shall be added . however , i judge it not amiss to make here a distinct chapter of some important points , which i cannot easily rank any other where . it hath been long in dispute , whether it be good to alter publick laws ? and upon debate of the question to and fro , 't is concluded , that there is oft-times so pressing a necessity , that it cannot be forborn : but withal , that such alterations must be insensible to the people , who hardly come off from old customs ; and cannot be brought to any new observance , but by a long circumference , and ways to them unknown . legislators are physicians of common-wealths , and in this case ought to imitate the ordinary artists of that profession , who seeing the whole habit of a body out of order , and that to preserve the patient from perishing , 't is necessary to change it , do prescribe remedies , which the more slowly they operate , the surer their effect . now the first law , which in my opinion might be made , or rather renewed in france , is to banish thence all usuries , of whatever quality , except among merchants ; and those should be expresly prohibited , which arise from personal obligations , under pretence of damages and interests ; even interests adjudged by sentence not excluded ; this pretence being but a means to authorize usury , and defraud the law , which forbids it . usury was strictly prohibited among the ancient inhabitants of candie : but the coveting of riches , to elude the severity of this statute , disposed the borrower , that he should seem to have stollen the money he had need of , and which in reality was lent him . by this artifice the debtor was constrained to pay the interests ; which were not adjudged to the creditor on the account of any loan , but in hatred of robbery , which he said had been committed upon him . this means cannot be used in france ; for that theft is there a capital crime , both in religion and in policy . but the spirit of man being unbounded , and having more craft when bent to transgress , than the law hath prudence to hinder evil doing , the taking of damages and interests hath been introduced amongst us ; which is an equivalent to the cretan expedient . for the feigning a detension of money against the owners will , as is done in france , and the debtor thereupon condemn'd to pay the interests , can be no other thing for substance , than the feigning a robbery , as was done in candie . there is not any nation of note , in which usurious contracts have not been prohibited among the subjects . 't is known what the law of the church in this behalf is , and what that of the old testament , so often repeated in scripture , was . usury sure , hath caused the greatest disorders that have hitherto troubled the tranquility of states . the athenians , the spartans , and the romans , did not forbid it only ; but were also forced to abolish debts contracted ; and for publick benefit , rescin'd the compacts and promises that private men had made , though they seemed inviolable , as having been made under the authority of the laws , and upon the security of general custom , which they were not wont to over-rule . an act of very particular consequence all usurious contracts should be annulled , yea the culpable and complices as to the crime of usury , put to death ; the usurer in plato's opinion , being worse than the thief . the second law should be , to permit contracts for annual rent out of land : yet with charge , that they be publish'd for publick security ; as i have said elsewhere , when i treated of the shortning of law-suits . withall , regulating to a denier , the arrearages , which are a kind of usury , but the most tolerable of any seeing there is an alienation of the land ; and it is a fiction prudently hit upon by the popes calixtus the third , and martin the fifth . as for the declaration in form of an edict which is to be made herein ; contracts , even the formerly made , should be reduced to the thirtieth denier . the romans limited use to the hundredth , afterwards to the two hundredth , and at length abolish'd it altogether . a third law should be , that no sum lent to any son of a family , or to others under 25 years of age , without the consent and authority of their relations , do produce any action ; no not thought the contracts be ratified by the debtors , after they come of age . vespasian made a like ordinance ; and there is nothing more effectual to repress the greediness of usurers , or the debauch of young people : whereupon they would set themselves to labour , to exercises and study . the profit which these laws would yield the state , beside their stopping the course of great evils , would be , that persons who are alway concern'd , and impatient to be getting , seeing they could not put out their money at interest easily , and that the interest of their contracts would be at too low a rate , must of force apply themselves to two things , each of which is eminently advantageous to the kingdom . for they would addict themselves to trades and husbandry ▪ or put their money in the hands of merchants to make benefit of it , if not enter into partnership with them , which they should be permitted to do . for usury in matter of commerce , was never forbidden , and is the secret that the hollanders have found , to make all their people merchants . on the other hand , the genoeses have engaged themselves in traffick , upon observing the profit it yielded . the fourth law might be , that gentlemen be disabled to sell their fiefs or inheritances , until they have made declaration of their poverty in open court. among the israelites , lands engaged reverted to their ancient owners at the jubilee . the spartans lands were not divided at all ; i mean those 7000 portions which lycurgus had lotted out . the locrians in like manner sold not their estates : the same is observed in flanders . the fiefs of the great houses of bretanie are never parted out . substitution of heirs in france doth hinder the alienation of lands . in spain gentlemen cannor sell their estates : and lastly , the demesne of the crown in france , is in-alienable , which may prescribe a law for all noble families . this ordinance would make gentlemen good husbands . when the jews , the lacedemonians , the syracusians , the romans , and all civilized-people , made a partition of their lands , they consider'd the benefit that might thence redound to their states , and very wisely provided , that all such as possess'd inheritances should fix in the country : having an estate there which they could not carry away , they would love the places where they had their subsistance ; and every one defending his own possession , all would jointly defend the common-wealth , and fight for the publick interests . the fifth law should be , that a gentleman being ruin'd , and having acknowledged his poverty in court , should be no longer noble ; there being no estate so shameful , as that of a man of quality reduc'd to an extream misery . on the contrary , that a plebeian , when he hath rais'd himself an advantageous fortune , which might be limited at 50000 crowns , should be ennobled ; provided always , that the profit had been made by laudable and lawful means . a sixth law should be , to hinder the publick begging of the poor , by appointing the greatest penalties upon it ; and ordain , for that end , that every parish both in town and country , do maintain their own poor , not suffering them to wander ; punish all that make a trade of it ; send the stoutest of them to the gallies , and set all the rest on work according to their ability . this is a means to fetch out that idleness which is among the meaner sort . the seventh law might be , to render fathers responsible , as to civil interests , for all the faults and crimes their children should commit while they depend on them , and under 25 years of age ; or , however , whilst they dwell in their fathers house . the mulct to be allowed for afterwards in the patrimony of those faulty children ; this law is in force in bretanie , and was so at rome . masters , in like manner , for the faults of their houshold-servants ; and paying an arbitrary fine besides , because they ought to correct them . in the third place , provost marshals and their officers , for all robberies and murthers committed on the high-ways , burglaries , counterfeit coin , and other the like crimes within their district , if they took not up the malefactors , and brought them to their trial. this law would hinder well-nigh all mischiefs of this nature ; it being , as may be said , of publick notoriety , that provosts hold intelligence with all persons of ill life . again , all lieutenants criminal and judges , for the crimes committed in their towns , by the same reason . masters of inns , and houses of entertainment , for the crimes committed by their guests , while they are in their houses . owners of houses , for the crimes committed by their tenants during their term ; because they ought to know , and answer for the good abearing of such as they entertain . captains and officers for the crimes of their soldiers ; the inhabitants of an house for those committed in it . this is done in spain . in the turkish towns , the townsmen of each street are responsible for what is done there ; and if a man be slain , the townsman before whose door he falls , is sentenced to pay for his blood. this order is excellent . for assoon as there is a noise in the street , all run thither , and the authors of the fact , whatever it be , are seized , brought before the judge , and forthwith punish'd according to the quality of the crime . in paralel to this rule of government in turkie , severest penalties must be imposed upon such as transgress the laws , and especially the laws that relate to publick order and policy ; those penalties also speedily inflicted ; otherwise the said laws will be of no use . for example , 't is ordained in france , that no lackey wear a sword ; that no towns-man have arms ; or that bakers make their bread of a certain weight , or other things of like nature . they that obey not , must be instantly punished , the rich by pecuniary fines , the poor by corporal penalties . the turks cause offenders who have not money to pay their fines , to be beaten with a lath. an eighth law , all printers and booksellers must be forbidden , and that upon pain of death , to print , sell , disperse , set to sale , or keep any book of what quality or subject soever , without its having been approved , and licence given them under seal in due manner ; after which may nothing be added to the book . but as it is just to punish bad subjects , so it is reasonable to reward the good : and them that out of love to their country , employ themselves in advancing its reputation and glory . the king ought to be the sole master and arbiter of all rewards ; and confer them himself , so as they that receive any beneficence of his , may be convinc'd they owe it to his bounty . this would be an infallible means to attract to him the hope of his subjects , and together with it , their respect , whereupon every one would strive to please him , in doing of his duty , and no body promise himself any grace or advantage , but by his merit , his services and diligence . there are several kinds of rewards with which his majesty may honour his subjects ; i say , honour them ; because a subject , in receiving a benefit from the hand of the king , receives withal , a mark of the esteem which is had of his person , and of the satisfaction he hath given in his conduct . nothing can be more glorious to a man of worth ; nothing can yield him a truer contentment . a gift from an ordinary hand is many times somewhat shameful to him that takes it ; and hence comes the adage , that it is better to give than to receive . but when a king is the donor , the dignity of the royal hand doth add to the gift a new quality , which augmenteth the worth and excellency of it : whence it is , in such a case no less praise to receive than to give . this now which i have affirmed , cannot be doubted of : yet it may be taken for evident , that of these rewards , there are some purely honourable , others only profitable ; and a last sort , both honourable and profitable too . the reward purely honorary is , when the king confers upon a subject some dignity which he had not afore ; as upon a plebeian , the quality of gentleman , upon a gentleman that of knight , or marquess , &c. and permits him to carry fleurdelizes in his coat of arms , or some other ▪ memorial of a great action : or grants him the privilege to wear a crown in his crest , or the like . this kind of reward is unlimited , because sovereignty is a source from whence new honours and dignities incessantly flow ; as projections of light do every moment issue from the sun , without exhausting its secondity ; and on the contrary , the more rays that it emitteth , the more resplendent is it in it self ; so the more honours a king confers , the greater lustre he adds to his own royal majesty . the romans , of any people upon earth , did most abound in conferring rewards of this nature : and on that account , brought into use crowns , triumphs , statues , rings , inscriptions , publick praises ; and stuck not to grant deifications , temples and sacrifices : such a love they had for virtue ; and so ingenious were they to inhance the merit of their fellow-citizens : thus inciting them to worthy persormances , and principally to an advancing the power of the common-wealth . for any man that hath a noble spirit , and is virtuously dispos'd , does more to merit a just reward , than he would to gain the empire of the world : because in the issue , 't is always virtue that triumphs ; and oft-times but fortune that rules . in conformity to this example , which both antiquity , and the authors of it , and experience , do render illustrious , the king may honour such as serve him best , with honourable titles ; but ought to punish all those , who , without his permission , dare assume and usurp them . 't is necessary that there be a difference of rank between persons ; and the distinguishing of them by their merit , is to be preferr'd far before all discrimination made by their wealth . it would also be very commodious , that as the honour of knighthood is purely personal , so the king should make the dignity of baron , of marquess , of count , &c. personal likewise ; not real , or annexed to estates ; the said dignities to become extinct by decease of the persons invested with them . this expedient , to recompence men of worth , being well managed , would produce a marvellous effect ; and an whole race , thereby become men of merit . for , what would not the son of one of these personal marquesses do , to prevent falling from that degree of honour which his father had ? and how could he choose but press vigorously on in the court of honour that has been thus mark'd out to him ? but in this case , there is one thing to be further done , which might much profit the state , by laying a more express obligation on the nobility to serve the king : and that is , that the king do give his letters for personal marquessates , in such form as they may be verified in the parisian chamber of accompts , and the persons honoured with them , do homage to his majesty thereupon . such kind of homages have been done heretofore for officers , and even for pensions , though but of two hundred livres . the emperour in germany hath , in this manner , made gentlemen , and counts of the empire , as for example , the late count de guimene ; who had not a foot of land within the emperours jurisdiction . the king of england creates a gentleman , baron , and earl of a barony , or county , in which the gentleman possesseth nothing . the second kind of gratifications and rewards , is of those that are purely gainful and pecuniary ; as pensions , tickets for money , acquittances by patent , ransoms , confiscations of deceasing strangers goods , and the like . these however , carry a great deal of honour with them , as i said afore . the third kind , is of those that are at once both gainful an honourable , as great offices , governments , &c. upon this matter of rewards , there is this further reflection to be made ; namely , that a king never be inform'd of a good action , but he gratifie the actor , either with praises , or with benefits . in fine , all these favours must be regulated by consideration of his service , and the welfare of his state. god , in giving princes a sovereign power , inspires into them affection for their people . but his will is , that it be a paternal affection ; that a king do open his bosom to his subjects , as his very children ; and that all his counsels and designs be levell'd at their felicity ; without which , himself cannot be happy . 't is principally for this great and glorious effect , that kings are images of god , and be fortified with his spirit . i have said , that monarchs are in their kingdoms , what the soul is in the body of man , that external goods cannot enrich them ; that virtue alone is their proper portion , as it is of god himself . it now remaineth i should say what kind of virtue it ought to be . 't is necessary that a great prince have piety , to give his subjects an example of it ; and bettering of them in this , is the security of his state. he must be just to govern them . a government never is of long duration without justice . this queen of virtues comprehends , ( as aristotle judiciously noted ) all the rest . a king i say must be just , to render unto every one , and unto himself , what is respectively due . the third virtue of a prince , is prudence , to foresee of himself what may betide his states . thus a wise pilot hath the skill to foresee calms and storms : he knows by secret notices , whether the winds will be favourable , or contrary to his voyage . the fourth virtue is magnanimity ; a weight this , that keeps the soul always in the same position , and gives it so setled a firmness , that neither good nor bad successes can put it out of place ; and a king appears unalterable : he thus bears up the hope of his subjects ; they look upon him as an assured succour against fortune , and persuade themselves , there is somewhat of divine quality in his person . of royal virtues , a fifth is clemency ; it pertains to the greatness of a king , that he be benign , and do commiserate the weaknesses of his subjects ; who are men as he is . mischances are pardonable , and it seems to me , 't is too much rigor to punish a poor wretch for a crime committed out of imprudence , or by necessity ; and of which he is less guilty , if i may say it , than his ill destiny , 't is to criminals of this kind , that grace should not be deny'd : and when a king gives one of his subjects his life , who hath been condemn'd to death , he should rejoyce more at the feeling in the secret of his heart a will to pardon : than at the having in his hand the power to punish . to give a man his life , is in some sort to create him ; and the preserving of his being , is a giving of it . it would be , 't is true , a great fault , to stop the course of justice , in case of publick crimes , and such as have disturb'd the peoples peace : yet in sum it is noble , that a king be inclin'd to compassion and mercy . 't is an action appropriated unto god , to disarm his anger : upon this ground the roman poet said , that those thunderbolts which jupiter throws , might be diverted . the sixth royal virtue is liberality . one of the ancients pronounced , that it was less disadvantageous for a king to be overcome by arms , than by liberality . a poet introduceth mark anthony excellently saying , that he had nothing left him but the benefits he had conferred . and to say true , a great prince never enjoys his wealth , but when he hath given it . liberality enricheth him , and makes him purchases of inestimable value . for thereby 't is , that he wins the love of his own people , and becomes admired of all others . when i say liberality , i mean a judicious liberality , such as is a virtue , not an exorbitant profuseness ; a liberality alway exercis'd with advantage , and with glory . to conclude in short ; when i consider other virtues , i do not find any one of them all improper for a king ; but it is impossible a king should have those which i have mention'd , without having every one of the rest ; since they are inseparable companions , and must be united to make a virtuous man. chap. x. 1. of finances , or a princes treasure . 2. means to make the subjects more numerous . 3. of the officers that manage the king's treasure . 4. of the king's demesnes . 5. means to recover the demesnes . 6. of taxes . 7. means to ease the people . 8. of the free cities . 9. of the gabells . 10. means to augment the receipt of the gabells , and ease the people . 11. of the salt-free country . 12. of the countries of state , and free gifts . 13. of the expending of money . 14. of the reserving it . the art of finances , or the treasury , is a principal part of the politicks ; and so much the more necessary in a state , in that money is the soul of all affairs . a common-wealth is no further powerful , than proportionably to the richness of its publick treasury , and the greatness of the yearly income that maintain it . this the french name plainly importeth ; for finance is an old word , signifying power , and comes from the ancient verb finer , which is to be able , to may or can . three particulars are here to be considered . first , just and easie means to make money . secondly , the prudent expending it . thirdly , the keeping it in , and laying it up for necessities that may happen ; as famine , pestilence , war , fire , shipwrack , and such like . we have in france three general means to make money ; the king's demesnes . impositions on the people , merchandises , &c. of this last i will speak in the chapter of commerce . i will say nothing here of conquests ; which may come in for a fourth means of getting ; i will treat of them elsewhere . before any further advance into this matter , it will be pertinent to observe , that the fundamental wealth of a state consists in the multitude and plenty of subjects . for 't is men that till the ground ; that produce manufactures ; that manage trade ; that go to war ; that people colonies ; and in one word , that bring in money . to make way in france for multiplying of men , and oblige them to marry , the king may at once do two things , after the example of the emperor augustus . first , he may decree priviledges and advantages in favour of such as shall have divers children ; exempting them from guardianships , from being collectors , from commissions to look to the fruits of sequestred lands , and other burthensom offices : he may discharge them from subsidies , and even give them some estate . secondly , he might impose penalties upon those that marry not before a certain age : and take part in the successions of all sorts of persons , who in contempt of law and wedlock , live single , not having impediment by any natural infirmity . 't is upon a like consideration , that i said in a former chapter , the king , to restrain parents from compelling their daughters into cloisters , might declare , that the right of all recluses in any succession , was vested in himself : and 't is for the very same reason that the ancient earls of flanders were heirs to all the priests that were their subjects . now to that which augustus did for the inducing of his subjects to marry , the king might add two particulars : one is , that the first year a man taxable did marry the first time , being under 26 years of age , he should be exempt from all subsidies and impositions , and publick charges , even quartering of soldiers , in case he kept house apart , and was setled in a dwelling of his own . if the newly married be the king's officer , his office should not fall into the king's hand , if he died within the year . commanders also , and soldiers should be dispens'd with , as to their serving for that time , unless on urgent necessity , or some important occasion . the other partilar which in france had need to be added to augustus's ordinances , is , to take effectual order , that persons once married , be not so easily separated again as they are . for 't is to no purpose to contract marriages , if they be not stuck to , and the coupled parties cohabit not . a strange abuse in this matter of separation hath crept in of late , nor know i how the officials have become so favourable in it , or how the parliaments have suffer'd it . now-a-days , a woman that would have , as they say , her swing , and without controul , practice all that her giddy , witless , and oft times wanton humour prompts her to , raiseth stirs in the house , at length tires out her husbands patience ; hereupon , she complains of his vices , hath servants suborned for her purpose ; a divorce comes to be adjudged upon their depositions , the husband is sentenced to yield her up her goods , and not only do that , but also to let her have possession of her dower , or of a good part of it ; at least to allow her a great pension . then this woman reties , takes an house , and lives after her own fashion , which is not alway the most commendable in the world ; her husband the while , sinking under the whole weight of his houshold affairs . had she counted upon nothing else , but that of necessity she must live with her husband , and in his house , she would have formed her self to it , and not have play'd her vexatious pranks ; so she had promoted the happiness of her husband , and of the children , and together with it , her own . for application therfore of a remedy in this case , it must be a law that a wife shall not sue for a separation ' as to person or habitation , but by the advice ' of four of her nearest kindred ; men of known integrity : and that a separation being ordered , either by sentence in court , or by accommodation between the parties , she shall be bound to enter a monastery , without egress again ; nor suffered to admit a visit from any man there ; it being contrary to publick decency , that a woman who hath lost her husband , ( for to be separated from him , is to lose him ) should appear openly , and maintain commerce with other men. on the other hand , her sex , and all seemliness requiring , that in this estate she hide her self , and hide withal her ill fortune , and her grief for it . i would too that a very slender pension be adjudged her . and since husbands will be found in fault on their part likewise , and discover their ill husbandry , it would be very just , that the disposal of their estates be not left to them , nor the possession of more than a part of 'em : as is the case of wives : and that supposing they have children , the money arising from the remainder , should be received , employed , and administred by a guardian : he to accompt for it to the said children in due time . if there be none , the revenue exceeding the pension should be laid out on hospitals , and other necessities of the state. this law should extend to separations already made . and such rigour being practis'd in matter of divorces , there would be no more of ' em . husbands and wives would be under a reciprocal obligation , to live together , and to live together discreetly : so they would breed up a family that might prove the contentment of their life , the comfort of their elder years ; and be beneficial to the whole kingdom . there is a further consideration to be made in the matter of the finances ; and it is this , namely , that it is expedient the king should declare , that for the future he will be creditor , and donotary to his receivers and accomptable officers , fot their wives dotal money , and marriage settlements , and for their childrens portions and donatives : then explaining the late ordinances to take away all difficulty , declare further , the crime of misemploying the publick money to be punishable by death ; and ordain , that the interests , amends , and civil reparations adjudged against criminals of that kind , should fall upon their heirs or legatees . this law is rigorous ; yet it is just and necessary : forasmuch as it will strike terror on the financiers : who having no hope to escape justice , could not entertain a thought of committing a fault that would ruine all that is dearest to them . beside , the romans punish'd even with death , the very friends of those whom they condemn'd for crimes against the state ; the history of sejanus affords unquestionable proof of it . that which we call the demesne of the king , and of the crown , cannot be alienated , nor is it liable to any charge or encumbrance . this law is fundamental in all kind of common-wealths , as well as in france . but here things are judged to belong to the crown three manner of ways from all antiquity : as the soveraignty , the power of war , subsidies , and the like . by declaration ; when the king , by his letters , declares some particular united to the crown . by confession , when for the continued space of ten years , the receivers have accompted for it to the chamber . there are many questions proposable in reference to the demesne ; but it is not our business to state them . chopin may be consulted , who hath learnedly written of this subject . in necessities of the state , divers things have been engaged by the king to the use of private private persons , who have paid in sums thereupon . yet these persons cannot hinder , but that the things may be recovered . and there are two equitable ways to effect this . the first is , by making a principal of what is due to those creditors , and assigning them rents upon the town hall of paris , or some other place ; of which there are examples . for when the king had sold , or rather engaged some rights of his unto particular men , they have been resum'd by contracts for a rent-charge . now those rights were demesne , upon which , to recover the demesne , rents were charged . the same course then may be taken again . nor could the engagees have any cause to complain ; for the engagements made to 'em , are but to secure their due , and give them not any propriety : their security therefore will be as great when they have contracts for rent . for the one and the other pertains to the demesne still . and such kind of impositions in like manner , the power to impose them being royal and dominical , the engagees concerned will by this means have security for security , and rent for rent . but that the king may reap advantage from this exchange , it is necessary to settle a stock for the raising of these new rents ; and to that end , a new imposition must be laid upon the clergy , the countries of state , cities , commonalties , companies , colledges , merchants , and other members of the kingdom , the engagees themselves paying their proportions . there is in this no inconvenience at all : because the demesne having been engaged for the preservation and defence of all the corporations in the kingdom , it is natural , that they all contribute to free it again . the second way to disengage the demesne , would be , by giving ready money instead of rents , and making an imposition for this end , which might be more easie . a reimbursement should be compleated in five or six years . mean time , and before all things , the engagees must be put out of possession , and order given , that the receivers of the demesne do take up the profits . for if any condition be propos'd while the said engagees are in possession , they will make a thousand difficulties at it ; and on the contrary , if they no longer possess , they will readily consent . but that the matter may be transacted with less noise , it ought to be expedited in each parliament apart : or at least the receivers commanded , by virtue of a decree of the kings council , to receive all the profits , and even those of the engaged demesnes . if there be not made a new imposition , in order to recover those demesnes , the affair will not be of advantage to the king ; and there may one be very justly made for the reasons now alledged , and for the putting of things again in order , let us pass unto the art of the tallies . the imposition of the tallies [ or taxes ] is a kind of subsidy or aid laid upon the people . under it , ( in france ) are comprehended the tallion , and the subsistance ; as they term them . the tallie is hugely equitable ; it is ancient ; it is necessary ; and in use all the world over . for there never was people that paid not to defray the publick expences . in france it is so moderate , and may be so easily paid , that it hath been known to be higher than now it is : because the sums that make it up are receiv'd without much trouble : yet at present , though it be considerably diminish'd , the people are scarce able to pay it , and the country extreamly incommodated by it . the prime cause of this is , that the ratable persons considered , the rates are not duely proportion'd ; the rich peasants , the justicers of the villages , the gentlemens farmers , the eleus , and other persons of power , are so eased , that they pay almost nothing , and the poorest of all do bear all . a second cause of the mischief is , that they who are commission'd to receive the tallies , do so run up the charges , that they far exceed the principal , and thus draw money out of the peoples hands , which they can part with but once . when the sergeants of villages need a cow , or corn , or some piece of houshould-stuff , they go to the peasants houses where they know the same is to be had ; there they make seizures , and then sales at what price they please . they seize and sell whatever they find , to the very household-loaf of bread that hath been cut , and is in use : upon this , the poor rustick hath nothing left to help himself , but is utterly distressed , and can no longer do his work . the greatest part of these officers must be suppress'd ; the more there are of them in the matter of the finances , the more disorder and oppression there is . for all of them look for profit ; and they spoil all by their avarice and ignorance . to remedy the two evils that have been mention'd , effectual order must be taken that the peasants may pay equally ; that is , in proportion to the estate they have ; and pay without charges superadded . first , all the taxes should be made real , as they are in languedoc , that every one may pay . secondly , the tax should be levied in kind of the fruits that are receiv'd from the lands and tenements , as wine , sider , beer , corn , cattle , and the like ; the quantity that is to be taken being stinted and fix'd , for example , to a tenth part . a peasant that might have ten bushels of corn , would very willingly pay one to the king , and might do it without inconvenience . but when for payment of forty sous in money , which he hath not , the sergeants and collectors seize upon , and sell the ten bushels of corn , which too are priz'd at an extream low rate , and all is spent in charges , doth he not really , instead of forty sous , pay twenty livres ? this turns not at all to the profit of the king , and tends to the undoing of his people . under the name of lands and tenements this tenth might be extended unto houses in cities , towns and villages , and they ordered to pay a tenth part of the money they might be let out for ; which should be very low rated . in like manner a tenth or twentieth part might be taken upon contracts for a rent-charge . for these are stocks , and a real estate . the ecclesiasticks , who have sure been wary men , have taken their rents in kind , and these sorts of rents are now infinitely augmented . the greatest part of the revenues of the romans and aegyptians themselves , was paid in fruits . they paid their armies and officers with them . many kings have taken a tenth of estates , oft-times a fifth , sometimes a third . it is not necessary that the people have money ; but they must have fruits for sustenance of life . the king might have farmers of this tenth in each parish , or in each election , who might let out under ▪ farms of it to the peasants , as is done in the tyths of the church . if it be thought fit to take things in kind , there must be magazines in cities , as there are store-houses for salt : in them the receivers should sell the fruits , or reserve them , as joseph did in aegypt . the king will need them for armies , for fleets , for victualling places of strength , for transportation into foreign parts ; especially in case of a famine . this is practis'd in many countries abroad , and particularly in italy . what is done in a petty state , may be done in a great kingdom . it is not to be doubted , but that if the tallie were thus rais'd , it would go further than it does , and the people suffer no incommodity by it at all . but one thing which presseth more at present , is , the putting of the country in case again . for this end , the rich must be permitted to give cows , sheep , and other cattle , upon terms , to the poor peasants . this is done in very many places , yea , in the greatest part of the kingdom . the too severe , and over-scrupulous parish priests prohibit it ; but they will not any longer be able to do so , when the thing is publickly permitted . it seems unreasonable , that some certain cities should , upon imaginary privileges , be for ever exempted from the charges of the state ; and mean time , the country bear the whole weight of them . the pretext of these franchises hath induced divers of the peasants to retire to these places . order must be taken in the case , and all these cities obliged to contribute to the expences of the kingdom , which they are so considerable a part of . they may then be brought to pay , under colour of subsistance or loan . there should be garisons sent them , or soldiers quartered upon them ▪ that all the beams of the state may bear their part in publick affairs , and so the weight be more easie to them , whereas one alone would be over-charg'd , and break under it . the third means the king hath to bring him in money , consists in the gabells . some have said , that the gabells are not of the nature of the kings demesne : and their reason is , because the ordinances for the first imposition of them do import , that it was not the kings intention they should so be . the contrary might be true . for , beside that the salt-pits did heretofore belong to the emperour , as goods of the empire , the sums that are raised out of them ▪ are raised by publick authority , and turn to the profit of the whole kingdom : as hath been done for many ages . but however that be ▪ not to enter into a dispute , which can be of no consequence here , i will consider the gabells according to the present state of things . i will not say when this kind of imposition did commence in france ; nor upon what examples of antiquity our kings did ground themselves . not will i explain , how , beside the gabells of france , which are call'd the grand party , there are the gabells of provence , dauphine , languedoc , and lionnois ; because the thing is known , and makes not to our purpose . the gabells are paid in france by two different means . first by impositions ; so in places neighbouring on the salt-free countries . there , for fear the subjects would not take salt at the kings garners , the officers see how many minots each parish ought to take : then a rate is made in the parishes , for it , as for the tallie . the second means is without imposition : this is the use in places remote from the salt-free countries . there , because prohibited salt cannot be brought in , every one fetcheth from the garners at the price currant . the king receives a great deal of money from these gaballs ; but the people pay excessively beyond what comes into his coffers . the infinite number of officers belonging to a store-house , the receivers , the commissioners , the archers , the charges , the portage , the fees of officers , to whom presents are also made , do swallow up huge sums , which the king fingers not , and the people do pay . for there is not a petty gabeller but lives handsomely by his employment : not a commissioner but makes him a fortune , and grows rich upon it , making good chear , and great expences . 't is of very much importance that a remedy be apply'd to the malady ; and in truth , the vexations which the king's subjects do suffer under pretext of the gabelle , are not to be comprehended . the archers enter into houses , to search ( they say ) for concealed salt : in obedience to authority the doors are open'd to them ; mean time themselves covertly convey in some bags : hereupon they form a process ; and the master of the house is excessively fin'd : nor do they depart till they have pillag'd all they can lay hands on . if entrance be deny'd them , they force the house , and act all hostilities : nor dares any one complain ; all are at their mercy ; and thus they ruine the poor persons whom they single out . this is no way beneficial to the king's affairs , nor is it his intention , that his subjects should be so ill treated . but it is easie to break them of this course . first of all , it must be debated in the kings council of the finances , what sum is fit to be taken for the salt ; this sum being determin'd at ten or twelve millions ; for example , two several parts of it shall be set out , to be yearly paid : one for the country-parishes , another for the cities . each of these allotted parts shall be sent into each generality , and thence to the places where there is a store-house of salt. the allotment for the country shall be divided by the parishes , as is now done for the tallie , the subjects among themselves rating every one's proportion . the gentlemen , the church ▪ men , the monasticks , and others , must be engaged in it , and bear their part : because they are charged by reason salt is so dear as now it is ; and by consequence , the king making a change to the profit of all , all ought to be taxed , to recompence the diminution that will follow in the finances . the second sum allotted for the cities , shall in like manner be sent to the generalties , and salt-garners , that such rents as the towns are to pay the king may be divided ; the houses may be measured by the perch , and the rents assessed accordingly ; much like to what is done for cleansing the strrets at paris . the cities that claim a freedom , as anger 's , orleans , and paris , shall enter into this contribution , for the same reason that the ecclesiasticks and gentlemen do ; inasmuch as they will notably profit by the suppression of the gabells , and abatement of the price of salt. for it is to be observed , that that measure which now costs at paris five and forty livres , might amount not to two crowns , and so proportionably in other cities . now the number of perches in each city being known , ( having been taken by commissioners of the kings , who might be citizens ) it will be very easie , on any necessity , toraise an aid from the city , upon the proportion of the said perches , by way of loan or subvention , or under some other title . and that the citizens may not oppose the kings intentions in the matter , permission must be given to each city , to treat every year with what merchants they please ; and agree a price for the salt that shall be there sold through the whole year ; he to sell it , who will oblige himself to afford it best cheap ; ( except the citizens had rather leave it free for all merchants that would , to bring in , ) always understood , that there be no power to compell any one to buy . the like may be done in every village ; the gentleman causing salt to be sold in a servant's name , and making the profit of it . this course , will , without doubt , be gain to the people ; and salt being sold in such manner , it may be brought to pass , that the commodity it self shall pay the rents which shall be due to the king , and they the while , buy it at much a lower rate than they do . so that clearly , all sorts will receive such a proposal with applause . to augment the cheapness of salt , it should be ordained , that it be free from paying to lordships , and by the load , and from imposts . the thing being resolved in the council , the king shall make a declaration in form of an edict , by which his majesty shall take off the impositions upon salt , on condition the towns and parishes will pay him yearly the sums he shall resolve upon in his council : and that until the declaration be executed , the gabell shall continue its course . it would be needful to ordain , that these sums be paid into the hands of the receivers of the tallies . for there would be no more need of a receiver of a salt-garner . what are so many receivers good for , but to consume all ? in this case , the receivers of salt must be otherwise dispos'd of . this declaration would include a suppression of all the officers of the gabells ; for when salt should be freely sold , the king would have no more use of ' em . as for their re-imbursement , provision might be made , either by continuing their wages during their lives , or by assigning them rents , which might be redeemed for little and little ; or by giving them ready money . the people too might be charged with this re-imbursement , in favour of the suppression of the gabells . this affair might be worth the king a great deal , and can never fail of being beneficial : the people will gain six millions by it , beside the quiet it will yield them . it being put in execution , the king may purchase the salt-pits , upon the greatest part of which , he would-previously have the tenth part of the salt , if he took the tenth of all revenues , as i said afore . again , in doing as hath been shewed , he would have an army ready raised : for all the gabellers must be led into the field . there are in their companies notable stout men , who also have been in action . as for the salt-free countries which have bought out their freedom , no one durst touch them hitherto , by reason of the strength of the huguenots , the civil and forraign wars , and other considerations , as the minority of kings , &c. but now that the king is master , and in a condition to make himself be obeyed ; 't is reasonable , that he do oblige so many great and rich provinces to bear a part of the burthens of the state , in proportion to their ability , for the easing the rest of france . and to this end , one of the three following propositions may be made them . first , to take a reimbursement of the sums paid by them ; which re-imbursement shall be made , by granting them a diminution of the tallies , without putting hand in purse other ways . hereto may be subjoyn'd , that the king may not wholly discharge them : because such a discharge tendeth to the oppressing of his other subjects : that a king may indeed augment and diminish subsidies , as seemeth him good , but not extinguish them ; it not being possible , that a kingdom should subsist without publick incoms : that it must be remembred on this occasion , how nero proposing to take off all the imposts that were paid at rome , the senate oppos'd it , as a thing that would be the ruine of the empire . the second proposition might be , that these provinces be obliged to pay the king a yearly rent , by way of supplement , and in confirmation of their ancient treaty . the third , that the tallie , and other impositions on them , be augmented , to even the ballance , which cannot be done any other way . there are certain means to maintain the finances ; among others , the free gifts that are presented to the king by the people of those provinces , which are called countries of state. no other order need be taken with them , but to hinder as much as may be , that the principal members of these states be not in the offices they bear , unjust at the publick cost . yet they must make their advantages in them , otherwise the states would come to nothing ; which would occasion no small confusion , and a retardment of the king's affairs . his majesty might make himself master of the deputations , and gainful commissions , which are given to the states : as for example , in bretannie , monsieur the late mareschal de la milleray , nominated alone , or rather , caus'd to be nominated whom he pleas'd , and there was no more deliberating after he had given order ; 't was one way he had to gratifie his friends . monsieur the duke mazarin , does the same still ; which may , in his person , succeed well : but the king may cause whom he will to be nominated , and the liberty of the states will not suffer by it any prejudice , or innovation at all : for such is the condition of things in these places . i will not speak here of the farms of iron , nor of others of like value . these things run in ordinary course . but having spoken of the bringing in of money , i must speak of a due laying out , and a like due laying up thereof . the advantage of an exchequer doth not consist in the bare getting in of money ; but also in a meet expending of it : and there is no less profit in giving of it forth , than in receiving of it . 't is necessary the king should spend to maintain his revenues . for if all the sums that come into his coffers should not issue thence again , no one , in the end , would be able to pay him any thing . the kings of aegypt , who took a third part of their subjects estates , caus'd the labyrinth to be built , the pyramids to be erected , the lake of meotis to be dug up , and other fabricks raised , which are incredible to posterity . their design was to disperse among people , the treasure they received from them ; and withal , banish sloth and idleness out of their states . these two vices , so dangerous in kingdoms , the aegyptian laws did so strictly provide against , that there were particular magistrates appointed , unto whom every private man was obliged to give an account every year of all that he had done throughout the year ; which was executed with so much exactness and rigor , that if any one had taken an ill course to live , or not preserv'd his estate , he was severely punish'd for it . the same thing was done at athens , and the romans had censors , who took the like care ; they had it in charge , to make a review of all the people every fisth year , and inform the senate of all that was amiss in the commonwealth . i have often wondred , that there is no such officer in france : and that each ones estate is not precisely known , which 'tis hugely important , it should be ; because in difficult times , when the kingdom perceives it ▪ self involv'd in urgent necessities , succor must be drawn from every one in proportion to his interest in the publick fortune , that is , in proportion to what he possesseth in the kingdom . expence must be made with good husbandry ; and a judicious parcimony observed in it ; that it run not out to a profusion on one hand , nor sink into a sordid avarice on the other : if measure and rule be not kept in the issuing out of money , all the gold of asia will be but a small matter . caligula found the way to consume in his debauches in one year , the immense treasures which his predecessor had been heaping up all along the whole course of his empire . thus it is expedient , that a king do cause the sums to be paid which are charged upon the receipt of his finances ; and also that he give liberally ; but always so order the matter by his prudence , that nothing go out of , or be kept in his hand , but for the preservation and prosperity of his subjects . i said in a former chapter , that there were too many officers in france ; that the wages they draw from the king were unprofitable , nay , prejudicial to the state. since the sale of offices was introduced , divers new creations have been made . all these edicts were meerly to get money in some pressing occurrences ; and nothing but the conjunctures of the time rendred them tolerable . now that those occurrences are over , and the conjunctures pass'd , things must be reduc'd to due order , by suppressing all those new officers . i noted , that wherever magistracy brought gain , disorders would creep in ; the reason of which is very clear , and very natural . for it is infallibly certain , that judges will augment the number of suits , while those suits will bring them in profit . consequently , useless officers being suppress'd , and provision made in the case by a due reduction , sufficient salaries must be allowed them , and they forbidden to take any thing of the plaintiff or defendant , upon the penalties express'd in the ancient statutes . and that the king might make a stock to raise those salaries , without charging his finances , it should be ordained , that such as go to law shall , when they commence their suit , deposite a certain sum into the hands of the clerks : this , to be done in all the royal jurisdictions . as for other judges , they ought to take nothing at all : the proprietary lords must defray the charge of their courts , if they will keep up the power to hold them : they having it of the king upon this condition , from the first grant of the fiefs . in matter of the finances , it is not sufficient to have the secret of getting money , and the skill of duly expending it : but there must be also a right course taken to make reserves of it . the romans had a publick treasury , where every year they laid up certain sums for the necessities of the commonwealth . other nations were no less provident . history tells us of the stores of david , of croesus , of midas , and many others . the king having setled an order in his finances , both as to expences and receipt , it will be very prudently done of him , to limit what he shall think fit to reserve : and this reservation should make the first article in his finances , and be continued until he hath in his coffers , in some secret place , the fourth part at least of all the coin in the kingdom : the rest ( if well us'd ) may be sufficent for all the people to maintain commerce , and pay the king's revenues i say , this reserve should be in a secret place , and known only to persons of approved fidelity . for if many had notice of it , such a store might occasion seditions , and civil wars . now a fourth part of the money being once laid up apart in the king's coffers , some addition to it shall be made continually from year to year , in proportion to what comes in anew . yet liberty must be left to persons , for some time , to have gold and silver plate : yea , it would do well , to augment the use and mode of having it , if it may be ; and that for three reasons . first , because the goldsmiths perceiving hope of gain , will not want inventions and industries to get into france as much mettal as possibly they may , either in ingots , or barrs , or coyned pieces . secondly , because by this means riches will be kept in the kingdom , and when a season for it comes , all they that are owners of such plate , may be commanded to carry it to the mint , and there receive the price of it . the third reason is , because the goldsmiths having wrought up , and made plate , contrary to the direction of the statute , ( which undoubtedly they will do ) a search may be made in the case , if affairs require ; a search highly just , and no less advantageous . two regulations must be made for the goldsmiths , and they enjoyned to observe them , upon pain of forfeiting life and goods ; and so strict an hand held over them , that of all who trangress , not a man be pardoned . the first is , to prohibit their working upon any piece of gold , or silver coyn. the second , that they do not change the form of any prohibited plate : rectifie and mend it they may . at the same time , all persons that have any such and would put it off , must be commanded upon great penalties , to carry it to the mint , where ready money shall be paid them for it , at the currant price ; they making proof that they are the true owners ; and this to avoid thieveries which may have been committed . these two regulations will oblige the goldsmiths to make use of new silver , or foreign coyns , and thus they would cause a very considerable quantity of either to enter into france . the state would receive no small profit by taking a due order in matter of coyn. it should be ordained therefore in the first place ; that no more be made any where but at paris ; and all other mints , and their officers , suppress'd as useless . the romans , who had so much money , had but one place to make it in , which was a temple of juno's at rome . charlemain forbad any money to be made otherwhere than in his palace . and the truth is , should all the money of france pass through paris , the king would much better know what quantity of it was in his kingdom . secondly , the court des monnoyes must be suppress'd , and united to the chamber of accompts , as i have said heretofore . in the third place , the value of brass money must be abated ; this kind of coyn being the ruine of the state. it cannot be believ'd how many liarts and sous the hollanders have brought into france . it would be convenient to set the sous at two liarts a-piece , the liarts at a denier , and the doubles at an obole , ( half a denier : ) but this should be done by little and little , and the fall made by degrees , that the people be not ruin'd : mean time , silver pieces of six blanks , others of a sous in value , and of twelve deniers , are to be stamped . brasiers , and workers in mettal , must be forbidden to melt up any sous , liarts , or doubles ; or otherwise use them in work . for after the reduction , a sous , a liart , and a double , would be worth more in work than in money ; and that quantity of them which is in the kingdom being preserv'd , would suffice for commerce in small wares ; they also being less ▪ worth in money than otherwise , foreigners would bring in no more of them . in the fourth place , 't is fit that a gold-coyn be made of the value of the leuis's ; this coyn to have on the front a sun , the face thereof representing the king , with these words about it , nec pluribus impar , and the year it is made in : on the reverse , a cross charged or cantoned with fleurdelizes ; and the ordinary motto , christvs vincit , regnat & im●e●at . of this coyn there should be half and quarter pieces made , as there are half crowns of gold. this new money should be called suns , and all gold louises made in france , forbidden . as likewise all cravens of or sol , and crowns of the queen . new silver-coyn also should be made ; the pieces called monarques , or dieudonnes , or some other names ; in them the figure of the king crowned after the manner of antiquity , with the title ludovicus xiv . franciae rex : on the reverse , a cross with fleurdelizes , and the ordinary inscription . of these pieces there must be some of twelve deniers , others of two sous , six deniers : others of five sous , of ten sous , of twenty , of forty . and to have matter for them , all loueses of sixty must be forthwith prohibited : because a multitude of false ones go abroad . afterward , the loueses of thirty sous , made any where but at paris , shall be call'd in ; and there must the new coyns be also made . they will be well received by the people ; for that every one hath an extream affection for the king ; and because in france we account by livres , or franks , and have no such money ; the quardecues being no longer current . this new coyning of money is likely to bring a great deal into the kings coffers . gold and silver must be held in france at an higher rate than they bear among strangers ; that we may draw it hither ▪ nothing hath brought us so much gold from spain , italy , and other countries , as the permission sometime grantéd , that light pieces should pass . the same thing should be done awhile , for once again : it would cause all foreigners to come and take off our wines , our linnen , and our corn. i should not forget to say , as i put an end to this chapter , that the masters of accompts , the correctors and auditors , having wages of the king , ought not to take any other salary for any thing they do , that directly refers to his majesties service ; i mean , for the accompts of the treasurers of the reserve , and other accomptable officers : for they are paid for this by their wages : practising in the manner they do , they take , as the saying is , two tolls of one grist . i said , that it was not at all just , that the masters of accounts , auditors , and correctors , take fees for the accounts they examine , forasmuch as they receive wages and privileges from the king : also this custom was anciently practis'd , and this would be to reduce things to the primitive state. i well know , that the pretence of these fees is founded upon the creation of some chamber of accouuts , where those payments are made that never go to the chamber ; but this pretext is frivolous ; for the chambers of accompts in montpellier , and elsewhere , ought not in like mauner to take any money for examining the accounts of the king : so these new chambers take away no money from that at paris , that peradventure takes from them the homages , and the verification of gifts ; but in this the clerks only are the loosers , and the master auditors and correctors are not concern'd . addition . of the fine gross farms . i said but a word by the way of fine gross farms , which is one of the projects to raise money by ; the fine gross farms are let upon the merchandise , and upon the receipt of the kings rights ; to avoid the charge of all these , an agreement might be concluded with all the merchants , to pay every year a certain sum to the king at paris ; and upon their doing this , they should not be molested in their passage on the rivers , or by land , for any toll or custom . chap. xi . 1. of peace and war. of sciences , of arts , of laws , of publick edifices , and shews . 2. of arms , of arsenals , artilleries , of fortified places and governors . 3. of armies , of conquests ; how a conquered country should be preserved . either calm or storm , if perpetual , would alike unfit the sea for navigation . the waves must not rage , and swallow up the vessels they should bear : but there must be wind enough to fill the sails , and give convenient motion ; nay some little tempests are of use to quicken the pilots skill ; whom continual fair weather would entice into a dangerous idleness . just so is it necessary , that there still be , in a great state , especially in nations of the french temper , some moderate agitation , and that the noise of arms produce an effect upon them , like that of the winds upon the sea. peace , by general consent , is that at which all politicians do aim ; nor can it be deny'd to be preferrable to war , being natural , as liberty is . yet war hath its peculiar advantages ; and those to such a degree , that we may account it to be of divine right . to say true , what other right did god give his people against the kings of canaan ? in short , war makes the peace of kingdoms the more firm , as a storm causeth the air to resume a more setled serenity . the prudence of laws therefore should have provided expedients for the preservation of states in each of these seasons : and the wisdom of legislators hath been justly taxed , in that they have not sufficiently thought upon this provision . the poet , upon this ground , gives his vlysses all along , the company of minerva , and disguiseth her a great many ways , that she might not be parted from him . in sum , the mythologists representing this goddess armed , and bearing both the shield and thunder-bolt of jupiter her father , do therein let us know , that the wisdom of a good king ought to serve him both for peace and war. and such was the manner of teaching , in deepest and most remote antiquity : philosophy then but growing up , and bashful , durst not shew her full lustre unto deprav'd and ignorant men , to whom she was yet very much a stranger . she accosted them veiled with the shadows of fable ; and went softly and secretly about the preparing of their reason to receive her illuminations and instructions . but to return to our similitude ; a storm doth not reach to the whole extent of the ocean ; and whatever tumults be in some part of a kingdom , yet the whole doth not so feel the shock of war , but that in others , peace subsists ; so as the glory of arms , and the contentments of a full tranquility , may be had together . nevertheless , since these two different times do require like different cares ; each of which were enough to take up the whole application of an excellent king ; it is expedient to consider them severally . peace is undoubtedly proper for the cultivation of arts and sciences . knowing men there must be in a common-wealth ; it being necessary that there should be good men. for knowledge 't is that enlightens our soul , shews us virtue , and inflames us with desire to possess it . i joyn sciences here and arts ; it being impossible that men should have the one without the other . for as they are images of god , they are mov'd by a natural propension , to produce one thing or other ; so that having acquired general speculative principles , they necessarily descend to practical operations , which are perform'd by particular rules , from whence arts take their rise . this is done during a calm ; then the soul , not interrupted by any violent agitation , enjoys , and by reflections , which by its leisure and repose permit it to make , views its self . 't is in these precious hours that it may come to know the dignity of its original , and be assured of its immortality . at such a time , having and keeping its faculties united , it gathers the fruit of a solid wisdom ; which is unto the soul , as the sun is to the eyes of the body ; and being of all goods the greatest , communicates its self in precepts ; whereof law is the abstract and consummation , giving the same spirit to all the people . to proceed : it is important , that cities be enrich'd with publick buildings , as temples , palaces , and other sumptuous edifices ; because people have , by that means , the more affection for their country . the trojans regretting their defeat , were griev'd more for the ruine of troy , than the subversion of its empire . and the jews in babylon lamented the demolishing of the temple , where they had offered their sacrifices , more than they did the loss of their liberty . this affection of people for their country , is likewise augmented by the contentment they receive in it ; and this maxim was a principal reason why the greeks and romans exhibited to their subjects publick shews . 't is in a time of peace that a prince should prepare his forces for war : yea , he ought to be always in arms , they being the ornament of his royal majesty , and support of the laws . a people not armed does degenerate ; and we see , that nations heretofore eminently redoubtable , are now bankrupt as to valour and reputation . croesus after his defeat , counselled cyrus his conqueror , in recompence for the favour which had been shewed him , to disarm the lydians , and promote among them musick , good cheer , and pleasures : so they would never revolt , nor fail of obeying his command . this counsel of croesus was really good : for by that means the inhabitants of lydia lost their former love for war , and forgat their ancient virtue . yet it is not expedient that arms , which are the kings , ( for he hath the power of the sword ) should be in the hands of all private persons alike : and the difference between a citizen and a gentleman , a soldier and a country-labourer , not be discern'd : arms therefore must be in their hands whom the king intends for that employment : and he being every ones protector , securing all by his authority , all others must be expresly forbidden to bear any , without his permission , upon pretence of hunting , or journey , or enemies : and this upon pain of being fined , and in case of reiterated offence , sent to the gallies . these penalties too must not be meerly comminatory , but as they term it , legal , and of indispensible necessity . not that gentlemen should all be depriv'd of the liberty to wear a sword : on the contrary , 't is fit to be injoyn'd them , that they never neglect to do it ; because it is the mark of their quality , and continually minds them of the virtue of their ancestors . it may be prohibited them to carry fire-arms ; yet 't is convenient to permit them to keep in their houses musquers , fire-locks , pistols , and other arms ; for that they naturally are defenders of the state , and by consequence ought to be furnish'd for any occasion that may be offered . for the same reason 't is meet that gentlemen be enjoyn'd to keep their stables stor'd with good horses , to breed up and manage a number of them for their service in war. but to this end , the use of german horses for the coach , must be forbidden , and none of them suffered to come into france : but mares only for breed . lawyers , ecclesiasticks , citizens , merchants , artificers , husbandmen , should never wear a sword , because 't is not their profession ; and i would as much approve a gentleman's fancying to wear a lawyers gown , or a priests cassock . but that no such person do abuse this honourable mark , it must be ordained as a fundamental law of honour , that whoever strikes with a sword , a man , who , ( not being of such profession ) has none , shall be declared actually fallen from all honour , and as a very plebeian , yea villain , ( to use the old word ) deprav'd from all gentility , and reduc'd to the rank of a labourer . since arms are the kings , as i said , it is expedient that there be magazines in divers parts of the kingdom : they , committed to the custody of safe hands , and persons of unquestionable fidelity : in them a store of all sorts of arms offensive and defensive ; ready fix'd , to arm 40000 men. there should be equipage for horses , boots , spurrs ; one of these magazines should be plac'd at paris , to cover picardy , champagne and normandy . one at lion , for any occasion that might happen on the side of the mediterranean of italy , of swisserland , or the franche comte . one at tholouse , or some other city of languedoc , for all that might be apprehended from spain , or the sea of guyenne . and one at anger 's , to secure the coasts of bretagne , and poictou . there need be beside these , two arsenals for the sea ; which i shall speak of in their place . it will be necessary to have in the magazines a good number of cannon for battery , and of field-pieces ready mounted with powder , ball , and equipage for the horses of the train . the king should have , for the security of his state , several fortified places in his kingdom . 't is an ill piece of policy to neglect them ; and good heed had need be taken , that he that may chance to win a battel , and become master of the field , do not at the same time become master of the cities also . it is known what revolutions england hath suffer'd by it . and on the contrary , flanders clearly shews what a countrey thick set with fortresses is . yet excess being every where vicious-i would observe a mediocrity here . but , above all , there must be left no fortifications in towns or castles , which belong to particular lords : except the king places in them other governors than the proprietors . these kind of places embolden persons of quality that possess them , to declare themselves , and make parties in a time of civil war : what pass'd at tailebourg in the last troubles , is an example fully authorizing what i have propos'd . i will say more of strong places and garisons in the chapter of the education of children . it is not sufficient to have such strong places , and them well furnished with garisons and brave soldiers ; unless there be given them captains fit to command them , and to be their governors . in each place then there must be four sorts of officers . the governor , the king's lieutenant , the governor's lieutenant , and the major . these all having their commissions from his majesty , it is expedient , that , as far as is possible , their bearing office be limited to a certain time ; to the end , that the continuing of 'em longer may be in nature of a recompence for their services . and they thus attending with the greater diligence to their duty ; i should also wish , that being continued in employment , they should change place . as for example , that a person who hath been the king's lieutenant three years at dunkirk , should go serve as lieutenant-governor at peronne , or elsewhere . not that such a change were fit to pass upon all the officers of a place at the same time . but let their commissions last three years , and every year one be changed , that they may serve together one year only . it is meet to , after the manner of the turks , that their commissions expired , they be kept a year without employment , to see whether there be any complaint against them . these alterations would work two effects equally advantagious to the king's service . the first is , that every one would stick to his duty . the second , that the king always having such kind of employments to give , there would be more persons to hope for them ; which would much more strongly engage them to well-doing . the same usage should be introduc'd , if it be possible , in reference to governors , the king's lieutenants . there is a concluding observation to be made ; namely , that it being the custom for governors to have some companies of carabines , which they call their guards ; they give them cassocks of their own livery . i would have this order changed ; and that the king should every year send each governor a troop of horse to serve about him for a guard ; they having the king's cassocks as a badge of their commission ; and their officers carrying the staff in presence of their governor during their year of service . this would be a means to augment the authority of the king , and not diminish that of the governors . as to armies , it cannot be precisely said of what number of men they should consist ; nor whether they ought to be strongest in horse or in foot. this wholly depends upon the enterprizes that are made , upon the quality of the country , and nature of the enemy . i should advise , that a great king do keep troops on foot , even during peace , nothing is so necessary to a state as old soldiers . augustus , after his victories , did not cashier the forty roman legions ; which prov'd to be the safety of the empire . constantine , on the contrary , disbanded them ; and thence came , in the issue , the dissolution of the power of the romans augustus however , and the other caesars , committed a great fault in keeping the pretorians in a body , for the grandeur of their persons ; and history tells us what lamentable changes they made in the succession of the emperors . the turks have fallen into like disasters by following the like usage . i should therefore judge it expedient to divide the troops into several quarters , and keep them in far distant garisons . the ancient kings of aegypt had a great many soldiers perpetually in pay , and were always apprehensive of their instructions : but found a way to secure themselves from all such seditions of their armies . dividing them into bodies , according to the diversity of nations , they gave them different ensigns ; as for instance , to some a crocodile ; to others a dog ; to a third sort a cat ; and so the rest . now the aegyptians being hugely superstitious , they were easily induced to believe , that their tutelary deities were included in the figure of those beasts which were given them for ensigns ; and that they had the same antipathies among them in heaven , which those beasts that represented them , had to one another upon earth . thus under a veil of religion , those people were possess'd with an aversion for each other , like those animals which they had been ordered to carry in their banners ; yet all were close united , and perfectly at accord for the common defence of the state : so nothing could be executed against the intentions of the prince ; because as soon as any should begin to stir , the rest would immediately have opposed them . upon this example the king might divide all his troops by provinces ; and though there should be no engaging of religion in the case , yet much advantage would , without fail , be drawn from thence . for the nations would strive to out-vie one another , with more zeal and ardor than the regiments now do . these regiments themselves might have names given them from the arms of their provinces ; as that of the bretons might be called the regiment of the ermine ; that of the normans the regiment of the leopards , &c. jutius caesar raised a new legion among the gauls , and gave it the name of the lark . but what i say in this particular , is but the giving my opinion . for i am not of the mind , that the order of the militia should be changed , or regiments disbanded , which consist of the best and most war-like troops that are in the world. 't is ordinarily a great question ; of what soldiers an army should be composed . we have subjects and forreigners . the subjects are gentlemen and plebeians . the plebeians are citizens and rusticks . on the other hand , of forreigners , some are the auxiliary troops of allies , which serve at the cost of their own princes : as when the king sent succors into germany , and unto the hollanders : others are troops that serve at the cost of the state which employs them . the ancients termed them mercinaries . such at this time are the suissers , and not a few germans . all these different sorts of soldiers may be used , as necessity and the conjuncture of affairs requires . the romans did so . it is true , by their treaties of alliance they always obliged their allies to send them a certain number of soldiers ; but these were not incorporated with their legions ; and it is clear , that subjects are ever best ; of subjects , gentlemen have ordinarily more courage than others . of plebeians , those of the country are to be preferred before the inhabitants of cities ; because peasants are more accustomed to labour and hardship than townsmen are . auxiliary troops serve but for a time ; and often , when some continuation of service is demanded of them , they impose hard conditions . mercenaries will have money , and care not if a state be ruin'd , so themselves are paid . in fine , strangers may on the suddain change interests and party ; so of friends becoming enemies ; and that in occasions of greatest importance . mercenaries above all , do serve without affection , and seldom stand it out in fight unto the utmost . they push on a victory indeed , but scarce ever win a battel . in short , strangers should be as little made use of as possible : and scarce for any other cause , but that enemies might be deprived of their aid . when strangers only are taken into service , the subjects grow less war-like , and the most considerable of them despise war , as is done in spain ; and extreamly ill done . the carthaginians were ruined principally by the fault they committed in employing numidian troops and other strangers ; and not sending out their own citizens in their armies . i will not here speak of the art of war ; 't is a matter that deserves a chapter apart . yet i will say cursorily , that the rules of it change as time and seasons do . we neither attack places nor defend them , in the very manner that the ancients did . there is also a great deal of difference between their way of fighting and ours ; so that they had not the arms which we now use . all of precept for the leading of an army , that faileth not nor changeth , is , that discipline be exercised ; wherein commanders should never be remiss . the only school of war , is war it self : and twenty years experience will better make a great captain than an hundred years reading . not but that we have examples of general command given to persons , who never were in armies afore . there are elevated spirits , to whom nothing is impossible ; but the instances are rare ; and 't is too too hazardous a course to rely upon them . for a captain must have , not only spirit and courage , but also credit with his soldiers ; which cannot be gotten but by service . in fine , it is necessary for a great state to keep war on foot , and men of quality must be employed in it : to the end there may always be a stock of good soldiers , and a breed of generals . these two things give a nation marvellous advantages and esteem among foreigners . though france now be a most powerful monarchy , by means of its extent , of its scituation , the fruitfulness of the soil , the number of its inhabitants ; and though greatest states have not always most strength , as biggest men are not always stoutest ; yet were it to be wish'd , that the king did add unto his kingdom , first all the low countrys to the rhyne . this conquest would re-settle him in possession of the ancient demain of his predecessors , giving france gain its primitive limits . it would make him master of the northern seas , and by consequence , arbitrator between the crowns of sweden and denmark , poland , &c. conquest must be aspired to out of a thirst of empire , being an unjust thing , ( if we believe aristotle : for i would not determine , but that the right of war were a very lawful right , consonant to what i have said in the beginning of this chapter ; ) but the desire of conquest should principally be for the doing of good to all men ; which is the end why god gave them laws . the more subjects and power a just prince hath , the better will it be for the world. secondly , it were convenient that the king had strasbourg , to keep all germany quiet . in the third place , he need have the franche county , to lay a restraint upon the suisses , least dividing themselves between the empire and france , or serving spain in a war there , they strengthen his enemies . in the fourth place , milan is necessary in respect of italy , to give the lesser sovereigns and republiques protection , and ballance the power which the king of spain hath usurp'd there . in the fifth place , genoa and all its territory , pertains to the king : nor would the genoese have revolted , had it not been for the bad counsel given to francis the first , to discontent doria. genoa would make the king master of the mediteranean sea ; beside , those two acquisitions would keep the duke of savoy lock'd up within french territories : so he would never depart from the king's service , being entirely his dependant . we must re-enter the isle of elba , and into portolongone , and piombino , on the continent , to drive the spaniards out of italy . here our nearness would keep the duke of florence , the dukes of parma , of modena , and of mantua , and even the state of the pope , in a submission for france . corsica would not stand out after the reduction of genoa ; and then sardinia would be no difficult conquest . this would strongly favour any stirs on the account of liberty or discontent that might be raised in the kingdoms of sicily and naples : nor would it be an hard matter to raise them in time . on the coast of bayonne there would be need of fuentaravia ; and those parts of the kingdom of navarr which the spaniards have in possession , might be justly re-demanded . the king might also carry his arms into catalonia : we have ancient pretensions there ; and the conquests of it would be no less easily atchieved than it was in the time of the last war. majorca and minorca would follow without trouble . thus the king would be absolute umpire of the mediterranean , and of all the fortune of the spaniards . if it should happen one day that the queen , or her descendants , should have an hereditary right there , the king would be in a condition to do himself reason in these matters . the means of making these conquests severally , cannot be shewed without particular discourses . mean time , what i have said is not , in truth , to be done in a day : it would be an enterprise of many years . yet there is nothing of meer fancy it it . i propose no conquest to be made but what hath really been made , except that of the isles of the mediterranean , which our kings never minded ; for that before charles the eighth they never were in case to strengthen themselves at sea. bretagnie was separted from the kingdom , the wars of italy took up every reign unto henry the second . then follow'd the affairs of religion , which put a stop to all the designs that might have been formed in this behalf . here one thing i suggested in the precedent chapter , is to be remembred ; namely , that conquests do afford a state one expedient to get money . in this the roman captains are to be imitated ; who made it a point of glory to lay up extraordinary sums in the publick treasury ; and their triumphs were as illustrious by the wealth they brought home with them , as by the enemies they had defeated in their expeditions . it would be very material therefore , that generals should account it a glory to them , to bring the spoils of their enemies unto the profit of the king and kingdom ; or at least make the conquered countrys maintain and pay their armies . but the difficulty is not to make conquests ; the arms of the french will be victorious wherever they appear . all the trouble is to find out the secret how to keep what hath been gotten . it is fit to say something on this particular . the means to preserve conquer'd countrys which the ancients used , and that with good success , are in a manner these . transportations , and shiftings of the people . as when the chaldeans led away the jews to babylon . the taking away of their money , of their richest goods , their antiquities , their holy things and things of religion ; as was done with the ancient idol-gods , and as the ark of the covenant , the tables of moses , and the israelites holy writings , were dealt withall . the same for substance might be done among us , by shifting of saints reliques and consecrated images . the leading away of the ablest men , and such as have greatest credit with the people . so did the romans when they carried some of the greeks out of their country to rome , and treated them there with all possible kindness and civility . in like manner as to artificers : the turks drew at one time 30000 work-men out of persia . the romans , out of their enemies whom they had vanquish'd and taken in war , reserved those whom they thought stoutest , and made them fight on the theatre , the people being spectators , destroying them by that means . christianity suffers not such inhumanity . slavery was alway practis'd in the case of prisoners of war , and the ransom we make them pay , is an image of that old custom . some people to this day stay their prisoners , or send them away to punishment , after the fashion of the ancients . to proceed , other means in reference to conquer'd countrys are , the mixing of the old and new subjects by marriage , the conquerors accommodating themselves to the manners of the conquered , taking up their modes , eating with them , as alexander demeaned himself towards the persians . then again , the ruining the fortifications of their towns ; the taking hostages of them : the taking away their arms , and keeping them weak ; the abstaining from their wives ; the giving them no jealousie in matter of love. to have little converse with them , especially in their houses ; and when any is , to see it be with seriousness and decency ; to honour them ; to do them a pleasure on occasion ; not play with them ; not pick any quarrel with them : not touch their liberty , nor the goods that have been left them : not disquiet them for matters of religion . to do them justice , maintain them in their laws and customs , and in their manner of government , as the romans did ; who permitted the people whom they had subdued , to have their accustomed laws to be diffedent of them , and shew a confiderde in them . to appear not desirous of their secrets : not interrupt them in their pleasures : make them pay the tribute agreed upon with them exactly , not at all augmenting it . to keep word with them in all things , seldom meddle in their affairs , except it be to accord them : to lend them no money ; but owe them some , and punctually pay the interests of it : not let them know the true state of affairs ; not give them entrance into strong holds ; which must always be well furnish'd with men and provisions ▪ that the governor never come among them without being strongest , or having hostages . to prevent their assembling , and hinder as much as may be their having commerce with neighbours that are under another prince's dominion : to keep off all kind strangers from houses , and severely punish such of 'em as shall cause the least trouble , or any motion that may tend to sedition . if our conquerors had practis'd in this manner , italy and sicily would have been french to this day . chap. xii . of the sea , and its usefulness . 2. means to augment the kings power there . 3. of commerce . 4. of colonies . the water of the sea are wholly obnoxious to the humorousness of fortune ; and the wind that governs them turneth and changeth with as much inconstancy as that blind goddess . yet it is certain , that those states whose renown is greatest in story , did not establish their supreme dominion , but upon the power they attained to at sea : as if virtue , stout and undaunted , had resolv'd to combat and conquer her enemy in the very seat of her empire . the romans are one instance , ( whose example is ever to be follow'd with as peculiar a diligence , as their conduct of matters was with singular wisdom , and hard to be imitated : ) they imposed not upon the world their laws , till they had forced the seas to receive and acknowledge them . had they not set out war-like fleets , they had never accomplished their glorious designs ; they had never extended their frontier beyond italy ; never brought down the pride of carthage ; nor triumphed over all the crowns on earth . the aegyptians , the persians , and the grecians , considered the sea as the principal support of their domination . xerxes having caus'd the h●li●spout to be to punish'd ( as he termed it ) with stripes , accounted his vanity satisfy'd in the sight of all asia , which he drew after him into greece , with so much magnificence and pomp , that it seemed as if jupiter himself was come down from heaven . the venetians still renew every year their alliance with this element , by an old fond superstitious custom , casting into the sea a ring , as if they espoused it : perhaps by this use they would inform all the particular subjects of their common wealth , that they should be content with the inconstancy and infidelity of their women , since the state of espousing the sea , espouseth inconstancy and infidelity it self . the riches of tunis , of algier , of holland , and england , plainly prove the necessity there is for princes to be strong at sea , and do shew the profit which does thence accrue . these are petty states , yet dare measure their forces with those of the greatest monarchs . the former of them are turkish slaves , the others revolted burghers ; and how insolent soever the english are , they must confess , that all the brittish isles laid together , do not equal the half of our continent , either in extent , or in fruitfulness of ground , or for commodiousness of scituation , or in number of men ; in wealth , in valour , industry , and understanding ; yet they fear not to affirm themselves sovereigns of the sea. had they cast up the wracks they have suffered , and the battles they have lost ; had they well examin'd our ports and havens : in fine , had they compar'd the coasts of france with those of england , they would condemn their vanity , as canutus , one of their ancient kings , did . 't is true , all states are not disposed unto navigation : either because they are too far up in midland countries , or because the temper of the people suits not with it ; or because they want subjects : but 't is so far , that any of these obstacles should hinder the french from addicting themselves unto it ; that on the contrary , all things conspire to raise desire of it in them ; and to give them hope of advantageous success . the work however is such as must be leisurably carried on , and perfected by little and little ; so great a design continually allarming europe , asia , africa , and america , friends and foes . a precipitation of it would be its ruine . i say not what number of vessels would be fit for france to put to sea. but i affirm that the king may keep an hundred gallies , and an hundred ships on the mediterranean ; and a fleet of two hundred sail upon the ocean . the more vessels he shall have , the more enabled he will be to recover the expence made about ' em . as to the building of such numbers six or ten years of time may be allotted for it : and there is timber in france , there is cordage , there are sails ; there is iron and brass ; there are victuals and workmen ; so that the king's subjects will gain the money which is laid out in ' em . is it not far better for the king of france to build ships for the employing and enriching of his subjects , than it was for the kings of aegypt to build their useless pyramids ? there need be no anxious enquiry whence a stock should rise for this advance ; every year will bring in money ; and the vessels once made , and their guns mounted , it will not cost the king a quardecu for other equippings . 't will be but to give the captains places in the ships and gallies , on condition to fit them out ; and there will more persons come to take them , than there will be offices and places to be bestowed . 't is true , fleets being out , there will need vast sums to maintain them : but the sea will yield a maintenance for the sea , either by commerce or by war. neither will it be always proper to keep so many vessels in service . on the other hand , it will not be necessary to have so many troops at land as are at present . for spain or italy will not dare to disfurnish themselves of their men ; so there will be no need of a land-army but towards germany . the number of rowers will be made up by bringing men from canada , and the american islands : or by buying negroes at cape verde : or by sending all malefactors to the gallies . and when things have taken their course , seamen will be had ; time , and the profit that will accrue , will afford store , and bring them in from all parts of the world. hereupon the corsairs of algiers , tunis and tripoli ; will not be able to keep at sea ; and the french being continually on their coasts , they will be constrain'd to tarry at home for the guarding of their towns : so not in a condition to send out troops for collecting the tribute which they exact of the arabs , and princes who lye further up in africa ; the tributaries will , without fail , revolt : and the king may in the sequel , treat with them for their recovering their liberty , and take them into his protection , there is no cause to fear the power of the ottoman port in this particular . for beside that the turks are no good seamen , the grand signior doth make no such account of the pyrats of algier , as that their fortune is considerable to him. the friendship of the french is more necessary for him , both in point of commerce , and in reference to other interests . the fleets which the king might keep upon the ocean , would make him master of all the powers and trade of the north. yea , though the english and hollanders should unite against france , they could not avoid their ruin in the end . for how should the one and the other make good their commerce , which is all they have to trust to , if they were forced to maintain great armada's to continue it ? the point of bretannie is the gate to enter into , and go out of the channel . fifty ships of war at brest would keep this gate fast shut ; and they should not open it but by the king's command . spain and portugal would not be able to attempt any thing but by his permission , if there were kept a fleet on the coast of guyenne . thus there would need no war almost to be made for all these things ; nor his majesties forces hazarded . it would be sufficient to give his order to forreiners . nor will it be difficult to cut them out work in their own countries , and by this means stay their arms at home , and make them spend their strength there . i shall something of this in its place hereafter . there is one further excellent means to strengthen the king at sea : and it is the taking order that no more of his subjects go to malta . to do this , there must be given in fee to the french knights of st. john of jerusalem , some isle in the mediterranean , as for instance , the isle du levant , for which they should pay an acknowledgment to the king , as they do for malta to the king of spain . there might be given them too on the same condition , an isle in the ocean , as besle-isle , l'isle-dieu , or the isle of ree : so that the french knights fighting not but against the enemies of their country , they would make war upon the english as upon turks ; and keep the islands at their own charge , whereas the king is fain to keep great garisons , and be at vast expence to do it . there is no cause to fear that they will ever give the king any trouble : for being french , they cannot fail of affection or obedience : and their kindred , together with the wealth they have in france , will be perpetual hostages to the king , and caution for their fidelity . this project is just : for of ten parts of the knights of malta , no less than eight do come from the commanderies of france ; and it is easie to be put in execution ; for there need be only a stopping the income of the commanderies to effect it . the order in general will find its advantages in it ; both in that there will be an addition made it of two considerable islands : and that the king will receive the knights into a more particular protection than he hath done hitherto . the number of commanderies may also be augmented , by giving them some maladeries , ( or hospitals for the diseased ) which are always usurped by people that have no right to them at all . be it observed in the last place , that it is very requisite the office of admiral , and powers of the admiralty , should be united to the crown . it hath been an ill policy in france , and a diminution of the king's authority , to communicate unto a subject so much of his soveraignty at sea as hath been done . he must resume it to himself , and be every way supreme alone : then he may appoint a select number , whose charge may be to give him advice of the state of maritime concerns ; and hold a council from time to time upon them in his majesties presence , if he please to assist . these officers shall in this council judge of prizes , and other sea-affairs ; and when its necessary , be commission'd , some of them , to visit the ships , and make report , or send their acts in writing concerning them . other officers for the marine shall be military : they , to execute the king's orders , and have the conduct of designs and enterprizes in the usual manner . it is important to the king's service , that the captains of ships and gallies , be honoured with dignities and rewards . there may be created mareschals of france for armies at sea : as there are for those at land , with the same honours and prerogatives . the romans decreed a triumph for captains who had been victorious at sea , and called it a naval triumph . they gave also naval crowns , as well as mural and civical . these honours would eminently promote the king's intention as to the marine . there must be two arsenals erected : one in provence , in some town upon the rhosen , for what relates to naval expeditions on the mediterranean : another upon the river loire , for all occasions on the ocean . by means of these two rivers , it will be easie to bring out to sea all the vessels that are builded : and all necessary provisions and tackling whatever . nor need it be feared that any enemy should get up these rivers : they too may be shut up by bridges , or by chains , or by forts . his majesties power thus strongly setled on each sea , it will be easie to secure commerce in france , and even draw the merchants thither from all parts . i say secure commerce : for till all this be done , it will ever be uncertain and dangerous . now 't is unnecessary to expatiate here , in proving what profit commerce brings in to most potent states ; the thing is generally known , and all men convinc'd of it . again , i know not why it hath been said , that trading is contrary to virtue ; except it be , for that merchants are incessantly busied in studying inventions to get money , and be in a sort , servants to the publick . the romans , the thebans , and the spartans admitted not any citizen of theirs unto the administration of affairs , unless he had for ten whole years sorborn merchandizing : because they would not have their principal magistrates accustomed to gain , and expert in the means to do it . these kind of inclinations being blameable in persons , who being destined to great employments , ought to be above all considerations of private interest . commerce in every common-wealth ought to take its measure from the temper of the people , from their strength , their wealth , the fertility of their grounds , and the situation of their country . therefore order must be taken , that things traded in be useful , and in a manner , necessary . for it is a rule in oeconomie , that a man spend not his money in what is pleasing , though he needs it , but only in what is absolutely necessary . but necessity is stated by the birth , the dignity , and the estate of persons ; as for example , noble furniture is necessary for a great lord ; not so , for every meaner gentleman : and thus in othes cases , proportionably still to the rank and fortune of men. it must be studiously prevented , that commerce introduce not into a state , superfluity , excess and luxury ; which are often followed with ambition , avarice , and a dangerous corruption of manners . and forasmuch as it is not sufficient to commerce , that there be people to sell , but merchants must be had to buy , otherwise no wares can go off ; in which all the advantage of trade doth consist : it is meet , that traders furnish themselve , with necessaries , rather than with things that meerly tend to ease , or magnificence . among necessaries , those make up the first rank , which do sustain life it self ; the second is of them that are for convenience ; others are also necessary to preservation from diseases , the injuries of time and violence of enemies , as medicinals , dwelling , arms. there is every where a twofold commerce , which is visible in france , more than in any other part of the world. the first is for things ordinarily found in the country , some of which are spent by the inhabitants themselves , and others transported . the second , for foreign merchandises . we have in france , wines , corn , linnen and salt , in so great a quantity , that we send them into the neighbor kingdoms ; and the quality of them is so excellent , that strangers cannot forbear to come and carry them out of our ports . we have cattle , skins , wooll , tallow , oils , and other things necessary for man , of which foreiners export very little , but our selves do in a manner spend them all : and this is the great wealthiness of france , that we have enough to serve our turn without foreign merchandises ; but forreigners cannot do well without ours . we receive from other countries , minerals , pearls , precious stones , silks , spices , and what seems to be matter of luxury . order should be given , that in france , the commodities we have be made use of , before any foreign merchandises be employed : because this order followed would bring in the people money , and take off their commodities ; which would incline every one to fall to the work of his calling , and the whole kingdom be thereby hugely benefited . it hath been a question offer'd to debate , whether traffique in france should be managed by the subjects , or by forreigners ? many reasons might be produced in the case , upon each hand : but to make a short decision ; 't is evident , that foreigners must be allowed to gain by our merchandises , if we would have them take them off . for if we carry them home into their ports , we shall make less sales , and be at greater cost , than if they came to fetch them . yet that our merchants may share in the profit , they may enter into partnership with them , or be their commissioners here , or freight them themselves , provided , they sell at somewhat cheaper rates , and so be content with moderate gain ; or take in payment , and exchange , the foreign commodities . by means of commerce , as well as by war , there may be french colonies planted abroad , and so the dominion of the king extended , even to far distant countries . all the nations of the earth are intermix'd , and may be termed colonies , some of one people , some of another : of as many as are known , few can be affirmed to be originally of the places they inhabit . but to plant colonies out of danger , they must be seated in as much nearness still as is possible : for if they be separated at too great a distance , it will be difficult to relieve them : and perhaps they may revolt , or some one or other make himself master of them ; and so the state will be in danger to lose its subjects . secondly , it is necessary , that colonies be placed in such countrys as are able to maintain the families , that are design'd to make them up : otherwise provisions , and money it self , must be carried to them , which would cause loss and damage to the common wealths that send ' em . in the third place , the country should bear things that may yield profit to the state , which erects the colony . fourthly , the scituation should be such , as the state may have succour , and forces from them , both for war , and for commerce . in the fifth place , the country should not be so fertile , and so much profit to be there made , that the ancient subjects should be drawn thither , and the state drein'd of people , as hath happen'd to spain , by means of the west-indies . in fine , for prevention of the inconveniences , i have mention'd , means must be used to have always hostages from those of the colonies , that they may be kept in their duty , and in the greater adherence to the interest of the state. chap. xiii . 1. of the education of children . 2. at what age it is expedient to marry them . nature gives us the first fundamental dispositions for arts , and all sorts of prosessions ; and we feel a certain propension leading us to one kind of life , rather than another . some say , this impression comes from the power of the stars , which by secret , influences from our temper ; others affirm , that we derive our inclinations from our ancestors . however it be , 't is certain , we have movings , the principles whereof are in our selves ; we bring them into the world with us , and cannot quit them : 't is true , rules may be applied to them , and they corrected , when faulty , but to change the quality of them , is impossible this regulation , or amendment , is effected by discipline ; which can only give an after perfection to the works of nature , keeping to her foregoing draughts , and designs , and compleating what she hath begun . a principal point then , in reference to children , is to know their genius , that they may not be put out of their natural order , but employ'd in things to which they are originally bent . the philosophers , to make known the difference of capacities , have told us , that as for souls , some are of gold , others of silver , other of iron ; and that as a good essayor must not mistake himself , in distinguishing these three metals ; so a good politician should not fail , in the judgment he makes , of the children that are in the state : it 's a piece of his profession to discern , what each of them will be proper for , that the intentions of nature may be sortify'd , and polished by precepts . there are no common-wealths , but have in them priests , judges , counsellors of state , soldiers , sea men , merchants , artificers , husbandmen ; children must be educated for these different professions , and timely enabled to discharge them . 't is fit , that in the case of the younger sort , three ages be distinguished . the first , from their birth , to the end of the seventh year . the second , from that seventh year to the fourteenth . the third , from fourteen unto one and twenty . childrens first five years should be spent in their nursing up ; and they not disquieted with any higher documents . 't is good , to put them upon some gentle exercise , as they are growing , and cause them to endure cold ; they will have the more vigour , by that means . there are some nations , that plunge their children into running water , and give them slight clothing in the midst of winter : so the ancient gauls are noted-to have done . the bodies of children must be plyed to the acting of all kind of postures , and motions ; this will get them a facility and dexterousness for any thing . after the age of five years , unto seven , 't is convenient to tell them stories , that may raise in them a desire to do well in that profession to which they shall be destinated . from seven years , unto fourteen , those that are intended to be given to the church , or to the affairs of justice , or those of the state , should learn latin , and greek , because in those languages , they have the source of all the doctrine they will be obliged to profess : as likewise after fourteen , unto one and twenty , they shall be taught rhetorique , philosophy , theology , law , or politicks : which must be continued also , after that age in the usual manner . it is very necessary that seminaries for priests be erected in every diocess , and our lords the bishops ought to take all possible care in it . the young persons , that are intended for the wars , may be taught italian , spanish , and high dutch : they that are design'd for trade , should know somewhat in those three languages : but such as are thought on for commerce , in further distant countrys , ought to learn the arabic , or the sclavonian ▪ or some other of the general tongues that are current in asia , or in africa , as the latin is in europe . there must be publick professors for these languages , as there are for latin , and masters places endowed at the publick charge . after fourteen or sixteen years of age , the youths should be dispos'd of unto places , where they may learn the art of traffick . as for those that are destin'd to the wars , whether gentlemen , or plebeians , they should be sent at fifteen or sixteen years unto garisons , and the skill of serving on horseback or on foot , there taught them ; and they exercised once a weak constantly ; which would most conveniently be done on sundays and holy-days . they shall be taught to handle the pike and the musket , the use of the sword , the halbard , partisan , broad-sword , and other arms ; they shall be put to run , and leap , and wrestle . the lacedemonians ordinarily exercis'd their young people ; which was very providently done of them . for strength and expertness is not attained but by long and daily exercise . in the garisons shall be taught fortification , the mathematicks , dancing , vaulting , ridiug ; and it would do well , to take away academies and masters of exercise , from places not garison'd , that the garisons may be the academies , as i may term them , where these things are learnt . yea , to the end , that all sorts of persons might betake themselves to the garisons , it should be ordained , that no private masters shall take any apprentices , but in garison'd places ; and that no one keep a shop , or exercise any trade , in any city of the kingdom , without a testimonial from the governor , that he hath serv'd his apprentiship in a garison town : as we see , that no physicians , or advocates , are admitted to practise , but such as have studied in some university . order must be given , that masters cause their lacquies to learn a trade , and that for this , they give them , after four years service , 200 livres , and a suit of cloaths : or if they serve less time , a sum proportionable after that rate . nor must it be suffered , that lacquies have wages given them as is done ; because they are ill husbands , and lay up nothing . their reward-money must be put in a publick purse , or into some merchant's hands , who will be responsible for it . the share of lacquies that die , will serve for other youths that shall be chosen . this would prove an excellent means , for the having of soldiers : for the apprentices would serve in their turn , on military occasions : they would go upon the guard , &c. nor would this take them off from perfecting their skill in the calling they had chosen . it would too , be profitable , that poor soldiers have skill in one handicraft or other , and be made to work at it , whenever they are not on the guard ; by this means , they would avoid idling , and get money for a subsistance . the parishes both in town , and country , might be obliged to set forth and maintain each of them a soldier or two in garison , giving also a sum for their being taught a trade at the same time . there would be parishes able to maintain a man and half , others half a man , the rest in proportion to the number of communicants in each of them . so the king would have 50000 men well-nigh in garison , and a nursery of soldiers , without its costing him a quardecu ; for none must have pay , but old soldiers : it s by taking this course , that the turks raise their janizaries , and they become their best men , and most warlike . when the young men have been a while in garison , that is , two or three years , they shall be sent to the army , if there be war on foot : and all recruits shall be rais'd out of the garisons : by this means they will be rais'd without any expence at all : for instance , if there need a recruit of 4000 men , each of the governors shall be ordered to send , one an hundred , another two hundred : and the men being drawn out of the garisons , new supplies shall be put in , taken out of the parishes , which sent the former . thus the armies would be alway compos'd of none , but expert soldiers ; which is a matter of exceeding great consequence . i will not prescribe , in what towns , or in how many places , it is fit to settle garisons ; because this depends on the kings will and pleasure : and towns , to be chosen for this purpose , need not be nominated ; the most commodious , and best scituated are known . as to those that should be destin'd for sea-service , they might be taken out of the same garisons ; and should be taught principally navigation : but it would be better , to breed them up in the ships themselves , that they might be accustomed to the sea. it is fit that they should understand all the practise of mariners ; and also be handicrafts men , as well as soldiers : it would be very good , that some of the number were carpenters , or at least each of them somewhat skilled in use of the axe and adice . if soldiers both at sea and on land were artificers , their captains , or others might cause them to work . they should be paid for what they made , and the person that employed them might fell their work , either in gross or by retail : as garments , shooes , cloth , hatts , gloves ; and this would prove hugely beneficial ; all the soldiers would find content in it , & hardly one of them fall into debauch . when the youngsters have been some time in garison , and are not needed for recruits , they should be sent home with their discharge and certificate . hereupon they may set up the trade they have learned , or addict themselves to husbandry , as they should think most commodious for them . the country youth , not chosen by the king's commissioners for the garisons , should abide in their parishes , to learn the art of husbandry , and be exercised in it . a like course , as is to be taken with young men , should also be taken with young women . there must be school-mistresses in every city , publickly pay'd , who may teach them all kind of works : the maids giving them too , something for a reward . it would do well to use means , that women , and even those of highest rank , might count it a shame to be unskilfull : work would notably fix their thoughts , and busy them to excellent good purpose . of women i had not yet spoken ; nor will i say , of them , ought more : herein i shall imitate lycurgus , and besides him aristotle ; who both conceiv'd it not possible , to give them any rules , and that their temper was so imperious , that they could not endure to be restrained by law : this is more to be excused in french women than in others : 't is their due to be mistresses ; since they may glory , upon better title than the lacedemonian dames , that they give birth to men , who are capable of rendring themselves , by their valour , conquerors of all the earth it seems to me a fault , that maids should be suffer'd to marry at twelve , and males at fourteen , at which ages the too too indulgent laws have fixed the puberty of the sexes . for , as to nature , it is not possible but persons of those years only must extremely prejudice their health by marriage , and spend their strength before they have attain'd it . 't is the making of young trees bear fruit before the time : the children are without doubt the less vigorous for it . how can the parents give them , what they as yet have not themselves ? again , morality and the laws are concerned in the case : the truth is , when a girl is put so young into the possession of a husband , she hath the less of bashfulness and modesty ; nor is virtue so well secured for her . besides , at this age , neither man nor woman is of understanding to know their duty : and hence it comes , that the marriages of persons so young are ordinarily attended with no very sure felicity and success . finally , how can the one or the other , take care of the affairs of an house , being altogether unexperienced ? or duly govern their children , needing government themselves , and having not , by allowance of the laws , power to dispose of any thing ? so that it must be ordained , they shall not be capable of making a valid contract of marriage till they have attained , females , the age of eighteen years compleat , and males of twenty . chap. xiv . 1. how france should act with forreign princes , and first with the king of spain , and king of portugal . 2. with the pope , with venice , with the princes of italy . 3. with the swisses , with england . 4. with the emperor and princes of germany . 5. with the hollanders , the crowns of denmark , sweden and poland . 6. with the turks , and king of persia . 7. with the kings of the coast of barbary , and the king of morocco . 8. with all remote princes ; as the emperor of the negroes , prestor john , the great mogul . the other kings of the indies , of china , and of tartary . having treated in the precedent ceapters , of things internal to the state : i think it reasonable to speak of externals and what course is to be taken in them . for to promote the happiness of people , and govern them discreetly , 't is not enough , that you regulate their lives , and their comportment at home , but their ease and well-being must be secur'd against strangers abroad , and principally against their neighbors . now interest being the prime motive unto all states , we ought to consider other nations , either in quality of friends , or in that of enemies ; ever accounting of them , according to the advantage we may receive from them , or the damage they may do us . as they on their part take no thought of us , but in proportion to what they fear , or to what they hope for from our arms. besides , to treat safely with forreigners , it is necessary that we know their designs , their strength , their alliances , their temper , and their country . forasmuch then as spain shareth with us , at this time , the concerns of all europe ; and there is not a power in christendom , but hath alliance with the one or the other of these two crowns , it is meet we examine in the first place , what measures we are to observe with the spaniards . the council of spain proceeds with a great deal of slowness ; but always with a great deal of evenness : and since the house of austria put it in their head to get the dominion over all europe : the said council hath continually steered the same course . the end which these states-men have propos'd to themselves , has been tyrannical and unjust ; and the means they have made use of to attain it , bad , destrustive , and ill-adjusted , which the declining of their affairs doth evidently demonstrate . our enemies are always allies of theirs , either covertly , or openly and declared ; just in like manner , as they who chuse the king's protection , and to be interessed with france , will be enemies of spain . the emperor is leagu'd with the catholick king by consanguinity , and moreover , by reasons of state. for we are cause of fear to the empire on the north , and towards germany , as we are to spain on the south , and towards italy . of all the other princes , the duke of bavaria , seems fastest knit to the house of austria ; and the pope would , perhaps , be of the party , did not his dignity , of being the common father of christians , withhold him ; and if he , as a temporal prince , did not also apprehend some irruption on our part . spain is a country yielding little increase ; either for that the ground is barren ; or because the inhabitants neglect to cultivate it . the discovery of the west-indies , and the expulsion of the moors have dispeopled it . flanders , and the places in italy are a charge to spain , in time of war : and what is rais'd there doth scarce suffice to maintain the armies and garisons . their government is hard , and ill to be endured ; because they are inflexibly severe ; and the monks , ( whose depravation is there at the highest pitch ) and inquisitors , do under pretext of religion , exercise incredible grievances . the spaniards are valiant for their persons : but men of quality despise the military profession , as heretofore the carthaginians did : and the name of soldier is , in a manner , ignominious with them . they are idlers , and prefer pleasure , and a gallantry , before any thing , be it ever so important , or of greatest consequence . the king of spain hath little money , and much expense to defray . the vanity of the viceroys and governors of his places , doth spend him above measure . the spaniards are presumptuous , haughty , and provided there be honour done them , you may treat advantageously with them . charles v. had reason to say , that the spaniards seem to be wise ; but are not . their forces are not at all to be feared ; we ruin'd them in the late war ; and the affairs of portugal have hindred their recovering them . the minority of their king , the discontent of don john , and the pretensions of some lords upon the particular kingdoms , which compose the spanish monarchy , augment its weakness . sicily might easily make insurrection . the neapolitans upon a pretext of liberty , such a darling in italy , would set up for themselves , if they had succors ; and perhaps a new pope would favour our designs there , if he were made to see , that it would be no impossibility for him to make some person of his family king of naples , or joyn that kingdom to the state of the church , of which he is possess'd already . if ever the spaniards be attacked , it must be done with force , and all at once , in flanders , in italy , in spain it self , on the sea , and on the coast of portugal . this is the best method for the french. such a general effort would produce two effects . the first is , that the spanish partisans would be astonish'd , having no forces ready to make resistance . the second , that all their enemies would resume vigor , and might set on foot again their pretensions against them . if a through conquest be intended , we must not do as was done in the last war : must not make it our business to take all their fortifi'd places , one after another , or to keep them when taken . but this is a matter fit to be discours'd of by it self . as for portugal , it 's a state , yet under age , and not throughly setled : to us , a perpetual instrument for weakning the spaniard . france hath nothing to fear on that side . it would do well , to convey covertly some troops , or sums into the country : and above all , give secretly great hopes unto the french , that are in service there , if they made any important enterprises upon spain , which would divert their forces . it would , i say , do very well to order some soldiers thither , and 't were to be wish'd , there were so many french in portugal , that the partisans might not dare to make a peace with spain , for fear of having those same french for enemies . the queen of portugal , who is french , both by birth , and by affection , may bear up this interest ; and she may be told , that there is a necessity of it on her part , and that her fortune depends upon it . it must be accounted on in all treating with the spaniards , that they are every whit as foolish as they seem to be . the pope , the venetians , and all the princes of italy , are of one and the same temper . the italians are wise and circumspect : nor should we , but very seldom , enter into negotiation with them . to reduce them to our intentions , we must work by down-right force , they are weak , and ( as i have said ) wise : they are people for pleasure ; their country is the beautifullest , and best in the world ; consequently they love it , and know their interest ; they are able to foresee , and fear the ill that may betide them . the pope will ever consider france , by reason of the county of avignon , of the consequences of the concordat of 1618. and because of the jansenists . the venetians are weakned by their war with the turk ; the dukes of mantua , of modena , and of florence , and the genoese can do nothing that 's considerable . the duke of savoy must never separate from france . we have the entrance into his estates : and a war with us , but of 3 months , would utterly ruin him : he may be induc'd to hope , that he shall be reinstated in the principality of geneva . if war be made in italy , the italians must not have time given them to look about them . as they are the wisest , so when inur'd to war , they are the bravest upon earth . in one word , they are the masters of the universe . the swisses are mercenaries , who will alway serve the king for his money . as for matter of the english , they have not any friends : themselves be a sort of people without faith , without religion , without honesty , without any justice at all , of the greatest levity that can be , cruel , impatient , gluttonous , proud , audacious , covetous , fit for handy strokes , and a sudden execution ; but unable to carry on a war with judgment . their country is good enough for sustenance of life , but not rich enough to afford them means for issuing forth and making any conquest : accordingly , they never conquered any thing but ireland , whose inhabitants are weak , and ill soldiers . on the contrary , the romans conquer'd them ; then the danes , and the normans ; in such a manner too , that their present kings are the heirs of a conqueror . they hate one another , and are in continual division , either about religion , or about the government . a war of france for three or four years upon them , would totally ruin them . so , it seems reasonable that we should make no peace with them , but upon conditions of greatest advantage for us ; unless the king think meet to defer the execution of this project to another time ; or that his majesty , press'd with the love he hath for his own people , do incline to prefer their ease , before so fair hopes . one had need be a monarch , to know what it is to love subjects ; as be a father , to know how children are loved . in fine , if we had a mind to ruin the english , we need but oblige them to keep an army on foot : and there is no fear that they should make any invasion upon france ; that would be their undoubted ruin , if they be not call'd in by some rebels . now if they have an army , they will infallibly make war upon one another , and so ruin themselves . you must put them upon making great expences ; and for this end , raise a jealousie in them for the isles of jersey and guernsey , of wight and man , for the cinque-ports , and ireland : and by that means , oblige them to keep strong garisons in all those places : this will create a belief in the people that the king formeth great projects against their pretended liberty ; and while he is in arms , his subjects will hate him. they must be wrought to distrusts of one another , by writing letters in cypher to some particular persons , and causing them to be intercepted . for ( being suspicious and imprudent ) they will soon be perswaded , that the letters were seriously written . some forces should be landed in ireland , and in other parts . the irish may be induced to revolt , as having a mortal hatred for the english . the scots also will not neglect to set themselves at liberty . factions must be rais'd , and the sects favoured against one another ; especially the catholicks , among whom , the benedictine monks in particular , should be secretly promis'd , on the king of england's behalf ( wherein it will be easie to deceive them ) that they shall be restored to all the estates , which they once possessed in the island , according to the monasticon there printed . upon this , the monks will move heaven and earth , and the catholicks declare themselves . the rumor , which hath already gone abroad , that the king of england is a catholick , must be fortifi'd , and so all will fall into utter confusion , and the english monarchy be in case to be divided . on the other hand , our league with the hollanders should be renew'd , and they put into a belief , that we will give them all the trade still : because they have a through knowledge of it , and are proper for it ; whereas the french have no inclination that way , and nature cannot be forced . they must be told , that now they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs , and ruining their competitors in the sovereignty of the northen seas . beside these particulars , if the king give belle-isle , or l'isle dieu , or the isle of ree , to the knights of malta , as i have said before , these knights will make irreconcilable war upon the english , redemand the commanderies of their order , and by their courses , and piracies , oblige them to keep great fleets at sea ; which will ruine them , by ruining the profit of their trade . mean time , the king shall increase his strength at sea ; and then finding his enemies weakned , consummate their depression , and subversion . it is not difficult , to make defence against any enterprises of the emperor ; for he cannot make war upon france , though he would : such a war would be too costly for him ; and and to make any progress in it , he must needs bring into the field excessive great armies . but if he armed him so potently , the princes of germany would grow jealous of him , and make levies to oppose him , and to hinder his passage through their territories : beside , his hereditary countrys would be disfurnish'd of men , and so expos'd to the inroads of the turks : so that there is no cause to apprehend any thing on the part of the emperor . on the contrary , he hath intentions to give the king content ; because he may receive great succors from him , in wars with the turk , as happen'd of late years . the princes of germany , whether catholicks or protestants , have an equal interest to keep themselves in the king's protection : for the reasons i noted afore in the chapter of the huguenots ; so that they will always oppose the emperors growing greater , on the side of france : as it may be , they would oppose the designs of the king ; if he should carry his arms too far up into germany . 't is the interest of lesser states , that the kings their neighbours be equal in power , that the one may maintain them against the others . to conclude : the king hath no allies , whom he should so highly esteem , as the germans ; there is not a braver nation , a nation more open , more honest . their original is also ours ; they have no vices ; are just and faithfull : there is among them an inexhaustible seminary of good soldiers : their generosity put alexander the great into admiration for 'em ; and wrought affection and confidence in 'em , in the first caesars ; who by committin● their persons to the virtue of these people entrusted them with the quiet of the universe . the hollanders will never attempt any thing against france ; but keep themselves in our alliance , as much as possibly they may . they are rich , and interessed as merchants commonly are . if the king had relinquish'd them , the●… state would have sunk . ( which yet by the rules of policy , cannot last long ; democracie● being subject to changes . ) it would be expedient , that the king do interpose in their affairs and some division be raised among them . we can hope for little from their armies ; and they would always be a charge , and expence to us . the king of denmark is a prince , whose state is but of small extent ; his whole strength consists in the king's protection , who upholds him against the suedes his enemies . sueden will never break off from the interest of france . it 's a country unfertile except in soldiers ; but there being little money in sueden , and they far of , they can of themselves make no considerable war : they are feared and hated in germany . so , we ought to consider them , as instruments , which for our money , we may make use of , to avenge our quarrels , either against the emperor , or the german princes ; or to divert the english and the holland forces , when his majesty makes any enterprise which pleaseth them not . poland and muscovy are of almost no use to 〈…〉 , except it be to serve us in stopping the en●erprises of the emperour . furs may be had ●om them ; and cloth , and silk-stuffs sent ●hem . the friendship of the turks is good for ●rance , to be made use of on occasion against ●he emperor ; and that of the king of persia , to ●e made use of against the turks . the one and ●he other may favour our commerce . there must be no reliance upon the promises of the kings of tripoly , tunis , and algier ; they ●re pirates , that take a pride in breaking their words , and have no faith at all . whenever ●ccasion serves , war must be made upon them , ●nd they attacqued home to their own doors in ●heir harbours , but with considerable forces ▪ they may be ruin'd in time , by hindring their courses at sea , and by causing the tributary princes to rise against them by land : as i have observed asore . upon this , the king , as the carthaginians did , might employ the numidian troops , so much magnified by the ancients . the emperor of fez and morocco is a potent prince , who 's alliance may be useful to the king against the spaniards , and for commerce . he is a mahometan ; and i would not have too much trust put in his oaths . in fine , when occasions for it are offered , we must not fail to compliment the african kings , as the emperors of the negros , and of the abyssins , then the great mogol , and the other kings of the indies , of china , of tartary and japan ▪ letting them know by presents , the virtue , the greatness and magnificence of the king. the conclusion . such are the political maxims , by which i have judged , that the subjects of this ( french ) monarchy might attain to the possession of a true , and stable felicity ; and so , the heroick labours of the king be crowned with immortal glory , and france enjoy in all its parts the highly beneficial virtue of its incomparable monarch . finis . reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the clergy . london , printed for thomas basset , at the george , in fleetstreet , 1691. to monsieur p. h. marquess of c. sir , i took so great satisfaction in the reading of those your reflections upon the roman clergy , that i have thought i could not better employ my time , than illustrating them with a large comment ; and though sometimes i improvs upon your judgement , and make bold to push on somewhat farther than you are pleased to go , yet shall you not find that i have gloss'd upon your discourse , as some monks have done on the bible , for i have faithfully confirm'd your opinion by the history of our france , and by the wise sayings of the best authors . and if by their help i let you see that your maxims carry you to much higher enterprises than your counsels aim at , this is not to contradict , but to assist you , and per adventure to say for rou ; what you would have been content to have said your self . after having thus fought under your banners , the interest of my party , which in your fifth chapter you are so hard upon , obliges me to engage in their defence . and i know you are too generous , sir , to take this ill . but i bestow not above a third part of this discourse on that subject , that you may clearly perceive i have more than double the pleasure in following your steps , than i find in opposing you . to return then to my chief design , which is , to espouse your quarrel , and take your part against the vsurpations of rome , i will shew you what more remains to be said on that occasion , there is a pretty book called an examination of the powers of cardinal chigi , then when he came in the quality of leg at to his majesty . a book furnish'd with invincible reasons , and a profound knowledge of antiquity , especially for what concerns our france . and from thence i acknowledge to have received some of the authorities that i alledge . as in those two chapters , where you speak against two contrary parties , you consider not religion otherwise than as it affects the policy of france , i likewise have confin'd my self within the same bounds , and have not examin'd this , or the other religion , and the professors , farther than the state has or may have damage or benefit by them in temporals . i shall throughout this discourse forbear to say what i now only mention at parting , viz. that the interest of god ought to be dearer to us than that of the state ; and that these two interests accord so well , that where truth and piety reign , peace , justice , and the state can never fail to flourish . god of his goodness grant such happy times to france , this is the prayer of your most humble , and most obedient servant , de l'ormegeigny . reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the clergy . france is much oblig'd to my lord the marquess of c. for having mark'd the many vsurpations of the court of rome , upon the rights of our kings . he has wisely observ'd , that the churchmen have attempted , on several occasions , to render themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction . that their obstinacy has proceeded so far , that making advantage of trouble some times , they have forced our kings to declare in their favour upon very unjust conditions , and to yield to them the rights of mortmain and indemnity for the lands they possess . whereby the state is so much the weaker as they grow in strength , and that the conceipt of these priviledges is so full in their heads , that to this day they can hardly acknowledge the king's sovereignty . that the multitude of monks is an abuse of so sensible , that the king can dissemble it no longer , and that 't is high time seriously and effectually to apply some remedy . that their blind subjection and dependance on the pope's will , makes a foreign monarchy even in the very bosom of france . and that they seduce the silly credulous people , which is a matter of pernicious consequence . that this policy is founded on the abusive and destructive maxims of rome , which are meerly politick . that those particular vows of obedience to the pope , and the name of religion in this case , is only a bugg and vain pretence laid hold on by the court of rome , for promoting their temporal power , and making their creatures in every corner . that the shiftings of the monks , and their rambles from one end of france to the other , serve only to debauch them with an universal acquaintance . all these observations are true and judicious . but the fear that my lord marquess shews of offending the court of rome , or at least , the complement he had made , that it is the glory of a king to honour the holy see , hinders him from sounding the bottom of the evil , and from presenting the necessary remedy . for it may be said of the wholsome rules that he prescribes for reducing the clergy to their duty , and for preventing of fraud in matters of benefices , that this comes to no more , than the paring a man's nails when his skull is broken , and ought to be trepann'd . the great honour , and the great interest of the king indeed , would be to think of a way , how he may roundly shake off this infamous and tyrannical yoke of the roman court , which my lord marquess calls the holy see. and deliver himself from this buzzard superstition which rides even our very statesmen , viz. that there can be no religion catholick , but in submitting to the spiritual jurisdiction of the holy. see. is it because the pope is the vicar of jesus christ , his majesty has a number of bishops within his realm , who , if they understand , and do their duty , are the vicars of jesus christ ? so that we need not travail over the alps to seek one . instead then of providing a french secretary of conscience , who may make a bank in the court of rome , by which means we might know what money passes from france to italy , which is the advice of mouns . the marquess , he should rather break the bank in france , and give order that no more money pass out of france into italy ; for this bank is a continual pump which draws away the fairest cash of france , which fattens a stranger with our kingdoms treasure , which carries much away , but returns nothing . i know all these tributes and respects are paid to the pope , because he is suppos'd to be the head of the church ; and his flatterers tell us , that the church can no more subsist without the pope than the body without the head. but that great chancellor of the university of paris , john gerson was not of this opinion , for he writ a book expresly de auferribilitate papa ab ecclesia . that is to say , to prove that this same head might very well be quite taken away , and the church yet be never the worse , nor take any harm . the cardinals have sometimes continued more than two years before they could agree about their choice of a pope . during all which time the body of the church was without a head. the churches of france and germany did not at all feel the want of it , and matters went still on there as they were wont . which puts me in mind of the man of wood , that being mounted on horse-back , and coming under a tree , a bough struck off his head to the ground , yet the heart of oak kept the saddle , and trotted on with the company nothing dismaid , for that the head was not essential to the rest of the body . it is too soft an expression to call the pope an unprofitable head of the church , he is absolutely pernicious to it . i pass by the spirituals , suiting my self herein with the humour of mouns . the marquess , who considers the catholick religion little farther than as it makes for the interest of france . but what greater mischief can the pope do to the church , than to render the power of the church suspected to sovereign princes , as a pure politick device to invade their rights , grind their subjects , and form even an empire within their empire . the marquess endeavours with great reason to make the king jealous of the popes temporal monarchy over his subjects . he might with as good reason have mov'd him to be jealous of that spiritual monarchy , which is in effect purely temporal . for he has well observ'd , that the name of religion is a false pretence us'd by the court of rome to advance his temporal power . and that the popes having begun with letters of recommendation to the chapters , to have an eye on such an ones mirit to be chosen bishop . have after in process of time turn'd these letters recommendatory to bulls and decrres to dispose of the bishopricks of france at their pleasure ; which is a tyranical invasion of the rights of the king , and of those of the church . glaber , who liv'd in the times of hugh capet , relates lib. 3. cap. 4. how pope john sent a cardinal into france to found and consecrate a monastery within the diocess of tours ; and that the prelates of france and hugh archbishop of tours opposed him , and said roundly , that the bishop of rome having a diocess to himself , ought not to meddle with the affairs of another diocess , nor send his commands to their bishops , who are his fellow bishops and colleagues . the doctors of the sorbon in their rescriptum publish'd at the time of the appeal , concerning the abuse about the breviary of anjou , by the bishop of e●gers , and his injunction to the church of the trinity , to use that of rheims , amongst other propositions declare , that the other bishops have the power of government and ordination within their diocess , as fully as the bishop of rome has within his . therefore in the time of st. cyprian , and even in st. angustin's days , the popes did write ad coepiscopos galliae & collegas . now collegue imports equality of power . and if the bishops of rome have not any power over the bishops of france , they can much less pretend to any over our kings . pope leo vi. promised lotharius , dist . 10. c. 9. can . 10. to obey his edicts both at present and for the future . pope pelagius to the like effect to childebert , the holy scriptures , ( says he ) command us to obey kings , and to be subject to them . the popes were always humble subjects of the roman emperors so long as that empire continued . and 't is but the other day that they got free from the emperors of germany ▪ onuphrius de varia creatione pontif l. 4. testifies , that even then when they were look'd upon as the successors of st. peter , their authority reached no farther , but only to maintain and defend the truth of the doctrines of faith. and for the rest were wholly subject to the emperors , who ordered all things according to their wills , and were wont to create the popes . it is a notable observation the marquess has made , that the tables were put into the hands of moses , and not into the hands of aaron , and that it is the part of secular princes , that the people be instructed in the laws of god. he was entrusted with the first table as well as with the second , to teach us that the care of the service of god belongs as much to the authority of the prince , as that of justice and civil government . those expressions of the marquess , that secular princes are the protectors of the church , of its doctrine , and of its canons , are intended by him in a more liberal and ingenious sense , than they meant , from whom he takes them ▪ for they are the ordinary terms of those who make the king subject to the pope , and who own not the king for the sovereign of the church , but only for its protector , and to execute the commands of his holiness , and for that his canons be observed . this is the stile of my lord bishop of montauban . peter bertier in his remonstrance made to the king in the city of rheims , june 8th , 1654. where after he had term'd his sovereign power a true resemblance of the deity , he sinks it again not only below the pope , but even below the bishops , who are the kings subjects , saying , that the bishops are the head to govern , and the mouth of the church to speak , but that the king is its arm , and its right hand to execute its decrees and ordinances . this scholar of the jesuits speaks like his masters ; for all the jesuits harp on the same string , which becanus in pref. ad reg. jac. kings are only to execute the popes commands . what is the duty of kings ( says he ) in relation to the church and to religion ? i will tell you in one word ; they ought to guard and defendit , not as lords but as servants , not as judges but as executioners . and why , i pray , has not the king the same sovereignty in france , that the emperor constantine , and the emperor charlemaigne enjoy'd ? under whom the canons of the synods were none other than counsel and advice , till these emperors had examin'd and authoriz'd them . did not these sovereigns altogether call and dissolve those synods of bishops at pleasure ? and wherefore shall our kings be rob'd of that power ? our great king who surpasses all his predecessors in glory and magnanimity , shall he suffer a stranger bishop to snatch from his crown this essential right , of governing the church of his kingdom , and he of a king become a serjeant to put in execution the commands of that bishop , and those of the bishops his subjects . the world is well chang'd since pope adrian in his letters , inserted in the second council of nice , express'd himself to the emperor constantine to this effect , we beseech your clemency with ardour of spirit , and as though we were present , we cast our selves at your knees , and lie at your feet , i with my brethren . then it was that popes kissed the feet of emperors , whereas now emperors kiss the popes toe . in the year 679. the pope agathon pray'd the emperor constantine to discharge the tribute which the bishops of rome pay'd ordinarily to the emperor for their conservation . very far from compelling the emperors , the day of their conservation , to lay a sum of money at the popes feet for tribute , as a token of subjection , which afterwards the emperors of germany have been oblig'd to do . gregory the first gave a good example for our popes at this day , how they should demean themselves towards the emperor , for he speaks thus to the emperor , l. 3. ep. 6. i am the unworthy servant of your pity . and in the same epistle , whilst i speak thus before my masters , what am i other than dust and a worm . and l. 2. ep. 61. i am subject to your commands . i might bring many examples how anciently the christian emperors , and the kings of italy created and depos'd the popes , commanding them , and deposing them at their pleasure . not to go farther than our france , there we may see what power our kings of the first line exercis'd in the government of the church . the history of gregory of tours may furnish us with many examples , l. 4. c. 5. king glotharius speaks thus to the inhabitants of tours , have not i commanded that the priest cato be made a bishop ? why are my commands slighted ? and chap. 18. pascentius is made bishop of paris , ex jussu regis chariberti , by the command of king heribert . the same king being provok'd , because emerius had been turn'd out of the bishoprick of xaintes , caused him to be beaten , who came to signifie to him that deposition , and made him be drawn upon a cart loaden with thorns , into banishment , and restor'd emerius to his place from whence he had been cast out , l. 6. c. 27. felix bishop of xaintes being deceas'd , nonnichius consobrinus rege ordinante successit . his cousin nonnichius succeeded him by the king's order , c. 39. king guntram created sulpitius bishop of bourges , rejecting the presents offered him for promoting another , and saying , it is not our custom to sell the priesthood for the price of money , l. 8. c. 22. are these words , then the king commanded that gundegesil be made a bishop , which was done accordingly . and c. 39. evantius bishop of vienna died , and in his place was substituted vitus a priest , the king chusing him . in all these passages we find no mention of the pope , nor of annates , nor of letters of investiture . for in those days the bishops of rome meddl'd not at all with the election of the bishops of france . above all is memorable the francique synod , to be found in the third tome of the councils of the edition of cologne , pag. 39. where carloman , who stiles himself duke and prince of the french , thus speaks , by the advice of my priests , and of the chief of the realm , we have appointed bishops for the towns , and have set over them boniface archbishop . pope adrian the first , by a council , made this law to pass , that charlemain should have the right and power to choose the pope , and to govern the roman see. which constitution is inserted in the roman decretal . the council of mayence held under charlemain , an . 813. dist . 63. can. hadrians , begins thus , to charles august , rector of the true religion , and defendor of the holy church of god ▪ and the second council of mayence , under lewis the debonnaire , to lewis the most soveraign rector of the true religion . at this day these titles would be counted wicked . now for all that charlemain and lewis the debonnaire have advanc'd the pope out of measure , yet his authority , even in spirituals , was no better than precarious , and suject to those kings that were emperors . for proof of this , hincmar relates l. 55. c. 20. that the emperor charlemain did convoke a general synod in france , whereby the worshipping of images was condemn'd ; and the second council of nice which defended them , was rejected as a false synod , thô the pope had approv'd it . and thô at this synod , convoked by charlemain , the authority of the pope was admitted . for the history of those times teaches us , that charlemain , who had advanced the pope , made use of the authority given him , to his own advantage , even against the pope himself , when he had a mind . insomuch that he was not content to make the popes opinion be condemn'd in this synod assembled ( pro forma at least ) by order of the pope ; but he sent to the pope a book , which he writ against the second council of nice , and against images , which we have still to this day . after that charlemain had rais'd the pope , in giving him a good share of the country , which he had taken from the lombards , the popes began to be puft up extreamly , and by little and little made themselves formidable , taking upon them the figure of judges and correctors of the actions of princes throughout christendom , by excommunications , interdictions , and finally , by the deposition of their crowns . now 't is very remarkable , that whereas , by their imaginary arms they have laid at their feet the emperors of germany and and the kings of england , and brought their estates into a miserable confusion , yet had they never the like success against france , they never have been able to depose our kings ▪ never could prevail to have any interdict receiv'd in their kingdoms , which so often as they attempted , they were mock'd , their officers beaten , and their partisans ruin'd . but alas , the submission which henry the great made to the pope ( the only instance that we can be reproacht withal ) is a cooling cast in our way . under lewis the debonnaire was held at paris a council against images , that is to say , against the pope who maintain'd them . of which council we have all the acts entire . and in the beginning of his reign claudius bishop of turin broke down all the images he could find within his diocess , and listed himself against the bishop of rome , who stood for their adoration , and writ a book against images , and the pope durst not be angry , because this bishop was supported by the authority of lewis . great troubles being stirr'd in france , gregory the fourth confederates with the sons of this lewis , too debonnaire , who had engag'd in a wicked conspiracy against their own father . sigebert about an . 832. testifies , that pope gregory came into france , and took part against the emperor with his sons . and the annals written at the same time , bochel . decret ▪ eccl. gall. l. 2. tit . 16. and the continuer of aimoinus , a religious of st. benet , writes , that the resolution of the french bishops was , that they would by no means yield to his will , and that if he came to excommunicate them , they would excommunicate him again . after this , pope nicholas the first excommunicated king lotharius , ( for in those days deposing was not talkt on ) to make him leave waldrade , and take again thetherge his former wife . whereupon , the articles drawn up by the french , and which may be seen in hinemar archbishop of bheims import , that the bishops hold that as the king ought not to be excommunicated by his bishops , so can he not be judged by other bishops : because he ought to be subject to the empire of god alone , who alone could establish him in his kingdom . then also , the clergy of france writ to the pope letters full of hard words , related by aventin in his annals of bavaria , insomuch as to call him thief , wolf , and tyrant . the popes growing in insolence , adrian ii. took upon him to command king charles the bald to leave the kingdom of lotharius entirely to his son lewis . the same hincmar , a man of great authority in his time , writ several letters to him , containing many remonstrances on this occasion , and amongst ▪ other matters , informs him , that the church-men and the seculars of the realm assembled at rheims , have said , and say by way of reproach , that never was such a command sent from that see to any of our predecessors . he adds , that bishops and secular lords us'd threatnings against the pope , which he dares not repeat . and for the king's part , see how little he valued the pope's commands ; amongst the epistles of the said hincmar , are to be found the letters of charles the bald to pope adrian , wherein , after having charg'd him with pride and usurpation , he adds , what pit of hell has vomited out this preposterous law ? what infernal gulf has disgorg'd it from the black and dismal dungeons , quite contrary to the way that is set before us by the holy scripture . and he forbids the pope to send any more such commands to him or to his bishops , unless he would be content to meet with contempt and dishonor . pope vrban excommunicated philip the first , and set his kingdom under an interdict . innocent the third did as much to philip the august . but nether of their thunderbolts had any effect , and were only receiv'd with mockery . which agrees with the relation of mat. paris , that after the pope had declar'd to philip the august by the cardinal d'anagnia , that he would set his land under an interdict , unless he would reconcile himself with the king of england ; the king answered , that he was not at all afraid of his sentence , seeing that it was not founded upon any just cause : adding moreover , that it belong'd not to the church of rome , to pronounce sentence against the king of france , the which du tillet , clerk of the parliament , tells us , was done by the advice of his barons . but what was ever more memorable in history than the truly royal courage of philip the fair an . 1302 ? boniface viii . that monster of pride , was irritated against him , because he held prisoner the bishop of pamiers , who had spoken defamatory words against him : and moreover , for that he assum'd to himself the collation of benefices . the pope then commands him to release the bishop , and writ him the following letter . fear god , and keep his commandments : we will that thou take notice , that thou art subject to us in spirituals and temporals ; that no collation of benefices and prebends belongs to thee ; that if thou hast the keeping of any that are vacant , thou reserve the profits for the successors ; if thou goest about to make any such collations , we decree them void , and so far as in fact they are executed , we revoke . those who shall believe otherwise , we shall count hereticks . a legate came to paris with these fine letters , which were torn from him by the king's people , and thrown into the fire by the count of artois . the answer of philip to the pope was this : philip , by the grace of god , king of the french , to boniface , that calls himself sovereign pontifex , wisheth little health , or rather none at all . may thy great sottishness know , that in temporals we are subject unto none , that the collation of churches and prebends belongs to us by our right of royalty ; and also to take to our selves the profits during the vacancies . that the collations made by us , and to be made , shall be strong and good , and that by vertue thereof we will defend those in possession courageously . those who believe otherwise we count fools and mad-men , the pope thus provok'd , excommunicates the king , but no body durst publish the excommunication , nor be the bearer of it . nevertheless the king assembles at paris , his knights , barons , and prelates , and demanded of them , of whom they held their fiefs , and their church-temporalties . they answered , that they hold them of the king , and not of the pope , whom they accus'd of heresie , murder , and of other crimes . in the mean while , the pope made it his business to stir up germany and the low countrys against france . but the king sent into italy , william de nogaret , who , assisted with the advice of sciarra a polander , took the pope at anagnia , and having mounted him upon an hurdle , carried him prisoner to rome , where he died of grief and anger . observe , that this pope who thundered against kings , had so little power at rome , and so little love of the people , that not a roman stirr'd a foot to deliver the bishop of rome , so rudely treated even in rome it self . for all this the king had immediately from the successors of boniface rare bulls , for abolishing the memory of all these transactions ; as may be seen in the extravaganta meruit of clement v. where this king is prais'd as a religious prince , who had deserv'd well of the holy see. for the popes are of the nature of spaniards , who will lick their masters feet when they have soundly bang'd them . in the year 1408. pope benedict xiii . angry because charles vi. had express'd the exactions and pilferings of the popes court , which drain'd france , sends into france a bull of excommunication against the king and his princes . the university of paris order'd , that these bulls be torn in pieces , and that the pope benedict , whom they call'd peter de luna , be declar'd heretick and schismatick , and disturber of the peace . and these bulls were torn by the sentence of the court , june 16. 1408. and ten days after , the court being risen , at eleven a clock in the morning , two bullbearers , who had brought this excommunication , made their honourable amends upon the stairs of the palace , and after were carried back to the lovre in the same manner they had been brought ( being drawn on two sledges , adorn'd with coats of painted canvas , and miters of paper on their heads ) with the sound of trumpets , and the publick laughter . so little did they care for the popes thunder . and what would they have done , if these bulls had brought the sentence of deposition against the king ? charles de moulin in his treatise against the perites dates , relates a pretty sentence of the court against the pope under charles vi. from the same vigor of the french , to defend the dignity of the crown of their kings , are risen these customs which have been observ'd many ages , that a legate of the pope is not receiv'd in france , nor any rescript , nor command of the pope , without the kings leave , and without that the legate communicate his powers to the kings procurator-general , and that they be view'd and verified in the court of parliament , who modifie and and restrain them to masters that do not derogate from the rights of the king , the liberties of the church , nor the ordinances royal. against which ancient form cardinal balui being come into france an . 1484. and there acting as a legate without the kings permission , the court , at the request of the procurator-general , decreed a commission for an information to be brought against him by two counsellors of the court , and did forbid him to use farther any faculty or legantine power , on pain of being declared rebel . an. 1510. the gallican-church being assembled at tours , it was concluded , that the king lewis xii . might with a good conscience dispise the abusive bulls and unjust censures of pope julius ii. and might by arms oppose his usurpations , though the pope should go on to excommunicate , or to depose him . which is more , by a council held at pisa , he declar'd himself fallen from the papacy , and caus'd money to be coin'd with this inscription around it . perdam nomen babylonis . there is some reason to believe he would have made good his word , had he been 30 years younger . and we hope that god has reserv'd this glory for another lewis in our days , who with the vigour of a flourishing youth , has the prudence of an old cato ; as also the courage and fortune of an alexander . when lewis xii . and his adherents were depos'd , john d'albert , king of navarre , was entangl'd with the same misfortune , whose kingdom by this pope julius ii. was given to ferdinand king of arragon . and this is all the right the spaniard has to that our great kings hereditary kingdom . in the year 1561. on friday 12th of december , master john tanquerel , a batchelor of divinity , was condemn'd by a sentence of the court to make confession publickly , that he had indiscreetly and rashly held this proposition ; that the pope is vicar of christ , having power spiritual and secular , and that he may deprive of their dignities the princes that rebel against his commands . and notwithstanding that tanquerel protested , that he had propos'd this doctrin aliter tantum & non juridice ; that is to say , not for affirming it as true , but as a subject for dispute in the schools , was he compell'd to make this acknowledgment . during the wars of the league an . 1591. were sent from rome bulls monitory of pope gregory xiv . by the which king henry the great was declar'd uncapable of the crown of france , as an heretick , and a relapser ; and his kingdom was exposed to prey . whereupon the court of parliament assembled at tours , made this decree . the court having regard to the conclusions of the kings procurator-general , have declared , and do declare the bulls monitory given at rome the first of march 1591. null , abusive , damnable , full of impiety , and impostures , contrary to the holy decretals , rights , franchises , and liberties of the gallican-church . do order that the copies sealed with the seal of marsilius landrianus , under-seal'd septilius lamprius , be torn by the executioner of high-justice , and burnt in a fire which shall be kindled for this occasion , before the great gate of the palace , &c. which was executed august 5th of the same year . i verily believe that many good freuch men read not these examples with pleasure , and reckon it no glory that the pope has never set his foot on the neck of a king of france , as pope alexander the third did to the emperor frederick , nor kick'd off his crown with his foot , as celestine ii. to the emperor henry vi. nor brought our kings to yield homage to the pope for their kingdom , as other kings have done , and do to this day . without doubt they will laugh at the just punishment which boniface viii . had for his insolence from the officers of the generous king philip the fair , and to see how after this treatment the popes successors of boniface , did compliment him with a many commendations , and apostolick benedictions . without doubt also these good french-men are well satisfied with the pragmatick sanctions whereby our kings have repress'd the exactions of the court of rome , and have appropriated the collation of a number of benefices ; and think we are well helpt up in that the king , the magistrates , and the sorbonne will own no other superior to the king but god , for what concerns temporals . but i pray to what end is all this briskness in our kings , in our parliaments , and in the sorbon against the usurpations of the pope in temporals , but to yield him the spirituals , and to confirm his pretensions even in temporals ? grant him the spiritual power , and he will be master of the temporal without contradiction , and he shall bring under his jurisdiction all secular causes under the colour of a sacrament , of an oath , of charitable uses , or of matters of conscience . the concords of our kings with rome , and their pragmatick sanctions about the collations of benefices , what have they come to ? is not this to come in for a share with the robbers , who had seiz'd the royalties , and by solemn articles to make them a title , which they had no pretence to before their invasions ? and what other do our kings , in acknowledging the spiritual power of the pope , but own themselves his subjects in temporals ? for the one hooks in the other of necessity . the experience of six ages has prov'd this truth . 't is the voluntary subjection of emperors and kings to the spiritual power of the pope , that has given him the liberty to excommunicate them , for this belongs to the spiritual jurisdiction . and the very same jurisdiction has authoris'd him to exempt their subjects from the oath of fidelity , for the keeping of an oath is a duty of religion : so that if the pope be obey'd by a discontented and factious people , you see an emperor or king is depos'd by the spiritual jurisdiction : and the pope may spare the other power that he pretends to over the temporalties of kings , seeing that his spiritual power all alone is sufficient to ruine the poor prince . and if that the christian princes , that are of his communion , own him for the vicar of jesus christ ; let the kings understand it in what sense they please , he will make them know , when-ever their weakness shall give him an opportunity , that he takes himself for the vicar of the secular power of jesus christ , as well as of the spiritual : and that to him , as to christ whom he represents , all power is given in heaven and on earth . this is what the last council of lateran attributes to him , and applies to him that prophesie of psalm 72. particular to jesus christ . all kings shall be prostrate before him , and all nations shall serve him the kings that prostrate themselves the most humbly before him , are those he throws at his feet . witness the treatment he gave our good king henry the third , who ador'd him : and yet he thundered upon him , and persecuted him even to death , and beyond death . for after he was assassinated , in pursuance of his excommunication and deposition , by his creatures of the league , and particularly of the house of guise that he favour'd : he would not at all suffer any obits or services to be made for him at rome , as if he had a mind to have him damn'd , after he had caus'd him to be murder'd . particularly he extoll'd , in a publick harangue , the execrable parricide jacob clement , and compares his fact to the mystery of the incarnation of the son of god. the design of this persecution drawn out so at length against the king , the princes of the blood , and against all the kingdom , is to be seen in the memoirs of the advocate david , intercepted at lions , an. 1577. as he was upon his return from rome , where he had been secretary to the bishop of paris , the king's ambassador with the pope . this bishop of paris , a creature of the duke of guise , being at rome , an. 1576. instead of serving the interests of the king his master , who had sent him to make an excuse , by reason of the necessity of the king's affairs , for the peace he had made with the duke alenzon his brother , and with the princes of the blood that were protestants ; he apply'd himself wholly to the interests of the duke of guise and the pope , who had then complotted together their devilish design of the league . for the pope , whose custom it is to build his greatness upon the weakness of kings , and the troubles of their states , seeing the royal-house declining , despis'd , and drawing to an end , and france harassed with civil wars ; was easily wrought upon to favour the house of guise , which aspir'd manifestly to the crown by the exclusion of the princes of the blood. so upon the whole matter , the duke of guise , a prince well made , and of high undertaking , powerful in friends , lov'd and ador'd by the people , promised to give him all the soveraignty in france , which he counts himself debarr'd of , by the pragmatick sanctions , and by the liberties of the gallicane-church . then during the stay of this ambassador at rome , an. 1576. an agreement was drawn between the pope and duke of guise , whereby the pope declares , that hugh capet had seiz'd the crown of france , which of right belong'd to the house of charlemaign . that he and his race had render'd the french refractory and disobedient to the holy see , by that damnable error which they call the liberties of the gallicane-church , which is none other , ( says he ) but the doctrine of the valdenses , albigenses , the poor of lyons , lutherans and calvinists . that it is this error which makes the arms of the kings of france , in defence of the holy church , unfortunate , and that they never will prosper , so long as the crown shall continue in this line . in order thereunto , an opportunity was now offer'd by reason of the present divisions , to labour in good earnest the restoration of the crown to the true successors of charlemaign who had always constantly obey'd the commands of the holy see. and who had in effect shew'd themselves the lawful heirs of the apostolick benediction upon that crown , though depriv'd of their inheritance by fraud and violence . that 't is plain , the race of the capets are wholly deliver'd over to a reprobate sense ; some being possess'd with a spirit of mopishness , stupid , and of no valour . others rejected by god and men for their heresie , proscribed and shut out from the communion of the holy church . whereas the branches of charlemaign are fresh and flourishing , lovers of virtue , vigorous of body and in mind , for the execution of high and laudable enterprizes . he goes on and prophesies for them , that as war bad been the means whereby they lost their degree , so peace shall do them the service to restore them to their ancient heritage of the kingdom , with the good will , the consent and the choice of all the people . afterwards follows a lesson of the conclave , for the execution of this design , well worthy to be read . for it is the whole plot and project of the league , which was exactly observ'd all along , even to the very last act with the states of blois , when the theatre on a suddain fell upon the actors heads , and that the tragical death of two of the principals broke the great design ready to be accomplisht ; which was to shut the king in a monastery , and the queen in another , and to put to death all the princes of the blood , to make way for monsieur the duke of guise , to whom immediately the crown was to be given . for the conclusion of this accord , his holiness requires of the duke of guise , that he shall cause to be acknowledg'd the power of the holy see , by the states of the realm , without any restriction or modification : abolishing the priviledges and the liberties of the gallican-church , the which he shall promise and swear to do before he take the crown . the pope enrag'd to see his great design quash'd , that he had laboured and push'd on with so much artifice , by the execution made by the king upon the persons of the duke of guise , and of the cardinal his brother , excommunicates and deposes the king , who , for all that , lost not his crown , till he lost his life ; also , being assassinated by james clement , a dominican-monk : who being immediately kill'd by the king's servants there present , had undoubtedly been canoniz'd by his holiness for his heroick act , if the business of the league had prosper'd : for we have have seen and read with horror the legend of st. james clement , printed and dispersed through france : and his execrable paracide has been defended as a just and meritorious action by the jesuit guignard , who has written a book expresly on that subject . even bellarmine condemns highly those that kill'd the monk who murdered his king , because , ( says he ) they kill'd sacratum virum , a man consecrated , accounting this detestable monk more sacred and more inviolable , than the sacred majesty of the king , henry the great having inherited the crown of henry the third , the pope prosecutes the league against him with a re-doubled zeal . so that besides the open war , there followed three several attempts upon his person , by villains instructed , and posted in convenient places for their design by the jesuits , who for this reason , were banish'd out of france , and a pyramid was erected close by the palace , with an inscription which declar'd the cause of their banishment . now , for all that his majesty professed the roman catholick religion , yet would not the pope of a long time receive him into the bosom of the church , because as yet his party was but weak . but when his holiness saw that the interests of the league declin'd , and that good cities and whole provinces treated with the king , then the holy spirit suggested to him , that he might receive into his fold of the church this straying sheep ; out of fear , least france , provoked too far , should , in the end , come to do what has been often threatned , that is , to make a patriarch of the gallicane-church . and yet in this reconciliation , the pope made appear so much pride and rancor , this great king could not but in the person of his ambassador , lying on the ground at the pope's feet , receive a bitter cup of repentance . never had a king of france made the pope the like submission . the pope has taught our kings a lesson to take advantage in their turn of his necessities , to make him bend or break . and i am full of hope that our great and glorious king will have a deep resentment of so great an indignity done to his heroick grandfather . especially might his majesty be pleas'd to consider , that the court of rome , notwithstanding that reconciliation , never pardon'd him ; keeping near his persons confessors that conspir'd against his life , causing seditious sermons to be preacht in paris , and censuring at rome in full consistory the sentence of the court of parliament against john castel , executed for having struck with a knife at this great king , in order to cut his throat . and this censure was made at rome four months before that this excellent king was kill'd , to prepare their spirits for this execrable assassination . thereupon , when ravaillac , who perform'd what the other martyrs of the pope had attempted , was examin'd , and asked why he undertook this detestable parricide , he answered , that there needed no more than to have heard the sermons preached in paris the last lent , to inform any body of the motives ; for the rest that the king was preparing to make war against god , in that he would make war against the pope , and that the pope is god. in short , one might find in this wretch the sparks of that fiery zeal , and blind devotion for his holiness , and the desperate spirit of the league , which the pope , by the means of the jesuits , industriously fomented in france , to produce this horrible and dire effect . when it was represented to these bigot parricides , that the king having been excommunicated , was afterwards absolv'd and reconcil'd to the pope ; they answer'd , that his conversion was feign'd . and they who attempted against his person , before this reconciliation , might shield themselves with the canon excommunicatorum of pope vrban , which speaks thus , we count them not murderers , who shall happen to kill any excommunicated persons , out of an ardour of zeal , for the catholick church their mother . observe then , that all they whom the pope taxes for heresie , they that appeal from the pope to a future council , and they that levy taxes upon the clergy , are excommunicated by the bull de coena domini , which the pope pronounces every thursday absolutely : a many kings and princes are involv'd in this excommunication , and the kings of france amongst the rest : no heresie being more criminal at rome , than the asserting of the liberties of the gallicane-church , and the not owning the terrestrial empire of his holiness . it concerns then those to make good provision for the securing of their lives , who are by this canon expos'd to all those who shall be pusht on to kill them by an ardor of zeal for the catholick church . he was much deceiv'd , who thought that the pope , and the jesuits , his emissaries , take it very ill any should represent to the world , that by the doctrine , and by the censures of rome , subjects are instructed to kill their kings , as often and as many as it shall please the pope to excommunicate ; and that the murder of our two last henries ensued thereupon . i think the quite contrary , they are well content that in laying to their charge these furious executions , which have plung'd our france in a gulph of miseries , we serve their design , which is to scare our kings and princes , and render them tame slaves to the court of rome , by the fear of excommunication , deposition , rebellion , knife and poison . but this is not to be fear'd save where the people are bigotted with a sottish zeal , and believe in the pope , instead of believing in god , and obeying the king. france at this time is pretty well purg'd of this zeal . and by the grace of god , and the wise conduct of his majesty , there is no longer now any ambitious prince within the kingdom to rob him of his peoples affection , or that may dare to make any alliance with the pope , to tumble him from his throne , and share the crown . we have this good fortune , that we may set out to the life the ill aspect of rome upon our kings , and that dangerous vigilance over france , without any danger of abating the courage of our great king ; but on the contrary , were his truly royal courage capable of an increase , it would yet swell the higher , from the consideration of the evils that rome has done , and will yet do to france , if he do not heartily oppose the usurpations she exercises , with impunity in all the parts of his kingdom . the honest french men that have the honour to be near his person , might represent to him the danger of this doctrine maintain'd by the popelings of his kingdom , that jesus christ committed to st. peter , as well the earthly as the heavenly empire , which are the very words of pope nicolas . therefore cardinal bellarmine , ch. 27. against barclay , holds absolutely , that the pope may dispose of all the temporals of the world. i affirm ( says he ) with confidence , that our lord jesus christ , the time he was mortal , might dispose of all temporal things , and deprive the kings and the princes of their kingdoms and dominions , and that without doubt he has left the same power to his vicar , to be employ'd , when he shall judge it necessary for the good of souls . the pope pius v. displays this power with great ostentation , in his bull against queen elizabeth of england ; wherein after that he calls himself servant of servants , he declares , that god has establisht the bishop of rome prince over all nations and kingdoms , to take , destroy , disperse , consume , plant and build , and in the power hereof he does anathemize , degrade , and depose this queen , absolves all her subjects from the oath of fidelity that they had made her , and forbids them absolutely to give her obedience . gregory xiv . set out such another bull against our great henry , declaring him uncapable of the crown , and exposing his kingdom to prey . but both this and the other bull were torn and cast into the fire by the hands of the hangman . observe that the pope exerciseth this power over the temporalties of kings for the good of souls , and as a spiritual prince . so that our french statesmen may cease to have their eyes wilfully seal'd up by that distinction of spiritual power , which they allow him , and temporal power that they deny him . for that it is by virtue of the spiritual power , that he exerciseth the temporal . see what cardinal bellarmin says , de pont . rom. l. 5. c. 5. the pope may change the kingdoms , take them from one , and give them to another , as a sovereign spiritual prince , when it shall be necessary for the good of souls . and of this necessity he shall be the only judge , as the sovereign spiritual prince . for 't is thus the cardinal argues , apol. pro garnet p. 84. if the church ( that is to say the pope ) had not the power to dispose of temporal things , she would not be perfect , and would want the power that is necessary for the attaining her end : for ( says he ) the wicked might entertain hereticks , and go scot-free , and so religion , be turn'd upside down . this reason charges imperfection on the church in the apostles time , for that had no power over the temporals . these horrible principles so strongly maintain'd by the court of rome , were of fresh memory found so prejudicial , both to the safety of our kings , and to the peace of france , that those ▪ of the third state an . 1615. were mov'd to propose to the general states an article , containing the means to dispossess , the people of that opinion , that the king might be depos'd by the pope , and that by the killing of kings one might gain the crown of martyrdom . cardinal du perron , in the name of the clergy , oppos'd this article , and employ'd all the strength of his eloquence and learning in two fair speeches , the one before the nobility , the other before the third state , to perswade them that our kings may be depos'd by the pope , offering himself to suffer martyrdom in defence of this truth . the lords of the nobility , to their great shame , joyn'd with the clergy , for the putting their kings crown under the miter of the pope , much degenerating from the vertue of their ancestors , those french banons , by whose advice philip the august declar'd to the cardinal d'anagnia , the popes legat , that threatned him , that it did not at all belong to the church of rome to pronounce sentence against the king of france . but the third state held firm to their article that maintain'd the dignity of their king , and the safety of his person ; and could never be won by promises , nor affrighted by threatnings to depart from it , shewing themselves in this more noble than the nobility . it is no wonder in this case that the third state shew'd more affection to their king than the clergy , seeing that the clerks hold , that they are not the king's subjects ; for in effect they acknowledge another sovereign out of the kingdom . and who can think it strange if they labour to heighten that monarchy of which they make a party ? but that the nobility , the kings right arm , that they should be so base to strike their head , and lay it at the feet of an italian bishop ; this is that which after ages will reflect upon with astonishment and indignation , and which historians shall blush to relate , and be vex'd that they cannot let pass in silence . so the nobility being joyn'd with the clergy , the article of the third state was censur'd and rejected . whereupon the pope writ triumphant letters to the clergy and the nobility , who had been faithful to him in this cause , glorying in his victory , and exalting the magnanimity of these genero●s nobles . but in truth , the deputies of these generous nobles deserv'd to have been degraded from their nobility , and they of the third state to have receiv'd their titles . the minority of the late king , and the easiness of the queen-mother , render'd them expos'd to these injuries , and apt to be circumvented ; insomuch that this harangue made to the third state was printed , with the priviledge of the king , and the pope gain'd his point . the false dealing of the cardinal , who made this speech , is remarkable ; namely , that he had a long time followed king henry the great , even then when he was of a contrary religion , and depos'd by the pope : and that a little before , in an assembly held at the jacobins in paris , he had resisted the popes nuncio , who would that this doctrine of the temporal sovereignty of the pope might be held for an article of faith. but in these two harangues , the cardinal made a kind of a recantation , and pronounc'd himself his own condemnation . ungrateful wretch ! to have thus abus'd the tender age of the son of his king , and his great benefactor : and to have basely betray'd the rights of the king , to oblige the court of rome . but this may not seem so strange , if one consider , that he got the best part of his preferment for certain services of pleasure , that do not much bind the conscience of him that receives them , nor that of him who is recompens'd for them . and in truth , those diverting services that he and monsieur de la ravenne render'd to king henry the great , deserve that posterity should erect for them statues crown'd with myrtle . god be thank'd that france now has a king vigorous both in age and in virtue , who is the terrour of rome , having shewn himself sensible of its usurpations upon france , beyond all his predecessors ; and of whom we have good occasion to hope that he will shake off this italian yoke , and banish all foreign jurisdiction out of his kingdom . we also ought to bless god , for that the french nobility at this day is much of a different temper from that which in the full states submitted the crown and life of their king to the popes tyranny 56 years ago . and that is ready to cover their fathers faults by generously assisting their king , to make him the only king within his kingdom . to effect this , above all things , those pretended immunities and exemptions must be taken from the clergy , which indeed are revolts from the kings authority to that of the popes . 't is in truth very reasonable , that they who have the charge of souls , should be discharg'd from many publick services , by reason they are vow'd and reserv'd to the service of god : but however , not that they and their lands should no longer depend on the king , and be subject to another sovereign . this is what was represented to king henry the great , by that illustrious personage achilles de harley , first president of his court of parliament at paris , in a speech he made to him , to disswade him from recalling the jesuits , he remonstrates to him , that according to their doctrine , he who has taken the lowest orders of the church , could not be guilty of high treason , whatever crime he committed , for that the clergy are no longer the kings subjects , nor belonging to his jurisdiction . in such manner that the church-men ( if one would believe them ) are exempt from secular powers , and may , without punishment , attempt against kings with their bloody-hands ; and that this doctrine they maintain in their publish'd books , thuanus l. 130. ad an . 1604. to this effect , the jesuit emanuel sa holds , that the rebellion of a clerk against the prince is not the crime laesae majestatis , because he is not a subject of the prince . words that have been left out in the edition of paris , but remain in that of cologne , and that of antwerp . bellarmin , that has not been purged , says the same thing . he affirms , de cl. c. 28. that a clerk cannot be punished by the civil judges , or in any wise brought before the judicial seat of a secular magistrate . he likewise says , that the sovereign pontifex having deliver'd the clerks from the subjection of princes , kings are no more the superiors of clerks . the pope then by his reckoning is the king of kings , if he can deliver whom he pleases from their subjection due to their princes by their birth , by making them clerks ; and it will be in his power not to leave in france any subject to the king , if all his subjects will but accept of the meanest orders . this body of the clergy has its judges and officers apart , and prisons apart . their causes will not bide the trial before the kings judges , but fly to the rota , or to the consistory at rome . there may be found an incredible number of persons in france , who , under the title of the clergy , have shaken off the yoke of the kings authority ; and a third part of the land of the kingdom is in the church-mens hands , for which they will neither render homage nor service to the king. and though the lots and vents , the quints , requints , and other rights of lordship belong to the king ; all these rights are lost after that the moveable goods are enter'd into the possession of the clergy . the king also loses his rights d'aubanir , of confiscation , and of deforence , the clergy being a body that never dies , yet mortifies the inheritances ; new donations falling to them every day , but none goes from them . a famous writer said pleasantly , that as the arms and thighs dwindle when the belly swels to excess ; so in the body of a state the nobility and people that are as the arms and legs of a commonweal , are impair'd by the fatning of the clergy . i am of those who wish the clergy may have those means , and that dignity which may lift them above contempt and oppression , and render them respected even of kings . but because i love them , i wish their riches may not be so excessive , as to create in kings a jealousie , that may cause them to be taken away , as has happen'd in england , and in other places . 't is therefore a great imprudence of our lords , the clergy of france , who possess the best part , and the fat of the kingdom , enough to cause jealousie in the seculars , and the avarice of sacriledge ; to add , yet this unjust pretension of immunity from all charges , both for their persons and for their goods ; and defend themselves with the popes authority , which exempts them . which , in effect , is to tell the king , that they are another kings subjects , who has power to command him , to dispose of the lands , under his obedience , and to limit his authority over the persons of the native french. if for this they alledge a long custom , we may say , that the popes to settle their usurpations in france , have ever embroil'd our kings in troubles , and oblig'd them to think of somewhat else , besides the repelling the blind encroachments of a stranger kingdom that crept into their realm ; and that they had to do with weak princes , or such as had their hands full other ways . but now that god has given france a king , wise , powerful , flourishing , and who has leisure to have an eye or all his interests , will these gentlemen expect that he will suffer long that a third of his kingdom lie unprofitable to him , and even that it be reserv'd to fortifie a foreign monarchy ? and though natural reason requires that they who live at ease should comfort those who fight for their preservation ; all this while that the nobles and the third state oppose the invasion of strangers , all this while that the king is fortifying his frontiers , entertaining garisons , setling officers both for the state and for the war , why do not the church-men , who are thereby maintain'd in the quiet enjoyment of so great plenty , contribute one mite towards the defraying of publick charges ? why shall their increase be a diminution to the strength of the king , who is kept waking for their repose and preservation ? shall not the king who is so clear-sighted , see what an impoverishment it is to his kingdom , that france be tributary to a stranger , under the title of annates , offerings , dispensations , absolutions , and causes matrimonial ? against these depredations , our ancient kings had provided some remedy by the pragmatick sanctions , vext to see the fairest revenue of the kingdom pass over the alps by a religious spoil , and go into the purses of those who laugh at our simplicity . but what reason is there that they who pay so willingly tribute to the pope , should make so great difficulty in paying to the king ? is it not because they believe they owe all to the pope , and nought to the king ? st. paul teaches them to pay tribute to the higher powers , inasmuch as they are ministess of god. and st. chrysostom commenting upon this text , tells them who are these higher powers . if ( says he ) the apostle has establisht this law whilst the princes were pagans , how much more ought this to be done under princes that are believers ? and he had said before , the apostle commands this to all , even to the priests , which is more , he adds , though thou art an apostle , though thou art an evangelist , or a prophet , or what ever else thou art . from st. ambrose we have the same lesson in his oration of delivering the temples , if tribute be demanded , refuse it not , the lands of the church pay tribute . even pope vrban and the roman decretal say , that the church pays tribute of its exterior goods . also , that tribute must be paid to the emperors , in acknowledgment of the peace and repose , in which they ought to maintain and defend us . the right of kings and truth must needs be very strong , that could draw from the pope and his canonistical doctors this acknowledgment . for the canon law was not founded for any other end , but to supplant the civil laws , and establish the popes jurisdiction throughout . this is a body of foreign laws , that have their tribunal apart , and that depends on a foreign prince , and where the king has nothing to do but look on ; i mean till such time as he shall please to take cognizance of so unreasonable an usurpation . and forbid that any cause be judged in france by other authority than his , and much less any cause commenc'd in france , be appeal'd to rome . and , in truth , he is but a king by halfs , till he alone possess all the jurisdiction exercis'd within his kingdom . this is what charles du moulin said in an epistle to henry ii. where he writes freely against the empire that the pope has set up within our france , where the pope has subjects that submit not to the laws of the king , but to those of the pope , which are the canon-law , and the constitutions that come from rome . but ( some may object ) would you have the king judge in spirituals ? i answer , that if the king ought not to be judge , it does not follow that the pope must . the king has his bishops that may and ought to judge of matters purely spiritual ; but of nought without being authoriz'd by the king : and there is no need of an authority out of the kingdom for this . i will say more , that the ecclesiastical government is a part of the office of a king. for so it was in the kingdom of israel . and who would believe that in this age , and in spain , where the inquisition reigns , king philip iv. assum'd to himself the soveraign power of churches within his dominions ? for this purpose he apply'd that excellent passage of isodore , which is attributed also to the council of paris , that the secular princes should know , that they ought to give an account of the charge of the church committed to them by jesus christ ; for whether that the peace or the discipline receive improvement by believing princes , or that they are impair'd : he who committed the church to their power , will demand an account . o the excellent passage ! o the holy lesson ! god give all christian kings the grace so well to learn it , that they may never leave this charge of the church which jesus christ has committed to them upon the hands of strangers ; and when they have taken it into their own hands , to acquit themselves worthily , and render a good account . alas ! alas ! have kings eyes to see their rights , and have they no hands to maintain them ? are they quick-sighted enough to perceive that the government of the church is committed to them , and that they are to render an account to god ; and have they not the courage to rescue them from unjust and strange hands that snatch them away ? think they to acquit themselves of this great account , of the government of the church of their kingdoms , by saying , that the holy father has discharg'd them of it , when they have in their hands the power to discharge him from his usurpations ? in truth , they will never be in condition to govern the church committed to them ; they will never be but kings by halfs , till they have banisht from their territories this pretended spiritual jurisdiction , which destroys the civil , and which will draw under its cognizance all sorts of causes , there being none , wherein there is not some matter of conscience , or some kind of transgression of gods commandments , and that by consequence belongs not to the jurisdiction of the pope , if he must be own'd the soveraign spiritual judge in france . the popes themselves inform our kings of their right to govern the church . leo iv. writing to lewis and to lotharius , did not he own that the investiture of the bishop comes from the emperor , and the pope has only the consecration ? did not he beseech the emperor to invest a person he had recommended ? and does he not acknowledge , that the metropolitan dares not consecrate him , without the emperors consent ? and pope john x. in his epistle to hereiman of cologue , about the business of heldwin of tongres ; does he not observe , that the old custom has this force , that none ought to confer a bishoprick upon any clerk , save the king , to whom the scepter has been given of god. the council held at thionvil , under lewis the debonnair , an. 835. gives us this good maxim , that the pope ought to be call'd pope and brother , not father and pontifex : and that lewis had more power in the government of the gallicane-church , than the bishop of rome , as agobard bishop of lions has it in his treatise of the co●●●●…ison of the two governments , related by bossellus in his decretals . gregory turonensis does furnish us with more than ten examples of the right of investiture belonging to our kings before the empire fell into their hands . in the times of clovis they held the royal right of the investiture of bishops . they had also a right which they call'd regal , which was the power of enjoying vacant bishopricks and prebends , and the moveables of bishops dying without a will. and it is very easie to prove , that under the first line of our kings , and a long while under the second , the kings of france were the soveraigns as well in spirituals as in temporals . and though they had lost their soveraignty about the end of the second line , and under the third by their negligence , and by the cunning of the popes , watchful for their advantage ; nevertheless an infinite of persons , in those times , both of the clergy and of the law , took notice of , and taxed the usurpations of the popes upon the rights of our kings . amongst others , aegydius romanus , archbishop of bourges , in the time of philip the fair , this archbishop , for the reasons registred in the court of parliament , remonstrates , that the gallicane-church has that right , and that liberty to provide for its occasions by synods of the bishops of the country , without that the pope ought to meddle , unless by way of exhortation . cardinal d'offat ( letter 90 to the king ) shews , that the pope ought not to meddle at all with the election of t●● french bishops , and this he proves by the ordinance of orleans , an. 1560 , and saith , that since the popes have reserv'd to themselves the provision of bishopricks , they have been very ill serv'd . the excellent archbishop of paris , peter de marca , in his agreement of empire and the priesthood , has wisely and boldly remonstrated ; that since the pope would hold the same degree in france , that the soveraign sacrificer held in the synagogue , he ought not to pretend to more authority in our france , than the soveraign sacrificer had in the kingdom of israel , where he was the kings subject : his person , his jurisdiction , the affairs of the church , the order of ceremonies were within the kings jurisdiction : who depos'd the sacrificer , and set another in his place , out of his pure and full authority . god be prais'd for that in these later times , where the throne of iniquity , the papal see is so much adored , he has rais'd up such brave assertors of our christian liberty , which would bear up again , and for which we want only to shake off the yoak . what is alledg'd the most specious for the necessity of a pope to superintend the christian kingdom , is , that the kings need an arbiter of their differences , that may be generally respected , and whose dignity and sanctity may oblige them to submission and veneration . but if this general arbiter , instead of making peace amongst princes , foment their differences , and embroil their affairs , to fish in troubl'd waters , they shall do wisely to let him alone , and yet more wisely to rid themselves of him . there 's no question but that when a general peace is for the advantage of the pope , that then he will set himself seriously about it . but it rarely happens otherwise , then that the good of one party shall be disadvantageous to the pope , and then 't is ill trusting to his arbitrement . france has more reason to stand upon its guard than any other nation , for the court of rome has always sought its ruin : has favour'd its enemies , or rais'd them up anew . when the english made war against us , rome abetted their quarrel , and aided them with spiritual weapons . i cannot let pass the ridiculous assistance sent to henry v. of england , when he levied an army to go into france : this was a ship loaden with consecrated apples , which were distributed to all who would list themselves for this war : and they listed themselves with a good will , having scrambl'd for the apples with greediness and devotion , and were well satisfied in conscience of the justice of this expedition by these apples apostolical . the pope employ'd more powerful means against us , when france was weak , and the spaniard powerful , whom he assisted with all his forces spiritual and temporal . what a strong league did he make to destroy both king and kingdom ? what evils did he heap on france ? and after the injury done us , how much praying did he require before he would be appeas'd ? thomas campanella speaks thus of this judge of differences , who shall carefully read history , shall find that the popes have made more wars amongst christians , than they have quieted . let france mark what he adds , so far have the popes been from opposing himself , hispanis imperiorum helluonibus , to the spainiards unsatiable devourers of empire , that the pontifical authority has lent pretences to their voracity : witness navarre and france in the times of henry iii. for this last hundred years , all the popes ( except vrban the viii . ) have favour'd the spaniard . and what reason can we have to expect better from them , seeing that the greatest part of the cardinals are born subjects to spain , in the principalities of milan , of naples , and of sicily ; and that the court of rome is inclos'd within these principalities ? judge what confidence we can have in such arbiters . france loses plainly both money and pains ' sending ambassadors to these gentlemen , courting them , and enriching them , when they are assembled for the election of a pope . the fear they have of france's power , may gain some respect , but it is a respect without friendship ; and when france has gain'd it , i do not see what france has gain'd . they have reason to fear the king , knowing that this great prince is sensible of their usurpations ; and they have no great reason to love his subjects , because they are no great purchasers of indulgences . and the less the king cares for them , the more will they fawn upon him ; but we may assure our selves , they employ all their strength , and set to work all their art and subtilty to put a stop to his progress , and to pull down his greatness . that agreement of the pope with the duke of guise ought never to be forgotten . what rancour did he testifie against the royal line that reigns at this day ? what pains did he take to disinherit and destroy it ? into what combustion did he cast the poor kingdom , that he might have a king of his own choice , who might abolish the liberties of the gallican-church , and make france a fief of the court of rome . let us for our experience learn the truth of that character given by aeneus sylvius , who was afterwards pope pius ii. that there was never any great slaughter in christendom , nor any great calamity happen'd either of church or state , whereof the bishops of rome were not the authors . hist . austria . and as much is said by machaivel in his history of florence . and if we consider that the great evils done by the pope to kings , were done under the colour of com-promise ; we shall find that 't is the surest way to decline his kindess , and to have nought to do with him ; and that he always comes better off that affronts him , than he that flatters him . the marquess after he has wisely consider'd , that the name of religion is a false pretext laid hold on by the court of rome , thereby to encrease their temporal power , and raise them creatures every where , the abuses he would have retrench'd after the example of charlemaign , and of many more great kings . but to compass this , it is not adviseable to appear in it barefac'd , for ( says he ) that would be to bring upon us the clamours and importunity of all the monks and their followers ; this would be to bring rome upon our back , which might give us trouble . i confess that no good can be acquir'd without trouble . but i cannot conceive that it would be much trouble to deliver france from the usurpations and the exactions of rome . to forbid that there be in france no more courts depending on the pope ; nor money carried from france to rome , or any cause removed thither by appeal . and that no provision of benefices be receiv'd from thence . this , in truth , would be to bring rome on our backs ; but not one sword would be drawn in the cause either within the kingdom or without . should the emperor do the same within his principalities , our king would not stir ; nor would the emperor any more be concern'd if the king should set back the jurisdiction of the pope to beyond the alps. when king henry viii . of england did the same in his kingdom , what prince undertook the quarrel against him : how easily would the people accustom themselves to be free from the papal exactions : and how vain and idle were the attempts of the popes partisans in england to restore his authority ? that prince hack'd and harass'd what he had a mind to in the ecclesiastick estate , and the clamours of the monks , which the marquess is affraid on , frighted not him , though he treated them coursely . nor are we at all to fear least the monks take up arms , as the chiefs of the league forc'd them to do ; which would serve only to make them be laught at , and gave a subject to the painters for those antick and ridiculous portracts that they have left us . or if any little broil should be rais'd by some of the bigots , how soon must it fall before a great king who is never without an army . who shall read over all the book of the marquiss , shall find that he proposes reformations in the state far more hand to be effected , than the banishing of the canon-law and papal jurisdiction out of the kingdom . for he would perfectly melt down the justice and policy , and cast them all anew . he has truly made it appear , that he understands the malady of the state , and yet his projects to remedy them cannot be put in execution , without bringing to ruine and despair many active spirits that live on their prosessions , which is very dangerous to attempt in a state. whereas the expulsion of the canon-law out of france , and the reduction of all causes thereon depending to the civil magistrate , and of all persons acknowledging the pope to the obedience of the king , would not at all be any dangerous innovation . to discontent the regular ecclesiasticks that are unactive , as bred up in the shade , and in contemplation , or in idleness , can be no great danger : especially leaving them their revenues , at least for life . i neither have the wit nor the presumption to give a model of what orders should be prescrib'd the church after the papal jurisdiction is banisht the kingdom . and i shall go no farther than to say , that i see no vigour in the roman jurisdiction , and their partisans in france , that may hinder the king from cashiering them absolutely , and making himself master at home . even the excommunications and interdicts that would follow , would strengthen him , being of no other effect but to provoke the parliaments , and to animate the people against the pope . the greatest part of the clergy would submit to the king , and would cast off all foreign domination : and the dissenting clergy would be inconsiderable , would be disperst , and vanish before the rays of the authority royal. and , i pray , a king of england , could he accomplish this work , to free himself from the papal-yoke , though carried thereunto more by passion than prudence ? and our great king , so vigorous , so powerful , so wise , shall not he dare to undertake it , for fear of vexing the pope and the monks ? shall he be scar'd with an imaginary monarchy , that has neither force nor foundation , save in the opinion of those that fear it , and establish it by their sottish fear ? what is most considerable in this example , is , that the pope continues banisht out of england . for though restor'd by queen mary , and his power own'd for the space of five years ; queen elizabeth , and the kings her successors , found themselves so much at ease in being deliver'd from the roman-yoke , and in being acknowledged supreme , under god , in all causes , and over all persons , as well ecclesiastical as civil ; that they have maintain'd , and do yet maintain this authority essential to their crown . this authority is no less essential to the crown of our great king ; and 't is this that the good prince , james king of england , represents to all kings and princes of christendom , in the remonstrance he has made them , touching the rights of their crowns . they have not hitherto been so happy to listen to it , but let us hear what he says to them . if you that are the most powerful , come to consider in earnest with your selves , that well-nigh a third of your people and of your lands belong to the church ; will not the thoughts of so great a loss move you , which withdraws from your jurisdiction so many men , and so much of your lands in such manner , that every where they plant colonies and provinces for the pope ? what thorns and thistles suffer you to grow in the country under your subjection , so long as so powerful a faction flourishes and spreads over so much good soil within your kingdoms , openly maintaining that they are exempt from your power , and that they are by no right subject to your laws , and to your judgments ? insomuch , that whereas formerly the clerks desir'd no more but their tiths , and liv'd thereon content ; at this day the pope , chief of the clerks , is not content with less than a third part of your subjects , and of your lands . these words of a king , our neighbour , happily enjoying a sovereignty independant of the pope , of which his ancestor robb'd this robber an hundred and forty years ago , ought to move in our kings a virtuous emulation to recover , and after to maintain the rights proper to their crown . and the example of so flourishing a success ought to encourage them to so just and so noble an undertaking . from this great and principal acquisition , that the king shall be the only sovereign in his kingdom , other advantages will arise . these stranger courts being put down ( that are the mills whither every one brings , and where the moulture goes all to rome , or to their creatures ) the money they drain from the kings subjects shall stay in france ; and seeing that this employs a great number of officers , that only do harm to the state ; when this gate shall be shut , the young men will seek out other ways to make themselves valued by , and the arts and commerce of the kingdom will be more considerable . we shall likewise save the treasure , that is spent unprofitably in the embassies to rome , and in courting the good graces of the cardinals at the elections of popes , and in the reception of legates and nuncio's ; by all which france does nought else but prosess and encrease her slavery , without the return of the least advantage . for what-ever compliments , what-ever expence france may make , yet the catholick king is the minion of rome ; and the subjects of spain are the chapmen that but most of their wares , and that have most blind devotion for the holy see. and in truth , seeing that the politicks of france ( by the marquess ) and monfieur silhon , and before them cardinal d'ossat , have testified their little satisfaction with rome , and publish'd her cheats , in so far that as we know that rome does not at all love us ; in like manner rome well knows , that we care not for her : and i cannot understand to what end serve all our civilities to the court of rome , but to puff them up the more , and provoke the gentlemen to laughter , who without doubt receive a wonderful pleasure in seeing their professed enemies come to kiss their feet . 't is true , that so long as france suffers rome to dispose of many benefices , we must always have occasion to deal with them ; and as the pope , to preserve his credit , amuses the princes with com-promises and treaties which he draws out at length , deporting himself as the judge of differences , whereas he creates more than he decides . so very often princes contribute to his inclination by their delays , and in setting before his council-board affairs that they have no intention should be concluded . and whatever their inclination be at the bottom , he is courted and caress'd as the arbiter , which pleases him extremely . and why should it not please him to have at his court the ambassadors of the empire , of france , of spain , of poland , of portugal , and other princes that bring him authority by their difference , and bring gain to his court and his citizens , by their liberalities , and by their expences , suitable to the dignity of their masters ? the great men and the sages of council to his majesty may , when they please , consider what good comes to our kings , by their keeping the pope in this humour , of his being their judge , and in letting him enjoy his pretended rights in france . and whether it is not better , and a shorter way , for france to do its own business without him , and to take from him what does not at all belong to him in our kingdom , that we may have no more to do with him . the king has been pleas'd to declare , that he desir'd to re-unite his subjects in their religion . this so christian and royal design cannot be executed , so long as the pope shall have any power in france ; for this re-union cannot be made , unless the parties mutually yield some matters either in the doctrine or in the discipline ; 't is certain that the pope will never consent , at least not to be own'd the vicar of jesus christ , that has all the power which jesus christ had upon earth ; and that on the other hand , the protestants who have quite another opinion of him , and such an one as all know ( though they make it not an article of their faith ) they can never submit to his authority . but if that france were not govern'd in spirituals , save by the king and his bishops , an half of the way to this great work were already over ; it being most certain , that most of the points in difference are not maintain'd by the theologians , vow'd to the popes service , farther than as they serve his interests . reflections upon the fifth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the huguenots . i have treated my lord , the marquess of c. with all the respect that was possible for me in my reflections upon his chapter of the clergy . i could not do more to comply with him and serve him , than by approving his judgment , and confirming it with authorities , adding only what he durst not venture , and ( may be ) had a mind to say . upon his chapter of the huguenots i shall keep my self within the same respect . but i would hope from his ingenuity , that after i have taken some pains in commending and defending the judgment he has made on the roman clergy , he in recompence would give me the liberty to oppose that which he has given , upon those he calls huguenots , and to complain of the treatment he would have dealt to them . but because i take great delight in according with him as far as is possible , i embrace the advice he gives at the entrance , that a king cannot have a more noble object of his care , than to preserve in his states the religion he has receiv'd from his ancestors . for though this proposition be not universally true , i will understand it in his senle , supposing that he means the true christian religion . and 't is that his majesty he receiv'd of his ancestors ; the which i presume he will not limit to two or three descents of his next predecessors ; but as he has drawn from three stocks the lawful succession of our last kings , and affirms , that they are branches sprung from the same root , he cannot take it ill that we go back to the first and second race , to find the religion that his majesty has receiv'd of his ancestors . therefore as the noble marquess in his second chapter , speaking of the pretended exemptions of the clergy , appeals for that matter to the old kings and emperors , who own'd no such thing , and says , that the clergy cannot take it amiss if his majesty reduce things to their primitive state . in like manner the marquess cannot take it amiss , that religion be reduc'd to its primitive state , at least to the state it was left in at the time when our kings were emperors . now i have shew'd in the foregoing chapter , that the emperor charlemaign , one of his majesties ancestors , convok'd a synod , in which the worship of images was condemned , and that he himself made a book against the second council of nice , and against images , which we have preserv'd to this day ; and that under lewis the mild , his son , another synod was held at paris against images , all the acts of which we have entire . this doctrine is a principal point of the religion that our kings receiv'd from their ancestors , and which we profess . and as much may be said in point of the holy sacrament , of which so much noise is made at this day , that we willingly refer our selves to what was believ'd in the times of his majesties ancestors . i should stray from my subject , should i enter upon controversie ; the marquess obliges me to stand upon another guard , employing his eloquence in treating us as rebels and enemies of the state. i am far from justifying the evil actions of our party . but since we are to deal with men of such a spirit , that display the evil and suppress the good , that insult over us for actions forc'd by the despair of a few , and protested against by the greater party ; and that will not acknowledge the signal services we have done for the crown , which ought never to have been forgotten , so long as the race of henry the great shall sit upon the throne . i think my self oblig'd to represent truly what is most considerable in their condition , and in their actions since the last return of the purity of the gospel into france . i say the last return , because that it has been , and has flourisht there two or three hundred years before , and the professors , remain'd there skulking , and yet in great numbers , after long and cruel persecutions . for we dissemble not , but own that this holy doctrine came to us , and was planted by the remains of those poor valdenses and albigenses , the destruction of whom is rank'd by the noble marquess , amongst the good works of the first rates . the character that reinerius , their cruel inquisitor , gave them , is very remarkable , and may satisfie those who ask , where was our religion before luther , c. 4. contra valdenses . this , says he , of all sects , is the most pernicious , for three reasons . first , because of its long duration , for some say , that it has continu'd since the time of pope sylvester ; others hold , that it began even in the apostles time . secondly , because of all sects , this is the most general , there scarce being any country where this sect has not taken root . in the third place , by reason that all contrary to other sects that become abominable , by the enormity of their blasphemies against god , these people seem very godly , for they live justly before men have a sound belief in all things , and of god , and of all the articles contain'd in the apostles creed : only this , they blaspheme against rome . an admirable testimony from the pen of a mortal enemy , that deserves to be writ in letters of gold. let us joyn hereunto that of good king lewis xii . the father of the people ; he was much importun'd by those of the clergy , who pray'd him to root out the inhabitants of the cabrieres , and of merindol in provence , that were of this profession , and some remainders of the albigenses . but this just king , afore he would grant that bloody request , would see their confession of faith , which having read , he swore they were better christians than he and his people , and preserv'd them from the rage of their enemies . but these enemies obtain'd what they desir'd of king francis the first , and made an horrible slaughter of those poor christians . if these albigenses be hereticks , because they blaspheme against rome , is not the marquess one , and all the men of politicks in france , who declaim so openly , and so generously against the pope's usurpations , that makes of religion a pretence thereby to invade the rights of the king , and make himself universal monarch of all the world ? these gentlemen would abate much of the hatred they bear us ; would they be pleas'd to consider that the pope and roman clergy hate us , for a cause that is common to us both . for it is not upon the account of any controversies about the holy sacrament , the invocation of saints , and the prayers for the dead ; but it is because we oppose boldly the usurpations of rome ; it is because we blaspheme against rome , as the albigenses in reinerius's days , that we are call'd ( as he calls us ) a pernicious sect. this is the great heresie for which we have been made objects of the publick hatred , and for which the devotion of the people is made to consist in a bloody zeal to burn us , and massacre us . in the year 1520. the light of the gospel shin'd throughout all the parts of france . and the queen of navarre , sister of king francis i. who was enlighten'd therewith , was a great rampire against the fury of the roman clergy , that labour'd to extinguish this holy light by persecution : however , she could not hinder , but that much cruelty was exercised . but after her decease the persecution grew hot again , and continued during the reign of francis i. and henry ii. for the space of forty years , those that were converted , maintain'd their holy profession , by a constancy in their sufferings , in imitation of the christians of the primitive church . notwithstanding this vigor , many of the princes , and of the best families of france , as the princes of the blood of the house of bourbon , embrac'd the reform'd religion . under the reign of francis ii. the princes of the blood , debarr'd of their rights by those of the house of guise , the queens uncles , form'd the design at ambois , to banish those from the king's person , that held them at distance . this attempt failing , was call'd a crime of high treason , and charg'd on them of the reform'd religion , though renaudy the chief of the plot , was a roman catholick , and this party was compos'd of noblemen and gentry of both the perswasions . whoso understands the priviledges of the princes of the blood in france , will never accuse these undertakers of the rebellion . thuanus testifies in their favour , hist . l. 24. that not one of them was prov'd to have attempted against the king , or against the queen , but only against strangers that govern'd all at court in a tyrannical way : for then the house of guise was still lookt upon as a stranger in france . francis ii. being dead , his successor charles ix . being a minor , the princes of the blood had more right than afore to be admitted to the management of publick affairs , at least joyntly with the queen-mother . but when they saw themselves excluded , and their persons in danger , they levy'd forces for their preservation . when the king came of age , the princes seeing him much incens'd against them , and that he was of a dangerous and implacable nature , they retir'd , and stood upon their guard. the several affronts they receiv'd , and the frequent massacres , occasion'd two or three little wars . to rid himself of them all at one blow , the king set his sister for a bait , to draw in and to destroy the whole party of the princes , giving her in marriage to the prince of navarre , who was afterwards our henry the great . he and his cousin germain the prince of conde were imprison'd , and the principals of their party slain in their beds , having danc'd at a ball the evening before . never were dancers at such a wedding . pope gregory xii . had a hand in this execrable action , his predecessor pius v. refused to consent to this marriage , because ( said he ) the prince of navarre is an heretick . but when the cardinal of lorrain told his successor gregory xii . that this marriage was a trap to catch the hereticks , he then dispatcht the dispensation , and encourag'd the design . the prince of navarre having sav'd himself at rochel , was immediately assisted by a great party that had escap'd the massacre , and the war broke out afresh . thereupon was form'd that faction of the league , to destroy the princes of the blood , under the colour of religion , and particularly , to destroy the king henry iii. as appear'd afterwards . during these long troubles , what refuge found the king of navarre , whom god reserv'd for the crown of france , but amongst these of the reform'd religion ? these were they that aided , that defended , and even nourisht him in his long and cruel adversities . and after , in the end , when the league had pull'd off the mask , and had driven the king from paris , and besieg'd him at tours , came not they to his relief under their brave chieftain , and did they not deliver him from the utmost danger , though he had sent his armies against them , to extirpate them ? i would gladly ask the noble marquess , where were then the honest french ? and where were the rebels ? would he find the honest french amongst the fiery zealots and bigots of the league , who have shed so much blood to beat down this dangerous sect , as he is pleas'd to brand us ? with your good leave , noble marquess , which of the two is this dangerous sect , that which teaches that the persons of kings are inviolable , and that exposes their lives to defend those kings that had persecuted them ; or that which holds , that a king excommunicated by the pope , may be justly kill'd by any body ; and which out of zeal for religion , plunge their bloody hands into the bowels of their soveraign , as st. jacob clement did , and as john castrel and peter bar●iere attempted , and as ravaillac perform'd ? where is the huguenot that ever offer'd any thing of this nature , during all the persecutions of their party ? or where is the minister that ever broacht such doctrine to his flock , to kill their king , which your spiritual fathers have so often done ? i would also ask the marquess , where he finds that term of near fourscorce years spent in quelling this dengerous sect , which is the title he is pleased to give us ? would he take in to these 80 years , the 38 after the death of francis ii. till the peace of amiens , in which time the reformed party were the constant , and the only support of the great henry for near 30 years ? will he venture to say , that those arms which defended the hope of after ages , and the fortune of france , were unjust ? let him also say if he please , whether by the zeal that has been to reduce the hereticks to their duty , he means that butchery of the st. bartholomews , and the massacres in every town of france , at that time and before , which are reductions of a strange nature . and because he may object , that their defence of the princes of the blood was only a pretence for the huguenots taking up arms , and their unjust resistance against their sovereign . it will suffice to answer , that their arms were necessary for the preservation of that great prince , whom god reserv'd for the blessing of france ; and that when he came to the crown , they were judg'd worthy of a reward . i would beseech also all indifferent persons to consider them simply as men , that are neither angels nor devils , and to tell us , if they think it strange that men , the relicks of fires and slaughters ( which were the only arguments employ'd for their conversion for so many years ) take the course at length that nature teaches them , to defend themselves against force with force . this to take it at the worst , is all the rebellion can be objected against them in all that past age , till the quiet settlement of henry the great . but the good providence of god has well clear'd them from the necessity of that excuse , having set them out an employment so just , and so fortunate for their arms , that all who love , and who shall for future ages love the prosperity of france , and the greatness of the royal family , will have perpetual reason to bless the timely succour of this party , and to praise god , who rais'd them for the everlasting good of the kingdom . let us come to their condition , after that henry the great was establish'd on his throne . the king being turn'd roman catholick , and seeing his party of the reformed religion discontent , and in trouble , as expos'd afresh to what they had afore tried , gave them places of security for about twenty years . this was the ground-work of all their miseries , and i am much inclin'd to believe that this was procur'd for them by those who projected their ruine . for their enemies might well think , that a king that understands his interest , would not long sufler in the heart of his kingdom places assign'd for protection , against himself in effect , and to make resistance , in case he kept not all his promises . that these places would be retreats for all discontented persons , and incendiaries that would trouble the state. that strangers seeing in france a party strengthen'd with garisons , and holding themselves in perpetual defiance , would never leave bidding them to cock up , and fomenting their discontents . that this thorn in the foot of france would always hinder it from advancing ; and after all , that this would be a kind of dangerous discipline in a state ; to accustom subjects to represent their grievances with sword in hand . on the other hand , they might well fore-see , that the reform'd being seiz'd of these places , would not quit them at the end of the term assign'd , imagining that the enjoyment of their religion , of their goods , and of their lives , depended all on their keeping of these places ; and that by their refusal , they would oblige the king to win them by force ; which would make them criminals , odious , and objects of the justice and vegeance of an incens'd master . and even so it happen'd . for their term for holding these places being expir'd , the king demands them again , and having at their instant request prolong'd their term for three or four years , at length wisely resolv'd to force them ; this gave occasion for the assembly of rochel , where most imprudently , and contrary to their duty to god and the king , they resolv'd to hold the places by force ; a resolution of despair ill-grounded . for though the king shew'd himself favourable to his subjects of the religion , after he had taken these places by his arms , he would have been yet more favourable to them , had they render'd the places humbly and peaceably at his demand . when the assembly of rochel began , was held the national synod of alaix , in which the famous du moulin was president . in that country where many of these places of security were , he apply'd himself seriously to consider the posture of the affairs of his party , to sound their inclinations , and to give them good counsel . and he found that the greatest and the best part was dispos'd to render their places to the king , and did not at all approve of the proceedings of the assembly of rochel , of which matter he thought himself oblig'd to inform that assembly ; and having return'd home , he writ them an excellent letter , a copy whereof i have procur'd , which is as follows : sirs , i write not to you , to pour my sorrows into your bosoms , or entertain you with my partcular afflictions . i need no consolation on that account , thinking my self greatly honour'd , that in the publick affliction of the church , it pleases god to set me the foremost . i should account my self very happy , if all the storm might fall on my head. so that i might be the only sufferer , and the church of god continue in peace and prosperity . one care more pressing , has mov'd me to write to you , and has forc'd nature , which was ever averse from medling with publick affairs , and acting beyond my calling . for seeing the church generally in eminent danger , and upon the brink of a precipice , it was impossible for me to hold from speaking . nor can i be silent in this urgent necessity , without making my self guilty of insensibility , and of cruelty towards the church of god. and , i hope , in speaking my thoughts about publick affairs , my domestick affliction will deliver me from jealousie in your opinion . and if i be not believ'd , at least i may be excus'd . i confess indeed , it does not become me to give counsel to an assembly of persons , chosen out of all the kingdom , to bear the weight of publick affairs in a time so full of difficulty ; but i think it for your advantage to be inform'd rightly what is the opinion , and what the disposition of our churches , from persons that have a particular knowledge of them . the question then being , whether you ought to break up your assembly , in obedience to his majesty , or continue to hold together , in order to provide for the affairs of the churches ; i am bound to tell you , that it is the general desire of our churches , that it might please god we may continue in peace , by obeying his majesty . and that seeing the king resolv'd to make himself obey'd by force of arms , they assure themselves , that you will to your power endeavour to avoid this tempest , and rather yield to necessity , than engage them in a war that will most certainly ruin the greatest part of our churches , and will plunge us in troubles , whereof we well see the beginning , but know not at all the end . by obeying the king , you will take away their pretence , who incense his majesty to persecute us . and if we are to be persecuted , all they who fear god , desire that this may be for the profession of the gospel , and that our persecution may truly be the cross of christ . in a word , sirs , i can assure you , that the greatest and the best part of our churches desire your assembly may break up , if it can be done with safety to your persons : and even many of the roman church , love that publick peace are continually about us , praying and exhorting us , that we may not , by throwing our selves down the precipice , involve them in our ruin . on this occasion i need not represent to you the general consternation of our poor flocks , who cast their eyes upon you as persons that may procure their quiet ; and by yielding to necessity , may divert that storm so ready to break upon their heads . many already have forsaken the conntry , many have quitted their religion , from whence you may judge what a distraction there will be , should these troubles go on farther . nor need i more recommend to you , to have a tender care for the preservation of our poor churches , knowing that you will rather chuse death , than draw upon you the reproach , that you have hasten'd on the persecution of the church , and destroy'd that which the zeal of our fathers had planted , and brought this state into confusion . i am not ignorant that many reasons are alledg'd to perswade you to hold on your assembly . as that the king has permitted it ; but for this permission you have not any warrant , nor any declaration in writing ; without which , all promises are but words in the air. for kings believe they have power to forbid what they have permitted , and to revoke what they have offer'd , when they judge it expedient for the good of their affairs . and there is none of you that having sent his servant any whither , or given him leave to go , does not think you have power to call him back again . above all , sovereign princes keep not willingly their promises , when they have been extorted from th●m . there are also represented to you many grievances and controventions to the kings edicts ; which complaints to our great sorrow , are but too true : yet , without alledging that we our selves have given the occasion of many of these evils ; the difficulty lies not in representing our grievances , but in finding redress . consider then , whether the continuance of your assembly may heal these maladies , whether your session may put our churches under shelter , provide necessaries for a war where the parties are so unequal , levy forces and make a fond for payment ; if all the good your session is capable to produce , shall be equivalent to the loss of so many churches that lye naked , and expos'd to the wrath of their enemies ; whether when they are beaten down , you can raise them again ; whether in the manifest division that is amongst us , you have the power to bring together all the scatter'd parts of this divided body , which were it well united , would yet be too weak to maintain it self on the defensive . pardon me , sirs , if i tell you , that you will not find all those of our religion dispos'd to obey your resolutions ; and that the fire being kindl'd all about you , you will remain feeble spectators of the ruin that you have made to tumble upon your heads . besides , you cannot be ignorant that many amongst us , of the best quality , and most capable to defend us , condemn openly your actions , imagining and expressing that to suffer for this cause , is not to suffer for the cause of god. these making no kind of resistance , and opening the gates of their places , and joyning their arms to those of the king , you may easily gather what the loss will be , and what a weakning of your party . how many persons of our nobility will forsake you , some by treachery , others through weakness ? even they that in an assembly are the most vehement , and that to appear zealous , are altogether for violent courses , are most commonly those that revolt , and that betray their brethren . they hurry our poor churches into the greatest danger , and there leave them , and run away after that they have set the house on fire . if a fight , or the siege of a town should happen , whatever might be the event of the fight or siege , it would prove a difficult thing to contain the people animated against us , and to hinder them from falling upon our churches , that have neither defence or retreat . and whatever orders the magistrates of the contrary religion should give , it will be impossible for them to take effect . i might also represent to you many reasons arising from the state of our churches , both within and out of the kingdom , to let you see that this commotion is altogether ill-tim'd ▪ , and that it is to sail against wind and tide . but you are wise enough to see and consider the posture of our neighbours , and from whence you may hope for succor , and whether amongst you the virtue and the good agreement , and the quality of your chiefs is augmented or diminish'd . certainly this is not the time when the troubling of that pool will bring us a cure. and it is plain , that if any thing can help us amidst so much weakness , it must be the zeal of religon , the which , in our fathers time , did support us , when we had less strength and more virtue . but in this cause you will find that zeal very cool , because the most part of our people believes that this evil might have been prevented , without making a breach in the conscience . assure your selves , there will always be divisions amongst us , when we shall stir upon civil accounts , and not directly for the cause of the gospel . against all this , 't is objected , that our enemies have resolv'd our ruin . that they undermine us by little and little , and that we had better begin presently , than attend longer . 't is very true , he must want common sense , that doubts of their ill-will mean time , when i reflect on our several losses , as that of letoure , of privas , and of bearn ; i find that our selves have contributed thereto : and we are not at all to wonder if our enemies are not much in pain to set us right , and if they joyn with us to undo us . but herein it does not follow , that we should throw the helve after the hatchet , and set fire to our own house , because others are resolv'd to burn it , or undertake to remedy particular evils by means weak for that end , but strong and effectual for the general ruin . god , who so often has diverted the counsels taken for our destruction , has not lost his power , neither has he chang'd his will. we shall find that he is always the same , if we have the grace to wait his assistance , and do not cast our selves headlong , through our impatience , and dash upon impossibilities . take this for certain , that though our enemies seek our ruin , they will never attempt it openly , and will lay hold on some other pretence , more plausible than that of religion , which we never ought to give them . if we contain our selves in the obedience that subjects owe to their soveraign , we shall see that whilst our enemies hope in vain , that we shall make our selves criminals by some disobedience . god will cut them out some other work , and furnish us with occasious to testifie to his majesty , that we are a body profitable to his state , and thereby put him in mind of the signal services our churches have paid to the late king of glorious memory . but if we are so unfortunate , that whilst we keep to our duty , the calamnies of our enemies prevail ; at the least , we shall have this satisfaction , that we have been just on our side , and that we have testified , that we love the peace of the state. notwithstanding all this , sirs , you can , and you ought to give order for the security of your persons . for his majesty and his council having said often , that if you will separate , he will leave to our churches the enjoyment of peace , and of the benefit of his edicts ; it is not reasonable that your separation should be made with danger to your persons . and when you shall require that you may separate with safety , i make no doubt but you will easily obtain your desires , provided that you insist upon what is possible , and such things as the misery of the times , and the present necessity may admit . it remains , that whilst you are together , you advise what ought to be done , in case you may be opprest , notwithstanding your separation . it concerns your prudence to give order , and is not my part to suggest . if in proposing these things to you , i have slipt beyond the bounds of discretion , impute it , if you please , to my zeal for the good and the preservation of the church . and if this my advice be rejected , as unworthy your consideration , i shall have this comfort , that i have discharg'd my conscience , and retiring into a strange country , i shall there finish the few days that remain for me to live , lamenting the ruin of the church , and the destruction of the temple ; for the building of which , i have labour'd with more courage and fidelity , than with success . the lord turn his wrath from us , guide your assembly , and preserve your persons . i am , &c. when this letter was read in the assembly , which did not at all approve it , some arose immediately , went from the assembly , and never return'd more ; and all found in the end , that the advertisements of this holy person were prophesies . it appears then , that notwithstanding the great temptations of fear and despair , that mov'd this assembly to resist the king , their resistance was disavow'd by the best and the greatest party of the reform'd churches of france , and that they were exhorted to obey the king by their divines , who , in matters of conscience , are the representative body of the church , when they are solemnly assembl'd . now this was the sense of the national synod , of which this eminent person came from being the president . 't is then wrongfully that the noble marquess taxes all our party with rebellion , when as our theologians declar'd themselves so strongly against it ; the most of those that held these places of security , open'd their gates to the king ; and more than three fourths of his subjects of the reform'd religion kept in their obedience . i cannot omit , that in the greatest heat of those who resisted , there yet remained many glances of loyaly and love for their king. i shall observe two : at the siege of montaubon , the most obstinately defended of all the other sieges , the king and his court passed before the walls , from whence they were shooting most furiously : but when the besieged beheld his majesty , they left off shooting , and cry'd out with a great force , long live the king. the instance of rochel is more remarkable , and it is very memorable . the rochellers besieg'd , implored the assistance of england , which was offer'd them ; but the duke of buckingham came late , so that the rochellers after they had eaten the horses , were now eating their saddles . in this great extremity the duke told their deputies , that if they would deliver the town to the king of england , they should be assisted effectually . the deputies refus'd , and the rochellers resolv'd to undergo all the rigours that their king , provok'd , would exercise upon them , rather than deliver the town to a stranger . this just king had notice thereof , and treated them the more mildly at the surrender , overcoming , like a christian , evil with good . the noble marquess does the quite contrary , for he studies to overcome good with evil ; displaying our faults , with all the aggravation , and concealing our services . he says , that the spirit of the huguenots is always ready for revolts , for confusion and anarchy . that there will be more than an hundred thousand men of the kings enemies in the bowels of his kingdom , so long as there shall be huguenots in france ; and that perhaps they wait only an occasion to rise up in arms. he pretends even to know their hearts , saying , that they have in their hearts the same hatred they had ; which are words flung out with more animosity than reason . for 't is but ill logick , that they are all rebels , because about a six part of their number took up arms , in their defence , to keep some places of safety ; and that because they have sin'd they never have repented . if all they who have been engag'd in the troubles of the state , within these last forty years , are to be thought the kings enemies for ever ; his majesty would find few persons in his kingdom whom he might trust ; and now forty years are past since the war for those places of safety , was ended . when the body is in a fever , the good humors are stir'd as well as the bad , and all settle again when the disease is over . the same is in the body of a state ; it is subject to hot fits that enflame both good and bad ; but all grow cool and quiet in time , by the wisdom of the sovereign , and by the repentance of those that are honest good men . to upbraid them as rebells and enemies , that took up arms against their duty , and laid them down again forty years ago ; this is to violate the laws of amnesty , without which no state could subsist . kings being the lieutenants of god , ought to deal with their subjects as god does with his . he forgives and forgets offences ; and makes them faithful that were disobedient , through his benefits . the protestants of languedoc stay'd not for the kings benefits , till they testifi'd their fidelity , and their oblivion of what they had suffer'd in the reduction of the places that they had held , than when their wounds were yet bleeding . this was when the duke of montmorency in longuedoc , where he was governor , made a party against the king , hoping to find the protestants , who are in great numbers in that province , ready for an insurrection from the resentment of their late sufferings . but he found the quite contrary ; for they all joyn'd as one man with the kings forces , and did him excellent service in a battel where the duke was defeated and taken , and a bishop with him . the old marshall de la force , who had scap'd the massacre of st. barth olomew , by hiding himself under the carkasses of his brothers , whose throats were cut , was one of the principal commanders in this action . that marquess confesses , that in the wars at paris , they put themselves in arms , and with great respect protested , that they were at the kings service ; and their actions would have justify'd their protestations , if his majesty had had occasion for their service . i will not loose time and pains in making reflections upon the fourteen ways he proposes to torment us , and make us weary of our religion , of our country , and our lives . ways enough are found out , without his proposing . and now , because the king , of late years , has had much to do with the court of rome , it has been a part of the policy of france , whilst they affront the pope , at the same time to treat us with some extraordinary severity , to prevent the suspicion of heresie . we humble our selves under the powerfull hand of god , and under that of our sovereign ; confessing that we are justly chastis'd for our sins . for the rest , we know in whom we have trusted , and shelter our selves under the hand that strikes us ; assuring our selves , that it will protect us , and that we shall find jesus christ our redeemer , and his spirit our comforter , both in this life and in that which is to come . as the marquess is very exact in giving instructions to ruine us , he does the same towards the end of his book for england ; counting it a nation that is good for nothing but to be ruin'd . we cannot take the advantage of these instructions given against us , to defend our selves against them , for we are a body meerly passive , expos'd , and submitted to all that god and the king will do with us . but for the english , when he has disoblig'd them by the most odious character that his malice could furnish his eloquence withall ; he obliges them , in publishing all those ways that must be taken to destroy them ; for it is likely , that being told of them , they will look to themselves . mean time , his readers will say of him , that they who tell aforehand of their cunning , are not very cunning . because that the noble marquess terms us rebels and enemies of the state , after the humble confession of our faults , which i have neither cloak'd nor dissembl'd ; i will take the boldness to compare them with those of some of the gentlemen of the roman clergy , especially of the jesuits and their disciples : and that they that are not pre-possest with passion may judge , whether to them rather , or to us , belongs the title , of enemies of the state , let us consider the actions and the doctrine of the one and the other , for the actions , the horrible attempts against the sacred persons of our kings , by ecclesiasticks and scholars of the jesuits , and all the enormities of the league , to destroy our kings , our laws , and our monarchy , and to transfer it to a stranger ; carry away without dispute the prize of villany , from those who being possest with a fear ill-grounded , have with arms defended the places that were lent to them by edict , for the security of their religion , of their goods , and of their lives . add hereto , that they had their hearts big with the sense of their incomparable service to the crown , and believ'd they well deserv'd what these endeavour'd to keep . and as for the doctrine , these never read lectures of rebellion and parricide . and the resistance some of the party made against the king , was condemn'd by their divines , whose writings are full of lessons of obedience , and of fidelity to their sovereigns . whereas those of the jesuits , and their disciples , teach the people to cast off and kill their king , so often as it may please the pope to excommucate him . france has felt the effects of this doctrine during the long wars of the league ; and it was the books and the sermons that made the sword be drawn , and that sharpen'd the daggers for the murder of our kings , whilst the protestants expos'd their lives for their preservation . now i am content to let pass what is past , provided the same may be done to us . let us fix upon the present . whom ought you to esteem the enemies of the state , those who subject the crown of our kings absolutely to the papal mitre , and who acknowledge another sovereign than the king ; or they who own him their only sovereign , and maintain that his crown depends not save on god alone ? what , in conscience , is the true ground of the great hatred that is born us ? is it not for that , if we are to be believ'd , there would not in france be any french-man that is not the kings subject , causes beneficial and matrimonial would not be carried to rome , nor the kingdom be tributary under the shadow of annates , and the like impositions . and on this subject , the testimony of cardinal perron for us , in his harangue to the third state , is very considerable ; whe● he says , the doctrine of the deposition of kings , by the pope , has been held in france until calvin . whereby he tacitely acknowledges , that our kings had been ill serv'd before ; and that those he calls hereticks having brought to light the holy scripture , have made the right of kings be known , which had been kept supprest . shall they be said friends of the state , who owning themselves subjects of a stranger soveraign , dare endeavour to make themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction ? of which the marquess complains loudly , and with good cause ; and of the great resistance they have made to maintain themselves in an usurpation so unreasonable . in this kind , those of the church of the reform'd religion could never be accus'd , in the towns where we have had some power . our religion is hated , because it combats the pride , the avarice , and the usur pations of the court of rome , and their substitutes in the kingdom ; and because we have shewn to the world that sordid bank of spiritual graces they have planted in the church , and how they have drawn to themselves a third of the lands of france , for fear of purgatory , from silly people , mop'd with a blind devotion , and from robbers and extortioners , who have thought to make peace with god by letting these share in the booty . 't is an advice very suitable to the politicks of france , to examine well the controversies that are most gainful to the clergy , as this of purgatory , concerning which an old poet said the truth , in his way of drollery . but if it be so , that no more souls shall go to old purgatory , then the pope will gain nought by the story . it would be wisely done to examine what necessity there is for so many begging-fryers , that suck out the blood and marrow of devout people ; and for so many markets of pardons in honour of a number of saints of a new edition ; and for what design are made so many controversies . and whether it would not be a great treasure for the kings subjects to teach them to work out their salvation , and put their consciences in quiet at a cheaper rate . god , justly provok'd , by the great sins of france , gives us not yet the grace of that gospel-truth , st. john , ch. 8. know the truth , and the truth will set you free . and though it shines out so clear , to let us see the usurpation of the popes upon the temporals of the king , and upon the spirituals of the church ; yet see we not clearly enough to discover all the mystery of iniquity , and to resolve to shake off the yoak . for this great design , no other war need be made by the pope , but only take from him all jurisdiction in france , all annates , and all evocation of causes to rome . this would hardly produce any other stirrs , but the complaints and murmuring of them that are loosers . and the condition , truly royal , that the king at present is in , will sufficiently secure him from insurrections at home , and invasions from abroad . or should any happen , behold , more than an hundred thousand huguenots , that the noble marquess has sound him , in the heart of his state , whom he is pleas'd to call his enemies , but who on all occasions , and on this especially would do his majesty a hearty and faithful service . the two main interests of france , being to weaken the house of austria , the princes of which enclose him on both sides ; and to throw off the yoake of rome , which holds a monarchy within the french monarchy ; 't is easie to judge that amongst the kings subjects , the protestants are absolutely the most proper to serve him on both these occasions . i know that amongst the roman catholicks , as well ecclesiasticks as seculars , there are excellent instruments to serve the king in both these interests . but there is need of great caution to well assure him , by reason of the multitude of jesuits scholars , with whom these fathers have industriously fill'd all professions of the state and church ; and it is for no other end that they have so many colledges . they who have been too good scholars of these masters , are contrary to both these interests , being so great catholicks , that they espouse the interest of the catholick king , to advance that of his holiness . but to find amongst the protestants trusty instruments for both these accounts , he need not try them ; they are fitted and form'd , by their education , for these two uses , so necessary to france . the marquess assures his majesty , with good reason of the friendship of the protestant princes of germany , which they would never testifie so freely , as in serving him to ruin the power of the pope , who savours that of the house of austria . for thereby they would kill two birds with one stone . not to mention our other neighbours , who have broken with rome , and being disquieted by its secret practises , will be ready to contribute to its destruction . who shall well consider the scheme of the affairs of christendem , shall judge , that all things invite his majesty to shut out the jurisdiction of rome beyond the mountains ; right , honour , profit , liberty , facility , his duty to his crown , to his subjects , and to his royal posterity ; and that many aids smile upon him , both within , and out of his kingdom , for so fair and so just an enterprize . this is the warm desire of the honest french-men . and none there are who better deserve that title , than they , who , with the most indignation , resent that their kings should kiss the feet of that prelate , who ought of right to kiss their feet , for having receiv'd his principalities from kings of france ; and who , in recompence of their good deeds , have plotted , and plot continually their ruin . when the king shall have deliver'd himself and his people , from this strange yoak , he will find the enmity amongst his subjects , for matter of religon , greatly diminisht ; and the way open to a re-union . and were the difficulties about the doctrine overcome , the protestants would not stick much at the discipline . god , who is the father of kings , and the king of glory , protect and strengthen our great king , to accomplsh the designs that turn to the general good of his church , to the greatness , and to the respect of his sacred person , and to the peace and prosperity of his state. finis . the new-found politicke disclosing the secret natures and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers; wherein the gouernments, greatnesse, and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured. together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome, both protestants and papists, which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine, as by the speech of the duke of hernia, vttered in the counsell of spaine, and hereto annexed, may appeare. written in italian by traiano boccalini ... and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, 1556-1613. 1626 approx. 502 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 128 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2004-11 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a16264 stc 3185 estc s106274 99841992 99841992 6615 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a16264) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 6615) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1475-1640 ; 773:16) the new-found politicke disclosing the secret natures and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers; wherein the gouernments, greatnesse, and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured. together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome, both protestants and papists, which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine, as by the speech of the duke of hernia, vttered in the counsell of spaine, and hereto annexed, may appeare. written in italian by traiano boccalini ... and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, 1556-1613. vaughan, william, 1577-1641. florio, john, 1553?-1625. scott, thomas, 1580?-1626. newes from pernassus. boccalini, traiano, 1556-1613. pietra del paragone politico. [12], 242, [2] p. printed [at eliot's court press] for francis williams, neere the royall exchange, london : 1626. editor's dedication signed: william vaughan. in three parts; part 1 is a translation by john florio and part 3 an adaptation by william vaughan of "de' ragguagli di parnaso" by traiano boccalini. part 2 is a partial reprint of thomas scott's "newes from pernassus", an adaption of boccalini's "pietra del paragone politico". printer's name from stc. the last leaf is blank. reproduction of the original in the new york public library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to 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elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -early works to 1800. 2004-06 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-06 aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images 2004-07 emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread 2004-07 emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited 2004-10 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the new-found politicke . disclosing the secret natvres and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers ; wherein the gouernments , greatnesse , and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured . together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome , both protestants and papists , which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine , as by the speech of the duke of hernia , vttered in the counsell of spaine , and hereto annexed , may appeare . written in italian by traiano boccalini gentleman of rome , and priuiledged by sundry princes of italy , and also out of italy by the most christian king. and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome . london , ¶ printed for francis williams , neere the royall exchange . 1626. to the kings most excellent maiestie . dread soueraigne , the kinde welcome which these raggualioes of boccalini lately found among the french and in other princes courts , who suspect the incroaching power of the house of austria , hath moued me to collect and consecrate them in english weeds vnto your maiestie . the first was translated by m. florio , sometime seruant to your royall mother of blessed memory . the second by one , vnto whom the common-wealth cannot as yet be beholding for his name ; and the third part by me , although farre inferiour vnto either of them for any knowledge which i dare arrogate to my selfe in the italian tongue , hauing discontinued the vse thereof since my returne out of italie , being aboue 24. yeeres past , vntill this present time . yet neuerthelesse , when i had fully perused the noueltie of the authors straine , the pleasant conceits of the worke , enterlaced with some matters of consequence , which might serue for caueats and annotations to such as stand interessed in state-affaires , i was encouraged to renew that which i had so long neglected , and by compiling some of the choisest obseruations , to present them to your iudicious view . and because my chiefest cares for many yeeres haue beene fixt vpon that most hopefull plantation in the iland commonly called the new-found land , i entituled this worke the new-found politicke , as well in regard of my affection deuoted to that place , as for the newnesse of the stile and matter , wherein the author poetically discouers some mysteries of policie , which may rowze vp the spirits of the state of venice , and other neighbouring prouinces , to watch with argus eyes , lest the deceitfull shew of indian gold , a fitter bait for turks and moores , might produce any sudden innouation preiudiciall to the libertie of christendome , which ought to flourish in mutuall loue and charitie , and not to liue in continuall iealousies to be surprized by any prince that acknowledgeth christ for their vniuersall head. the king is wise as is the angell of god , and conceiues more than it becomes a man of my ranke to insinuate to so high a maiestie concerning the affaires of long-handed princes , whom experience , and not the admonition of a contemplatiue scholar , hath taught to remember that verse of the poet : tunc tua res agitur paries cùm proximus ardet : when the next wall vnto your house doth burne , looke to your selfe betimes ; next is your turne . the king of kings long preserue your maiestie in all earthly happinesse , to his glory , our comfort , and the defence of the true christian faith. so praieth from the bottome of his heart your maiesties most humble subiect , william vavghan . the contents of the first part. chap. 1. the company or corporation of polititians , sets vp a ware-house or publike shop in parnassus , in which are to be sold diuers kinds of wares vsefull for the vertuous life of the learned . chap. 2. the most soueraigne vertue fidelitie , being secretly fled from parnassus , apollo hauing discouered where she had hidden herselfe , dispatcheth the two most excellent muses , melpomene and thalia , to perswade her to returne . chap. 3. apollo perceiuing the great disorders , that the flight of the sacred vertue fidelitie bred in all mankind , by the mediation of the soueraigne muses , and of the sublime heroike vertues , obtaineth her returne into parnassus . chap. 4. iustus lipsius , to make amends for the fault he had committed in accusing of tacitus , doth so passionately obserue him , that before apollo he is charged to idolatrize him : whereupon after a faigned , and but verball punishment , he is in the end by his maiestie , not onely absolued , but highly commended and admired . chap. 5. the chiefest learned men of parnassus are sutors vnto apollo , to inioyne tacitus , to recompile those books of his annales and histories , which are lost . chap. 6. cornelius tacitus , for some complaints vrged against him by diuers great princes , by reason of certaine politicall spectacles , which he hath deuised , most preiudiciall vnto their gouernment , hauing beene imprisoned , is by apollo set at liberty . chap. 7. the duke of laconia , for hauing aduanced a most faithfull secretary of his , to the highest dignities of his estate , is accused before apollo to idolatrize and dote vpon a mignon : but he doth most egregiously defend himselfe . chap. 8. apollo , bewailing the wofull wracks , which in the courts of great princes , his vertuous followers suffer , and fall into ; for to assure their nauigation , commandeth some of the chiefest learned men in his dominion , to endeuour to frame a sailing-card , to saile safely by land . chap. 9. the lord iohn de la casa , hauing presented his quaint galateo , or booke of manners vnto apollo , meeteth with great difficulties in diuers nations , about their promises to obserue the same . chap. 10. apollo hauing highly commended the statute , made by the most mighty kings of spaine , that no aduocates , lawyers , or proctors , shall passe into the indies , the doctors of the law finding themselues aggrieued , complaine vnto his maiestie . chap. 11. an apothecarie , at the very instant , that he is taken prisoner by sargeants , without being examined at all , is forthwith condemned and sent to the gallies . chap. 12. the vertuous people of apolloes state , hauing consigned vnto his maiesties generall treasurer , the accustomed donatiue of a thousand conceits , according to their custome they beg a boone or grace at his hands . chap. 13. by letters intercepted , and taken from a currier , dispatched by some princes to the lake of averno , the common people come to know , that the rancors and hatreds now raigning among diuers nations , are occasioned and stirred vp by the artifices of their princes . chap. 14. antonio perez of aragon , hauing presented the booke of his relations vnto apollo , his maiestie doth not onely refuse to accept it , but commandeth the same to bee presently burnt . chap. 15. the monarchy of spaine is much aggrieued , that her falshoods and treacheries are discouered . chap. 16. the spanish monarchie arriueth in parnassus ; shee intreateth apollo to be cured of a cauterie : shee is dismissed by the politicke physitians . chap. 17. the spanish monarchy goeth to the oracle of delphos , to know whether she shall euer obtaine the monarchy of the world ; she hath a crosse answer . chap. 18. philip the second of that name , king of spaine , after long strife about his title , makes his solemne entry into parnassus . chap. 19. the dogs of the indies are become wolues . chap. 20. the french are humble sutors vnto apollo , to know the secret , how to perfume gloues after the spanish fashion . chap. 21. why the monarchy of spaine is lately retired into her palace . chap. 22. how the ministers and officers of spaine are continually interessed in their priuate profit . chap. 23. apollo hauing vsed all possible meanes , and exquisite diligence , to haue some one of the court-mignons , or princes-idols taken and apprehended , doth seuerely proceed against one lately fallen into the hands of the iudges . chap. 24. the whole race or genus of sheep send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they earnestly intreat him to grant them sharp teeth and long hornes : whose suit is by his maiestie scorned and reiected . chap. 25. in a publike congresse or assembly , contrary to the accustomed manner of the phoebean court , force hauing pretended to precede reputation ; that illustrious ladie with an excellent resolution , maintaineth her reputation and credit which was in some danger . chap. 26. the prouince of focides by her ambassadors complaineth vnto apollo , that his maiesties officers doe not permit her to enioy her priuiledges : whose request is not only reiected , but they haue a most sharp and vnpleasant answer . chap. 27. socrates hauing this morning beene found dead in his bed , apollo vseth all possible diligence , to discouer the true occasion of his so sudden death . chap. 28. natalis comes the historian , for hauing spoke something in a publike congresse of learned men , that grieuously offended apollo , is by his maiestie seuerely punished . the contents of the second part. chap. 1. maximilian the emperour is aduertised of the trouble begun among his sonnes . chap. 2. most of the princes , common-weales , and states of europe , are weighed in a paire of scales , by lorenzo medici . chap. 4. almansor , sometime king of the moores , encountring with the kingdome of naples , they relate one to another the miseries they sustaine by the oppression of the spaniards . chap. 5. sigismund battor learneth the latine tongue . chap. 6. the cardinall of toledoes summa is not admitted into the library of parnassus . chap. 7. the monarchy of spaine throweth her physitian out of the window . chap. 8. most of the states of the world are censured in parnassus for their errors . chap. 9. the monarchy of spaine inuiteth the cardinall of toledo , to be her theologian , which he refuseth , and why . chap. 10. the spaniards attempt the acquisition of savoy , but doe not preuaile . chap. 11. the duke d'alva being arriued at parnassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , they fall foule about defrauding the colonesis of their titles . the poste of parnassus to the reader . the contents of the third part. chap. 1. after an exquisite examination and triall made of those wits , which ought to haue the charge of prouinciall gouernments , a rank of gouernors are published in parnassus , and wholsome auisoes for all gouernours , iudges , and vnder-officers of state. chap. 2. the most illustrious monarchies resident at parnassus , demand by what meanes the venetian lady got such exact obedience , and exquisite secrecie of her nobilitie , whereof she giues them conuenient satisfaction . chap. 3. the romane monarchy demanding of cornelius tacitus the resolution of a politicall question , receiues full satisfaction of the shepherd meliboeus , who casually was there present . chap. 4. many people hauing wasted their meanes by gluttonous feasts , prodigall fare , and pompous apparell , for the moderating of such lauish expences , doe desire a statute of their princes , but they misse of their purpose . chap. 5. terence the comedian being imprisoned by iason the pretour of vrbine , for keeping a concubine , is deliuered by apollo with very great dishonour to the pretour . chap. 6. domitius corbulo for certaine words spoken by him during the time of his gouernment , which sauoured of tyrannie , is called in question by the criminall magistrates , but in the end , to his greater glory , dismissed . chap. 7. by the promotion of diogenes the cynick , vnto a higher place , the honourable chaire of the tranquillitie of a priuate life being vacant , apollo prefers the famous philosopher crates to that charge , who refuseth it . chap. 8. a controuersie hapning betwixt the gouernours of pindus and libethrum about matters of iurisdiction ; apollo punisheth them both . chap. 9. the vertuous of parnassus doe visit the temple of the diuine prouidence , whom they humbly thanke for the great charitie which his supreme maiestie from time to time hath vouchsafed to shew vnto mankind . chap. 10. a contention hapning between many learned men , which might be the most notable politick law , or most excellent custome worthy of commendation in the flourishing state of venice , the same is finally decided and determined by the venetian state herselfe , to whose arbitrement the question is referred by their generall consent . chap. 11. the doctors of the chaire hauing admitted into their vniuersitie some famous poeticall ladies , apollo commands them to be dismissed home to their families . chap. 12. the lady victoria colonna intreats of apollo , that the infamie which women incurred for cuckolding their husbands , might likewise extend to adulterous husbands . apolloes answer . chap. 13. a poetaster for playing at cards and deuising the game called triumph or trump , is brought before apollo , who after he had deeply entred into the mysticall meaning of the said game , not only dismisseth him , but granteth him an yearly pension to instruct his courtiers in that new arte. chap. 14. it being noted , that petus thraseas in the company of his sonne in law eluidius priscus did vse commonly to frequent the house of the lady victoria colonna , he is grieuously rebuked by apollo . chap. 15. a learned gentleman of rome begs a remedie of apollo , to make him to forget certaine grieuous wrongs , which hee had receiued in the court of a great prince : for which cause his maiestie causeth him to drinke a cup-full of the water of lethe , but with vnfortunate successe . chap. 16. apuleius his golden asse , and plantus his asse do complain vnto apollo of the great seuerity which their masters vsed in beating them . but they are sent away with no pleasing answer . chap. 17. a generall reformation of the world by the seuen wise men of greece , and by other learned men , is published by expresse order from apollo . chap. 18. the duke of hernia his speech in the councell of spaine to a proposition , whether it were expedient for his catholike maiestie , to conclude a peace with his brother in law the duke of savoy . the new-fovnd politicke . the first part . the company or corporation of polititians , sets vp a ware-house or publike shop in parnassus , in which are to be sold diuers kinds of wares vsefull for the vertuous life of the learned . the first raguaglio of the first part . the great businesse , which the corporation of polititians hath for so many moneths negotiated with these exchequer-officers , that they might set vp a publike ware-house , common to their nation , in parnassus , with large priuiledges for politians , was the last week fully concluded and established . and euen yesterday , in the great market-place , they made a most sumptuous shew of all such wares , as men commonly do most stand in need of . and euen as menante will not thinke his labour ill employed to giue you notice of the chiefest of them ; so is hee perswaded , that some honest man will not disdaine to reade them . first then , there is to be sold in that admirable ware-house great store of stuffing , or ( as some call it ) quilting , which though it be of no esteeme among the base and vulgar sort of men , yet is it valued and bought vp at a very high rate of many wise and vnderstanding men , namely , of courtiers , who haue discouered , that it is the shearings or nap of those rich clothes of prudence , which wise men weaue with the fine wooll of patience , and serues to boulster or fill vp the pads of seruitude , or pack-sadles of bondage , to the end they may fit the more easie vpon the backes of wretched courtiers , and hide those lothsome bloudy gallings and festered sores , which seem most vgly in such men , who albeit they be knowne for capitall enemies vnto all paines and labour , are not notwithstanding induced to serue & follow the courts , with an assured hope , there to liue an idle merry life , and proudly to command others . it hath by diuers beene obserued , ( as a thing regardfull ) that many young men , who though they may liue well in their own fathers houses , haue neuerthelesse bought vp good store of that precious stuffing , and haue therwith quilted certaine petty boulsters , vnto which they enure themselues in the seruice of priuate houses , only that they may not come into courts , as vnbroken colts , and in receiuing the first time the boistrous heauy pack-saddle of court seruitude , assure themselues not to commit those fond actions , and fantasticke prankes , which enforce house-stewards , and hall-vshers ( who are the rough house-breakers of young courtiers ) to giue them some lashes of bitter distastes , thereby to bring them vnto the patient toleration of that irkesome and toilesome thraldome . there is also sold in the said ware-house great store of most excellent pencils for those princes , who in their vrgent occasions , are often enforced to paint white for blacke vnto their people . and although this be a merchandize only fit for princes , yet doe those false-hearted men make great prouision of them , that relying on the traffique of apparances , apply themselues to nothing more , than to the infamous profession to leere and laugh in ones face , and vnderhand craftily to deceiue him , and to winde about the silly credulons people with fawning faire words , and foule tainted deeds . they haue likewise an infinite quantity of spectacles of admirable and sundry vertues : some of which serue to giue light vnto those salacious and beastly luxurious men , whose sight doth so faile them in the fury of their vnbridled and libidinous lust , that they cannot discerne honour from infamie , nor know a friend from a foe , a stranger from a kinsman , nor any other thing worthy of respect . so great is the riddance , that those politicke merchants do hourely make of such spectacles , as all may euidently perceiue , that few or none are those men , that in carnall things haue a good or cleare sight . they haue besides a kinde of spectacles , which serue to dimme all light , and shorten all sight : and the politicians themselues affirme , that albeit these spectacles are more behoouefull vnto all sorts of men , than those that extend the sight farre off , yet are they most needfull vnto courtiers , by reason , that there doe often present themselues most lothsome and nastie things vnto the sight of honest men . and for so much as to turne ones backe towards them may breed displeasure , yea and anger in mightie men or great lords : and to looke vpon them is a torment and vexation vnto an honest minde : and therefore for a man vpon any such occasion to put so strange spectacles vpon his nose , he is free frō the troublous molestation to see the lothsome and abominable things of this fil the corrupted world , and the vulgar silly multitude is induced to thinke , that a man viewes them with more heedie curiositie . there are also other spectacles very good to preserue the sight of those vnkinde and vnthankfull men , which the very first day of any new dignitie receiued , waxeth so dim and misty , as it reacheth euen to the bounds of ingratitude . the politicians that keepe the shop and fell them , say that they are made with the precious stuffe of the fast-holding memory of benefits receiued , and of the remembrance of fore-passed friendship . but most wondrous are those spectacles framed with such skilfull art , that they cause to those that haue them on , pleas to seem : elephants , and pigmeys giants . these are greedily bought vp by certaine great men , who putting them vpon the noses of their vnfortunate attendants , do so alter and distract their sight , as if their lord doe but once lay his hand vpon their shoulder , or looke vpon them with a smile , though artificiall , and perhaps forced , they deeme it as a reward of fiue hundred crownes a yeere . but the spectacles lately inuented in the low-countries are likewise bought vp at a very deare rate by great lords , and distributed among their courtiers , which being vsed by them , they cause those offices and rewards , to which their sight shall neuer attaine , not perhaps their age reach , to seeme neare at hand . moreouer , there are to be sold in the said ware-house ( but at a most excessiue rate ) humane eyes , which are of admirable vertue , since it is impossible to thinke , how infinitely a man bettereth his owne things , when he viewes them with others eyes : yea the very politicians themselues protest vpon their cōsciences , that with no other , or better instrument , may a man sooner attaine vnto the happinesse , to purchase that thrice excellent vertue , so ambitiously aimed at , and sought after by great men , of nosce te ipsvm . there are also sold in that shop , certaine compasses , not made of siluer , of brasse , or of steele , but of the pure interesse of the most fine reputation , that may be found in all the mine of honour : and they are most admirable to measure a mans owne proper actions , since experience hath manifestly caused all men to know , that compasses framed of the base stuffe of fantasticke conceit , of selfe-will , or of meere interresse , do seldome proue iust and true to those , who in their owne affaires desire to draw their liues parallel . moreouer , such compasses proue most excellent to those , that doe exactly possesse the skill and art to vse them , to take the iust measure of the latitude of those ditches , which for their credit and reputation they are compelled to leape cleane ouer , and not runne in danger to fall or stumble in the middle of them , and ●●mefully bury themselues aliue in the puddle of folly and vnheedinesse : nor can those lauish waste-goods , and spend-thrifts , whose purses being but shallow and poore , will waste and spend like princes , with any other instrument , better learne the most necessary vertue to make the step answerable to the leg , than with these compasses . the said politicians doe likewise sell a numberlesse quantitie of boxes or leather-cases full of mathematicall instruments , such as surueyors or land-meters doe vse , which are more than necessarie , exactly to measure , and in all dimensions to square out those with whom a man is to treat about graue affaires , and important negotiations , or to confer and impart weighty secrets . the said warehouse hath also great vtterance of certaine iron-tooles , which resemble those , that chirurgions or tooth-drawers vse , and call barbicans . they serue to open and dilate the chaps of those vnhappy courtiers , which being to make a vertue of necessitie , are often compelled to swallow huge great pumpions in stead of small mastick pills . they haue likewise great store of beesoms , made of circumspection , whereof warie courtiens make good prouision aforehand , that they may euery morning and euening diligently sweepe from off the staires , which they daily goe vp and downe , perilous hard peasen scattered vpon them by certaine enuious and maleuolent spirits , who taking greater pleasure in spoiling other mens affaires than in accommodating their owne , doe onely exercise the shamelesse trade , and trecherous worke , of breaking the neck of honest and vertuous mens reputation . moreouer , there is in th●● ●●shop to be sold ( but for the weight in gold ) a kinde of most perfect and superexcellent inke of the maker , far more precious than bise of the most far-fetched azure , which by the quills of learned writers ( being vertuously and skilfully displaid on books ) serueth to embalme the dead bodies of vertuous men , and to yeeld them most aromatically odoriferous vnto after-ages ; whereas those of the ignorant yeeld a most loathsome stench , and are soone turned into vselesse ashes . and with this ink● only is the name of the learned eternized in the memorie of all nations , which in the illiterate and ignorant doth suddenly die and vanish . a balsame ( truly ) of more than humane vertue , since those , that therewith annoint themselues , liue , although they die , and departing out of the world , but with their bodies , abide perpetually therein with the memorie of their learned works . an infinite summe of money doe likewise those politicians receiue daily for a kinde of oyle , which they sell , for so much as it hath often beene experienced to be most exquisitely auaileable , to comfort and corroborate the queasie stomacks of courtiers , to the end that without enfeebling their constitution of patients , the poore vnfortunate wretches , may the more easily and speedily digest the bitter distastes , which so often and daily they are enforced to swallow and pocket vp in courts . they sell moreouer in certaine little viols of glasse , ( of which menante , who writes these present newes , hath been so fortunate as to get one at a reasonable rate ) odoriferous humane sweat , most admirable to perfume those , who with the fragrancie of muske and ciuets of honourable labours will endeuour with pen in hand to appeare and ranke themselues among learned men . the said warehouse hath also great dispatch of a kinde of penids , made of most fine paste-royall , very excellent to whet and stir vp the appetite of certaine wilfull sowre stoicks , to the end , that with an insatiate greedinesse , they may know how to eat and feed on those loathsome dishes of this world , which albeit they recoyle and prouoke vomit in some , and are wholly repugnant vnto the taste and stomacke of good men , neuerthelesse there be some , who because they will not purchase the displeasure of great men , and so ouerthrow their owne affaires by pulling an old house on their heads , are forced to make shew and pretence , that they greedily desire them , and with hungry rauenousnesse deuoure them . there are besides to be seene in that shop certaine great boxes full of musk-comfets , very excellent to make the breath of those secretaries , priuy counsellors , or senators in common-wealths ( who are bound to let secrets putrifie in their bodies ) to yeeld a sweet sauour . then in a back-roome and seuerall magazin , they sell certaine horse-pasterns or fetters , made of the iron of considerate maturitie , which , though by some foolish kinde of men , they be scorned and reiected as implements for beasts , the wiser and more warie haue lately brought them into so great credit , as they are daily bought vp at an excessiue price by those precipitate and foole-hardie wits , that fearing , or scorning the iudicious maturitie of the ordinarie carier , take pleasure rashly , and hand-ouer-head to addresse and compasse all their affaires by posts and curriers . but no other merchandise of that rich warehouse hath lately had greater vtterance , than certaine fann's , made , not of the feathers of ostriges , of peacocks , or of any other gay-coloured bird , but of herbs and flowers . and because mr. andrea mathioli , the delphick herbalist , hath among those flowers and herbs found and knowne the drearie and infernall weed , wolues-bane , the warie and fore-seeing vertuous inhabitants of parnassus , haue euidently discouered , that those mysterious fann's , serue not to make wind in the h●at of summer , but to rid and driue away from mens noses those importunate flies , which certaine ill-aduised and vnheedie spirits , hauing gone about to remoue , by hitting them with their daggers , haue shamefully slit and cut their owne noses . the most soueraigne vertue fidelitie , being secretly fled from parnassus , apollo hauing discouered where shee had hidden her selfe , dispatcheth the two most excellent muses , melpomene and thalia , to perswade her to returne . rag. 11. 1 part. the royall palace of the soueraigne vertue fidelitie , which whilome was so frequented by the chiefest and most eminent officers of princes , and by an infinite number of senators of the most renowmed common-wealths , is of late so little haunted , that it seemeth to be the house of desolation . whereupon , on the 18. day of this present moneth , the honourable mansion of so excelse a vertue was seene to be cleane shut vp . apollo was no sooner aduertised of so important a case , but he commanded , that the gate of her famous palace , should with violence be laid open ; and that from the ladie fidelitie herselfe , they should vnderstand the true occasion of so strange a noueltie . his maiesties beheast was forthwith put in execution , and they , who most exactly searched each corner of the royall palace , found no creature therein , which the vertuous inhabitants of parnassus vnderstanding , they presently put themselues into mourning weeds , sprinkled themselues with ashes , and shewed diuers other signes of sad sorrow : yea and apollo himselfe in particular did so grieuously condole , that all the court might euidently perceiue in him those very same effects of inward sorrow , which he publikely made demonstration of , at what time the wailefull and deplorable disaster befell his vnfortunate sonne phaeton . his maiestie well knowing , that the gouernment of mankind would goe to wrack , if the solide foundation , which vpholdeth all this worlds machine , should faile , caused presently certaine edicts to be proclaimed , wherein ( both to the ignorant , and to all others incapable of the most noble prerogatiue , to liue with honourable fame and good report in the memory of men ) he freely granted a hundred yeares of immortalitie , to be deliuered him so soone as he should finde out , where that famous vertue had hidden herselfe . and to assure the payment promised , the royall exchequer-chamber deliuered bills of exchange , and letters of assignation , signed by homer , by virgil , by liuie , and by most wealthy tacitus ; all of them principall and most eminent merchants in the factorie of paruassus , amongst those vertuous men , who with their praise-worthy studies , wholly apply themselues to the right noble and honest traffique , to e●ernize others names in the memorie of all nations . the greatnesse of the promised reward inuited diuers to goe seeke her out . and after much pursuit and exact diligence , the royall maiestie fidelitie was found in a stable , lying among the hounds and spaniels belonging to the famous hunter acteon , and of most louely adonis . apollo being in all possible haste aduertised of so strange a noueltie , did immediatly send thither the two soueraigne muses , melpomene and thalia , to the end that remouing so excellent a virtue from so vile and loathsome a place , they should reconduct her to her wonted habitation . but all endeuours proued vaine : for that glorious princesse , bitterly bewailing her disastrous condition , cried out , oh you sacred di●ties , relate vnto my soueraigne good lord apollo from me , that my eternall and most capitall enemy fraud , hath at last obtained a compleat victorie , touching the controuersie , that shee hath euer had with me : and how that infamous interesse , who in these dismall daies , tyrannizeth ouer the minds of all the best nations , hath rigorously banished me from out the hearts of men , which in former times were wholly mine . let his maiestie likewise vnderstand , that the whole vniuerse is so deeply plunged in the filthy mud of all abominable and brutish pollutions , that the constant fidelitie , honourably and faithfully to serue her lord or prince , euen to the effusion of the last drop of her heart-bloud , and to the emmission of the last gasps of life , which erst was so admired , and ambitiously sought after , is now adaies reputed no better , than a foolish and hare-brain'd obstinacie . and tell him moreouer , that if a man ( so he may accommodate and fit himselfe to all times to all places , and to all persons ) haue a fraudulent heart , full-fraught with perfidious trechery , and readily disposed , to exercise whatsoeuer execrable infidelity , or damnable periurie ; the same is now adaies commended and extolled , to be wisdome , sagacitie , and warinesse of an all comprehending and reaching wit. and tell him , that i , a poore abiect creature , glutted , and euen tyred to see so filthie and opprobrious things , am inforced to imbrace the resolution ( as you see ) to liue among these dogs , in whom i now finde that true fidelitie , which with so much toylesome carke , i haue euer laboured , and wearied my selfe to insert and plant in the perfidious and interessed heart●● of all men . apollo perceiuing the great disorders , that the flight of the sacred vertue fidelitie , bred in all mankind , by the mediation of the soueraigne muses , and of the sublime heroike vertues , obtaineth her returne into parnassus . rag. 30. 1 part. no tongue can fully expresse what anxietie and anguish apollo fell into by the secret and sudden departure , which ( as by our former letters hath already beene signified ) the excellent vertue fidelitie ( some weeks since ) made from this state of parnassus . for his maiestie could not possibly be at peace , or take any rest , to see the world depriued of so noble a princesse . and his afflictions were daily increased by the foule disorders , which continually were heard to multiply in all principalities , betweene the common people , and thrice-sacred amicitia ( the only exquisite delight of mankind ) who seeing her selfe forsaken by that pre●ious vertue fidelitie ; and fearing to receiue some notable affront by fraud , absolutely denide to inhabit any longer in the hearts of men , who freed from the oath of fidelitie or allegeance , which indissolubly they owe vnto their princes ; and likewise loose from the bond of that sincere loue , with which they are fast tied vnto their priuate friends , became so fell in perfidiousnesse , so brutish in seditions , as making euery most detestable wickednesse to seeme lawfull ; they with treacherie chased vnspotted faithfulnesse from all humane societie , and with foule seditions , sacred peace ; defiling the whole world with bloud , and filled the same with most villanous larcenies , and with all manner of perfidious and execrable confusion . besides , the iust grieuances and complaints of princes did continually molest apollo's minde ; which princes did openly protest , that by the damnable infidelitie of their subiects , they were inforced to abandon the gouernance of mankind : whereupon apollo , to finde out some conuenient remedie against so notorious a mischiefe , thought it expedient to intimate the high court of parlament of all the generall estates , against the twentieth of the last moneth , vnto which hee summoned the poet-princes , and the deputies of all vertuous nations . all which being in great diligence appeared on the prefixed day , there were discouered in many people great hatreds against their princes , all which protested openly , that not by the vice of infidelitie , but vrged and euen compelled by desperation , they had for euer banished from out their hearts that fidelitie , which , as most hurtfull and preiudiciall to them , they were resolutely determined neuer to acknowledge and re-admit : forsomuch as shee was most foulely abused by many princes . and whereas in former times , the fidelitie of subiects , hauing euer serued as an instrument to induce princes , to counterchange the awe and seruice of their people with gentle and courteous vsages , they now clearely perceiued , that the vertue of a base and prostrate obedience , was reputed but the basenesse of an abiect minde , and the merit of a voluntarie and vntainted faithfulnesse , a necessitie to serue ; by reason of which manner of proceeding , publike mischiefes and disorders were vncontroledly gone so farre , that many people had beene compelled to vndertake the resolution , which the world now saw ; onely to the end , that humorous and capricious princes should come to the perfect knowledge , that the authoritie to sway and command may easily be lost , when the outrages , ingratitudes , and misusages , daily vsed towards subiects , hauing surmounted all humane patience , brought all nations ( naturally inclined to dutifull obedience ) euen vnto desperation ; and neuer any more to liue in subiection of masters ; with an obstinate resolution , rather to wrach on a free gouernment , than to be continually contemned , abused , flaied , hurried and molested vnder principalities . although the rage and disdaine of princes towards their subiects were great , and the distaste of the people greater , the soueraigne muses neuerthelesse , with the assistance of the thrice-excellent heroick vertues , who effectually laboured to bring a businesse of so great consequence to some good end , with the dexteritie of their wit , in the end they somewhat calmed and asswaged the minds of the angry princes , and instigated the proud hearts of the enraged people : and the court of parlament was dissolued , with the capitulation of this atonement , that the people should solemnly vow and promise forthwith to readmit into their breasts the excellent vertue fidelitie , which they should sweare to make absolute mistris of their hearts . and that princes should be strictly bound , to banish and expell from out their hearts , auarice and crueltie ; and in lieu of them , yeeld the free possession of their mindes vnto the soueraigne vertues , liberalitie , bountie , and clemencie , who were they , that perpetually held fidelitie and obedience fast ●ettered in the hearts of subiects : since that by an autenticall testimonie , subscribed by caius pliuius , and other naturall h●storians , it most euidently appeared , that the sillie sheepe , who are seene so gently and willingly to obey their shepherds , doe notwithstanding shun and abhor all butchers . and that it was impossible to induce dogs ( although naturally most trusty , louing , and kinde to their masters ) to wag their taile , or to leape , and faune on those , that gaue them more stripes than morsels of bread . iustus lipsius , to make amends for the fault hee had committed in accusing of tacitus , doth so passionately obserue him , that before apollo he is charged to idolatrize him : whereupon after a faigned , and but verball punishment , hee it in the end by his maiestie , not only absolued , but highly commended and admired . rag. 86. 1 part. the most curious learned of this state , haue often obserued , that whensoeuer any vertuous man , doth through humane frailty commit any ouersight , for the dread which he afterward seeleth of wicked actions , doth in such sort ( with falling into the other extreame ) correct the same , that some there be who affirme , that democritus did not so much for the benefit of contemplation , pull out his owne eyes , as for to make amends for the errour hee had committed , laciuiously gazing vpon a most beautious damsell , than beseemed a philosopher of his ranke and profession . and the report yet goeth among the vertuous , that harpocrates , to correct the defect of ouermuch babling , for which he was greatly blamed at a great banquet , fell into the other extreame , neuer to speake more : nor ought the sentence of the poet be accounted true , dam vitant stulti vitia , incontraria currunt . since that , in a dog that hath once bin scalded with boiling water , it is held a point of sagacitie , to keepe himselfe in his kennell when it raineth . as likewise it is the part of awary man to auoid eeles , if hee haue once beene deadly bitten by snakes . this we say , for so much as so great was the griefe , and so notorious the agonie , that iustus l●psius felt for the accusation , which he so vnhappily framed and published against tacitus , that to repaire the fault , which of all the vertuous of this state was exceedingly blamed , not long after fell into that errour , and went in person to visit tacitus , and for the iniury which he acknowledged to haue done him , hee most humbly begged pardon at his hands . tacitus knowing what reputation the readinesse of a free and genuine pardon yeeldeth a man , with a magnanimity worthy a romane senator , not only frankly and generously forgaue lipsius the iniury receiued , but ( which by the vnanimous report of all the vertuous of this state hath deserued highest commendations ) he most affectionately thanked him for the occasion he ministred vnto him , to make purchase of that glory , which sincerely to forget all iniurious affronts receiued , doth procure and conferre vpon a man , vnto the ancient and most affectionate deuotion , which lipsius ( who had euer bin most partially affected vnto tacitus ) had euer borne vnto so sublime an historian ; the wonder of so great indulgence being adioyned , and the facility of a p●rdon so earnestly desired , did so encrease the loue in his minde , and so augment his awfull veneration towards him , that hee more frequented tacitus his house than his owne . hee now loued to discourse with no other learned man : no conuersation did more agrade him : he commended no other historian : and all with soth partiality of inward affection , namely , for the elegancie of his speech , adorned more with choise conceits , than with words ; for the succinctnesse of his close , neruous , and graue sententious oratorie , cleare onely to those of best vnderstanding , with the 〈◊〉 and hatred of other vertuous men of this dominion , dependents of cic●ro , and of the mighty caesarean faction , who approue it not . and did with such diligence labour to imitate him , that not onely with hatefull antonomasia , hee dared to call him his auctor , but vtterly scorning all other mens detections , he affected no other ambition , than to appeare vnto the world a new tacitus . this so vnwonted kindnesse among friends , neuer seene from inferiours towards their superiours , and which exceeded the most hearty loue or affection that any can beare and expresse to the nearest of his blood , engendred such a iealousie in the minds of mercerus , of beatus , rhenanus , of fuluius orsinus , of marcus antonius muretus ; and of diuers others , followers and louers of tacitus , that , induced thereunto by meere enuy , hatched in their hearts ( but according to the custome of worldly dissemblers , which is , to paliate the passion of priuate hatred with the robe of charity toward their neighbour ) vnder colour to reuenge the iniury , which not long since lipsius had done vnto their friend tacitus , they framed an enditement against lipsius , and presented the same vnto apollo , charging him with the same delict or crime of impiety , whereof he had accused tacitus , giuing his maiestie to vnderstand , that hee loued not tacitus as a friend , that he honoured not him as a master , and regardfull patron , but adored him as his apollo and deitie . this accusation , which as in crimes of capitall treason , by reason of it's hainous outragiousnesse , needeth no other proofe than the bare testimony of any one man , did enter so deepely into apollo's minde , as hee deemed himselfe offended by lipsius in the highest degree , caused him forthwith to bee brought before his maiestie , by the pretorian band of the lyrick poets , fast bound in chaines and gyues ; and staring on him with a fierce wrathfull countenance , and with death-threatning gestures , demanded of him , what his genuine opinion or conceit was of a certaine fellow , called cornelius tacitus , borne of an oyle-monger of terni . lipsius vndismaiedly answered apollo , that hee deemed tacitus to be the chiefe standard bearer of all famous historians , the father of humane wisdome , the oracle of perfect reason of state , the absolute master of politicians . the stout coripheus of those writers that haue attained the glory in all their compositions , to vse more conceits than words ; the perfect and absolute forme to learne to write the actions of great princes , with the learned & apparent light of the essentiall source and occasion of them : a most exqusite artifice , and which was onely vnderstood by the sublimest master of the historian art , as that which greatly yeelded him glorious , that knew how to manage it , and him truly learned that had the iudgment duly to consider the same ; the perfect idea of historicall veritie ; the true doctor of princes ; the pedagogue of courtiers ; the superfine paragon , on which the world might try the alloy of the genius of princes ; the iust scale , with which any man might exactly weigh the true worth of priuate men ; the volume which those princes should euer haue in their hands , that desire to learne the skill and knowledge absolutely to command : as likewise those subiects , who wished to possesse the science dutifully and rightly to obey . by this so affected encomium , and by so earnestly exagerated commendations , apollo easily perceiued , and came to know , that lipsius did manifestly idolatrize tacitus , wherupon in minde enraged thus he bespake him . in what esteeme wilt thou then ( oh lipsius ) haue mee , that am the father of all good letters , soueraigne lord of the sciences , absolute prince of the liberall arts , monarke of all vertues , if with such impiety and shamelesse impudency , thou doest idolatrize a writer , so hatefull vnto all good men ? and an author so detestable vnto the professors of the latinetongue , both for the nouelty of his phrase , for the obstruse obscurity of his speech , for the vicious breuity of his discourses , & for the cruell and tyrannous politicall doctrine which he teacheth ? by , and with which , he rather frameth cruell tyrants , than iust princes ; rather wicked and depraued subiects , than endowed with that vntainted probity , which so greatly auaileth , and facilitates in princes the way how to gouerne their states mildly and vprightly . it being most apparent , that with his impious documents , and abominable precepts , he peruerteth lawfull princes into cruell tyrants , he transformeth natural subiects ( which should be as milde and harmelesse sheep ) into most pernicious foxes : and from creatures , whom our common mother nature , with admirable wisdome hath created toothlesse and hornelesse , he conuerteth them into rauenous wolues , and vntamed bulls . who sheweth himselfe a ●lye cunning doctor of false simulations , the only subtile artificer of treacherous tyrannies , a new xenophon of a most cruell and execrable tiberipedia , the wily forger of the euer to be detested mystery , how leeringly to smile and therewith deceiue , how with facility to vtter and affirme that which a man neuer meaneth or intends , effectually to perswade that which one beleeueth not , instantly to craue that which one desireth not , and to seeme to hate that which one loueth ; who is a sublime pedagogue to instruct others in that most villanous doctrine to smother and suppresse the conceits and meanings of a true-meaning heart , and yet to speake with a false-lying tongue : the ingenious architect of fallacies and deceits , and so singular and excellent an author of rash and fond-hardy iudgments , that he hath often most shamefully attributed holy interpretations to most impious and to bee abhorred actions : and on the other side , hath cannonized sacred ones as diabolicall . and wilt thou ( oh lipsius ) among so many my liege and trusty vertuous men , euen before my face , adore and worship as thy god , a man that in all his compositions hath manifestly declared , that he hath not knowne god ? who being composed of nought but impiety , hath sowed and scattered through the wide world , that cruell , prodigious , and desperate policy , which so infinitely defameth those princes that make vse of it , and so deepely afflicteth the people that feele it ; who as well to princes as to priuate men , hath taught the cursed way , and mischieuous fashion , how to conuerse and proceed with false doublenesse ; and the treacherous art , to doe that which a man saies not , and to say that which one meaneth not . a way which by some is practised onely to become skilfull in that abhominable doctrine , how with the pensill of false pretences , to pourtray blacke for white ; to circumwinde the simpler sort of people with the fallacies of faire sugred words , and of lewd and wicked deeds ; to deceiue all men with vsing laughter in anger , and weeping in ioy ; and onely by and with the pernicious compasse of priuate interesse , to measure loue , hate , trust , faith , honestie , and each humane or morall vertue , read and perused by good men , onely to come to the knowledge of the new and hidden tricks and artifices , with which , in these daies , wretched mankinde with so euident calamitie , is most miserably circumgired , and tossed to and fro : and to discouer the most execrable hypocrisie , that diuers followers of so wicked an art haue vsed and practised , to bee by the simpler sort of people reputed for men of vpright conuersation , and honest life ; albeit , for to obserue and obey the rules of tacitus , they act , and daily perpetrate deeds , that by the vgliest diuels of hell , are deemed most abhominable . perceiuest thou not ( oh lipsius ) since the volumes of this thy tacitus haue past the hands of all people , diuers princes haue straied and e●●onged themselues from the ancient course , to gouerne their subiects with humanity , mildenesse , and clemency : and what an infinite number are now cleane parted & diuorced from the genuine plainnesse and singlenesse of atruly-vertuous life ? know lipsius , that so great a part of tacitus his workes ( as some simple and shallow-brain'd men doe affirme ) were not lost in the violent deluges of the barbarous nations , which with so rapid inundations passed into italy , to ouerrunne and subdue it , for they miscaried , and were lost before so great ruines ; not through the ignorance of the people , who in those turbulent and embroiled times , were continually busied in the exercise of armes , but because those yet vntainted ancient nations , in which reigned equally the well-meaning simplicity of minde and heart , and the purity of the then new budding christian religion , abhorred that author whom some ill aduised doe now so much loue and cherish , that ( as i perceiue thy selfe hast done ) many and diuers euidently idolatrizing him , haue ereared him for their golden calfe . tacitus is in euery part of his most vnworthy to be read of good or honest men , for so much as the villanies , and the impieties contained in his workes , doe far exceed in number his leaues , his lines , his words , his sillables , and his letters . but by the life of tiberius , which hee hath compiled , a prince sutable and worthy the genius of such an historian , all must acknowledge the same to bee most intollerable and damnable ; the which for a singular benefit of all mankinde , hauing for many ages lyen secretly hidden in the most secret and concealed parts of germany , through the pesti●erous and diabolicall curiositie of a germane , more dreary and fatall to all the world than his compatriate , that was the first inuented the deadly and dismall bombard , whence it was drawne forth , at what time that most noble prouince began to be infected by the moderne heresie ; only to the end , that with so horrid a prodigie , at the same time that execrable luther began to molest and subuert the sacred rites , wicked tacitus should embroile the prophane . compositions in the highest degree most wicked and pernicions , which for many yeares were lost , because they pleased not antiquity ; and are now , to the great shame and reproach of this age , admired of those polititians , who being followers of such impieties , haue most compleatly learn'd from the master of fallacies and tromparies , the doctrine to know , how to the vtmost of a mans age , to entertainemen with faire words , to feed them with smoake , to fill them with winde , and with vaine-vaine hopes fairly to lead them to extreame beggery . a doctrine most assuredly infernall , which by tacitus the the inuentor and husband thereof , hauing beene sowne and dispersed abroad , onely for the benefit of princes , is now a daies seene to be imbraced and cherished with such insatiate greedinesse , by priuate and meane subiects , that tacitus , who was herefore an auth●● held onely worthy of princes , doth now so publikely passe from hand to hand among all men , that euen shop-keepers , fachius and base porters shew not themselues more cunning in any profession than of state policy , to the great contempt and derision of an art held in highest regard and reputation of great men , the whole vniuerse is seene to swarme , and to be full of sharking and spoiltrade polititians . at these irefull and exorbitant speeches of apollo , lipsius stood amazed , as one halfe dead and distracted , yet notwithstanding , euen in the vtmost abashment and consternation of minde , pulling vp a good heart , and taking breath , most submissiuely begged pardon of his maiestie for any fault hee might haue committed ; then boldly told him , that such and so infinite were his awfull obligations towards his beloued tacitus , and so great was the honour , which among his countrymen the flemings , the english , the germans , the french , the italians , and the spaniards , his bosome-minion , and most dearely beloued author tacitus had purchased him ; whom though he acknowledged to loue most entirely , and to honour as his terrestriall god ; yet , to attaine vnto a superlatiue degree of due satisfaction of his bounden duty , and with exactnesse to accomplish the duty of true gratitude , he thought all he could doe to be nothing , in respect of his vnualuable merits . his reason was , that hauing published and left vnto the world , diuers ordinary labours and compositions , his onely workes vpon tacitus were they , that had made him to merit an abode and mansion in pernassus , and an honourable and immortall renowne among many nations : and that if he , who with other mens money exercised the trafficke of trading and rich merchandizing , was easily pardoned his errour , if hee did euen worship and adore him , that at his pleasure might make him breake and turne begger : how much more then did he deserue of his maiestie to be , if not commended , yet at least excused , if in louing and honouring his deare dearest tacitus , he exceeded all bounds of duty , of decorum , or of dignity , sithence in & vpon him only was grounded the whole fabricke of all the credit and estimation that he had purchased among the vertuous . and that hee , euer since his first ingresse into pernassus , had of all the learned bin so beloued , cherished , courted , and reuerenced , that his house was no otherwise frequented , then that of the most famous writers . but that after hee fell into the errour to make tacitus his enemie , statim relictum illius limen , nemo adire , nemo solari : and therefore rather than hee would any whit diminish his veneration , and awfull respect toward that prime author of his , he was well pleased to hate himselfe , and to lose his life , deeming the losse of the same farre lesse , than the greatnesse of the fame , vnto which by meanes of tacitus he had attained . so highly did these words of lipsius offend apollo's mind , that more and more enraged with fierce wrath , he vehemently complained , that euen before his awfull presence with so impudent asseueration , hee had rather manifestly made demonstration of a wilfull stubbornnesse to perseuere in his stiffe opinion of so hainous an excesse , than humilitie to yeeld vnto penitence , and for his fault to craue p●rdon . and aboue any other demerit of so obstinate a man , his maiestie could by no meanes endure , that he had entitled the impiety of idolatry , with the stile of honourable gratitude ; and wilfull obstinacie , with the title of a constant and vncorrupted truth . whereupon he suddenly commanded the foresaid cohort of the lyricke poets , presently to drag him out of his presence , as one most vnworthy to looke his maiestie in the face , whom he had so capitally offended to the quicke . and that hauing stripped him of such good letters as he possessed , they should publikely proclaime him to be a most shamelesse ignorant asse ; and after burne him aliue , as a most wicked and detestable idolater . forthwith was poore lipsius brought , and haled vnto the place of so great infamie , where his friends most earnestly perswaded him to aduise himselfe , and at once , humbly ●uing for mercy at his maiesties hands , endeauour to saue both his life and reputation . in the very moment of desperation of so horrible and lamentable a plunge , it was manifestly perceiued , that at the apprehension thereof , there appeared in lipsius such an vndanted constancie , and an vndismaid boldnesse of a couragious minde against the terrors of death , that he thus answered apollo . and let his will be done : for , he cannot die ignorant , that can perfectly demonstrate to possesse gratitude , which is the soueraigne queene of all humane vertues . and therefore , the flames that were prepared to consume him , would yeeld a farre brighter splendor of glory , than of fire : and that euen in the last instant of his dying-life , he solemnly protested , that he would in no wise acknowledge the crime wherewith he was charged , to haue ouer-much loued or superstitiously honoured his beloued tacitus to be true . and that by reason of the infinite bonds , wherewith he stood tied vnto him , and for the respectfull loue he bare him ; the griefe and molestation that he felt in remembring , that hee died vngratefull vnto him , did more excruciate and torment him , than the rigor or paines or death : and that the agony , in which they all saw him , proceeded not from the fright or terror hee felt , that hee must die , but from the inward pangs , and hearts griefe , which vexed him , in as much , that he had heard his maiestie , name and pronounce tacitus , to be a wicked atheist . an iniurie , which had it beene vttered of so excellent and wise an author by any other man whatsoeuer , then by his sacred maiestie ( euen in that last gaspe of life ) he would neuer haue left it vnreuenged , at least with the weapons of his tongue . and that with the same libertie , which is so proper vnto such as care not to liue , hee made it knowne vnto all men , that the reall truth was , that tacitus had so much knowledge of god , that he alone , among all the heathen writers , with his profound and exact knowledge , hauing attained perfectly to know of what worth and efficacie ( touching matters of religion ) faith is of those things , which are not seene , or cannot by humane reason be proued , had boldly said , sanctiusque ac reuerentius visum de actis deorum credere , quam scire : words most sacred , and well worthy to be considered by those diuines , who in their writings had lost themselues in their sophisticall subtilities , and logicall nicities . apollo hauing heard these things , as one possessed with wonderment , and full of admiration , presently caused lipsius to be loosed , and most affectionatly embracing him , he thus bespake him ; oh my dearely beloued and vertuous lipsius , with what comfort to me , and auailefull gaine to thee , haue i tempted thy patience , and made triall of thy most vertuous constancie ? and by the bitter detractions , which i haue vttered against tacitus , which are but those with which they accuse him , that either neuer reade him , or vnderstand him not , i haue throughly made proofe of thy zealous deuotion towards that most excellent historian , whom i deeme worthy my regardfull admiration . and by that , which i haue now heard from thee , i doe euidently perceiue , that thou hast read him with delight , studied him with profit , and learnt him to thy great aduantage ; for i know that the stout defence , which to thy immortall glory , thou hast made in his behalfe , is not thine owne , but drawne from thine and mine tacitus . this said and done , apollo turned himselfe towards the vertuous , who for curiositie , and to heare the successe of that great accident , were in great troupes flocked into the hall , he thus said vnto them : oh you my entirely beloued vertuous learned men , admire and perpetually imitate the renowned constancie of this my glorious vertuous lipsius , and let the infinite dilection and sempiternall veneration of that prince , be eternally imprinted in your hearts , who strongly supporteth your reputation : and neuer forget that the credit and power of him , who loseth the good grace and fauour of his prince , doth more easily ruine , and precipitate , than doe the houses , whose foundations faile and decay . and therefore , you that follow princes courts , learne to know , that nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile , ac fluxum est ▪ quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa . a most assured document , which teacheth all men , both in louing , in honouring , and in perpetually seruing their princes with a most constant trust , and stedfast faith to imitate my lipsius . for , euen as in sacred mysteries and holy rites , it is an vnpardonable and grosse impiety , to haue or acknowledge any other god , than him , who hath created man , the heauens , and the earth : so should you neuer admit into your hearts any other deuotion of princes , nor at no time expect commoditie , or wish for preferment , except from that lord , who by the trust and confidence , which he reposeth in your trust and fidelitie , by the extraordinary affection which he beareth vnto you , makes you to be knowne to all the world , not as his seruants , but as his deare friends . and by the supreme and vncontrolled authority , which he suffereth you to exercise in his dominions , causeth you to appeare and seeme vnto his other subiects ( euen as himselfe is ) so many princes . and for so much as the great wittinesse and sagacity of princes , by reason of the great iealousies and diffidences , that accompany those , who sway and raigne , is commonly accompanied by suspition , and fauourites or minions in courts , being euer aggrauated by enuy , euer pried into , and obserued by emulous competitors , and euer persecuted by the malicious or enuious ; to the end you may the more successefully ouercome so many difficulties , and may euer prosperously maintaine your selues in the states and honours which you haue acquired ; loue your princes with all your hearts , obserue them with all your best affections , and euermore serue them with all possible faithfulnesse and sinceritie . and rather , then so much as to thinke , much lesse to doe any thing , that may bring with it the least-least danger to diminish one iot of their good fauour ( as my lipsius hath done ) chuse to yeeld vnto death . and beleeue confidently , that then beginneth your downefall , when by some fatall mischiefe of yours , you suffer your selues to be perswaded or entangled , that you may better or aduantage the condition of your seruice , with , and by vsing with your princes ( who know so much , see so much , vnderstand so much , and obserue sa much , as more cannot possibly be knowne , seene , vnderstood , or obserued ) simulation to seeme that , which one is not ; the falshood at once to smile and deceiue : all double dealing , and to chew with both chaps : all cloging dissimulation in stradling ouer ditches , the better to be able ( if euer his prince should fall into some disaster ) to take part with the conquerour . for , princes , who , suppose they know not so much , yet haue they euer so many whisperers about them , as one or other will bring them in tune . and when they sleepe , they are neuer destitute of wicked spirits to keepe them awake . so that , they , who thinke it safe , and dangerlesse , to liue and hold out long with falshood and dissimulation , may rightly be compared vnto those fooles , that vndertake to cant gipzies , to cheat cozeners , or that hope to sell false balls vnto mountibankes . the chiefest learned men of parnassus are sutors vnto apollo ; to enioyne tacitus , to recompile those bookes of his annales and histories , which are lost . rag. 84. 1. part. yester-day the chiefest learned men of this state of parnassus met together in the common colledge-hall , where after diuers long discourses past between them , they with one accord presented themselues before apollo's maiestie , vnto whom petrus victorius , a great learned man of florence , in the name of all the rest , said , that those vertuous men , whom his maiestie beheld , did most humbly beg a fauour at his hands , the most gracious , that euer hee could conferre vpon his learned followers , who with continuall brackish teares bewailed the disastrous losse of the annales and histories of cornelius tacitus ; the father of humane wisdome , and true inuentor of moderne policie , did most humbly coniure him , to command that excellent man to repaire the damages , which the iniury of times had caused , both to his reputation , and to the generall commoditie of his vertuous followers , by framing all that anew , which at this day is wanting in his most excellent workes . at this request , which seemed both vertuous and reasonable , contrary to the opinion of all men , his maiestie was much offended , and with manifest alteration of minde , he framed this answer : oh you my ignorantly-learned friends , doth it not then seeme vnto you , that the princes of this world are already ouer-cunning statists , but that you wish them to be more perfect doctors in that science , in which for your last misery , they offend in being ouer-skilfull in the same ? since some of them with the practise of one truly diabolicall and infernall reason of state ; it euidently appeareth , that they haue brought both sacred and prophane things into a manifest confusion : haue not as yet the common miseries of so many scandals , which by the harsh and wrested gouernment of some princes , are seene to arise in the world , opened your eyes so wide , as you may perceiue and know , that all moderne policie is but the trash of your so beloued tacitus , and as a contagious disease hath infected all the world ? are you not yet come to the knowledge , that the now present reason of state , with which a number of people are rather flead than shorne ; rather suckt drie , than milked ; and rather oppressed , than gouerned . a thing in it selfe so exorbitant , it is meere ignorance to desire the same to be more violent ? and doth it not seeme vnto you , that from the cruell gouernment of tiberius , and from the prodigious life of nero , so exactly written by your tacitus , some moderne princes haue drawne most exquisite precepts , how to gnaw to the bone , and how to shaue to the braine ? but that you would also haue them to haue the conueniencie , to see whether in the liues of caligula and domitianus , which to the end that the lothsome obscenities , and the barbarous cruelties , which those two vgly monsters of nature committed , should for euer lye hidden : the maiesty of the eternall god , for your incomparable benefit , hath exterminated from out the world , they might draw some secret precept , to make the fifth act of the wofull and dismall tragedie more funerall and wailefull . a happie a●d beneficiall gaine ( oh you vertuous ) for the whole world , hath the losse beene of the greatest part of tacitus his labours . oh how fortunate might men be reputed , if likewise those fatall reliques , which for the last calamitie of mankinde are left vnto vs , were also lost for euer . and that the world were gouerned with the modestie and simplicitie of the ancient monarkes , who esteemed men as reasonable creatures , and not with the bitternesse of diuers moderne princes , who manifestly seeme to beleeue , that they are but two-footed beasts , so created of god only for their benefit : euen as his diuine maiesty , to no other end caused the earth to produce mice , but to fatten cats . but you sir peter victorius , since i see , that you also are of the number of those good men , that wish tacitus were entire ; be pleased that i speake a few words with you in priuate , since you haue spoken in behalfe of the publique . doe you not thinke , that your princes with the only first leafe of the annales of tacitus , which they so diligently studie , and know so well to put in actuall practise , are become so skilfull medices to cure the canker of the sedicious florentine people ? thrice happie were all the world , if tacitus had euer held his peace . therefore get you gone in the name of god , together with the rabble of your learned copes-mates ; for my very heart is ready to burst , to see that men likewise are borne with the vnhappie calamitie of thrushes . cornelius tacitus , for some complaints vrged against him by diuers great princes , by reason of certaine politicall spectacles , which he hath deuised , most preiudiciall vnto their gouernment , hauing beene emprisoned , is by apollo set at libertie . rag. 7. 2. part. the apprehending of the person of cornelius tacitus , which happened the last night by the expresse commandement of the lords censors , hath caused great amazement throughout all the vniuersitie of the learned men ; being a man so remarkable in parnassus , so deare vnto apollo , prime counseller of state , chiefe chronicler , and his maiesties master of sentences . it was presently diuulged , that this hath happened by reason of some complaints exhibited against him by certaine most potent princes , who haue grieuously complained and aggrauated , that tacitus with the seditious argument of his annals , and of his histories , hath framed a kinde of spectacles , that work most pernitious effects for princes ; for so much as being put vpon the noses of silly and simple people , they so refine and sharpen their sight , as they make them see and prie into the most hidden and secret thoughts of others , yea euen into the centre of their hearts : and they protest , that they nor can , nor will euer by any meanes endure they should make apparent demonstration vnto all men of the pure essence and qualitie of the mindes and purposes of princes , what they are inwardly , and not what with their trickes and artifices ( necessary for to rule and raigne ) they endeuour to appeare outwardly . yesterday morning the atturney generall of the greatest monarks , now resident in parnassus ▪ appeared before the right honourable lords censors , among whom , in regard of the reputation of tacitus his person , who was to be arraigned and adiudged , apollo himselfe came and sate among them . this aduocate or atturney generall with exaggerated words gaue them to vnderstand , that it was full well known to all the best vnderstanders of state-matters , that for the peace and tranquillitie of kingdoms , princes are often compelled to commit actions not greatly to be commended , which ( to maintaine themselues in the peoples opinion , to be honest and vpright princes , in which conceit , hee that reigneth must necessarily labour , and endeuour to keepe himselfe ) they were wont to shadow and blanch ouer with the specious and precious pretexts of an holy and vndefiled intention , and of an honest , hearty , and affectionate zeale towards the common good . all which tricks , deuices , and artifices , they can no longer put in practise or make vse of , if the true sense or meaning of their designes shall at any time come to the knowledge of the vulgar . and that if it were possible , that the people ( without being subiect to others empirie ) might be gouerned of themselues , then would princes most willingly renounce the royall titles , and authoritie of commanding ; forsomuch as they are now fully resolued , that kingdoms and principalities are but insupportable burdens , subiects full-fraught with crabbed difficulties , and of so infinite dangers , as at their owne richly-sumptuous tables ( so much enuied them by gluttons and greedy gourmands ) they should neuer taste morsell , that would not relish of arsenike . but if experience had made the world to know , that the sway and gouernment of humane-kinde , without the presence of a wise and politicke prince , to rule and direct the same , would ere long be filled and ouer-run with wailfull and tragicall confusions . it is likewise conuenient , that all these iust and lawfull meanes be granted them as are requisite and behouefull vprightly to gouerne their subiects : for , if to manure and till the fields , the husbandman is not denide to haue his oxen , his plough , and his mattock : if the taylor ( to cut out and sew his garment ) haue allowed him , both needle , thimble , and sheares ; and the smith , his hammer and his tongs ; why shall monarchs be depriued of meanes , and barred of power , hereafter to cast dust in their subiects eyes , which is the readiest benefit , the most excellent , and necessariest instrument , that euer any politician could inuent , or finde in all the volume of state-reason ( though most excellent ) rightly to gouerne empires ? all which things , princes ( by reason of the seditious inuention of tacitus ) could no longer effect , or bring to passe : it being most euident , that the diabolicall spectacles , framed by that euer-factious and seditious man , besides the first qualitie ( as hath beene said , to subtilize and sharpen the sight of the vulgar people ) they produce also a second most pernicious effect , that is , to be so well and fitly fastned to the noses of all men , as it is no longer possible for princes , ( as heretofore they haue done , with no lesse facilitie , than profit to themselues ) to cast dust into their subiects eyes , though it were of the most artificiall , and superfinest , that possibly could be , without plainly discouering , that they are cheated , cozened and deceiued . the complaints and grieuances of the monarchies seemed most true both to apollo , and to the venerable colledge of the censors . and therefore they deemed them worthy to be maturely considered . now by the long discourses and debatements , that passed among them , conc●rning a businesse of so great consequence , it seemed , that their opinion was likely to preuaile , who consured , that tacitus together with his scandalous annales , and his seditious histories , should for euer be expulsed the society and conuersation of all men . but his maiestie , vnwilling so much to vilifie or embase the prince of all politicall historians , or to distaste honest students , by depriuing them of their bosome-delights , was contented , that tacitus should be giuen to vnderstand from his maiestie , how his pleasure was , that of those spectacles ( in very deed preiudiciall vnto princes ) he should frame as few as possibly could be . and that aboue all things , hee should vigilantly take great heed , not to disperse any abroad , except vnto choise and excellent men , vnto secretaries , and vnto priuy counsellers of state to princes , to the end they might serue to facilitate vnto them the good and vpright gouernment of their people . and that aboue all , ( euen as he tendred or loued his maiesties good fauour ) he should take especiall care , neuer to impart or communicate any vnto those turbulent or factious spirits , which in seditious and duskie seasons , might serue in stead of bright lamps , or far-seene beacons to that simple race of men , which is easily gouerned , as wanting the glorious light of letters , may be said to be blinde and without a guide . the duke of laconia , for hauing aduanced a most faithfull secretarie of his , to the highest dignities of his estate , is accused before apollo to idolatrize and dote vpon a mignon : but he doth most egregiously defend himselfe . rag. 38. 1 part. the now regnant duke of laconia hath of late aduanced one of his subiects ( by him highly esteemed , and extraordinarily beloued ) from a base and low fortune to the highest dignities , and supremest honours of all his dominion . for he hath not only placed him in the sublime senate of the laconians ( a degree by reason of its eminencie ambitiously aimed at , and sought after by diuers great princes ) but hauing infinitely enriched him with great reuenues , hath also made him to be as much honoured and regarded as any whatsoeuer most renowmed subiect of all his state. this so worthy duke , by those who enuie the greatnesse of that his seruant , was before apollo's maiestie denounced to be an idolater of a mignon , and a doter vpon a fauorite or darling . apollo being highly moued against that prince , for the hainousnesse of so horrible a delict ( as his manner is in any outragious excesse ) without taking diligent information of the truth of the accusation , presently caused lewis puloi , prouost-marshall of this state , to be called before him , whom he threatned to be rigorously tortured , if within the space of halfe an houre , with all manner of scorne and derision , he did not bring before him , fast bound in fetters , as prisoner , the duke of laconia . pulci , with all exact diligence accomplished apollo's beheasts : for immediatly , all laden with heauy chaines , he haled and dragged the poore prince before his maiestie , who by an expresse messenger was presently aduertised of his attachment , and forthwith commanded the martelli , most vertuous florentines , and publike bell-ringers of parnassus , that by the ●olling of the greatest bell , the criminall magistrate should be called together , which was immediatly done . thus the duke standing fort● before him , apollo himselfe , after he had tauntingly vpbraided him with the foule crime , whereof he stood endited ; all inflamed with wrath , he told him , that he allowed him but the space of halfe an houre to defend his reputation . and in the meane time ( as if that poore princes case had beene vtterly desperate ) he straitly commanded , that whosoeuer had committed the indignitie to haue adored a seruant of his , should be condemned to perpetuall infamie , as vnworthy to liue among the vertuous princes of the phoebean court. then the duke thus began his defence . sir , and father of the vertuous ; i haue so armed my conscience with the fine , and proofe-cuirace of innocencie , and so am i assured to haue liued vertuously , and vprightly in all my actions , as i am more than certaine to haue demerited nothing of your maiestie . nor doth your indignation , nor this precipitous doome , to see , that the dreadfull sentence of my infamie doth fore-goe the cognition of the cause , any iot dismay or confound me . only i maruell to see , what as yet i neuer beleeued , that the foulenesse of accusations , yea among the most iust and vncorrupted tribunals , as this is , is of power to call in question , and bring into so dangerous hazards , the reputation of men of my ranke and qualitie . but i quiet my selfe in the will of god , who hath euer willed , that the gold of others innocencie , should be refined in the fire of false calumnies , and in the test of persecutions . i freely confesse vnto your maiestie , to haue exalted my friend more than my maleuolent enemies haue reported vnto you . and in this my action , which to your maiestie hath beene pourtraid so hainous , this only grieueth mee , that ( in mine opinion ) i haue not throughly performed all that vertue of compleat gratitude , which so deare a friend hath worthily deserued at my hands . and if those who accuse me , or other princes my equals , of prodigalitie , of dotage , or of an abiect minde , borne in the foule sinke of sottishnesse , to serue seruants , when they see a courtier well-beloued or rewarded by his lord or prince , would not suffer themselues to be blinded by malice , by passion , or by enuie , but with a minde void of flegme or spleene , would impartially consider the true merits of court-fauourits , they would then name that a vertuous life , which they entitle vitious prodigalitie ; dutie of gratitude those gifts , which they call inconsiderate ; and a vertuous affection , the infamie , wherewith they charge them to dote vpon , or idolatrize mignons : but it is not a profession fitting vulgar or ordinarie men , to diue or pierce into abditos principis sensus , & si quid occultius parant : whence it hapneth , that the ignorant , with the infamie of great men , fall into so grosse errors , as they stile the vertuous proceeding of a gratefull man , to be a vice of an abiect minde . the principalitie of the laconians ( as your maiestie well knoweth ) is electiue , in which the confining princes , haue euer beene of greater power , than he that ruled and commanded the same : not onely for the end and scope , common to all electiue princes , after their death , to procure vnto their blood and kinsfolks , potent friends , but for the adherences , which foraigne princes , for important respects , haue with the senators or peeres , that enioy the prerogatiue to elect a new prince : the dependance and traine of whom they endeuour to acquire , and procure with those arts and tricks , as are already too well knowne to all men . moreouer , your maiestie knoweth , that the prince of macedonia , with his plots and practises had gotten so great authoritie in my state , and was so ouer-growne in forces aboue all the grecian princes , as he was not only the absolute arbitrator of all greece , but openly aspired vnto an vniuersall monarchie . besides , it is not vnknowne to your maiestie , that the said prince of macedonia , vnder colour of amitie , and the protection of the dukes of laconia , with vndermining practises sought euer their ruine and ouerthrow . and forsomuch as the power of the prince of epirus hindred him from being able to compasse so high ends , he , to remoue , or at least , to frustrate , or to weaken so strong an obstacle , more with machinations of gold , and with secret conspiracies , than with open force of armes , he caused those insurrections of the people , and those rebellions in epirus , that haue so much impaired the state thereof . and ( as a thing too too well knowne to the world ) i will not now call to your memories , how that my most prudent predecessor , fore-knowing that the depression of epirus , was a manifest preparation for the ruine of the laconian empire ; to assure the same from the ambition of so mighty an enemie , hee resolued , openly with might and maine to aide and support the afflicted state of epirus . and how that good prince died in the pursuit of his wise resolution , not without vehement suspition of poyson ministred vnto him by expresse order from the prince of macedonia ; as he , who neither could , nor would endure , that the diuision of epirus ( by him accounted so secure ) should be hindred by him . in this vnhappy state of things , i was aduanced to the dignitie : and to auoid the disastrous end of my predecessor , in the first months of my principalitie , i shewed my selfe to be of a remisse genius , and altogether incapable of great affaires of state. i did wholly apply my selfe to reforme the magistrates of my dominion , and correct the abuses and vices of my subiects , openly professing to be a capitall enemie to the prince of epirus ; but in my heart , ful wel knowing wherunto the secret machinations , and plots of the macedonian prince aimed : and knowing also , that each losse of the prince of epirus , would proue my ouerthrow ; i , to establish my state , reduced vnto so apparent dangers , resolued with my selfe , to afford him all the aid i could . but , to assure mine owne life for those disastrous mischiefs , in which my predecessor perished , it behoued me , in so strait and difficult a deliberation , to proceed with wonderfull caution and secrecie . and obseruing ( as no doubt your maiestie , and all these right honourable iudges know full well ) that amongst the numberlesse imperfections incident vnto electiue states , the greatest is , that , lesse than any whatsoeuer principalities , they finde or enioy that most important , and vnualuable benefit of secrecie in their ministers : forsomuch as the customes of men are so depraued , as their senators and counsellors proue often greedy merchants , or brokers of their dignities and offices ; out of which they labour and practise to extract and reape the greatest commoditie , that possibly they can : now therefore , euen in the beginning of my principalitie , seeing my selfe engaged , yea and engulfed in so many anguishes and perplexities : and knowing , that i must needs wracke , and vtterly perish vpon the rocke of infidelitie , if in a businesse of so maine consequence , i made vse of those ordinarie secretaries , whom i knew to haue long before fore-stalled and bribed by foraigne princes : the great god ( from whose only benignitie , and not from any else , i acknowledge this great benefit ) inlightned my vnderstanding . and hee it was , that first proposed vnto mee , this mine , i will not say seruant ; for by the matchlesse vertue , which i haue found and experienced in him , he deserueth not to be stiled with so meane , or with so base a surname , but most deare-deare friend . and to him , who in the quality of a bosome seruant , had most faithfully serued me the space of full eight yeeres , i freely vnfolded that secret of my heart , which had it but falne into my imagination , i would haue deemed it most dangerous for me . and then it was , that i perceiued , how that the excellencie and high worth of a secretarie consists not ( as many thinke ) in the speaking with elegancie , but in being secretly silent with fidelitie . this i say , because with so happy successe of the important businesse , which i had in hand , i vsed and imployed this my trustie seruant , as i most successefully came to beguile and countermine the wilie-wise prince of macedonia ; which no subtle or craftie wit was yet euer able to doe . and by the meanes of this my so faithfull secretary , my affaires haue bin so carried , as no man could euer diue into , or so much as guesse at my designes . and i haue vnderhand aided and supported that prince my friend , whom i openly professed to hate and persecute : and haue prosperously practised the trade , at once to laugh and to deceiue , with those who make publike ostentation to bee the canonicall doctors of that art. and with so vertuous a deceit haue i reduced the affaires of epirus ( whilome so imbroiled , as they were generally held desperate ) vnto the state the world seeth . since that from the most deplorable misery that could be , i haue raised the same to be the sole arbitrator of all greece . and the macedonians , who had chimera'd and ideated vnto themselues vniuersall monarchies ; and that in lesse than a moneth they should bee able to swallow downe all other mens states : from their highest hopes are so tumbled downe into a precipice of lamentable desperations , as hauing vtterly renounced their ambitious cepricios , to vsurpe other mens estates , as with much adoe they keepe and maintaine their owne . apollo , hauing attentiuely listened vnto those things , all ioyfull ranne to embrace the duke of laconia , and with tendernesse of heart said thus vnto him . oh duke of that thrice noble nation , which in few words expresseth many things , right vertuously and honestly hast thou dealt with a man of so incomparable worth and vertue . and i tell thee plainely , that in thy most honourable laconian senate , there are but few other senatours to be found equall in merit to this thy friend , to whom hadst thou giuen all thine estate , yet shouldest thou dye vngracefull to him , and in his debt ; sith in these vnhappy times , wherein euen in the open market of the perfidiousnesse of many , the secrets of princes are at port-sale , sold to him that offereth most . that secretary , who in important affaires proueth faithfull , and continueth trusty vnto his prince , cannot so highly bee honoured , nor so bountifully be rewarded by him , but that he hath deserued much much more . apollo , bewailing the wofull wrackes , which in the courts of great princes , his vertuous followers suffer , and fall into ; for to assure their nauigation , commandeth some of the chiefest learned men in his dominion , to endeuour to frame a sailing-card , to saile safely by land . rag. 23. 2 part. the deplorable wracks , which diuers learned men so often suffer in the courts of great princes , grieuing apollo daily more and more to the very heart , who with continuall labour and toilesome sweats , of the most famous sciences ( hoping by them to merit the good fauour and grace of princes ) hauing fraighted the ship of their minds with them , are afterwards seene vnfortunately to lose themselues on the quick-sands of a beggerly hired chamber , or to sinke in the whirle-poole of some base hospitall , and somtimes to split on some craggie rocke of beggery . no riches of infinite vertues being of force to free them from so deplorable calamities : he , i say , would needs at last endeuour to finde out some remedy for so great mischiefes , whereby hee might rest assured , that in all courts ( but especially in that of rome , placed in so tempestuous a climate ) the nauigation of his beloued vertuous attendants might be reduced vnto all possibe security ; and all for the benefit of good letters , which doe much empaire their reputation , when others see that they so little aduance or benefit those that spend most of their best age in learning them . now apollo seriously discoursing with himselfe , that if the english , the portagues , the bretton , the biscan , the hollander and the zelander pilots , onely with a little obseruing of the starres , the moone and the sunne , with a little stone in their hand , could and were able to curb and command the vast and dreadfull ocean , which they so freely , and euery way , and at all seasons furrowed and waded through , as they had thereon plotted out high-waies and watlin-streets , towards and from all coasts . how it could bee that his vertuous , with the powerfull helpe of astronomy , of cosmographie , of the mathematiks , of the meteors , but chiefly with their quaint wits , sharpned on the whetstone of continuall reading of bookes , could not inuent as easie and secure a nauigation by land , as the pilots of the forenamed nations had found out by sea . therefore to assure ( as farre as the vertue and strength of good letters can extend vnto ) the nauigation by land . apollo did not many moneths since institute a congregation of men , selected out from all the sciences necessary for so maine a businesse , appointing as chiefe and president thereof , ptolomie , the prince of cosmographers , vnto whom he allotted great aristotle , as companion in the meteors , euclide for the mathematicks , guido bonatti for astronomie : and to these he added as coadiutor , count baltazar castilion , a man well skil'd and practised in the bottomlesse seas of the courts . and for the better security of all that which he intended to establish for the happy successe of a businesse of so important a consequence , his maiestie commanded , that famous annon of carthage , palinurus , columbus , cortese , ferrante magellanes , amerigo vespucci , vasco di gama should be admitted in the congregation , as they , who haue beene the prime & chiefest pilots that euer the nauigation by sea had . first then ( as it was conuenient ) there was by that right excellent man ptolomie , framed a most exquisite card to saile by land , which with singular cunning was euery way lineated . and to come to the perfect knowledge of the true eleuation of the merits of courtiers , and longitude of the rewards , with which their seruices should be acknowledged , there were not onely inuented diuers and most learned astrolabs , but a new and most artificiall quadrant . true it is that that excellent man guido bonatti , with all his profound astronomie , laboured exceeding hard to finde out the true altitude of the pole of the court of rome ; nor was it euer possible , either for him or for any other of the most sufficient of the whole congregation , with any astrolabe whatsoeuer , to euen or leuell and adiust the course of the sunne of the phantasticke braine , and giddy humour of a selfe-conceited prince . for the genius of princes being the true and safe north-starre , which nauigating courtiers ought heedily to obserue in the nauigations by land . those worthy men were much amazed , and wondred how a starre so certaine and infallible in sea nauigations , should in land nauigation be found not onely vnstable and wauering , but was perpetually turned and gired about , by the two contrary motions of priuate interesse , and selfe-passion : from which two difficulties , many most dangerous turbulencies arising , they were often the causes of foule and horrible wracks . but greater difficulties and incumberances were discouered in the most vncertaine motions of the wandring stars , of the ministers and officers of princes , since ( as it should haue bin ) they were not so much rapt by the first impetuous mouer of the good seruice due to their prince , vnto which they were often manifestly seene to be retrograde . and that which exceeded all wonder , was the amazement whereinto the congregation fell , when by a certaine obseruation it perceiued , that the inferiour heauens of the ministers , with the course of their priuate passions towards their owne interesse or selfe-respects , did often draw and rap the said primum mobile . so that by these strange accidents , the businesse was so intricate and full of confusion , as those lords could neuer possibly come to the perfect knowledge of the regular and true motion of so many sphears , as was necessary to those that were to publish infallible rules of them . the rubs and impediments increased when they came to the act to note and set downe the winds in the guide-ship compasse , which they found to be neither certaine , nor limited in number , as we see they are in all sea-cards , but were little lesse than infinite ; for , besides the foure master winds of the princes will , of his childrens desires , of his brethrens prerogatiue , of other princes of the blood's preheminence , and the seuerall opinions of priuie councellors , there were discouered an infinite number of quarter-winds , or side winds , of the ministers and officers of the court , of mignons and fauourits to the prince , of vnder-secretaries , of buffons , of flatterers , of parasites , of fidlers , yea , and of panders , all so irregular , so voluble , so vnconstant , and in some occasions , so stormy , so boistrous , so high and furious , as in the compasse which they were a framing , they bred so inextricable difficulties , as made those famous pilots to condole the miserable condition of nauigating courtiers , who in their land-sailing must bee enforced to fit and adapt the sailes of their wits to such a multitude of seuerall winds as appeared vnto them . all which difficulties notwithstanding ( though insuperable ) those notable pilots neuer fainted or gaue ouer . nay rather , though they discouered the immense and vast ocean of the courts to be all ouer full of flats , shelues , shallows , quicksands , crags , rocks , gulfs , whirl-pools , sirts , scilla 's and carybdis of enuious , emulous , malicious , seditious , malevolent , spightfull , rancorous , clamorous , turbulent , froward , skittish , and diabolicall , male-contents , detractors , back-bi●ers , slanderers , railers , grudgers , persecutors , finde-faults , fantastick-humors , and heteroclit-wits , by so much the more did their courage increase to surmount so hard a taske , and so intricate a businesse , and to bring it to some good passe . their astrolabs being framed , and the quadrant finished , and the ship-guide compasse reduced vnto the best perfection they could , the congregation determined to come vnto the act of experience , whereupon hauing made choise of eight quaint , smug , and spruce courtiers , all compleatly stored with patience ( the most necessary biscuit , commodious prouision , and needfull sustenance for those that haue the heart to lanch into , and furrow the tempestuous ocean of the courts ) who , whilest they diligently prepared themselues for their voyage , hauing hoised their sailes , and onely expecting a fauourable wind , a chance befell impossible to be beleeued ; which was , that a most propitious north-gale blowing , to which all the eight courtiers , suddenly hoised and spread the sailes of all their hopes , onely those of one were seene to appeare full swolne , and prosperously to follow his voyage , whilest the other seuen neuer budged from their stations . which the lords of the congregation perceiuing , they were much distracted , especially when they obserued , that in a land-nauigation the fauourable winds of the princes good grace and opinion did not blow equally in all the sailes of his courtiers , though all of equall merit and worth . and greater was their wonder , when the said fauourable winde , blowing a new faire stiffe gale , some courtiers , who were prepared for a bon-voyage , speedily hoised , and spread all their sheeting , they might perceiue one who had neither mast , nor saile , nor tackling , of any merit , but lay there idly hulling in the hauen , to learne some practise of the court , before he would aduenture himselfe into the dangers of so troublous and hazardous a nauigation , by the force of that propitious winde , was driuen out of the port of his restfull ease , and blowne roomeward into the deepe of managements beyond his skill or sufficiency ; and with a most succesfull nauigation , end the voyage , with the purchase of great reuennues , of rich offices , of eminent honors , and of sublime titles : a nouelty that seemed so rare and strange to all the pilots , that mag●lanes , as one confounded with wonder , said thus ; my honourable good lords , i would neuer haue beleeued there should bee so great a difference betweene the sea-nauigation , and the land-sailing . and these extrauagant nouelties which now i see , seeme so strange to me , as they make me greatly to doubt of any happy issue of this our enterprise . but , for as much as all arduous difficulties may at last bee ouercome with a constant patience in the pursuit of them , let vs boldly proceed . by this time another right vertuous courtier , displaied the sailes of his faithfull seruice , at a faire westerly gale of the good fauour of his prince , and by the quality of the sailes full puft , with the gracious demonstrations of words , which he receiued from his lord , imagining that he had gone a far iourney , after a long-long voyage , hauing calculated the course of his nauigation , hee found himselfe riding at anchor in the very same place , whence hee hoised saile in the long voyage of his assiduous seruice : the silly and vnhappy wretch , hauing continually bin fed with diuers hopes of fallacious expectations , without substance of any good . but a stranger accident presented it selfe vnto those lords , when they saw at one same instant a stiffe gust to blow both south and north so ragingly , from the adle braine of a fantasticke prince , that the vnfortunate courtiers , tossed to & fro by two so contrary winds , could not resolue to which they were best to addresse their sailes , so that diuers vertuous good men perished in that tempestuous storme . at which strange case celumbus exclaimed and said ; now i plainly perceiue ( my lords ) that the nauigation by sea , wherein these extrauagances are neuer seene , is a businesse so safe , as it may be compared vnto such iournies as men go by land in horse-litters columbus had no sooner vttred these words , but the lords of the congregation perceiued , that certaine right vertuous courtiers , who rode in the hauen , were in great danger to be cast away ; the sea of the court wrought so , and was beyond it's custome so risen , and the surges mounted so high , as they threatned a generall naufrage . the biggest cables of the most exquisite court-patience , although right strong and tough , did rend in sunder ; so that all was wrackfull ruine . all which notwithstanding the skie of the princes countenance was calme , and his aspect cleare , nor did any other winde blow , but the gentle zephirus , or west of the princes quietnesse . the mischiefe was apparent ; the breath of the princes indignation was not felt , and yet the miserable nauigating courtiers perished in the harbour all this raging storme notwithstanding , an hardy and couragious courtier , who dared to heaue anchor , & come out of the hauen ; and ( as euery man thought ) was not only nor drowned nor ouerwhelmed ; for , that blustring tempest which would haue endangered or wrack't any whatsoeuer best practis'd and skilfull sea-man , serued him in steed of so prosperous a gale , as in a short time it brought him vnto an hauen of high and honourable dignities . an accident ( in truth ) worthy of infinite admiration , and which caused great wonderment and amazement in all the lords of the congregation . it seeming very strang vnto them , that in the land nauigation , those stormy tempests serued some in lieu of fauonrable winds , which in most safe and quiet hauens were the dismall destruction of many . but another thing seemed more wondrous vnto them , when in a calme skie , cleare welkin , and faire season ; no clouds , no lightning , no thunder , nor any signe of foule weather appearing , there were suddenly seene certaine thunder-bolts to fall , which vtterly consumed and burnt two most vnfortunate courtiers . at which vnwonted accident , the lords of the congregation were much affrighted , wondring how the thunder-darts , hurled by an irefull prince , were not accompanied with those fore-going lightning-flashes and thunder-claps , as those be , which by the all-powerfull hand of the great god are hurled at mankind , and which forewarne all courtiers to auoid them . a little while after , they saw a courtier assailed by an outragious storme of persecutions ; who after he had long strugled , and stoutly defended himselfe against the muddie fury of the swolne sea of his princes wrathfull indignation , and from the furious blasts of cruell and malicious detractions , lest he should sinke and be swallowed vp , hee was forced to fling all his goods and merchandize ouer-board . and the miserable wretch had already lost the maine mast of his hopes , and his merits had a great leake , and drew in abundance of water of desperation , when loe his vessell rushed and split against the marble rock of the ingratitude of a most vnthankfull prince . then followed a most strange thing , which was , that after so disastrous an encounter , the vessell of that courtiers seruice being split , wrackt and sunke , the storme of court-persecutions ceased , the sea of the princes indignation was calmed , and the rocke ( which had caused that miserable wracke ) was conuerted into a most safe hauen : the courtiers vessell but ere-while ouerwhelmed , of it selfe start vp out of the waues , more faire , more strong , and in better plight , than euer it had beene before . and the merchandize of his merits of it selfe was laded againe , which not long after , he vttered and vented at a very deare rate ; trucking and changing the same for great dignities , eminent titles , and rich reuenues . this accident seemed very strange vnto the lords pilots , and vnto all the congregation , nor could they sufficiently wonder how it could be possible , that in the land-nauigation the most vnhappie wrackes of some , might serue as great felicities to others . now the congregation continuing in trying of new experiments , enioyned a sly-witty courtier to hoise and display the sailes of his talent towards a wind that blew from south , and happily sailing , and keeping towards the north , after many dayes sayling the pilot-courtier desirous to see where he was , he with his astrolabe measured the altitude of the pole of his merit ; and to his great wonderment found , that hauing continually kept the prow of his faithfull seruice towards the north of his princes interresse , hee had made his voyage southward . of so strange a disorder , the courtier at first accused himselfe , that ( as hee should haue done ) he had not steered the helme of his faithfull minde towards the north of his princes good seruice . but when both with his sailing-card , and with his ship-guide compasse in his hand , he assured himselfe , that he had euermore guided the ship of his actions in an euen and honest line , he plainly perceiued , that the errour or mistaking of his vnluckie voyage proceeded so , because the north of his princes affection had suffered it selfe to to be turned towards the south , by certain wicked and maleuolent whisperers , which he hath alwaies about him . then vespucci , gama , and other pilots , besought the lords of the congregation , to giue ouer the businesse , as a desperate cure : and said , that nothing yeelded the nauigation by sea more sure or safe , than the immutabilitie of the north-starre . and that by the last most vnfortunate experience , it hauing euidently appeared , that the mindes of princes ( which are the infallible north-starre of land-nauigation ) suffering themselues so often and so easily to be turned , remoued , and circumgired by lewd and wicked people of the court : to aduenture to saile the tempestuous ocean of the courts , was a resolution not fitting wise men , but desperate persons . in this interim the lords of the congregation might see a most elegant spruce courtier , who for the space of more than threescore yeares had so happily sailed , both in the court of rome , and in others , that he had not only surmounted outragious storms of ruthlesse blasts and boistrous winds of persecutions , but had euen shiuered and broken the very same huge rocks , on which he had split & wrackt his vessel ; but that afterwards , when with a most pleasant gale , and prosperous wind , on the height of his felicitie , he pursued his course , onely for that he vnfortunately hit vpon a rush of an impertinencie of a base catch-pole , he was vtterly cast away . an accident which caused such distraction in the congregation , that the lords ioyntly resolued , to haue but one triall more made ( and then be quiet ) by a courtier , that was readie to set saile ; and him they commanded to hoise and spread all his sailes : but so it happened , that whilest he held on his course in a coast , deemed of all men , most safe and dangerlesse , his ship vnheedily , or by chance , hit vpon a rocke , and was wholly split and wrackt , which the lords of the congregation seeing , they all bitterly bewailed the ignorance and vnheedinesse of the courtier ; for so much as hee could not auoid that rocke . but he made manifest demonstration to them all , that it was not marked in the sailing-card . whereupon all the pilots casting their eyes vpon great ptolomey , as if they silently accused him of ignorance , hauing omitted that rocke , which so well deserued to be marked in his card , and had been the cause of so disastrous a mischiefe . but ptolomey hauing first well viewed the place , and considered the countrey thereabout , did euidently demonstrate vnto the lords , that no man liuing had euer before that time seene any shelfe or rocke in that place , and therefore he had not marked it in his card ; but that it suddenly grew and started vp in the very instant , that the vpfortunate courtier hit and ranne vpon it . now the lords of the congregation perceiuing , that in the nauigation by land , huge rockes did euery hand-while spring vp and grow in a moment , euen in the middest of fields and other places supposed most safe to be nauigated in the darkest night , they concluded their businesse to bee desperate , and their attempt impossible . and therefore dismissing the congregation , they straitly commanded , that in the perillous land-nauigation , no man should dare to goe a iourney , except at high noone , and withall , euery man should carry a great lanterne of wisdome , with a burning taper therein in the prow of his proceeding ; morning and euening with his bare knees on the ground , and hands heaued vp to heauen , humbly beseeching the maiesty of the euerliuing god , to send them good successe , since that for one to bring the ship of his hopes into a court , as into a safe heauen , doth rather depend from the immediate aide and assistance of god , than from any humane wisdome whatsoeuer . the lord iohn de la casa , hauing presented his quaint galateo , or booke of manners vnto apollo , meeteth with great difficulties in diuers nations , about their promises to obserue the same . rag. 28. 1 part. the right reuerend lord , iohn de la casa , who ( as wee wrote vnto you by our last ) was with great solemnity admitted into parnassus , where after he had visited these illustrious poets , and complemented with all the learned princes of this court , hee presented his right quaint and profitable booke of galateo vnto apollo , which his maiestie did so highly commend , that immediately , he strictly commanded , it should inuiolably be obserued by all nations : and at the same instant enioyned the said lord to compose a galatea , since it was manifestly knowne , that the ladies of these moderne times , haue as much need to be corrected in their euill and depraued manners , as men . which edict caused great alteration in the people subiect vnto apollo's dominion : for , it was neuer possible , neither by entreaties , nor by menaces , to induce the marquesans to be pleased to receiue it ; and they boldly protested , that they were rather resolued to renounce their countrey , and forsake their children , than to leaue their most laudable custome , to honour their lords and masters with all sincerity of heart : to loue their friends with purity of affection ▪ rather than with lou●ing coursies , and with such other court-ceremonies learn'd by rote . there were also found greater difficulties among princes , because the most mighty monarchie of france would neuer subiect it selfe to the nice obseruations of the strict rules of galateo , nisi si , & in quantum , her owne tast and liking did accord vnto , which ( she said boldly ) she would rather attend , than on affected faire creances , which she should neuer obserue but with a certaine outward apparence . the soueraigne monarchie of spaine swore solemnely , that she would submit her selfe vnto galateo's rules , on condition the lord de la casa would remoue but one chapter out of it , which was , that being at a table with other princes , shee would not haue it counted ill manners in her , if seeing a good morsell in her companions dish , she did presently lay hold on it , and conuey the same vpon her owne trenchar . moreouer shee would not be noted to be ouer-gluttonous , if by chance shee should eat and deuoure all her neighbours part . the venetian magnificoes affirmed , that they would willingly allow of galateo , prouided alwaies that the lord de la casa would declare therein , that with all diligence to pry into , and seek to know other mens matters , businesses , and secrets , was no point of ill manners , but a necessary point of state-policy . then all the princes of italy applauded and embraced galateo , onely they said , that without being accounted vnmannerly , they would bee allowed to chew on both sides . but the dutch mutined , and were like to cause some hurly-burly : for they did not onely vtterly refuse to binde themselues to the italian sobricty in drinking , but did obstinately require , that it should be enacted and recorded in galateo , that the dutchmens excessiue quaffing , and continuall being drunken , and cup-shotten , was one of the chiefest vertues could be found in men of their nation , and one of the first requisits that princes and common-wealths , for the safety and welfare of their states , could wish for , or desire in their subiects , which request of theirs was by all the learned of parnassus reiected and impugned , as impertinent and abominable . and therefore touching that particular of sobriety in drinking , the dutch were earnestly intreated and exhorted to submit themselues vnto the rules of galateo , since that by reason of their custome of immoderate bibbing , and so often being fox't , they were by the best nations of europe pointed at as gazing-stocks . to these obiections the dutchmen answered stoutly , that those sober men deserued rightly to be stiled foul drunkards , who liuing vnder the bondage and seruitude of princes , by the phantasticke humour , or toyish conceit of one man , strangely passionate and giddy headed , they were daily insulted vpon , oppressed , hurried , and extortioned in liues , lands , and goods : and that those drunken germanes should bee reputed perfectly sober , who had the wit to vindicate themselues ; and had likewise the heart and grace to maintaine themselues in liberty : adding moreouer , that they accounted them bedlam fooles , who did not beleeue , that the drunkennesse of the germane people was the true foundation and establishment of so many famous republiks as were now seene among them . for the safety of a state , and the vniuersall peace of the people , depending onely on the fidelity of the ministers of princes and republiks , and on the well-meaning plainnesse and sincerity of euery mans mind : what other more precious iewell could bee desired in the world , then continually to see in germany by vertue of excessiue quaffing of wine , to vomit forth the inwardest secrets and most hidden cogitations of the minds of men . the germanes added moreouer , that by long experience they had plainly discouered , that they did most exquisitely well aduise & counsell their countrey , who by means of the good store of wine that they had drunke , hauing therein drowned all priuate interesses , and smothered all foule dissimulation , which sobriety is wont to beget in others minds ; the open-hearted dutch spake alwaies with a single free heart , and not as the italians , and other nations , yea , the sobrest are commonly wont , onely with their mouth , ordinarily full of guile and leasings . they said likewise , that so ambitiously affecting the glorious name of braue men at armes , as was well knowne to all the world , they could not with patience listen vnto the counsels and deliberations of sober men , who are commonly full of timidity , and of a vicious circumspection , vailed with the man●le of prudence ; but because they would haue them to be generous and couragious , they would not allow , that any man should vndertake to counsell his countrey being fasting , but after hee had first swilled downe good store of grape-liquor , and enflamed his heart with generosity , it being the proper quality of good wine rather to expell timidity from the heart , than remoue iudgement from the vnderstanding . and therefore the germanes with great reason , de reconciliandis inuicem inimicis , & iungendis affinitatibus , & adsciscendis principibus , de pace denique ac bello , plerumque in conuiuijs consuitant , tanquam nullo magis tempore ad simplices cogitationes pateat animus , aut ad magnas incalescat . furthermore they said , that if the italian vicious sobriety were introduced among the germanes , that most faithfull and sincere nation , would therewithall begin to abound with those double hearts , false minds , secret thoughts , vnseene sleights , handy-dandy , or turne-coat spirits , fraught with treasons , treacheries , conspiracies , and machinations , full of vntrue and forged affections , masked with secret hatred , with faigned and dissembled friendship , and with all manner of foisting , whereof those nations that glory to be sober are most abundant cicilies and fruitfull egypts , a thing so true , that the french , who for the vnspottednesse and purity of their free and single hearted minds , in the excellent vertue to be euer most faithfull & loyall to their kings , haue at all times bin most glorious and renowmed in the world , since diuers of them haue left the most commendable custome to quaffe merily , and to bee drunken after the good dutch fashion , haue suffered themselues to bee drawne into those most felonious actions that the world knowes full well . and if that little window in a mans breast , was by the wisest of former ages deemed a thing so necessary , and esteemed as an vnualuable benefit vnto mankinde , because through it a man might visibly see and view the hearts of certaine slie cunny catching companions , who , within being most vgly deuils , imploy the vtmost of their endeauours to bee reputed faire angels ; with what ground of good reason can any man blame the right laudable and precious custome to quaffe merily , and to be drunke ? it being most palpable and euident , that drinking of much wine hath the vertue to make bodies diaphaned or transparent . for which solid reasons , which by apollo were both allowed and commended for militant , it was resolued , that concerning the particular point of drinking moderately and soberly , the excellent and farre renowmed dutch nation should not bee subiect vnto the strict precepts of galateo . the vse of drunkennesse being among the germanes rather an artifice of the publike , than a vice of priuate men ; it being manifestly knowne , that both in times of peace and of warre , those nations are best aduised that doe as the germans ; deliberant , dum fingere nesciunt : constituunt , dum errare non possunt . apollo hauing highly commended the statute , made by the most mighty kings of spaine , that no aduocates , lawyers , or proctors shall passe into the indies , the doctors of the law finding themselues aggrieued , complaine vnto his majestie . rag. 83. 1 part. the renowmed court and habitation of parnassus may rightly be esteemed most happy , not so much for the right excellent gouernment of apollo's maiestie , nor because it is inhabited by the most quaint , flourishing , choise , and sublime wits of the whole vniuerse , as because the exquisitenesse of a vertuous life , the perfection of all right honourable customes , and the exactnesse of all the best lawes dispersed through the whole world , are therein with all precise diligence introduced , propagated , cherished and obserued . the reason is , because those that inhabit or reside there , are bound to bring the most commendable fashions of their countries . a custome , that hath brought so great commoditie vnto the priuate , and so honourable reputation vnto the publike , as all men may euidently perceiue , that to be a right blessed and happy country , which liueth and subsisteth , not so much by her owne proper lawes , as by and with those iudiciously selected from out all other most ciuill and best established nations . apollo hauing lately bin informed , how the most potent kings of spaine , hauing vnder great penalties prohibited , that no aduocates , no lawyers , nor proctors shall passe into the indies , was pleased to approue and ratifie the said decree as most wholsome , as most holy . and did highly extoll and commend the piety of those monarks , who shewed so great charitie towards the new world , in seeking to preserue it from that mischieuous infection , that hath filled and infected the old-one with so many deplorable calamities and wailfull controuersies . whereupon his maiestie commanded , that the said holy and excellent edict should forthwith be engrauen , and enregistred in a faire table of metall , which to the perpetuall memorie thereof should be affixed neere vnto the twelue tables of the most famous romane lawes in forum maximum . we must not omit to let you vnderstand , that the doctors of the lawes were greatly moued and vexed at this iniunction , who earnestly recommended the indemnitie of their reputation vnto his maiestie , alleaging , that if they should not obtaine the fauour to haue the publication of that ordinance staied , occasion would be giuen vnto many to imitate those of ancona , of norcia , of recanati , and of other people , who to the great dishonour of good letters , had chased and expelled from out all their counsels and consultations those pettie-foggers and law-pleaders , which of all other people were held in so great admiration ; for they verily beleeued , that without the placet of a man skilfull in the law , it was impossible for any man to say or doe any thing well or honestly . and that by so much the more , they besought his maiestie to take their cause into his consideration , as there was question made of the indemnitie of the thrice-sacred liberall arts , which all students of the lawes , to their intolerable costs and charges , and with vnspeakable toyle , labour and sweat , did waste and consume themselues to learne . at whose strange instances , apollo ( against the opinion of all the by-standers ) fell into a chafing passion , and with great indignation , answered those malapert doctors , that hee much wondred , how before his maiesties sacred presence , they had dared to affirme , that they spent , and laboured , and sweat so much to learne the sacred liberall arts , as if the delphick edict were not knowne to all the world , in which the studie of the lawes is especially declared to be no liberall science , but a base trade , and a mechanicall occupation , brought into the world for the affliction of mankinde , studied and plodded vpon without any delectation to the minde , without any speculation of the intellect , and without the so materially-needfull helpe of the soueraigne muses in all perfect and commendable sciences ; and only exercised for meere couetousnesse of lucre , to fatten with pelfe and crownes a peece of man with two gloting eies in his skonce , or a slouenly fellow , who although he be altogether void of that viuacitie of wit , which good and noble letters affect so much , neuerthelesse , to become an eminent aduocate , it sufficeth him to haue a blockish braine , a porter-like grosse complexion , a rusticall behauiour , and a clownish demeanour , fit rather to draw in a cart , than to conuerse with ciuill or learned men . an apothecarie , at the very instant , that he is taken prisoner by sergeants , without being examined at all , is forthwith condemned and sent to the gallies . rag. 65. 2 part. the apothecarie that dwelt at the signe of the two crownes in the high mercerie-street , was foure daies since apprehended by the officers of the criminall court : and forsomuch as the poore wretch was suddenly hood-winkt , and muffled , and on mens shoulders carried to the hauen , and put into a gallie , all parnassus rested much amazed , to see the execution of that vnfortunate mans condemnation , foregoe the framing of his enditement . it is reported , that this hath hapned at the instant request of all the chiefe monarks of the vniuerse , now resident in this state , who thinke themselues offended to the quicke by that apothecarie , forsomuch as hee did openly sell fine smoake : a merchandise , which princes challenge and pretend to belong onely to them ; and that no priuate person whatsoeuer should dare to sell but they . some suppose , that by the example of that vnfortunate wretch they haue gone about to terrifie all others from troubling them in matters concerning their iurisdiction and prerogatiue . and although the shallow-headed and simple sort of people giue out , that the apothecaries fault deserued not so rigorous a resentment , yet those that will prie and thorowly diue into the secrets and interesses of great princes , affirme , that he hath very gently , and with much indulgence beene dealt withall . forsomuch as fine smoake , seruing princes ( in many and daily occasions ) in lieu of fine coyned gold , euery treasure of theirs ( though neuer so rich and great ) would soone be exhausted , whensoeuer that so currant money of fine smoake , losing its credit and esteeme among the vulgar sort of people ; princes should ere long bee enforced ( according to the plebeian fashion ) to pay their debts with ready money . the vertuous people of apollo's state hauing consigned vnto his maiesties generall treasurer the accustomed donatiue of a thousand conceits , according to their custome they beg a boone or grace at his hands . rag. 81. 2 part. those that haue exact knowledge of the passages of this state , know full well that the vertuous of parnassus pay duly vnto the exchequer-chamber , not only the tenth part of the fruits of their wits , but the quit-rent taxed according to each mans talent : whence it is , that fertile ouid doth yearely pay vnto the publike receiuers eight elegies ; virgil fourescore printed heroicke verses ; horace fiue odes ; martiall eleuen epigrams ; and so others according to their sessment or taxation . besides that , the vertuous euery three yeares vnder the name of a donatiue or free gift ( yet such a donatiue , as if it be not paid with a genuine good will , without losing its modest name , it may be exacted , distrained , and leuied by bailiffs and sargeants , who may distraine goods , take pawnes , and sell them at port-sale ) pay into the delphick treasurie a million of conceits , which by the soueraigne muses are afterwards liberally distributed among those sillie literates and poore schollers , who being depriued of all munition , onely for the loue and good will they shew towards good letters , yeeld themselues worthy to bee releeued . and the custome is , that vpon the occasion of so large a donatiue , his maiestie is euer wont to counter-change the bounteous liberalitie of his vertuous with some sutes or fauours , which the learned may lawfully demand and challenge . so that the last weeke , after the collection of the donatiue , in a generall congregation , the vertuous concluded to beg six graces at apollo's hands , all which were set downe in a note or memoriall , that should be presented to him , when as the quaint classis or wittie forme of the politike-vertuous aduertised the congregation , that in the occasions of begging sutes , boones , or graces from princes for any merit a man may pretend , it was necessarie to auoid the error of demanding ouer many things at once , not only because the multitude of graces which sutors crau● , doe distaste and molest princes , who commonly are easily distasted vpon occasions to pay bonds or duties ; but because hee that beggeth pluralitie of requests , is commonly answered and satisfied with the slightest and worst of them : and therefore it would proue a wise resolution , in such a case , to bee very earnest and circumspect for the obtaining of one onely good sute . alwaies prouided it bee of good worth and consequence , and which without a note of much ingratitude may not be refused or denied by the prince . this aduertisement of the polititians , was by the generalitie of the vertuous , applauded , commended and followed . whereupon the very next day , there were sent vnto his maiestie the right excellent bernardino viperio , and tiberio serpentino , both aduocates for the vniuersitie of the vertuous , who hauing tendred and presented the donatiue vnto apollo , they most humbly besought him , that in prouiding of iudges for his tribunals , and of other officers for publike magistrates , he would be pleased to make choise of men of milde and gentle natures , of a courteous and affable genius , of a plausible disposition , of a meeke and lowly dexteritie , of easie accesse , of a quicke vnderstanding , of a nimble apprehension , of a temperate patience , of a tractable conuersation , and of a cheerfull aspect . and that it might stand with his good pleasure to send certaine eteroclit , irregular , arrogant , fantastick , wayward , peeuish , insolent , passionate , self-conceited , humorous , proud , giddie-headed , and fouly tainted animals , who with their vntuned , vnde●linable , vnsetled , and distempered calfe-braines put wretched sutors , and miserable clients into greater troubles , and more harmfull agonies , than the processes , or please themselues , and appoint them to be botesons , masters-mates , and auditors in the gallies , there to employ , and exercise their turbulent , seditious , litigious , mutinous , harsh , and quarrelous talent vpon the ging , swabbers , and rowing-slaues , which is , and proues so insupportable to free men . by letters intercepted , and taken from a currier , dispatched by some princes to the lake of auerno , the common people come to know , that the rancors and hatreds now raigning among diuers nations , are occasioned and stirred vp by the artifices of their princes . rag. 58. 2 part. betweene the confines of pindo and libetrum , on monday night last , was an extraordinarie poste rob'd , whom certaine mighty princes had in great diligence dispatched towards the lake auerno . and forsomuch as the currier had no hurt done him in his bodie ; it is suspected , that the robbery hath beene committed to none other end , than to seize on his letters , as indeed it followed : for they onely tooke a packet from him , which he had about him , directed to the infernall furies , alecto , thesifon and megera , by which letters ( and truly with great scandall ) it hath beene disconered , that certaine princes doe wage and stipend the said furies , to the end , that not onely among diuers nations , but often among the subiects of one same prince , they may sowe and nourish perpetuall strifes , and neuer-ending discords . and to fill vp the measure of distastes , there was a letter found in the said packet , of ten thousand duckats , to bee paied them for the arrerages of six moneths past . the subiects of those princes , that haue written the letters , by their deputies haue caused them to be presented vnto apollo , to whom they haue grieuously exclaimed , and bitterly complained , that their princes , who ought vigilantly to heed nothing so much , as the perpetuall peace and vnanimous concord , not only of their owne particular subiects , but of all other nations besides , should with ready money purchase ●editions to others , and mischiefes to themselues . and that vntill now , they neuer came to the knowledge , how by the meere artifices , tricks , plots , and machinations of princes , those diuisions , factions , grudges , vnkindnesses , distasts , discords , and vnnaturall hatreds , were seene so to abound among diuers nations ; and to bee the source and root of those calamitous and infinite mischiefes , that so much oppresse and afflict mankinde . all outrages , excesses , abuses , and pollutions of that nature , as if they were once cleane rooted out of the world , men might securely enioy the comfort , to see the french loue the english , the spaniard affect the french , and the dutch embrace the italian , and see a perfect peace and good concord to follow betweene all men . whilst these deputies were thus discoursing , it was obserued that from apollo's eyes , through the great compunction of what he heard , there gushed forth abundance of sad teares . whereupon the by standers supposed verily , that his maiestie would in raging passion burst forth into some bitter termes against those princes , that were charged and accused of so hainous crimes , when thus he said : oh you my faithfull friends , your complaints are as grieuous , as they be true ; but know , that the enormities whereof you complaine , proceed not so much from the bad or waiward nature of princes , as they are occasioned by the turbulent humors and seditious deuises of the peeuish people , who with their sicklenesse and instabilitie doe so worke , as it is impossible to purchase and obtaine the vniuersall peace of mankind with any other instrument , than with sowing those discords , diuisions , seditions , and factions among nations , whereof you so much , and so grieuously complaine : for long experience hath made princes to know , that the huge and vnweldie machine of raigning securely , is all built and reared vpon the firme foundation of equally-contributing and iustly-distributing . and it is a thing most manifest , that the people without princes to sway and gouerne them , would of themselues precipitate into more cruell seditions and bloudy quarrels , than those , which for the publike peace , and generall good of all , others sowe and breed among them . all mischiefs ( oh you my most beloued ) very necessarie . although it grieuously grieueth mee to see , that the infirmitie of those vniuersall iarrings , and discords , which now reigne in mankinde cannot be cured with any more soueraigne remedy , and ready antidote , than with the bitter medicine , which you say is now so nastie vnto you . antonio perez of aragon , hauing presented the booke of his relations vnto apollo , his maiesty doth not onely refuse to accept it , but commandeth the same to be presently burnt . rag. 60. 2. part. antonio perez , whilom principall secretary to the most mighty king of spaine , philip the second , knowing the bad opinion that that secretary purchaseth vnto himselfe among all nations , who with distaste parteth from his prince ; within a while after he had recouered himselfe in france , for his owne discharge , published vnto the world those his vnhappy relations , which haue so heauily laden him with infamy and blame . for , whilest he with all manner of art and skill should haue procured to conceale them , vpon thursday morning last , dared to present them to apollo ; who , as soone as hee saw the booke , and was informed of the contents thereof , fell into such indignation against him , that euen then hee caused the same to be burnt in the publike & chiefe market-place , and said vnto perez , that he had giuen vnto his relations that place in parnassus which he and they deserued . and that to the end other secretaries , his equals , might take example , and learne to preferre secrecie , and faithfulnesse of silence before the charity to ones proper life itselfe ; yea , and before the loue of a mans owne selfe : for , euen as he deserueth the name of a treacherous and proditorious villaine , that vpon any casuall distaste , or conceiued vnkindnesse , reuealeth the secrets committed to his trust in times of former friendship ; so a thousand times most shamefull , infamous , and euer to bee detested is that secretary , who for whatsoeuer hard vsage he may haue receiued from his prince , publisheth those secrets which by his lord and master haue beene imparted vnto him in forepassed confidence , not onely voluntarily , much lesse by any kinde of cruell racke or sharpe torture , ought neuer to be published or disclosed to any creature whatsoeuer . the monarchie of spaine is much agrieued , that her falshoods and treacheries are discouered . rag. 2. 3 part. it is not yet well knowne , whether it were by chance , or by the malice of some frenchmen , or ( as many haue vehemently suspected ) by the machination of that nation , which is so implacable an enemy vnto the french , some few yeares since , a fire tooke hold of the royall palace of the monarchie of france ; and so great was the flame , and so dreadfull the blaze , that the neighbouring monarchies entred into feareful suspition , that so huge a fire could hardly be quenched , but with the ruine of their states : so that euery man , for the safety of his owne , ranne speedily to quench the fire in an others house . the english , albeit naturall enemies vnto the french , with all diligence brought thither the waters of their thames . the germanes , those of mose and rhine . the venetians did in a manner empty all their fennes and marishes . the prudent dukes of tuscanie , in great haste ran with all sorts of weapons , to helpe to extinguish that consuming flame , which wise men greatly feared , was likely to end in an vniuersall desolation . and truely it was wondrous strange to see that the monarchy of spaine , knowne to be so deadly an enemy vnto the french , shee also among the chiefe friends of france laboured with might and maine to extinquish that fire , at which most men supposed , that she would rather run merily to warme her selfe , whereat all men stood amazed , especially when they saw , that shee with all solicitude , and externall charity brought vnto it , not onely the waters of her golden tagus and iberus , but also of the vast ocean , of which when the english and the hollanders please , shee is absolute mistris . since those politicians sinisterly interpreting the spaniards charity , declared publikely , that it was a most pernicious thing in the necessities of the french , to admit the aides of those spaniards , who being knowne to be eternall foes , & capitall enemies vnto france , ought rather to be esteemed the architects of the vtter ruine of the french , than zealous of the greatnesse and prosperitie of their kingdome : as they who measuring all the actions and proceedings of those which reigne among princes , by the onely compasse of priuate interesse , doe seldome admit any manner of piety towards god , much lesse of charity towards men . and so much the more were such polititians become abominable to most nations , as it manifestly appeares , that the spaniards in their forwardnesse , diligence , and charity , to bring water vnto that fire , did not equall onely , but exceed whatsoeuer best friend vnto the french. and that which increased the wonder , and that among the simpler sort , caused great reputation vnto the monarchy of spaine , was , that flanders and austria her ancient patrimonies , burning in a most cruell combustion of warre , she had preferred the welfare and safety of the french , before the charity of her owne preseruation . but for so much as no humane endeuour , nor store of water was sufficient to quench the least sparkle of so frightfull a fire : and that notwithstanding all the diligence and remedies that were vsed , the deuouring flames of those most fierce and bloody ciuill warres , increasing daily more and more , the wel-meaning and best affected simpler sort of men began to listen vnto the polititians aduertisements , and to suspect , that the charity of the spanish monarchy was altogether priuate interesse , and peculiar spanish charity ; which made them resolue , no longer to giue credit vnto outward apparences , but inwardly to view what matter the spaniards brought in their caske , and found , that in lieu of water to quench fire , they had filled them with pitch , tarre , rosen , oile , and turpentine , and also with diabolicall dissentions to foment and increase the same . which treachery was likewise found to bee fauoured by certaine french barons , who more than others professing to bee charitable , made vse both of the barrels , and of the matter lent them by the spaniards . whereupon they were by the iust disdaine of the french monarchy presently put to death , and burnt in the very same flames , which with so great sedition , and treacherous infidelitie , they nourished in the heart of their owne countrey . and the spaniards were not only chased from that worke , but by sound of trumpet publikely proclaimed to be a company of false hearted hypocrites . and by an especiall edict of the french monarchy , all men were giuen to vnderstand , that if euer there were any man found that would beleeue , that any sparke of charity towards the french could lodge in the breast of a spaniard , he should be held , esteemed , and reputed an egregious gull. and that if after the first warning he should persist in his errour , he should be tossed in a blanket , as a factious and seditious fellow . it was a thing worthy of admiration to see , that so soone as the spaniards and the foresaid vnnaturall french gaue ouer their worke , that fire which before was so great , that the most iudicious doe affirme , it was in all humane reason inextinguible , on a sudden ceased of it selfe : whereupon the eternall and farre renowmed flower de luces , whilom so hurried and trampled vnder foot , sprung vp againe , more gloriously flourishing and resplendent than euer they were . and france , which through the immoderate ambition of some turbulent spirits , had most barbarously bin tormented and molested more than full forty years , to the great wonderment of all , in the twinkling of an eye became quiet and in peace . whereby all the world came to know , that the spaniards had beene the first authors of that euer deplorable french combustion , which they vnder most specious shewes and pretences of religion , and christian charity , had laboured to make the world beleeue that they sought to quench . some report that the spanish monarchy vpon this retired her selfe into her royall palace , and that for many daies , shee would not admit any body to see her , hauing giuen her selfe ouer vnto so great melancholy , that with floods of teares trilling downe her blubred cheeks , shee loudly exclaimed , that shee would much rather haue lost two of her best kingdomes , than to see those her holy and hypocriticall pretexts so scoft at , so derided , and so laid open to all the world , wherewith she remembred to haue diuers times ( to her infinite profit ) sold vnto the world most stinking assa-fetid● , in stead of muske , ziuet , and amber-greece : it seeming vnto her to be depriued of her richest treasure , and to haue lost her inexhaust mynes of gold and siluer in peru , yea , and of the new world besides , seeing her selfe so vnluckily depriued of the hope and benefit , to be at any time more able to depaint vnto the silly credulous people , white for blacke , or chalke for cheese ; deeming it a very hard case to see herselfe brought vnto the wretched and dreadfull condition , in which she hath euer seene the french , to be inforced to purchase kingdomes and dominions with the onely force of the point and dint of the sword ; and not as heretofore she hath done with the onely semblances of her false-holy pretexts , which haue sometimes stood her in stead of flourishing and strong armies . she knowes that she hath put the world into combustion , and hath euer loued to fish in troubled waters . and it grieueth her beyond measure , that she hath so lost the good opinion of most nations , that shee is in some danger that none will hereafter beleeue her though she chance to speake the truth ; whereas heretofore the stimulation of false pretexts , and of most apparent hypocrisie were held in credit , and in lieu of thrice sacred verity , most absolute zeale and perfect deuotion . the spanish monarchie arriueth in parnassus , she intreateth apollo to be cured of a cauterie : shee is dismissed by the politike physitians . rag. 4. 3 part. it is now foure months since the renowmed maiestie of spain ariued at this court , vnto whom apollo forthwith assigned a day for her puklike & solemn entrance , which by the consent of the whole consistory of the learned , was appointed to be in the royal audience chamber , in the presence , and with the assistance of the soueraigne muses : which solemnity ( for some vrgent occasions ) was not performed but two daies since . the reason is , because she hath spent the full time of foure moneths in consultation with the poet princes , about the titles which shee should mutually giue and receiue from others ; as also in agreeing about the manner how to receiue them , and how they would receiue her in their reciprocall visitations . the consideration whereof hath made all the vertuous of this colledge , to stand amazed , and bitterly to bewaile the hard condition of these moderne times , infected with the contagion of so many complemental vanities . and the grieuances of the vertuous were so much the more increased , for so much as diuers learned princes openly refused to bee visited by that great queene , saying , that they feared to receiue some insult or affront from her , for they had lately receiued letters from italy , wherein they were by their louing friends forewarned to be circumspect , and vigilantly stand vpon their guard , it being peculiar vnto the spaniards to goe visit others , with intention rather to iniu●y than to honour them . and that they thought it an egregious folly , in lieu of auoiding of affronts abroad , to expect them with bended knees and cap in hand at home in their owne houses . and although that so potent a monarchie ( to the great admiration of all ) hath shewed her selfe much more nigardly , in giuing others satisfaction of titles , than in distributing of her duckats , shee hath notwithstanding receiued from these poet princes , and from all vertuous potentates ( who concerning this titular circumstance , stand rather vpon reall substance than on the vanity of things ) the greatest gust and contentment she could desire . true it is , that one thing hath much empaired the reputation of so great a queene in this court , which is , that albeit shee stand in extreme need of trusty friends , shee neuerthelesse sheweth herselfe so procliue and foreward to alienate those from her , who expect for nothing at her hands but satisfaction in words . yea , some haue noted ( as a remarkable thing ) that the master of the ceremonies hath forewarned her maiestie , that those precise punctilio● shee so nicely stands vpon , are most odious , and onely proper to barbarous kings , and right worthy her royall maiestie . and that a great queen in europe , her equall , hath in great passion and anger plainly told him to his teeth , that she much maruelled both at him and all his ceremonials , since hee seemed not to know , how a prince without grauity and state , may rightly be compared to a peacocke without a traine . it is impossible to set downe with what longing curiosity and earnest desire , so renowmed a princesse hath bin expected by all the learned of this court : for , from the vtmost bounds of all apollo's dominions , an infinite number of all sorts and sexes , haue flocked hither to view the countenance of that mightie queene , who with a prodigious stream of happines , hath in short time vnited & brought vnder her diuers potent kingdoms , and with them framed an empire so formidable , that there is no prince in the known vniuerse , but for feare & suspition of her , hath at some time or other bin driuen to put on a lacket of maile , or a cuirace of steele . this queene not many moneths since , attended on by a numberlesse fleet , with prosperous nauigation , arriued safely in the isle of lesbos : and the most honourable ladie the republike of genoa , hath gratis lent her her most famous port , although by reason of a certaine ancient prerogatiue , the family of the dorias draw a very great reuenue out of it . the spanish monarchie , in comparison of that of france , of england , and of other ancient monarchies of europe , is but yong in yeares , but in body and bulke far bigger than any other whatsoeuer : and to the proportion of her yeares , she is of an vnmeasurable greatnesse , whereby it is argued , that if she continue to grow vnto that age in which humane bodies are wont to receiue increase and growth , shee will prooue an huge giantesse , and attaine to that boundlesse height of vniuersall monarchies , vnto which the romane monarchie came . but he accidents of matters , and secrets of state , affirme most assuredly , that she cannot grow much greater . and that in her tendrest yeares shee is sprung vp vnto that height of bodie , vnto which shee may in any long time attaine : which is euidently perceiued by this infallible argument , that in these daies , shee groweth but halfe an inch with greater difficultie than in former times she did two handfull . this potent lady is of so swarthy an hue , that shee drawes neere vnto the moore or affrican . and therefore are her comporiments rather disdainfull and proud , than serious and graue and in all her actions she sheweth her selfe more cruell than seuere . and for as much as she could yet neuer learne the art so necessary vnto princes , to pardon , it is the vndoubted opinion of many , that it will proue some hindrance to her greatnesse : for glorying in nothing more , than to be called the doctoresse of all nations , in the science to be implacably-resolute , in knowing how to cut off the tops of those haughtie and luxurian poppies , which in the gardens of her states doe proudly ouertop others , she greatly reioyceth that it be said , how in this art , she hath excelled that great tarquinius , that was the first inuentor of so mysterious a secret . she being then so hardie and resolute in committing of seuerities , she is much perplexed in conferring of fauours , which are seldome seene to proceed from her . and those few that she bestoweth come from her with such an imperious haughtinesse , that they are not very acceptable . and yet in exterior semblance shee is all affabilitie , and wholly spends herselfe in complements . but he that with the spectacles of state-policie can prie into the inmost of her heart , shall easily perceiue , that shee is all pride , all auarice , all crueltie . so that all they that haue any long time treated or negotiated with her , report , that none receiue from any other princes more milde-honied words , and more bitter deeds . whence it is , that as a friend she doth greatly allure men , and as a mistris much insult vpon , and terrifie them . her hands are beyond all due proportion long , which shee extendeth farre and neere , as occasions serue , without distinguishing of friends from foes , or stranger from kinsman . her nailes are like an harpies , and most griping . her fingers are of so hard and fast-hold , that what once comes into her clutches , shee neuer lets goe againe . her eyes are blacke , and a most sharpe piercing sight . her looke is squint , with which wishly beholding one , she fixedly looketh vpon another . a thing of great danger vnto princes ; for of late daies , hauing bent her face towards algiers , no man suspecting it , she had earnestly fixed her looke towards marseilles . in her eyes is plainly discouered a most greedy and insatiate desire , since that there is nothing that shee fixeth them vpon , but shee most greedily wisheth and coueteth the same with all her heart , and that 's the reason , that our obseruing speculants say , that this queene doth immoderately thirst after others goods , and that as yet she neuer had friend , but with her tricks , and wilie-beguilies , she hath in the end made her slaue . all which things discouer plainly vnto the world , that she is rather fit to gouerne slaues than free men . for there is no other princesse whatsoeuer , that more ambitiously laboureth to ingrosse and forestall all seruice into her hands , not onely from her owne subiects , but from her best friends . she obserues so punctuall a forme of state , that she doth not so much as vouchsafe to goe meet good occasions , which infinite times haue sought her in her owne house . she farre excelleth all other queenes , both present and past in knowing , how vnder her rich robe of cloth of gold to paliate her priuate interesse , be it neuer so diabolicall . and although she be daily seene to commit most damnable actions , she makes no greater ostentation of any thing than of her conscience ; whereby the french , who vnder colour of her holy and religious pretexts , haue so often beene ouer-reached , haue at last ( to their no small cost ) learn'd to arme themselues , and to get on horsebacke , when with a crowne in her hand , they see her propose , or treat affaires full of religious pretexts , and sacred charitie , towards her best beloued neighbours . she is so cunning in the exercise of riding , that she hath not onely successefully tamed and broken the generous coursers of naples , but also the rough and skittish mules of spaine , which by a naturall instinct are wont to kick , to whinze , and bite at all men . she is of all other queenes of so mistrustfull a genius , that , except her owne nation , she hath declared all others ( though subiect vnto her ) to be of no confidence , albeit she haue diuers times , and in all occasions found them right trustie and faithfull ; which point is so preiudiciall vnto her , that the most skilfull in the worlds affaires , doe probably conclude , that by reason of this one most important defect , it is impossible she should grow bigger . the reason is , because there is no other queene , that careth lesse to be beloued of her people , than she , and that endeuoureth more to be feared . and therefore doe our polititians note this in her as a kinde of notorious follie , that shee confidently beleeueth , that with misusing and hurring all men , shee shall induce them to adore her , and with such hatefull deportments , allure all nations to serue her : for the great store of her treasures , is the forcible adamant , which violently attracts vnto it the mindes of some , who vtterly abhorring her , are bound to seeke , and by all meanes procure her declination . she is most curious and accurate in matters of small moment , whereas in weighty and important affaires , no other queene hath more easily suffered herselfe to be supplanted and ouer-reached . in her discourses , and in resoluing of most important businesses , she sheweth admirable wisdome , and circumspection ; but whether it be through her naturall tarditie , or artifice of her officers , who are all most greedy merchants of great negotiations ; or because she is of opinion , that no resolution is done with decorum , that is not long a doing , and with tedious delayes expected of all men . shee executeth her determined resolutions with such slownesse , that the face of affaires changing with the times , her resolutions determined with great wisdome , doe often proue vnhappy . and therefore doe all conclude , that shee is more couragious in the skill of plotting machinations , than in the exercise how to manage armes , in which she sheweth to haue an vndanted heart , a resolute constancie , and an vnspeakable sufferance of all crosses and inconueniences ; but so weake in resolutions , that her extraordinarie circumspection hath many times the semblance of timiditie . whence it followeth , that shee seemeth more apt to maintaine states , than to acquire them . diuers notable men laugh at her , to see her addresse and gouerne all her actions by the compasse of certaine solid and mature counsels , without euer referring them into the hands of that fate or chance , which hath so greatly fauoured the french , and yeelded them so glorious , when in their actions and managements , they haue gouerned themselues with much valour and little braine . there be some that thinke this hapneth , onely because she is as sparing of her owne bloud , as she is thirstie and insatiate of other mens . and therefore doe the expertest captaines of warre mocke and gibe at her , to see her aspire at the empirie of the whole vniuerse without euer fighting . the reason whereof is , because this most potent queene , being of long time accustomed to purchase great estates by alliances and mariages , she abhorreth the dreadfull custome of the french , to conquer kingdoms with the price and hazard of their owne dearest bloud . she being then more wittily-warie than boldly couragious , it followeth , that she is more mischieuous vnto her enemies in times of peace , than warre : whence it is , that the french , who hitherto haue liued with her in a supine or stupid carelesnesse , after so many calamities endured , haue at last learnt to double the barres of their doores , when they haue concluded peace with the spaniards . she is most carelesse and lauish of her owne riches , but so greedy of other mens , that shee careth not to desolate her patrimoniall estates , so shee may make conquest of others . she is of so secret and hidden thoughts , and of a minde so abstruse and vnsearchable , that there is no wit , artifice , or skill of man able to looke into her drifts . nay , linx himselfe with his through-piercing sight , cannot penetrate into them , no not so much as the outside of them : whereas men of a glimmering or short sight , may plainly see into the very bowels of the french and other nations . for he that shall with with iudgement goe about to describe the genius and customes of so great a princesse , must confidently beleeue , that in all the managements she hath in hand , and in all the affaires that others negotiate with her , shee is inwardly cleane contrary to that shee appeareth without . and although that among the foresaid vertues , shee be full fraught with so enormous vices , notwithstanding by reason of her prodigious fortune , all of them are interpreted and admired in her as vertues , whence it followeth , that diuers great princes take it as an honour to imitate her in her vices . she is of a most sturdie and robust complexion , whereby all iudge her to be long-liued . she onely languisheth of the indisposition , to haue her limbs much distracted , which doth much debilitate the forces of so huge a bulke . and although that with the helpe of the libertie of genoa , and of the alliance shee hath with the duke of sauoy , shee vseth diuers meanes and artifices to contract them ; neuerthelesse by reason of the diuersitie of the interesses of these potentates , she makes no great vse of them . this mighty princesse receiueth no greater damage from any , than from her chiefe spanish officers , whom alone she imployeth in great charges , all which are by them exercised with such , and intolerable surquedrie , as they will not onely be honoured as men , but adored as gods. an impertinencie so great , as it hath stirred vp a loathing , and nastinesse of the spanish dominion , not onely in the italians , and in the flemmings , but in the spaniards themselues . one thing hath caused great wonderment in all that behold so potent a queene , which is , that her whole bodie is full of horse leeches ( for the most part of genoa ) some of which are so big and fat , as they appeare to be of those great ecles that come out of holland , or those big lampreis that breed in seuerne it is not knowne whether it be through impotencie , or negligence , or through a destinie fatall vnto great princes , whose vitall bloud these noysome creatures seeke euermore to sucke , that shee endeuours not to shake them off , and be freed from them . this most mighty queene then , being entred into the royall palace before apollos imperiall maiestie , stretched forth her left arme , causing her seruants to vnswathe the same , and so naked , shewing it vnto apollo , and to the whole sacred colledge of the learned , she thus bespake . imperiall sir , and gratious father of all good letters : this which your maiestie seeth ; yea euen this is that stinking cauterie , and loathsome issue of flanders , which the french , the germanes , and some italian princes , that now friendly faune vpon me , together with the helpe of that formidable virago , and transmarine renegada made in this mine arme , for the distrust or suspition they had of me . i acknowledge that the princes forenamed had iust cause to be iealous of my power , when after the death of henry the second , they saw france falne into the wretched calamitie of infant-kings , and that i , in their minoritie , sought to sowe discords in that goodly kingdome . now that these suspitions are vanished , and that ( ay me , why doe i not blush to speake it ? ) the contention , which i haue had with the french , and particularly with that vndanted limbe of the deuill , the prince of bearne , is now ended , and that i haue at last beene condemned my selfe in all costs and charges : my humble request vnto your maiestie is , that this grieuous and fasheux cau●erie be healed , and closed vp . for most men are of opinion , that for the infinite number of humors , that haue runne vnto it , it is now become so festred and enraged a cankre , as i feare ( which god a●ert ) it will proue the losse of my arme . i did not passe into italie through mine owne ambition , or vnquenchable thirst , wholly to sway the same , as mine enemies report . it is well knowne to all the world , that i was vntimely called thereunto , and euen haled vnto it by the princes of italie themselues , to free them from the great feare they were in of the french. and there is no man liuing in europe , but knowes how that in the states that i possesse in italie , i imploy so large a share of my stock and free-hold , as they rather serue to further my weaknesse , and keepe me still oppressed . and thrice-happy were my spanish home , which i might ere now haue couered with tiles of pure siluer , and states of massie gold , had i neuer had intelligence , or dealings with the italian nation , so double-hearted , so full of fallacies , so anxious of priuate interesses , and onely good to embarke her neighbours into dangerous affaires without bisket ; and then vpon the least occasion , shake them off , and leaue them in the lurch , or in the midst of their greatest danger ; as shee , that openly professeth the tricke and skill to plucke creuises out of their holes with others hands , and not with her owne . and i haue often wondred , how italie , which ( as all the world knowes ) hath suffred herselfe to be broken , sadled , and backt , and ridden by all strange nations , will now stand vpon such nice punctillios of chastitie with me , who if she but see me stirre ( be it neuer so little ) shee presently entreth into suspition , that i goe about to rauish her of her honour and liberty . and howbeit , the greatnesse wherein the kingdome of france doth now finde it selfe , may assure italie , and all the forenamed princes from the feare they haue conceiued of my power ; i am neuerthelesse ( if it bee your maiesties pleasure ) ready to giue all men good caution and surety de non offendendo : on condition , that this to me so loathsome and irksome issue be healed and closed vp . by the expresse appointment of his maiestie , the cauterie was with all diligence viewed and considered by the politike physitians , who after long and mature consultation of the whole colledge of them , they vnanimously concluded , that it most euidently appearing , that the spanish monarchy is continually troubled with an vncessant thirst , to sway and dominere , she stands in need of that running issue , by which those grosse and peccant humors , which from peru distill into her stomacke , may be purged and euacuated ; for they are the cause of her vnquenchable and hydropicall thirst . those excellent physitians did likewise consider , that if the said monarchie had not that cauterie , there were most euident danger , that the pernicious humors of peru , might ascend into the head of italie , to the manifest ruine of those principall members , which yet are left sound in her ; and that the said monarchie of spaine might easily fall into an incurable dropsie of an vniuersall monarchie ; against which dangerous inconueniences they affirmed , there is good prouision made with the cauterie of the low countries , which ought to be kept open , so long as peru ( so stirring a member ) doth subminister those pernicious humors vnto the spanish monarchie . this resolution did mightily displease her , wherefore in great passion and perturbation of minde , thus she brake forth : sir , if through the spight and malignitie of others , i must so fouly languish and consume my selfe in continuall prouiding and applying vnguent for this corroding cankre , which mine enemies call a diuertiue font●ell , some , who haply thinke least of it , shall lay clouts and plaisters vnto it . her quip was presently vnderstood by the english , by the french , and by the italians , who replied , that they nor feared , nor doubted of any thing ; since they sent nothing into the low countries , but the garbage , the offals , the filths and sweepings of their states ; whereas the spaniards did there waste pure gold and consume vitall bloud . and therefore , both the english , the french , and the germanes , to arme and secure themselues from the formidable power , boundlesse ambition , and secret machinations of the spaniards , who haue no horizon , were forced , in conformitie of the aphorisme or the politike hippocrates , tacitus , consilijs , & estures externas moliri arma procul habere . the spanish monarchie goeth to the oracle of delphos , to know whether shee shall euer obtaine the monarchie of the world ; she hath a crosse answer . rag. 10. 1 part. yester day morning , two houres before day , the renowmed monarchie of spaine , in great secrecie departed from parnassus , in a caroch with six horses , hauing taken but a few followers & confederates of her court to art end her . her departure hath ministred no small iealousie in all this dominion , but more especially in the monarchie of france , who was much moued thereat . and to finde out what way she had taken , presently tooke post , and following her tracts , ouertooke her euen as she arriued in delphos before the oracle of apollo ; vnto whom the spanish monarchie presenting herselfe ( as they report that were present ) she proposed this question . oh eternall and bright lampe of the world , the right eye of heauen , who art the bringer not onely of the day , but of all goodnesse vnto mankinde . thou knowest that long since , all my thoughts haue bin addressed vnto that vniuersall monarchie , vnto which none euer attained but the romane people . thou knowest the effusion of blood , and the prosusion of treasures that i haue caused and spent , to reach vnto the goale of my intention . thou only knowest the teilsome vigils , the bloody sweats , the industrious practises that i haue spent , suffered , and plotted , to come vnto so important a designe . thou likewise knowest , that by the indefatigable dexterity of my wit , by the mighty vertue of my coyne , and by the marchlesse valour of my nation , i did not many years since sow so infinite seditions , and raised so turbalent warres in the very heart of france , on which i had laid the foundation of all my hopes , i had well nigh obtained the wished end of mine intention : and how for a finall conquest of all lets and rubs i wanted but the meanes to vnite naples vnto milane : which difficultie if i can once surmount , i may boldly vaunt to haue wonne the game . but since either by my fatall misfortune , or by the impossibility of the businesse , or by the power of so many cruell enemies that are risen vp against me , the scandals of the reuolutions , which with so many machinations , for the space of so long time , i had dispersed among the french , whom i could yet neuer vanquish , are in one onely day conuerted into that peace and tranquility , that my heart is aggrieued to see , and my minde abhorreth to remember ; as loath to make an vtter hauocke of so many of my people i entended to employ in this enterprise , i haue almost brought them vnto a finall desolation . and because i would no longer bee a laughing stocke vnto the world , i here prostrate my selfe before thy sacred maiestie , most submissiuely beseeching thee to giue me a direct answer , whether that vniuersall monarchy which i haue so deeply riuetted in my heart , and which is the onely ayme of all my actions , is by the will of heauens destinated vnto me ; which i desire to know , to the end if there bee no impossibility in the pursuit thereof , i may rouze vp my spirits , and by the possibility of it , keepe my spaniards in heart . for , to tell thee the very truth , who pryest into the secretest thoughts of all men both by sea and land ; by the infinitenesse of conspiracies , of counter-mines , and of complots , that by mine implacable enemies haue bin plotted and contriued against me , and now more than euer are practised to my detriment , i begin to faint and dispaire of any good successe . at this exorbitant question the temple did shake , and the earth trembled round about a great distance off , when from the mouthof the minister of apollo proceeded these words . the vniuersall monarchie shall againe returne to the farre renowmed italian nation , at what time it shall haue banished those intestine iarres , and ciuill discords which haue brought her in bondage to forraigne and strange nations . after so dolefull an answer , the spanish monarchie , full of spight and anguish came forth of the temple , but confounded with amazement when shee saw the monarchy of france present her selfe before her , whom ( hauing first entertained with some ordinary complements ) shee tooke by the hand , drew her apart , and friendly imparted vnto her the answer that the oracle had giuen her . and how the vniuersall monarchie was by diuine prouidence like to return vnto the italian nation ; which thing succeeding , france should finde and feele new iulius caesars , as spaine second scipioes . and that to secure and settle their affaires , shee thought there was no better way than to share and diuide italy equally betweene them . moreouer she offered to teach her the secret that she most successefully had experimented in the indies , by vertue of which , they might both assure themselues of the italian nation , in such sort as there should no memorie be left in the world of so wicked a race of men but the bare name . vnto whom the french monarchie framed this answer ; oh spaine , first suffer me to forget that most vnfortunate diuision of the kingdome of naples , which my king lewis the twelfth made with thee , and then we will confer of this matter . for , know spaine , it is not so easie a thing to consen and iniurie the french the second time , as i see you perswade your selfe . then as touching the secret you propose vnto mee , how wee may assure our selues of the italians , i pray you doe you attempt it and put the same in execution , since to desart and desolate the world of people ( as you haue done and practised in the indies ) and to dominere ouer a bare land void of inhabitants , is a certaine politicke precept that is not found in the register of the french reason of state. for , i haue ( and that to mine owne cost ) learnt to bee contented with a little so it be good . and therefore doe i found my greatnesse more on the multitude of good subiects , than on the wide extent of a kingdome . and so that my french nation may liue at ease and commodiously in this world , i am well pleased to admit of other nations therein . the negotiation of the concord of italy is long and tedious ; and you know by good experience , that purges giuen to assure a man from a disease he feareth , do many times hasten the same . i will not omit with the genuine liberty , that is proper to my nature , confidently to tell you , how that the enterprize to subdue all italy , is not so easie a taske as i perceiue you apprehend to your selfe . for , when i had such toyes in my head , which to me proued most pernicious , and i verily beleeue will proue no better to you , i thought as you thinke now : and i haue manifestly discouered , that the italians are a kinde of creatures that are euer more warily vigilant how to escape our hands , and who can neuer bee tamed , or brought vnder the yoake of strangers bondage . and although as most subtle apes , and crafty monkies , they easily transforme themselues into the customes and fashions of those nations that sway them , yet doe they euer keepe fixed in their hearts their ancient malice and hatred . they are great merchants of their seruitude , which they trafficke and trucke so cunningly , that if they but once put on a paire of breeches after the cut of madrill , they will induce you to beleeue that they are become true and perfect spaniards ; and if they weare but a great folio ruffe of cambricke , we presently thinke them to bee turned into right french-men . but come once to the close or vpshot of any businesse with them , they will then shew you more teeth than can be found in fifty bundles of handsawes , or a thousand combes . and italy doth iustly resemble those greedy and couetous dames , who with the strong and sharpe lye of their blandishments scald their vnheedy louers , but neuer let them come to the iouissance and fruition of that which they most desire . and therefore beleeue me ( who haue to my no small cost made tryall of it ) concerning the conquest of italy , you shall in the end reape nothing but losse and shame . philip the second of that name , king of spaine , after long strife about his title , makes his solemne entrie into parnassus . rag. 12. 3 part. the most mighty king of spaine , philip the second , who ( two moneths since ) arriued in this court , could not before yesterday bee admitted to make his publike and solemne entrance . the reason hath bin , because that in certaine triumphant pageants which the spanish nation hath with royall magnificence erected vnto him , there were fairely written , these words ; philippo secundo hispaniarum ; vtriusque siciliae , & indiarum regi catholico , italiae pacis auctorifoelicissimo . which words , for so much as they were somewhat distastfull vnto most of the italian princes , they instantly required that they might be cancelled and blotted out , saying , that ( vpon no tearms ) they would neuer acknowledge that peace of italy from the spaniards , which themselues so dearly , and with such vast summes of ready money purchased of the hollanders and zelanders . this aromaticall contestation was long debated and canuast to and fro . and although the italian princes did concludingly prooue in iudgment , that the present peace of italy did not directly proceed from any well-meaning sincerity of the spaniards , who if they might haue had their wils , would haue enthralled the same , had not that great diuersion bin made to them , but ought wholly to be acknowledged from the warres in the low-countries . now in the greatest heat of this controuersie , the queene of italy , with her wonted wisdome , interposing her selfe , appeased the same , who hauing conuoked all her princes , she exhorted them to leaue all vaine ostentations and spungy vauntings vnto the spaniards , and meditating on reall and substantiall subiects , continue to feed them with vapourous smoke . the horse-troope , both for the quality and number of the princes that concurred to fauour , to court , to attend , and to serue so great a king , was the most numerous and the most honourable that euer was seene in parnassus . so was this mighty king ranked among those monarchs , which in the world haue bin more famous for their wisdome and sagacity , than for their courage or valour in warre . moreouer , the impresa which hee caried in his royall standard made all the learned of this court to wonder , which was a faire painted writing-pen , by vertue of which it did euidently appeare by the testimony of some historians , that both in the most potent kingdome of france and elsewhere , where any fit occasion had beene offered vnto him to make vse of it , hee had caused and stirred vp more and greater ruines , spoiles , rapines , wracks , and hauocks , than euer his father charles the fift could cause or effect with the greatest part of the cannons of europe . the impresa was highly commended by the sacred colledge of the vertuous : all writers taking it for a great honour vnto themselues ; that a pen in the hand of one that had knowne how to vse it , had archieued and effected so memorable and remarkable actions . this great king hath still bin most royally entertained in parnassus ; for , euen the chiefe and most eminent monarkes in europe haue held it as an honourable reputation , to be able to attend and serue him . so that euen the next day after his ingresse into this dominion , being disposed to be trimmed , & to commit himselfe into the hands of a barber , the great queene of england disdained not all the while to hold the bason vnder his chinne . and the most renowmed martiall king of france , henry the fourth , surnamed the great , tooke it for a matchlesse glory to himselfe to be admitted to wash his head , which hee performed with so exquisite skill and artificiall dexterity , as he seemed to bee borne in that exercise , and brought vp prentise in that trade . although some enuious detractors haue giuen out , that he did it without any sope or washing-ball , but with strong scalding lye alone . this mighty monarke hath bin presented by all the vertuous of parnassus , with diuers gifts of poetrie , and other quaint and much elabourated poems , all which hee hath counterchanged with great liberality , and bounty . and to a certaine learned man who presented him with an excellent discourse , wherein was demonstrated the way and meanes , how , and in what manner most noble partenope , and all the most flourishing kingdome of naples , which by the vnsufferable outrages of the soldiers , by the robberies of the iudges , by the tyrannous extortions of the barons , and by the general rapins and ransakings , which the griping and greedy vice-royes that from spain are sent thither , onely to cram and fatten themselues , is now brought vnto extreme misery and desolation , might be restored vnto the ancient greatnesse of its splendor , he gaue a reward of twenty duckats of gold , and consigned the said discourse vnto his confessour , commanding him to keepe it safe , for that it was written very honestly and religiously ; whereas vnto a most cunning and sufficient politician , who deliuered him a very long treatise , but altogether contrary to the first , as that which treateth of politicke precepts , and sheweth what course is to bee held to depresse and afflict the said kingdome of naples , lower and more than now it is . and how it may with facility bee reduced vnto such misery and calamity , as that generous courcer which the seggio of state , without any headstall or saddle , hath hitherto ( with no happy successe ) borne for an impresse or recognisance , may bee compelled patiently to beare a pack-saddle or panier , to cary any heauy packe or burden ; yea , and to draw in a cart. for so much as hee was informed that it was iudiciously compiled , and according to the right tearmes of moderne policy , hee assigned a gift of twelue thousand crownes rent a yeare , and moreouer made him a grand of spaine . the dogs of the indies are become wolues . rag. 22. 3. part. on the night of the twelfth of this present , about eight of the clocke , arriued in post-haste a curtier dispatched from lisbone vnto apollo , who told his maiestie , that he had brought him most important newes from the west-indies . the next morning very early , all the learned ran to the court , to heare some newes . and the spaniards were the first , who with great anxietie inquired , whether there had lately beene discouered some other mount of petofis , or a new rio del plata in the indies , which if it were , they would speedily haste thither , to plant the holy word of god. the french were very importunate to know , whether some new world had beene found our , which with making the spaniards more powerfull , might helpe them vtterly to subuert the old-one . apollo had no sooner read the letters , but he fell into a ●●ance of sorrow ; and hauing inuolued himselfe into a ●oggie mist , a shower of abundant brackish teares was seene to trickle downe his cheeks ; which was taken for a most disastrous presage : by which sudden alteration , all men iudged , that the post had brought very bad newes . now whilest all the court was full of all sorts of learned and vertuous men , who in great anxietie longed to vnderstand the cause of his maiesties publike sadnesse ; after sundry clattrings of thunder , and infinite flashings of lightnings , which they heard and saw , there was heard an horrible and dreadfull voice , which said : oh you , that inhabit the earth ; fast , macerate , and cloath your selues with haire-cloth ; sprinkle your selues with ashes ; eat your bread with teares ; endeuour with humble prayers to asswage the wrath of god ; and with contrite hearts , and penitent soules , suppliantly beseech him , that of his infinite mercy , he will vouchsafe , to deliuer all humane-kinde , inhabiting the old world , from those portentous and monstrous nouelties , which wee certainely vnderstand to haue lately hapned in the new . at so vnexpected , and prodigious aduertisements , infinite of the vertuous , by the wounding affliction that they felt in their hearts , fell downe in a swoune , thinking verily that the west indies had beene vtterly consumed by fire , or ouerwhelmed by the furie of mercilesse waters . in this terror and dismall plight , all the people in par●assus , with showers of teares , with throbbing sobs , with groning howlings , with loud-shrill voices , as the like were neuer heard , cride for mercy , mercy : and with most submissiue intreatings and groanes besought apollo , that hee would daigne to impart vnto his deuout subiects , what those mischiefes were , from which they should intreat the immortall god to be deliuered . then from the aforesaid court of his maiestie was heard a second voice , which gaue all men to vnderstand , that the dogs which the spaniards had transported into the indies for the safegard of their flocks of sheepe , were all become such rauenous wolues , that in worrying and deuouring of flecced cattle , they exceeded the voracitie and cruelty of the greedy tigres . after so drearie and vnhappy tidings , all the learned in parnassus burst forth into wailfull cries , and lamentable skreeks , dolefully complaining , that if the dogs , which were placed for the guard & safetie of the sheepe , became wolues , so rauenous , as they deuoured whole flocks ; vnto what gardians night shepherds hereafter recommend the keeping and safe custodie of their sheepe ? and their flocks being now destitute of the protection of dogs , who haue alwaies beene so faithfull vnto their masters and shepherds , how could it be possible , but that the whole genus and kinde of sheepe must needs decay and perish through all the world , and become the most vnhappie creatures of all others , since they must be a prey both to the wolues their enemies , and to the dogs their friends ? whilest all the nations of parnassus ( surprised by so great terror ) were all dismaid , fainting , swouning , and groueling on the ground , onely the flemmings and the people of the low countries , were seene all dreadlesse and vndismaid , to runne leaping vp and downe parnassus , incouraging all men to pull vp a good heart , to be of good cheere , and neuer droope or faint : for there was no calamitie nor miserie could or be threatned or inflicted on mankinde , which by an vndaunted resolution , and resolute minde , might not be or diuerted or auoided . and with lond acclamation they gaue all men to vnderstand , that euen in their owne countries , those dogs and currs , which the spanish shepherds had sent for the guard of the flemmish and belgick flocks , were transformed into such rauenous wolues , as with their fierce immanitie , and fell brutishnesse , they deuoured all their sheepe ; and that ere this they would haue woorried the whole race and flocks of the low countries , if by the resentment of that bold and couragious determination ( now famous through all the world ) they had not prouided a sound remedie for it . and therefore , if those mischiefs should befall the old world , which ( as the report was ) were hapned to the new , they wished all men to know , that the true and only remedie , to chastise those currs , tainted with that foule fault , to woorrie , to rapine and deuoure harmlesse sheepe , was , to giue them some holland-nux-vomica , and ( as they deserued ) make them to vomit out their very heart , and burst and burst . the french are humble sutors vnto apollo , to know the secret , how to perfume gloues after the spanish fashion . rag. 9. 3 part. the emulation that raigneth betweene the two most warlike , martiall , and mighty nations , the french , and the spanish , is as great as eternall . for there appeareth no vertue in the french , that is not most ambitiously sought after by the spaniard . and the french is neuer quiet vntill he haue attained vnto all the rarities wherewith he seeth spaine endowed . now forsomuch as the skill or sleight of the perfuming and tempring of amber , with which they make their gloues so sweetly odoriferous , is the peculiar inuention and meere endowment of the spaniards ; the french haue omitted no manner of pursuit , to finde out , and attaine the perfection , how to make the like . for they haue with anxious labour , and to their cost prouided themselues of muske , of ambergreese , of ziuet , and of all the most aromaticall drugs , that the orient affordeth ; but all proued vaine and effectlesse . for neither their cost , nor all their diligence haue beene sufficient , to make them obtaine the end of their wished intention : yet rather than they would giue ouer their pursuit as desperate , the thrice noble french nation had recourse vnto apollos maiestie , as the onely producer of all aromatikes and sweet gums , whom shee hath most instantly besought to vouchsafe to reach her the true way , how to perfume gloues with amber-greese , wherein the spaniard is so cunning . it is most certaine , that apollo was neuer seene to laugh so heartily , no not when he saw the downefall of vnhappy dedalus , as he did at the impertinent request of those french sutors , whose hands he commanded his priests , that were about him , to smell vnto . and that they should make a true report what they smelt of , the priests presently obeyed ; and told his maiestie , that they had no ill sauour , but smelt very sweet . which apollo hearing , he told the french , that nature did euermore counterchange others defects with some rare vertue or other . and therefore had he conferred the gift , to make sweet-smelling gloues only vnto that nation , whose hands were so ranke , that they did euer stinke worse than any carrion . why the monarchy of spaine is lately retired into her palace . rag. 14. 3 part. forsomuch as many daies were past since the monarchie of spaine had shewed her selfe in publike , and hath not onely euer since , liued as a recluse in her owne house , but hath continually kept all the doores thereof fast shut . the italian princes , and aboue all the venetians , not only most diligent searchers into mens thoughts , but carefull and studious obseruers of that great queenes actions , seeing so strange an alteration , entred into anxious and great iealousies . and because it hath neuer beene possible for them or any other to know , what her so sudden retirednesse might signifie , all men did argue , that it could not be without some secret mysterie . the venetians for iealousie of their owne estates , impatient of delayes , by ladders set vp against the walls of her palace , entred in at the windowes thereof , and saw that she was very busie with one of her chiefe officers , called the marquis spinola , labouring hard with diuers rare and artificiall engines , to stop all the holes , gaps , chinks , and creuisses in and about her house . and wondring not a little , to what end she should doe it ; they presently aduertised their friends speedily to arme and prepare themselues ; for so soone as the spaniards should haue stopped all the gaps and holes of any supply , helpe , or succour , they would assuredly giue chase to all the mice and rats , and make an vniuersall slaughter of them . how the ministers and officers of spaine are continually interessed in their priuate profit . rag. 20. 3 part. three daies are now past , when about nine of the clock at night , there were seene to enter forty cart loads of hay into the royall palace of the monarchie of spaine . and forsomuch as the strange and vnseasonable houre , made the french , the venetians , and other potentates , who liue in continuall iealousie of the greatnesse of so formidable a princesse , to suspect some mischiefe , there was speedy search and diligent inquirie made , to know the mysterie of so strange prouision ; and whether vnder that hay , the carts might be laden with any vnlawfull and forbidden goods . whereupon many spies were set a worke about it , who found out , and reported , that vnder the hay there were hidden and stowed certaine chests full of mattocks , spades , pick-axes , and shouels . and because these are instruments and tooles belonging to pioners , sappers , diggers , and labouring-men , the french presently resolued to arme themselues . and the venetians were about to lanch their gallies from out their arsenall into the sea ; when by some polititians it was aduised , before they should discouer their intention , to finde out , whether the spaniards had at any time before made prouision of such tooles or implements , & whether they expected to receiue any more else-whence . but they were vndoubtedly assured , that before that time they had neuer receiued any , nor did hereafter looke for any more . the said did besides certifie vnto them , that so soone as the said chests were vnladen , they were not caried into the royall armorie or common magazin , but that all the grandes of spaine , and the chiefe officers of so potent a monarchie , did presently diuide those spades , mattocks , scoopes , shouels , pick-axes among themselues ; with which the very next day very early they began to dig ditches , to draw rills , to conuey riuelets , to direct gullets , to reare banks , to frame scluses , and to fill the country with aqueducts , and water-pipes , with such labour , paine , and diligence ( euery man drawing all the water he could procure to his owne mill ) as they had brought all publike matters , and the whole state to such miserie , and calamitie , that the mills of the communitie of spaine , for want of water , could nor goe , nor worke , nor grinde . apollo hauing vsed all possible meanes , and exquisite diligence , to haue some one of the court-mignons , or princes-idols taken and apprehended , doth seuerely proceed against one lately fallen into the hands of the iudges . rag. 5. 2 part. apollo ( to his infinite griefe ) being come to a perfect knowledge of the most enormous disorder , which the shamefull blindnesse of those princes causeth , no lesse in great empires , than in pettie principalities , who commit that vnpardonable excesse , to subiect and enuassal themselues vnto a base and new vp-start seruant of theirs , since neither his maiesties continuall exhortations , nor the frightfull calamities , which for the said foule excesses an infinite number of princes hath suffred and smarted for , hath beene of force to remoue them from that hard destinie , by which they seeme violently to be drawne , to precipitate into the bottomlesse whirlpoole of so outragious inconueniences ; forsomuch as he would not abandon the protection ( a quality proper to his maiestie ) of the gouernours of mankinde . some few moneths are now past , since he resolued with all rigour to persecute those seruants , that with their prodigious ambition , and artificiall tricks ( altogether diabolicall ) vndertake to rule and gouerne their lord and master . and therefore did his maiestie not many yeares since publish most grieuous mulcts , and rich rewards , to be inflicted vpon the offenders , and giuen to those that should reueale any such vnto his iudges . two weekes are now past since one of these varlets , hauing bin accused vnto the magistrate , was presently apprehended and laid vp , who by many euidences being found foule and guilty , was laid vpon the racke , where he confessed all the horrible tricks , shifts , wiles , circumuentions , masks , and detestable iuglings , that he had vsed and practised , not onely to induce his master to become his slaue , but euen to adore and worship him . apollo hauing read and considered the processe and enditement against that monstrous villaine , fell into a strange amazement , how those princes ( who are so greedy of domination that they often fall into moody iealousies , and vnnaturall suspitions , not onely of strangers , but of their own children ) may or can ( either through their owne gullishnesse , or monstrous fraud of others ) fall into that reproachfull infamie , to become vassals , and euen slaues vnto a base rascally seruant of theirs . and hee thought it a most portentous case , that there should bee found both sonnes and nephews vnto princes , who to obtaine the goale , to dominere ouer their fathers , and to lord it ouer their vncles , had shewed spirits full of ambition , and minds extremely thirsty , to sway and command , and by cunning policies , and politike mysteries , had attained the garland of their desires , the very same men shortly after , could themselues fall or decline into that abhominable metamorphosis , to forgoe their domination purchased with so great care , anguish , wiles , and sweat , and make one their superiour , that is so farre their inferiour . a wonder so rare and extrauagant , as humane wit can no more giue a reason for , than of the hidden vertue of the adamant stone . apollo , to the end that by the exemplary punishment of that darling-courtier , princes might learne some so profitable document , as might in some sort terrifie them from committing so hateful indignities ; three daies since he summōed all the princes now resident in this court , to appeare before him in the great audience-chamber . in presence of whom , their greater confusion , with a loud and intelligible voice , ●●caused the abominable enditement , framed against that villanous varlet , to be read by bossius , his maiesties clarke of the crowne , who being demanded what tricks , course , or art he had vsed to reach vnto the end , so absolutely to ouersway & gouern his lord and master , answered , that the very first day he came to the court , he wholly applyed his minde and wits , exactly , and with all diligence punctually to obserue the genius of the prince , which hauing ●ound to be naturally inclined vnto lust and luxury , he with gentle , plausible , and cunning artificiall manners , did presently ●o apply himselfe to commend a vice so vnworthy a man that hath the charge and gouernment of a state committed vnto him ( as if laciuiousnesse had bin an egregious and laudable vertue . ) and how he vsed all possible industrie to become his instru●ent or minister in them : which hauing easily obtained , he imployed all possible industrie to prouide him with most obscene instruments to fulfill his filthy lust : and that afterwards , vnder diuers pretexts and sundry colours , he had industriously laboured , that all those vertuous , honest , and honourable seruants about the prince , whom he knew or suspected might reclaime him vnto a debonaire and vertuous life , should be remoued or discharged from the court as vicious and professed enemies to the prince and state ; yea , some he had put to open shame and disgrace , and others he had blinded with false and surmised offices , places , titles , and honours . and had in their places aduanced and substituted some of his owne creatures , dependants and confidents , who were all deeply plunged into all manner of carnall sensuality and bruitish lasciuiousnesse , by whose meanes and furtherance ( he affirmed ) to haue employed all his study and care that his lord and master should be vtterly depriued , and shake off some commendable and genuine endowment , which by nature , and from his former education hee had attained vnto ▪ and had after that so wrought , that vnder colour of being false and disloyall , all the old officers of the state , were or discharged or expelled the court , whose iust condoleances and grieuances he had pourtraid and represented vnto him as sedi●ious railings and petulant detractions : and had so preuailed with him that their important charges and offices were all conferred vpon men without iudgement , without wisdome , without honesty , or without charity towards their princes welfare , or priuate interesse ; hauing in recompence required nothing at their hands but confidence , secrecie , and a strict adherence to his owne affaires ; by whose meanes hee had so beset , besotted , and circumgired his lord and master , that it was neuer possible afterward for truth ( which as the shadow to the body should perpetually and inseparably bee vnited vnto a prince ) to come to his notice or eares , by the relation of any well meaning or faithfull friend to him or , the state. and that afterwards to the end he alone might absolutely rule , and vncontrouledly sway the state , hee had so fairely allured him to sloth and idlenesse , that hee brought him to be plunged euen vp to the eyes in pleasures of gardens , in recreations of countrey houses , and in sports of hunting and hauking : nay , he had so far preuailed with him , that he abhorred as things most hatefull to heare of state-matters , or of his proper interesses . and had besides induced him to beleeue that his treacherous plots and practises to make him fall out with his owne sonne , and other princes of his blood , was an vnfaigned zeale of inward loue and hearty affection towards him : a spotlesse charity towards the publike benefit of his people : and that by his quaint artifices and iugling trickes , hee had brought him to be so stolide , so stupid , & so gullish , that the manifest and insolent tyranny of his base seruant ( knowne & abhorred by the simplest of his state ) was by the vnfortunate prince , named to be a vigilant regard to his seruice , an easing of him from paines , a disburthening of him from cares , and a charity towards the common-weale ; and that sloth , idlenesse , lithernesse , and carelesse negligence was an honourable rest and quiet repose . and moreouer , to the end his prince might neuer awaken or rouze himselfe from out his drowzie and shamefull laethe-sleepe , and by opening his eyes , come to the knowledge of his owne stolidity , idiotisme , and gullishnesse , and so discouer others trecherous ambition , hee had filled his court with flatterers , parasites , and sicophants , who with plausible blandishments , and infamous perswasions , extolled and commended his silly vnaptnesse to bee a matchlesse valour : the generall hatred of his people , to be a louing and vnfaigned affection : all publike railings and detractions to be exaggerated praises ; confusion and disorder to be a perfect gouernment , the tyranny of a lewd villain to be honourable and carefull seruice , extor●ions to be sacred iustice , lauish prodigality to be vertuous liberality , his abiect lithernesse , and crauen timidity in hauing so basely neglected and abandoned the helme and gouernment of his state , he commended to be right honorable labours , diligent endeuours , and politicke gouernment . all these perfidious treacheries being confessed by that false wretch , so amazed and terrified those princes that heard them , that with a loud voice they all cride out , that , to become most rigorously cruell against so impious and wicked a villaine , with gallows , gibbets , rackes , wheeles , halters , axen , tortures , flames , and bloody weapons , were true and charitable piety and pitty . and therefore they should all ioyntly become suiters vnto perillus , to deuise some new kinde of torment , as might dilaniate and teare in peeces that monster of nature , and yet not depriue him of life ; to the end there might neuer more be found a man that durst dare to commit so hainous and outragious villanies . and all the princes were so moued with the foulenesse of that enditement , as vnanimously they all besought his maiestie to shew some extraordinary rigors against those , who by the fraudulent wiles and exorbitant trickes of their seruants , suffer themselues to so vi●uperous and shamefull a state . now for so much as by this vertuous instance intimated by those princes vnto apollo , his maiesties minde was so moued to compunction , that teares were seene to trickle downe his cheekes , some idiots that stood by , deemed this to proceed from the excessiue contentation which apollo felt , to heare the great horrour , whereby princes had embraced and fostered that vice , which his maiesty so much desired they should shun and detest . but the wisest and best of the vertuous that were present at that act , knew very well , that apollo wept and bewailed the vnhappy blindnesse of those inebriated and infatuated princes , who abhorring their owne excesses in others , did most instantly require , that those vices into which the greatest number of them were imperceptibly , and at vnawares plunged ouer head and eares , might with some extraordinary and rigorous seuerity be punished . so mischieuous and pernicious is that reproachfull and detestable vice in princes to idolatrize mignons , which they exactly perceiuing , and extreamly blaming in others , they neuer see , but rather fauour and commend in themselues . and whom doe wee see fall into this foule fault , and shamefull errour , but such as make most ostentation to bee the aristarco's and reformers of the world ? the whole race or genus of sheepe send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they earnestly entreat him to grant them sharp teeth and long hornes : whose suit is by his maiesty scorned and reiected . rag. 88. 1 part. the whole race or corporation of sheepe haue sent foure ambassadors to this court , which this present morning haue bin admitted by his maiestie to haue a royall audience . whereupon a great and goodly magistrall ram of lincolne-shire , in an articulate bleating voice vttered these words ; that the sheepe knew very well , that that god , who had created all things , had vsed so great charity and impartiall iustice towards all sorts of liuing creatures , as he had recompenced the defects and imperfections of some with other equiualent endowments of vse and vertue . so that in so infinite a multitude of bruit animals , there was not one that might iustly complaine to haue in its creation receiued any wrong at his diuine maiesties hands . but yet it seemed vnto them that ( as a step-sire ) hee had shewed great partiality onely with the sheepe , forsomuch as hauing created them with diuers imperfections , it did not appeare that hee had endowed them with any equiualent vertue by or with which they might ( if not assure their state ) yet at least bee able to liue in this world with that safety and quietnesse that other creatures did . for although his diuine maiestie had created the hare with wondrous timidity , with sharpe teeth , and without a heart to bite , he had necerthelesse endowed her with so swift a foot as did assure her from the tushes or fangs of the fiercest beast . and that the fox could not iustly find her selfe agrieued to haue beene created slow of foot , his maiesty hauing endowed her with such sagacity of wit , as shee could with facility auoid the wiles , the snares or ambushes of any wild beast . and that hee had so recompenced the slownesse of the wolues running with so hardy an heart , with so keene a tooth , with so circumspect a genius , as being a terrour to all beasts , hee makes himselfe to bee awed and respected of men . moreouer it euidently appeared , that his maiesty had vsed the same charity vnto the fowle and birds of the aire , since that vnto those to whom hee had denied the speedy vse of their feet , he had in recompence giuen them larger wings , and a swifter flight , namely to pheasants , to partridges , and to quailes , who in requitall of their short wings and traine feathers had the nimblenesse of their feet . and that the silly sheepe onely , hauing bin created with so blockish a stupidity of wit , heartlesse , slow-footed , and without those keen biting teeth , with which other beasts make themselues to be awed and respected . they thought themselues forsaken and reiected by that diuine maiesty and charity that had manifested so great dilection and louingnesse , euen vnto wild , fierce , and hurtfull beasts . the said goodly tall ram added moreouer , that to fill vp the measure of the incomparable calamity of the harmlesse and disarmed sheepe , his maiesty had allotted the lions , the tigres , the beares , the wolues , ( being the most cruell and blood-thirsty beasts that wander vpon earth ) to bee their fatall and implacable enemies . so that it seemed that the poore sheepe were created only to feed and to be a prey to those enraged and furious beasts , that know not what satiety meaneth . hee said moreouer , that vnto the vnsupportable iniuries which the sheep receiued daily from their enemies , were likewise added the outrages and misusages which their owne shepheards continually heaped vpon them ; all which proceeded because they were so disarmed & weaponles : for , if they might be so happy , as but once in ten yeares , if not for reuenge , at least for correction , vpon certaine occasions , to haue teeth allowed them to bite certaine cruell and indiscreet shepheards , who milke them without charity , and sheare them without discretion , peraduenture they should bee more kindly and better dealt withall . and their shearers , or rather shauers , would more gently handle their sheares , and not hurt or teare their skinne . and therefore the whole kinde or race of sheepe , that they may no longer bee the load-stone or subiect of most wailefull oppressions , doe most instantly beseech his sacred maiesty , to haue long teeth and sharpe hornes granted them to bite & gore their enemies , that so they may become more respected and better esteemed . to this rammish request apollo answered with a blith and chearefull countenance , that the sheepe had made a request suitable and worthy their silly simplicity , since they know not how among all the foure-footed creatures that liue vpon the earth , no one can be found more fauoured and priuiledged than they ; for , whereas others are with numberlesse cares and infinite dangers enforced to shift and sharke for food , diuers of which are constrained to imploy the night ( ordained for sleep and rest ) to feed and sustaine themselues , as not daring to beseene by day ; only for the sheep , euen by men ( who are lords ouer all wild beasts , and possessors of the earth ) pastures and fields are prouided , reserued , and with carefulnesse and labour hired , purchased , and manured at excessiue and deare rates . and that in darke and stormy nights , in foule weather , and at all times , they alone were carefully prouided for , charitably fed , tenderly watched , and diligently guarded in their folds , yea , and desended from their hurtfull foes . and whereas other creatures were continually hunted , chased , and pursued by many sorts of other rauenous wilde beasts , and entrapped by the wiles and deuises of men ; for whose destruction infinite people apply themselues to nothing more than to weaue nets , to frame toiles , to lay springes , to set traps , to hide ginnes , to dig pit-falls , and to breed , to teach , and to feed dogs . onely the sheepe by an especiall grace and prerogatiue , enioyed the noble priuiledge , to haue men labour so industriously for them , and to shield them from so infinit dangers ; and that the creator of this vniuerse had made demonstration of especiall predilection towards the whole race of sheepe , who in lieu of rauenous teeth , goring hornes , and swift legs , had graciously granted them the powerfull and subduing weapons of rich wooll , of nourishing milke , of dainty cheese , and of diuers other sorts of vnualuable riches , with which they so forestalled and possessed the loue of men , that for the endeared charity that they beare to all sheepe , they vncessantly hunt , chase , pursue , and destroy wolues , tigres , beares , foxes , lions , and all other wild and rauenous beasts , which loue not sheepe , with all manner of armes , rapine , or bloody cruelty . and how by reason of the singular gifts and incomparable benefits that sheepe bring to all mankinde , being reputed the onely deliciousnesse , delight , and wealth of man , it came to passe that they were the most numerous race or kind of creatures that liue vpon the earth ; so that the sheepe being nourished , fed , cherished , guarded and defended by the vigilancy , care , cost , paines , & charity of their shepheards , they shewed themselues very simple and foolish in desiring to haue deuouring sharpe teeth , and long goring hornes . and at last apollo said , that concerning the seuerity of some shepheards in milking and shearing of them , they ought to vse no other weapons to reuenge themselues , than those of dutifull obedience and humility , with yeelding them store of wooll , plenty of milke , abundance of cheese ; and 〈◊〉 , co study fertility and fruitfulnesse . this being the supreame 〈◊〉 of the brood and race of sheepe , that those shepheards who misuse and euill intreat their flocks , are in extremity cruell vnto themselues ; it being most certaine , that a wound rashly giuen to a sheepe , hath the propriety to kill the shepheard . and therefore he straitly commanded them , to take greater heed to manifest the least inclination or shew to bite their shepheards , than they would doe of wolues keene teeth , since those sheepe cannot be accounted so happy , which with all humility and prostrate obedience , do warrant and guard their shepheards from all harme and danger , as those most vnhappy , that make a dismall profession , to terrifie and make them afraid . in a publike congresse or assembly , contrary to the accustomed manner of the phoebean court , force hauing pretended to preceed reputation ; that illustrious lady with an excellent resolution , maintaineth her reputation and credit which was in some danger . rag. 15. 2 part. that the lady reputation in all publike places and assemblies hath yet euer had the precedence and right hand of lady force , is well knowne in parnassus . but it fortuned the other morning , that whilest apollo made his solemne entrance into the signe of leo , force ( according to her terrible genius , borne vnto insolencies ) dared to presume to preceed reputation , who , if in that occasion ( making vse of her admirable dexterity ) shee had not knowne to reto●t and put by so dangerous a rub , and vnexpected stop , shee had vndoubtedly receiued some notable affront . she was neuerthelesse much offended at the foule petulancy offered her by her capitall enemy , whereupon the vertuous , euer much deuoted vnto so excelse a princesse , ceased not to encourage her , exhorting her by no meanes to pocket vp the insolency of her temerity . and moreouer , bade her to remember , that she was the right arme of all potentates , and the sole instrument wherwith princes lorded and swaied the world . and therefore willed her to pull vp a good heart , and resolue to confront that fondly rash dame , whom with the only maiesty of her countenance she would at the first encounter so daunt and abate her pride , that ( as a thousand times it had come to passe ) shee might with great facility suppresse and bring vnder . with wondrous reposednesse of minde , and gentle words , reputation answered those vertuous men her louing friends who so comforted her , that shee exceedingly valued and loued the ready good will , which she perceiued in them all ; but she could neither commend nor follow the counsell they gaue her . and that they should call to minde , that the whole of the power of her authoritie and greatnesse being founded , not on the forces of strong-armed armies , nor on the strength and securitie of inexpugnable cittadels , but on the bare opinion of men ; a thing most inconstant and variable . so as it behoued her , in this her aduersitie , to proceed with great caution , and admirable dexteritie . and that betweene her , and force , there was a monstrous great disparitie : for if force were once vanquished , shee might easily recouer her selfe , and with greater impetuofitie attempt a second battell , so much the more dangerous for her ; for to her ordinarie power shee might ioyne the violence of disdaine , and the shame of her first ouerthrow . but if it should happen , that at the first shock shee did not quell her enemy , either with the maiestie of her presence , or with the authoritie of her looke , so that as an elephant , which being once fallen to the gound can neuer rise againe , she might destroy her , shee should wholly be depriued of that greatnesse and awfull respect , which the publike veneration of the common people bred in her . considerations so much the more necessarie in her , as she had experienced , that nothing is more perillous for her , than by force of armes to seeke to maintaine that auctoritie great , and that reputation on foot , which shee seeth to bee founded but on the bare opinion of the vulgar popular . and that shee hoped to prouide for the indemnitie of her authoritie with her wonted remedies , and would with her accustomed weapons buckle with force , not doubting but to conquer her . she said moreouer , that force did now vse those extraordinarie termes of insolencie towards her , not because her power was any whit increased , but by reason of some disorders of hers , shee perceiued the ancient decorum , her wonted maiestie , and the peoples veneration towards her to be greatly diminished . reputation hauing vttered these kinde words , went away , and shortly after retired her selfe into her lodging ; whence for diuers moneths space shee was neuer seene to come abroad , but with great seueritie gaue her selfe to reforme and correct her selfe , for euer banishing all self-respects and priuate interesses ; to which , because shee had yeelded ouermuch , and too openly abandoned her selfe , shee euidently perceiued her honour and credit to be much impaired . and then with the beesom of a rigid reformation in her selfe , she wholly imployd her time in cleansing her house and ●●milie from all manner of filthinesse , pollution , and basenesse ; from which she also chased and expelled griping auarice , daring ambition , and all other priuate , dishonest , vnlawfull or scandalous passions . this princesse hauing thus reformed her priuate disorders , being one morning to be present at some solemne and publike act , she extraordinarily embellished and adorned her selfe all ouer with honestie of minde , with vprightnesse of spirit , with singlenesse of heart , with vngrudging liberalitie , and with all her other most esteemed vertues . and hauing put on the rich robe of righteousnesse , and affectionate loue towards all well-deseruing creatures , and of publike charitie , she came forth with so awfull a maiestie , and comely a grauitie , where shee was expected by all the other most excellent vertues , in whom shee stirred vp so great respect , and regardfull veneration , that euen the lady force her selfe ( so great was the deuotion that possessed her minde ) was seene to tremble and stand amazed : and in that occasion , not only with her accustomed reuerence , to grant her her due precedence on the right hand , but with a kinde of seruile submission , to beg , as a singular fauour at her hands , the prerogatiue , in that solemnitie , to carry vp her traine . the prouince of focides by her ambassadors complaineth vnto apollo , that his maiesties officers doe not permit her to enioy her priuiledges : whose request is not only reiected , but they haue a most sharp and vnpleasant answer . rag. 1. 2 part. the most populous prouince of focides , which some yeares since rebelled from the ignorant , and voluntarily did subiect it selfe vnto apollo's dominion , of whom she obtained so ample priuiledges and large immunities , as it might truly be said , that the focenses liued in a kinde of free libertie , hath now sent her ambassadors to this court , to complaine against his maiesties officers , that they will not permit them to enioy those priuiledges , which by his sacred maiestie were granted them . and therefore doe instantly require him , to command the due obseruation of them . this businesse , which somewhat distasted apollo , was by him referred vnto his royall councell of state ; from whom the ambassadors two daies since had for a finall answer , that the lords of the councell did greatly wonder , and rested much scandalized , that the people of focides seemed to be so ignorant of the affaires of the world , as they knew not , that priuiledges , liberties , franchises , exemptions and immunities granted vnto people newly conquered , were like vnto those cherries , that were giuen to children when they cryde and puled , to make them hold their peace , but were afterwards taken from them when they lay still and quiet . to whom the chiefe of the ambassadors stoutly replied , that if in parnassus they vsed so fouly to abuse sillie well-meaning people , focides would ere long fall to whining againe , to the end it might be stilled with cherries of new priuiledges . to this companion , francis guicciardin , lord president of the royall counsell suddenly answered , that if the f●censes did well consider the present state wherein they were , they should finde , that with the cittadels , which in times of peace they had suffered to be built vpon their necks , they were reduced vnto such termes of bondage and thraldome , as if they fell to whining againe , they might very well , without any danger or preiudice vnto apollo's state , be stilled and made to hold their peace with smarting lashes and bloudy stripes . socrates hauing this morning beene found dead in his bed , apollo vseth all possible diligence , to discouer the true occasion of his sudden death . rag. 32. 2 part. this present morning , great socrates , who yesternight went to bed in perfect good health , hath beene found starke dead in his bed : and forsomuch as his corps was all swolne and puft vp , most men doe vehemently suspect , that there hath beene some machination of poyson practised vpon him . and the peripateticks ( cruell enemies to the socratike sect ) haue beene much questioned and blamed for it . and so much the more , because it is well knowne to all men , that the most detestable armes of poysoning are very familiar vnto aristotle . prince of that great sect. all socrates his houshold hath this morning beene imprisoned , from whom no other light or confession can be wrested , but that some daies before , socrates was seene and obserued to be much anguished , grieued , and perplexed , still seeming to feele some griefe of minde ; for he was diuers times heard lamentably to exclaime , oh corrupted world ! oh depraued age ! oh most-most vnhappy mankinde ! apollo , who hath felt an extraordinary sorrow for the losse of so great a philosopher , hath strictly commanded the body to be opened , to see whether his bowels and entrailes yeelded any signe or likelyhood of poyson , which being done , all his interiors were open , whereby it was euidently percei●ed , that socrates , by reason of the infinite filthy things , enormous abuses , and scandalous obiects , which he was compelled daily to view and behold in this depraued and corrupted age ; and for hauing taken a great windinesse of scandals , hee was forced to burst . most rich and sumptuous haue the funerals beene , that were celebrated for so great a man. and marcus tullius cicero ( a most affectionate fauourer of the socratike sect ) with an excellent and elaborated oration , hauing highly extolled the veritie of the doctrine , with flouds of teares bewailed the calamitie and miserable condition of these present daies ; in which with rigorous seueritie , all men are strictly forbidden to satyrize . and honest gentlemen beholding continually things most worthy to be published by sound of horne and trumpet , are inforced to see , to hold their peace , and to burst . natalis comes the historian , for hauing spoke some thing in a publike congresse of learned men , that grieuously offended apollo , is by his maiestie seuerely punished . rag. 49. 2 part. vvhilest some few daies since , natalis comes a latine historian , together with diuers other learned men of this court , vnder melpomenes porch ( as the custome of historians is ) discoursed of the glory of those great princes , that haue left any eternall memorie of their honourable actions in the world , termed by the name of a glorious conquest the vsurpation of a kingdome , made by a mightie prince , without any iustice , right , or lawfull pretence . which speech being presently reported vnto apollo by one of those wicked and make-bate spirits , whereof the ai●e , and the earth is euer full : his maiestie fell into so passionate a rage against natalis , as at that very instant he caused him to be put in prison , and at once vsed the rigor , straitly to forbid him , for the space of three whole yeares , the ingresse into any libraries . and howbeit apollo haue most importunately beene sollicited by most of the chiefe historians of this state , to proceed with some milder terme of mercy towards so vertuous a follower of his , he neuerthelesse hath and doth still refuse to doe it . and saith besides , that there is no greater wickednesse in the world , than the impious and trecherous licence , which diuers princes haue vsurped vnto themselues , to rob and steale whole states and kingdoms one from another . an action that hath filled the world with those lamentable mischiefs , and deplorable confusions and disorders , that so much afflict mankinde . and he thinks it an iniquitie extremely outragious , that in his vertuous dominion , there should be found any one learned man so perfidious , as durst dare to stile those trecherous thefts , and vnlawfull robberies , which are committed with a million of aggrauating and impious circumstances , by the title of glorious conquests . the new-fovnd politcke . the second part . chap. 1. maximilian the emperour is aduertised of the trouble begun among his sonnes . there came three posts very lately vnto the maiestie of the emperour maximilian the second ; and presently it was knowne how they brought him aduertisement , that the arch-duke matthias had taken armes against the emperour rodolphus his brother , seditiously requiring the kingdomes of hungary and bohemia , and the absolute dominion of austria , and other prouinces . these ill newes infinitely troubled the minde of the emperour ; for he well knew , that the discord risen vp among his sonnes , would giue the enemies of the house of austria that content , which they so much desired . whereupon , yesterday morning very early , that prince presented himselfe before apollo , and with many teares demaunded of him , when the euils of the house of austria , so long before commenced , through the cruell combination of all germany against it , should haue an end ; and for what demerit such fearefull scourges were sent vnto his house . vnto this demaund apollo answered in this sort : all the troubles and persecutions of your family , great emperour , shall cease , when it shall wholly abandon those ambitious thoughts of desiring to command ouer hungary , and transiluania , which hath giuen vnto germany such iealousies , that to secure her ancient liberty from the power of your house , she bendeth all her study to nothing more , then to the depression of it : for the germans , searing greater prejudice from your acquests , then from the victories of the turkes , are fully resolued rather to lose vienna , then recouer buda , and then also shall all germany vnfainedly loue your archdukes , when deposing their present ambition , they shall make it appeare , that they desire to be equall , and not superiour to other princes of germany . chap. 2. most of the princes , common-weales , and states of europe , are weighed in a payre of scales , by lorenzo medici . seeing it is apparent , that the roman common-weale , after the acquisition it had made of the empire of all italy , could in a short time arriue to that vniuersall monarchy , which is yet so famous to the world , and whereunto many ambitious princes haue since in vaine aspired , it hath beene a generall receiued opinion , that that potentate , who in state and forces is suffered to grow vnto such greatnesse , that he findeth no other prince able to counterpoyze him , no more then the roman commonweale did , after it became commander ouer italy , cannot possibly bee impeached from obtayning the vniuersall monarchy . whereupon those empires and kingdomes , which were afterwards framed out of the pieces of the roman monarchy , to auoyd those calamities and dissolutions , which fell vpon such potentates as were oppressed by the roman forces , out of most wholesome , and almost diuine counsell agreed together , that euery fifteenth yeare , all the princes of europe should assemble into one place ; where each ones forces should be seuerally weighed ; and thereupon fit counterpoyze , and due mortification be giuen vnto him , that was found to be growen to any greatnesse , which might be odious and dangerous to his competitor . many great wits were from time to time preferred to that honourable charge of gouerning the scales ; but for an hundreth yeres past or thereabout , they were managed by the illustrious house of medici , and in particular by lorenzo the great . which prerogatiue , although to many it seemed preiudiciall vnto the maiestie of the popes , and prudence of the venetian senate , who haue alwaies watched ; if not more , at least-wise equally with lorenzo , and the florentine common-weale , to maintaine both in italy and abroad , the forces of the potentates of europe euen ballanced , yet with a maruellous consent of all the historians the gouernment of the scales was giuen into the hands of signior lorenzo . the first day of august , then all the princes and potentates of europe , assembled in phocis , not onely to meet with so important a businesse as the perfect knowledge of their owne affaires , but that also of others , which in matter of state importeth much more . whereupon by an ancient and just prerogatiue , the first that came to be weighed , was the aristocraticall monarchy of the apostolike sea ; whose temporall state was put into the scale ; and because the weight of the last fifteenth yeere was but sixe millions of pounds , and now was found to amount vnto seuen and an halfe , euery one knew , that the addition of the noble duchy of ferrara had caused that increase . the next that was put into the scale , was the state of the seuen princes electors of the roman empire , which by old records appeareth to haue weighed in times past seuenty millions of pounds ; but since , by the indiscreet gouernment and courses of many emperours , that lusty complexion , which made it euermore redoubted , was so spoyled , that it fell into those dangerous and foule infirmities , which after a long quartane , found end in an hecticke feuer , that hath now so consumed it , as our age beholdeth it left with nothing but very skinne and bone . howbeit , though it be so much decreased in state , yet the great bulke it hath of body , maketh it in shew very goodly to look vpon ; the rather , because the intrinsecall imperfections are not discouered : for many good persons with the ancient titles of the empire , and maiesticall name of caesar , haue beautified it very excellently without , but when it came to be weighed , it was found quite empty within ; a feather not being so light , as the name of a prince without authority is vaine : whence it is that the roman empire proued so weake , as it weighed but 480 pounds . then the famous peeres of france brought vnto the scale the flourishing and warlike french monarchy ; a square of fiue hundreth and fifty miles euery way , replenished with an infinite noblesse , armed on horsebacke , which not onely maintaineth peace at home , but maketh so great a king formidable to all the nations of the earth ; besides a world of learned men which adorne it ; merchandise and trades which enrich it ; tillage and husbandry , which make it plentifull , and abounding with euery good thing . the ancient weight of so famous a monarchy was twenty millions of pounds ; but in the last fifteenth yeeres weight , by reason of the horrible calamities , whereinto ( by the disloyalty of some of her barons ) she was thrown , it did not arriue to twelue millions ; howbeit , now it not onely equalled , but went farre beyond the weight of the best ancient times ; for it came to fiue and twenty millions ; a matter of such maruel to euery one , that the spaniards got on their spectacles , and very narrowly obserued , whether the weights were right or no. to the ancient kingdome of france , was added the acquisition of bresse giuen vp by the duke of sauoy , which in regard it was so aduantagious to the city of lyons , augmented the weight of it aboue a million . next were the many kingdomes of spaine put into the scale by the spanish grandes , and to the great wonder of those ancient men , that could remember , how an hundreth and twenty yeares since , they were held in a poore and vile account , the weight amounted to twenty millions . the spaniards remained exceeding well satisfied with this weight of their spaine : and assured themselues , that with the addition of so many other states , they had besides to put into the scale , not onely to equall , but farre to exceed the fiue and twenty millions of the french monarchy . wherefore instantly they put into the scale the flourishing kingdome of naples , which euery one thinking would increase the weight at least 2 millions more , it appeareth , that then it weighed lesse by one and an halfe : at this strange accident the spaniards being much amazed , said , that either lorenzo had vsed some fraud in the weighing , or that of necessity the scales were not euen ; because it was a monstrous thing , that the addition of matter should abate of the weight . whereunto lorenzo coldly answered ; that his scales were euen , but that neither the indiaes void of inhabitants , nor the neopolitans , & milanese , which were so farre distant from the forces of spaine , and replenished with a people , which so vnwillingly supported the command of strangers , weighed any thing at all : for it was the loue and multitude of subiects , the fertility and vnion of states , that giue weight , and turne the scale . hereupon the spaniards added the dutchy of milan into the scale , which in like manner abated a million of the weight ; whereat also the spaniards were so much astonied , that they would not put flanders into the scale , fearing to receiue a greater distaste and affront . howbeit some said , that if they had put in the indiaes , they might haue wrought some good effect , but not those miracles which certaine lauish tongues haue deliuered ; who with the same facility talke of milions of crownes that the furnace men make of very bricke and tyle . then came the english lords , who put into the scale their kingdome , so much redoubted for the strength of the wonderfull situation thereof ; for the continued mountaines which compasse it about , seruing for walls , made by the very powerfull hand of god in forme of bulwarks , and the ocean for most profound dit●hes , make it a kingdome feared , in regard of the commodity it hath to assaile others ; and the insuperable difficulties which they shall finde that offer to attempt it . the weight of this kingdome was answerable to that of the last fifteenth yeare which amounted to sixteene millions . but the english , to giue more weight to their kingdome , would haue put the kingdom of scotland into the scale when the scottish nobility with drawne swords in their hands opposed themselues ; freely protesting , that they would neuer suffer their countrey to be annexed to the kingdom of the english ; for yet fresh was the lamentable example of the miseries of flanders , who when she saw her earls become kings of spain , foolishly beleeued that she should command ouer the spaniards ; whereas soone after , not spain was sacked by the flemmings , but flanders by the couetous and cruell spaniards ; and that which made vp their misery , charles the fifth , the emperour , and king philip his son , by their continuall residence in spaine , of flemmings became spaniards . the vnfortunate flemmings by loosing their prince , of naturall subiects , grew to bee esteemed strangers , and men of little faith . and so flanders , the naturall countrey of charles the fifth , the patrimony of king philip , became ( according to the termes of modern policy ) a state of fiue states , and began to bee gouerned by strangers ; with those iealousies , and with those oppressions of customes , taxes , contributions , and donatiues , as begat those bad humours , those ill satisfactions , from whence since hath proceeded that ciuill warre , which after an vnspeakable profusion of gold , an infinite effusion of blood , an incredible losse of honour to the flemmings , was conuerted into a couetous merchandise of the spaniards . therefore the scots by such lamentable miseries haue learned , not to permit their king , vpon any termes whatsoeuer , to abandon the royall seat of his ancient kingdome , for to place it in a greater , newly fallen vnto him : in which case the scots should vnder their cruell enemies the english , be sure to suffer all the calamities , which inferiour nations are wont to endure at the hands of the superiour . some that were present at this act , report , how the spaniards told the king of england , that those scots which had spoken so arrogantly in the presence of his maiesty , were to be seuerely chastised ; to whom the king of england answered , that the spaniards ought not to giue that counsell vnto others , which had proued so pernitious to themselues : and thereupon hauing commanded the stay of weighing their kingdome , he assured his scots , that ere long he would giue them all possible satisfaction . after this , the vast ottoman empire was put into the scale ; which the last fifteenth yeare arriued to the summe of two and thirty millions , but now was found to bee lesse than sixteene ; the strangnesse whereof made all the princes very much to maruell ; and particularly the venetians , who could not beleeue such a fall ; whereupon they desired , that wich more diligence it might be reweighed , and it appeared , how in that little time running betweene the first and this second weighing , it had fallen eight hundred twenty and two pounds : whereby it was manifest , that the ottoman empire , heretofore so terrible to the world , now consumed with luxury , couetousnesse , and idlenesse , runneth headlong to his ruine , which gaue great contentment to all those princes . neuerthelesse it was obserued by some of the wisest there present , that the spaniards were not so glad of it as the rest ; out of a doubt they had , that the depression of the turke , would bee the exaltation of the venetian state. then came the polach senators , and put into the scale their kingdome , which in regard of the small authority the king hath there , & the too much command , which the palatines arrogate vnto themselues , made but a poore reckoning , for it did not amount to six millions of pounds , whereas in times past it alwaies exceeded twelue . after them the signory of the councell of te●● put into the scale the flourishing estate of the venetian common-wealth , most admirable for the greatnesse thereof , and opportunity of situation fitting for all great enterprises , which went beyond all expectation in the weight , for it came to eight millions ; the cause whereof was said to bee the huge masse of gold , which those wise senators in so long a time of peace had gathered together into their treasury . next came the switzers , the grisons , and other free people of germany , and brought their common-weals to the scale . howbeit the princes required , that they might be weighed each one seuerally by it selfe , wherewith the germanes were well contented , so that it might be done . but lorenzo hauing put the common-wealth of basil into the scale , it appeared , that the greater part of the other common-weales of germany were all so linked together , that it was impossible to separate them one from another , which put a many of ambitious princes there in a sweat . then the duke of sauoy caused his state to be put into the scale by his noble knights of the annonciata , which equalled the weight of the last fifteenth yeere ; but lorenzo hauing added into the scale that most noble prerogatiue of title , which the said duke charles emanuell enioyeth of the prime souldier of italy , it was seene to aggrauate the weight a million foure hundreth and twenty pounds . after this , with a pompe and maiesty matchable to kings , appeared the duke of lorraine ; whose state , though little , equalled the weight of great kingdoms ; and it was considered that it fell out to bee so by a certaine good fortune which that prince had , to haue his states so happily seated , that hee could easily put the low-countries into grieuous difficulties , by impeaching the passage of those succours which the spaniards conduct thither out of italy , whereby he hath growne into such reputation , that to the most offerer he selleth for ready gold the merchandise of that his adhering : in such sort , that after he had dreyned the spaniards , asmuch as any the de●outest french lord of the holy league whatsoeuer , siding afterwards with the french , hee knew so well how to change his coppy , that a king of france , such as was henry the fourth , the great duke of toscan , and the duke of mantoua were glad of his alliance . and fully to make vp the spaniards iealousie , the famous venetian common-wealth drew into her pay a prince of that house with such affection , that if that great lady had not made a vow of perpetuall chastity , and her nature ( according to the custome of some indians ) had not beene stitched vp the first day she was born by the venetian signory , most iealous of her honour , it was verily beleeued by many , that she would haue taken him to husband . it was obserued , that the duke of sauoy enuied much the felicity of this prince , because hee finding himselfe also seated betweene the french and the spaniards of milan , as the duke of loraine was betweene the french and the spaniards of flanders , in stead of so many benefits , and so many commodities as fell vpon the duke of loraine , hee had receiued most cruell kicks , not onely from the french , then his enemies , but from the spaniards his friends , so that it was euident , the duke of sauoy did now plainly see , how that practise of his with the spaniard was most pernicious for him . then came the otto di balia , and put into the scale the flourishing state of the great dukes of tos●an , which by reason of the excellent wits of the inhabitants , perpetuall plenty , continuall peace , and quiet security it enioyeth , answered in weight to many kingdomes . lorenzo greatly reioyced , when he saw how vpon the foundations of those churches and hospitals , which he and his predecessors in the time of the florentine liberty had laid in their countrey , their successors , according to the modell left them by cosimo the great , had afterwards found meanes to erect strong cyttadels ; whereupon lorenzo , to make a glorious shew of the worth and wisdome of the princes of his house , added into the scale the admirable vnderstanding of ferdinand the great , with the excessiue weight whereof it was so ouer charged , that the huge chayne whereby it hung brake in two , so that all went to ground . this accident of the scales so broken , was an hindrance that other italian princes which remained could not be weighed ; whereupon it was concluded , that comming according to the ancient custome , to lay all the princes and potentates of italy in ballance against the monarchy of spaine , out of the vniuersall weight of the italian princes , each ones particular would easily appeare . into the midst of the great hall then was brought an huge and euen paire of balance , whereinto on the one part was put all the kingdomes of the monarchy of spaine , and into the other all the principalities of italy , and it was seene that they stood in equall ballance ; a matter of great trouble to all the italian princes : but whilest they continued in this agony , it was noted how the mighty french monarchy , with one onely louing looke which shee gaue to that ballance , wherein the italian principalities lay , made it suddenly to turne on that side . it may not be omitted , how the spaniards seeing the dukes of sauoy , who the last fifteenth yeare refused to be weighed with the italian forces , now to be put into the ballance , for to counterpoise theirs , threatned them by biting their thumbs at them ; whereof those princes being aware , with a generosity worthy their vndaunted spirits , they say thus vnto them ; signory of spain , yee can no longer feed men with hopes , for now we are throughly possessed of your courses : ye thought to haue brought the dukes of sauoy , by the cunning of your hopes , to such a ma●ne , as to forgoe that little bread , which they had in the mouth of their state ; to reach at the shadow of those great inheritances of spaine , which they saw in the bottome in the water . and because the spaniards complained for that the dukes of parma , modena , vrbin , the lords of mirandola , and the famous roman barons , gartani , colonesi , and orsini , which haue the fleece , and are in their pay , were weighed with the italian forces ; whereas in regard of that order , and the pensions they receiue , they were obliged to adhere to their designes , and to be the ministers of their greatnesse . they were answered by those lords , that they receiued the honours of the fleece , and inioyed the profits of those pensions , as honourable ladies accept of gifts from their louers ; only in a pure way of curtesie , and not with an intent any way to forget what appertaineth to their honour . chap. 4. almansor , sometime king of the moores , encountring with the kingdome of naples , they relate one to another the miseries they sustaine by the oppression of the spaniards . the famous king of moores , almansor , he that many yeares together raigned in spaine ouer the noble realme of granada , met yesterday with the kingdome of naples , and falling in talke with him , after hee had for a good space obserued the chaine , which the said kingdome of naples wore fastned about his legge , he told him , that the manufacture thereof being moresco , he verily thought that he had many times seene , and handled it somewhere else ; and a little while after with a shew of great maruell he affirmed , that he knew it well ; and how it was the very same , wherewithall both he , and the moorish kings his predecessors had for the space of seuen hundreth yeares held many kings of spaine in seruitude ; and therefore he earnestly intreated him , to let him vnderstand , how , by whom , and when he was chained in that manner . a very good eye , and an excellent memory hast thou , almansor , ( answered then the kingdome of naples ) for this vnluckie chaine , which thou seest about my legge , was brought out of spaine by gonsaluo corduba , called the great captaine , and therefore it is very likely to be the same thou speakest of . and now it is an hundreth yeares , since first i found my selfe in the miserable seruitude , wherein thou beholdest me , and from which i know not whether euer i shall be freed ; for in regard of the mighty power , whereunto i see the forces of the spaniards arriued , hauing vtterly lost all hope of assistance , that may be expected from men , i know that my ancient liberty standeth wholly in the powerfull hand of god , who had need to renue in me the miracles of the red sea , if my deliuerance shall follow . the yeares ( replied almansor ) confront well ; for a little before the time of thy seruitude , the spaniards vndid this my chaine from about the leg of the kingdome of granada , wherewithall afterwards they bound thee . but let it not displease thee , o kingdome of naples , to declare vnto me , how it could come to passe , that the spaniards should make themselues masters of such a kingdome as thou art , so potent , and so far distant from their forces . by fraud almansor , ( said the neapolitan kingdome ) did the spaniards get into italy , for by open force they had neuer beene able to make such notable acquests ; and as thou saidst well , so disproportionable to their forces , which were so far off . but heare , and wonder at the large and grosse conscience of a king of spaine in matters of state , although he vsed much art to seeme vnto foolish men a very saint ; for thou shalt come vnto the knowledge of a tragedy , according to the rules of my christian religion , most wicked and cruell ; but according to the termes of moderne policie , the most aduised that euer any nation represented vpon the stage of the world . alfonso my king , to his vtter , and my chiefest ruine , gaue isabella his neece ( for from this vnhappy mariage did my displantation take beginning ) to iohn galeazzo , duke of milan for wife . the minoritie first , and then the vnspeakable silly weaknesse of so infortunate a prince incouraged lodouico sforza to vsurpe the state vpon his nephew ; alfonso , as it behoued him , sought to hinder that tyrannie ; whereof lodouico being aware , and knowing , that without the ruine of my kings , it was not possible for him to arriue vnto the end of his most iniust desire , hee fell into that resolution , which afterwards both to himselfe , to me , and to all the princes of italy , proued so fatall , of drawing the french into italy , to the conquest of me . my kings to defend themselues from such mighty enemies , called to their aide that holy soule of ferdinand king of aragon their cousin , who shewed himselfe so kinde a kinsman , and such a faithfull friend , that in stead of chasing away the french enemies , he diuided me with them ; and to shew himselfe compleat , a little after this vnhappy diuision , hee entred into warres against the french , and hauing ouercome them , he forced them to returne full of shame , and losse into their country ; whereupon the good king ferdinand without any scruple at all of conscience became my absolute lord ; and then it was , that he fastned this chaine about my legge , which thou remembrest to be the manufacture , and worke of thy nation . and i doe not thinke , that in all the chronicles of the saracen● , moores , or turks , which it is likely thou hast read , there was euer a more wicked trechery recorded , done by a king , that desired to be reputed a man of a good conscience , and of an holy disposition ; and that a little before had receiued of the apostolike sea that glorious title of the most catholike king. truly ( replied aim●nsor ) in the chronicles , which thou hast named of my nation , many foule actions committed by diuers princes out of ambition to raigne , may be read , but this which thou hast recounted of ferdinand goeth beyond them all . but if thou , o almansor , ( said the kingdome of naples ) diddest with thy nation keepe the kingdome of granada , chained so many hundreth yeares , what course tooke the spaniards for to free him ? that vnion of the kingdomes of castile and aragon ( replied almansor ) which followed vpon the mariage betweene ferdinand and isabella , occasioned the liberty of the kingdome of granada : a most vnhappy vnion , the which , no lesse than i haue done , and continually still doe , the greatest potentates of europe haue lamented , doe lament , and perpetually with vnfained teares will lament ; as that which is the true and onely root , from whence are sprung all those greatest subuersions of states , which vnto this day haue beene seene in many parts of europe , but more remarkably in italy . and beleeue me , neapolitan kingdome , that euen till now might i haue raigned happily in spaine , if this pestiferous vnion had not ouerthrowne my greatnesse ; for the many iealousies that raigned betweene the castilians and aragonians , were my inexpugnable cittadels , which would haue maintained my raigne here for euer . withall assure thy selfe , o kingdome of naples , that the aids which the popes gaue to ferdinand , and queene isabella , greatly accelerated my taking in . peace , peace , almansor ( said then the neapolitan kingdom ) for after thou wert chased out of spaine by the ambitious spanish nation , the popes vnderwent such miseries , that it may be truly said , how with ready money they bought those extreme calamities , wherewithall afterwards they encountred ; for though the sea apostolicall were well contented to see the moores driuen out of spaine , yet that satisfaction was much distasted with my seruitude , which followed presently vpon it , the popes hauing neuer had any thing in greater feare , than that i should fall into the hands of a mighty prince , who might make them liue in those perpetuall iealousies , wherein finding themselues drowned euen vp to the very eyes , many of them , and particularly those , that haue a greater knowledge of things of the world , doe not alwaies make quiet sleeps . a cleare testimonie of the truth which i speake , was the lamentable and wicked sacke of rome , perpetrated by the spaniards a little after my seruitude ; with which ingratitude they paid the apostolike sea for all they were debtors vnto it , as well for the remission of the tribute of naples , as for the other succors , which they receiued in the warre of granada . a calamitie , that hauing past the termes of most grieuous miseries , hath in such manner opened the eyes euen of men of the drowsiest vnderstanding , that euery one commeth clearly to know , what it is to vnchaine the lion out of a zeale of pietie ; for the spaniards no sooner saw themselues freed from the impediment of the moores of granada , but that through the ambition , which they shewed in desiring to command ouer the whole vniuerse , not onely in italie , but throughout all europe , most important iealousies of state , and most grieuous interests of religion discouered themselues , insomuch , that i haue often heard it discoursed by men of most vnderstanding in affaires of the world , how peraduenture it would haue beene lesse preiudiciall for many princes of europe , that thou hadst raigned still in granada , than that the spaniards should haue passed into italy , to acquire such important states , as at this day they possesse there . hereunto may be added the preiudices both publike and priuate , which my ruine hath brought , and continually doth bring vnto the italian princes , and more particularly to the popes , because the kings of spaine had no sooner fastened this chaine about my leg , but presently they began to aspire vnto the dominion of all italy ; and the quicklier to arriue thereunto , they knew very excellently how to interesse themselues in the differences , which at that time depended betweene the princes of italy and the french , about the possession of the dutchy of milan , wherein that top of man , charles the fifth caried himselfe in such sort , that hee made himselfe to bee knowne the worthy nephew of his grandfather by the mothers side : for hauing with the forces of the italian princes , chased the french out of italy , in stead of restoring the sforzi to the state , as it was agreed betwixt him , and the confederate princes , with the fraud of a thousand turkish quarrels pickt of purpose , which he well knew how to inuent against the sforzi , he made himselfe absolute master of that so important a dutchie . stay , kingdome of naples ; and making a point here , ( said almansor ) satisfie me in this : seeing the noble state of milan was fallen into the hands of the spaniards ; what hindred them from running precipitously to the acquisition of all italie ? and seeing thy seruitude doth manifest vnto the world , that the aids and succours of princes , serue more for the benefit of him that giueth them , than for the profit of him that receiueth them , why would not the italian princes rather suffer , that milan should bee vnder the dominion of the french , than by receiuing aide from the spaniards , runne the danger of letting that dutchy ( being so important a member of italy ) fall into the hands , as thou saidst it did , of the kings of spaine ? the power of the kings of france ( answered the neapolitan kingdome ) defendeth that remnant of liberty which remaineth in italy , from the ambition of spaine : for those glorious kings out of the interest of their greatnesse will not endure , that the dominion of all italy should fall into the power of the ambitious spanish nation , which cannot extinguish the ardent thirst they haue of commanding , neither with the conquest of all the new world discouered by them , nor with so great a part which they possesse in the old . besides , the italian princes , who know the great perill ( wherein they finde they are ) of a dangerous and miserable seruitude , haue so vnited themselues together , that although they be many in number , yet make they but one body ; and the spaniards ; who haue vsed , and doe vse all possible deuices to disunite them , euidently perceiue , that they wash a black-moore . but touching the state of milan , thou must know , how it was iudged more secure for the publike liberty of italie , that that dutchie should fall into the power of the spaniards , than that it should remaine in the hands of the french ; who for that they were ioyning to italie , when therein they should possesse any little part , there would haue beene manifest danger , that they would haue made themselues absolute lords of the whole : but in the spaniards it would fall out cleane contrary ; for their forces , albeit very great , are notwithstanding so far off , that by so long a tract of sea , they could with much difficultie transport out of spaine into italie forces , that were able to maintaine the acquests they had made , not that they could be sufficient to subdue the whole . thou speakest the truth , ( said then almansor ) but goe on , and declare vnto me the prejudices , which thy falling into the hands of the spaniards brought vnto the popes . know then , ( replyed the kingdome of naples ) that whereas before , the popes were the terror of my kings , now it happeneth to be cleane otherwise ; for they liue in a very great agony , lest the vnion of milan with naples should one day follow ; to which marke , they obserue , the spaniards haue directed the scope of all their thought ; whereupon the spaniards , whose proper nature it is to make good vse of the feare , whereinto they see they haue put the princes their neighbours , haue arrogated vnto thēselues such authority in the court of rome , that they vaunt they are the true arbitrators of all the most important matters which there are handled . moreouer , when the kings of naples were not kings of spaine , the popes with euery little menace of denying the inuestiture , obtained of my kings , principalities , duchies , earledomes , and other great states in gift , buying their friendships also with marriages , and many other sorts of liberalitie ; but now the feare being ceased , if the popes will make their kinred great with titles of important states , they must be glad to buy them with their ready money , and the aduised kings of spaine , besides the precious gold of intreaties , which at any hand they will bee sure shall precede for a first payment , sell them vnto them throughly sawced . important interests , and grieuous disorders are these ( said almansor ) which thou hast recounted vnto me ; but how commeth it that thou , kingdome of naples , which art the magazine of silkes , the granary of italy , shouldest goe so ragged , and be so leane ? seeing the spaniards , that come naked out of spaine [ answered the kingdome of naples ] after they haue been three or foure dayes in my house , will needs couer themselues all ouer with gold , it is no maruell if i be spoyled , to clothe so many raggedemuffins : besides , if thou sawest the rapacitie of the vice-royes , that to recouer themselues are sent vnto me , or if thou knewest the rapines of secretaries , of thousand officers , and other courtiers , which they bring along with them , all thirsty of my bloud , thou wouldest greatly maruell , how it were possible , i should sa●iate the raging and greedy swallow of so many hunger-starued wretches . as for the little flesh thou seest on my backe , the spaniards affirme , that in the booke of a certaine florentine , who hath giuen rules of the cruell moderne policie , they find written , that being a kindome conquered , after the manner of those horses which are kept onely for races , i ought to bee maintained low in the flesh . i but ( said almonsor then ) the milanesi how are they intreated ? they also ( replyed the kingdomes of naples ) are bathed with the water , wherwithall thou seest me so wet ; only this difference is betwixt vs , that in milan are drops , in my house , floods . the true occasion of the diuersitie of these intreatings is the quality of the lombards dispositions , most vnlike to my neapolitans : for the nobilitie of the state of milan are naturally phantasticall , free , resolute , and farre from that vice so proper to my neapolitans , of flattery , and affectation ; but so bold and hardy , that they dare say , how ●f one onely cremonese spirit had beene found amongst my neapolitan barons , it would haue hindred that same forced donatiue , that hath brought me to eat bread and onyons ; the which , although with great words , it hath bin often demanded by the spaniards in milan , they haue been as resolutely answered , that they should take care to liue : besides , the confining of the grisons , of the duke of sauoy , and venetians , are the cause , that the kings of spaine proceed with more discretion in milan : for when the popes managed armes , i my selfe also was for their occasion greatly respected . but soft , almansor , yonder commeth my most capitall enemy don pedrode toledo , wherefore i pray thee withdraw a little ; for at any hand i would not haue him take notice , that i lament my disgraces heere with thee ; and for this onely , were it for nothing else , may i tearme my seruitude most wretched , in that i am forced to call this miserable state , wherein thou seest me , the happy golden age. chap. 5. sigismund battor learneth the latine tongue . yesterday about eight of the clocke in the euening , the ordinary post of germany arriued at this court , and brought very ioyfull newes how sigismund b●ttor , prince of transiluania , was growne so inamored of the gracefull latine tongue , that to his great glory he spake , and wrote with the purity and eloquence of the cesarean style ; whereupon all the vertuous earnestly besought apollo , that for such good newes there might be made in parnassus all those demonstrations of ioy , which ( to incourage great men to the loue of learning ) were wont to be made , when any prince became learned : but his maiestie , that seeth into the vttermost secret of all things , denied those vertuous their request , and told them that then onely there should be feasting in parnassus , when out of the freenesse of a noble minde , and meere election of studies , not constrained by any necessitie , princes applyed themselues to learning ; and that they were to know , how prince battor had gotten the elegant latine tongue , neither out of ambition to shew himselfe to be learned , nor out of a vertuous curiosity to know many things , but onely out of necessitie for his reputations sake , to correct the foolish and childish absurditie which he committed , in gender , number , and case , at such time , as in the warre of hungary , he took that fatall resolution to arme himselfe against the turke , for to adhere vnto the emperour of germany , whom in regard of the strong and liuely pretensiors , which he hath to the principality of transiluania , hee was to haue in more horrour , then seuentie ottoman emperours . chap. 6. the cardinall of toledoes summa is not admitted into the library of parnassus . the illustrious and reuerend francesco cordova , cardinall of toledo , a personage of exemplarie life , an exqu●site diuine , and excellent philosopher ; hee that in his owne person honoured the word of god in the pulpit , more then any other preacher whatsoeuer of his time , some few dayes since arriued at parnassus , hauing been receiued vpon the confines of the state , by alessandrod ' ales , and cornelio musso bishop of bitonto , and all the way encertained at his majesties charge . this honourable learned man presented his writings vnto the venerable colledge of the vertuous ; and those of philosophy were not onely commended , but admired , as also the commentaries composed by him vpon the diuine passages of all the sacred writers , were receiued with extraordinay applause , and shortly after they were carried in a pretious vrne vnder a cloath of estate , into the delphicke library , and with the name of the author , consecrated to eternitie . onely his summa , although very learned , was not receiued by those vertuous , who freely told him , that there were so many workes already of that kind in his maiesties library , as some of them seemed superfluous : for an infinite many of great diuines had with such diligence handled ma●ters appertaining to the consciences of priuate men , that they had put the saluation of soules into comprimise , for the onely regard of a shillings gaine : and that the world very much desired to see a complete summa , composed vpon the consciences of grea● princes ; a matter most necessary for the quiet of the whole vniuerse , and altogether omitted by diuines ; wherein those actions of princes should be exactly discoursed vpon , with which so often they put the world into confusion , filling it with robberies , assassinates , and such slaughters of men , that many of them blinded with ambition to raigne vpon earth , haue made riuers to runne with humane bloud . the colledge of the learned , hearing these particulars , said , that they much desired to haue these questions disputed and resolued : namely , whether christian pietie will admit the speciall hypothesis , which the violence of the sword hath vsurped ouer others states : whether a principalitie , that by armes and fraud , is forcibly taken from another prince , may be held by one that hath the true feare of god : whether that course of ruling a kingdome , which is conquered onely to the end to impouerish and waste it , that so it may be gouerned without jealousie , may be practised by one that is borne in the christian faith : whether the exalting of reason of state to such an height , that it should trample vnder feet , as at this present it doth , all lawes diuine and humane , be not a more detestable and execrable idolatry , then worshipping nabuchadnezzars image , or the golden calfe . and lastly , the colledge said , that then their desires would be fully accomplished , when there could be found a diuine so much fearing god , that with his writings durst fright princes as much from doing euill , as many others with their great volumes had terrified priuate men ; for it seemed a strange thing vnto them , that infinite learned diuines ●●d so laboured to reason of the strict account , which shop-keepers are to render , euen for idle words , vnto the majestie of god , and in the meane time had omitted to make mention of those exorbitant errours , committed by great princes ; when with their armies ouer-running states , they send all things into perdition , both sacred and prophane : and that with more benefit to mankind , and eternall reward to themselues , diuines might haue discoursed vpon the actions of lewis the twelfth , and francis the first , both kings of france ; of ferdinand king of aragon , and charles the fifth the emperor , whose soules departed out of this world with the heauy burthen of halfe a million of man-slaughters , all committed by their ambition to reigne , and whereof they were to giue a strict account to almighty god : all which were matters exceeding necessarie , to the end , that mankind so much afflicted by the ambition of princes , might one day receiue the consolation , which with such longing it desireth , when those that reigne should be terrified from doing amisse , and be made to know , that hell was prepared as well for the great as the small . chap. 7. the monarchy of spaine throweth her physitian out of the window . this morning the monarchy of spaine hauing sent for her ordinary physitiā , a little after with her own hands she threw him out of the window of her royall palace , whereupon the poore wretch , being all battered in peeces , died incontinently . an accident that seemed the more strange , in regard the physitian was held by all the court , to be a man of extraordinary honesty , and in the practise of his profession most admirable . sundry were the discourses that were made vpon so remarkable a matter . but , apollo desiring to know of the spanish monarchy herselfe , the true cause of so grieuous a resentment , that mighty queene told him , how aboue forty yeares since , vpon occasion of some accidents that befell her , and other signes which shee had discouered , shee feared that in processe of time , shee should catch some dangerous french disease from the royall house of burbon , and therefore to prouide for the inconuenience which shee foresaw , shee had demanded counsell of her physitian , who prescribed her a long fastidious and chargeable purgation , compounded of diuers oyles of holy leagues , of insurrections of people , of rebellions of nobility , of cauteries , and other very bitter ingredients , whereby she had spoiled her stomacke , weakened her strength , and altogether lost her appetite ; and that the infinite quantity of syrrupes , and the many medicine● which she had taken with such anguish , had wrought no other effect , but the acceleration of the disease , which without that vnlucky and vnseasonable purgation peraduenture shee should neuer haue had : moreouer , that the many leaches which were applyed to many parts of her body , had in such manner sucked the best vitall blood of the gold of that spaine , that through the weaknesse of her complexion , she was not able to euacuate those euill humours of flanders , which had held her , and doe hold her oppressed . by which disorders , all occasioned through the naughty counsell of that imprudent physitian , shee was so exasperated against him , that she had solemnely sworne to throw him out of the window , if to free her from future infirmities , he euer after ordained her any purgation ; and that perceiuing how the paine which she hath at this instant in the shoulder of holland , was an apparant lues gallica , shee had demanded counsell of the same physitian for to cleare her selfe of it , who vnmindfull of his former errors , had foolishly ordained the second purgation , wholly and altogether like the former , and that therefore being ouercome with paine , shee had throwne him out of the window , so punishing him at once for both the faults hee had committed : for it seemed vnto her , that hee had well deserued the misfortune of that resentment , seeing that by the accidents following , with such infelicity of her spaniards , he had not learned to know , that purgations made before their time for diseases that are feared , doe not worke those good effects , which either the physitian beleeueth , or the patient desireth . chap. 8. most of the states of the world are censured in parnassus for their errors . apollo carefull of nothing more , than to see the princes of the world , should in the vpright gouernment of their states , giue the people such satisfaction as they ought , introduced into parnassus ( many ages since ) this admirable custome : that euery yeare , the names of the chiefest potentates of the earth , written vpon little scedules , should be put into an vrne , and then being drawn forth one by one , the publike censor of politicall matters should ( in the presence of the sacred colledge of the learned ) record the disorders , which he had obserued in the gouernment of their states ; whereupon those princes were bound either incontinently with satisfying reasons to defend such things as were obiected against them , or else within a moneth to reforme them . an institution no doubt very noble and holy ; for it hath effected , that in the progresse of so many ages , since first it was vsed , princes haue corrected an infinitie of errours : besides , knowing that they are to bee called to so strict an account , it maketh them endeauour to liue so vertuously , that in the presence of so many princes they neede not to blush . vpon the day appointed then , most of the potentates of the world appeared before apollo : and count baldazar castiglione the politicall censor , said vnto the reuerend lord giouanni dalla casa , nuntio for the sea apostolicall in this state , which was first drawne out of the vrne ; that it seemed vnto him a most scandalous matter , and indeed vnworthy the greatnesse and maiesty of the popes , that in rome should be seene some potent families , vnto whom it serued in stead of a rich patrimony to bee dependant on forraigne princes , not very well affected to the greatnesse of the apostolicke sea , which in euery occasion were apt with the power of their factions to giue the popes much trouble ; and that he might truly say , how in all his time he had not seene a more foule and execrable thing , than that which the emperour charles the fifth did , when with the noble charge of the kingdome of naples , he rewarded the cruell seditions , and shamefull treacheries , which the cardinall pompeo colonna , vsed against the high bishop clement the seuenth . then the lord giouanni demanded of the count , how long it was since hee had conuersed in the romane court ; who answering , some seuenty yeares past : the nuncio replyed , that returning thither now he should find , how by reason of the abundance of vertjuyce , which the pompei , fabritij , prosperi , ascanij of the family of colonna ; the virginij , and other more principall barons of the house of orsina had eaten ; the teeth of their nephews and grand-children were so set on edge , that they could hardly chaw their broth : for the popes which had tyed those exorbitances about their fingers , knew so excellently how to practise the tarquinian precept , that they haue reduced those poppies , which heretofore were as high as cedars , to the humble stature of ridiculous dwarffes . this answere satisfied the count , who turning to the romane empire , next drawne out of the vrne , hee said vnto him , that the present disorders which were seene not only in the great patrimony of the house of austria , but in all germany , proceeded from the negligence of the present emperor rodolphus , and therefore hee much desired , that that maiesty would with more care embrace the gouernment of his so many states ; remembring , that princes , rulers of mankind , bore vpon their shoulders the heauiest weight , and had in their hands the most laborious worke that any the painfullest day-labourer whatsoeuer could exercise . the censor was exceedingly thanked by the romane empire for this aduice ; whereunto with much grauity he answered , that it was a disgrace common with all princes , to be accused of negligence , when scandals arose in their states , although it notoriously appeared , that in regard they were occasioned by the practises of more mighty enemies , they could not possibly be auoyded by an vnderstanding prince . wherefore it was to be considered , that the monstrous felicities , which the most mighty house of austria haue had by inheriting with their matches , the states of flanders , the kingdomes of spaine , of naples , sicilia , bohemia , hungary , and portugall , haue giuen all the princes of germany , of italy , and of europe such diobolicall jealousies , that they haue caused both the passed and present ruines , now beheld in their ancient patrimony : whereunto the emperors , which haue raigned since maximilian the first of famous memory , albeit they were reputed most valorous and prudent princes , could neuer after apply any salue , that did not infinitely exasperate the sore of the disorders of germany , wherin had concurred such abundance of malignant humours , that it might truly be said , it was immedicable . further , it was to be remembred , what small authority the moderne emperors haue had in germany , so that it were not onely a discourtesie , but open injustice to will one , that hath his hands fast bound behind him to performe the acts of or●ando . moreouer , the qualitie of the empire was to be regarded , which being electiue , they that serued , had more authority in it , then they that commanded . besides the present weaknesse of the house of austria in germany , from whom ( with the seditions of religion ) the hearts of their subiects are stollen ; a theft so important , that they may well abandon those states as lost , wherein such dangerous seed is sowen . whereupon the present emperour seeing himselfe depriued of the obedience of his subiects , desireth euery one to reflect vpon the quality of the cousins , which the house of austria hath in spaine , and they shall find that the people of almaine borne for their libertie , to secure themselues from the monstrous power of such a family , take impious and wrongfull reuenges euen on those , which shal not be free frō the seruitude of the spaniards , if for the sins of men they euer arriue to that point of commanding ouer the world ; from which ( by the meere goodnesse and mercy of god ) they are put off as farre , as by their many deuices they haue laboured to come neere it . that also it was to be thought vpon , how the first that in italie , and abroad , disinherited with all kinde of irreuerence , and disrespect , the maiestie of the empire , were those their cousins of spaine , as clearely appeared by the vsurpation of finale , and other imperiall feudes by them possessed . all which things , mouing dangerous humors without dissoluing them afterwards , doe cause the house of austria in germany , to be cruelly scourged by most powerfull enemies , whilest the spaniards with their only menaces seeke to put the whole world into suspition and distate . and for conclusion , he desired all the sacred colledge to consider , that to the miserable sterilitie of children , which is seene in the present emperor , is adioyned a lamentable fertilitie of brethren ; one of which incited by the most violent spurre of ambition , hath not doubted at last to goe about to ouerthrow his owne house , which is ready to fall . all accidents so vnhappy , that they would make euen salomon himselfe seeme to the world a very foole . these replies , which to all the assistants seemed very weighty , satisfied the censor , who turning him to the warlike french monarchie , said vnto her ; how all the vertuous of parnassus much desired of her , that shee would rule the furious , vnquiet , capricious , and exceeding impetuous dispositions of her french , reducing them to those termes of prudence , aduisednesse , and stayednesse of minde , which are seene in the noble italian , and spanish nations ; and how it much blemished her reputation , that the kingdome of france , which holdeth a first place amongst the most principall monarchies of the world , should be inhabited by men so infinitely rash . to this aduertisement the french monarchie replied , that the censor not well informed of the interests of her kingdome , had censured for defects the chiefest vertues , which she loued in her french. folly , lightnesse , vnaduisednesse , and a precipitous nature were they , which had made her so feared , and formidable a queene , because her french with vnspeakable alacritie and forwardnes , would vpon the least nod of hers , expose themselues to those perils , whereunto other princes could not with the rope , the cudgell , and the cruellest kinds of punishment compell their wise , aduised , and circumspect subiects : and that in the many warres , which she had held with most valorous nations , she had learned to know , how an armie framed of souldiers , which had little braine , and much courage , so that they are led by a valiant , and discreet generall , doth carry away the victorie from those people , who professe more circumspection , and wisdome . this answer of the monarchie of france , was so much the more commended of castiglione , by how much , regarding the qualitie of a mighty kingdome , he knew that the french possessed all those endowments and vertues , which were requisite in a nation , for to found , amplifie , and maintaine a great empire . then the censor turning to the powerfull monarchie of spaine , said vnto her , how it was euident , nothing gaue greater satisfaction to all people in generall , but more particularly to those which were subiect to strange nations , than the humanitie , and affable cariage of such as gouerned them ; whereas she sending to the gouernments of naples , milan , and sicilia , none but her owne spaniards , they with their ordinarie castilian statelinesse , and insupportable spanish pride , without all comparison far exceeding that , which the kings of spaine themselues either could , or would haue vsed in those states , did so exasperate euen their good and faithfull subiects , that the spanish dominion was growne infinitely odious : and that further , both in weighty , and sleight affaires , hee desired more quicke expeditions from her , seeing that by her too much delay , and perplexitie in the deliberation of important matters , shee had lost many faire occasions , that had presented themselues vnto her , for the inlarging of her empire . the monarchy of spaine very much thanked the censor for the aduertisements he had giuen her , and in her excuse answered , how that honourable gentleman , which had a young wife , beyond all expression faire , but of a disposition inclined to lasciuiousnesse , should shew himselfe very discreet , if he desired , that a proper hansome seruant , whom he kept in his house , should be rather extremely hated , than any whit affected by his wife : and that vnto the delay in the resolution of her affaires , which she knew to be vitious and preiudiciall , it lay not in her power to giue remedie : for almighty god hauing not without important occasions created her spaniards wholly , and altogether quite different in disposition from the french , whilest they in the deliberation of businesses , were rather precipitous , than executiue , she in her being so slow and irresolute , obeyed the will of god , who would haue it so . the next drawne out of the vrne was the monarchie of poland ; vnto whom count baldasar said , how all the princes of europe c●u●d haue wished , that the present king sigismond had vsed towards those seditious nobles , which last rebelled against him , some seueritie worthy so grieuous a fault , only to the end , that by their example , other lords might haue beene deterred from committing the like . to this the polach monarchy answered , that those chastisements giuen to the nobility , which in an hereditarie state would be commodious , haue alwaies proued in her electiue kingdome preiudiciall : and how that kingdome , which another receiueth in gift from a nobility , in whose power is the election of the king , cannot without euident perill of falling from his greatnesse . be gouerned with that rigour , which in other hereditary states is necessary ; for that senate , which out of an election of loue giueth another a kingdome , if it be prouoked by the powerfull passion of hate , knoweth also how to reassume it , in regard well-aduised senators are wont to reserue vnto themselues those necessary instruments , whereby vpon euery occasion of euill satisfaction , they may recall their vsed liberalitie : and that the present king sigismond being the first of his house , which had raigned in poland , hee was to direct the aime of all his thoughts to no other scope so much , as by an extraordinary indulgence to win the hearts of the nobilitie of his state , that so with a gratefull memory of his clemency , he might perpetuate the succession of such a kingdome in his bloud . an aduertisement most necessary for sigismond his king , by reason the polachs , although their king be electiue , doe neuer defraud the royall bloud of the succession , if hee that raigneth , can tell how to get the generall loue of the nobilitie . for the polonians being a nation , that know not how to liue in an absolute liberty , doe so abhor all manner of seruitude , that that king among them ( a matter common to all electiue princes ) shall be most oculatiue , and vigilant in the matters of his state , that least seemeth either to see or know any thing . not only the censor , but the whole colledge of the vertuous , admitted the iustification of the polach monarchy for excellent . hereupon the count turning himselfe to the vast ottoman empire , said vnto him , that the cruelty which hee vsed , onely vpon light suspitions , against his chiefest ministers , was held by all the world to be a bloudy course ; it being a receiued opinion , that men of extraordinary valour and merit , should not be laid hands on , but for great and proued offences : and that when the ottoman princes did euen iustly take away the liues of their ministers , the custome of seizing vpon their estates to their owne vse , and thereof vtterly depriuing the children , did scandalize all good iustice , because it seemed , that with such cruell rigour , the estates , rather than the faults of the delinquents , wee hunted after . to this so open a correction , the ottoman empire answered with admirable grauity , that he was growne to that greatnesse wherein he was seene , by the onely two most powerfull meanes of reward without measure , and punishment without end : and that the sole foundation of the quiet of euery state , being placed in the fidelity of the most important ministers , princes were not to seeke any thing with more care , than with immense rewards to allure them vnto faithfulnesse , and with infinite punishments to terrifie them from trecheries : that those ministers which haue in their power , the forces , command , and gouernments of states , not being able to erre , but in most important matters , it were the counsell of a foolish prince , vpon suspitions of that moment , to arraigne , accuse , and heare the iustifications of the offender ; but in such a case , the prince which will runne no danger , ought to endeuour to surprise his minister vpon the sudden , and to deale so securely , that the execution of the punishment may precede euen the accusation it selfe : that many times it had fallen out , that he with a sudden chastisement had preuented the consummation of most foule treasons : which resolution , though he acknowledged to be most seuere , yet he knew it had so wrought , that there were neuer seene in his state any counts st. paul , princes of orange , dukes of guise , d'aumale , du maine , de mercure , and other foule monsters of disloyaltie , which , with the shame of those princes , that with halters , poynards , and axes , knew not how to preuent such dangerous offences , haue beene seene otherwhere : it being a rule in matters of state as common , as secure , that that minister , which giueth to his prince the least shadow of suspition of his faith , incurreth a capitall paine , because those captaines which haue the care of armies in their power , are bound , like the wiues of honourable personages , to liue with such puritie of minde , that they be free not only from blame , but from the least suspition of a blame-worthy thought . that touching the seizure of his bashawes estates after their death , he thought he might truly say , that the entertainments , gifts , and wealth , wherewithall other princes rewarded their ministers , in comparison of those inexhaustible riches which he bestowed on his well-deseruing officers , were vile , and poore , as those royall treasures , which ruften , mahomet , ibrahin , and infinite others left behind them after their decease , haue fully testified : that the greatest regard which a prince ought to haue in rewarding his ministers , consisteth in prouiding , that the vnmeasurable riches , wherewith he bought of them infinite fidelitie , may not possibly at any time be conuerted to the prejudice of him , that vsed the liberalitie : that from the grieuous disorders fallen out in the states of other potentates , he had found it to be a matter most pernitious vnto princes , that the extraordinary riches left by a deseruing minister , should passe vnto his children , not hauing first deserued it ( by their vertue , valour , and fathers said fidelitie ) of the prince : that he had not out of couetousnesse , as many misiudged , confiscated the great inheritances of his bashawes , but that by the commoditie thereof , those subiects should not be idle , and consequently vicious , which being descended of fathers of notable valour , gaue the prince assured hope they would imitate the vertues of their progenitors : that the gate of his treasure stood perpetually open to the heires of his ministers , to restore them their fathers inheritances twice doubled , when they with their fidelitie and valour should deserue them ; and how much the riches of men vicious , and subiect to ambition , were apt to disturbe the peace of any kingdome , how great soeuer , well appeared by the fresh examples , which he had seene both in france and flanders . whilst the ottoman empire spake in this manner , he obserued that the renouned french monarchy , with the shaking of her head , seemed to declare , that she no way approued those reasons : whereupon somewhat the more moued , he said thus : mighty queene , my custome in seizing vpon the estates of my bashawes , is profitable for the greatnesse , and quiet of my state ; and in regard of the friendship that is betwixt vs , i would to god , the same course were obserued in your france ; for you know full well , to what vse henry the duke of guize conuerted the exceeding riches , wherewithall the liberall kings francis the first , and henry the second rewarded the merits of duke francis his father . you , and i , and all those that raigne doe know , how the sweetest bait that can allure men , is a crowne , and there being no man , which for to taste neuer so little of it , but would hold it a great pleasure for to expose euen his life to manifest danger of losing it , princes ought to be most vigilant in keeping with extremest seueritie the passages thereunto closed vp against all men : nay , they ought to accōmodate their affaires in such sort , that no priuate man whatsoeuer should once hope to taste of so sweet a thing : and i tell you freely , that if your duke of guiz● had in my state but onely thought that , which with such publike scandall he boldly put in execution in your kingdome of france ; i would the very first day haue giuen him that blow , whereunto your king henry the third , although he were incited vnto it by the greater part of the princes of italy , could neuer be drawne , vntill the very last houre of his shamefull disgraces , and euen at that instant , when the sort of the french vprores was become an incurable vlcer ; for where ambition raigneth among nobles , princes are constrained to shew themselues all seueritie , continually keeping scaffolds in readines , & prepared , to punish the seditious and rebellious ; and their treasury open , to reward the quiet , and the loyall ; that prince being vnworthy to command , that hath not the vnderstanding how to make himselfe be obeyed ; neither can there be a more scandalous matter seene , not met withall in a state , then that the prince should liue in jealousie of an officer , which ought to tremble before him . but it is the propertie of you the princes of christendome , making profession of learning , and directing your selues by rules of policie , to call me barbarous , and my secure way of proceeding , tyrannicall , whilst in the meane time , yee suffer your selues to be reduced by your heroycall vertues of clemencie , and gentlenesse , to shamefull tearmes of enduring vnworthy things . it is not possible to deliuer , how much the ottoman empire offended all the vertuous of the sacred colledge with his discourse , who standing vp , told him in great disdaine , how they could proue with present reasons , that all which he had said , were most wicked conceipts , vnworthy to be spoken by any person that had a soule , or to be heard of men , that made profession of honour . whereunto the ottoman empire answered , smiling , that others in the gouernment of kingdomes might haue regard to vertue , and i know not what , but for his part he would neuer be perswaded , but that the quiet and peace of states ought to be preferred before all other humane interests whatsoeuer . then the censor , to cut off so odious a dispute , turning to the great duchie of moscouy , said vnto him , that the most noble perogatiue of raigning ouer people , which were louers of learning , and excellently vertuous , was the second amongst the greatnesses of a prince : whereas he by so endeuouring to bring vp his subjects in a grosse ignorance , reaped no small blame , if not much disreputation ; because euery one skorned him , for that , expelling the famous liberall arts out of his state , he had onely permitted his people to learne the benefit of writing and reading . to this censure the duchie of moscouy answered , that the dreadfull fire , which he had obserued learning had euer kindled in those states , where it had been admitted , had made him resolue not to suffer in any sort , that so scandalous a cockle should be sowed in his duchie ; for men being the heards of princes , as sheepe the flocks of priuate persons , it were extreme folly to arme those gentle sheepe their subiects with the malice , which learning engraffeth into their dispositions , that attaine vnto it ; whereas otherwise , in regard of that harmelesse simplicitie , wherewith almighty god hath created them , they may be commodiously ruled and gouerned , be they neuer so many in number , by one prince alone : and how he held for infallible truth , that if the germans and hollanders had been maintained by their princes in the simplicitie of their ancient ignorance , and withall it had been prohibited , that the pure minde of those nations might not haue beene contaminated with the plague of greeke and latine learning , without all doubt they had neuer had the judgement , with such a ruine of their old religion , and destruction of many princes , that before ruled ouer those prouinces , to know how to frame those perfect formes of common-weales in their countries , whereunto neither the wit of solon , the wisedome of plato , nor all the philosophy of aristotle could euer arriue . this answere so moued the censor , and all the sacred colledge of the learned , that with threatning lookes they said , how the reasons alledged by the great dutchy of moscouy , were open blasphemies ; and it seemed the learned were ready to make good their words with deeds , when the greater part of the mightiest monarchies were seene to betake themselues to their weapons , for defence of the moscouite ; who growing more audacious vpon the forward assistance of so many potentates , boldly said , if any one would deny , that learning did not infinitly disturbe the quiet , and good gouernment of states ; and that a prince might not with more facilitie rule a million of ignorants , then an hundreth learned , that were made to command , and not to obey , he lyed in his throat . the vertuous vpon this daring defiance grew extremely incensed , and stoutly replyed , that the moscouite had spoken with an insolence , worthy of an ignorant , and how they could also proue vnto him , that men without learning were asses and calues with two legs . now were they almost ready to goe together by the eares , when the censor cryed out , forbeare , and carry due respect to this place , where we are assembled to amend disorders , and not to commit scandals ; whereupon such was the reuerence euery one bare to the maiestie of the censor , that both the princes , and the learned , although they were transported with anger and disdaine , became sodainely pacified . all being quiet , then the censor said vnto the famous venetian libertie , which next was drawen out of the vrne , that the hardest matter to be found in an aristocracie , as she well knew , was to restraine the young nobilitie , who with their licentiousnesse distasting the better sort of citizens , had many times occasioned the ruine of most famous common-weales ; and that he to his great griefe had heard , how the yong nobilitie of venice with their proud demeanour had offended many honourable citizens of that state ; who exceedingly complained , that whilest the insolency of the nobilitie encreased , the chastisements for it decreased ; and that therefore heremembred her , that it was a dangerous point in an aristocracie , when those which were to glory for that they were farre from those dangers , whereunto such are subiect , as are to obey the humour of a prince , be heard to complaine , that they are oppressed by many tyrants . hereunto the venetian libertie answered , that the disorder recounted by the censor was true , and withall dangerous ; but that the authoritie of commanding , was so annexed to pride and insolencie , that they seemed to be borne both at one birth : and that the licenciousnesse , which the nobilitie of all aristocracies vseth towards the citizens , was by all the greatest men , that haue discoursed of common-weales , reputed a desperate cure ; for although it was most necessary , that insolencies should be restrained with seuere paines , yet on the other side , an aristocracie was to abstaine as much as possibly might be from publike punishments of noblemen , albeit seditious ; to the end that their shamefull suffering might not be an occasion to disinherit the whole nobilitie it selfe of that respect which is due to them from the people ; for hauing the gouernment of the state in their hands , the interest of the publike conseruation thereof requireth , that they be held in highest reputation : and although in her venice , disobedient and insolent noblemen were not seene to be so often punished , betweene the two pillars in the piazza of saint marke , as it seemeth many desired , yet by the great councell the pregadi , the colledge , and other supremer magistrates , that dispence the publike charges , those seditious noblemen , which were discouered to carry a tyrannicall minde , were cruelly afflicted with the torment of shamefull repulses : and that many subjects of most noble houses are seene in venice , whose ancient reputation for their demerits was maimed by arquebuses charged with bullets of paper ; and that being strucken downe with such kind of shot , they could neuer rise since to honours and dignities ; things wherein consisteth the life of the noblemen of an aristocracie : and that to excruciate a body , a greater torture could not be deuised , no not by perillus himselfe , then that which once a nobleman of venice experienced , when in a concurrence of the honourablest charges , he saw one yonger then himselfe passe before him , onely because he was knowne to the senate to be more deseruing . castiglione did not onely admit the justification of the venetian libertie , but also did infinitely commend the circumspection and seueritie which shee vsed in punishing her nobilitie , vpon occasion of any demerit or defect . then the censor said vnto the duchy of sauoy , that his state being seated in the confines of france and italy , he was necessited with all carefulnesse to maintaine himselfe neutrall betweene those princes , with whom hee confined ; but in those last rumors of france , by discouering himselfe openly to be wholly spanish he had put , not onely his owne , but the states of all the princes of italie in great trouble : and that whilst with the bellowes of his forces he blew the fire of the french vprores , kindled by the spaniards ambition , hee ought to beleeue , that that flame was to burne vp friends and kinred , before euer it could get to the other italian potentates that were enemies . the duchy of sauoy answered the censor very readily , that the adherence of his last duke to the spaniards , was true , but the faire occasion hee had of three seuens in his hand , euen forced him to set vp his rest , hoping to encounter the most famous primiera , that euer any other prince whatsoeuer had at cards ; to which venture he was the rather carryed , because he was assured hee could loose but that money , which at that game he had won before : that afterwards , though by his ill lucke the fourth card , which was dealt him , proued to be a coat of affront , wherewith he had made the worst hir , that could be encountred on the whole pack of cards , neuerthelesse he knew , that the brauest mindes would confesse , that albeit the resolution was very dangerous , yet not to wrong the cards , they would haue played no otherwise themselues . the censor apprehending the metaphor , very much commended the magnanimous resolution of that duke ; who , for that hee might from a small feauer haue receiued in gift the empire of the greater part of the world , not only without any note of imprudence , but to his infinit glory , at such time as so resolutely he cast the dye of all the greatnesse of his fortune vpon the table of chance , he might well speake those famous words anew , or caes●r , or nothing . then the censer turned him to the noble great dutchy of toscan , and sharply reprehending him , for going with his galleyes as it were prouoking of waspes , hee recorded vnto him , the misery and calamities which the knights of saint iohn suffered at rhodes , at tripoli , and the great danger , that lastly they ranne at malta , onely because they would imprudently haue tyed squibbes to the buls taile ; and that euerywise christian prince ought rather to fauour the present carelesnesse of the turkes , then to waken them with injuries of little profit ; nay , such as brought others much dammage , and necessite them to apply their mindes anew vnto maritime affaires , which in these times they had euen abandoned : also he remembred him , how infinite people daily complained , for that , by his hindering italy of the trade of the commodities of the l●vant , all drugges that came from beyond the seas , were growne to an excessiue rate . to this correction the great dutchy of toscan answered , that the power of a prince could not be termed perfect , which with a number of armed vessels had not some dominion on the sea : and that his galleyes were not onely very necessary for the toscan greatnesse , but also for the securitie of the libertie of all italy , as seruing for a schoole of mariners , for a seminary of captaines and souldiers at sea : that he confessed the dammage , which they did to the trade of merchandise , but withall , he desired it might be considered , that the mysterie of warre , either by land or by sea , could not be learned by souldiers , nor exercised by princes without prejudice to others : and that toscan breeding much filthinesse of fantasticall vnquiet braines , and extrauagant humours , he had therefore great occasion for those gallies , that might serue , as it were , to carry forth all the filth of his state , and thereby keepe it cleane , imploying such onely for gally-slaues in them , as had done euill before , and that in regard of their vnquiet nature , were like to doe worse after . this excuse of the great dutchy of toscan was approoued both by the censor , and all the sacred colledge . wherevpon the count said vnto the libertie of geneua , who was last drawne out of the vrne , that the excessiue vse of exchanges , which shee permitted vnto her nobilitie , caused that great disorder of inriching the priuate , and withall of impouerishing the publike , whose reuenues would haue risen to huge summes of gold , if the reall riches of her nobilitie had beene imployed in a iust trade of merchandise . the genouese libertie with a readinesse , that gaue a particular gust to all the learned , answered , how it was true , that exchanges doe worke that effect , which the censer had mentioned , and therefore were most pernicious in any monarchy whatsoeuer ; howbeit that notwithstanding they might bee permitted in a well-ordered common-wealth , without any prejudice of the publike interests ; because the richest and securest treasures of a free state , are the riches of the nobility , and citizens together ; a matter which falleth not out in a monarchy , where betweene the commings in of the prince ; and the meanes of priuate men , there runneth a long wall of eight stories high built by mine and thine : further , that in a monarchy the mutation of the state commonly followeth with little or no prejudice to the people , onely changing the name of matthew , to that of martin ; but in the subuersions of common-weales , where liberty is changed into seruitude , there the proper substance of priuate men , is the publike treasure ; for then will they profusely spend all that euer they haue , for to defend their owne libertie euen to the last gaspe . chap. 9. the monarchie of spaine inuiteth the cardinall of toledo , to be her theologian , which he refuseth , and why . the report goeth in this court , that the mighty monarchy of spaine , by her chiefe secretarie inuiteth the worthy cardinall of toledo , with allowance of a large pension , to assist as her theologian in the royall councell of state , to the end that nothing should be determined there , which might be against his conscience : this matter filled the whole court with maruell , in regard euery one knew how little that prelate in the rebenediction of the most christian king henry the 4. fauoured the affaires of his prince ; for which cause no man could imagine the occasion , wherefore so wise a queene in a businesse of such weight , should vse the seruice of so diffident a subiect . those which make profession best to vnderstand the manner of proceeding of the aduised spanish nation , euen in this resolution acknowledged the inueterate prudence of the kings of spaine , whose proper custome it is neuer to be at quiet , vntill that with pensions , with honourable charges , with all kinde of louing demonstrations , and humane deuices , they haue drawne vnto their party all such great subiects , as they see to be alienated from their interest , and from whom they know , that one day yet they may receiue seruices . the chiefest confidents of so great a cardinall , deliuer , that his lordship very gladly accepted the noble charge propounded vnto him ; howbeit with this condition , ( which by the spaniards was presently reiected ) that whensoeuer with the authority of the sacred scriptures , with the doctrine of the holy fathers , with the ordinances of the canons , he should make the royall councell capable , how the resolutions made in it , were disagreeing from the lawes of god , and men ; hee alone then would haue power to hinder the execution of them ; and all to the end , the world might know , that the royall theologian in that councell was only to helpe the conscience of his king with the will of god , not to serue for a maske to establish the dominion of kingdoms ouer men ; for it seemed too shamefull a matter vnto him , that such a one as he should be imployed to authorise the diabolicall impiety of the moderne reason of state , and to make most stinking assa fetida appeare vnto simple people very excellent muske . chap. 10. the spaniards attempt the acquisition of sauoy , but doe not preuaile . seeing that for to draw the french naile out of the table of milan , where it was fixed , the ill-aduised italian princes had made vse of the spanish pickaxe , which entred in such manner into the very table it selfe , that it was neuer possible since to draw it forth with any kinde of pincers whatsoeuer , all the potentates of europe , and especially the italian princes , which perceiued , that the spaniards after the seruitude of the milanesi , openly aspired to the absolute dominion of all italy , to the end they might secure that remainder of liberty , which is yet resting in her , agreed amongst themselues , that euery fiue and twentieth yeare , the chaine which the spaniards haue forged for the italian seruitude , should with exact diligence be measured by persons thereunto deputed . and comming ( a few daies since ) accordingly to measure it , the italian princes to their infinite amazement found , that so odious a chaine was increased with fiue most preiudiciall links ; presently whereupon the politicall smiths were called , who very carefully made an assay of the yron added to the chaine , and they found that the first linke was forged at piombino , the other at finale , the third at correggio , the fourth at porto lungone , and the last at m●naco . greatly did the princes maruell at the strangenesse of this accident , and many of them were ashamed , that through their carelesse simplicitie the spaniards had increased the chaine of the italian seruitude , much more in peace , than they could haue done in war with foure armies . with these strange exorbitances , the italian princes were so incensed against the spaniards , that they told them freely , how if they did not containe themselues within the bounds of honesty , and modesty ; if the italian files would not suffice to reduce that miserable chaine to his due measure , they would make vse of the french ; and if with them neither they could obtaine their intent , they would procure enough from england , and germany ; yea , and in case of desperation they would not sticke to furnish themselues with those excellent damasked ones , that are made in turkie . whilest the italian princes were in this contestation , there arriued a poste , which in all haste had beene dispatched out of italy vnto them with this certaine aduertisement , that the spaniards were forging another linke in sauoy , to be added vnto the chaine of their seruitude : in regard of which newes , the renowned venetian liberty instantly opened her famous arsenall , and all the princes of italy ran to arme themselues ; the warlike french monarchy commanded her nobilitie to horse , all germany put themselues in order to passe the mountaines , and the numerous fleets of the english , and hollanders , set saile towards the straits of gibraltar ; when iust in the nick , euen as all the world was in armes , a new poste arriued , who pacified the minds of men with this intelligence , that indeed it was true , how the spaniards had laboured with all possible industry to forge that most important linke of sauoy , but that they had sweat in vaine , because in the soldering , it broke . chap. 11. the duke d'alva being arriued at parnassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , they fall foule about defrauding the colones● of their titles . don hernando de toledo duke d'alva , a few daies since , arriued at parnassus , and by expresse order from apollo , a diligent examination of his actions being made by the military men , he was found worthy to be admitted into parnassus amongst those famous captains , which without effusion of bloud , knew how to vanquish an enemy , more by patience , and art , than by open force , or valour ; that durst hazard the fortune of kingdoms vpon the doubtfull chance of a battell . but because lodouic● guicciardino , an vnderstanding writer of the affaires of flanders , had preferred a complaint , how that for certaine matters not very pleasing , which he had written of the duke , hee had beene ill intreated by him , therefore he staied a long time to cleare himselfe of such an imputation ; for there was an edict of apollo very rigorously obserued in parnassus , whereby that prince , or priuate man , was declared to be infamous , which durst offer any wrong to any historian , or other writer , for things written by him not very honourable , but yet true : howbeit , of such power were the dukes friends , that guicciardino was contented to reuoke his complaint , whereupon with all the greatest solemnitie hee was admitted into parnassus , and had a place in his maiesties company of men at armes , which was commanded by that famous quintus fabius maximus ; who for the excellencie of his well-aduised warinesse , was surnamed cunctator . and it hapned , that amongst the other princes , and captaines , which the said duke visited , one was the most excellent lord prospero colonna , by whom he was receiued with all kinde of honour ; and so much the more , because hee vnderstood that the duke made a publike profession of being the disciple , follower ▪ and imitator of his slow , but sure way of making warre . howbeit , a strange and troublesome accident fell out in this visitation ; for at the first meeting , the duke hauing giuen the lord prospero the title of your honour , he was so incensed with disdaine , that taking himselfe to be highly wronged by so vile a title , with an angry voice he said ; duke , i had thought thou wert come hither , to honour one that is greater than thy selfe , not to vndervalue him ; but because it is the fashion of the colonesi to answer the iniuries of words with deeds , goe out of this house , and in the street ( with my sword in mine hand ) i will proue vnto thee , that all those , which vse such base termes to men of my ranke , deserue not to be admitted into the company of honourable persons . the duke remained much astonished to see that great captaine take the matter so hainously at his hands ; and going to withstand the lord prospero , who offered to thrust him out of the chamber , they fell to grapple one with another : and because the spaniards , which were in company with the duke , seeing him in such termes with colonna , entred into the chamber to assist him , the italians which belonged vnto the lord prospero did the like ; whereupon in regard of the number of persons in so strait a place , there ensued a cruell fray ; the noise whereof comming into the street , was the cause that the newes of so dangerous an accident was suddenly carried to apollo ; who in all haste dispatched thither the regent of the vicaria with the guard of archers , who freed the duke out of the lord prosperoes hands : and the vprore being quieted , he commanded the spaniards , that had beene very ill handled , to returne home to their houses ; thereupon the lord prospero , to preuent any sinister information that might haue beene giuen against him , presented himselfe before apollo , vnto whom ( the same goeth ) with a troubled countenance hee vsed these words : sir , it is well knowne , that men of the family of colonna , of the quality i am of , haue alwaies inioyed the title of excellencie , antequam abraham fieret , and ere the spaniards were in rerum natura ; wherefore for that nation to abuse a man of my ranke , as the duke d'alva did me but now , is most insupportable ; for if the vilenesse of him that offended , doth infinitely aggrauate the iniurie with him that is offended , how is it possible , that an italian baron of my quality , should containe himselfe within the bounds of modestie , seeing himselfe vndervalued by that nation , whose miseries , not aboue foure daies agoe to speake of , so moued the whole world to compassion , that thorowout all churches they were recommended to the charitie of well-disposed christians , of whom almes were gathered , to free them from the miserable seruitude , wherein they were so grieuously oppressed by the moores of granada . the spaniards enioy the dominion of the greater part of italy ; where , by such as i am , notwithstanding that daily they threaten it with a cruell , and vniuersall seruitude , they are loued , honoured , and euen serued . with their prodigious auarice they haue depriued vs of our wealth ; and in that lamentable sacke of rome with their vnexpressable lust they violated the honour of our chastest matrons . and now , in exchange of so abiect a patience , they would also take from vs this little honour of breath we enioy , and these miserable titles , the vnhappy remaines , and deplorable reliques of the italian reputation : which is a matter so hard to bee digested , that by euery honourable italian baron it ought to be reuenged , not with complaining words , as i doe , but with daggers points . it is reported by them that were then present , how all the while the lord prospero was speaking , apollo did nothing but smile , and that when vpon his conclusion he burst out into those words , how the spaniards abuses towards the italians were to be reuenged with daggers points , he fell to laughing out-right , and said , prospero , thou art , and euer wert too much giuen ouer to choller : and i am inforced to tell thee , how it infinitely mislikes me , that such a one as thou , who hast alwaies made a particular profession of prudence , shouldst maruell , that slaues , which for twenty yeares together haue beene fed in the gallies with course and mouldy biske● , when they light vpon a batch of new white mancher , should fill their bellies till they are ready to cracke againe : whereas that raging appetite of theirs , and euery other dishonest act , which they vse , to asswage their hunger , ought to be so farre from seeming odious vnto honest men which behold it , that it should rather moue them to pitie . therefore doe yee italians likewise permit , that the spaniards , men but new in this world , and lately got out of the seruitude of the moores of granada , may glut themselues with meat so delicate to their taste , as are the honourable titles , which they haue found in italy ▪ for i assure thee , that when they shall be cloyed with such vanities they also will become , as the french are , such courteous gallanes , that they will willingly giue the title of excellency euen to their horse-boyes , much more to such as thou art . and i tell thee , that if thou hadst that prudence , and that perfect knowledge of the world , as i wish thou haddest , thou wouldest very well perceiue , that those exorbitances , and that so odious manner of proceeding , which the spaniards vse in italie , whereof thou so complainest , is euen as so much sweet sugar for you italians , and bitter poyson for the spaniards ; who if to their valour to their aduisednesse , and vnspeakable ambition which they haue to raigne , they had affable and courteous manners annexed , with the vtter destruction of that remnant of libertie , which is yet out of the lions iawes , they would soone become absolute masters of the world. all which are in●olencies , that with daggers points , not by you italians , but by the monarchy of spaine herselfe , ought to be reuenged with all kinde of cruelty on her spanish ministers , who with their vanitie distaste the good seruants of so great a queene , and make her gouernment nothing acceptable to her subiects : a disorder that bringing much difficultie to the substance of that vniuersall monarchy , whereunto it is not possible she can arriue with the publike hatred of all italy , hath high need of remedy . with this answer apollo returned the lord prospero exceeding well satisfied to his house , after whom the duke d'alva appeared before his maiesty with all his family wonderfull melancholy , which cast such milke in their faces , that the spaniards seemed not so blacke , as ordinarily those moores that come out of granada vse to be . then apollo interrupting the complaint which the duke was about to make against the lord colonna , said ; duke , i am much displeased with the disorder , which i vnderstand hath h●pned , and so much the more , by how much the cause of such an vprore is not very iust , nor withall very honourable on thy side : and vpon this occasion it pleaseth me to remember vnto you spaniards , that to be not only niggards , as to all men yee are knowne , but not to vse prodiga●itie in giuing vnto oth●rs those titles , which are desired , is a manifest signe of malignitie , because the ingenuous nobilitie of a baron is knowne , by shewing little couetousnesse in receiuing titles , and much liberalitie in giuing them : for euen by ouer-much , not by due honour , doth greater reputation accrue to him that giueth , than to him that receiueth it . and you spaniards that vse such austeritie in desiring great titles only for your selues , are not a whit increased in reputation , but rather are become so odious and ridiculous to all men , that the italians in their comedies , haue deseruedly introduced the personage of the spaniard to represent vnto the world a perfect braggado●hia , i wonder ye should not perceiue , ●hat in thinking to arriue vnto the dominiō of the earth by abusing m●n , is the wrong way to the wood ; the minds of men ( duke ) are taken with the bait of humanitie , with the whistle of gratitude , of courtesie , of gentlenesse ; and that fowler would shew himselfe very ignorant , that should go with a drumme into a doue-house for to take pigeons , as i see you spaniards foolishly doe . moreouer , i tell you , that if euer any nation were to make a bait of dignities , for to allure the italians to fall into the nets of your dominions , and light vpon the limebush of your seruitude , it is you spaniards , for the ends which ye haue vpon italy : withall yee are to consider , that the states , which yee possesse , of napl●s , and milan , are fastned vnto you with waxe ; for ye shall command ouer those two members no longer , then til the italians resolue to chase you from thence ; who if they could be assured , that after your ruine , they should not fall into the power of the french , ye should quickly know , that only with a little disturbance , which they could giue you in the port of genoua , they would put you into a thousand intricate difficulties : all matters that should admonish you to giue satisfactiō , at least wise in words , to them , whom in regard of your interests in italy , yee are obliged to respect . as for the iniurie , which you say you haue receiued from the lord prospero , i tell you plainly , that whatsoeuer affront shall be done you vpon any such like titular occasion , i will not only be insensible of it , but i will thinke you haue desirously sought it . then the duke would haue excused himselfe with saying , that from his king he had instruction how to carry himselfe towards the italian barons in the particular of titles , when apollo told him , that the spanish abuses to the italians were not to extend but only to the neapolitans , and milanesi ; and his maiestie also added , that if too much passion did not blind the spaniards , they might easily see , how their grandes , whom spaine it selfe could not containe , and that in italy , would play the giants , compared with the romane barons ; and those of meane stature would proue but dwarffs . hereupon a cloud ▪ as white as snow , beginning by little and little to couer the person of apollo , the priests that were about him perceiued how his maiestie would prophecie ; so that euery one falling prostrate on the ground , and with the rest , the duke and his followers ; out of that hollow cloud proceeded the diuine voice of his maiestie , which with a pleasing sound spake in this sort : i foretell vnto you spaniards , that with your rough and odious manner of proceeding , yee will one day compell the italian nobilitie , which is the mistris of the cruell sicilian vespres , to plot some bloudy neapolitan euensong against you ; it being the proper custome of the italians , with greater rage to reuenge the abuses of words , than the offences of blowes ; as they that hauing short patience , and long hands , are borne not only with an heart most inclined to great resolutions , but that doe not vse to reuenge iniuries with all kinde of cruelty , before they are quite forgotten by those that did them . and with your owne ruine , you will then finde them , with swords in their hands , to be paladine orlandoes , when ye shall perswade your selues they are become most suffering asses . the poste of parnassus to the reader . these papers comming by chance into my hands , i perceiued there was something in them that i could not perceiue ; wherefore i thought best to communicate them with better vnderstandings ; for my part i could see no hurt in them , but did imagine by that little good which i saw , there was much more that i could not see , and therefore iudged them fit for all mens eyes . yet finding the names of spaine and austria , or austria and spaine , ( pardon me , politicke reader , for i am not certaine which should haue prioritie ; and i know in such catholike points , a little error is deadly ) so often inserted , i durst not be too bold with sacred things . for i well saw those two names iointly considered , are now growne of such estimation , as all nations & kings bend their knees , & doff their bonnets at the naming of them , more superstitiously for destroying , thā reuerently at the name of iesus for sauing . therefore i could not resolue , whether it were treason or sacriledge , or i wot not what greater sin , to touch sacred things profanely with common and vnwasht hands ; especially when i saw all such as had done the like , or lesse then thus , made miserable examples of disobedience , as if they had offended adam himselfe , or a house miraculously raised vp by god , or rather originally created in nature , to rule ouer all the world in adams stead ; and that to be the son of a king , could not protect an offendor in this kind from punishment , yea , from being cast out of his paradise . o ( thought i ) when i saw this , how worthy is he , that doth thus to be counted only the catholique king : for he is a king of kings indeed , fit to be the executioner of his holinesse diuine decrees , and to consume all with lightning , where the sacred fulminations went before . tremble all princes , and looke to your crownes ; especially you petty ones in germany , that are but fatted to be swallowed one after another , as his stomack can digest , or your turne comes to be serued vp . you see it is safer being his seruant , than the sonne of any potentate besides . therefore striue for place and preferment there , and helpe with all the speed yee may , to betray one another to ruine . your that are protestants or lutherans , it is no matter for religion ; hold some the stirrop , and let others lift spaine into the saddle , to ride one another like poste-horses by turnes . you see how honourably he deales with that prince , whose peaceable patents made him easie entrance ; and how fauourably with the palätinate , whom he rides in bloud , and spur-galls on both sides , whilst you stand laughing on , and see not that your day is comming . thus i thought , and thought withall to be silent , and to keep these papers from flying abroad , for feare of hauing my owne wings clipt . but when i saw in defect of greater , god had raised vp petty princes to defend the faith , and put that spirit into the prince of orange , the count mansfelt , and the duke of brunswicke , which he had taken from saxonie and bavaria , and others , it made me resume courage , beholding the immediate hand of god in this worke , and to thinke , surely god will haue all the glory to himselfe , that he imployes such instruments , whose estates , in comparison , are but drops to the spanish ocean : i will not therefore be guilty of so much cowardise , as to reserue my selfe , where these men fight , and seeme prodigall of their owne liues ; or at least , not of so much dishonestie , as to conceale what god hath sent into my hands , perhaps to publish for the generall information and benefit of all christendome . goe out therefore , and prosper in gods name . the new-fovnd politcke . the third part . chap. 1. after an exquisite examination and triall made of those wits , which ought to haue the charge of prouinciall gouernments , a ranke of gouernors are published in parnassus , and wholesome auisoes for all gouernors , iudges , and vnder-officers of state. after a long time spent in expectation , yesterday , finally to the satisfaction of all men , the distribution of this states gouernment was published . it is not possible to beleeue the diligence and exquisite circumspections , which were taken by his maiestie and his ministers in the choise of those being exact and worthy of so great a businesse . for first , they tooke into their consideration to make choise of ancient men , experimented in state affaires , onely to the end , that colts should not be put to be tamed by knauish house breakers ; and it is worth the obseruation , that in so great a number of concurrents for places , they had elected persons of a slow genius , of cold constitutions , and in their actions perplext , irresolute , and addicted to drowsinesse , euen almost to disability : and on the contrary , that they had excluded those which for the quicknesse and viuacity of their wits , appeared to be far fitter , and more worthy of employments than others . and it is thought the reason was , because that wise men , which are promoted to businesses of examinations and trialls of wits doe firmely beleeue , that those wits which are ouer liuely , nimble , & fiery , proue very vnapt to rule others , hauing great need themselues of a curbing-bit , and a head-straine to saue them from falling downe headlong into ditches ; it being also manifest by long experience , that these by their foole hardy , and ouer-resolute spirits , doe sooner disquiet people than become good instruments to maintaine them in that sweet peace and correspondent satisfaction , which indeed ought to be the principll care of all those which should be admitted to mannage the affaires of prouinciall gouernments . and it is apparant to all men , how those princes electors hold it for an irrefragable maxime , that , hee makes a happier progresse with very good successe , who being of a slower genius , of a soft spirit , knowes best to accommdate his passions to stand as still as a signe at a tauerne ; because the world , which requires good gouerment , turnes quickly seditious and imbroyled with the phantasticall chymeraes of certaine hotspurres , which in all their affaires by seeking to become ouerwise in their owne conceit , they doe in stead of quenching and appeasing troubles and combustions , kindle them the more by vnseasonable remedies . intempestiuis remediis delicta accendunt . fifteene daies since , by a most rigorous triall , which was made for so great a businesse , not the ignorant ( as many thought ) but those capricious proiectours were excluded , whose pates being full of or others and new inuentions , are enemies to those ancient customes and ingenuous orders , whereto people haue beene enured as another nature , yet these subtle heads would better them with moderne and new lawes . t is true , they greatly laboured to finde out pliable subiects of a milde and flexible disposition , which knew to apply their owne nature to another bodies nature conformable , as wiues ought to be to their husbands . nor did they admit at any hand an officer , which had not studied for the space of foure years continually , that most important point of philosophy , to liue as not to liue : the very basis and ground-worke , whereon the quietnesse of people securely consisted , and the safety also of that good gouernment , which might be hoped at the hands of an honest wise gouernour , in whom they did not so much regard his insight and knowledge in the lawes and statutes , as that he should be well seene in that prudent mystery , in that mild manner of proceeding , and in that dexterity of vnderstanding , as is not as yet found registred in bookes . a consideration so necessary , that some great lawyers , which haue had the charge of prouinces , lighted vpon most simple successe , as that lanthorne of the lawes bartolus can beare testimony , who was forced to leape out of a window at the palace of todi , for all his rare iudgement and skill in the lawes because he would not be taken and torne in pieces by some that could no longer brooke the impertinent curiosities of one that was so wise of his tongue , and so imprudent in his braine . likewise this is certaine , that they reiected , euen with the bastinado , those great beasts , which with open ostentation , to peacocke-wise vsed to looke big with austere & terrible countena●●ce , taking delight to threaten his maiesties subiects , made by the creatour of the same mould as themselues , more like tyrants , than ciuill iudges , which many of them counterfeit for some other sinister respect , and aboue all things they had a care to exclude those tyrannicall butchers , who busyris like , being bent to shed humane blood , would make men beleeue , that they went about to set the crooked world right againe with pillories , with gibbets , , or at least with stupendious ●ines and mulcts worse than a thunder-bolt , such as were neuer imposed in more ancient times . aboue measure they loued those iudges which tooke more care to hinder misdemeanours , than to punish them , and which neuer subscribe to the sentence of death , the greeke letter θ , without the inke of teares . the next day after , all the presidents and iudges appeared before apollo , who caused salust crispus , chiefe notary of the collaterals , to minister the oath vnto them , which was , that they should faithfully leaue the world as they found it , and not alter any of the ancient priuiledges . after the oath thus ministred , the said salust tooke aside the gouernour of libethrum , a fauorite of his , and gaue him these admonitions . first , to begin his gouernment with a kinde of carelesnesse , and to continue it with diligence by degrees , entring in as a lambe , and playing the lyon towards the end , but alwaies generously inclined , remembring that principle of cornelius tacitus , acribus initiis incurioso fi●e . secondly , that in all causes betweene the common people he should doe most exact iustice without exception of persons : but in suits arising among the nobler sort hee should mingle with the rigour of iustice the dexterity of a wary iudgement , remembring alwayes , that the accusations of great persons were so odious to princes that they laid vpon officers gownes an aspersion , like the tainting spots of corrupted oile which could neuer bee washt away with the purest sope of innocence . therefore among those great spirited men , a iudge had need with the sword of iustice , to imploy like a wise fencer , the target of a nimble wit and a cautelous care , that neither of the one side nor of the other , he be exclaimed vpon for any distasteful order . for princes hauing cause to vse their helpe for counsell , force , or purses , they desire to hold them well satisfied . and therefore in controuersies falling out among them , a iudge had need to learne some easie way to draw out rotten teeth , and with the hand of dexterity to fill vp the place with the finest cotten wooll . thirdly , a iudge must enforce himselfe to know all things , but not to execute al which he knowes . omnia scire non omnia exequi . for to attempt needlesse and brabling matters , were to goe about to set straight the leg of a dog , or to lose his braine in the alchymie of fooles . and in this corrupt age it is good counsel for an officer to tolerate in people some stale disorder , then with any ill satisfaction to the generalitie to torment himselfe to seeke to bring in that , which he cannot execute without commotions and heart-burnings . fourthly , that with other iudges and officers subiect to the same prince , he should not contend nor contest for matter of preheminence or right , nor looke to be his owne caruer , or to right himselfe in his court by vsing any strict course with inferiour officers for matters of prerogatiue of courts , but either to acquaint the prince himselfe , or to winke at the affront , if another court seemes to iustifie the subiect , or els to take in hand the weapons of a gowned man , the pen. but if the iudges authoritie stretch to the confines of another prince , hee must not seeke differences , nor auoid them . but if they proceed from souldiers or pyrats , he must defend his borders and iurisdiction with armes . yet so , that towards all princes subiects in league and amitie with his prince , he behaue himselfe as temperately regardfull , as zealously affected to his owne princes honour . fiftly , that in some occasions he preferre the publicke peace of his gouernment before that strictnesse of iustice , which is mentioned in bookes . sixtly , that for any impertinent thing , which hee sees or heares , which be not extraordinarily altered in mind or countenance ; and that if he cannot doe this , yet that he refraine himselfe from speaking of it , and in any case to beware that he deliberate not , nor study for reuenge or reformation in heat or anger , but in cold blood after a long times delay . seuenthly , that in supreme and waighty matters hee take heed of making any shew of vndaunted , of a fiery , and resolued mind , but rather that he content himselfe to hunt waspes and hornets out of their holes , with the hand of the prince armed with the gauntlet of a higher authority ; for although an officer findes that he hath ability and power enough to execute a greater enterprise , yet for feare of emulation in court , or some casuall blocke in his way , which the wisest man could not foresee , oftentimes it is not expedient to put in execution all that which his authority might warrant him . eightly , that he deale in all ordinary matters concerning ordinary men , entring into strict friendship with no man residing within the precincts of his command , but to beware of that wresting and wiredrawing occasions , which might reach vnto the hatred and hindrance of another , and to auoid domesticall familiaritie , which causeth contempt . onely let him vse that decent grauity which may procure respect and an awfull loue . but in any case , that he shunne the conuersation of base and riotous persons , and that he keepe company for the most with men of his owne ranke , yet so , that he make not any man so endeared and so bosome a friend vnto him , who might afterwards by prying into his dealings , and diuing into his secrets , turne to be his capitall enemy . for sometimes contemptible persons , not suspected for craft , may in the twinkling of an eye , of low and earth creeping mushromes , become tall cedars at least in their owne ouerwe●ning conceit . ninthly , that he force his noble nature to endure the stinking pride of lawyers , although most odious to god and all good men , and to beare with their impertinent discourses , and wrangling bawling , who take vpon them to become lambes at home and lyons abroad , onely to maintaine the glory and reputation of the bench , but commonly it is to fill their owne purses with the ruines and spoyles of honester men than themselues . wherein i wish him to remember that golden saying of tacitus , that it is a most profitable , as also most pithy in the choise and free will of good and euill things to consider , what thou thy selfe wouldest or wouldest not endure vnder another gouernour or iudges power , vtilissimus idem , ac●●r●uissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus , cogitare , quid volueris sub alio principe , aut nolueris . tenth , that he take heed with great circumspection he fall not into the other extremity in seeking to auoid the defect of his predecessor , as a certaine prince very heedlesly did , who perceiuing that wise men fou●d fault with the late prince for too much lenity , turned an odious tyrant . the golden meane is euer best . eleuenth , that with extraordinary seuerity he take more care to bridle the disorders of his own house , then the seditions of the common people ; for the immodest and vnciuill carriage of a magistrates domesticke gentlemen , whom some call countrey-courtiers , is a farre greater blemish and scandall to their master , then the brutish insolence of rude clownes and ill-bred swaines . twelth , that he hate , as the horrour of hell , all kind of fore-stalling and engrossing of commodities , and that he account as the capitall enemy of his reputation such detestable gaines . but specially , that diuelish gaine , which is in these dayes much practised , and one of the chiefe causes of our creators anger towards many states , by the sale of offices . a most perillous charybdis , a rocke so dangerous in the sea of worldly businesse , that iustice being fled backe into heauen , these petty chapmen , who neuer dreame of another world but this earthly one , turne all things topsie turuy to make themselues sauers for their dear-bought places . whereas a noble spirit should firmely beleeue , that the merchandise of a christian is ingenuous simplicity and plain dealing , and being honestly called to beare office in his countrey , then his richest lucre worthy of an honourable officer is to ingulfe himselfe in the trade of honour and vprightnesse of iustice , which being by the trumpet of fame blowne into his princes eares in a short time , god inspiring the heart of the prince , he shall be preferred from office to office , vntill hee arriue to a contented fortune correspondent to his heroycall worth and magnanimous minde . thirteenth , that perpetually he haue his eyes fix● on his vnder-iudges hands , and that he looke as narrowly to them , as if he held a biting serpent in his owne hand , that iniustice being a very dangerous member which hazards his credit by the diuels temptations to blurre his masters honour by playing the base mechanicke in the sacred seat of iustice. and because no iudge receiues bribes but sinisterly by his wise , seruant , or without witnesse , sauing the party himselfe , his supreme iudge or prince ought to proclaime rewards to the discouerers , and vpon the least euidence to remoue such theeues of the deity ; seeing that iustice is one of the prime diuine attributes . fourteenth , that he accommodate his genius & nature to the nature of his prouincials , shewing himselfe mild to the peaceable , and seuere to the seditious . and to take speciall care to weed out idle persons ; if they refuse conuenient labor , which he ought to see them put vnto ; and if any drones be found with honey , to examine them from whose hiue they stole the same . fifteenth , that to the end his prince may conceiue well of his worth , he acquaint not his highnesse with slight occurrences , nor trifling matters , which fall out in his gouernment . nor yet must he refraine to certifie vnto him all the most important affaires , chiefly , all proiects tending to his honour or profit . sixteenth , that he beleeue how the penalties and punishments in the power of a wary iudge , consists more in threats then in inflicting of them , & that he neuer forget this lesson : how officers gouerne men full of a thousand imperfections , subiect to infinite errours , how they are not angells of heauen which cannot sinne ; and therefore in his gouernment hee affects more the report of a sweet natured iudge , like his creatour , who bearing with our trespasses , si quoties peecant homines , toties sua fulmina mittat , and not the repute of a tyrannizing minister . seuenteenth , that he frequent not reuels , dances , or any publike feasts , mournfull spectacles , and tragicall in the end to wise officers , as instruments , which vilifie his fame , and bring his personall presence into contempt among the vulgar , and might bring his grauitie into question among his equals . eighteenth , that he know how the shamefull acts of the nobles and principall gentlemen doe waxe more cruell against them , which debase themseues to commit them , without touching or blemishing the generall reputes of their honourable families . ninteenth , that he held it for a thing certaine , that it is better to dissemble and winke at some common infirmities and frailties , then to shew himselfe earnest to punish them , it not being the resolution of a wary man to enter into that naughty passage , out of the which he otherwise knowes , that the horse cannot draw forth his feet . twentieth , that he vary not in opinion with his equals in office or vnder officers , but vpon extremitie , knowing that his prince had rather he should vse dexteritie and nimblenesse of wit in such actions , then rigorous iustice. twenty one , that with a pleasing sagacity he let the world see , how he had found all such as inhabite in his iurisdiction rather good people , then by any rigorous proceedings of his that he made them good , because whosoeuer glories and vaunts that he hath hanged and punished so many malefactors during the time of his office , he triumphs in their infamy and shame , which cannot redound to his honour , nor to that discreet carriage , which is required in a well foreseene gouernour . chap. 2. the most illustrious monarchies resident at parnassus , demand by what meanes the venetian lady got such exact obedience and exquisite secrecie of her nobility , whereof shee giues them couenient satisfaction . the monarchies of great britaine , prance , spaine and polonia , wondring that the venetians had gotten the start and fame for their gift of secrecie , and that the spanish monarchy could by no cunning intelligences , nor rich pensions corrupt any of their parliament house , called the pregadi , neuer as yet to disclose any of their priuy coūcel , they went with one consent to the palace of the venetian lady , earnestly importuning her to discouer vnto them by what meanes or pollicie of state she had arriued to that happinesse , as to obtaine such secrecie and rare obedience in so many mouthes and hearts , which they could scarce meet withall in one or two of their trustiest seruants . to this the lady answered , that she had allured and wonne her nobility to this vertue of secrecie , with rewards and hopes of promotion , and for the crime of disobedience she scared them with punishment . to which the aboue-named monarchies replied , that they also wrought and vsed the same meanes , but could neuer as yet obtaine that wonderfull effect and rare end . then said the lady that hapned , because in comparison of those ●ewards , which are conferred vpon well-deseruing persons in a common-wealth rightly ordered , the rewards of monarchies were poore , and punishments more sparing . whereto the monarchies made answer , that with them it was cleane contrary , and that the rewards of free-states , to bee paraleld with the wastfull liberalitie , which great kings extended towards their ministers , was but beggery . for they neuer heard , the venetians had beene so liberall as to recompence any of their senators seruice and fidelity with preferring them to be owners of cities , townes , castles , lieutenantships , or lands in fee , as kings haue diuers times aduanced their subiects vnto : and that the greatest reward , which the venetians accustomed to bestow at any time vpon their senators , was to prefer them to some offices , which they were forced to labour hard for , and to passe many base and inferiour offices by degrees and steps , euen from their youth vp , before they could arriue to any supreme place of command or profit . besides that , the most part of their offices were rather hindrances than gainfull : onely they caried a colour of some reputation to them that knew no better , nor saw the glory and pomps of monarchies . and for punishments , without any comparisons , those were far more terrible and cruell , which proceeded from the resolued will of a prince incensed for some grieuous cause , than the punishments of the venetian senate against any of their senators , which ordinarily were more slow and warie , than sudden and quicke . and that there was a great difference in proportion betweene a prince , which iudged his v●ssall , and a senator which by his suffrage and voice punished his equall , his friend , and kinsman : that the venetians knew not but banishment , and one kind of cruell punishment , called , iltremendo canal orfano , to sowe vp their traitors in a sack , and to drowne them in their lake , which they seldome doe but in desperate cases : whereas in monarchies , the iudges sentenced some to be hang'd , drawne , and quartered , some to be burnt , some to be rackt and tortured , a thing common in spaine , practised vnder pretext of heresie towards other princes sub●ects ; and if any of their nobilitie were condemned for high treason , they escaped not the axe , the kindest fauour england affords to offendors , sauing one only example in the chronicles , of queene anne bullen , for her greater grace and honour was beheaded with the sword of calice . at these speeches the venetian dame smiled , and said , that in stead of those rewards of honour and estates in fee , which monarchs bestowed vpon their well-deseruing creatures , shee also requited her best and wisest nobles with places of great authority and command , with most absolute power and dominion ; one with the noble kingdome of creet or candy ; others with corfu , and other ilands subiect to her state : some shee preferred to be her viceroyes in dalmatia and istria ; some shee appointed gouernours of her neighbouring territories on the continent , of nova palma , forum iulij , harca trevisano , padua , vincenza , verona , brescia , bergamo , crema on the frontiers of milan , and the rest of her nobilitie shee reserued perhaps to their far greater contentment in the senate-house at home in venice , which might be termed the maiesticall miracle of cities . so that her nobles might better be called kings and great princes , than priuate gentlemen or subiects , who in all affaires of moment , hauing euery one a speciall interest , must needs be faithfull to their owne selues ; whereas the seruants of princes were faithfull vnto them not as sons but as vassals . and the feare , which frights our nobles of venice from selling the secrets of the state , to forraigne princes ariseth from this infinite disparity and disproportion , that is betwixt that which is lost with treachery , and that which is gained with fidelitie ; betwixt that remorse of conscience , which a subiect feeles for betraying his prince , and the feare which a senator is possessed with for prouing disloyall to a free-state . there is great difference in the loue of a free-borne senator , and the loue of a cringing vassall , howsoeuer he be gilded with the bare title of a nobleman . what will it then boot one of our senators to bewray the secrets of our state to his owne hindrance and perpetuall dishonour ? finally , the venetian dame told them , that the rewards which princes conferred vpon their counsellors and secretaries , occasioned oftentimes pernitious effects cleane contrary to their masters meaning which trusted them ; because those rewards so giuen not onely cooled them in their good seruice , specially at that time , when they had no more , than they might hope for of him for their cares and paines : but the good will of the prince being commonly mutable , and subiect to change and nouelty , the treacherous machinations and emulations of some courtiers being frequent and rife , it sometimes falls out that the ministers to assure themselues of their places and high commands , which they purchased by their honourable deserts , or perhaps by the helpe of their purses , or by other meanes , suspecting a remouall from their offices , or some disasters by their aduersaries , they proue vnderhand false , and to make vp their market , or perhaps to make themselues sauers ; if they bought their places , they fell their princes secrets , and may be afterwards tempted to doe him a worse mischiefe . but such is the ardent affection , which kindles in the hearts of all our venetian nobles , that they will hazard to liue with pouerty , shame , and disdaine at home , than to be hired abroad by strange princes , or to betray their natiue country by reuealing any secrets which might redound to the common hinderance : so that i may rightly liken a nobleman of venice to a fish , which being bred in that lake in the water of liberty , knowes not how to liue abroad out of venice in the element of seruitude . chap. 3. the romane monarchy demanding of cornelius tacitus the resolution of a politicall question , receiues full satisfaction of the shepheard meliboeus , who casually was there present . the ancient romane monarchy euer since shee was ransackt by the gothes , vandalls , and other northerne barbarians , liued neere this court vnder colour of going a hunting continually disguised for the same purpose the other day repaired to cornelius tacitus , who for his recreation had retired himselfe out of parnassus into the country . to whom shee said , that she came vnto him purposely to be resolued of one maine doubt , which troubled her minde continually , the which she had imparted to many politicians , but could neuer as yet be satisfied by any of them , and therefore she repaired to him , as to the prime and grand statesman of all others . the matter which thus perplexed her was to know why the kingdomes of greece , asia , egypt , france , britaine , spaine , and the common-wealth of carthage , with many other great prouinces , before they became vnited to the state of rome , were of themselues powerfull-enough and formidable , but being sithence subiected and vnited together in her proper person , they missed with all their forces to make her strong and durable . to this cornelius tacitus answered , that this was a difficult question , and could not suddenly be resolued , but the next day after some pause and studie he would returne thither with his best resolution . the monarchesse rested very well satisfied , and as shee was ready to licence his departure , meliboeus that famous shepherd recorded by the poets , who that morning had brought to tacitus a present of fresh cheese and creame , and a couple of dainty cheeses , and stood all the while attentiuely listning to this question , seeing them now ready to take their leaue , he interrupted them , desiring tacitus not to depart , for he would instantly without any study giue the lady sufficient satisfaction . the lady and tacitus laughed very heartily , and bade him not to beat his braine about such deepe matters , but to goe home and looke to his sheepe . meliboeus replied very earnestly , that no race among mortall men could better discourse of true and solid state-businesse than shepherds ; and that princes should be most happy , if in gouerning their subiects , they could imitate shepherds in charity : and so should the people bee , if they could obey their prince , as sheepe did their shepherd . the monarchesse and tacitus confounded with maruell at the sudden and extemporary words of the shepherd , willed him freely to vtter his resolution . whereupon meli●oeus began in this manner : most mighty princesse , i am ( as my virgil well knowes ) his mantuan shepherd , and it were a great shame to these siluer haires , which you see on my head and chin , if i were not exactly experienced in my owne occupation ; i say then , that in so many yeares which i haue spent in gouerning sheepe , i haue gotten this knowledge , that the greatnesse and power of a shepherd doth not consist ( as many ambitious and conetous men beleeue ) in possessing of thousands of sheepe , but that he be owner of so many sheepe onely , as a good shepherd can watch with his eye , gouerne with his rod , and rule with his whistle . and the reason is cleare , for in too small a number of sheepe we see shepherds poore , because their great pouerty compels them with too much seuerity to milk their flock , and too often to sheare them . in a moderate and meane number , where the true perfection lies , shepherds become alwaies wealthy and happy ; whereas in the excesse and ouer-abounding number of sheepe , by reason of the difficult and hard means to gouerne them , being thus from the golden rule of proportion so far remote , and indeed beyond the power of one man , they cannot chuse but incur manifest danger . whence it comes to passe , that the miserable sheep of his flock being too many in number , by the couetousnesse and carelesnesse of him , that vndertakes to gouerne them , doe pine away at first , and at last they dye of meere necessitie and want . how is it possible , but that confusion should happen , where multitudes abound out of the owners view and reaches : for it is the masters owne eye , which fattens and makes his flocke to thriue . right happy were many great potentates and states , if our creator had bestowed on them the propertie of camells to bow and kneele downe to the ground for the receiuing of the burthen of gouernments , and had the discreet moderation to set meeres and bounds vnto their ambitious minds by rising and standing vp ( as is the manner of those beasts ) when they feele themselues reasonably well laden ; and to receiue no heauier charge on their shoulders , though stronger than atals , at such time as they know themselues sufficiently charged with states proportioned according to their abilities in true wisdome and prudence . there are past now 1626. yeares , since i became a shepheard in arcadia , and euer since my comming and being here , i haue contented my selfe with fiue hundred sheepe in my flocke , which haue yearly yeelded mee fiue hundred crownes , which is more than sufficient for my owne maintenance , and my families . and this most fortunate gaine is so sure vnto me , that i am respected of all men in arcadia , and reputed for the best shepherd in all the country . yea , the wisest in parnassus doe hold me to be a happier man than alexander the great , who was not ashamed to wish for more worlds to conquer . that shepheard , whose ambition prouokes him to keep many flocks in hope of gaine is much deceiued , for where his owne eye cannot ouersee , he must needs commit the charge of them to others , commonly , to louts , knaues , theeues , and villaines , who as people borne altogether for their bellies , and other carnall and worldly pleasures , will not only sheare but slay their masters flocks . besides , who knowes not whether he must sometime or other vndergoe a greater charge than all his flocks amount vnto in warlike prouisions and garrisons to defend them from pirates and wilde tartars , or from his malicious neighbours ? for example , i will instance in my neighbour menalcas , who being my capitall enemy , and bearing great enuy and emulation in seeing me prosper with my fiue hundred sheep aboue him and others , and verily beleeuing , that he should supplant me , if he could enioy more flocks than i kept , not content with the like number of sheepe as he formerly possessed equall vnto mee , but thinking to make himselfe absolute monarch of all other pastors in arcadia , he tooke vp money at vse , and at the extremest interest , sold the greatest part of his patrimonie , and hauing got together a large masse of money , sent into england , spaine , and to strange countries , where he vnderstood the fairest wolled sheep were , and with excessiue cost transported them hither , and made three seuerall flocks of fiue hundred in each flocke . but it fortuned so , that those sheepe being forraine , and not acquainted with the language and whistles of our shepheards , nor with our kinde of pasture , they stragled here and there into vnknowne places . whereupon menalcas was forced to substitute deputy shepheards and many dogs to looke vnto them and to fetch them in . but such was the naturall hatreed of the sheepe towards the dogs , and the implacable moodinesse which they conceiued to be continually hurried vp and downe , that they fell into an inward conceit of languor and despair , and so into flat disobedience to abhorre both their shepheards and the dogs , insomuch that when they were to bee milkt and shorne , they hid themselues in woods and deserts . and then it was known throughout all arcadia ▪ that despaire and strange vsage can turne conies into lions . yea , it was sound , that at that time the spanish sheepe , which menalcas had brought thither , proued so rauing mad , that they attempto bite their shepheards . menalcas thus perplexed for the losse and escape of so many sheepe , hired out of spaine and swizzerland , the valiantest dogs hee could haue for money , which considering the infinite charge he sustained in conducting them into arcadia , and the nature of these dogs being continually accustomed to hunt these sheepe , they came at last , what for want of their due allowance , and what of a wanton and greedy disposition , they turned like wolues , and preyed so long vpon these silly sheep , that the rest which were left aliue pined away with griefe , rather to endure such continual hurrying and troubles vnder strange pastors and rauenous dogs . poore menalcas vpon the report of this tragicall euent became the by-word and subiect of laughter to all arcadia for this his ambitious enterprise ; and was pointed at with the more fingers , euen of very boyes , when afterwards he was faine to turne a petty merchant of skins , the vnlucky relicks of a lamentable charge , and the presaging tokens of his owne funerals ; for indeed the mans heart-strings brake of very sorrow and melancholy , leauing his house , that sometimes flourished among the best of vs in arcadia , now desolate and most miserable . chap. 4. many people hauing wasted their meanes by gluttonous feasts , prodigall fare , and pompous apparell , for the moderating of such lauish expences doe desire a statute of their princes , but they misse of their purpose . some nations subiects to certaine princes which are resident here at parnassus , hauing tryed , that superfluity of belly-cheere , excesse of drinking , and the vanities of apparell and new-fangled fashions , are now a dayes besides the wrath of their creatour iustly incurred for the breach of these vowes , which were vndertaken for them at their baptisme , many men were transformed into swinish qualities , to their healths impaire , the ruine of their estates , and soules danger . and for their outside , they garnished themselues like peacocks , so gay and trimme , that no patrimony how rich soeuer , can now supply the ambition of men , nor the vanities of women ; & that they also obseruing in these proud times , how this excesse proceeds yet further , that all the portion which is left vnto young gentlewomen , whom ciuill modesty heretofore was wont to be their chiefest ornament , how great soeuer the same might be , did not now suffice to buy them carkanets and iewels , and imbrodered peticotes , so that fathers are not able to marry them according to their rancke ; and to match them with thrifty persons were almost impossible , for hauing knowne them for such vaine creatures , they will not be troubled with their company , and to let them runne headlong according to their vnbridled fancies , they must either marry with vnthrifts , like themselues , or liue vnmarried , to the hazard of their chastities : so that except some law be enacted for the curbing of this excesse , they may well be said to hold the wolfe by the eares . vpon these considerations , fearing their vtter ouerthrow , with one consent they presented their supplications to their princes , who seemed very glad to entertaine their motion so much tending to the publike good , and like good polititians knowing how profitable it is to strike the iron while it is hot , & at that time to publish a law , when the subiects themselues become sutors for it , must needs fall out very luckily , & with good fruit in the effect , they out of hād , while their subiects were in this humour of thirft , ioyned together to cut off all superfluous customes in feasts and drinkings , and all new fashions of attires , tying themselues to one fashion onely , not to be altered for many yeares , allowing what is decent and comely to euery seuerall vocation . but the euening before this most laudable statute was to be signed and published , accidentally it came to the eares of the princes , farmers , and officers of the customes and imposts , who being likewise backt and whetted on by the mercers , vintners , grocers and other tradesmen which liued vpon the spoile of the richer sort , they repaired in all haste to their princes , and very cunningly intreated to defaulke and abate a great part of those yearely summes which they were to pay them for such wines , spice , sugars , and such other forraine commodities , as by way of customes and imposts , they were to receiue to their vse . the princes stood confounded in their iudgement , hearing speech of so great losses and defalkments , as they very craftily insinuated and pretended in foxes habits to be most true , and although most of the stuffes were wrought in their owne countries , at least the most durable and best befitting euery nation , yet they made their princes beleeue , that there came from naples , from genoa , from millan , and from spaine , so many kinds of stuffes , silkes , gold and siluer lace , which if the statute of thrift went currant , they could not but sustaine exceeding great losses in the publike customes ; whereupon the princes sent for the committies and deputies of their people , and told them what their customers had proued before them on their honest words , so that they could not hinder their owne interest and profit , lest they should make themselues leane in going about to fatten them . with this answere sauouring of the princes gaine , the people departed much grieued and afflicted , and confessed all of them , that to heale any disorders with that medicine which might offend the publike customes and imposts were desperate cure , and incurable cankers . chap. 5. terence the comedian being imprisoned by iason the pretour of vrbine , for keeping a concubine , is deliuered by apollo with very great dishonour to the pretour . pvblius terentius liued in a little house , but very well furnished , in the comicall quarter , with no more meni all seruants about him , then bacchis his maid & davus his ancient attendant . and although bacchis in the floure of her age , being then a very beautifull creature , had bin graced with her masters bed , yet now being aged , she continued in his house without scandall , and very modestly disposed , not ministring the least cause of murmuring or dislike to any of the neighbourhood . but it happened about tenne dayes since , that iason the great lawyer being pretour of vrbine , to get him some repute in his new office , directed a proces vnder a penaltie to terence , commanding him in his maiesties name , all excuses laid aside , immediately to put bacchis out of his house , vnlesse he would incurre the danger of a concubine-keeper . but terence did not onely disobey the contents of the mandate , but other writs of iasons court . whereupon the pretour forbare to send any more warrants of orders and injunctions ; and yesterday without any more adoe caused terence to be apprehended and imprisoned ; but with so great displeasure to apollo , that in an extraordinary great chafe he publikely exclaimed , that by his officers , yea and that in parnassus , men more malicious then ignorant , that wicked abuse of being quick-sighted in apparance and shew , but blind in matters of substance was lately introduced and practised to the dishonour of his court. then commanding terence to be discharged out of prison , he caused iason himselfe , for all his famous bookes of the law to be there shut vp in his stead , and also to his greater affliction , appointed philip decius his aduersary , to be pretour in his roome . whereupon yesterday the rod and the standard , being the pretorian e●signes , were deliuered to decius , who going to apoll●es presence his maiestie spake these words vnto him : by the correction inflicted on iason , learne to know that reuerend iudges , which in the administration of iustice , doe more attend the true and reall seruice of god , than by formall trickes and gibes to play vpon their inferiours , they ought first to hunt out of his owne house malice and bribery , and then to chase out of other mens houses young harlots , as thai● , before hee proceeded to expell an aged bacchis . chap. 6. domitius corbulo for certaine words spoken by him during the time of his gouernment , which sauoured of tyranny , is called in question by the criminall magistrates , but in the end to his greater glory dismissed . because the citie of pirrhus , and all that most populou● territory by the mildnesse and ouer much lenity of certaine gouernours , became more insolent then in former times , and full of malefactours and perillous factions , which disturbed the peace of the vertuous , apolloes maiestie , to bridle with some exemplary punishment , the licentiousnesse of his seditious subiects , about two moneths past sent into that gouernment , the rigorous domitius corbulo , who in few dayes did so demeane himselfe , that from a seditious state , he reduced the same to a peaceable course of liuing . within a while after , it chāced , that corbulo discoursing with some of his familiar friends , enquired of them , what conceit they had of him : they freely answered him , that the rigor and seuerity which he had lately vsed against many of the seditious , had terrified the whole citie and countrey , that all did hate him . at which answer , corbulo reioyced beyond measure , and told them againe : there 's no matter , oderint dum metuant ; let them hate , so they stand in feare of me . the which words were afterwards carried by some pick-thanks to apollo who taking in ill part the accusation , referred the same to his court of criminall causes . and because by an ancient decree published by his maiestie , it was knowne and declared , that whatsoeuer prince legitimate , naturall , and hereditary , presumed to vtter such arrogant and rash words , he should incurre this penalty , to be reputed a tyrant , and if any officer should let slip , though vnawares , and by chance , any such dangerous words out of his mouth , he should be capitally punished . corbulo was summoned to appeare vpon this information before the iudges , who according , came the next day to answere with all humility ; where the case was throughly canuased , and while all men expected to heare some rigorous order to be taken with corbulo , by extraordinary fauour the cause was remoued by a certiorari before apollo himselfe , where to all mens admiration he was pronounced cleare and guiltlesse , and remaunded backe into his gouernment with far greater authority and grace then before . the sentence contained , that in a prince which had the honey of grace in his power , those words were shamefull , and expresly tyrannicall ; most honourable in that officers mouth , which had nothing in his hands but the odious sting of iustice : that prince being miraculous indeed , which causeth himselfe to be beloued and reuerenced of his people , and that officer most sufficient which hath the genius and nature , to make himselfe to be feared and obeyed . chap. 7. by the promotion of diogenes the cynick , vnto a higher place , the honourable chaire of the tranquillitie of a priuate life being vacant , apollo preferres the famous philosopher crates to that charge , who refuseth it . diogenes the cynicke , who for so many yeares with much fruit to the vniuersall good , and his owne infinit glory in particular had vndergone the charge of commending in the chaire of the publike schooles pouerty , solitarinesse , and that contented quietnesse of mind , by whose perswasion attalus himselfe the king of treasure became of that admirable resolution to put away his riches , the easier to embrace the austere sect of the stoikes , which is much edified now in parnassus , about two moneths past he was promoted for his singular great merits to a more sublime dignitie , euen to be the archcriticke of the sacred muses . whereby the noble cynicall place left vacant his maiestie bestowed it on the famous crates , who yesterday morning went to apollo , and contrary to all mens expectation refused to accept of this renowned charge , freely affirming , that by the aduancement of diogenes to that late transcendent dignity , the chaire of pouerty and contentment of mind , being now become vilified and much hindred , his heart would not giue him to exercise that office with that candour , feruencie , and ingenuous simplicity of mind , as the affaires of that place required : because the very first day , when he should settle himself to his milde lectures & peaceable meditatiōs , of necessity he could not but be swoln with some ambition , and be possessed with the like ardent desire & glorious hope to be enstalled in the same or such another dignitie , as his predecessor had obtained , who had cashired & cast out of his hart , though extraordinarily composed , that honest simplicity , which makes wise men to reason , and like a calme wind to breath with their harmlesse thoughts and not with the tongue , which oftentimes trips and deliuers , like a clattering clapper , more noises and gall , then honeyed admonitions . to this he added , that the necessitie of ambition and the violence of desire did arise and flow , not from vice but from that honourable zeale , which also philosophers , yea , the most mortified of all others in parnassus , doe hold as the most earnest and intentiue spurre of their reputation . the reason is , because when they should not receiue in progresse of time , the same or the like preferments at his maiesties hands , as he had conferred vpon diogenes , the world would iudge all that came to passe , not by their professed humility , nor because they with all their hearts and soules preferred the priuate life before publike offices , quietnesse before businesse , and pouertie before riches : but because his maiestie had not found in them those abilities , worths and deserts , which he had knowne and found in diogenes . therefore crates foreseeing these inconueniences incident to this office , his conscience would not permit him with such a troubled mind , so subiect to the violence of ambition , with any hope of doing good to reade lectures of humilitie , the contempt of riches , and the vanitie of worldly greatnesse : it being a thing impossible to find any man so powerfully eloquent , which shall be able to perswade others to follow that kinde of life , which the hearers know to be abhorred and misliked of the preacher himselfe . chap. 8. a controuersie hapning betwixt the gouernors of pindus and libethrum about matters of iurisdiction : apollo punisheth them both . in the territorie of libethrum , a hainous misdemeanure being committed , the gouernour of the place pursued the offendor , that fled to a country mans house adioyning to the territorie of pindus , and threatned to burne the house , except he yeelded his bodie . in the meane time the gouernour of pindus vnderstanding that this place was in his iurisdiction , hastned also thither . but before his arriuall the party had submitted himselfe prisoner to the gouernor of libethrū : wherupon he of pindus required the prisoner as his due being taken in his liberties : but the other claimed the place , where the prisoner was apprehended , to be in his patent or commission . after much debating the question and difference , both gouernours not being able longer to contend in words , fell to blowes , and their men so sided with their gouernours , that there was much bloudshed on either part . apollo hearing of these affronts sent for them both , and after long patience in examination of the difference , his maiestie finding that the gouernour of libethrum had profferd the first wrong in rashly disturbing the gouernment of his fellow-subiect , the place appearing now to be clearly in the gouernment of pindus , though before somwhat litigious , he depriued him of his gouernment , and declared him incapable of bearing any charge from thenceforward . and for the gouernour of pindus , whom his maiestie found to haue most right to the place and prisoner , he condemned him for all that to the gallies for ten yeares , aggrauating this execution for example sake , to teach him and all other officers , that they which serue the one and the same prince or state , ought to defend the reasons of their iurisdictions with the pen , and not with the pike , reseruing armes and force for strangers , which might inuade their country . a case remarkable , and to be regarded of all such officers bearing charge on any frontier townes , if not of iudges of courts , who though they be subiect to one prince and the same lawes , yet for matter of iurisdiction do sometimes contend , punishing the poore subiects for their ambition and ouersights . chap. 9. the vertuous of parnassus doe visit the temple of the diuine prouidence , whom they humbly thanke for the great charitie which his supreme maiestie from time to time hath vouchsafed to shew vnto mankind . this morning according to the ancient stile of this court , the temple of the diuine prouidence was visited by all the scholasticall princes , and learned barons of parnassus . and there iovianus pontanus with an excellent praier thanked our great creator for the infinite charity and loue he hath shewed to mankind , in creating frogs without teeth ; because it would haue beene an vnprofitable benefit for mankind , that this world couered with so many heauens , full of so many stars , had beene created the chiefe and soueraigne height of all the most delicious pleasures , and not also as abundant of things more necessarie , when gallants which should spend their time in defending themselues and vs from the bitings of such fastidious and importunate creatures , were like to walke with an insupportable impediment of iron boots : whereas now against such troublesome vermine , which haue no hurt in them sauing their croaking noise , a rampart of a good paire of eares sufficeth , which will not care for that ill-pleasing noise , which they know to be without danger . chap. 10. a contention hapning betweene many learned men , which might be the most notable politick law , or most excellent custome worthy of commendation in the flourishing state of venice , the same is finally decided and determined by the venetian state herselfe , to whose arbitrement the question is referred by their generall consent . vvorthy of record is that vertuous contention , which about six daies past arose betwixt certaine learned men of this state ; who while they discoursed of the notable orders , the most excellent lawes , and other mostrare decrees , which maintained the famous common-wealth of venice in such height of greatnesse , they fell into sundry opinions , which of them ought to beare away the victory . and because euery one of them did obstinately defend his owne opinion as the best , to the end so great a difference should be decided without commotion of minde or passion , they vnanimously agreed vpon this resolution , to appeare all of them before the state herselfe , to whom they should first declare their seuerall reasons , and that shee should afterwards adiudge which of them had aimed next vnto the marke . this they made knowne vnto the soueraigne lady , who gratiously vndertooke to giue that satisfaction which they expected . petrus crinitus then was the first , who said , that it being a most assured rule , that all things whatsoeuer subsist vnder the moone , doe spring at first and then grow , and waxing old at last they faile : it seemed a thing vnto him worthy of admiration , that the venetian state alone did notwithstanding her yeares become more youthfull and fresh euery day than other , and that those lawes , orders , and decrees , which in other principalities after long forbearing of their execution , were at length vtterly forgotten , did only in venice so flourish with seueritie , with greater obseruance , and exacter diligence , working that efficacie and benefit , that in this common-wealth no such reformation , nor innouation euer hapned , as heretofore wee read haue chanced with infinite tumults and hurliburlies in the ancient romane state , and now of late in the florentine common-wealth ; it being a peculiar vertue vnto the venetian senate , perpetually to preserue their flourishing liberty , with a seuere execution of their ancient lawes ; whereby none of those defaults euer hapned in this state , which other potentates and free states could no way shun for all their exquisite care and diligence , but that they fell into such carelesse negligence , that they lost both their liberty and liues . therefore not without good cause he dared to affirme , as a thing most certaine , that the venetian common-wealth for their prudent care in the rigorous execution of their ancient lawes ought to continue and prosper eternally , as long as the world lasteth . next spake angelus politianus , that he did truly admire both what petrus crintus had recounted , and a thousand other orders in that most prudent common-wealth . but the rarest thing which he obserued , was how an aristocracie , the true foundation whereof , as the most vnderstanding writers haue deliuered , was the equalitie of fortunes among the nobilitie , could haue beene able to maintaine it selfe in such peace and greatnesse , consisting in that disproportioned inequality of wealth , wherewith the venetian nobilitie is endowed , wherein although there were two such dangerous extremes found , as immoderate riches with some of them , and much pouertie with others of the same ranke in venice , notwithstanding there appeared not that defect , which in humane probability and according to the common course of the world , the best lawes could not prohibite , that the richer sort did not trample the pooror vnder their feet , who though they greatly enuied the condition and state of the wealthy , yet notwithstanding either by reason of their affectionate charity , which reigned in the venetian nobilitie towards the publike good , or else because those infinite riches , which some of them so possessed , were not abused towards their inferiours ; both poore and rich liued modestly , peaceably , and contented in this most fortunate countrey . after him followed iulius caesar scaliger , and said , that the greatest wonder in the venetian state , which amazed the world , was that the nobilitie themselues which bare sway , did not onely most patiently pay the vsuall ancient subsidies and tallages belonging to the exchequer , but with incredible alacritie of minde and speedy performance , they assessed on themselues other new impositions of money , which with great diligence and rigour were afterwards exacted and called for at the publike receiuers hands . yea and oftentimes in important affaires concerning the common-wealth , before they burthened the common people with any new customes and taxations , they haue yeelded supplies out of their owne purses , and that so liberally and cheerfully , that this one act of theirs deserued place before all other wonders and remarkable orders in this state , as such a one , which euery man must acknowledge to be an act of that excellent quality , which renders the venetian common-wealth for euer glorious ; for hauing such a nobilitie so dearely inamoured of their free-state , that they more readily preferred the publike interest before their owne priuate particular . then succeeded bernardo tasso , and said , that he had for a long time soiourned in venice , where he maruelled at nothing more than to see the nobilitie , who glutted their mindes with continuall pleasures , delights , and idlenesse , gouerning the affaires of the republike with such admired vertue , that they seemed vnto others to be men of an exemplarie and regular life , and also rulers borne to perpetuall cares and burthens . after the opinion of tasso , francis berni , according to his manner , with a pleasing grace , which gaue good content to the most excellent venetian lady , said , that the most rare and wonderfull thing , which great wits ought to admire in this state , that notwithstanding the marshes and chanels did abound with crabs and creuices in all places about the citie , the venetian senators tooke so few of them , that of all other nations they were reputed , and that iustly , to be the salt of the earth . next vnto him , said sabellicus , that while he wrote the venetian historie , hauing most diligently obserued the notablest lawes and customes of this renowned state , hee wondred at nothing more , than at the publike treasure , which carefull senators managed with so great fidelitie , that among the nobilitie it was held not only a capitall excesse , but exceeding great infamy to defile their hands with one penny of their patron s. marks treasurie . after him spake sannazzarius , that the strangest thing vnto him was , that seeing there were many among the noblemen of venice poore and ill prouided of the goods of fortune , yet neuerthelesse they endured with vnspeakable patience all their miseries and crosse fortunes , without hauing the least thought of affecting any of the publike goods to be gotten either by ingrossing of corne , or by some vnequall diuision of lands , matters which mightily perplexed the state of rome . and that it seemed vnto him a thing worthy of commendation to see a poore nobleman in venice so striue and force himselfe only by the helpe of vertue to comfort himselfe in his miseries , hoping in time to deserue some honourable and profitable place of imployment in his country , whereby at last it chanceth , that the vertue , valour , and bountie of the minde doe serue an impouerished nobleman of this state in stead of a wealthy patrimony . iouianus pontanus said , that they which passed were great maruels , but in his opinion this surpassed all things in the venetian state , that the huge estates and infinite wealth of some noble persons wrought not those pernitious effects to puffe them vp with vaine-glory and pride , as haue beene noted in many other common-wealthes . and that it was a most laudable custome to see these rich senatours possessing princely treasures liue very priuately at home , and to shew themselues abroad little differing from ordinary people . whereby all men may conceiue , that the venetians onely doe know the true way and meane to distinguish and seuer from great riches those inconueniences of ambition , pride , and popularity , which the famous romane state neuer knew , or could not hinder in pompey , caesar , and many other powerfull senatours . assoone as pontanus had ended his discourse , hannibal caro said , that aboue all other wonders he thought it a matter worthy of greatest admiration , to obserue the quality of the duke of venice , followed with obedience and reuerence , with regall authoritie , with a great command : and for all that to see his royalty and princely sway moderated with a set rule , and the power of his will ioyned with modestie were tempers vnknowne to the prudent lawgiuers of ancient times , and a kind of wisedome luckily practised among the venetians . bartholomew caualcanti , after him told his opinion , that as pontanus had intimated , it was strange indeed , that their senatours wealth and great estates did not cause some of them to be puft with ambition : but it was a more strange thing to see that such were the orders of this famous state , such the sacred lawes of this euerlasting common-wealth , that the high places and supreme gouernments , which some of their senators inioyed as presidents in remoter countries subiect vnto their dominion , did not sometime or other pricke them with ambition to rebell and vsurpe . and at that time when he lay there at venice , he wondred not at the great treasure of saint marke , nor at the arcenall , nor at the grand canal , with the proud palaces of the cornaria , the grimani , the foscari , and other magnificent edifices built with such royall expences in this renowned city being miraculous things in the sight of ordinary persons . but farre more miraculous in his conceit was , that he saw the noble signior sebastian venieri , a little after he had returned to venice from that memorable victory at sea , which hee had gotten being generall against the turkes , liue retired at his priuate house , and when hee walked abroad to the market place , hee differed in nothing from these senators , who had stayed behind at venice , but went very plaine and simple in apparell . and surely it is a most singular custome , which they haue , that their nobilitie can vse that ciuility and modestie in their owne citie , and being employed abroad in matters of import and of high command , that they can sodainly transforme themselues into most costly garments , with such magnificence , and princely liberality , to let the world know them for no citizens of an ordinary state , but for men borne for great enterprizes and for bra●e commanders , as if they were subiects descended from royall bloud ; and also to make themselues famous vnto all other nations by thus accommodating their affections and spirits to the nature of the place , and framing themselues as well to modesty , ciuilitie , and thrift at home , as to pompuous authority abroad . a thing so true , that whereas other states for the reputation and countenance of publike magistrates are wont to recommend to their gouernours , that they maintaine the maiestie of their soueraigne places , with magnificence and stately comportments both of courage and gorgeous apparell . the venetian state on the contrary haue enacted statutes to forbid any of their citizens , which supply offices or charge vnder them in any of their territories to grace their presence with glorious shewes , or to weare any costly suits of apparell . so great a care haue those politicke senators of their cities thrift and prosperitie . this spake caualcanti , whē flauio biondo said , that whē he was at venice , he became much astonisht to find in a pure aristocracie , that the citizens and common people liued with such cōtentment in this fortunate coūtry , that in many years of his abode there , he could neuer learne , whether the publike state were better beloued and respected of the nobility which cōmanded them , or of the cōmon people which obeyed . next to him spake paulus iouius , that not onely vnto himselfe , but also vnto many great princes , with whom hee oftentimes had conference , touching the wonders of venice , it seemed a thing of great momēt that the senate of this most famous republicke , did altogether bend their endeauours vnto peace , and to no other end at all , withall their vigilancy and care , not studying to make perpetuall preparations for the warres , as others did , whereupon they all concluded , that in this flourishing state alone , a man might find the lady peace armed withall exquisite appurtenances . after ●ovius ensued iohn boccace , who said , that the true salt , which preserued the venetian state from the purrefaction and corruption of abuses , was the soueraigne queene of all lawes , that most excellent order , so inuiolably obserued of her , that for the aduancing of a senatour to a higher place , not the glory of his riches , not the merits of his father , or ancestors , nor the multitude of his tenants or friends , nor the fauour of great persons , but his owne worth and naked vertue were had in most consideration . from whence it comes to passe , that in venice the vitious and ignorant nobles were onely accounted a number , as ciphers in arithm●●ke , while the vertuous alone , and the best deseruing subiect , bare the chiefe sway , detur digniori , with that prudent care and circumspection , as is knowne vnto all the world . but leonardus aretinus after he had extolled the opinion of boccace , added , that the excellēt vsage of the venetian state , in not granting to their nobilitie , the charge and offices at the first iumpe , but by degrees , was the true solid foundation , wheron their greatnesse consisted most firmely built , & withall the eternitie of their libertie . for this is one of their most admired precepts , that euery nobleman whatsoeuer , before he mount vp into the highest dignity , must from his youth vpwards be forced , like an enfranchised townesman , to beginne from the lowest offices , and not leaping wise and sodainly . a most safe custome , as that , which iustly distributed this important effect of vpholding the true and substantiall equality among the nobilitie of an aristocracie , which giues long life to a free state , because according to the certaine and vnderstanding policie of true gouernment , the equality of goods made not senatours equall in a common-wealth , but that all the nobles should be first compelled to walke faire and softly to the most eminent places of command from the inferiour steps , which i haue formerly shewed . the which if the roman empire had practised , it had not shortned the life of their libertie , nor wrought those dangerous and fatall infirmities of tyrannies and tumults . their grosse abuses in affording the consular authority and the charge of armies vnto pompey , the caesars , and to other wealthy and powerfull citizens in their greene and vnsetled youth , was no other then as if they had chosen some of the bloud-royall in a monarchy , as lords and patrons of their liberty , rather then senatours of a well ordered common-wealth . by which vnwitting errour all men may note , that the freedome of rome got her mortall wound and vtter desolation . albeit that the most excellent lady of the state of venice gaue apparant signes , that she seemed well contented with the opinion of aretine , shee commanded notwithstanding th●● her vertuous statesmen , who aduanced themselues forwards , to proceed with their opinions . and then benedict varchi thus began : my florentine state , which neuer knew the way of good fortune to bring in among her noble families , that peace , vnion , and mutuall loue , which makes the liberty of a common-wealth euerlastingly durable , in the end fell into the infirmitie of serui●ude , puts me now in a great amazement , and i thinke it may surpasse all other maruells in this state , when i consider with deliberation , that a nobleman of venice , although most grieuously offended for the life of his sonnes , and for his owne proper person , enforced more with a feruent charity towards the freedome of his countrey , then terrified with the seuerity of magistrates , had learned that difficult lesson of resolution , to forgiue at the instant the wrong which he had receiued at his aduersaries hands , and that with a free heart . a resolution worthy of remembrance , and by so much the more wonderfull by how much it is cleerely obserued , that a nobleman of venice referres the reuenge of all receiued iniuries into the senates hand with all willingnesse of mind , the which sensuall and brutish men , yea & many of the wiser sort without the length time and much strugling of nature cannot yeeld vnto god , to whom vengeance belongeth , and from whom wee must all acknowledge our liues , liuing , and liberty to proceed . this varchi spake , when lodouico dulce began the deliuery of his opinion , that if that were true , which all confessed , that the rarest and most prized greatnesse that might be considered in a prince , was to disarme with facilitie and without danger one of his war-like generals , and to receiue of him exact and conformable obedience , for all that that this generall did aforehand know , and long before his returne , how his prince grew in suspition of his loyalty , or in dislike of his seruice : then this custome vsual in the state of venice , deserued more to be wondred at then any other , to be able to disarme with great ease , their generals and admirals at sea. yea , and at such time when they vnderstood how the senate was earnestly bent to punish them at their returne , notwithstanding that they found themselues very strong , beloued of their souldiers , and powerfull enough to offend the state , or to defend themselues from shame , it alwayes fell out , that assoone as euer they were sent for , they readily and presently obeyed , voluntarily they resigned ouer their charge , and publike command , and withall speed hastned to venice , to be sentenced by their friends and citizens , though with capitall punishment , which they willingly endured , rather then to hazard the losse of their countrey by vnnaturall innouations , and ciuill warres . so deare vnto them is the care of the common safetie . the most excellent venetian lady , who without answering any thing to the vertuous aboue-named had attentiuely heard all these commendable orders and admirable prerogatiues said to dulce , that the matter which he related , was indeed of great consequence , yet not so rare , but that the ottoman emperours likewise participated of the like benefit . howbeit neuerthelesse , there was one singular prerogatiue , which she most exactly possessed , and wherein she excelled all other principalities , as well of the ancient , as present times , whereto she acknowledged and ascribed all her greatnesse , the which as yet she did not heare any of them as much as touch . then spake hieronymus mercurialis , that while he read the physicke lecture at the vniuersitie of padua , hee knew some of the plebeian and common sort at venice , that went in their gundoloes to disport themselues vpon the water with some young courtezans , according to their common custome , and there being mightily misused by certaine young noble-men , whom they casually met , it chanced that these plebeians slew one of them in the affray . for which offence vpon complaint made by the parties friends , the plebeians were sent for by the iudges , who although they knew the power of the law to be in the hands of the nobilitie , whom they had offended , neuer fled , but trusting in the vprightnesse and integrity of the senate and magistrates , they doubted not to appeare before them , and to yeeld themselues prisoners . neither did their hopes faile them , for vpon consideration of the cause giuen in euidence for their defence , how they were prouoked first by those young noble-men , they were enlarged and pronounced innocent to the honour of the venetians vncorrupted iustice : so that neither powerfull parentage , greatnesse of friends , nor abundance of wealth can blinde and diuert the iudges of venice to wrong any man. last of all , these vertuous states-men spake the most learned hermolaus barbarus , that in a free state tyranny begins then to vsurpe and worke , when the most weightie secrets concerning the generall good of the common-wealth , are communicated to a few senators . and for this cause the most soueraigne lady of venice , to auoid shipwreake on that dangerous rockie shelfe , imparted her secrets , and deliberated the designes and pragmatickes of greatest import , wherein her state was interessed in her highest court of magistracy or parliament of the pregadi , a number cōsisting of two hundred and fiftie senators and vpwards ; and to him it appeared to be a miraculous thing , how the venetian state could finde among so great a number of senators that secrecie , which many great potentates for all their exquisite diligence and large entertainment of gifts and rewards , had bootlesse sought in one only secrtarie , or in a couple of counsellors of state. at these words , the most excellent venetian lady laid her hand on the shoulders of barbarus , and pronounced this verdict : now thou hast hit the naile on the head , and named that most pretious iewell , wherein i most glory , and prize my selfe aboue all other states , and for which indeed i ought to be iustly emulated and enuied at , seeing that nothing else appertaines for the true gouernment and managing of state-businesse , more necessary than secracie . chap. 11. the doctors of the chaire hauing admitted into their vniuersitie some famous poeticall ladies , apollo commands them to be dismissed home to their families . the famous doctors of the chaire , about a few moneths past , admitted the most vertuous ladies victoria colonna , laura terracina , and other learned poeticall ladies of parnassus into their academicall corporation , where they vsed times to resort to their publike exercises . but it chanced so that many schollers enamoured with the beautie of these ladies , did not only flocke oftner than they were accustomed , into the schooles , whensoeuer they vnderstood that these ladies repaired thither , but also consumed their pretious time and wits in composing of amorous sonnets , which they dedicated vnto these ladies , as if they were goddesses , with such rare conceits and lofty tunes , as eclipsed the glory of the muses themselues . at length the sauour of these sonnets , though fragrant and sweet in the schollers apprehensions , offended apolloes diuine nostrills worse than the stinke of a blackamore . for which cause before the end of these ladies probationship and their matriculation , his maiestie charged the cathedrall doctors to dismisse them out of the vniuersitie . his reason was because he well saw out of his diuine knowledge , that the true poetry of women were the needle , the distaffe , and the wheele , and that the schoole exercises of ladies among vniuersitie men might well be likened vnto the dalliance and playing of dogs , which after some fained snarling , catching , and gamesome tossing one another , doe conclude their sport in riding and mounting vpon their play-fellowes backs . chap. 12. the lady victoria colonna intreats of apollo , that the infamie which women incurred for cuckolding their husbands , might likewise extend to adulterous husbands . apolloes answer . the most excellent lady victoria colonna a princesse of exemplarie chastitie , about three daies past appeared in his maiesties court of audience , and in the name of all womankind said , that they all loued the excellencie of chastitie , which was naturally giuen them for a most particular vertue , that they did not awhit enuy courage , a vertue attributed to mans sexe , because they well knew , that a lady without the soule of chastitie , which renders her odoriferous to the world , was but a stinking carcasse : yet notwithstanding it seemed vnto them , that they had much cause to grieue and lament at the great inequalitie , which they saw betwixt the husband and the wife in the particular punishment of adultery ; so that women could not rest contented to see men in such wise free , that the punishment of shame , which alone was wont to terrifie honourable persons , did now lesse serue to restraine them from committing against their wiues these beastly and libidinous defaults . in which dissolute courses they said , that they proceeded so far , that many husbands were not onely not ashamed to keepe openly concubines in their houses , but had oftentimes presumed to make them partakers of the sacred bed of matrimonie . these abuses came to passe , by reason that the lawes had not prouided the like punishment against the offending husbands , as were thundred out and practised against adulterous wiues . and that in this case , the lawes shewed too much fauour vnto maried men , in allowing them to reuenge the iniurie with their owne hands at the time when they hapned to take their wiues in the adulterous act . by which notorious aggrieuances the sexe of women being so much wronged , were now forced to repaire vnto the cleare fountaine of true iustice , to the end that by publishing equall punishment in the equalitie of the self-same fault , there might be some competent remedy ministred for their oppressions . and that if this did not stand with apolloes good will and pleasure , there might be at leastwise the like liberty granted vnto them in this particular of adultery to keepe amorous seruants , or to marry againe , as many men aduentured to doe . after which liberty granted them , they would not perhaps make vse thereof , but only in terrorem tantùm , vnder colour of law to be enabled to bridle their loose and lustfull husbands . vnto this demand of the lady victoria , apollo answered , that the law of fidelitie betwixt the husband and the wife ought to be indeed equall , and that the defect and breach thereof ought to be punished no lesse in the one , than in the other : but that in the wife a more exquisite and perfect chastitie was required for the great and weighty respect to know the certainty of their children , to which end nature had assigned them the noble vertue of chastitie , the which was so necessarie for procreation of humane kinde , that without it the children should both lose their inheritance and their fathers affection . a thing so true , that nature herselfe hath most prouidently allotted chaste wiues to all liuing creatures of the earth , where the male concurres for the industrious hatching of the egge , or for the nourishing of their young ones ; all to the end that the carke of the fathers being imployed for their children welfare should proue somewhat pleasing , and that their charge should redound to comfort , and to great gaine in time to come . at these words the lady victoriaes beautifull cheeks were stained with an honourable blush , who with a roman ingenuitie confessed vnto his maiestie the simplicitie of her demand , and said , that indeed it were a great shame and dishonour to the sexe of women , if in the pretious gift of chastitie they suffred themselues to be ouercome of those vnreasonable liuing creatures , who although they pursue no other thing than pleasure , yet neuerthelesse doe they very religiously obserue chastitie , because they would not anger the fathers of their young ones by their wandring and inordinate lust . and for the important reason , that husbands desired to haue their wiues chaste , the lawes against adulterous women were too fauourable , because the wound which the vnchaste husband giues his wife did only pierce the skin , whereas the wife by her lasciuious deeds doth stab and kill her husband with the poniard of euerlasting infamy , and also doth disparage her children . chap. 13. a poetaster for playing at cards and deuising the game called triumph or trump , is brought before apollo , who after he had deeply entred into the mysticall meaning of the said game , not only dismisseth him , but granteth him an yearely pension to instruct his courtiers in that new art. to the end , that the ignorant with the filthinesse of their most beastly minds should not profane the vertuous places at parnassus , apollo many yeares since caused two companies of skeltenicall poets , dogrel rimers , men that made verses at random , and very aduentrous at ruffianly conceits to come out of sicily , whose office was to scoure the countrey and to cleare the coast , of vagabonds . these , about eight daies past , tooke prisoner a poetaster , that had beene capitally banished from parnassus , who although he was forbidden the vse of all books , and the exercise of his pen , notwithstanding as it were in despite of apollo , and in contempt of the sacred muses , he defiled paper with his dissolute rimes , and at last proceeded so far in his audacious arrogancie , that he assumed vnto himselfe the soueraigne name of a poet. this exorbitant fault of his became aggrauated with a paire of cardes , which those catchpoles in searching him had found in his pocket , for which being likewise a notorious vice and worthy of death they brought him incontinently with the said cardes before apollo , who when he saw them was wonderfully amazed at the brutish inuention , which the vicious had found out to cast away their pretious time , to consume their reputation , and to spend their meanes . but much more was his maiestie astonished , when he vnderstood , that men now a dayes were growne to such a height of folly , that they vsed to call that thing a play or game , whereat they dealt so cruelly in good earnest . and further that they esteemed it a delight , sport , and pastime to put in suspence and to doubtfull compromise that money , which was gotten with so much toyle and cares , and serued so necessary for such great vses , that without it , this present world would take aristotle to bee an ignorant foole , and alexander the great a base plebeian . then apollo askt the prisoner , what game at cards was most familiar vnto him , and because he answered , that it was trumps or triumph , his maiestie willed him to play it . the prisoner obeyed , and plaide ; which when apollo had obserued & penetrated into the magiste●iall lessons and secrets of the game , he cried out , that this game of trumpe was the true philosophy of courtiers , the most necessarie science , which all men ought to learne , that would not be thought innocents or simple-witted . and shewing how much the affront done vnto the prisoner did displease him , he inlarged him presently , and honoured him with the title of a vertuous man. and the next morning commanded his officers to erect vp a publike schoole , where with a stipend of fiue hundred crownes a yeare , that notable person for the common good should reade as a lecture that excellent game of trumpe , and vpon a grieuous penalty to be imposed , hee charged the platonicks , peripateticks , the stoicks , and other philosophers , specially the morall ; and to all other the vertuous crew residing at parnassus , that they should learne this most necessarie science , the which because they should not forget , he bound them to practise themselues therein one houre at least euery day . although it seemed strange to the learned , how it could be possible , that out of a most vile game deuised by the off-scum raskals of men there might be drawne any profitable document for honest men : yet notwithstanding , they all knowing that his maiestie neuer commanded any thing , which did not afterward redound to their good and to a speciall purpose , they obeyed so willingly that this schoole was in as great request , and frequented no lesse than an vniuersitie . but when the learned had discouered the magisteriall secrets , the hidden mysteries , and admirable cunning tricks of this triumphant game of trumps , they extolled apolloes profound iudgment to the eighth heauen , all of them with one voice celebrating and magnifying it in all places , that it was not philosophie , poetry ; nor yet the mathematicks , nor astrologie , nor any other famous knowledge , but it was the most rare game of trumps , which taught men , chiefly great men and courtiers , that secret of most import , how euery seuerall trumpe tooke vp and got , as aprey , euen the goodliest of all the cards . chap. 14. it being noted , that petus thraseas in the company of his sonne in law eluidius priscus did vse commonly to frequent the house of the lady victoria colonna , he is grieuously rebuked by apollo . it was obserued by those vertuous censers , whose office and delight consisted in looking to other mens deeds , that petus thraseas , in the company of eluidius priscus his sonne in law extraordinarily haunted the house of the lady victoria colonna , and also of other learned dames of this court. and though the said thraseas were reputed for a man of singular good parts , that one would hardly suspect any obscene or lewd action in so great a senatour , his vsuall and daily visites together with his continuall abodes in these ladies houses , occasioned so great a scandall , yea , among the vertuous themselues , that the smell thereof ascended euen to his maiesties nostrels ; who to extinguish the flames of these slanderous murmures , about two dayes since sent for thraseas , and expresly commanded him to reueale what businesse he had in resorting so often to these ladies houses . thraseas answered , that he frequented them , onely to exercise charity among these ladies , by reading euery day vnto them a chapter of boetius his booke of the consolation of philosophy . vpon this answer apollo was so grieuously mooued against thraseas , that in great anger he said : if with your talent and zealous office by giuing office by giuing comfort & consolations to the afflicted , you hope to merit grace at gods hand , and to obtaine good will among men , goe your wayes to comfort those poore wretches , who die of meere necessitie and pure want in the hospitalls , or those vnfortunate people , who are condemned to the gallowes or spanish gallies . but to sit all day long closely among ladies , as sardanapalus vsed to doe , thinking to make men beleeue , that you exercise spirituall doings , they are such hypocrisies , as will moue the veriest idiot to laugh at you , and will make them to burst with rage , that know , how these which goe often to the mill become whited with meale . and a man of your wisdome ought to vnderstand , that at such time as a woman conceiues of two infants , which we call twinnes , if both be male , they are enclosed within one membrane , the which likewise comes to passe , if both bee female . but if it happens , that one bee male , and the other female , most prouident nature preserues the female in a perticular membrane , seuered from the male . seeing that nature thought good not to thrust a little brother and a little sister of that tender age to dwell together in one place , she teacheth all men , and especially men of your fashion to liue more warily and securely ; and in these doings , o thraseas , whosoeuer trusteth his owne power , i hold him to be more rash than wise . and for that these disorders , in regard of our reputation and yours , had need to be corrected , i doe straitly command you , that from henceforth you leaue off such dangerous practises . the world is not so sottishly simple , as you more simply conceiue it , but that they doe well vnderstand , how the visites which men of your qualitie vse vnto ladies , doe begin to smell after the second time , and specially in their noses , that know , how faire and beautifull things seeme pleasing to all men , and that the prouocation of the flesh is a naturall vice in all men , the which they cannot cure and keepe backe with a more excellent remedy , than to stand a farre off from such faire and goodly obiects : there 's no safer way to defend a man from error , than to shunne the occasions . and all your philosophy cannot produce such proofes , as will make any man of iudgement beleeue , that a dainty bit of flesh doth not agree with euery mans mouth , that is made of flesh . lastly , i must put you in minde , that a man of your credit and condition , who makes profession aboue all things not to defile the white robe of your reputation with the sports of lasciuious oile , ought not at all to busie himselfe about lampes ; it being not onely great folly , but most insolent rashnesse , worthy of the whip and strapado , to think he can make gun-powder in a forge , where a smith workes nailes , and afterwards to perswade men , that he might goe to the field without danger . chap. 15. a learned gentleman of rome begs a remedie of apollo , to make him to forget certaine grieuous wrongs , which he had receiued in the court of a great prince : for which cause his maiestie causeth him to drinke a cup-full of the water of lethe , but with vnfortunate successe . a learned gentleman of rome , which some few dayes since arriued at parnassus , was yesterday admitted to his maiesties royall audience , vnto whom he shewed , that for many iniuries , which hee had receiued of diuers ill willers of his in the court of a certaine prince , where the lawyers persecuted him , and made him pay aboue three score seuerall fees by their cunning trickes of law , he hath sithence liued very much troubled in minde , and so much the more , for that he could not worke his reuenge vpon them without incurring farre greater troubles , then his enemies had plunged him in . and on the other side , he found that he was not endowed with that generous resolution of forgetting and forgiuing them . for which cause , and now to be freed from this hellish torment , wherein he perpetually liued , he repaired to his maiestie , whom most humbly he intreated to bestow vpon him some present remedie to heale his mind , which was galled with the passions of hatred and reuenge . apollo did much pitie this gentlemans case , and commanded that one should giue him a large cup-full of the water of lethe , prepared in such manner , that it might cause him to forget odious things , and not to take away the remembrance of benefits receiued . the gentleman with great greedinesse drunke vp the water , the which to all mens wonder was found to haue only the vertue to blot and cancell out of his minde those iniuries , which he had receiued of his inferiours in condition ; and that the iniuries which were done vnto him , by greater persons than himselfe , had inflamed and exasperated his minde rather with an euerlasting memory of them , than any way caused him to forget them . whereat many began to murmur , that the famous water of lethe had lost that pretious vertue , which the poets had blazed of it . but his maiestie gaue them to vnderstand , that the water of lethe had euermore the same vertue , which it had in the beginning . and in that it did not worke the expected effect in that gentleman ; the reason was , because persons nobly descended , and of great spirits , had euer this custome proper vnto their natures , to write in the sand these iniuries , which they receiued of base people ; but in solid marble with eternall characters those aboue-handed blowes , which were giuen them by their equalls , or superiours ; it being the propertie of a noble mind to remit wrongs by magnanimitie , but not to pardon them of necessitie . chap. 16. apuleius his golden asse , and plautus his asse doe complaine vnto apollo of the great seueritie which their masters vsed in beating them . but they are sent away with no pleasing answer . about the eight of the current apuleius his famous asse accompanied with plautus his asse , appeare before apolloes maiestie , who in the name of all the sort of mules , asses , and pack-horses , said , that if any kinde of beasts subiect to mankind , which were of small expence and of much profit , had deserued better vsage than others ; they had most reason aboue all other beasts , to grieue at their masters rough and rigorous dealings . and although they bare the whole burthen of their lords houses , and maintained them both day and night by their perpetuall labours , and were content to feed ordinarily on sedge , straw , and water , and to keepe their shrouetide with branne , and such poore prouender ; all this notwithstanding they were ingratefully , cruelly , and with great indiscretion entreated by their masters , and being the most vnhappie of all creatures , they were now become the miserable spectacle of all drudgery . for as much as they could not by their prostrate and humble seruices mollifie the passionate minds of their lords , they petitioned his maiestie in most lowly manner to commiserate their asinine miseries , if not to conclude and end them , yet at least to order the matter so , that by his maiesties command their patrons would thenceforth vse them , though not gratefull respects for their great seruices , yet with moderation of passion , and with more hmanitie . vnto these apollo answered , that the seuerity , which masters vsed towards their pack-horses , whereof they so bitterly complained , proceeded not out of their masters naturall crueltie , since that it is plaine , that no man yet hated the vtilitie and benefit of his heritage , but rather from their monstrous sloth , and stupendious stupiditie of the pack-horses , through which most brutish defaults , their masters were enforced furiously with whips and goads to pricke them on to doe that labour , which otherwise for want of quickness they had not spirit enough of themselues to performe . and whosoeuer would exactly iudge and determine of any mans cruell and rigorous dealings , he had need not only to haue regard vnto the genius and nature of him that exerciseth and vseth this correction , as to the qualitie and manners of him , that complaines he is hardly dealt with . chap. 17. a generall reformation of the world by the seuen wise men of greece , and by other learned men , is published by expresse order from apollo . ivstinian the emperor , that great composer of the codes and pandects , some few dayes since brought a new law vnto apollo , to haue the same approoued of his maiestie , whereby it was straightly forbidden , that any man should waxe so cruell against his owne person , as to be the authour of his owne death . apollo seeing this law , had it in so great horrour , that with a sigh , which proceeded from the bottome of his heart , he brake forth into these speeches : is the good gouernment of mankinde precipated into such disorder , o iustinian , that they will now a dayes voluntarily attempt their owne deathes , because they will not liue any longer , as they ought ? and wheras i haue hitherto hired a great number of the wisest morall philosophers , to the end that with their tognes and writings they should minister vnder mee graue and ciuill conceits vnto others , which might make death seemed lesse terrible , are things now reduced to that great calamity , that men wil no longer liue , not yet learn to accommodate thēselues to die well ? and do i carelesly sleep , while these disorders abound among my learned fraternitie ? to these words of apollo , iustinian answered , that this law was very necessary , and that many notorious effects hauing happened by these desperate courses , more inconueniences would yet ensue , if his maiestie did not in time prouide some conuenient remedy to salue the wilfull disorders of these franticke fellowes . whereupon apollo tooke diligent information of that manner of life , which the world lead , and found that it became extraordinarily depraued with euill customes , the which to reforme hee resolued to create a congregation of some notable personages , the most prudent and ingenuous polititians of his empire . but in the very beginning of this serious talke he met with inuincible difficulties , for being come to the point , to appoint a number of subiects among his morall philosophers , and those innumerable vertuous spirits which attended his court , he could not light on any to his absolute liking , sufficiently enabled for so great a businesse , by reason that his maiestie knew , that the sanctitie of life , and the good example of the reformer wrought a greater force and power in them , which were to be reformed , then the best rules , which the wisest state could enact and publish . in this penurious exigent , apollo referred the charge of the worlds vniuersall reformation to the seuen wise men of greece , men that are held and reputed to be in the chiefest credit at parnassus , was those which in all mens conceit haue learnt the receit and way to make straight the dogs leg , which with so much paines ( yet alwayes in vaine ) antiquity hunted after . the rumour of these newes being come to the grecians eares , it reioyced them exceedingly for the honour , which his maiestie vouchsafed vnto their nation ; as on the other side , it much troubled the latines , it seeming vnto them , that they herein had singular great wrong offered vnto them to be excluded . apollo perceiuing , that this emulation might much hinder the generall reformation , to take away all impediments , and to yeeld some satisfaction to the discontented romans , to those grecian sages he adioyned marcus cato and annaus seneca , and in fauour of the italian philosophers , hee constituted iacobus mazzon secretary of the congregation , whom he graced with a consultiue voyce . vpon the ninteenth day of the aforesaid moneth , all these famous sages and new reformers brauely accompanied with a great troupe of the noblest vertuous of this state went into the delphick palace , the place appointed for this businesse of reformation , and to the learned it was a pleasing sight to behold the great number of pedantes , which with table-books in their hands went quoting and laying downe the sentences and apothegmes , which these continually let slip out of their harmonious mouths . as soone as these learned and wise lords were reunited to declare their remedies , the fame is , that thales the milesian , the first of the seuen sages , began in this manner : most prudent philosophers ; the businesse for which we are now here assembled together , is the greatest , which the wit of man can treat of ; and although no other enterprise may be found so hard , as to heale an inueterate neapolitane bone-ache , an infistulated gangrene , an incurable canker , yet notwithstanding , the insuperable difficulties , which weare out other mens braines , ought to animate men of our ranke to ouercome them , seeing that the supposed impossibilitie of the cure will augment our glory , and will maintaine vs still in that sublime and high degree of reputation , wherein we are eleuated ; and now i firmly assure my selfe , that i haue found out the true antidote for the easie expulse of these venemous and banefull corruptions . i am confident , that there is not any of vs , but assures himselfe , that no other disease hath infected the healthfull life of this present age , than the hidden hatred , dissimulation , equiuocation , and treachery of men couered ouer with the faire mantle of religion , of loue , simplicitie , and charity ; the which , my good lords , being corrected with cauteries , razours , and with corrosiue plaisters fit for this cancred wound , such as i shall now discouer , all men liuing , which at this time are by these vices brought euen to deaths doore , all other physitians hauing left them without hope of recouery , shall suddenly become restored to their former health , and shall resume that sinceritie , that verity of speech , and that holinesse of life , which in ancient times hath beene esteemed true-hearted candour , genuine simplicitie , and plaine dealing . the true remedie then is of necessitie to reduce men into an ingenuous kinde of liuing , and to embrace that simplicitie of the heart , which they can neuer doe , before princes haue with their high authoritie chased out of their kingdomes irreligious hypocrites of a different religion , as wolfes of state , and also to cut off wrangling suits at law ; nor these can they euer bring to passe without diminishing the number of lawyers , and needlesse courts of iustice , which hearten euen sheepe to turne vpon their keepers . these , these abuses , most vertuous lords , being so restrained , then lies , falshoods , double dealing , and hypocrisies , will depart , as the chiefe nourishment of the infernall spirit out of the possessed soules homeward to their master the deuill . in such wise did this opinion of thales worke within the rest of the sages hearts , that he was ready to goe away with all their suffrages and voices , when mazzon the secretary commanded him to rehearse the same vnto apollo , who approued so well of thales his remedy , that he commanded out of hand a chirurgion to make a little window in the heart of man. but in the same houre , when the chirurgion had prepared his instruments to open the breast of man for that purpose , homer , virgil , plato , aristotle , auerroes , and some other learned men repaired to apollo , and signified vnto his maiestie , that the chiefest instrument , which with great facilitie gouerned the world , was the reputation of those which commanded it , and that a iewel of that worth ought neuer to be exposed vnto any perill by wise princes . they laid before his maiesties consideration the credit of a holy life , the opinion of the bounty of customes , wherein the excellent philosophicall senate , and the honourable colledge of the vertuous were had in great reuerence among all the learned subiects of apolloes empire . and if his maiestie would suddenly cause all mens hearts to be opened , the greatest and best sort of his vertuous followers could not but suffer infinite shame & infamie , whonow were in chiefe credit about his sacred person , when they should see euen boyes to take notice of their foolishnesse , as who is wise at all seasons ? yea and his maiestie himselfe would grow into hatred with his most principall fauourites , when hee saw they were not such notable persons of an vnspotted life as he reputed them to be . and by these meanes he should lose the most part of his dependants , to the vtter depopulating of famous parnassus . and for this cause , before his maiestie would attempt this important enterprise , they humbly desired in the name of all the vertuous , to grant them some competent time to purifie their mindes , and to lay them a little a bucking . the aduise of these famous persons greatly pleased . apollo , and by a publike edict he prorogued the terme of making the window vntill eight daies were expired , in which time the vertuous in such manner toyled themselues in cleansing their minds of all hidden fallacies , of counterfeit friendship , of inbred rancour , and other stinking vices , that in the grocers , druggists , and apothecaries shops of parnassus , all the sweet conserues , cinnamon , cassia , syrops , lozenges , roses , violets , and other pretious wares were all spoiled with the taint , and the stench abounded so corrupt , that all the quarters of the platonick and peripatetick philosophers , smelt worse than if the filthiest i akes of the countrey were emptied ; whereas the street of the latin and italian poets , smelt only like the broth of reheated coleworts . now the time for the vniuersall bucking and purifying , that was limited , became almost ended , when the day before the opening of the window in mens hearts , the great hippocrates , galen , cornelius celsus , and other experimented physitians of this state went to apollo , and freely spake their minds in this manner : royall sir , if this worke goes forward , wee must needs deface this little world of mankinde , most noble for the miraculous workmanship , wherewith it is wrought with euident perill of an important musckle and a principall veine , and by that meanes kill and destroy the whole fabricke of mans microcosme , or at least make it for euer sickly and crazed . and so great an euill we might practise onely by the benefit of foure ignorant persons , seeing that not only the profoundest wits , but likewise men of meane iudgement onely with foure daies practise , which they may haue with any notable hypocrite whatsoeuer , they know how to penetrate into the most inward gutt . with apollo this speech of the physitians so preuailed , that he resumed his former deliberation , and by ausonius gallus made it knowne vnto the lords reformers , that they should continue their philosophicall opinions . then solon thus began : the cruell hatred and poysonfull enuie , which vniuersally breed among men , and domineere ouer them in these daies , are these , most prudent lords , which to my thinking haue so confounded the world in the case , as we see it . the correction then consisteth in insusing of charitie in mens hearts , and the sacred loue towards their neighbours , which is one of the precepts of god. we must now imploy the whole engine of our ablest wits to take away the occasions of hatred , which make them so sauage and implacable . i haue to the vttermost of my vnderstanding diued into the mysticall cause of this hatred , and i finde it to proceed of the inequalitie of worldly goods by that hellish vsage of mine and thine among our worldlings , the very rock of all scandals . and it is manifest , that mens mindes depraued by ambition , couetousnesse , and tyrannie , haue occasioned this inequality and disproportioned diuision . and seeing that is true , which all must confesse , that this world is no other than an inheritance left by one father and one mother vnto mankind , from whom as brothers we all descend ; what iustice is there , but that euery one of vs should not haue share and share like throughout all the wide world , the one as well as the other ? but now it falls out otherwise , that the good and vertuous haue the least part , and the wicked the greatest part : the honest man a begger , the dishonest by a preposterous order haue gotten their right , and will not communicate the same , no not to their owne flesh and bloud , and neerest kinne . now i haue discouered vnto you the wound , it is easie to apply the medicine . the best aduise which i can giue , is to come vnto a new diuision of the world , and to let euery man haue his share ; and by this meanes there will be enough for euery one of vs without troubling one another : though tyrants and lawyers may for a time grudge at this equalitie , yet true iustice requires it for the pacifying of this vnnaturall hurly-barly . and further to take away all disorders in time to come , let there bee a law enacted to forbid all chopping and changing , all buying and selling to the worlds end . a long time this opinion of solon was canuased , the which although it was esteemed necessary , but not altogether good , by bias , periander , and pittacus , was reproued notwithstanding by the rest of the philosophicall lords ; whiles that the iudgement of the wise seneca preuailed , who with most liuely reasons made all the lords of the congregation to vnderstand , that if now they should come to a new diuision of the world againe , there would ensue a very great disorder , that too great a part would fall into the share of gluttons , and too little among braue spirits , who hold sobriety , temperance , and reason , the chiefe meanes to distinguish them , which beare the image of god in their soules from bestiall satanicall creatures ; and that the plague , famine and warre were not , as many thought , the most rigorous scourges wherewith god in his anger afflicts mankind , but that the sorest and most grieuous whip , wherewith he may torment them , is to enrich villaines , and base minded misers , whose pelfe will at last worke the ruine of their dearest and better part being their soules . as soone as solons opinion was refelled , chilon produced his : which of you ( quoth he ) most wise philosophers , knowes not , that the insatiable thirst of gold and siluer hath not occasioned such mischiefes in the world , as wee all see and many of vs haue felt ? what impietie , what wickednesse , what vnnaturall act is there , which men will not commit , and that with all diligence , to rake together a masse of money and wealth ? conclude yee then all couragiously with me , that to root those vices out of the world wherewith this age is corrupted , there is no better way than to exterminate and vtterly to abolish the vse of those pestiferous mettals , gold and siluer , the true prouocations of all these miseries : irrimenta malorum . very goodly and specious in apparance seemed the sentence of chilon , but when it came to the scanning and triall , it proued not solid at the stroke of the hammer of liuely reasons . because it was answered , that men had brought the vse of gold and siluer , that it might stand for the measure and counterpoyse of all bargains & commerce betwixt party and party . and if gold and siluer were prohibited , they must of force imploy some other mettall or commoditie to supply their necessities , which likewise would replenish the world with the same greedinesse of minde as before : as in some part of the indies they vse shels as currant as wee doe money . and cleobulus in particular with a kinde of ironicall scoffe said ; my lords , we may as well banish out of the world iron , seeing that it is also a mettall , which hath wrought infinite confusion among men . gold and siluer for the vse destinated of god to be the balancing proportion of all things , whereas iron produced of nature to make ploughs , spades , harrowes , necessarie tooles for tillage and gardens , as for buildings , hath beene maliciously peruerted toswords , poniards , and other instruments of war to destroy mankind . with this opinion of cleobulus , albeit most true , it was neuerthelesse concluded by all the lords of the reformation , that it being a thing impossible to conuert iron from men without peruerting iron , it should be no prudence to multiply their miseries , and to heale the wound with more blowes . vnanimously it was resolued and concluded , that men should still retaine the mettals of gold and siluer , but to admonish the refiners to take care for the well purifying of them , & not to lift them off from the fire , vntill they were throughly assured that they had cleansed them from that clammie and fast clinging turpentine , which these kinde of mettals haue in them , which caused that their coines stucke exceeding fast to mens hands , yea sometimes to their hands , whom the world reputes for honest men . after this with extraordinary grauity pitiacus began thus : the world , most learned philosophers , is fallen into deplorable miseries , because this moderne generation of mankind haue relinquished the beaten way of vertue , and haue chose to walke through those crooked by-paths of vice , whereby they steale away those rewards due onely to the vertuous . things are now reduced , lords , to this passe , that no man enters into the house of dignities , of honors , & of rewards as in old time , through the gate of merit , true desert , and by vertuous paines , but by the windowes they clammer , like vnto filching theeues , which climbe to peare-trees with their back-sides turned to the true owners . yea , and we haue known some , with the force of fauours and violence of bribes haue not beene ashamed to enter through the tops of chimneyes , and by casting downe the tiles , haue through the very roofe come into the house of honour . to amend this corrupted course of behauiour , the best way in my iudgement is to decree vpon paine of death , that no man hereafter be so hardy , as to get into any well-deseruing place , whether it be of honor or gaine , but by the royall high-way of desert ; and to shut vp all other darke and damnable wayes , onely fit for scritchowles , and sauage beasts . this is a great disheartning of our learned rancke . wherehence many of our best vnderstanding spirits doe verily beleeue , that those hypocrites haue ioyned vnto their craft the spels of the magicke art , and thereby , like zoroastres , they bewitch , enchant , an taint the mindes of some princes , yea and those of the wiser sort . all the reforming lords admired this speech of pittacus , and were about to conclude with him , if periander had not thus opposed : the disorder specified by pittacus , most prudent lords , is very true ; but for what cause a iudicious and wise prince refuseth to preferre vertuous and learned men so pleasing to god , so honourable and profitable for his state : and wherefore in their stead hee serues himselfe , being the life and fountaine of all goodnesse , or at least seeming so to be , with debauched , vnworthy , and base-minded wretches , is a point of great import and to be considered of vs. i know the common opinion is , that the prince chuseth men which are like to humour and sooth him vp in his affections before the best deseruing creature . and i acknowledge that it is a rule of state , for a wise prince to aduance no man to any degree but either for his wisedome or valour . this foundamentall rule of state is well knowne vnto him , yet experience sheweth , that few princes practise it , and mocke at such as shall tell them that they doe the contrary by a carelesse respect to the honour of their place . but the truth is , they promote ignorant persons , new fellowes , and of small desert before learned and vertuous men , not by any default of their side , but by errors ( i am sorry to speake it ) of the learned and vertuous themselues . i confesse with you , that princes haue need of such , and of braue minded commanders for the warres . but none of you will deny , but they stand in more need of loyall and faithfull ministers of state , who with the gift of secrecie may stead them as much as all their treasure . and now it is more than apparant , that if honourable personages and valiant souldiors had bin as true & secret to their countrey , as they ought , we should not behold the infinite disorders , which we see and obserue to our great griefe in this present age , euen pigmeyes in foure dayes to shoot vp as tall as giants , and all these vnworthy spectacles to happen for want of fidelity , and firme regard to the interest of state. so corrupted is the mind of many men , that forgetting their owne worths and valorous magnamities , they will bee tempted with gold and ambition , yea and after sufficient promotion by their natiue prince some haue turned so vnthankfull , as to become mercenary slaues to another prince . which disasters princes distrusting , they are faine to confer honour and offices vnto vnworthy persons , who might serue them with their secrecie and fidelity , and proue more thankefull for their fauours . as soone as periander had ended his opinion , bias spake in this wise : there is not any among vs here , but knowes , most wise lords , that the world is become so much depraued , because mankind is departed from those sacred lawes of a contented state , the which god from the beginning allotted vnto euery nation , hauing assigned seuerall stations , out of which they ought not to breake out . the britaines , diuisos orbe britannos , he hath placed in albion , as in another world by themselues , the gothes in france , the spaniards in spaine , the dutch in germany , the italians in italy , and so other nations in other habitations . and because euery one of them should not trespasse , or like a deluge breake out vpon their bordering neighbours . his foreseeing maiestie framed the fearefull ocean to compasse about great britaine , the pyrenaean mountaines , as a wall betwixt france and spaine , and the alpes betweene the germanes and italy , as some part of them deuides this from france also . the like wary diuision the diuine maiestie hath set betwixt europe & africke , as the mediterranean seas . the which hee did of purpose , that none should encroch vpon the other , and not mingle one with anothers language , as heretofore fell out at babel , nor subiect the other to forraigne lawes and customes , whereby each one liuing at home with their neerest kinne might agree the better together without innouations or tyrannies , and not like drones , intrude into other mens liues to purloyne the sweet , which others wrought . now for as much as the world is infected with the company and customes of strange nations , let euery nation be ordered to returne into his proper limitation ; and for feare of the like sodaine and violent intrusions in time to come , let it be also enacted , that no ships be suffered to passe for the space of many yeares to come , nor any to be built , and if any bridges lie betwixt seuerall principalities , to sunder them the better , that these bridges be pulled downe . if this course be taken , people shall liue more peaceably in their owne natiue soile . with wondefull great attention this declaration of bias was heard , the which notwithstanding it was subtilly examined by the profound wits of the congregation , at the last seemed not expedient to be put in practise , by reason that they knew that the hatred , though excessiue , which reigned amogst diuers nations , are not naturall , as some very simply haue coniectured , but occasioned either by the artificiall sleights of some princes , or at least by the cunning tricks of some of their principall ministers to busie their princes and states braines , while they enriched their cofers with part of the treasures , which were to be laid out for the warres , or casually brought into the kingdome from the warres , as prizes and booties . besides , some princes are skilfull masters to put in execution that old maxime of policie : diuide & impera ; diuide and command . as for bias his counsell to forbid nauigation , who knowes not but among all nations vnited together that harmonicall perfection is pickt out for politicall gouernment , which cannot be found in any one particular states , and this is gotten by peregrination into forreine countries , so that an expert traueller returnes home like the grand vlysses , hauing bettered his vnderstanding facultie by noting the diuersities of spirits , manners , lawes and customes . to this may be added the other exceeding great benefits , as arise by nauigation , as the establishing of plantations , where their owne countrey ouerswarmes with multitudes of people , the transportation of commodities , and the ciuilizing of sauage nations . they obserue the wonderfull difference of climates , the seuerall natures of the cold , the temperate , and the torrid zones , with many other remarkeable euents , to the glory of our creatour and their vnspeakeable pleasure . then cleobulus desired leaue to speake , who boldly thus began : as farre i see , we proceed like those light-headed fellowes , who make publike languages with new conceits and curious fancies , to the outside beautifull , but not with matter of profit , as might edifie and reforme the world , the onely cause of our meeting at this time . to what purpose then for the rooting out of vias should we open a window in mans heart , as thales would fain● perswade his imperiall maiestie ? wherefore should we vndertake that most painefull charge and taske for the diuiding of the vast wide world into equall parts , as solon proposed ? the opinions of chilon for banishing of gold and siluer out of the world , of pittacus to enforce men to walke the beaten way of merit and vertue , of bias to limit men their habitations , and to forbid nauigation the miracle of this world , what are all these but sophisticall dreames , and chymerizing ideas of shallow imaginatiue schollers , no way participating of the practicke reall way to extreminate those moderne corruptions , which are crept into the world ? we must not treat of impossibilities , but fall to mat●ers actually in earnest , and to be put in execution , not how things ought to be done , but how substantially to reforme the world , according as now we find it most strangely deformed ; and this we must performe warily , secretly , and without long arguing pro and con , or criticall animaduersions , the cause of new tumults . in briefe then i say , that all the reformation of this present age consisteth in these few words : to reward the good , and to punish the wicked . here cleobulus rested , against whom thales thus violently opposed , shewing vnto all men , how dangerous a thing it is , albeit for the truths sake , to offend those persons , who liue in the repute of freedome and prudence , which made this sage philosopher breake forth into these speeches : both these reuerend lords and my selfe , most wise cleobulus , seeing that you had derided and despised our opinion as sophisticall and chymerizing , expected some rare proiect to proceed from your prudent braine , or that you had brought from the indies some new and miraculous bezoar for the sodaine cure of the present enormities , when you sleighted our cares , and propounded a receit more , i will not say difficult , but indeed impossible , which might pose & go beyond euen the most curious princes of secrets , caius plin. & albertus magnus . there is not any of vs here , my cleobulus , but knows , that the reformatiō of the world depēds vpō rewarding the good , and punishing the wicked . therefore let me demand of you , i pray , who be those good men and those wicked ? and then i will returne you this resolution , that that man liueth not , which can discerne and distinguish truth from hypocrisie . doe you not perceiue , that counterfeit art and dissimulation are in these times growne to that height of perfection , that a great number of spirits are so artificially and cunningly wicked , which seeme to wise men to be currantly good ? and that those good men , which liue sincerely , ingenuously , simply , as innocent as doues , without the least painting or dawbing of hypocrisie , are reputed scandalous , and of a libertine loose behauiour ? all men naturally loue the good , and hate the euill . yea and most princes themselues doe so as well by naturall instinct , as in respect of interest of state. and when hypocrites or slie crafty knaues are exalted to promotion , and the good are vilipended and neglected , that comes to passe not by the election of princes , but through the deceit and fraudulent tricks of others . onely true bounty and ingenuous candour are knowne to god and by him rewarded . by him vices are discouered & punished , for he alone entreth into the depth and profundity of the heart . yea , and my selfe too with opening the window in mans breast had pierced into the bottome of mens thoughts , had not the enemy of this honest proiect and profitable field wherein i had sowne this memorable graine , cast in before me his seed of tares . incredible satisfaction did these words of thales produce to the congregation , who casting their eyes vpon periander , he as if he had been bidden to shew his reason , thus began : the diuersitie of opinions , which hitherto i haue heard of you , most prudent philosophers , confirme mee in my ancient opinion , tht many a man doth die , because physitians haue not apprehended the certainty of their patients disease . for which errours of theirs , they are to be excused , because men may easily be deceiued in these things , to the knowledge of which they walke onely with the feet of aime and coniecture . but for vs , who are thought by his maiesty , to be the curers of the world , to be ignorant in the cure of this diseased world , it is the mor● shame , by how much the disease increaseth . yet as farre as i see hitherto by reason of the varieties of the medicines , wee goe about to heale the arme in stead of the breast that is corrupted . the truth is , that disorders haue euer raigned among men . but now adaies by reason of the worlds decrepit age , which cause men to abound with auarice , ambition , and pride , the true occasions of hatred . these being occasioned by some mighty potentates , which intrude vpon their neighbours states , haue bred in continuance of time iealousies , warres , and as it were an hereditary heart-burning of one nation against the other . the medicine therefore is , that princes repent them , and content themselues with a moderate fortune , leauing their neighbours at rest , and not vnder some imaginarie pretences challenge a catholicke supremacie ouer their brethren . here periander ended his discourse , whom solon thus opposed : the true causes of the present euills , o periander , were not omitted by vs of ignorance , as you perhaps suppose , but of a wary circumspection . the world from the beginning hath bin corrupted , and still continues . yet it is a point of prudence to winke at some disorders , rather than with danger to seeke to remoue them . all men liuing haue some faults . and many dishonourable acts which princes perpetrate , we must not meddle with , lest we aggrauate and make them incurable , whom time may correct . therefore let a wise man either speake charitably of their spots , or hold his peace . for we shall finde worke enough to reforme the hatred of the common sort ; by whom they proceed wee must not scan , but referre the prime workers of their disorders to the king of kings , who sometimes hardens pharaohs for their owne ruine , or nebuchadnezzars for scourges to punish his rebellious seruants . with these words , applauded of the congregation , solon made end of his speech . after whom cato began in this manner : exceeding well haue yee parlied , o graue and famous grecians , in shewing the meanes to supplant and suppresse hatred and other humane vices . but as i conceiue , they are those , which languish of an incurable ptisick , which spit vp their lungs , and do cast off their haire . in men there is no helpe ; therefore the best aduice which i can giue , is to desire a finall consummation of the world , and for vs to ioyne in prayer to the diuine maiestie , to open the cataracts and windowes of heauen to drowne the whole earth againe , yet with prouiso , to preserue in new arks all those male children , which haue not past twelue yeares of age , and that of all the feminine sexe , of what age soeuer , there may remaine no other thing behind them , saue their vnlucky memorie . and i beseech the diuine maiestie , that euen as he hath allotted vnto bees , fish , and to other infinite creatures , that prized and singular benefit to breed without the helpe of the female kinde , that the like grace he will graunt vnto men . for , my lords , i am assured , that while women liue in the world , that men will proue but a swinish heard of vngratious brood . it is not possible to beleeue , how much the congregation did stomacke this discourse of cato , who had this conceit of the new deluge in such horrour , that all the rest of the honourable philosophers fell prostrate vpon the ground with their hands lift vp towards heauen , and deuoutly desired god to preserue the pretious sexe of women , and to defend mankind from any such inundations , which none would wish but frantick braines , or chymerizing heteroclites ; and also to protect them from fraudulent make-bates , who vnder colour of the lawes with their mercenarie tongues put euen the best natur'd by the eares ; and that if men would not be ruled to follow more wholsome counsell , hee would beat them with his scourges of famine , warre , and pestilence , vntill they were made to know themselues , and their duties to their neighbours ; and if it pleased not his maiestie to be so seuere and rigorous , yet that he would vouchsafe of his soueraigne bounty to grant this one request , not to enrich villaines . this vnhappy euent had the opinion of cato , when seneca thus began his discourse : the reformations of these moderne abuses , as i conceiue , ought not to be handled too bitterly , before they be first dealt with gentle hands , and managed with some milde medicines in the beginning of their cure. for what shame will redound to that physitian , whose patient happens to die with his recipe still in his body remaining ? to passe from one extremitie to an other , and to neglect the due meanes is rash counsell ; because man is not capable of sudden and violent mutations . and seeing that wee finde that the world in thousands of yeares is now fallen into this dangerous infirmity of calamities , he is not very wise , nay very foolish , which thinks in a few daies to reduce this corrupted body to his former health . a grosse and corpulent person , if the physitian thinks it expedient to bring him low and leane , is to be prescribed a diet of one kind of meat at his meale , and to feed each day lesse than other , that so by degrees he forgoe his gurmandise and gluttonous custome . and so a sickly person vpon his recouerie , or a sea-man returning from a long voyage must for the first fortnight sup broths , gellies , and such weake nourishments , vntill time reduce him stronger to feed on stronger meats ; to which agrees that aphorisme of hippocrates , corpora , quae longo tempore extenuantur , lentè reficere oportet . besides this , both the quality of the reformers , and the condition of them which haue need of reformation , are to be considered . as for example , our selues , who at this present are appointed to reforme the world , if the parties to be reformed , are schollers , book-sellers , clerks , pen and inke men , or such like , we may preuaile to censure and correct their faults . but if we goe out of our limits , and enter into other mens professions and trades to reforme their enormities and knauish customes , we shall proue like that ridiculous cobler , who going beyond his naule , presumed to iudge of colours , and to censure the exquisite picture of apelles . let vs which are schollers meddle with matters onely in our clement . which of vs , i pray here , haue euer dealt among taylors , to iudge of their deceits ; among vintners , to tell of their sophisticating of wines ; among butchers , to shew their blowing vp of fl●sh ; among clergy-men , to censure of simony ; or among lawyers , to entrap them in their equiuocations , quirks , and quillets ? yet all these require reformations , and the whole earth grones and cries for ease and peace . but shall we aduenture to put our hands to hinder these disorders so far remote from our professions ? shall we like so many blind bayards , endeuour to stop bottles so crackt and cleft , and by that meanes let all the wine to spill about the roome ? then surely will a true reformation fall out , and not before , when the mariner is called forth to shew his iudgment of the seas and winds , the souldier of marshalling a battell , the shepheard of his fleece , and he that hath beene beaten by lawyers and baffeld by their iuglings , can best demonstrate vnto vs , how to tame their hydra furies and poysonous qualities . therefore let vs call vnto vs out of euery craft , mysterie , and profession , foure of the honestest , most renouned for their integritie of life , and confer with them touching the meanes , how to amend what is amisse . although this graue counsell greatly pleased pittacus and chilon , yet all the rest detested it as bad as catoes , saying , that he offred them a scandalous affront , and an indignitie to apollocs maiestie , to call in such base-minded people not traind vp in philosophy to be ioyned with men of their degree . and that they were the soules pretious faculties , which gaue the well-being to a businesse of this nature , which those wanted . further , they concurred in this purpose , with might and maine , to preserue the iurisdiction of their philosophicall court , whereof they protested to be as iealous as husbands of their fairest wiues ; and that they thought so wise a man as seneca was reputed to be , being the archphilosopher of the latines would haue yeelded to haue twenty ounces of his bloud drawne out of the best veine of his life , than to perswade them to lose one ounce of their iurisdiction , whereon their reputation consisted . the lords reform ●s after they had thus checkt seneca , were wonderfully perplext , and in a manner hopelesse of effecting any good , because mazzon who was yet to speake , they adiudged a new man , and without experience . yet now that his turne came to speake , he thus pithily spake : not by any desert of mine , most prudent philosophers , but by his maiesties meere and speciall fauour am i admitted into this honourable assembly . and i freely acknowledge , that at this vertuous meeting it were my part to imploy my eares , rather than my tongue , being fitter to learne and to be silent . and if that any other matter had beene to be determined sauing this , i would not presume to speake . but because the subiect now in hand concernes the reformation of moderne disorders , which now adaies raigne in the world , i being a moderne man , euen now come from the world , where i left them continually disputing and keeping a stir about reformations , am the better incouraged to lay my helping hand , and though i say it , i am as good a proficient in this matter , as euclide in the mathematicks . the true cure of the bodies disease is to visit the sicke in person , and to conferre with him of the causes and other occurrences of his sicknesse . euen so for the cure of the worlds infirmities , let vs call in the world himselfe , question with him , feele his pulses , and looke vpon the diseased parts of his body , whereby the cure may become the sooner remedied , which now seems desperate and incurable . in such wise did this aduice please the lords of the congregation , that they suddenly commanded the world to be called vnto them , who incontinently made his repaire , being drawne in a coach by the foure seasons of the yeare , and by them was led into the delphick palace . hee was a man well stricken in yeares , yet seemed to be of a galliard and robustuous complexion , which betokened that hee might liue many yeares longer . onely it seemed , that he had a wheezing in his pipes with some difficulty of breath , and in speaking he shewed himselfe to be somewhat hoarse , and wept continually , which argued he ayled somewhat , and laboured as yet more with some grieuous tormenting paine in his braine or some other inward part of his body . the philosophers askt him , how hee had his face so ruddy and iouially appearing , which was a signe that he was in health , hauing store of pure radicall moysture , full of naturall heat , and could not but haue a good stomack . and they remembred , that about a hundred yeares sithence , they had seene him looke yellow , as if hee had beene sicke of the yellow iaundise , yet now it seemed vnto them , that hee was recouered . but for all that they charged him freely to open his griefes , that they might prescribe thereafter some remedies to helpe him . hereupon the world answered : my lords , presently after i was borne , i fell into sicknesses and griefes , whereof i languish at this instant . my face , which you behold so seeming red , is done ouer with ladies licks , slicks , and other painting stuffe of the levant . my infirmitie is like the ebbing and flowing of the sea , with the self-same water in it , for all it seemes to increase , and fall ; but with this interchangeable course , that when i haue a good countenance outwardly , my griefe lies within mee , as i feele my selfe at this instant : and when i looke ill outwardly , i am in perfect health within . but if you please to try in what case i am indeed without dissembling any longer my miseries , pull off my maske and gaudy coat , and you shall see when i am starke naked , that i am indeed but a liuing carcase . the philosophers out of hand disrobed him , and when the world was stript naked , they saw , that the poore vnfortunate creature had a scurfe foure fingers thicke ouer his flesh , as bad as the leprosie , or the catholicke disease , which did eat into his flesh dangerously : whereupon the wise reformers tooke ten razours , and euery one of them with a razour began very diligently to shaue and pare off that thicke scurfe in apparance , and busied themselues so long , vntill they pierced to the quicke bone , but could not in this huge colossus meet with one ounce of good substantiall flesh . which when the reformers perceiued , they stood a while amazed , and when they had reuested him with his maske and ●oolish robes , they licensed him to depart . and then after conference among themselues , concluding the cure too desperate and past helpe , they abandoned the care of their publike thoughts , and resolued to prouide for the sauing of their priuate reputation vnstaind . and therefore they all ioyned together to satisfie the common peoples expectations , and because they should see they were not idle , nor carelesse of their good , they caused mazzon the secretary to pen and publish the generall reformation , wherein with a preamble of magnificall words , they testified to the world , the perpetuall care which his maiestie tooke for the vertuous conuersation of his learned societie , of his indefatigable paines from time to time , sustained for the safetie of mankind , and of the infinite labour and toyle of the lords reformers for the compiling and setting out of good orders ; and afterwards descending to particulars , they did put downe the prices of coleworts , pilchards , pumpions and melons . and now when all the lords were ready to subscribe to the proclamation , thales the milesian remembred them , that some slie hucksters , when they sold lupines , pease , and oaten meale , vsed a little dish , that i● was a most intolerable scandall not to foresee this disorder . this last aduice of thales seemed very expedient to the whole congregation , and as most necessary it was added to the reformation , that these dishes should be greater therefore from thence forwards . presently after they caused the gates of the palace to be opened , and going into the market place , they commanded the cryer to reade the proclamation concerning the reformation of the world , which was done with such applause and ioy to euery man , that all parnassus rebounded with their clamours and shouts , as tokens of the great contentments they tooke for this serious and long expected reformation . but the wisest sort smelt out the drift , and laughed in their sleeues to see the rascality and foolish idiots to delight themselues with bables , as babies with nuts . men of vnderstanding know , that vices will abound , as long as men liue in the world , vitia erunt donec homines ; and that humane prudence doth consist in this , to haue wit sufficient for this one difficult resolution , to forsake the world as another hath found it , or to liue as not to liue . chap. 18. the duke of hernia his speech in the councell of spaine to a proposition , whether it were expedient for his catholike maiestie to conclude a peace with his brother in law the duke of sauoy ? i could wish in these present stirres of sauoy , that i were rather a minister and an executioner of your maiesties will & commandement , then an inuentor of counsell , which if it chance to succeed ill in the euent , may returne preiudiciall to the author , and hurtfull to your maiestie . but since we are brought to this passe , that it is necessary to collect the summe of your deliberations , and that this charge is now imposed on me , i will inforce my selfe , as farre as the weakenesse of my wit extends , to satisfie the obligation of the loyalty , affection , and deuotion , which i owe vnto your maiestie and my country . the most sacred king treats now , whether he ought to lay downe armes and hostilitie , and to forgiue all such iniuries , as he receiued at the duke of sauoyes hands , by that meanes pleasuring the princes of italy , and the pope in particular , who by his nuntio doth earnestly solicite the same ? or else whether your maiestie ought to depriue him by force of warre , either of all his estate , or of part , thereby to secure your dutchy of milan from his treacheries , being a member of so great importance , both by it selfe and by the opportunity of the situation , with the which it bindes together all the body of this great monarchy , that it is deseruedly held to be the key of all your kingdomes , seeing that with the benefit of this dominion , wee inioy the preheminence of g●noa , and the commoditie of the sea with hauens , from whence in times of peace by trafficke , we receiue very great gaine , and in times of warres we open a secure passage to our armadaes and armies ? from hence the kingdome of naples is preserued , where we shall hardly arriue with our armed gallies , through the midst of the tirr●ene sea in a tempestuous winter , if wee touch not and ride at anchor in one of these places . from this state in briefe we are enabled to goe into switz●rland and germany , there to leuie souldiers for the low-countries , to giue and receiue aid from the confederate princes ; besides that with the situation of this place , being in the midst of lumbardy , we hold the residue of italy bridled , that they dare not stirre to oppose our wills . the which things although they bee knowne vnto this most prudent councell , and better yet to your maiestie , i would notwithstanding put you in minde thereof , because you might excuse me , if i seemed perchance fearefull or iealous for the preseruation thereof ; and certainely when i shall conceiue that there is some securitie and sufficiency in these courses which now are propounded , i will then rancke my selfe among the first to incline to peace , wishing , that after our tedious and long warres in flaunders , which haue consumed both the men and kingdomes , wee might breathe a while , and recouer some fresh blood , and also refresh our drooping vitall spirits , to be the better able one day gloriously to encounter and lead our armies against the infidels , and to spread in their countries both the christian faith and the empire . but what security doe wee see in th●se propounded treaties ? the popes nuntio doth promise , that if we would free the duke of sauoy from the feare he is in , to be preuented and oppressed , the duke should likewise disarme , and hold himselfe alwayes hereafter your maiesties good kinsman and seruant , and that he shall neuer more minister cause of innouation , nor nourish any intelligence preiudiciall to the state of milan . and to secure vs from fraud , that he shall leaue his second sonne at your court for pledge . but he speakes nothing of alienating and separating himselfe from the friendship and aliance of france ; nor that he will oppose himselfe against their forces , when they shall attempt to assault this state of milan . and who doth not here see his fraud , as if we were so simple in beleefe , and knew not how to diue where his thoughts tended ? are not we sufficiently choked and made perfect of his cunning deuices ? seeing that the count de fuentes hath written from milan , that we ought not to trust him ; that his treaties and practises holden with the king of france were most certaine for the surprizing of that state ; let no man tell me , that it is securitie sufficient to lay a sonne of his in our hands for hostage , because he hauing other sonnes left him at home , among whom is his eldest sonne , will neuer care to remoue him hence to hinder his designes , no more then king francis was hindred and stayed from raising armes against the emperour charles the fift , after hee had left his two sonnes in pledge : or the prince of orange , who for all that he had giuen a son of his in pawne , desisted not to conspire the ruine of flanders against your most glorious father . he hath declared himselfe what he is , and what remorse of conscience he feeles , that now hath complotted against a king , his kinsman and benefactour ; against that house , which twise restored him to the state which he holds , in that he would compasse and effect the french match , notwithstanding your maiesties disagreement and disswasion . for your maiestie fore-saw , that this match would proue a seminary of discord , and a rocke of scandall . now he tryeth and compasseth by all meanes onely to auoid the present perill , and to watch an occasion to deceiue vs another time , or to take vs vnprouided . for all this , hee comes not with humilitie to procure pardon from the magnanimity and generositie of your most sacred mind , but casting himselfe into the armes of your enemies with weapons in hand , and with threats he goes about to terrifie you , and with the greatest indignity to force your maiestie to a peace no lesse ignominious , then ill secured . we haue too much lost ( if it be lawfull forme to speake the truth ) our reputation in yeelding to a truce with the states of holland , though the same was accounted necessary for our affaires in regard of the difficulty to sustaine the charge of a warre so farre remote . to which now let vs adioyne this point , that there is not so vile an aduersary , who dares not to moue and conuert his thoughts at euery nouelty , and already we see the rest of the italians discontented with our greatnesse , willing to rise against vs , yea , and to call the iewes and the turkes in to their succour , albeit with their owne dangers , if god and the angell guardians of your crowne doe not worke continuall miracles for our defence , truely i cannot see , who shall deliuer vs. what then remaines ? most sacred king , i am of opinion , that peace is not to be refused , so that the same be concluded with safety , the which can no way be , but by holding in deposit● and impawned in your hands those forts , which shall be thought fit by your captaines , and to releeue them vpon his cost , and for your good , or at least that hee disburse the greatest part of the expence occasioned hitherto through his default . this demaund ought not to seeme strange vnto him , seeing he hath wittingly and aduisedly vsed such ingratitude and deceits so oftentimes against you . therefore we must let him vnderstand , that we may not repose any confidence in him , except we haue these forts in pledge , that so we may safely with our reputation , reduce our matters to a sound issue , not leauing place for him in reason to complaine of vs as the authours of the warre . but if the duke will not consent to these our iust demaunds , and will refuse to receiue our garrisons into his forts ▪ i am of the minde it is better to make warre against him , then by protracting time to expect troubles hereafter in our owne home . another time we may runne into a greater hazzard , and wee may haue to doe with a more powerfull prince . in the meane while it is conuenient for your maiesties honour to aduenture all into the hand of fortune , then voluntarily to yeeld with so great indignitie to conditions of so little safety . howbeit i see not where those dangers lie , which some would make so great . i am sure , that in respect of the iustice of the cause , where a man is not stirred with any desire to spoyle another of his due , but with necessity to preserue his owne state , and that with greater facility then some imagine , the duke of sauoyes power is not stronger then ours . i am sure , that hee is in a manner weake , and for two reasons to be slighted , as well in knowing him to be dangerously suspected , as also in that he is driuen to stand armed and on his guard , which cannot but consume him in a short time . nor doth their opinion any whit moue me , which say that he shall not want succours out of france , and out of those parts of italy , which are interessed for their preseruation , because the french which should aide him , are deriued from a gouernment , whereof the head is a woman , diuided in religion , full of emulation , and of sundry disagreements among themselues , where it is no hard matter still to nourish and increase their doubts with their dissentions and diuersified resolutions , so that the effects of them will fall out to be of small securitie , vaine , or long and vncertaine . and the dessignes of the italians enuironed with our bordering states are become weakned and worne out by the sodaine death of the french king , in whom they had grounded their hopes ; so that now being afraid of our nighbouring forces , and by the rising fortunes of your maiestie , they wil not presume openly to descend into this warre , but rather by obseruing other mens proceedings , and vainely trusting to the benefit of the time , they will stand idle as mournfull spectators of the tempest , which beates on their neighbours fields ; vnto whom it shall be in your maiesties power to giue them that ●orme and law , whatsoeuer your benignity shall please to impose , and hereafter shall be aduised according to the times . neither let your maiestie faile to entertaine them with sundry cautions and artificiall promises , and with protestations to affirme vnto them , that what you take away from their father , you will restore it to the sonne , granting that to your bloud , which now you haue denyed to the father for his ill deserts . with these hopefull promises let the prince philebert be fed , and extraordinarily made much off . in the meane time then let the prouisions for the warre be speedily hastened on , assembling souldiers out of the state of milan , which are not enfeebled , as some ( i know not whether they doe it of zeale or interest ) doe expresse , to minister an occasion to the enemy of insulting . we haue men for number and valour sufficient for a greater enterprize then this , among these good store of old souldiers exercised in the warres of the low-countries ; nor are there wanting captaines of estimation and experience . and if your treasure seemes somewhat scanted , you haue a way to find out so much money as you please , by departing with diuers merchandises , and by feeding your creditors with the particulars of the fleets at their returne from the indies , and also by other extraordinary meanes . and seeing that your maiestie hath no warres at this present in any other parts , the ordinary reuenues of your kingdomes are enough to supply the charge of this warre . besides the seat of the warre will fall out to be in a great part of the enemies owne territories , which will euery day produce more fortunate conditions . onely let your maiestie resolue , and determine to passe ( as caesar did ) the rubicon ; and then all things will succeed easie , plaine , and the fruits of the victory will alwayes ouercome the lightnesse of beliefe . occasions are rare , and you had need to meet with them : for whosoeuer thinkes you may aspire to the empire of italy without vnsh●●thing your sword , or a●iding the hazard , shewes that he hath had but small doings in the world . god and fortune doe fauour the aduenturous , the vigilant , and valiant ; and despiseth the fearefull , the sleepy , and the pusillanimous . shall we for friuolous suspicions of remote dangers contemne liuely and assured hopes ? i doe then conclude , most inuincible king , that vnlesse we may haue some forts impawned into our hands , without the which the state of milan will still remaine in the same perill , we ought not in any wise to embrace that other treaty , which is offered by the popes nuntio , nor to stay so long vntill the new king of france bee growne to his riper yeares , lest hee be then incited and prouoked by this duke , who is full of vast and irregular conceits to passe the mountaines to your dammage , but now whilest he is a pupill , it is necessary to preuent the inconuenience and to transferre the warre into the enemies land. i beseech your maiestie to consider with what good opportunity the way is made open for you to the monarchy of italy , and to the greater part of europe , as god hath lately fauoured you . in what manner hath hee dissipated and confounded our enemies counsels by the sodaine death of henry the fourth ? that kingdome is now without a head , italy disunited and weake , germany all tottered and diuided ; the turke is beaten backe , and intangled in the warres of the levant , so that none is able to withstand your designes . the iniury is apparant , which prickes you to a iust reuenge , and frees you from any blot of too much desire of rule . your age which is now at the flowre , is pried into , and expected that it walke with some trauell through the way of glory , with the which your greatnesse shall no lesse bee conioyned , then the aduancement of religion , together with the safety of all christendome . by which proceedings we shall see that verified of your maiestie , which many learned men with no ambiguous obseruations of the celestiall influences , and of the worlds passages , haue oftentimes affirmed to haue beene ordayned in heauen , that this most noble prouince hauing beene oppressed for so many ages , vnder the hard bondage of strangers , ought at last in the reuolution of so many yeares to stand aboue all , and to extend their empire to the vttermost confines of the earth , and to remaine nothing inferiour to that of the persians , of the macedonians , or romanes . finis . divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain and ireland tending all, to the asserting of the truth, in vindication of their majesties / by james howell ... ; som[e] of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed, but now are newly retreev'd, collected, and publish'd by richard royston. howell, james, 1594?-1666. 1661 approx. 456 kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from 215 1-bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : 2004-05 (eebo-tcp phase 1). a70276 wing h3068 estc r5379 13206616 ocm 13206616 98493 this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons 0 1.0 universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase 1, no. a70276) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set 98493) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, 1641-1700 ; 422:3 or 1594:6) divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain and ireland tending all, to the asserting of the truth, in vindication of their majesties / by james howell ... ; som[e] of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed, but now are newly retreev'd, collected, and publish'd by richard royston. howell, james, 1594?-1666. [8], 411 p., [1] leaf of plates : ill. printed by j. grismond, london : 1661. "the first tome" engraved illustrated t.p.: the people is a beast which heads hath many, england of late shew'd this more then any. "no more published"--nuc pre-1956 imprints. each essay has separate t.p. imperfect: bodleian library copy (422:3) lacks t.p. and frontispiece. reproduction of originals in the bodleian library and the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p5 using tcp2tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the 25,363 texts created during phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 january 2015. anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p5, characters represented either as utf-8 unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng divine right of kings. political science. great britain -history -civil war, 1642-1649. ireland -history -rebellion of 1641. 2003-12 tcp assigned for keying and markup 2004-02 apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images 2004-03 rina kor sampled and proofread 2004-03 rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited 2004-04 pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain , and ireland , tending all , to the asserting of truth , in vindication of their majesties ; by iames howell esquire ; som of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed , but now are newly retreev'd , collected , and publish'd by richard royston . the first tome . london , printed by i. grismond . 1661. belua multorum capit●…m plebs vana vocatur , plus satis hoc angli ●…uper docuere popelli . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ i : h : the people is a beast which heads hath many , england of late hath shew'd this more then any . to his majesty sir , these historical discourses ( set forth in such variety of dresses ) having given so much satisfaction to the world for the asserting of truth , in vindication of your royal father of ever blessed memory , and som of them relating also to your majesty , i humbly conceiv'd might be proper for your majesties perusal & patronage . concerning the author therof his name needed not to have bin prefix'd , he being so universally well known and distinguishd from other writers both at home and abroad by his stile , which made one of the highest wits of these times say of him , author hic ex genio notus , ut ungue leo. god almighty blesse your majesty with a continuance of happiness , and daily encrease of glory , so prayeth your majesties most loyal , and humble subject , royston . a catalog of the severall peeces that are here contain'd . i. a dialog twixt patricius and peregrin presently after kintonfield battaile , which was the first book that came forth for vindication of his majesty . ii. the second part of that discours . iii. a seasonable advice sent to philip late earl of pembrock , to mind him of the severall solemn oaths wherby he was bound to adhere to the king. iv. a manifesto sent in his majesties name to the reformed churches , and princes beyond the seas touching his religion . v. apologs , and emblemes , in whose moralls the times are represented . vi. of the land of ire , or a discours of that horrid insurrection in ireland , discovering the tru causes therof . vii . the sway of the sword , or a disurs of the common militia or soldiery of the land , proving , that the command therof in chief , belongs to the ruling prince . viii . an italian prospective , through which england may discern the desperat condition she stands in . ix . a nocturnall progresse , or perambulation of most countries in christendom . x. a vindication of his majesty touching a letter he writ to rome from madrid , in answer to a letter which pope gregory the 15th . had sent him upon passing the dispensation for concluding the match . xi . of the trety of the i le of wight , and the death of his majesty . xii . advise from the prime statesmen of florence , how england shold come to her self again , which can be by no other means under heaven , but by calling in the king , and that , in a free confident way without articles , but what he shall be pleas'd to offer himself . the tru informer , who discovers to the world the first grounds of this ugly rebellion and popular tumults in england , scotland , and ireland . deducing the causes therof in an historicall discours from their originall . — neutrum modò , mas modò vulgus . written in the prison of the fleet anno 1642. casuall discourses , and interlocutions betwixt patricius and peregrin , touching the distractions of the times , vvith the causes of them . patricius . surely i shold know full well that face and phisnomy : o heavens ! 't is peregrin . gentle sir , you are well met , and welcom to england , i am heartily glad of your safe arrivall , hoping now to apprehend some happie opportunity whereby i may requite part of those worthy favours i received from you in divers places t'other side side of the sea. peregrin . sir , i am as joyfull to see you , as any friend i have upon earth ; but touching favours , they deserve not such an acknowledgment , i must confesse my self to be farr in the arrear , therfore you teach me what i shold speak to you in that point : but amongst other offices of friendship you have bin pleased to do me from time to time , i give you many thanks for the faithfull correspondence you have held withme , since the time of our separation , by intercours of letters , the best sort of fuell to warm affection , and to keep life in that noble vertue friendship , which they say abroad , is in danger to perish under this cold insulary clime for want of practise . patricius . truely , sir , you shold have had an account of matters hence more amply and frequently , but that of late it hath bin usuall , and allowed by authority , to intercept and break open any letters ; but private men need not complain so much , since the dispatches of ambassadors , whose p●…ckets shold be held as sacred as their persons , h●…ve bin commonly open'd , besides some outrages offered their houses and servants ; nay , since their maj●…sties letters under the cabinet signet have bin broke up , and other counterfeit ones printed and published in their names . peregrin . indeed i must confesse the report hereof hath kept a great noise abroad , and england hath suffered much in point of national repute in this particular ; for even among barbarians , it is held a kind of sacriledge to open letters ; nay , it is held a baser kind of burglary , then to break into a house , chamber , or closet : for that is a plundering of outward things onely , but he who breaks open ones letters which are the idea's of the mind , may be said to rip up his brest , to plunder and rifle his very brain , and rob him of his most pretious and secretest thoughts . patricius . well , let us leave this distastfull subject , when these fatall commotions cease , this custom , i hope , will be abhorred in england : but now , that you are newly arrived , and so happily met , i pray be pleased t●… make me partaker of some forraign news , and how the squares go betwixt france and spain , those two great wheels , that draw after their motion ( some more , some lesse ) all the rest of the western world : and when you have done , i will give you account of the state of things in england . peregrin . i thought you had so abounded with domestick news , that you had had no list or leisure to hear any forrain ; but to obey your commands , you know that i have been any time these six years a land-loper up and down the world , and truly i could not set foot on any chr●…stian shore that was in a perfect condition of peace , but it was engag●…d either in a direct , 〈◊〉 or collaterall war , or standing upon it's guard in continuall apprensions and alarmes of fear : for , since that last flaming usher of gods vengeance , that direful comet of the yeer 1618. appear'd in the heavens , some malevolent and ang●…y ill-aspected star hath had the predominance ever since , and by it's maligne influxes , made strange unusuall impressions upon the humors of subjects , by inci●…ing them to such insurrections , revolts , and tumults ; which caused a jewish rabbi to say lately , that it seems the grand turk thrives extraordinarily in his devotions , it being one of his prime prayers to mahomet , that he shold prevaile with god almighty to continue disentions still among christian princes . and truly , as the case stands , one may say , that the europaean world is all in pieces ; you know well with what fearfull fits of a high burning fever poor germany hath been long shaken , which hath wrought a lethargie in some of her members , by wasting of the vital spirits which shold diffuse themselves equally through that great body ; and how she st●…ll ●…ostereth a cold northern guest ( the swed ) within her bosom , and is in 〈◊〉 fear of a worse from the levant : in the netherlands one shall hear the half-starv'd souldier murmur in every corner , and railing against his king , and ready to mutiny for want of pay . in france you shall see the poor asinin peasan half weary of his life , his face being so 〈◊〉 grownd , ever and anon with new tallies . you know ther are som soverain princes , who have a long time wandred up and down in exile , being outed of their own anti●…nt patrimoniall territories , and little hopes yet , god wot , of restoring them . the world knows how savoy is become of late a kind of province to france ; nay , spain , who hath been so dexterous to put her neighbours ogether by the eares , and to foment war a far off , to keep her own home secure , is now her self in the midst of two fearfull fires , kindled on both sides of her by quite-revolted subjects , viz. the portugues and cat alan , which so puzzles her , that shee cannot tell what saint to pray unto . the venetian also , with the pope , and all the princes of italy , are arming apace ; the hollander onely , salamander like , thrives in these flames : and as i have heard of some that by a long habitu●…l custom could feed on poyson , and turn it to nourishment , so hans alone can turn war to a trade and grow fat by it . now , sir , being weary of eating my bread in such a distracted world abroad , and hoping to take some sweet repose in england , i find that shee is in as bad a case , if not worse , then any other . so much news i give you in a lump , i will be more particular with you som other time , if you please to spare me now . patricius . i hear , not without much resentment , these pithy expressions you have been pleased to make of the torn estate of europe abroad ; and since you mention that blazing star , i remember what a noble knight told me some yeers ago , that the astronomers , who lay sentinel to watch the motion and aspect of that comet , observ'd that the tail of it having pointed at divers climats , at last it seem'd to look directly on these north-west i lands , in which posture it spent it selfe , and so extinguish'd ; as if thereby it meant to tell the world , that these islands should be the stage whereupon the last act of the tragedie should be play'd . and how many scenes have passed already , both here and in ireland , we know , god wot , by too too wofull and fresh experience . peregrin . there is a saying when your neighbours house is on fire , by it's light you may see in what danger your own stands : and was england so blind and blockish , as not to take warning by so many fearfull combustions abroad ? when i took my leave last of her , i left her in such a compleat condition of happines , both in court , country , city and sea , that shee was the envie of all europ , in so much , that that golden verse might be fi●…ly applied to her then golden times , mollia securae perage●…ant otia gentes . the court was never so glorious , being hanselld every yeer almost with a new roya●… off-spring ; the gentry no where more gallan●… and sportfull ; the citizen never more gorgeous and rich , and so abounding with treasure , bullion and buildings , that no age can parallel ; commerce , inward and outward was never at that height ; the customes increasing every yeer to admiration ; the narrow seas were never guarded with braver ships , nor the navie royall for number of vessels and magazines of all sorts of materials was ever so well replenished ; the universities had never such springing dayes : and lastly , the church did so flourish , that amongst the rest of the reformed churches of christendome , i have heard her call'd the church triumphant . besides , ireland was arriv'd almost to the same degree of prosperity , for all the arrerages of the crowne were paid , and not a peny sent hence for many yeeres to maintain the standing army there , or for any other publick charge , as formerly ; trafique came to that mighty height of encrease , that in few years the crown customes and imposts came to be five times higher . in fine , ireland was brought not only to subsist of her selfe , but inabled to contribut towards the filling of the english exchequer , and to make some retribution of those vast expences the crown of england hath been at any time these 400 yeeres to reduce her to civility ; her boggs were almost all dry'd up , and made good land ▪ her mudde-walls turn'd apace to brick in divers places , so that in one sommer that i fortun'd to be there , above 50. new brick-houses were built in one towne . but it hath been the fate of that island , to be 〈◊〉 neer a condition of a setled , happiness , and yet to have some odd accident still intervene to crosse it . in conclusion , there wanted nothing to make england and her united crowns so exactly blessed , that she might have assumed the title of one of the fortunat islands . good lord , how comes it to passe , that she is now fallen into such horrid distempers , and like a distracted body , laying han●…s upon her self , would thrust the sword of civil war into her own bowels ? i beseech you , sir , impart unto me the true cause of this change ; for i know none so capable to do it as your self . patriciu●… . infandum , peregrine , jubes renovare dolorem : first , sir , in the generall you know , that it is with the regions upon earth , as it is with those of the ayre , sometimes we have a clear azur'd skie with soft gentle ventilations , and a sweet serenitie the whole hemesphere over ; at other times we know the face of the heavens is over-cast with frowns , with frog vapors , and thick clouds of various shapes , which look like monsters , hovering up and down , break at last into thunder and fulgurations , and so disquiet and raise a kind of war in the aereall common-wealth . just so in the regions that are dispers'd up and down this earthly glo●…e , peepled with men ( which are but a composition of the elements ) you have sometimes a gentle calm of peace and quietude , with a general tranquillitie all the countrey over ; at other times you have ugly mishapen clouds of jealousies , fears , and discontentments rise up , which break out at last into acts of disobedience , rebellion , and fury . and as those aereall meteors and monsters above , are ingendered of those watery fogs and mists which are drawn up out of fennie and rotten low grounds here upon earth ; so in the region of the mind , the ill vapors which ascend to the brain from rotten and impostumated hearts , from desperate and mal●…-contented humorists are the causes of all civil commotions and distempers in state. but they have much to answer for in the world to come ( though they escape it in this ) who for any private interest or respect whatsoever , either of promotion , vain-glory , revenge , malice , or envie , will embroyl and plunge their own native country in any publick ingagement or civil war , by putting a partition-wall betwixt their soverain prince and their fellow-subjects . truely , in my opinion , these may be called the worst kind of betrayers of their countreys . but i am too far transported from satisfying your request in relating the true causes of these calamities , i will now fall to work , and bring you to the very source of them . ther is a pack of perverse people ( composed for the most part of the scummie and basest sort ) multiplied in england , who by a kind of natural inclination , are opposit so point blank to monarchy in state , and hierarchy in church , that i doubt if they were in heven ( whither 't is to be fear'd they run a great hazard ever to enter , it being a rule , that he who is rotten-hearted to his king , can never be right-hearted to his crea●…or ) i say if these men were in heven , they w●…uld go near to repine at the monarchical power of god almighty himself , as also at the degrees of angels , and the postures of holiness in the church triumphant . they call every crotchet of the brain , tenderness of conscience forsooth : which being well examined , is nothing else but a meer spirit of contradiction , of malice and disobedience to all higher powers which possesseth them . ther are no constitutions either ecclesiastical or civil can please them , but they wold cast both into such and such a mould , which their crack'd brains wold fain devise , yet are never able to bring to any perfection ; they are ever labouring to bring religion to the dock , and to be new trimm'd , but they wold take down her fore-castle , and scarce allow her the kings armes to adorn her : they are great listners after any court-news , and prick up their ears when any thing is spoken of king , queen , or privie councellour , and are always ready , though upon loose trust , to take up any report whereby they may whisper in conventicles and corners , and so traduce the government . these great z●…lots use to look upon themselves most commonly through multiplying glasses , which make them appear to be such huge santons , that it renders them not onely uncharitable in their opinions of others , but luciferian-like proud in their own conceit , insomuch that they seem to scorn all the world besides , beleeving that they are ●…he only elect whose souls work according ●…o the motion of the spirit : that they are ●…he true children of promise , whose faces alone look towards heven ; they are more pleased with some new reach or fancy , ( that may puzzle the pericranium ) than a frenchman is in some new faction in cloathing : they are nearest to the nature of the jew of any people upon earth , and will converse with him sooner than with some sort of christians ; and as in their pharisaicall dispositions they symbolize with the iew , so in some of their positions they jump pat with the iesuit : for though they are both in the extremes , and as contrary one to the other , as the points of a diameter , yet their opinions and practises are concentrique , viz. to depresse regall power ; both of them wold bind their kings in chaines , and the nobles in links of iron ; they both deny all passive obedience , and as the one wold have the morter of the temple tempred with blood , so the other wold beat religion into the brain with the poleaxe . their greatest master-piece of policy is to forge counter●…eit news , and to divulge and disperse it as far as they can to amuse the world , for the advancement of their designs , and strengthing their party : but the iesuit doth it more cunningly and modestly , for he fetcheth his news from far , so that before the falshood of it can be contrould , his work is commonly done , and the news forgotten ; but these later polititians use to raise lies hard by home , so that the grosseness and palpablenesse of them is presently discovered . besides , to avoid the extremes of the other , these later seem to fall into flat prophanness , for they may be called a kind of enemies to the very name , crosse , and church of christ. touching the first , they repine at any reverence to be done unto the name of jesus , though spontaneous , not coercive . for the second , which was held from the beginning to be the badg and banner of a christian , they cry up the crosse to be the mark of the b●…ast ; and for the last , viz. the church , they wold have it to be neither beautifull , holy , nor amiable , which are the three main properties that god requires in his house . to conclude , when any comes to be season'd with this sower leaven , he seems to degenerat presently from the nature and garb of a gentleman , and fals to be of a sordid and low disposition , narrow hearted and close handed ; to be timerous , cunning and jealous , and far from the common freedom , and sweetness of morall society , and from all generous and loyal thoughts towards his king and country . these , these have bin the chiefest machinators , and engeneers englands unhappy divisions , who viper-like have torn the entrailes of their own mother their dear country : but ther were other extern concurrent causes , and to find them out , i must look northward , for there the cloud began to condense first ; you know sir , the scot's nation were ever used to have their king personally resident amongst them , and though king iames by reason of his age , bounty , and long breeding there , with other advantages , drew such extraordinary respect from them , that they continued in good conformity : yet since his death , they have been over-heard to mutter at the remotenesse and absence of their king , and that they shold become now a kind of province by reason of such a distance : some of their nobles and gentry found not at the english court , nor at his majesties coronation in edenburgh that countenance , familiarity , benefit and honours which haply they expected , and 't is well known who he was , that having been denied to be lorded ( david lesley ) took a pet , and went discontented to his country , hoping that some title added to the wealth he had got abroad , should have purchased him more respect . these discontented parties tamperd with the mercenary preachers up and down scotland , to obtrude to the p●…ple what doctrines they put into their mouthes , so that the pulpits every where rung of nothing but of invectives against certain obliquities and solaecismes ( and i cannot tell what ) in government , and many glances they had upon the english church : yet all this while there was not matter enough for an insurrection , nor to dispose the peoples hearts to a mutiny ▪ until by the policy ( as some affi●…med ) of the said discontented party the english lyturgie was sent thither : this by the in●…itement of those fiery pulpiteers , was cryed up to be the greatest i doll that possibly could be brought into their kerke , insomuch that when it was first offer'd to be read , the woman and ba●…er sort of mechaniks threw stooles and stones at the bishops heads , and were ready to tear them in peeces ▪ and here began the storm . 〈◊〉 majesty having notice hereof , sent a most gracious proclamation , signifying , that whereas he had recommended that book to be practis'd amongst them , wherein he himself served god almighty twice a day , he did it out of a pious endeavour to breed an uniformity of publick divine service in all his dominions , specially in that his native kingdom . but since it had produced such dangerous effects , he was contented to revoke it absolutely ; for it was never his purpose to press the practise of the said book upon the consciences of any , he did onely commend , not absolutely command , the use of it ; therefore he exhorted and required that every one unto whom it had given any scandal , shold return to his pristine obedience , and serve god as formerly , offering herewith a gracious pardon , and to passe an act of amnestia for an abolition of all faults passed . peregrin . and would not this suffice ? in naturall motions we find that the cause being taken away , the effect ceaseth , and will not this hold in civil actions ? patricius . no , this wold not serve the turn , but 〈◊〉 was a further reach in it , and for an inch to take an ell : you know the scots since 〈◊〉 single lion came to quarter with our three , are much elevated in their spirits , more respected , emploied and trusted abroad , they are heightned in their resolutions and aims , and will questionless be daily more and more . you have heard of a mine that reach'd from our exchequer to edenburgh . and i beleeve you have not forgot boccolinies balance , that was shewed us in italie , wherein lorenzo de medici weighed all the states of christendom , and throwing in england amongst the rest , you know how much he made her to weigh less by this addition . the former proclamation i say , and pardon would not suffice , but they took opportunity to fish in those troubled waters , and vent their spleen further , by an utter extirpation of episcopacy , and by trampling the mitre under their feet , hoping to have som of the birds plumes , being pluck●… , to feather their own nests ; and they brought their work about ; good lord , what a deal of dirt was presently thrown into the bishops faces by every rurall pettie clerk ! what infamous ballads were sung , what a thick clowd of epidemical hatred hung suddenly over them , so far , that a dog with black and white spots was called a bishop amongst them up and down the streets . the chiefest contrivers of this up-roare , ●…inding their design to go on so well , and perceiving the whole country so eagerly bent against bishops , ( and what artifices and suggestions were us'd to render them so odious is incredible ) but finding withall his majestie unwilling to alter the government his father ( of so fresh and famous memory ) had left him , and to which he had bin sworn at his coronation , they put themselves in arms , and rais'd forces to beat down the mitre with the sword , if the scepter would not do it . to the frontiers they came with a great army , ( not half so great as was bruted ) pretending they came as petitioners ( though they brought their petition upon the pikes ▪ point , ) some of the great ones ▪ about the king grew cold in the action : and what a pacification was then shuffled up , and how a parliament was called thereupon in scotland , with other passages , is a fitter subject for a story then a discourse . peregrin . i could have wished two things , that either his majesty had given them battail then , having the flower of his nobility and gentry with him , who i understood came with all cheerfulnesse and pomptitude to attend him , or else that after the said pacification , his majestie had shaken off all jealousies , and with a royall freedom and a commanding confidence gone amongst them to hancell their new parliament house at edenburgh ; for it is probable , it had averted those showers and cataracts of ●…miseries which have fallen ●…pon us since ; but i pray sir , proceed . patricius . as they say , there is no wind but blows some-body good , so it was thought , this northern clowd did england some advantage , for a parliament was summond hereupon : a parliament do i call it ? it was rather an embryo of a parliament , an ephemeran of 20 ▪ days . in this sitting his majesty declared unto both houses the indignities he had received by his scotch subjects , and therefore propos'd a supply to be made of twelve subsidies to suppress that rebellion ; and in lieu thereof he was willing to forbear and utterly to abolish the ship-money , which he had reason to think legall at first , being advised thereunto by noy his attorney generall , who had such a mighty repute in the law ; yet he would not rest ther , but he advised further with his learned councell , who concurred in opinion with noy ; nor wold he rest ther also , but he had the approbation of all the iudges singly , and afterwards of nine of the twelve jointly upon a demur . this was enough to induce his conscience to hold it legall all this while ; it was clearly proved that the moneys levied this way , were employed to no other but the intended service , the garding of the narrow seas ; and not onely for that , but to preserve his right of dominion in them , being the fairest flower of his crown , which was not onely discoursed of abroad , but began to be questioned by the french cardinall : and touching danger , how could england be but in apparant dangers ? consideri●…g how all her next neighbours were in actuall hostility , which made huge fleets of men of war , both french , dunkerkers , hamburgers and hollanders to sail and flaunt ever and anon in her channells , and hard before her royall chambers : nor came ther one penny of that publick contribution to his privat coffers , but he added much of his own demeans for the maintenance of a royal fleet every sommer : yet he was ready to passe any bill for the utter abolishing of the said ship-money , and for redressing of a●…y other grievances , provided they wold enable him to suppress this scots rebellion : some say the house was inclinable to comply with his majesties demands , but ( as the ill spirit wold have it ) that parliament was suddenly brok up , and i wold they who gave that counsel had bin then in arabia , or beyond the line , in their way to madagascar , who neverthelesse have got to be in high request with this present parliament . among others , old sir harry vane was one , who , when the house seem'd willing to give six subsidies , and the king inclinable to take them ; the said vane being the secretary of state stood up , and said , his majesty expected no less then twelve , which words did so incense and discompose the house , that they drew after them that unhappy dissolution . his majesty being reduced to these straits , and resenting still the insolence of the scot , proposed the busines to his privy councell , who suddenly made up a considerable and most noble summe for his present supply , whereunto divers of his domestick servants and officers did contribut . amongst others who were active herein , the earl of strafford bestir'd himself notably , and having got a parliament to be call'd in ireland he went over , and with incredible celeritie raised 8000. men , who procured money of that parliament to maintain them , and got over those angry seas again in the compasse of lesse then six weeks . you may infer hence to what an exact uncontrollable obedience he had reduced that kingdom , as to bring about so great a work with such a suddennes and facilitie . an armie was also raised ▪ here , which marched to the north , and there fed upon the kings pay a whole summer . the scot was not idle all this while ; but having punctuall intelligence of every thing that passed at court , as farre as what was debated in the cabinet councel , and spoken in the bed-chamber , ( and herein amongst many others , the scot had infinite advantage of us ) he armed also , and preferring to make england the stage of the warre , rather then his own countrey , and to invade rather then to be invaded , he got over the tweed , and found the passage open , and as it were made for him all the way till hee came to the tine , and though there was a considerable army of horse and foot at newcastle , yet they never offered so much as to face him all the while , at newburgh indeed there was a small skirmish , but the english foot would not fight , so newcastle gates flew open to the scot without any resistance at all , where it is thought he had more friends then foes , and who were their friends besides for this invasion , i hope time , and the tribunall of justice will one day discover . his majesty being then at york , summoned all his nobles to appear , to advise with them in this exigence : commissioners were appointed on both sides , who met at rippon , and how the hearts and courage of some of the english barons did boil within them , to be brought to so disadvantageous a treatie with the scot , you may well imagin . so the treatie began , which the scot wold not conform himself to do , unless he were first unrebell ▪ d and made rectus in curia , and the proclamation , wherein he was declared traitour , revoked , alledging it wold be dishonorable for his majesty to treat with rebels . this treaty was adjourned to london , where this present parliament was summoned ( which was one of the chiefest errands of the sco●… , as some think . ) and thus far by these sad and short degrees , have i faithfully led you along to know the tru originals of our calamities . peregrin . truly sir , i must tell you , that to my knowledg these unhappy traverses with scotland , have made the english suffer abroad very much in point of national honour ; therefore i wonder much that all this while ther is none set a work to make a solid apologie for england in some communicable language , ( either in french or latin ) to rectifie the world in the truth of the thing , and to vindicat her , how she was bought and sold in this expedition , considering what a party the scot had here , and how his comming in , was rather an invitation , then an invasion , and i beleeve if it had bin in many parts of the world besides , some of the commanders had gone to the pot . patricius . it is the practise of some states i know , to make sacrifice of some eminent minister , for publick mistakes : but to follow the thred of my discourse . the parliament being sate , his majesty told them , that he was resolved to cast himself wholly upon the affection and fidelity of his people , whereof they were the representative body : therfore he wished them to go roundly on to close up the ruptures that were made by this infortunat war , and that the two armies , one domestick , the other forrain , which were gnawing the very bowels of the kingdom , might be dismissed . touching grievances of any kind ( and what state was ther ever so pure , but some corruption might creep into it ? ) he was very ready to redresse them : concerning the ship-money , he was willing to pass a b●…ll for the utter abolition of it , and to establish the property of the subject ; therefore he wished them not to spend too much time about that . and for monopolies , he desired to have a list of them , and he wold damn them all in one proclamation : touching ill counsellours , either in westminster-hall , or white-hall , either in church or state , he was resolved to protect none , therefore he wished that all jealousies and misunderstandings might vanish : this , with sundry other strains of princely grace he delivered unto them , but withall he told them , that they shold be very cautious how they shook the fram of an ancient government too far , in regard it was like a watch , which being put asunder , can never be made up again , if the least pin be left out . so ther were great hopes of a calm , after that cold northern storm had so blustered , and that we shold be suddenly rid of the scot , but that was least intended , untill som designs were brought about . the earl of strafford , the archbishop of canterbury , the iudges , and divers monopolists are clapt up , and you know who took a timely flight ( lord finch ) to the other side of the sea. and in lieu of these , the bishop of lincoln is enlarged , bastwick , burton , and prynn are brought into london with a kind of hosanna . his majesty gave way to all this , and to comply further with them , he took as it were into his bosom , i mean , he admitted to his privy councell those parliament lords , who were held the greatest zelots amongst them , that they might be witnesses of his secret'st actions , and to one of them ( the lord say ) he gave one of the considerablest offices of the kingdom , by the resignation of another most deserving lord , upon whom they could never fasten the least misdemeanour ; yet this great new officer wold come neither to the same oratory , chappell , or church , to joyn in prayer with his royall master , nor communicat with him in any publick exercise of devotion : and may not this be called a tru recusancie ? to another he gave one of the prime and most reposefull offices about his own person at court ( the earl of essex ) and thereby he might be said to have given a staff to beat himself . moreover , partly to give his subjects an evidence how firmly he was rooted in his religion , and how much he desired the strenthning of it abroad , the treaty of marriage went on 'twixt his eldest daughter , and the young prince of orenge . hereunto may be added as a speciall argument of compliance and grace , the passing of the bill for a trienniall parliament , and lastly ( which is the greatest evidence that possibly can be imagined , of that reall trust and confidence he reposed in them ) he passed that prodigious act of continuance . peregrin . touching the trienniall parliament , there may come some whole some fruit out of it , will keep all officers in awe , and excite the nobilitie , and young gentrie of the kingdome to studie , and understand the government of the land , and be able to sit and serve their countrey in this great senate : but for this act of continuance i understand it not ; parliaments are good physick , but ill meat ; they say abroad that england is turned hereby from a monarchy to a democracy , to a perpetual kind of quingentumvirat ; and whereas in former times ther was a heptarchy of seven ▪ kings in her , they say now she hath seventy times seven . but in lieu of these unparallell'd acts of grace and trust to the parl. what did the parliament for the king all this while ? patricius . they promised , specially upon the passing of the last act , that they would make him the most glorious , the best beloved , and richest king that ever reigned in england : and this they did with deep protestings and asseverations . but there intervened an ill-favoured accident which did much hurt , viz. a discourse ( for truely i think it was no more ) but a discourse ) which some green heads held to bring up the northern armie , to check the puritan partie , and the rabble of the citie : this kept a mightie noyse , and you know who fled upon it , and much use was made of it to make that cloud of jealousie which was but of the breadth of a hand before , to appear as big as a mountaine . yet his majestie continued still in passing acts of grace , and complying with them in every thing ▪ hee put over unto them the earle of strafford , who after a long costly triall ( wherein he carried himself with as much acutenesse , dexteritie and eloquence , as humane braine could be capable of for his defence ) hee was condemned to the scaffold , and so made a sacrifice to the scot , who stayed chiefly for his head , which besides those vast summes of money , was given him to boot . peregrin . touching the earle of strafford , 't is tru , he was full of ability , elocution and confidence , and understood the lawes of england as well as any , yet there were two things , i heard , wherein his wisdom was questioned ; first that having a charge ready against his chiefest accusers , yet he suffered them to have the priority of sute , which if he had got he had thereby made them parties , and so incapable to be produced against him : secondly , that during the time of his tryall , he applyed not himself with that compliance to his iury as well as to his iudges , for he was observed to comply only with the lords , and not with the house of commons . patricius . howsoever , as some say , his death was ●…esolved upon , ( si non per viam justitiae , saltem per viam expedientiae ) which appears in regard the proceedings against him are by a clause in the act not to be produced for a leading case or example to future ages and inferiour courts : i blush to tell you how much the rabble of the city thirsted after his blood , how they were suffered to strut up and down the streets before the royal court , and the parliament it self , with impunity ; they cried out , that if the common law fail'd , club law should knock him down , and their insolency came to that height , that the names of those lords that would not doome him to death , should be given them to fix upon posts up and downe ; and this was the first tumult that happened this parliament , whereof so many followed after their example , being not onely conniv'd at , but backed by authoritie , for there were prohibitions sent from the parliament , to hinder all processe against some of them . these myrmidons , as they termed themselves , were ready at a watchword , so that one might say there was a kind of discipline in disorder . peregrin . were ther any troubled for delivering their votes in the houses ? i thought that freedom of opinion and speech , were one of the prime priviledges of that great nationall senat. patricius . yes , those that were the minions of the house before , became now the subjects of popular malice and detraction , ( as the lord digby now earl of bristol for one ) because against the dictamen of their consciences they would not vote the earl of strafford to death , and renounce their own judgments , and captivate it to the sense of others , yet they stood firm to their first grounds , that he was a delinquent in a high nature , and incapable ever to beare office in any of his majesties dominions . peregrin . i perceive sir by your speeches , that one of the chiefest causes of these combustions may be imputed to the citie of london , which may be called the metropolis of all these evils , and i little wonder at it , for it hath been alwaies incident to all great townes , when they grow rich and populous , to fall into acts of insolence , and to spurne at government ; where so many pots , ( so many braines i meane ) are a boyling , ther must needs be a great deal of froth , but let her look to her self , for majesty hath long arms , and may reach her at last . but the truth is , that london bears no proportion with the size of this island , for either the one shold be larger , or the other lesser : london may be well compared to the liver of a cramm'd italian goose , whose fatning emacerates the rest of the whole body , and makes it grow lean and languish , and she may be well term'd a goose now more then ever , for her feathers are pluck'd apace ; but now that you have done with the earl of strafford , what is become of all the rest who were committed ? patricius . they are still in durance , and have continued so these two years and upward , yet are not proceeded against , nor brought to their answer to this very day , though all the courts of justice have bin open ever since . many hundreds more of the best sort of subjects have bin suddenly clapt up , and no cause at all mentioned in many of their commitments , and new prisons made of purpose for them , where they may be said to be buried alive , and so forgotten as if ther were no such men in the world ( wherof the author was one : ) and how this can stand with magna charta , with the petition of right ( to vindicat which , ther was so much pains taken the last parliament ) let any man of a sane judgment determin . yet one of the judges , who hath an impeachment o●… high treason still lying dormant against him , though he be not rectus in curia himself , is suffered to sit as judge upon the highest tribunall of england , whereas another for a pretended misdemeanour only is barr'd from sitting ther. others who were at first cryed up and branded to be the most infamous projectors and monopolizers of the land , ( as hamilton , holland , &c. ) are not only at liberty , but crept into favour , and made use of . peregrin ▪ hath the house of commons power to commit any but their own members without conference with the lords ? or hath any order or ordinance of one of the houses singly , or of both conjunctly , power to enjoin a virtual , binding , generall obedience without the royal consent ? patricius . the power of parliament , when king , peers , and commons , which is the whole kingdom digested as it were into one volum , is indefinit , but what either of both houses can do of themselves singly or joyntly without the king who is the life of the law , especially when a visible faction reigns amongst them , i will not determin . — tantas componere lites non opis est nostrae — but for my own opinion , i think it is as impossible for them to make a law without the king , as it was for paracelsus to make a human creture without coition of both sexes . the results of parliament without the royall consent , are as matches without fire ; and it is an incontroulable principle , that the old law must be our guide , till new be made , nor is any act of the subject justifiable , but what is warranted by the old . but to proceed in the tru discovery of these domestick scissures , my lord of stafford being gone , we hop'd fair weather wold follow . ( he who was the cause of the tempest ( as they pretended ) being thrown over-board ) but unluckie mists of jealousie grew thicker and thicker ; yet the scots were dismist , having had fidlers fare , meat , drink , and money , for eleven long moneths together . so his majesty went to scotland , where the parliament ther , did but ask and have any thing , though it be the unquestionable prerogative of majesty to grant or deny petitions , and to satisfie his conscience before any councell whatsoever . but during his sojourn ther , this formidable hideous rebellion brok out in ireland , which though it may be said to be but an old play newly reviv'd ▪ yet the scene was never so tragicall and bloody as now : for the barbarismes that have bin committed ther have bin so sanguinary , and monstrously savage , that i think posterity will hold them hyperbolicall ●…when history relates them . the irish themselves affirm ther concurr'd divers causes to kindle this fire : one , was the taking off of straffor●…s head , ( who awd them more then any deputy ever did ) and that one of his accusations shold be to have used the papists ther too favourably : secondly , the rigorous proceedings and intended courses against the roman catholiques here in england . lastly , the stopping of that regiment of irish , who was promised by his majesties royall word and letter to the king of spain , who relying upon that employment , rather then to beg , steal , or starve , turned rebels : and that , which hath agravated the rebellion all this while , and heightned much the spirit of the irish , was the introduction of the scot , whom they hate in perfection above all people els ; and intended lastly the design spoken of in our parliament , to make an absolute conquest , and nationall eradication of them , which hath made them to make vertue of necessity , and to be valiant against their wills . peregrin . indeed i heard that act of staying the irish regiment , considering how the marquesses de velada , and malvezzi , and don alonso de cardenas , who were all three ambassadours here for the king of spain at that time , having by reliance upon the sacred word and letter of a king , imprested money , and provided shipping for their transport , and bin at above 10000. crowns charges , i say this act was very much censured abroad , to the dishonour of his majesty and our reproach . patricius . i am very sorry to hear it . well sir. his majesty by his presence having setled scotland , was at his return to london received with much joy and exultation , but though he was brought in with a hosanna at one end of the town , he found a crucifige at the other : for at westminster ther was a remonstrance fram'd , a work of many weeks , and voted in the dead of night , when most of the moderat and well-thoughted members were retired to their rest , wherein with as much aggravation and artifice as could be , the least moat in government was exposed to publick view , from the first day of his majesties inaugurat●…on to that very hour : which remonstrance as it did no good to the publick but fill peoples heads with doubts , their hearts with gall , and retard the procedure of all businesse besides , so you may well think it could expect but cold entertainment with his majesty , who hoped his great councel , according to their often deep protestations , had done something for his welcom home , that might have made him the best beloved king that ever 〈◊〉 amongst his people . peregrin . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ther is no government upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 up of m●…n , but is subject to corruption ; there is no court of judicature so cleane , but some cobwebs may gather in it , unlesse an act of parliament could be made to free and exempt men from all infirmities and errour ; it cannot be denied , but scotland might have something to complaine of ( though i think least of any ) and so leapt first into the pooll to be cur'd , and what she fish'd besides in those troubled waters 't is too well known : england also no doubt might have some grievances , which his majestie freely offered not onely to redresse for the present , but to free her of all feares for the future , from falling into relapses of that kinde ; but to redresse grievances by armes , by plunging the whole countrey into an intestine warre , this makes the remedy worse then the malady , it is as if one would go about to cure a sick body by breaking his head , or let him blood by giving him a dash on the nose , it is as mad a tricke as his was who set the whole house a fire to roast his egs . but truly sir , in my opinion , his majesty at his return from scotland , might have justly expected some acts of compliance and gratitude from his parliament , considering what unparallel'd acts of grace he had pass'd before . patricius . his majesty did not rest there , but complied further with them by condescending to an act for putting down the star-chamber court the high commission , the court of honour , nay , he was contented his own privy councell should be regulated , and his forests bounded not according to ancient prerogative but late custome ; nay further , he pass'd a bill for the unvoting , and utter exclusion of the spirituall lords from the parliament for ever , whereby it cannot be denied , but by the casheering of 25 votes at a clap , and by excluding the recusant lords besides ( who subsist most by his grace ) he did not a little enervat his own prerogative . adde hereunto that having placed two worthy gentlemen biron and lunsford lieutenants of the tower , he remov'd them both one after the other , and was content to put in one of their election : and lastly , he trusted them with his greatest strength of all , with his navie royall , and call'd home pennington who had the guard of the narrow seas so many yeares . peregrin . truly sir , i never remember to have heard or read of such notable acts of grace and confidence from any king : but would not all this suffice ? patricius . no , but they demanded all the land souldiery and military strength of the kingdome to be disposed of by them , and to be put into what posture , and in what equipage , and under what commanders they pleas'd ; and this was the first thing his majesty ever denyed them , yet he would have granted them this also for a limited time , but that would not serve the turn ; hereupon his majesty grew a little sensible how they inch'd every day more and more upon his royall prerogatives ; and intending to go to his town of hull to see his magazin ( which he had bought with his own money ) with his ordinary train , he was in a hostile manner kept out , canons mounted , pistols cockt , and leveld at him . but whether that unlucky knight ( hotham ) did this out of his fidelity to the parl. or out of an apprehension of feare that some about the king , being mov'd with the barbarousnesse of the action would have pistold him , i will not determine . peregrin . i have read of divers affronts of this kinde that were offerd to the french kings , rochell shut her gates more than once against henry the great , and for the king now regnant , they did not only shut him out of many of his towns , but upon the gates of some of them they writ in legible characters , roy san foy , ville sans peur , a faithlesse king , a fearlesse towne . yet in the greatest heat of those warres , there was never any towne refus'd to let in her king , provided he came attended onely with his own traine ; and besides other people abroad , i heard the scot's nation did abhor that act at hull . but i pray sir go on . patricius . his majesty being thus shut out of one towne , he might justly suspect that an attempt might be made to shut him in , in some other ; therefore he made a motion to the yorke-shire gentlemen , to have a gard for the preservation of his person , which was done accordingly . but i am come to forward , i must go backe and tell you how the king was driven from westminster . when his majesty was return'd from scotland he retir'd to hampton court , whence upon the lord majors and the cities humble sollici●…ation , he came back to white-hal to keep his christmas . but when the bill against bishops was in agitation , which businesse ●…asted neer upon ten weekes , a crue of bold ●…turdie mechanicks , and mariners , came ●…rom the citie and ruffled before white-hall and westminster-hall , and would have violated the abby of westminster , so that for many ●…ights a court of gard was forced to be kept ●…n the body of that church , ( the chiefest sanctuary of the kingdom . ) moreover , his majesty having impeached some of the members of both houses , of high treason , and being denied to have them delivered up , he went himself to the lower house to demand them , assuring the house they should have as faire and legall a triall as ever men had . but as it pleas'd god , they were not there , but retir'd to london for refuge ; the londoners grew starke wilde thereupon , and notice being sent to all the adjacent counties , this act of the kings ( though it wanted no precedents of former times ) was aggravated in the highest degree that possibly could be . hence you may easily inferre , what small securitie his majesty had at white-hall , and what indignities he might have exposed himself unto , by that which had pass'd already from the rabble , who had vilified and cried tush at his proclamations , and disgorg'd other rebellious speeches with impunity : therefore he retird to hampton court ( as we read , our saviour withdrew himselfe once from the multitude ) thence to windsor castle , whence accompanying her majesty , with his eldest daughter to the sea side for holland , and having commanded the prince to attend him against his return at greenwich , the prince had been surpriz'd , and brought to london , had not the king come a little before . thence he removed to yorke , where he kept his court all the sommer . but to returne to london , the very next day after their majesties departure , the countrey about , especially buckinghamshire being incited by the c●…tie and parliament , came in great swarmes , and joyning with the london mechanicks , they ruffled up and down the streets , and kept such a racket , making the fearfull'st riot that ever i beleeve was heard of in parliament time : so those members which formerly were fled into the citie , were brought to the house in a kind of triumph , being garded by land and water in warlike manner by these champions : after this , sundry troops of horse came from all the shires near adjoyning to ●…he parliament , and buckingham men were ●…he first , who while they express'd their ●…ve to ( hamden ) their knight , forgot their ●…worn oath to their king , and in stead of feathers they carried a printed protestation in ●…heir hats , as the londoners had done a lit●…le before upon the pikes point . peregrin . this kept a foul noise beyond sea i re●…ember , so that upon the rialto in venice , ●…t was sung up and down , that a midsummer moon ( though it was then midst of winter ) did raign amongst the english , and you must ●…hink that it hath made the venetian to ●…hrink in his shoulders , and to look but ill-favouredly upon us , since wee 'l have none of his currans . but sir , i heard much of that protestation , i pray what was the substance of it ? patricius . it was penn'd , and enjoyn'd by the par●…iament for every one to take , and it consisted of many parts ; the first was , to maintain the tru potestant religion against all popish innovations , which word popish ( as som think ) was scrued in of purpose for a loop hole to let in any other innovation : the second was to maintain the prerogative an●… honour of the king ; then the power and priviledge of parliament ; and lastly , the propriety and liberty of the subject ; for thre●… parts of this protestation , the people up an●… down seem'd to have utterly forgotte●… them , and continue so still , as if their consciences had bin tied only to the third , viz the priviledge of parliament , and never was ther a poor people so besotted , never wa●… reason and common sence so baffled in an●… part of the world . and now will i go to attend his majesty at york , where , as i told you before , being loth to part with his sword , ( though he had half parted with his scepter before ) by denying the parliament an indefinite time to dispose of the militia , ( alleadging that as the word , so the thing was new . ) he sends forth his commissions of array , according to the old law of england , which declares i●… to be the undoubted right , and royall signorie of the king , to arm or disarm any subject : the parliament sends out clean countermands for executing the said militia , so by this clashing 'twixt the commission of array and the militia , the first flash of this odious unnaturall war may be said to break out . the pulse of the parliament beats yet higher , they send an admirall to the sea ( the earl of warwick ) not only without , but expresly against the kings special command . they had taken unto them a military gard from the city for their protection , without his majesties consent , who by the advice of the lord keeper and others , had offered them a very strong gard of constables and other officers to attend them , which the law usually allows ; yet the raising of that gard in york-shire for the safegard of his majesties person , was interpreted to be leavying of war against the parliament , and so made a sufficient ground for them to raise an army , to appoint a generall ( the earl of essex ) with whom they made publick declarations to live and die . and they assumed power to confer a new appellation of honour upon him , ( excellency ) as if any could confer honour but the king ! and this army was to be maintain'd out of the mixt con●…ribution of all sorts of people ; so a great masse of money and plate was brought into the guild hall , the semstresse brought in her silver thimble , the chamber-maid her bodkin , the cook his spoons , and the vintner his bowles , and every one somthing , to the advancement of so good a work , as to wage war directly against the sacred person of their soverain , and put the whole countrey into a combustion . peregrin . surely it is impossible that a rationall christian people shold grow so simple and sottish , as to be so far transported , without some colourable cause , therfore i pray tell me what that might be ? patricius . the cause is made specious enough , and varnished over wonderfull cunningly ; the people are made to believe they are in danger , and a prevention of that danger is promised , and by these plausible ways the understanding is wrought upon , and an affection to the cause is usher'd in , by aggravation of this danger , as one wold draw a thred through a needles eye : this huge bugbear danger , was like a monster of many heads , the two chiefest were these ▪ that ther was a plot to let in the pope ; and to 〈◊〉 the civil government into a french frame ; it is incredible to think how the pulpits up and down london did ring of this by brainsick lecturers , of whom som were come from new-england , others were pick'd out of purpose , and sent for from their own flock in the countrey , to possesse , or rather to poison the hearts of the londoners , to puzzle their intellectualls , and to intoxicat their brains by their powerfull gifts ; it was punishable to preach of peace , or of caesars right , but the common subject of the pulpit was either blasphemy against god , disobedience against the king , or incitements to sedition ; good lord , what windy frothy stuff came from these fanatick brains ; these phrenetici nebulones ( for king iames gives them no better character in his ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) who may be said to be mad out of too much ignorance , not knowledg ; who neverthelesse are come to that height of prophaness and pride , that they presume to father all their doctrines , all their non-sense , raptures and ravings upon the holy spirit . nor did the pulpit only help to kindle this fire , but the presse also did contribute much stubble ; what base scurrilous pamphlets were cryed up and down the streets , and dispersed in the 〈◊〉 ? what palpable and horrid lies were daily printed ? how they multiplied in every corner in such plenty , that one might say t●…er was a superfaetation of lies , which continue unto this day ? one while the king of denmark was comming over from the sound : another while the king of france had a huge army about calais design'd for england : another while ther was an army of irish rebels comming over with the privity of the king : another while a plot was cryed up and down to burn london : another while ther were subterranean invisible troups ( at ragland castle ) mustered under ground in wales , and thousands of papists armed in lancashire , and divers reports of this nature were daily blown up , and though the authors of them were worthlesse and mean futilous persons , yet the reports themselves had that credit as to be entertain'd and canvas'd in the high court of parliament . but these false rumors produc'd one politick effect ( and it was the end indeed for which they were dispers'd ) they did intimidat and fill the peoples hearts with fears , and dispose of them to up roars and so to part with money . peregrin . i know ther be sundry sorts of fears ; ther are conscientious fears , and ther are ●…annick fears , ther are pusillanimous fears , and ther are politick fears . the first sort of fear proceeds from guilt of conscience , which turns often to phre●…cy . the second sort of fear may be call'd a kind of chymera , 't is som sudden surprizall or consternation arising from an unknown cause . pusillanimous fear makes a mountain of a mole-hill , and proceeds from poverty of spirit , and want of courage , and is a passion of abject and degenerous minds , and may be call'd cowardise , and this fear is always accompanied with jealousie . politick fear , is a created forg'd fear wrought in another , to bring som design about ; and as we find the astronomers ( the comparison is too good ) do imagin such and such shapes and circles in the heavens , as the zodiak , equinoctiall , colures , zones and topiques with others , though ther be no such things really in nature , to make their conclusions good . so the polititian doth often devise and invent false imaginary fears , to make his proceedings more plausible amongst the silly vulgar , and therby to compasse his ends : and as the sun useth to appear far bigger to us in the morning then at noon , when he is exalted to his meridian , and the reason the philosophers use to give , is the interposition of the vapours which are commonly in the lower region , through which we look upon him ( as we find a piece of silver look bigger in a bucket of water then elsewhere ) so the polititian uses to cast strange mists of fear , and fogs of jealousie before the simple peoples eyes , to make the danger seem bigger : but truly sir , this is one of the basest kinds of policy , nor can i believe ther be any such polititians amongst the cabalists of your parliament , who pretend to be so busie about gods work , a glorious reformation , for you know ther is a good text for it , that god needeth not the wicked man ▪ he abominats to be beholding to liers to bring about his purposes : but i pray sir deal freely with me , do you imamagin ther was a design to bring in the mass●… again ? patricius . the masse ? you may say ther was a plot to bring in mahomet as soon , to bring in the alchoran , or talmud as soon ; for i dare pawn my soul , the king is as cordiall a protestant as any that breathes under his three crowns , which besides his publick deep protestations , and his constant quotidian exemplary open practise , many other convincing private reasons induce me to believe , and it is in vain to think the pope can take footing here to any purpose without the kings leave . you know as well as i sir , that of all the reformed churches in christendom , the lutheran retains most of the roman , both in his positions and practise , and comes much nearer to him then we do , yet i have observed , that from the first day of his reformation , to this , he is as averse , and as far off from rome , as the rigidest calvinist that is ; and shall i think , because ther are som humble and hansom postures , and decent vestures revived in our church ( for they were never abolished ; ) because the communion table stands in the east end where it ever stood since christianity came in all our cathedralls , which shold be a rule to all inferiour churches , though the seperatist cries it up most falsly to be an innovation : because the queen hath a few simple capuchins ( fewer then was allowed by the matrimoniall capitulations ) whither to retire sometimes : because schismaticks were proceeded against with more care , and the government of the church born up ●…ately with more countenance , shall i be●…ieve out of all this that the pope must pre●…ently come in ? shall i believe the weakness ●…f our religion to be such , as to be so easily ●…aken and overturn'd ? yet i believe ther was a pernicious plot to introduce a new religion , but what i pray ? not popery , but presbitry , and with it to bring in the doctrine of buchanan and knox for civill government , and so to cast our church and state into a scots mould . peregrin . indeed i heard the english much derided abroad for resigning their intellectualls in point of religion to the scots , whom from infidels they made christians , and reformed christians first , and now for the english to run to them for a religion , and that the uniformity & reformation shold proceed from them , having disdain'd us formerly , what a disparagement is it thinke you to the anglican church ? this with other odd traverses , as the eclipsing the glory of the king , and bringing him back to a kind of minoritie , the tampering with his conscience , i will not say the straining it so farre , the depriving him of all kind of propertie , the depressing of his regall power , wherein the honour of a nation consists , and which the english were us'd to uphold more then any other , for no king hath more awful attributs from his subjects , as sacred sovereigne , gracious and most excellent majestie , nor any king so often prayed for , for in your morning liturgie he is five times prayed for , whereas other princes are mentioned but once or twice at most in their's : i say that this , with interception of letters , some incivilities offered ambassadors , and the bold lavish speeches that were spoken of the greatest queenes in christendome , and his majesties late withdrawing his royall protection from some of his merchant-subjects in other countreys , hath made the english lose much ground in point of esteeme abroad , and to be the discourse , i will not say the scorne of other people . they stick not to say , that there is now a worse maladie fallen upon their minds , then fell upon their bodies about an age since by the sweating sicknesse , which was peculiar onely unto them and found them out under all climes . others say , there is a pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst them , that they are turn'd to wolves ( as you know it is a common thing in l●…pland ) & that the old adage is verified in them , homo homini lupus ; nay our next neighbours give out , that the saying was never truer then now , rex anglorum , rex diabolorum . nor is it a small disrepute to the english , that the word cavalier , which is an attribute that no prince in christendome will disdain , and is the common appellation of the nobilitie and gentrie in most parts of the world , is now us'd , not onely in libels and frivolous pamphlets , but in publicke parliamentarie declarations , for a terme of reproach . but truely sir , what you have related touching the pulpit and the presse , transformes me into wonder , and i should want faith to beleeve it , did you not speak it upon your knowledge ; but the english when they fall to worke upon a new humour , use to overdoe all people . patricius . you have not yet the tithe of what i could give you , you would little think that coachmen , and feltmakers , and weavers were permitted to preach up and down without controulment , and to vent their froth and venome against church and state , to cry downe our hierarchy and liturgie , by most base and reviling speeches . peregrin . touching your lyturgie , i have heard it censur'd abroad by the regidest calvinists of generva and dort , yet i never heard any other character given of it , but that it is a most pious , pathetick , and perfect peece of devotion , both for the matter and forme of it , which i have been a little curious to observe . it begins with some choise passages of holy scripture , and a previous declaration or monitory to excite us to the worke in hand ; the first addresse wee make to god is by an humble and joynt confession which is appliable to any conscience , and comprehends in it all kind of sins . then followeth a pronuntiation of gods promises and pronesse to pardon and absolve us ; we goe on to the lords prayer , which having bin dictated by our saviour himself we often use , and is as amber throwne in amongst our frankincense , to make the sacrifice more precious and pleasing unto god ; then we proceed to som choice psalms , and other portions of holy scripture taken out of the old and new testament ; then we fall to the symbole of faith , whereof we make a solemn joynt confession in such a posture as shews a readinesse and resolution in us to defend it : and so to the letany , wherein the poor penitent peccant soul may be said to breath out herself into the bosome of her saviour by tender ejaculations , by panting groans , & eviscerated ingeminations , and there is no sin , no temptation whatsoever that humane frailty is subject unto , but you shall find a deliverance from it there , it is so full of christian charity , that there is no condition of people , but are remembred and prayed for there . then wee proceed by holy alternatif interlocutions ( whereby wee heare our selves speak as well as the minister ) to some effectuall short prayers ; because in long prayers the minde is subject to wander , as some zelots now a dayes use to bring their hearers into a wildernesse by their prayers , and into a labyrinth by their sermons . then goe we on to the decalogue , and if it be in a cathedrall , there is time enough for the hearer to examine himselfe , while the musick playes , where and when he broke any of gods holy commandements , and ask particular forgivenesse accordingly in the intervall ; then after other choice portions of scripture , and passages relating to our redemption , and endearing , unto us the merits of it , with a more particular confession of our faith , we are dismissed with a benediction : so that this liturgy may be call'd an instrument of many strings , whereon the sighing soul sends up varions notes unto heaven : it is a posie made up of divers flowers , to make it the more fragrant in the nostrills of god. now touching your bishops , i never knew yet any protestant church but could be content to have them , had they meanes to maintaine the dignitie , which the churches of france with others have not , in regerd the reformation beg an first among the people , not at court , as here it did in engl. for unlesse ther be som supervisers of gods house , endowed with eminent authority to check the fond fancies , and quench the false fatuous fires of every private spirit , and unlesse it be such an authority that may draw unto it a holy kind of awe and obedience what can be expected but confusion and atheisme ? you know what became of the israelites when the wonted reverence to the ark , and the ephod , and the priest , began to languish amongst them : for the braine of man is like a garden , which unlesse it be fenced about with a wall or hedge , is subject you know to be annoyed by all kinde of beasts which will be ready to runne into it ; so the braine unlesse it be restrain'd and bounded in holy things by rules of canonicall authoritie , a thousand wild opinions , and extravagant fancies will hourely rush into it : nor was there ever any field so subject to produce cockle and darnell , as the human brain is rank and ready to bring forth tares of schism and heresie of a thousand sorts , unlesse after the first culture the sickle of authority be applyed to grub up all such noisom weeds . patricius . yet this most antient dignity of bishops is traduced and vilified by every shallow-pated petty clerk , and not so much out of a tru zeal , as out of envy that they are not the like . and touching our liturgy , wherof you have bin pleas'd to give so exact a character , people are come to that height of impiety , that in som places it hath bin drown'd , in other places burnt , in som places torn in pieces to serve for the basest uses , nay it hath bin preached publickly in pulpits , that it is a piece forg'd in the devils shop , and yet the impious foul mouth'd babbler never was so much as questioned for it . nor did the church only eccho with these blasphemies ; but the presse was as pregnant to produce every day som monster either against ecclesiasticall , or secular government . i am asham'd to tell you how som bold pamphleters in a discourse of a sheet or two , wold presume to question , to dispute of , and determin the extent of monarchik jurisdiction , what sturdy doubts , what sawcy quaeries they put , what odd frivolous distinctions they f●…am'd , that the king though he was gods anointed , yet he was mans appointed : that he had the commanding , not the disposing power : that he was set to rule over , not to over-rule the people ; that he was king by human choice , not by divine charter ; that he was not king by the grace of god , so much as by the suffrage of the people ; that he was a creatur●… and production of the parliament : that he had no implicit trust , nor peculiar property in any thing ; that populus est potior rege ; that grex lege , lex est rege potentior ; that the king was singulis major , universis minor , ( wheras a successive monarch — uno minor est iove . — sometimes they wold bring instances from the states of holland , sometimes from the republick of venice , and apply them so impertinently to absolute and independant royalty ; but i find that the discourse and inferences of these grand statists were bottom'd upon four false foundations , viz. that the king of whom they speak must be either a minor , and idiot , an insufferable tyrant , or that the kingdom they mean , is elective ; none of all which is appliable , either to our most gracious and excellently qualified king , or to his renowned kingdom , which hath bin always reputed an ancient successive monarchy , govern'd by one suprem undeposeable and independent head , having the dignity , the royall state , and power of an imperiall crown , and being responsible to none ●…ut to god almighty and his own 〈◊〉 ●…or his actions , and unto whom a body ●…olitick compacted of prelates , 〈◊〉 , and all degrees of people is naturally subject ; but this is a theam of that transcenden●…y , that it requires a serious and solid tractat , rather then such a slender discourse as this is to handle . but i pray excuse me sir , that i have stept aside thus from the road of my main narration ; i told you before , how the clashing 'twixt the commission of array , and the militia , put all things in disarray throughout the whole kingdom ; the parliament as they had taken the first military gard , so they began to arm first , and was it not high time then for his majesty to do some thing think you ? yet he essayed by all ways imaginable to prevent a war , and to conquer by a passive fortitude , by cunctation , and longanimity . how many overtures for an accommodation did he make ? how many proclamations of pardon ? how many elaborat declarations breathing nothing but clemency , sweetness and truth did drop from his own imperious invincible pen , which will remain upon record to all ages , as so many monuments to his eternall glory ? yet som ill spirit stept still in , between his grace , and the abused subject , for by the peremptory order of parliament ( o monstrous thing ) the said proclamations of grace , and other his majesties declarations were prohibited to be read ; fearing that the strength and truth of them wold have had a vertue to unblind , or rather unbewitcht ( for rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft ) the poor besotted people : what deep protestations and holy vowes did he reiterate that the main of his designs , was to preserve the tru protestant religion , the known lawes of the land , and the just priviledges of parliament ? how often did he dehort and woo the city of london ( his imperiall chamber ) from such violent courses , so that she may be justly upbraided with the same words , as the prince of peace upbraided ierusalem withall : london , london , how often wold i have gathered thee , as a ●…en doth her chickens under her wings , yet thou wouldst not ? how often did he descend to acknowledg the manner of demanding the one and five members in his publick remonstrances ? and if ther was an errour in the proceedings , how oft did he desire his great councell to direct him in a course how to go on in the empeachment ? which they never did , but wold reserve the priviledge to themselves to be judge and party . peregrin . can your parliament protect high treason ? i am sure the character of an ambassadour cannot , which the late french ambassadour ( who for his time play'd his cards more cunning than ever count gondomar did ) knew well ; and therefore , as i heard som french men say , he got letters of revocation before his designed time : but it seems strange to me , that the king who is the protectour of the law , and fountain of justice , cannot have the benefit of the law himself , which the meanest of his vassals can claim by right of inheritance : 't is strange , i say , that the law shold be a dead letter to him who is the life of the law , but that for omission of some punctillio in the form of the processe , the charge of high treason shold be so slightly wav'd , specially treason of so universall a concernment , that it may be call'd a complication of many treasons ; for if in every petty state it be high treason to treat only with any forrein power without the privity of the prince , it must needs be treason of a higher nature actually to bring them in ; and hereof i could alleadge you many pregnant instances , ancient and modern , but that i do not desire to interrupt you in your relation . patricius . the parliament , as i told you before , armed apace , it was not fitting then his majesty shold sit idle ; therfore he summons those nobles and others , who had an immediate relation unto him by office or service , to attend him at york , according to their particular obligation and oath : but it seems the parliament assumed power to dispence with those oaths , and excuse their attendance , which dispensation prevail'd with som ( tender ) consciences ; yet the great seal posted to court , and after it most of the nobles of the land , with the flower of the gentry , and many of the prime members of the commons house ; so that were it not for the locall priviledge , the parliament for number of members , might be said to be ever since about the king : these nobles and gentlemen resenting his majesties case , and what practices ther were on foot to alter the government both of church and state , not only advised his majesty to a royall war for defence of his crown and dignity , but contributed very chearfully , and have stood constant to the work ever since . peregrin . they have good reason for it , for the security of the nobility and gentry depends upon the strength of the crown , otherwise popular government wold rush in like a torrent upon them . but surely those nobles , and those parliament gentlemen and others , som of whom i understand , were reputed the wisest and best weigh'd men for experience and parts thorowout the whole kingdom , and were cryed up in other parliaments to be the most zealous patriots for the propriety and freedom of the subject , wold never have stuck so firmly to his majesty , had they not known the bottom of his designs , that it was far from his thoughts to bring in the pope or french government ; for therby they shold have betrayed their own posterity , and made their children slaves . patricius . to my knowledge , these nobles and gentlemen are still the very same as they were in former parliaments , wherin they were so cryed up for the truest lovers of their country , and best common-wealths-men ; yet now they are branded , and voted to be seducers , and traytors , because according to their oaths and consciences , they adhere to the king their master and liege-lord , for maintenance of that religion they were baptized and bred in . those most orthodox and painfull divines , which till this parliament began were accounted the precisest sort of protestants , are now cryed down for papists , though they continue still the very same men , both for opinions and preaching , and are no more papists than i am a pythagorean . in fine , a tru english protestant is put now in the same scale with a papist , and made synonyma's . and truly these unhappy schismaticks could not devise how to cast a greater infamy upon the english protestant than they have done of late by these monstrous imputations ; they wold fasten upon him such opinions which never entred into his thoughts , they wold know ones heart better than himself , and so would be greater kardiognosticks than god almighty . but to draw to a conclusion ; the parliaments army multiplyed apace in london , the kings but slowly in the north , so that when he displayed his royal standard at nottingham , his forces were not any thing considerable , so that if the parliaments generall ( essex ) had then advanced towards him from northampton , he had put him to a very great strait ; they encreased somthing at derby , and stafford , but when he was come to shrewsbury , the welch-men came running down the mountains in such multitudes , that their example did much animate the english ; so that his army in lesse than a month that the court continued in shrewsbury , came to near upon twenty thousand horse and foot ; not long before , the nephew princes came over , and the first encounter prince rupert had with the parliaments forces was at worcester , where he defeated the flower of their cavalry , and gave them a smart blow . at shrewsbury his majesty took a resolution to march with his whole army towards london , but after seven days march he understood the parliaments forces were within six miles side-long of him , and so many miles he went out of his road to find them out , and face them : upon sunday morning he was himself betimes upon edge-hill , wher the enemies colours plainly appear'd in vale before keinton ; it was past two in the after-noon before all his infantery could get to the bottom , who upon sight of the enemies colours ran as merrily down the hill , as if they had gone to a morris dance . so his majesty himself being generalissimo , gave command the great ordnance shold flye for a defiance , so the battell began , which lasted above three hours , and as some french and dutch commanders ( who were engag'd in the fight ) told me , they never remembred to have seen a more furious battail for the time in all the german wars . prince rupert pursued the enemies horse like a whirl-wind near upon three miles , and had ther bin day enough , when he came back to the infanterie , in all probability a totall defeat had bin given them : so that the same accident may be said to fall out here , as happened in that famous battell at lewis , in henry the thirds time , where the prince of wales ( afterwards edward the first ) was so eager , and went so far ( by excesse of courage ) from the body of the army in pursuance of the londoners , that it was the fatall cause of the losse of that mighty battail . his majesty ( to his deserved and never-dying glory ) comported himself like another caesar all the while , by riding about and encouraging the souldiers , by exposing his person often to the reach of a musket-bullet , and lying in the field all that bleak night in his coach. notwithstanding that many lying pamphlets were purposely printed here , to make the world believe that he had retir'd himself all the time of the fight ; what partiall reports were made in the guild-hall to the londoners , and by what persons , ( w. and strode ) i am ashamed to tell you : but that his majesty was victorious that day ( a day which i never thought to have seen in england ) ther be many convincing arguments to prove it ; for besides the great odds of men which fell on their side , and cannons they lost , som of their ordnance were nayl'd by the kings troops the next morning after in the very face of their army . moreover , the king advanc'd forward the next day to his former road , and took banbury presently after ; but the parliamenteers went backwards , and so from that day to this , his majesty continueth master of the field . 't is tru , that in som places , as at farnham , winchester , and chichester , they have prevail'd since , but no considerable part of the royall army was ther to make opposition ; and i blush to tell you , how unworthily the law of armes was violated in all those places . peregrin . good lord , how can the souls of those men that were in the parliaments army at keinton battell , dispense with the oaths of supremacy and allegeance , besides the protestation you speak of , they had taken to preserve the person , honour , and prerogative of the king , when they thus actually bandy against his person , and appear in battel with all the engines of hostility against him ? patricius . i wold be loth to exchange consciences with them , and prevaricate so palpably with god almighty ; touching the cavaliers , they may be said to comply with their duties both towards god and their king according to the oaths you mention ; moreover , ther was a strong act of parliament ( for their security ) which was never as much as questioned or controverted , much lesse suspended or repeal'd : but always stood , and yet stands in as full validity and force , as it was the first day it was enacted , and as much binding to an universall obedience , which act runs thus : 13. octobris anno undecimo henrici septimi , anno dom. 1496 it is ordained , enacted , and established by the king our soverain lord , by the advice and assent of the lords spirituall and temporall , and the commons in this present parliament assembled , and by authority of the same , that from henceforth no manner of person or persons whatsoever he or they be , that attend upon the king and soverain lord of this land for the time being in his person , and do him tru and faithfull service of allegiance in the same , or be he in other places by his commandment , in his wars within this land or without : that for the said deed , and tru duty of allegiance , he or they be in no wise convict or attaint of high treason , nor of other offences for that cause , by act of parliament or otherwise by any processe of law , whereby he or any of them , shall lose or forfeit life , lands , tenements , rents , possessions , hereditaments , goods , chattels , or any other things : but to be for that deed and service utterly discharged of any vexation , trouble or loss . and if any act or acts , or other processe of the law hereafter , therupon for the same happen to be made contrary to this ordinance , that then that act or acts , or other processe of the law , whatsoever they shall be , stand and utterly void . provided alwayes that no person or persons shall take any benefit or advantage by this act , which shall hereafter decline their said allegiance . peregrin . this is as plain and fair as can be for securing both the person and conscience of the cavalier , but was ther ever any act or oath , or any thing like an oath that oblig'd englishmen to be tru unto , or fight for the parliament ? patricius . never any , but these men by a new kind of metaphysicks have found out a way to abstract the person of the king from his office , to make his soveraigntie a kind of platonick idea hovering in the aire , while they visibly attempt to assaile and destroy his person and progeny , by small and great shot , and seek him out amongst his life-gard with fire and sword ; yet they give out , they fight not only not against him , but for him , and that their army is more loyall unto him than his owne ; who , they say , fight only for the name king , though they have his person really amongst them , commanding and directing : thus they make him a strange kind of amphibium , they make in one instant a king and no king of the same individuum ; a power which the casuists affirme god almighty never assumed to himself , to doe any thing that implies a contradiction . peregrin . noble sir , you make my heart to pant within me , by the pathetick relation you have been pleas'd to make mee of these ●…uthfull times ; but one thing seems to me to be no lesse then a miracle , how his majestie hath beene able to subsist all this while , considering the infinite advantages the averse partie hath had of him ; for they have all the tenable places and townes of strength , both by land and sea ; they have the navie royall , they have all the amunition and armes of the crown , they have all the imposts and customs , poundage and tonnage ( which they levie contrary to their former protestation before the bill be pass'd ) they have the exchequer at their devotion , and all the revenue of the king , queen , and prince , and lastly , they have the citie of london , which may be eall'd a magazin of money and men , where there is a ready supplie and superfluitie of all things , that may seed , clothe , or make men gay to put them in heart and resolution : truely considering all these advantages , with divers others on their side , and the disadvantages on the kings , it turnes me into a lump of astonishment , how his majestie could beare up all this while , and keep together so many armies , and be still master of the field . patricius . i confesse sir , it is a just subject for wonderment , and we must ascribe it principally to god almightie , who is the protectour of his anointed , for his hand hath manifestly appear'd in the conduct of his affaires ; hee hath been the pilot , who hath sate at the helme ever s●…nce this storme began , and will we hope continue to steer his course till he waft him to safe harbour againe ; adde hereunto , that his majesty for his own part , hath beene wonderfully stirring , and indefatigable both for his body and minde ; and what notable things her majesty hath done , and what she hath suffered , is fitter for chronicle , then such a simple discourse . hereunto may be added besides , that his majestie hath three parts of foure of the peeres , and prime gentrie of the kingdom firme unto him , and they will venture hard before they will come under a popular government and mechanicall corporations , or let in knox or calvin to undermine this church , and bring in their bawdy stool of repentance . peregrin . truely sir , amongst other countreys , i extreamly long'd to see england , and i am no sooner come , but i am surfeited of her already , i doubt the old prophecie touching this island is come now to be verified , that the churchman was , the lawyer is , and the souldier shall be . i am afraid the english have seene their best dayes ; for i find a generall kind of infatuation , a totall eclipse of reason amongst most of them ; and commonly a generall infatuation precedes the perdition of a people ; like a fish , that putrifieth first in the head ; therefore i will trusse up my baggage and over again , after i have enjoyed you some dayes , and received your commands . patricius . dear sir , if you seriously resolve to crosse the seas againe so soon , i may chance beare you company , for as you have since the short time of your sojourn here judiciously observed a national defection of reason in the people of this island , which makes her so active in drawing on her own ruine ; so by longer experience , and by infallible symptomes i find a strange kind of vertigo to have seized upon her , which i feare will turne to the falling sicknesse , or such a frenzie that will make her to dash out her own braines : nor are her miseries , i feare , come yet to the full ; it is the method of the almightie , when he pleases to punish a people , to begin with roddes , to goe on with scourges , and if they will not do , he hath scorpions for them : therefore , i will breath any where sooner then here , for what securitie or contentment can one receive in that countrey , where religion and iustice , the two grand dorique columnes which support every state , are fallen down ? which makes all conditions of men , all professions and trades to go here daylie to utter ruine . the churchman grows every day more despicable , as if he had no propertie in any thing , nor is there any way left him to recover his tithe , but by costly troublesome sutes . the civilian , a brave learned profession , hath already made his last will ; and the common lawyers case is little better ; the courtier cannot get his pension ; the gentleman cannot recover his rents , but either they are sequestred by a high hand of unexampled power , or else the poor tenant is so heavily assess'd or plundred , that he is disabled to pay them in ; all kind of comerce both domestick and forrein visibly decayes , and falls more and more , into the hands of strangers ( to the no small dishonour of the wisedome of this nation ) nor can the tradesman recover his debts , parliamentary protections continue still in such numbers , so that it is a greater priviledge now to be a footman to the meanest of the lower house , then to be of the kings bed chamber : prenti●…es run away from their masters , and against their fathers intent turn souldiers , and for money , which is the soul of trade , i beleeve since the beginning of this parliament , above one half of the treasure of the kingdome is either conveyed to'ther side of the sea , or buried under ground , whence it must be new digg'd up againe . moreover , all things are here grown arbitrary ( yet that word took off the earle of straffords head ) religion , law , and allegiance is growne arbitrary ; nor dares the iudge upon the tribunall ( according to his oath ) do justice , but he is over-awed by ordinance ; or els the least intimation of the sense of the lower house is sufficient to enjoyne him the contrary , so that now , more then ever , it may be said here , — terras astraea reliquit . — peace also hath rov'd up and downe this island , and cannot get a place to lay her head on ; she hoped to have had entertainment in york-shire by the agreement of the best gentlemen in the countrey ; but an ordinance of parliament beat her out of doores ; then she thought to rest in cheshire , and by a solemne covenant she was promis'd to be preserv'd ther , the principal agents of that covenant having protested every one upon the word of a gentleman , and as they did desire to prosper , both themselves , their tenants and friends , , shold strictly observe it ; but the like ordinance of parliament battered down that agreement . then she thought to take footing in the west , and first in dorcetshire , then in cornwall and devonshire , and by the holy tie of the blessed sacrament she was promised to be preserved ther ; but another ordinance of parliament is pursuing her , to dispense with the commissioners of the said agreement for their oaths . lastly , his majesty is mainly endeavouring to bring her in again thorowout the whole land ; but the furious , phrentique schismaticks will have none of her ; for as one of them ( besides a thousand instances more ) preach'd in one of the most populous congregations about the city , it were better that london streets ran with bloud , and that dead carkasses were piled up as high as the battlements of pauls , than peace should be now brought in . and now that peace is shut out , learning is upon point of despair , her colledges are become courts of gard , and mars lieth in mercuries bed . honour also , with her court , lieth in the dust ; the cobler may confront the knight , the boor the baron , and ther is no judicial way of satisfaction ; which makes monarchy fear she hath no long time of abode here . publick faith also , though she had but newly set up for her self , is suddenly become bankrupt , and how could she choose ? for more of the kingdoms treasure hath bin spent within these thirty moneths , than was spent in four-score yeares before ; but she hopes to piece up her self again , by the ruines of the church ; but let her take heed of that , for those goods have bin fatall to many thousand families in this kingdom : yet , she thinks much , that those publick summs which were given to suppresse one rebellion ( in ireland ) shold be employed to maintain another rebellion ( in england . ) and lastly , methinks , i see religion in torn ragged weeds , and with slubber'd eyes sitting upon weeping-crosse , and wringing her hands , to see her chiefest temple ( pauls church ) where god almighty was us'd to be serv'd constantly thrice a day , and was the rendezvouz , and as it were the mother church , standing open to receive all commers and strangers , to be now shut up , and made only a thorow-fare for porters ; to see those scaffolds , the expence of so many thousand pounds , to lie rotting ; to see her chiefest lights like to be extinguished ; to see her famous learned divines dragg'd to prison , and utterly depriv'd of the benefit of the common law , their inheritance : methinks , i say , i see religion packing up , and preparing to leave this island quite , crying out , that this is countrey fitter for atheists than christians to live in ; for god almighty is here made the greatest malignant , in regard his house is plunder'd more than any : ther is no court left to reform heresie , no court to punish any church officer , and to make him attend his cure , not court to punish fornication , adultery , or incest : methinks i hear her cry out against these her grand reformers ( or refiners rather ) that they have put division 'twixt all degrees of persons . they have put division 'twixt husband and wife , 'twixt mother and child : the son seeks his fathers bloud in open field , one brother seeks to cut the others throat ; they have put division 'twixt master and servant , 'twixt land lord and tenant ; nay , they have a long time put a sea of separation 'twixt king and queen ; and they labour more and more to put division 'twixt the head and the members , 'twixt his majesty and his politicall spouse , his kingdom : and lastly , they have plung'd one of the flourishingst kingdoms of europe in a war without end ; for though a peace may be plaister'd over for the time , i fear it will be but like a fire cover'd with ashes , which will break out again , as long as these fiery schismaticks have any strength in this island ; so that all the premisses considered , if turk or tartar , or all the infernal spirits and cacodaemons of hel had broken in amongst us , they could not have done poor england more mischief . sir , i pray you excuse this homely imperfect relation , i have a thousand things more to impart unto you when we may breathe freer air ; for here we are come to that slavery , that one is in danger to have his very thoughts plundered ; therfore if you please to accept of my company , i will over with you by gods help , so soon as it may stand with your conveniency , but you must not discover me to be an englishman , abroad : for so i may be jeer'd at and kickt in the streets ; i will go under another name , and am fix'd in this resolution , never to breathe english aire again , untill the king recovers his crown , and the people the right use of their pericraniums ▪ the second part of a discourse ' twixt patricius and peregrin , touching the distempers of the times . london , printed in the year , 1661. a discours , or parly , continued betwixt patricius and peregrin , upon their landing in france , touching the civil wars of england and ireland . peregrin . gentle sir , you are happily arrived on this shore ; we are now upon firm ground , upon the fair continent of france ; we are not circumscrib'd , or coopt up within the narrow bounds of a rhumatick island ; we have all europe before us . truly i am not a little glad to have shaken hands with that tumbling element the sea ; and for england , i never intend to see her again in the mind i am in , unlesse it be in a map ; nay , in statu quo nunc , while this faction reigns , had i left one eye behind me , i should hardly returne thither to fetch it ; therefore if i be missing at any time , never look for me there . there is an old proverb , from a blacke german , a white italian , a red frenchman , i may adde one member more , and , from a round-headed englishman , the lord deliver us . i have often crossed these seas , and i found my self alwaies pitifully sick , i did ever and anon tell what wood the ship was made of ; but in this passage i did not feele the least motion or distemper in my humors : for , indeed i had no time to taink on sicknesse , i was so wholly tsken up , and transported with such a pleasing conceit , to have left yonder miserable island . peregrin . miserable island indeed ; for i thinke there was never such a tyrannie exercised in any christian countrey under heaven ; a tyrannie that extends not onely to the body , but to the braine also ; not only to mens fortunes and estates , but it reaches to their very soules and consciences , by violented new coercive oaths and protestations , compos'd by lay-men , inconsistent with the liberty of christians . never was there a nation carried away by such a strong spirit of delusion ; never was there a poor people so purblinded and puppified , if i may say so , as i finde them to be ; so that i am at a stand with my selfe , whether i shall pitie them more , or laugh at them . they not onely kisse the stone that hurts them , but the hands of them that hurle it ; they are come to that passive stupidity , that they adore their very persecutors , who from polling fall now a shaving them , and will flay them at last if they continue this popular reigne . i cannot compare england , as the case stands with her , more properly , then to a poor beast , sicke of the staggers , who cannot be cur'd without an incision . the astronomers , i remember , affirme that the moone ( which predominates over all humid bodies ) hath a more powerfull influence o're your british seas then any other ; so that according to the observation of some nevigators , they swell at a spring tide in some places , above threescore cubits high : i am of opinion , that that inconstant humorous planet , hath also an extraordinany dominion over the braines of the inhabitants ; for when they attempt any innovation ( whereunto all insulary people are more subject then other citizens of the world which are fixed upon the continent ) they swell higher , their fancies worke stronglier , and so commit stranger extravagancies then any other : witnesse these monstrous barbarismes and violencies , which have bin , and are daily offered to religion and just●…ce , ( the two grand supporters of all states ) yea , to humane reason it self since the beginning of these tumults . and now , noble sir , give me leave to render you my humble thanks for that true and solid information you pleased to give me in london of these commotions . during my short sojourne there , i lighted on divers odde pamphlets upon the seamstresses stalls , whom i wondred to see selling paper sheets in lieu of holland : on the one side i found the most impudent untruths ( vouch'd by publike authority ) the basest scurrilities , and poorest jingles of wit that ever i read in my life ; on the other side i met with many pieces that had good stuff in them , but gave mee not ( being a stranger ) a full satisfaction , they look'd no further then the beginning of this parliament , and the particular emergences thereof : but you have , by your methodicall relation , so perfectly instructed and rectified my understanding , by bringing me to the very source of these distempers , and led me all along the side of the current by so streight a line , that i believe , whosoever will venture upon the most intricate task of penning the story of these vertiginous times , will finde himself not a little beholden to that relation , which indeed may be term'd a short chronicle rather then a relation . wee are come now under another clime , and here we may mingle words , and vent our conceptions more securely ; it being , as matters stand in your countrey , more safe to speake under the lilly then the rose ; wee may here take in and put out freer ayre ; i meane , we may discourse with more liberty : for , words are nought els but aire articulated , and coagulated as it were into letters and syllables . patricius . sir , i deserve not these high expressions of your favourable censure touching that poor piece ; but this i will be bold to say , that whosoever doth read it impartially , will discover in the author the genius of an honest patriot , and a gentleman . and now methinks i look on you unfortunate island , as if one look upon a ship toss'd up and down in distresse of wind and weather , by a furious tempest , which the more she tugs and wrastles with the foamie waves of the angry ocean , the more the fury of the storme encreaseth , and puts her in danger of shipwrack ; and you must needs thinke , sir , it would move compassion in any heart , to behold a poore ship in such a desperate case , specially when all his kindred , friends and fortunes ; yea his religion , the most precious treasure of all , are aboard of her , and upon point of sinking . alas i can contribute nothing now to my poor countrey but my prayers and teares , that it would please god to allay this tempest , and cast over board those that are the true causers of it , and bring the people to the right use of reason againe . it was well observed by you , sir , that there is a nationall kinde of indisposition , and obliquity of mind that rageth now amongst our people , and i feare it will be long ere they returne to their old english temper . to that rare loyalty and love which they were used to shew to their soveraigne : for all the principles of monarchie are quite lost amongst us , those ancient and sacret flowers of the english diadem are trampled under foot ; nay , matters are come to that horrid confusion , that not onely the prerogative of the crown , but the foundamentall priviledge of the free-born subject is utterly overthrowne , by those whose predecessors were used to be the main supporters of it : so that our king is necessitated to put himself in armes for the preservation not only of his own regall rights , but of magna charta it self , which was neuer so invaded and violated in any age , by such causlesse tyrannicall imprisonments , by such unexampled destructive taxes , by stopping the ordinary processes in law , and awing all the courts of justice , by unheard-of forced oaths and associations , and a thousand other acts , which neither president , book-case or statute can warrant , whereof , if the king had done but the twentieth part , he had been cryed up to be the greatest tyrant that ever was . peregrin . sir , i am an alien , and so can speak with more freedom of your countrey . the short time that i did eate my bread there , i felt the pulse of the people with as much judgement as i could ; and i find , that this very word parliament is become a kind of idoll amongst them , they doe , as it were , pin their salvation upon 't ; it is held blasphemie to speake against it . the old english maxime was , the king can do no wrong ; another nominative case is now stept in , that the parliament can do no wrong , nor the king receive any : and whereas ther was used to be but one defender of the faith , ther are now started up amongst you , i cannot tell how many hundreds of them . and as in the sacred profession of priest-hood we hold , or at least wise shold hold , that after the imposition of hands , the minister is inspired with the holy ghost in an extraordinary manner for the enabling of him to exercise that divine function , so the english are grown to such a fond conceit of their parliament members , that as soon as any is chosen by the confus'd cry of the common people to sit within the walls of that house , an inerring spirit , a spirit of infallibility presently entereth into him ( so that he is therby become like the pope , a canon animatus ) though som of them may haply be such flat and simple animals , that they are as fit to be counsellours , as caligula's horse was to be consull , as the historian tells us . patricius . touching parliament , ther breaths not a subject under englands crown , who hath a higher esteem of it then i , it makes that dainty mixture in our government of monarchy , optimacie and democracy , betwixt whom , though ther be a kind of co ordination of power during the sitting of parliament , yet the two last , which are composed of peers and people , have no power , but what is derived from the first , which may be called the soul that animates them , and by whose authority they meet , consult and depart : they come there to propose , not to impose lawes ; they come not to make lawes by the sword ; they must not be like draco's lawes , written in bloud . their king calls them thither to be his counsellors , not controllers ; and the office of counsell is to advise , not to inforce ; they come thither to intreat , not to treat with their liege lord ; they come to throw their petitions at his feet , that so they may find a way up to his hear●… . 't is tru , i have read of high things that our parliament have done , but 't was either during the nonage and minority of our kings , when they were under protectorship , or when they were absent in a forrain war , or in time of confusion , when ther were competitors of the bloud-royall for the crown , and when the number of both houses was compleat and individed ; but i never read of any parliament that did arrogate to it self such a power paramount , such a superlative superintendence , as to check the prerogative of their soverain , to question his negative voice , to passe things , not only without , but expresly against his advice and royall command : i never heard of parliament , that wold have their king , being come to the meridian of his age , to transmit his intellectualls , and whole faculty of reason to them . i find som parliaments have bin so modest and moderat ( now moderation is the rudder that shold steer the course of all great councells ) that they have declined the agitation and cognizance of som state affaires , humbly transferring them to their soverain and his privy counsell : a parliament man then , held it to be the adaequat object of his duty , to study the welfare , to redresse the grievances , and supply the defects of that particular place for which he served ; the members then us'd to move in their own ( inferior ) sphere , and us'd not to be transported by any eccentric motions . and so they thought to have complyed with the obligation , and discharged the consciences of honest patriots , without soaring above their reach , and roving at random to treat of universals , much lesse to bring religion to their bar , or prie into the arcana imperti , the cognizance of the one belonging to the king , and his intern counsell of state : the other to divines , who , according to the etymologie of the word , use to be still conversant in the exercise of speculation of holy and heavenly things . peregrin . i am clearly of your opinion in these two particulars ; for , secrecy being the soul of policy , matters of state shold be communicated but to few ; and touching religion , i cannot see how it may quadrat with the calling , and be homogeneous to the profession of lay-men , to determine matters of divinity ; who , out of their incapacity and unaptnesse to the work , being not pares negotio , and being carryed away by a wild kind of conscience without science , like a ship without a helm , fall upon dangerous quick-sands ; so that whilest they labour to mend her , they marr her , whilst they think to settle her , they confound her , whilst they plot to prevent the growth of popery , they pave the way to bring it in , by conniving at , and countenancing those monstrous schismes which i observed to have crept into your church since the reign of this parliament : so that one may justly say , these your reformers are but the executioners of the old project of the jesuits , the main part wherof was , and is still , to hurle the ball of discord , and hatch new opinions still 'twixt the protestants , to make factions and scissures between them , and so render their religion more despicable and ridiculous . but methinks , matters are come to a strange pass with you in england , that the iudges cannot be trusted with the law , nor the prelats with the gospell ; whereas from all times , out of their long experience and years , these two degrees of men were used to be reverenced for the chief touch-men , and unquestionable expositors of both , which another power seems now to arrogate to it self , as the inerring oracle of both : but i pray god that these grand refiners of religion , prove not quack-salvers at last ; that these upstart polititians prove not impostors : for i have heard of some things they have done , that if machiavell himself were alive , he wold be reputed a saint in comparison of them . the roman ten , and athenian thirty , were babies to these ; nay , the spanish inquisition , and the bloet-rade ( that councell of bloud ) which the duke of alva erected in flanders , when he swore , that he wold drown the hollanders in their butter-tubs , was nothing to this ; when i consider the prodigious power they have assumed to themselves , and do daily exercise over the bodies , the estates and souls of men . in your former discourse you told me , that amongst multitudes of other mischiefs , wh●…ch this new faction hath wrought , they have put division 'twixt all sorts and sexes , 'twixt all conditious , both of men and women ; one thing more i may say , they have done in this kind : for , they have laboured to put division between the persons of the holy trinity , by making the first person to be offended at that voluntary genuflection and reverence which hath bin from all times practised in the christian church to the name of the second person ; so that iesu worship , as i have read in some of your profane pamphlets , is grown now to be a word of reproach amongst you . but to the point ; ther is one thing i can never cease to wonder at : that whereas at the beginning of this parliament , ther were as able and experienced , as stout and well spoken gentlemen , as any in the whole kingdom , that sate in the house , and made the far major part , i wonder i say , that they wold suffer this giddy-headed faction to carry all before them in that violent manner , that they did not crush this cocatrice in the shell . patricius . first , sir , you know ther is nothing so agreeable to the nature of man , as novelty ; and in the conduct of humane affaires , it is always seen , that when any new design or faction is a foot , the projectors are commonly more pragmaticall and sedulous upon the work ; they lie centinell to watch all advantages , the sand of their brains is always running : this hath caused this upstart faction , to stick still close together , and continue marvellously constant to their ends ; they have bin used to tyre and out-fast , to weary and out-watch the moderate and well-minded gentlemen ; sometimes till after midnight , by clancular and nocturnall sittings ; so that as his majesty saies in one of his declarations , most of their votes may be said to be nought else , but verdicts of a starv'd iury. another reason is , that they countenanced the flocking together of the promiscuous rabble from london , notwithstanding the two severall motions the lords made unto them , that they might be suppressed by parliamentary order : this riotous crue awed the wonted freedom of speech in both houses , cryed up the names , and confronted many of their members : yet these new polititians not only conniv'd at them , but call'd them their friends ; and so they might well enough , or rather their champions ; for they had ordered the matter so , that they were sure to have them ready at their devotion , at the heaving of a finger : and from this tumultuous mongrell crue , they derived their first encouragements to do such high prodigious insolencies they have committed since . adde hereunto , that they complyed exceedingly besides with the common councell of the city , they used to attend them early and late to knock heads together ; and if any new thing was to passe in the house , they wold first wait on them , to know their pleasure , and afterwards it shold be propounded and put to vote in the house : and how derogatory it is to the high law-making-councell , to make their chiefest members wait from time to time on the magistrates of the city , who in former times were used to attend them upon all occasions in westminster , i am ashamed to think on ; nor am i lesse ashamed to remember those base artifices and indirect courses that were practis'd at the election of this pretended major ; here they tack'd about to a second choice ; after the first was legally made , and how the common-councell was pack'd up of the arrandest schismaticks up and down the city . and to that mutinous wealth-swoln city , and the said unbridled pack of oppidans ( seconded afterwards by the countrey clownes ) who offered such outrages to gods house , the kings house , and the parliament house , may be ascribed all miseries , and the miscarriage of things : for they caused his majesty to forsake his own standing palace , to absent himself from his parliament , and make that unpleasing p●…ogresse up and down his kingdom ever since , which put all counsells at a stand , and to be involv'd in a confusion . peregrin . but let me tell you that your britannick sun , though he be now ore-set with these unlucky clouds , engendred of the vapours of distempered brains , and the rotten hearts of many of his own meniall servants , who have proved like the sons of serviah unto him , ingratefull monsters , yet is he still in his own orb , and will , when this foul weather 's passed , and the aire cleared a little by thunder , shine more gloriously and powerfully then before , it being a maxime of state , that rebellion suppressed , makes a prince the stronger ; now rebellion durst never yet look a prince long in the face , for the majesty of gods anointed , useth to dart such fulgent piercing beams , that dazle the eyes of disloyalty , and strikes her stark blind at last . and truly , as you say , i am also clearly of opinion , that these ingratefull londoners , as they were the comencers , so have they been the continuers and contrivers of this ugly rebellion ever since ; they seem to have utterly forgotten who hath given them the sword , and by , and from whom they hold their charter ; their corporations are now grown body politicks , & so as many petty republikes amongst them , so that they begin to smell rank of a hans-town . poor simple annimals , how they suffer their pockets to be pick'd , their purses to be cut ; how they part with their vitall spirits every week ; how desperately they post on to poverty , and their own ruine , suffering themselves in lieu of scarlet-gownes , to be governed by a rude company of red-coats , who 'twixt plundering , assessements , and visits , will quickly make an end of them . i fear ther is som formidable judgment of regall revenge hangs over that city ; for the anger of a king is like the roaring of a lyon ; and i never read yet of any city that contested with her soverain , but she smarted soundly for it at last . the present case of london bears a great deal of proportion with that of monpellier here in france , in charls the seventh's time ; for when that town had refused the publishing of many of the kings edicts and declarations , murthered som of his ministers and servants , abused the church , and committed other high acts of insolency ; the duke of berry was sent to reduce the town to obedience ; the duke pressed them with so hard a siege , that at last the best citizens came forth in procession , bare-headed , & bare-footed , with white wands in their hands , and halters about their necks to deliver the keys of all the gates to the duke , but this wold not serve the turn , for two hundred of them were condemned to the gallies , two hundred of them were hang'd , and two hundred beheaded , the king saying , he offered those as victimes for the lives of his servants whom they had murthered with the false sword of justice . but , sir , i much marvell how your church-government , which from all times hath been cryed up to be so exact , is so suddenly tumbled into this confusion ? how your prelates are fallen under so darke a cloud , considering that divers of them were renowned through all the reform'd churches in christendome for their rare learning and pietie ? at the synod at dort , you know some of them assisted , and no exception at all taken at their degree and dignity , but took precedence accordingly , how came it to passe , that they are now fallen under this eclypse , as so be so persecuted , to be push'd out of the house of peers , and hurried into prison ? i pray you be pleased to tell me . patricius . sir , i remember to have read in the irish story , that when the earl of kildare in henry the eighth's time , was brought before the lord deputy for burning cassiles church , he answered , my lord , i would never have burnt the church , unlesse i had thought the biship had been in it ; for 't was not the church , but the bishop i aim'd at . one may say so of the anglican church at this present , that these fiery zelots , these vaporing sciolists of the times are so furiously enraged against this holy primative order ; some out of envie , some out of malice , some out of ignorance , that one may say , our church had not been thus set on fire , unlesse the bishops had been in 't . i grant there was never yet any profession made up of men , but there were some bad ; we are not angels upon earth there was a iudas amongst the first dozen of christians , though apostles , and they by our saviours owne election : amongst our prelates peradventure ( for i know of no accusation fram'd against them yet ) some might be faulty , and wanting moderation , being not contented to walk upon the battlements of the church , but they must put themselves ●…pon stilts ; but if a golden chaine hath happily a copper link two or three , will you therefore breake and throw away the whole chaine . if a few sho●…makers ( i confesse the comparison is too homely , but i had it of a scots man ) sell calfes skin for neats leather , must the gentle-craft be utterly extinguish ▪ d , must we go bare foot therefore ? let the persons suffer in the name of god , and not the holy order of episcopacy but good lord , how pittifully were those poor prelats handled ? what a tartarian kind of tyranny it was , to drag twice into prison twelve grave reverend bishops , causâ adhuc inaudita , and afterwards not to be able to frame as much as an accusation of misdemeanor against them , much lesse of treason , whereof they were first impeach'd with such high clamors : but i conceive it was of purpose , to set them out of the way , that the new faction might passe things better amongst the peers . and it seemes they brought their work about ; for whilest they were thus reclused and absent , they may be sayed to be thrust out of doores , and ejected out of their owne proper ancient inheritance , and the tower wherein they were cast might be called limbo patrum all the while . peregrin . but would not all this , with those unparallell'd bills of grace you mentioned in your first discourse , which had formerly passed , suffice to beget a good understanding , and make them confide in their king ? patricius . no , but the passing of these bills of grace , were term'd acts of duty in his majesty ; they went so far in their demands that 't was not sufficient for him to give up his tower , 〈◊〉 fleet-royall , his magazines , his ports , castl●… and servants , but he must deliver up his swor●… into their hands , all the souldiery & military forces of the land ; nay , he must give up his very understanding unto them ; he must resigne his own reason , and with an implicit faith or blind obedience , he must believe all they did was to make him glorious ; and if at any time he admonished them , o●… prescribed wayes for them to proceed and expedit matters , or if he advised them in any thing , they took it in a kind of indignation , and 't was presently cryed up to be breach of priviledge . peregrin . breach of priviledge forsooth , there is no way in my conceit , to make a king more inglorious , both at home and abroad , then to disarme him ; and to take from him the command and disposing of the militia throughout his kingdome , is directly to disarm him , & wrest the sword out of his hand : and how then can he be termed a defendor ? how can he defend either himself , or others ? 't is the onely way to expose him to scorn and derision ; truly , as i conceive , that demand of the militia was a thing not only unfit for them to ask , but for him to grant . but , sir , what shold be the reson which mov'd them to make that insolent proposall ? patricius . they cry'd out that the kingdom was upon point of being ruin'd ; that it was in the very jawes of destruction ; that there were forreign and in-land plots against it : all which are prov'd long since to be nothing else but meere chymera's ; yet people for the most part continue still so grossely besotted , that they cannot perceive to this day , that these forg'd feares , these utopian plots , those publick idea's were fram'd of purpose , that they might take all the martiall power into their hands ; that so they might without controulment cast the government of church and state into what mold they pleased , and ingrosse the chiefest offices to themselves : and from these imaginary invisible dangers proceeded these visible calamities , and grinding palpable pressures which hath accompanied this odious warre ever since . peregrin . herein methinks , your statists have shewne themselves politique enough , but not so prudent & honest ; for prudence & policy , though they often agree in the end , yet they differ in election of the meanes to compasse their ends : the one serves himself of truth , strength of reason , integrity , and gallantnesse in their proceedings ; the other of fictions , fraudulence , lies , and other sinister meanes ; the work of the one is lasting and permanent , the others worke moulders away , and ends in infamy at last ; for fraud and frost alwaies end foule . but how did they requite that most rare and high unexampled trust his majesty reposed in them , when he before passed that fatall act of continuance , a greater trust then ever english king put in parliament ? how did they performe their solemn promise and deepe protestations , to make him the most glorious ( at home and abroad ) the richest and best belovedst king that ever raigned in that island . patricius . herein i must confesse , they held very ill correspondence with him , for the more he trusted them , the more diffident they grew of him ; and truly , sir , herein white differs not so much from black , as their actions have been disconsonant to their words : touching the first promise , to make him glorious ; if to suffer a neighbouring nation ( the scot ) to demand and obtain what they pleased of him ; if to break capitulations of peace with a great forrein prince ( the french king ) by the renvoy of the capuchins , and divers other acts ; if to bring the dregs and riffraffe of the city to domineere before his court-gate , notwithstanding his proclamations of repressing them ; if to confront him and seek his life by fire and sword in open field , by open desiance , and putting him upon a defensive war ; if to vote his queen a traytresse , to shoot at her , to way-lay her , to destroy her , if to hinder the reading of his proclamations , and the sleighting of his declarations ( enclosed in letters sign'd and seal'd with his own hand ) for fear they shold bring the people to their wits again ; if to call them fetters of gold , divellish devises , fraught with doctrines of division , reall mistakes , absurd suppositions , though ther never dropt from princes pen , more full , more rationall and strong sinewy expressions ; if to suffer every shallow-brain'd scolist to preach , every pamphletter to print , every rotten-hearted man or woman to prate what they please of him and his queen ▪ if to sleight his often acknowledgment , condissentions , retractions , pronunciations of peace , and proffers of pardon ; if to endeavour to bring him to a kind of servile submission ; if to bar him of the attendance of his domestiques , to abuse and imprison his messengers , to hang his servants for obeying his commission ; if to prefer the safety and repute of five ordinary men , before the honour of their king , and being actually impeach'd of treason , to bring them in a kind of triumph to his house ; if for subjects to article , treat and capitulate with him ; if to tamper with his conscience , and make him forget the solemn sacramentall oath he took at his coronation ; if to devest him of all regall rights , to take from him the election of his servants and officers , and bring him back to a kind of minority ; if this be to make a king glorious , our king is made glorious enough . touching the second promise to make him the richest king that ever was ; if to denude him of his native rights , to declare that he hath no property in any thing but by way of trust , not so much property as an elective king ; if to take away his customs of inheritance ; if to take from him his exchequer and mint , if to thrust him out of his own towns , to suffer a lowsie citizen to lie in his beds within his royall castle of windsor , when he himself would have come thither to lodg ; if to enforce him to a defensive war , and cause him to engage his jewells and plate , and so plunge him in a bottomlesse gulph of debt for his necessary defence ; if to anticipate his revenue royall , and reduce him to such exigents that he hath scarce the subsistence of an ordinary gentleman ; if this be to make a rich king , then is our king made sufficiently rich . concerning their third promise , to make him the best belovedst king that ever was ; if to cast all the aspersions that possibly could be devised upon his government by publique elaborat remonstrances ; if to suffer and give texts to the strongest lung'd pulpiteers to poyson the hearts of his subjects , to intoxicat their brains with fumes of forg'd jealousies , to possesse them with an opinion , that he is a papist in his heart , and consequently hath a design to introduce popery ; if to sleight his words , his promises , his asseverations , oaths and protestations , when he calls heaven and earth to witnesse , when he desires no blessing otherwise to fall upon himself , his wife and children , with other pathetick deep-fetcht expressions , that wold have made the meanest of those millions of christians which are his vassals , to be believed ; if to protect delinquents , and proclaim'd traytors against him ; if to suscitate , authorise , and encourage all sorts of subjects to heave up their hands against him , and levy armes to emancepate themselves from that naturall allegiance , loyalty , and subjection , wherein , they and their fore-fathers were ever tyed to his royall progenitors ; if to make them swear and damn themselves into a rebellion ; if this be to make a king beloved , then this parliament hath made king charles the best beloved king that ever was in england . peregrin . i cannot compare this rebellion in england , more properly then to that in this kingdom , in king iohn's time , which in our french chronicle beares to this day the infamous name of iaquerie de beauvoisin ; the peasans then out of a surfeit of plenty , had grown up to that height of insolency , that they confronted the noblesse and gentry ▪ they gathered in multitudes , and put themselves in armes to suppresse , or rather extinguish them ; and this popular tumult never ceased , till charles le sage debell'd it ; and it made the kings of france more puissant ever since , for it much increased their finances , in regard that those extraordinary taxes which the people imposed upon themselves for the support of the war , hath continued ever since a firm revenue to the crown ; which makes me think of a facecious speech of the late henry the great , to them of orleans : for wheras a new imposition was laid upon the townsmen during the league by monsieur de la chastre , who was a great stickler in those wars ; they petitioned henry the fourth , that he wold be pleased to take off that taxe , the king asked them , who had laid that taxe upon them ? they said monsieur de la chastre , during the time of the league , the king replyed , puis que monsieur de la chatre vous à liguè qu'il vous destigue , since monsieur de la chastre hath leagu'd you , let monsieur de la chastre unleague you , and so the said taxe continueth to this day . i have observed in your chronicles that it hath bin the fate of your english kings to be baffled often by petty companions ; as iack straw , wat tyler , cade , warbecke and symnel . a waspe may somtimes do a shrewd turn to the eagle , as you said before ; your island hath bin fruitfull for rebellions , for i think ther hapned near upon a hundred since the last conquest , the city of london , as i remember , in your story hath rebelled seven times at least , and forfeited her charter i know not how often , but she bled soundly for it at last , and commonly , the better your princes were , the worse your people have been ; as the case stands , i see no way for the king to establish a setled peace , but by making a fifth conquest of you ; and for london , ther must be a way found to prick that tympany of pride wherwith she swells so much . patricius . 't is true , ther has bin from time to time many odd insurrections in england , but our king gathered a greater strength out of them afterwards , the inconstant people are alwayes accessary to their own miseries : kings prerogatives are like the ocean , which as the civilians tell us , if he lose in one pla●…e , he gets ground in another . cares and crosses ride behind kings , clowds hang over them . they may be eclypsed a while , but they will shine afterwards with a stronger lustre . our gracious soverain hath passed a kind of ordeal , a fiery triall ; he while now hath bin matriculated and serv'd part of an apprentiship in the school of affliction ; i hope god will please shortly to cancell the indenture , and restore him to a sweeter liberty then ever . this discourse was stopp'd in the press by the tyranny of the times , and not suffer'd to see open light till now . a sober and seasonable memorandum sent to the right honourable philip late earl of pembrock , and montgomery , &c. to mind him of the particular sacred ties ( besides the common oath of alleageance and supremacy ) wereby he was bound to adhere to the king his liege lord and master . presented unto him in the hottest brunt of the late civill wars . iuramentum ligamen conscientiae maximum . london , printed in the year , 1661. to the right honourable , philip earl of pembrock , and montgomery , knight of the bath ; knight of the most noble order of the garter ; gentleman of his majesties bed-chamber , and one of his most honorable privy counsell , &c. my lord , this letter requires no apology , much lesse any pardon , but may expect rather a good reception and thanks , when your lordship hath seriously perused the contents , and ruminated well upon the matter it treats of by weighing it in your second and third thoughts which usually carry with them a greater advantage of wisdom : it concerns not your body , or temporall estate , but things reflecting upon the noblest part of you , your soul , which being a beam of immortality , and a type of the almighty , is incomparably more precious , and rendereth all other earthly things to be but bables and transitory trifles . now , the strongest tye , the solemnest engagement and stipulation that can be betwixt the soul and her creator , is an oath . i do not understand common tumultuary rash oaths , proceeding from an ill habit , or heat of passion upon sudden contingencies , for such oaths bind one to nought else but to repentance : no , i mean serious and legall oaths , taken with a calm prepared spirit , either for the asserting of truth , and conviction of falshood , or for fidelitie in the execution of some office or binding to civill obedience and loyaltie , which is one of the essentiall parts of a christian ; such publick oaths legally made with the royall assent of the soveraigne from whom they receive both legalitie and life ( else they are invalid and unwarrantable ) as they are religious acts in their own nature , so is the taking and observance of them part of gods honor , and there can be nothing more derogatory to the high majesty and holinesse of his name , nothing more dangerous , destructive and damnable to humane souls then the infringment and eluding of them , or omission in the performance of them . which makes the turks , of whom christians in this particular may learn a tender peece of humanity , to be so cautious , that they seldom or never administer an oath to greek , jew , or any other nation , and the reason is , that if the party sworn doth take that oath upon hopes of some advantage , or for evading of danger and punishment , and afterwards rescinds it , they think themselves to be involved in the perjury , and so accessary to his damnation : our civill law hath a canon consonant to this , which is , mortale peccatum est ei praestare juramentum , quem scio verisimiliter violaturum ; 't is a mortall sin to administer an oath to him who i probably know will break it ; to this may allude another wholesome saying , a false oath is damnable , a true oath dangerous , none at all the safest . how much then have they to answer for , who of late yeares have fram'd such formidable coercive generall oaths to serve them for engins of state to lay battery to the consciences and soules of poor men , and those without the assent of their soveraign , and opposit point blank to former oaths they themselves had taken : these kind of oaths the city of london hath swallowed lately in grosse , and the country in detaile , which makes me confidently beleeve that if ever that saying of the holy prophet , the land mournes for oaths , was appliable to any part of the habitable earth , it may be now applied to this reprobate iland . but now i come to the maine of my purpose , and to those oaths your lordship hath taken before this distracted time , which the world knowes , and your conscience can testifie , were divers ; they were all of them solemn , and some of them sacramentall oaths ( and indeed , every solemn oath among the antients was held a sacrament : ) they all implyed , and imposed an indispensible fidelity , truth and loyalty from you to your soveraign prince , your liege lord and master the king : i will make some instances : your lordship took an oath when knight of the bath to love your soveraign above all earthly creatures , and for his right and dignity to live and die &c. by the oath of supremacy you swear to beare faith and true allegeance to the kings highnesse , and to your power to defend all ●…urisdictions , priviledges , preheminences and authorities belonging to his highnesse &c. your lordship took an oath when privie counsellor , to be a true and faithfull servant unto him , and if you knew or understood of any manner of thing to be attempted , done , or spoken against his majesties person , honour , crown , or dignity , you swore to let , and withstand the same to the uttermost of your power , and either cause it to be revealed to himself , or to others of his privy counsell ; the oaths you took when bedchamber man , and l. chamberlain bind you as strictly to his person . your lordship may also call to memorie when you were installed knight of the garter , ( whereof you are now the oldest living except k ▪ of denmark ) you solemnly swore to defend the honour and quarrels , the rights and lordship of your ▪ soveraigne : now the record tells us that the chiefest ground of instituting the said order by that heroick prince edward the third was , that he might have choice gallant men , who by oath and honour should adhere unto him in all dangers , and difficulties , and that by way of reciprocation hee should protect and defend them , which made alfonso duke of calabria so much importune henry the eight to install him one of the knights of the garter , that he might engage king harry to protect him against charles the eighth , who threatned then the conquest of naples . how your lordship hath acquitted your self of the performance of these oaths , your conscience ( that bosome record ) can make the best affidavit ; some of them oblige you ●…o live and dye with king charles , but what oaths or any thing like an oath binds you to live and die with the house of commons , as your lordship often gives out you will , i am yet to learne : unlesse that house which hath not power as much as to administer an oath ( much lesse to make one ) can absolve you from your former oaths , or haply by their omnipotence dispence with you for the observance of them . touching the politicall capacitie of the king , i feare that will be a weak plea for your lordship before the tribunall of heaven , and they who ▪ whisper such chimeras into your ears , abuse you in grosse ; but put case there were such a thing as politicall capacitie distinct from the personal , which to a true rationall man is one of the grossest buls that can be , yet these forementioned oaths relate most of them meerly unto the kings person , the individuall person of king charles , as you are his domestick counsellor , and cubicular servant . my lord , i take leave to tell your lordship ( and the spectator sees sometimes more then the gamester ) that the world extreamely marvels at you more then others , and it makes those who wish you best to be transformed to wonder , that your lordship shold be the first of your race who deserted the crown , which one of your progenitors said , he would still follow though it were thrown upon an hedg : had your princely brother ( william earl of pembrock ) bin living he wold have bin sooner torn by wild horses than have banded against it , or abandoned the king his master , and fallen to such grosse idolatry as to worship the beast with many heads . the world also stands astonished that you shold confederate to bring into the bowels of the land , and make elogiums in some of your speeches of that hungry people which have bin from all times so crosse and fatall to the english nation , and particularly to your own honour : many thousands do wonder that your lordship shold be brought to persecute with so much animosity and hatred that reverend order in gods church ( episcopacy ) which is contemporary with christianity it self , and wherunto you had once designed , and devoted one of your dearest sons so solemnly . my lord , if this monster of reformation ( which is like an infernall spirit clad in white , and hath a cloven head as well as feet ) prevailes , you shall find the same destiny will attend poor england , as did bohemia which was one of the flourishingst kingdoms upon that part of the earth , which happen'd thus : the common people ther repind at the hierarchy and riches of the church , therupon a parliament was pack'd where bishops were abolished , what followed ? the nobles and gentry went down next , and afterwards the crown it self , and so it became a popular confus'd anarchicall state , and a stage of bloud a long time , so that at last , when this magot had done working in the brains of the foolish peeple , they were glad to have recourse to monarchy again after a world of calamities ; though it degenerated from a successive kingdom to an elective . methinks , my lord , under favour that those notorious visible judgements which have fallen upon these refiners of reform'd religion shold unbeguile your lordship , and open your eyes : for the hand of heaven never appeared so clearly in any humane actions : your lordship may well remember what became of the hothams , and sir alexander cary , who were the two fatall wretches that began the war first , one in the north , the other in the south , plymouth and hull . your lordship may be also pleased to remember what became of brooks the lord , and hampden , the first whereof was dispatched by a deaf and dumb man out of an ancient church ( at litchfield ) which he was battering , and that suddenly also , for he fell down stone dead in the twinkling of an eye ; now , one of the greatest cavils he had against our liturgy was a clause of a prayer ther against sudden death ; besides , the fag end of his grace in that journey was , that if the design was not pleasing to god , he might perish in the action : for the other ( hampden ) he besprinkled with his bloud , and received his death upon the same clod of earth in buckingham-shire where he had first assembled the poor country people like so many geese to drive them gaggling in a mutiny to london with the protestation in their caps , which hath bin since torn in flitters , and is now grown obsolet and quite out of use . touching pym and stroud , those two worthy champions of the utopian cause , the first being opened , his stomack and guts were found to be full of pellets of bloud , the other had little or no brain in his skull being dead , and lesse when he was living : touching those who carryed the first scandalous remonstrance ( that work of night and the verdict of a starv'd jury ) to welcome the king from scotland , they have bin since ( your lordship knows well ) the chief of the eleven members impeached by the house . and now they are a kind of runnagates beyond the seas , scorn'd by all mankind , and baffled every where , yea , even by the boors of holland , and not daring to peep in any populous town but by owle-light . moreover , i believe your lordship hath good cause to remember that the same kind of riotous rascals , which rabbled the k. out of town , did drive away the speaker in like manner with many of their memberships ( amongst whom your lordship was fairly on his way , ) to seek shelter of their janizaries the redcoats : your lordship must needs find what deadly fewds fal daily ' twix●… the presbyterian and the independent , the two fiery brands that have put this poor isle so long in combustion . but 't is worthy your lordships speciall notice how your dear brethren the scots ( whom your lordship so highly magnified in some of your publick speeches ) who were at first brought in for hirelings against the king for them , offer themselves now to come in against them for the king : your lordship cannot be ignorant of the sundry clashes that have bin 'twixt the city and their memberships , and 'twixt their memberships and their men of war or military officers , who have often wav'd and disobeyed their commands : how this tatterdimallian army hath reduc'd this cow'd city , the cheated country , and their once all-commanding masters , to a perfect passe of slavery , to a tru asinin condition ; they crow over all the ancient nobility and gentry of the kindom , though ther be not found amongst them all but two knights ; and 't is well known ther be hundreds of privat gentlemen in the kingdom , the poorest of whom , is able to buy this whole host with the generall himself and all the commanders : but 't is not the first time , that the kings and nobility of england have bin baffled by petty companions : i have read of iack straw , wat tyler , and ket the tanner , with divers others that did so , but being suppressed it tended to the advantage of the king at last ; and what a world of examples are ther in our story , that those noblemen who banded against the crown , the revenge of heaven ever found them out early or late at last . these , with a black cloud of reciprocall judgments more , which have come home to these reformers very doors , shew that the hand of divine justice is in 't , and the holy prophet tells us , when gods judgments are upon earth , then the inhabitants shall learn justice . touching your lordship in particular , you have not , under favour , escap'd without some already , and i wish more may not follow ; your lordship may remember you lost one son at bridgenorth , your dear daughter at oxford , your son-in-law at newbury , your daughter-in-law at the charter-house of an infamous disease , how sick your eldest son hath bin ; how part of your house was burnt in the country , with others which i will not now mention . i will conclude this point with an observation of the most monstrous number of witches that have swarm'd since these wars against the king , more ( i dare say ) then have bin in this island since the devil tempted eve ; for in two counties only , viz. suffolk and essex , ther have bin near upon three hundred arraign'd , and eightscore executed ( as i have it from the clerks of the peace of those counties ; ) what a barbarous devilish office one had , under colour of examination , to torment poor silly women with watchings , pinchings and other artifices to find them for witches : how others call'd spirits by a new invention of villany were conniv'd at for seizing upon young children , and 〈◊〉 them on shipboard , where having their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were so transform'd that their 〈◊〉 could not know them , and so were carryed over for new schismaticall plantations to new-england and other seminaries of rebellion . my lord , ther is no villany that can enter into the imagination of man hath bin left here uncommitted ; no crime from the highest treason to the meanest trespasse , but these reformers are guilty of . what horrid acts of prophanes have bin perpetrated up and down ! the monuments of the dead have bin rifled ! horses have bin watered at the church font , and fed upon the holy table ! widows , orphans , and hospitals have bin commonly robb'd , and gods house hath bin plunder'd more then any ! with what infandous blasphemies have pulpits rung ! one crying out , that this parliament was as necessary for our reformation , as the comming of christ was for our redemp●…ion : another belching out , that if god almighty did not prosper this cause , 't were fitting he shold change places with the devil : another , that the worst thing our savoour did , was the making of the dominical prayer , and saving the thief upon the crosse. o immortal god , is it possible that england shold produce such monsters , or rather such infernal fiends shap'd with humane bodies ! yet your lordship sides with these men , though they be enemies to the cross , to the church , and to the very name of iesus christ ; i 'le instance only in two who were esteem'd the oracles of this holy reformation , petrs , and saltmarsh ; the first is known by thousands to be an infamous , jugling and scandalous villaine , among other feats , he got the mother and daughter with child , as it was offered to be publickly proved ; i could speak much of the other , but being dead , let it suffice that he dyed mad and desperate , yet these were accounted the two apostles of the times . my lord , 't is high time for you to recollect your self , to enter into the private closet of your thoughts , and summon them all to counsel upon your pillow ; consider well the slavish condition your dear country is in , weigh well the sad case your liege lord and master is in , how he is bereav'd of his queen , his children , his servants , his liberty , his chaplains , and of every thing in which there is any comfort ; observe well , how neverthelesse , god almighty works in him by inspiring him with equality and calmnesse of mind , with patience , prudence and constancy , how hee makes his very crosses to stoop unto him , when his subjects will not : consider the monstrousnesse of the propositions that are tendred him , wherein no lesse then crown , scepter , and sword , which are things in-alienable from majesty , are in effect demanded , nay , they would have him transmit , and resign his very intellectuals unto them , not only so , but they would have him make a sacrifice of his soul , by forcing him to violate that solemne sacramentall oath hee took at his coronation when hee was no minor , but come to a full maturity of reason and judgement : make it your own case , my lord , and that 's the best way to judge of his : think upon the multiplicity of solemne astringing oathes your lordship hath taken , most whereof directly and solely enjoyne faith and loyalty to his person ; oh my lord ! wrong not your soule so much , in comparison of whom your body is but a rag of rottennesse . consider that acts of loyalty to the crown are the fairest columns to bear up a noblemans name to future ages , and register it in the temple of immortality . reconcile your self therefore speedily unto your liege lord and master , think upon the infinit private obligations you have had both to sire and son : the father kiss'd you often , kisse you now the sun lest he be too angry ; and kings , you will find , my lord , are like the sun in the heavens , which may be clouded for a time , yet he is still in his sphear , and will break out againe and shine as gloriously as ever ; let me tell your lordship that the people begin to grow extream weary of their physitians , they find the remedy to be far worse then their former disease ; nay they stick not to call some of them meer quacksalvers rather then physitians ; some goe further , & say they are no more a parliament then a pye-powder court at bartholmew-fair , ther being all the essentiall parts of a true parliament wanting in this , as fairnesse of elections , freedome of speech , fulnesse of members , nor have they any head at all ; besides , they have broken all the fundamental rules , and priviledges of parliament , and dishonoured that high court more then any thing else : they have ravish'd magna charta which they are sworn to maintain , taken away our birth-right therby , and transgressed all the laws of heaven and earth : lastly , they have most perjuriously betrayed the trust the king reposed in them , and no lesse the trust their country reposed in them , so that if reason and law were now in date , by the breach of their priviledges , and by betraying the said double trust that is put in them , they have dissolved themselves ipso facto i cannot tell how many thousand times , notwithstanding that monstrous grant of the kings , that fatall act of continuance : and truly , my lord , i am not to this day satisfied of the legality ( though i am satisfied of the forciblenesse of that act ) whether it was in his majesties power to passe it or no ; for the law ever presupposeth these clauses in all concessions of grace , in all patents , charters , and grants whatsoever the king passeth , salvo jure regio , salvo jure coronae . to conclude , as i presume to give your lordship these humble cautions and advice in particular , so i offer it to all other of your rank , office , order and relations , who have souls to save , and who by solemn indispensable oaths have ingaged themseves to be tru and loyall to the person of king charls . touching his political capacity , it is a fancy which hath bin exploded in all other parliaments except in that mad infamous parliament wher it was first hatched ; that which bears upon record the name of insanum parliamentum to all posterity , but many acts have passed since that , it shold be high and horrible treason to separat or distinguish the person of the king from his power ; i believe , as i said before , this distinction will not serve their turn at the dreadful bar of divine justice in the other world : indeed that rule of the pagans makes for them , si iusjurandum violandum est , tyrannis causâ violandum est , if an oath be any way violable , 't is to get a kingdom : we find by woful experience that according to this maxime they have made themselves all kings by violation of so many oaths ; they have monopoliz'd the whole power and wealth of the kingdom in their own hands ; they cut , shuffle , deal , and turn up what trump they please , being judges and parties in every thing . my lord , he who presents these humble advertisments to your lordship , is one who is inclin'd to the parliament of engl. in as high a degree of affection as possibly a free-born subject can be ; one besides , who wisheth your lordships good , with the preservation of your safety and honour more really then he whom you intrust with your secretest affaires , or the white iew of the upper house , who hath infused such pernicious principles into you ; moreover , one who hath some drops of bloud running in his veins , which may claim kindred with your lordship : and lastly , he is one who would kiss your feet , in lieu of your hands , if your lordship wold be so sensible of the most desperat case of your poor country , as to employ the interests , the opinion and power you have to restore the king your master by english waies , rather then a hungry forrein people , who are like to bring nothing but destruction in the van , confusion in the rear , and rapine in the middle , shold have the honour of so glorious a work . so humbly hoping your lordship will not take with the left hand , what i offer with the right , i rest , from the prison of the fleet 3. septembris 1644. your lordships truly devoted servant . i. h. his late majesties royal declaration , or manifesto to all forrein princes and states , touching his constancy in the protestant religion . being traduced abroad by some malicious and lying agents , that he was wavering therin , and upon the high road of returning to rome . printed in the year , 1661. to the unbiass'd reder . it may be said that mischief in one particular hath somthing of vertue in it , which is , that the contrivers and instruments thereof are still stirring and watchfull . they are commonly more pragmaticall and fuller of devices then those sober-minded men , who while they go on still in the plaine road of reason , having the king , and knowne lawes to justifie and protect them , hold themselfs secure enough , and so think no hurt ; iudas eyes were open to betray his master , while the rest of his fellow-servants were quietly asleep . the members at westminster were men of the first gang , for their mischievous braines were alwayes at work how to compasse their ends ; and one of their prime policies in order thereunto was to cast asspersions on their king , thereby to alienat the affections and fidelity of his peeple from him ●…notwithstanding that besides their pub●…ick declarations they made new oaths and protestations , whereby they swore to make him the best belov'd king that ever was ; ) nor did this diabolicall malice terminat only within the bounds of his own dominions , but it extended to infect other princes and states of the reformed churches abroad to make him suspected in his religion , & that he was branling in his belief , and upon the high way to rome ; to which purpose they sent missives and clandestine emissaries to divers places beyond the seas , whereof forren authors make mention in their writings . at that time when this was in the height of action , the passage from london to oxford , where the king kept then his court , was so narrowly blockd up , that a fly could scarce passe ; some ladies of honor being search'd in an unseemly and barbarous manner ; whereupon the penner of the following declaration , finding his royal master to be so grosly traduced , made his duty to go beyond all presumptions , by causing the sayd declaration to be printed and publish'd in latin , french and english , whereof great numbers were sent beyond the seas to france , holland , germany , suisserland , denmark , swethland , and to the english plantations abroad , to vindicat his majesty in this point , which produc'd very happy and advantagious effects for salmtisius , and other forrin writers of great esteem speake of it in their printed works . the declaration was as followeth . carolus , singulari omnipotentis dei providentia angliae , scotiae , franciae & hiberniae rex , fidei defensor , &c. universis et singulis qui praesens hoc scriptum ceu protestationem inspexerint , potissimum reformatae religionis cultoribus cujuscunque sint gentis , gradus , aut conditionis , salutem , &c. cum ad aures nostras non ita pridem fama pervenerit , sinistros quosdam rumores , literasque politica vel perniciosa potiùs quorundam industriâ sparsas esse , & nonnullis protestantium ecclesiis in exteris partibus emissas , nobis esse animum & consilium ab illa orthodoxa religione quam ab incunabulis imbibimus , & ad hoc usque momentum per integrum vitae nostrae curriculum amplexi sumus recedendi ; & papismum in haec regna iterum introducendi , quae conjectura , ceu nefanda potius calumnia nullo prorsus nixa vel imaginabili fundamento horrendos hosce tumultus , & rabiem plusquàm belluinam in anglia suscitavit sub pretextu cujusdam ( chimericae ) reformationis regimini , legibusque hujus dominii non solum incongruae , sed incompatibilis : volumus , uttoti christiano orbi innotescat , ne minimam quidem animum nostrum incidisse cogitatiunculam hoc aggrediendi , aut transversum unguem ab illa religione discedendi quam cum corona , septroque hujus regni solenni , & sacramentali juramento tenemur profiteri , protegere & propugnare . nectantum constantissima nostra praxis , & quotidiana in exercitiis praefa●…ae religionis praesentia , cum crebris in facie nostrorum agminum asseverationibus , publicisque procerum hujus regni testimoniis , & sedula in regiam nostram sobolem educando circumspectione ( omissis plurimis aliis argumentis ) luculentissimè hoc demonstrat , sed etiam faelicissimum illud matrimonium quod inter nostram primogenitam , & illustrissimum principem 〈◊〉 sponte contraximus , idem fortissimè attestatur : quo nuptiali faedere insuper constat , nobis non esse propositum illam profiteri solummodo , sed expandere , & corroborare quantum in nobis situm est . hanc sacrosanctam anglicanae christi ecclesiae religionem , tot theologorum convocationibus sancitam , tot comitiorum edictis confirmatam , tot regiis diplomatibus stabilitam , una cum regimine ecclesiastico , & liturgia ei annexa , quam liturgiam , regimenque celebriores protestantium authores tam germani , quam galli , tam dani quam helvetici , tam batavi , quam bohemi multis elogiis nec sine quadam invidia in suis publicis scrip●…is comproban●… & applaudunt , ut in transactionibus dordrechtanae synodus , cui nonnulli nostrorum praesulum , quorum dignitati debi●…a prestita fuit reverentia , interfuerunt , apparet istam , inquimus religionem , quam regius noster pater ( beatissimae memoriae ) in illa celeberrima fidei suae confessione omnibus christianis principibus ( ut & haec praesens nostra protestatio exhibita ) publicè asserit : istam , istam religionem solenniter protestamur , nos integram , sartam-tectam , & inviolabilem conservaturos , & pro virili nostro ( divino adjuvante numine ) usque ad extremam vitae nostrae periodum protecturos , & omnibus nostris ecclesiasticis pro muneris nostri , & supradicti sacrosancti juramenti ratione doceri , & praedicari curaturos . quapropter injungimus & in mandatis damus omnibus ministris nostris in exteris partibus tam legatis , quam residentibus , agentibusque & nunciis , reliquisque nostris subditis ubicunque orbis christiani terrarum aut curiositatis aut comercii gracia degentibus , hanc solennem & sinceram nostram protestationem , quandocunque sese obtulerit loci & temporis oportunitas , communicare , asserere , asseverare . dat. in academia et civitate nostra oxoniensi pridie idus maii , 1644. charles by the special providence of almighty god , king of england , scotland , france , and ireland , defendor of the faith , &c. to all who profess the tru reformed protestant religion , of what nation , degree , and condition soever they be to whom this present declaration shall come , greeting . wheras we are given to understand , that many false rumors , and scandalous letters are spread up and down amongst the reforme●… churches in forein parts by the pollitick , or rather the pernitious industry of som ill-affected persons , that we have an inclination to recede from that orthodox religion , which we were born , baptized , and bred in , & which we have firmly professed and practised throughout the whol course of our life to this moment , and that we intend to give way to the introduction , and publick exercise of popery again in our dominions : which conjecture or rather most detestable calumny , being grounded upon no imaginable foundation , hath raised these horrid tumults , and more then barbarous wars throughout this flourishing island , under pretext of a kind of reformation , which wold not only prove incongruous , but incompatible with the fundamental laws and government of this kingdom , we do desire that the whol christian world shold take notice and rest assured , that we never entertained in our imagination the least thought to attempt such a thing , or to depart a jot from that holy religion , which when we received the crown and scepter of this kingdom , vve took a most solemn sacramental oath to profess and protect . nor doth our most constant practise and quotidian visible presence in the exercise of this sole religion , with so many asseverations in the head of our armies , and the publick attestation of our barons , with the circumspection used in the education of our royall off-spring , besides divers other undeniable arguments , only demonstrate this ; but also that happy alliance of marriage , vve contracted 'twixt our eldest daughter , and the illustrious prince of orenge , most clearly confirmes the reality of our intentions herein ; by which nuptial ingagement it appears further , that our endeavours are not only to make a bare profession thereof in our own dominions , but to inlarge and corroborate it abroad as much as lieth in our power : this most holy religion of the anglican church , ordained by so many convocations of learned divines , confirmed by so many acts of national parliaments , and strengthned by so many royal proclamations , together with the ecclesiastick discipline , and liturgy therunto appertaining , which liturgy and discipline , the most eminent of protestant authors , as well germans as french ; as well danes as swedes and swittzens ; as well belgians as bohemians , do with many elogies ( and not without a kind of envy ) approve and applaud in their publick writings , particularly in the transactions of the synod of dort , wherin besides other of our divines ( who afterwards were prelates ) one of our bishops assisted , to whose dignity all due respects and precedency was given : this religion we say , which our royal father of blessed memory doth publickly assert in his famous confession addres'd , as we also do this our protestation , to all christian princes ; this , this most holy religion , with the hierarchy and liturgy therof , we solemnly protest , that by the help of almighty god , we will endeavour to our utmost power , and last period of our life , to keep entire and inviolable , and will be careful , according to our duty to heaven , and the tenor of the aforesaid most sacred oath at our coronation , that all our ecclesiasticks in their several degrees and incumbences shall preach and practise the same . vvherfore vve enjoyn and command all our ministers of state beyond the seas , aswell ambassadors as residents , agents , and messengers , and vve desire all the rest of our loving subjects that sojourn either for curiosity or commerce in any forein parts , to communicate , uphold and assert this our solemn and sincere protestation when opportunity of time and place shall be offered . charles , par la providence de dieu roy de la grand ' bretagne , de france , et d' irlande , defenseur de la foy , &c. a tous ceux qui ceste presente declaration verront , particulierement a ceux de la religion reformee de quelque nation , degreou condition qu'ils soient , salut . ayant receu advis de bonne main que plusieurs faux rapports & lettres sont esparses parmi les eglises reformees de là la mer , par la politique , ou plustost la pernicieuse industrie de personnes mal affectionnes a nostre government ; que nous auons dessein a receder de celle religion que nous auons professè & pratiquè tout le temps de nostre vie iusques a present ; & de vouloir introduire la papautè derechef en nos dominions , laquelle conjecture , ou calumnie plustost , appuyee sur nul fundement imaginable , a suscitè ces horribles tumultes & allumè le feu d' une tressanglante guerre en tous les quatre coins de ceste fleurissante monarchie , soubs pretexte d' une ( chymerique ) reformation , la quelle seroit incompatible avec le governement & les loix fondementales de ce royaume . nous desi●…ons , quil soit notoire a tout le monde , que la moindre pensee de ce faire n●… a pas entree en nostre imagination , de departir ancunement de cell ' orthodoxe religion , qu' auec la couronne & le sceptre de ce royaume nous sommes tenus par un serment solennel & sacramentaire a proteger & defendre . ce qu' appert non seulement par nostre quotidienne presence es exercies de la dite religion , avec , tan●… d' asseverations a la teste de nos armees , & la publicque attestation de nos barons , avec le soin que nous tenons en la nourrituredes princes & princesses nos ensans , mais le tres-heureux mariage que nous avons conclu entre la nostre plus aisnee , & le tres-illustrie prince d' orenge en est encore un tres-evident tesmoignage , par la quell ' alliance il appert aussy , que nostre desir est de n' en faire pas vne nue profession seulement dicelle , mais de la vouloir estendre & corroberer autant qu' il nous est possible : cest ' orthodoxe religion de leglise anglicane ordonnee par tant de conventione de teologues , confirmee par tant de arrests d' parlement , & fortifie par tant d' edicts royaux auec la discipline & la lyturgi●… a elle appartenant , laquelle discipline & lyturgie les plus celebres autheurs protestants , tant francois , qu' allemands ; tant seudois que suisses , tant belgiens que bohemiens approuent entierement & non sans quelqu envie en leur escrits particulierement en la synode de dort , ou un de nos euesques assistoit , & la reverence & precedence deue a sa dignite ecclesi●…stique luy fut exactement rendue : ceste tres-sainte religion que nostre feu pere de ●…res-heureuse memoire aduoue en sa celebre confession de la foy addressee come nous faisons ceste declaration a tous princes chrestiens ; nous protestons que moyennant la grace de dieu , nous tascherone de conseruer ceste religion inviolable , & en son entier selon la mesure de puissance que dieu amis entre nos mains ; et nous requerons & commandons a tous nos ministres d' estat tant ambassadeurs , que residens , agens ou messagers , & a tous autres nos subjects qui fontleurseiour es paysestrangers de communiquer , maintenir & adouuer cestenostre solennelle protestation toutes fois & quantes que l' ocasion se presentera . apologs , or fables mythologiz'd . out of whose moralls the state and history of the late unhappy distractions in great britain and ireland may be extracted ; some of which apologs have prov'd prophetical . — nil est nisi fabula mundus . london , printed in the year , 1661. to my honored and known friend sir i. c. knight . sir , amongst many other barbarismes which like an impetuous torrent have lately rush'd in upon us , the interception and opening of letters is none of the least , for it hath quite bereft all ingenious spirits of that correspondency and sweet communication of fancy , which hath bin alwaies esteemed the best fuel of affection , and the very marrow of friendship . and truly , in my judgement , this custom may be termed not only a barbarisme , but the ba●…est kind of burglary that can be , 't is a plundering of the very brain , as is spoken in another place . we are reduced here to that servile condition , or rather to such a height of slavery , that we have nothing left which may entitle us free rationall creatures ; the thought it self cannot say 't is free , much less the tongue or pen. which makes me impart unto you the traverses of these turbulent times , under the following fables . i know you are an exquisite astronomer . i know the deep inspection you have in all parts of philosophy , i know you are a good herald , and i have found in your library sundry books of architecture , and comments upon vitruvius . the unfolding of these apologues will put you to it in all these , and will require ▪ your second , if not your third thoughts , and when you have concocted them well , i believe , ( else i am much deceived in your genius ) they will afford you som entertainment , and do the errand upon which they are sent , which is , to communicate unto you the most material passages of this long'd-for parlement , and of these sad confusions which have so unhing'd , distorted , transvers'd , tumbled and dislocated all things , that england may be termed now , in comparison of what it was , no other then an anagram of a kingdom . one thing i promise you , in the perusal of these parables , that you shall find no gingles in them , or any thing sordid or scurrilous , the common dialect and disease of these times . so i leave you to the gard and guidance , of god and vertu who do still advance their favorits , maugre the frownes of chance . your constant servant , i. h. the great conjunction , or , parlement of stars . upon a time , the stars complained to apollo , that he displayed his beams too much upon some malignant planets ; that the moone had too great a share of his influence , and that he was carryed away too much by her motion : they complained also , that the constellation of libra ( which holds the ballance of justice ) had but a dim light , and that the astrean court was grown altogether destructive , with divers other grievances . apollo hereupon , commanded mercury to summon a generall synod , where some out of every asterisme throughout the whole firmament were to meet ; apollo told them , i am placed here by the finger of the almighty , to be monarch of the skie , to be the measurer of time , and i goe upon his errand round about the worl●… every foure and twenty houres : i am also the fountaine of heate and light , which , though i use to dispence and diffuse in equall proportions through the whole universe ; yet there is difference 'twixt objects , a castle hath more of my light then a cottage , and the cedar hath more of me then the shrub , according to the common axiom , quicquid recipitur , recipitur ad modum recip●…entis . but touching the moon , ( the second great luminary ) i would have you know , that she is dearest unto mee , therefore let none repine that i cherish her with my beams , and confer more light on her then any other . touching the malignant planets , or any other star , of what magnitude soever , that moves not in a regular motion , or hath run any excentrick exorbitant course , or that would have made me to move out of the zodiak , i put them over unto you , that upon due legall examination and proof , they may be unspher'd or extinguished . but i would have this done with moderation ; i would have you to keep as neer as you can between the tropiques and temperate zones : i would have things reduced to their true principles , i wold have things reformed , not ruin'd ; i would have the spirit of malice and lying , the spirit of partiality and injustice , the spirit of tyranny and rigour , the base spirit of feare and jealousie to be farre from this glorious syderean synod ; i would have all private interests reflecting upon revenge or profit , to be utterly banished hence : moreover , i would not have you to make grievances , where no grievances are , or dangers where no dangers are . i would have no creation of dangers ; i would have you to husband time as parsimoniously as you can , lest by keeping too long together , and amusing the world with such tedious hopes of redress of grievances , you prove your self the greatest grievance at last , and so from starrs become comets : lastly , i would have you be cautious how you tamper with my soveraign power , and chop logicke with mee in that point ; you know what became of him who once presumed to meddle with my chariot . hereupon the whole host of heaven being constellated thus into one great body , fell into a serious deliberation of things , and apollo himself continued his presence , and sate often amongst them in his full lustre , but in the meane time , whilest they were in the midst of their consultations , many odde aspects , oppositions and conjunctions hapned between them : for some of the sporades , but specially those mongrel small vulgar stars , which make up the galaxia ( the milkie way in heaven ) gather in a tumultuous disorderly manner about the body of apollo , and commit many strange insolencies , which caused apollo ( taking young phosphorus the morning-star with him ) to retire himself , and in a just indignation to withdraw his light from the synod : so all began to be involv'd in a strange kind of confusion and obscurity ; they groaped in the dark , not knowing which way to move , or what course to take , all things went cancer-like retrograde , because the sun detained his wonted light and irradiations from them . morall . such as the sun is in the firmament , a monarch is in his kingdom : for , as the wisest of men saith , in the light of the kings countenance ther is life ; and i believe that to be the morall of this astrean fable . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . or , the great councell of birds . upon a time the birds met in councell , for redresse of som extravagancies that had flown unto the volatill empire ; nor was it the first time that birds met thus ; for the phrygian fabler tells us of divers meetings of theirs : and after him we read that apollonius thyaneus , undertook the interpretation of their language , and to be their drogoman . they thus assembled in one great covie by the call of the eagle their unquestioned hereditary king , and by vertue of his royal authority , complaints were brought , that divers cormorants and harpies , with other birds of prey , had got in amongst them , who did much annoy and invade the publick liberty : sundry other birds were questioned , which caused some to take a timely flight into another aire . as they were thus consulting for advancement of the common good , many rooks , horn-owles and sea-gulls flock'd together , and ●…luttered about the place they were assembled in , where they kept a hideous noise , and committed many outrages , and nothing cold satisfie them , but the griffons head , which was therfore chopt off , and offered up as a sacrifice to make them leave their chattering , and to appease their fury for the time . they fell foul afterwards upon the pies , who were used to be much reverenced , and to sit upon the highest pearch in that great assembly : they called them i dolatrous and inauspitious birds , they hated their mix'd colour , repined at their long train , they tore their white feathers , and were ready to peck out their very eyes : they did what they could to put them in owles feathers ( as the poor sheep was in the woolfs skin ) to make them the more hated , and to be star'd and hooted at whersoever they passed . the pies being thus scar'd , presented a petition to the royall eagle , and to this his great counsell , that they might be secured to repaire safely thither to sit and consult , according to the ancient lawes of the volatill empire continued so many ages without controllment or question : in which petition they inserted a protest or caveat , that no publique act shold passe in the interim . this supplication , both for matter and form , was excepted against , and cryed up to be high treason , specially that indefinite protest they had made , that no act whatsoever shold be of any validity without them , which was alledged to derogate from the high law-making power of that great counsell , and tended to retard and disturb the great affaires which were then in agitation : so the poor pies , as if by that petition they had like the black-bird voided lime to catch themselves , ( according to the proverb , turdus cacat sibi malum ) were suddenly hurryed away into a cage , and after ten long moneths canvassing of the point , they were unpearch'd , and rendered for ever uncapable to be members of that court , they were struck dumb and voice-less , and suddenly as it were blown up away thence , though without any force of powder , as once was plotted aginst them . but this was done when a thin number of the adverse birds had kept still together , and stuck close against them , and also after that the bill concerning them had bin once ejected , which they humbly conceived by the ancient order of that court could not be re-admitted in the same session . they petitioned from the place they were cooped in , that for heavens sake , for the honour of that noble counsell , for truth and justice sake , they ●…eing as free-born denisons of the aiery region , as any other volatills whatsoever , their charge might be perfected , that so they might be brought to a legall triall , and not forced to languish in such captivity . they pleaded to have done nothing but what they had precedents for : and touching the caveat they had inserted , it was a thing unusuall in every inferiour court of judicature , and had they forborn to have done it , they had betrayed their own nest , and done wrong to their successors . it was affirmed they had bin members of that body politique , long before those lower pearch'd birds , who now wold cast them out ; and that they had bin their best friends to introduce them to have any thing do do in that generall counsell : they prayed they might not be so cruelly used , as the solan goose , and redshanke had used them , who were not content to brail and clip their wings only , but to ●…ear them so , that they shold never grow again ; to handle them so unmercifully , was not the way to make their adversaries birds of paradice : in fine , they advised them to remember what the sick kite's mother answered him , when he desired her to pray to the gods for him , how canst thou , said she , expect any good from the gods , whose temples thou hast so violated ? at last , upon the importunity and pitifulness of their petitions , the accusation of treason , which kept such a noise at first , being declined against them , they were released in the morning , but cooped up again before night : and after the revolution of four full moons , they were restored again to a conditionall liberty , under which they remain till this day . ther wants not som , who affirm , that in that great counsell of birds , ther were som decoys ( and 't is well known where decoys were first bred ) who called in , not only these mongrill obstreperous birds from abroad to commit such outrages as were spoken of before , but drew after them also many of the greatest birds , who sate in that assembly , to follow them whither they listed : others , who were of a more generous extraction , disdained to be such buzzards , as to be carryed away hood-wincked in that manner , to be birds of their feather . thus a visible faction was hatched in this great counsell , as if the said decoyes had disgorged and let fall som grains of hemlock seeds amongst them to distemper their brains . or , as if som spinturnix , that fatall incendiary bird , or som ill-boding scritch-owle , which as stories tell us appeared once at rome , in a famous , though unfortunate great counsell ( when ther was a schism in the popedom ) had appeared likewise here . ther wanted not also amongst them som amphibious birds , as the barnacle , which is neither fish nor fowle ; and the cunning ba●…t , who sometimes professeth himself a bird , sometimes a mouse . i will not say ther were any paphlagonian birds amongst them , who are known to have double hearts . but 't is certain , that in this confusion ther were som malevolent birds , and many of them so young , that they were scarce fledg'd , who like the waspe in the fable , conspired to fire the eagles nest , ( and a wasp may somtimes do mischief to an eagle as a mouse to an elephant . ) moreover som of these light brained birds flew so high , that they seemed to arrogate to themselves , and exercise royall power , but foolishly ; for we know what became of the crow upon the ram's back , when she thought to imitate the eagle : and as it was observed that they were most eager to attempt those high insolensies against jove's bird , who had bin stark naked , and as bare as cootes , unlesse he had feathered them ; so that the little ant was more grateful to esops bird ; then those birds were to the eagle their liege lord and master . but the high-born bird with the two golden wings , the noble faulcons , the martlets , the ravens , the swan , the chough , and all the ancient birds of the mountains remained faithful and firm to the eagle , and scorned to be carryed away by such decoyes ; as also the generous ostriches , who unlesse they had had an extraordinary stomach , could not have digested such iron pills as were offered them . amongst other great birds which banded against the eagle , the flying dragons , green and white , were busie , specially the white ; and for the green , considering he was an ancient bird of the mountains , and that his progenitors had bin so renowned for their rare loyaly to the crown , every one wondered that he shold be drawn so far by the forefaid decoyes , as to be the first of his race that shold clap his wings against his soverain liege lord. the aforesaid destractions continued still , and increased more and more in that general convolation of birds ; therfore the turtle wold stay ther no longer , ther was so much gall amongst them : the pelecan flew away , he saw piety so vilified ; the dove was weary of their company , she found no simplicity and plain dealing amongst them : and the kings ▪ fisher , the halcyon ( the emblem of peace ) quite forsook them , he found so mnch jarring , dissentions , and bandings on all sides ; the swallow also , who had so ancient and honourable a rank amongst them , got into another aire , he fore-saw the weather was like to so be foul : and lastly , philomela , the queen of volatills , who was partner of the eagle's nest , abandoned them quite , and put a sea 'twixt her and them ; nay , the eagle himself withdrew his royal presence from them ; so the decoyes aforesaid carryed all before them , and comported themselves by their orders in that hight , as if like the lapwing , every one had a crown on his head ; they so inchanted in a manner , all the common sort of oppidan , rurall , and sea-birds , and infused such a credulity into them , that they believed them to have an inerring spirit , and what came from them , was as tru as the pentateuch : moreover , it was shrewdly suspected , that ther was a pernicious plot amongst them to let in the stork , who is never seen to stay long in any monarchy . morall . moderation is that goden rule wherby all great counsells shold square their deliberations , and nothing can tend more to their honour or dishonour , in point of wisdom : moreover , in a successive hereditary monarchy , when subjects assume regall power , when they bar the holy church of her rights , & of that reverence which is due to her chief professors , it is the most compendious way to bring all things to confusion , and consequently to an inevitable ruine , or som fatal change. and this i hold to be the chiefest morall of this apologue of birds . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the gathering together , or parlement of flowers . upon a time , the flowers assembled , and met in one generall counsell , by the authority and summons of the soveraign rose , their undoubted naturall king , who had taken the lilly for his royall spouse . the dew of heaven fell plentifully upon this happy conjunction , which made them to bourgeon , to propagate and prosper exceedingly , in so much , that the sweet fragrant odor which they did cast , diffused it self over all the earth . to this meeting came the violet , gilliflower , the rosemary , the tulyp , lavender and thyme , the cinquefoyle ( though of a forren growth ) had an honourable rank amongst them , and as some observed , got too much credit with the royal rose . the flowers of the field were admitted also to this great counsell : the couslip , the honysukle and daisie had their delegates there present , to consult of a reformation of certain abuses which had taken rooting in the common wealth of flowers , and being all under the rose , they had priviledge to speak all things with freedome ; complaints were made that much cockle and darnell , with other noxious herbs and tares were crept in amongst them , that the poppie did pullulat too much , with divers other grievances : the successe of this senat , this great bed or posie of living flowers , was like to prove very prosperous , but that the herb briony , wormwood , wolfbane , rue , and melampod ( the emblems of sedition , malice , feare , ambition and iealousie ) thrust in amongst them , and much distempered their proceedings : these brought in with them the bur , which exceedingly retarded and intangled all businesses ; and it was thought that the thistle was too medling amongst them , which made matters grow to that acrimony and confusion , as if the herb morsus diaboli had got in amongst them . amongst many other good-morrows , they propounded to the rose , that he should part with his prickles , and transmit his strength that way to be disposed of by them ; the royall rose liked not this bold request of theirs , though couched in very smooth language , but answered , i have hitherto condescended to every thing you have propounded , much more then ▪ any of my predecessors ever did ; but touching these prickles , which god and nature hath given mee , and are inherent in me and my stock from the beginning , though they be but excressencies , yet you know they fortifie and arm me , armat spina rosam . and by them i protect you and your rights from violence , and what protection i pray can there be without strength ? therefore i will by no means part with them to enfeeble my regall power , but will retain them still , and bequeath them to my posterity , which i would be loth to betray in this point ; nor doe i much value what that silly infected animall , the king of bees tells me sometimes , when humming up and downe my leaves , he would buzze this fond belief into me , how it added much to his majestie , that nature gives him no sting , as all other bees have , because he should rely altogether upon the love and loyalty of his subjects . no ; i will take warning by the eagle , the king of volatills , and by the lyon , king of quadrupedals , who ( as the prince of moralists reports ) when by fayre insinuations the one had parted with his tallons , the other with his teeth and ongles , wherein their might , and consequently their majesty consisted , grew afterwards contemptible to all creatures , and quite lost that natural allegeance and awe which was duc unto the one from all birds , and to the other , from all beasts of field and forrest . morall . every naturall borne monarch , hath an inherent inalienable strength in himself , which is the common militia of his kingdome ; for , though the peoples love ( which oftentimes is got by an apple , and lost by a peare ) be a good cittadell , yet there must be a concurrence of some visible setled force besides , which no earthly power may dispose of without his royall commands : and for him to transmit this strength to any other , is the only way to render him inglorious and despicable , both at home and abroad ; and thus you have the spirit of these flowers , and morall of the fable . the assembly of architects . there was an ancient goodly palace , composed of divers pieces , and partition'd into sundry chambers , halls and courts , which were supported by mixt pillars , partly corinthian , partly ionique , but principally by the dorique the king of columnes , as having the firmest pedestall : some tooke exceptions , and alledged , that some of the said courts were too high , and some of the chambers in this structure were too wide . the lord of this palace call'd together the best masons and architects , to advise with him ( not without him ) for mending of those faults , the better contrivance of the roomes , and to reduce the building to a just proportion . they solemnly met , and falling to consultation hereof , they found that the chamber which was spangled with stars , and where his privat counsell of state did use to sit , were too wide ; they thought that the court erected on the north-side , and that learned court where ecclesiasticall matters were scanned , was too high ; these , with that peculiar court which was erected for the support of honour , they went about in lieu of rectifying , to ruinat and raze to the very ground ; and some of these masons ( for indeed they were rather masons then true architects ) were so precise and over criticall , that they seem'd to find fault with the position of the chappell that belong'd to this palace , because , forsooth , it stood east and west , which situation , only in regard it was ancient , they held to be a superstitious posture ; they seem'd to repine at the decencie , riches and ornament of it , with divers other frivolous exceptions . the lord of the palace said little to that , but touching the errors and disproportions in the foresaid courts and chambers of publick justice , he was very willing they should be amended , and reduced to a true dimension and symmetrie ; and that all other roomes should be searched and swept cleane : but he would be loth to see those ancient pieces quite demolish'd , for that would hazard the fall of the maine fabrique , his princely hereditary patrimony ( descended upon him from so many wise oeconomists and royall progenitors ) in regard of the ●…uncture and contignation those parts had with the whole frame . to mend a thing by demolishing it , is as curing a sick body by knocking him in the head : he told them it was easier far to pull down , then build up ; one may batter to pieces in one houre , that which cannot be built in an age : that everlasting villaine , who burnt the ephesian temple , destroyed , as it were in a trice , what was a rearing up ten long olympiads : he wish'd them further to be very cautious how they medled with th the angulars and basis of that royal structure ; for so they might prove as wise as those architects , who took out som of the foundation stones , to repair the roof . lastly , he told them , that if they intended to pull down any part of his own standing palace , they shold be well advised before hand of the fashion wherof that new fabrick shold be , which they purposed to rear up in the room of the old . moral innovations are of dangerous consequence in all things , specially in a setled well temper'd ancient state ; therfore ther shold be great heed taken , before any ancient court of judicature , erected as a pillar to support justice by the wisdom of our progenitors , be quite put down ; for it may shake the whole fram of government , and introduce a change ; and changes in government are commonly fatall , for seldom comes a better . and this i hold to be the aim of this apologue . the insurrection of the winds . it fortuned , that the winds banded against eolus : and boreas ( the north-wind ) began to bluster first , and wold blow wher he listed , he grew so boisterous , that he is call'd scopa viarum , the high-way beesom , he seem'd to sweep all before him southward , insomuch , that uniting all his strength into one body , he made towards eolus in a hostile armed manner , and so obtained of him what he desired . after his example ( and an odde example it was ) the west-wind , his fellow subject rose up , alledging , that though he blew from the left-side of heaven , yet he deserved to be as much favoured as boreas , in regard he drove a far richer trade , and blew upon a more fertile countrey , which brought in much more benefit to the rest of eolus his dominions ; therfore he would have his liberties also assur'd him , which he alledged were altogether as ancient as the others : this made him puff with such an impetuous violence , that his blasts brought with them ( god wot ) divers showres of bloud , and whole cataracts of calamities : now , as it is observed in the course of naturall things , that one mischief seldom marcheth alone , but ushers in another , and hath alwaies its concomitants , so these north and western gusts , as one wave useth to drive on another , made all the winds in the compasse , both collaterall and cardinall to rise up and rebell against eolus , even under that very clime , and in those horizons , where he kept his principall residence and royal court. and this popular wind ( for 't was no other , take it all joyntly in one puff ) did rage with that vehemency , that it turn'd every wher into fearful flames of fire ( issuing out of a kind of ignis fatuus , which by its repercussions , and furious arietations , did a world of mischief , as if it had bin that incendiary prester wind , or rather an haraucana , that indian gust , which alwaies brings the devil along with it as those savages believe ) had blown here , for , surely god was not in this wind . yet som were so simple , to think that this wind proceeded from divine inspirations ; nay , they came to that height of prophaneness , as to father it upon the holy ghost , though nothing could be more different to his sweet motions , nothing so directly opposit to his soft gentle breeses and eventilatio●…s ; for no holy consecrated thing could stand before this diabolical wind , down went all crosses it met withall ; it batter'd down church and chappel windowes ( and i fear the walls and steeples will next to wrack . ) it was so violent , that it overturn'd all stone tables that stood east-ward ; it blew away all the decent vests and ornaments of the church ; the bishops mitre ( an order contemporary with christianity it self ) did quake like an aspen leaf before it ; nay , it shrewdly shook the very imperial scepter , and crown which stood on eolus his head , so that he was like to become ludibrium ventorum . but the highest deity of heaven , he who walketh upon the wings of the wind , and makes weight for them , and gathereth them in his fist when he pleaseth , hating such an odious rebellion , rebuked these tumultuous winds , he caused a contagious aire , to rush in and mingle with them , and infect them with new d●…seases ; besides whispers of jealousies , doubts and diffidence blew and buzz'd more and more amongst them , so that they could not trust one another ; insomuch , that it made them to fall into confusion amongst themselves , which is the common fate of all rebellions . so eolus recovered his monarchy , and as they say , ther is no wind but blows som body good ; so this turn'd much to the advantage of eolus , for he grew ever after more firm and better establish'd in his regall power , because he put a competent guard in those climes whence all these boistrous winds burst forth , and so secur'd himself ever after , that they could not blow where they listed . popular insurrections being debell'd , turn to the advantage , and render the ruling prince more secure afterwards , or a broken bone being well set , growes stronger oftentimes : and so you have the principal morall of this parable in brief . post-script . sir , i long to receive your opinion of these rambling pieces of fancy , you may , peradventure , have more , when the times are open : surely the wind will not hold stil in this unlucky hole , for it is too violent to last : it begins ( thanks be to god ) to sift already , and amongst those multitudes , who expect the change , i am one that lyeth at the cape of good hope , though a long time under hatches ( in the fleet. ) howsoever , though all the winds in the compass shold bluster upon me ; nay , though a haraucana should rage , i am arm'd and resolv'd to bear the brunt , to welcome the will of god , and possesse my soul with patience . if you desire a further intimation of things , i refer you to a discourse of mine call'd the tru informer , who will give you no vulgar satisfaction . so i am yours , as at first , inalterable . i. h. of the land of ire : or , a discours of that horrid insurrection and massacres which happen'd lately in ireland ; by mercurius hibernicus : who discovers unto the world the tru causers and incendiaries therof . in vindication of his majesty , who is most maliciously traduc'd to be accessary therunto ; which is as damnable a lie as possibly could be hatched in hell ; which is the staple of lies . a lie stands upon one legg , — truth upon two . mercurius hibernicus , his advertisement to the well-temper'd reader . there is a mongrell race of mercuries lately sprung up , but i claim no acquaintance with them , much less any kindred . they have commonly but one weeks time for their conception and birth ; and then are they but like those ephemeran creatures , which pliny speaks of , that are born in the morning , grow up till noon , and perish the same night : i hope to be longer liv'd then so , because i was longer a getting , ther was more time and matter went to my generation . ther is a tale how the tru mercury indeed , descended from heven once in a disguise , to see how he was esteem'd on earth ; and entring one day into a painters-shop , he found ther divers pictures of apollo , iupiter , mars , with others ; and spying his own hanging in a corner hard-by , he asked what the price of that pourtrait might be ? the painter answered , that if he bought any of the rest , he wold give him that into the bargain for nothing : mercury hereupon shaking his white caducean , flung out in indignation , and flew up to heven . shold mercury chance to descend now from his sphear , i think he wold be much more offended to find himself personated by every petty impertinent pamphleter ; yet i believe he would not think it ill that aulicus assumes his shape , nor that the harp , who owes her first invention to him , should be made now his crest . to my honourable friend mr. e. p. sir , if you please to cast your eyes upon the following discours , i believe it will afford you som satisfaction , and enlighten you more in the irish affaires . the allegeance i owe to truth , was the midwife that brought it forth , and i make bold to make choice of you for my gossip , because i am from the prison of the fleet 3. nonas april is 1643. your true servant , i. h. mercurius hibernicus . there is not any thing since these ugly warrs begun , whereof there hath been more advantage made to traduce and blemish his majesties actions , or to alienate and imbitter the affections of his people towards him , to incite them to armes , and enharden them in the quarrell , than of the irish affaires ; whether one cast his eyes upon the beginning and proceedure of that warre ( which some by a most monstrous impudence would patronize upon their majesties ) or upon the late cessation , and the transport of auxiliaries since from thence . there are some that in broken peeces have written of all three : but not in one entire discourse , as this is , nor hath any hitherto hit upon those reasons and inferences that shall be displayed herein . but he who adventures to judge of affaires of state , specially of traverses of warre , as of pacifications , of truces , suspensions of armes , parlies , and such like , must well observe the quality of the times , the successe and circumstance of matters past , the posture and pressure of things present ( and upon the place ) the inducement or enforcement of causes , the gaining of time , the necessity of preventing greater mischiefes ( whereunto true policy prometheus like hath alwaies an eye ) with other advantages . the late cessation of armes in ireland was an affaire of this nature ; a true act of state , and of as high a consequence as could be : which cessation is now become the common subject of every mans discourse , or rather the discourse of every common subject all the three kingdomes over : and not onely the subject of their discourse , but of their censure also ; nor of their censure onely , but of their reproach and obloquy . for the world is come now to that passe , that the foot must judge the head , the very cobler must pry into the cabinet counsels of his king ; nay the distaffe is ready ever and anon to arraign the scepter ; spinstresses are become states-women , and every peasan turned politician ; such a fond irregular humour reignes generally of late yeers amongst the english nation . now the designe of this small discourse , though the subject require a farre greater volume , is , to vindicate his majesties most pious intentions in condescending to this late suspension of arms in his kingdome of ireland , and to make it appeare to any rationall ingenious capacity , ( not pre-occupied or purblinded with passion ) that there was more of honour and necessity , more of prudence and piety in the said cessation , than there was either in the pacification or peace that was made with the scot. but to proceed herein the more methodically , i will lay downe , first , the reall and true radicall causes of the late two-yeers irish insurrection . secondly , the course his majesty used to suppresse it . lastly , those indispensable impulsive reasons and invincible necessity which enforced his majesty to condescend to a cessation . touching the grounds of the said insurrection , we may remember when his majesty out of a pious designe ( as his late majesty also had ) to settle an uniformitie of serving god in all his three kingdomes , sent our liturgie to his subjects of scotland ; some of that nation made such an advantage hereof , that though it was a thing only recommended , not commanded or pressed upon them , and so cald in suddenly againe by a most gracious proclamation , accompanied with a generall pardon : yet they would not rest there , but they would take the opportunity hereby to demolish bishops , and the whole hierarchy of the church ( which was no grievance at all till then ) to which end , they put themselves in actuall armes , and obtained at last what they listed ; which they had not dared to have done , had they not been sure to have as good friends in england as they had in scotland ( as lesly himself confessed to sir william berkley at newcastle ) for some of the chiefest inconformists here , had not onely intelligence with them , but had been of their cabinet-counsels in moulding the plot : though some would cast this war upon the french cardinall , to vindicate the invasion we made upon his masters dominions in the isle of rets ; as also for some advantage the english use to do the sp●…niard in transporting his treasure to dunkerk , with other offices . others wold cast it upon the iesuit , that he shold project it first , to ●…orce his m●…jesty to have recourse to his roman catholick subjects for aid , that so they might , by such supererogatory service ingratiate themselves the more into his favour . the irish hearing how well their next neighbou●…s had sped by way of arms , it filled them full of thoughts and apprehensions of fear and jealousie , that the scot wold prove more powerful hereby , and consequently more able to do them hurt , and to attemp●… waies to restrain them of that connivency , which they were allowed in point of religion : now ther is no nation upon earth that the irish hate in that perfection , and with a greater antipathy , than the scot , or from whom they conceive greater danger : for wheras they have an old prophesie amongst them , which one shall hear up and down in every mouth , that the day will come when the irish shall weep upon english mens graves : they fear that this prophesie will be verified and fulfilled in the scot above any other nation . moreover , the irish entred into consideration , that they also had sundry grievances and grounds of complaint , both touching their estates and consciences , which they pretended to be far greater than those of the scots . for they fell to think , that if the scot was suffered to introduce a new religion , it was reason they shold not be so pinched in the exercise of their old , which they glory never to have altered . and for temporall matters ( wherin the scot had no grievance at all to speak of ) the new plantations which had bin lately afoot , to be made in conaught and other places ; the concealed lands and defective titles which were daily found out ; the new customs which were imposed , and the incapacity they had to any preferment or office in church and state ( with other things ) they conceived these to be grievances of a far greater nature , and that deserved redresse much more than any the scot had . to this end , they sent over commissioners to attend this parliament in england , with certain propositions , but those commissioners were dismissed hence with a short and unsavoury answer , which bred worse bloud in the nation than was formerly gathered ; and this , with that leading case of the scot , may be said to be the first incitements that made them rise . in the cou●…se of humane actions , we daily find it to be a tru rule , exempla movent , examples move , and make strong impressions upon the fancy ; precepts are not so powerful as precedents . the said example of scotland , wrought wonderfully upon the imagination of the irish , and filled them ( as i touched before ) with thoughts of emulation , that they deserved altogether to have as good usage as the scot , their country being far more beneficial , and consequenly , more importing the english nation . but these were but confused imperfect notions , which began to receive more vigour and form after the death of the earl of strafford , who kept them under so exact an obedience , though som censure him to have screwed up the strings of the harp too high ; insomuch that the taking off of the earl of straffords head , may be said to be the second incitement to the heads of that insurrection to stir . adde hereunto , that the irish understanding with what acrimony the roman catholicks in england were proceeded against since the sitting of our parliament , and what further designes were afoot against them , and not onely against them , but for ranversing the protestant religion it self , as it is now practised ( which som shallow-braind 〈◊〉 do throw into the same scales with p●…pery . ) they thought it was high time for them to forecast what shold become of them , and how they shold ●…e 〈◊〉 in point of conscience , when a new deputy of the parliaments election ( approbation at least ) shold come over . therfore they fell to consult of som means of timely prevention : and this was another mo●…ive ( and it was a sh●…ewd one ) which p●…sht on the irish to take up arms. lastly , that army of 8000. men , which the earl of strafford had raised to be transported to england for suppressing the scot , being by the advice of our parliament here , disbanded ; the country was annoyed by som 〈◊〉 those stragling souldiers , as not one in twenty of the irish , will from the sword to the spade , or from the pike to the plough again . therfore the two marquesses that were ambassadors here then for spaine , having propounded to have som numbers of those disbanded forces , for the service of their master ; his majesty by the mature advice of his privy counsell , to occur the mischiefs that might arise to his kingdom of ireland by those loose casheer'd souldiers , yielded to the ambassadors motion , who sent notice hereof to spain accordingly , and so provided shipping for their transport , and impressed money to advance the business ; but as they were in the heat of that 〈◊〉 ▪ his majesty being then in scotland ▪ 〈◊〉 w●…s a sudden stop made of those promised troops , who had depended long upon the spaniards service , as the spaniard 〈◊〉 do●…e on theirs . and this was the last , though no●… the least fatal cause of that horrid insurrection : all which particulars well considered , it had bin no hard matter to have bin a prophet , and standing upon the top of holy-head , to have foreseen those black clouds engendering in the irish aire , which bro●…e out afterwards into such fearful tempests of bloud . out of these premises , it is easie for any common understanding , not transported with passion and private interest , to draw this conclusion . that they who complyed with the scot in his insurrection ; they who dismissed the irish commissioners with such a short unpolitick answer , they who took off the earl of straffords head , and delayed afterwards the dispatching of the earl of leicester , they who hindered those disbanded troops in ireland to go for spain , may be justly said to have bin the tru causes of the late insurrection of the irish ; and consequently , it is easie to know upon the account of whose souls must be laid the bloud of those hundred and odde thousands poor christians , who perished in that war ; so that had it bin possible to have brought over their bodies unputrified to england , and to have cast them at the doores , and in the presence of som men i believe they wold have gushed out afresh into bloud , for discovery of the tru murtherers . the grounds of this insurrection being thus discovered , let us examine what means his majesty used for the suppression of it . he made his addresses presently to his great counsel , the english parliament then assembled , which queen elizabeth and her progenitors did seldom use to do , but only to their privy counsel in such cases , who had the discussing and transacting of all foreign affaires ; for in mannaging matters of state , specially those of war , which must be carryed with all the secrecy that may be , trop grand nombre , est encombre , as the frenchman saith , too great a number of counsellours may be an incumber , and expose their results and resolutions to discovery and other disadvantages , wheras in military proceedings the work shold be afoot before the counsels be blazed abroad . well , his majesty transmitted this business to the parliament of england , who totally undertaking it , and wedding as it were the quarlel ( as i remember they did that of the palatinate a little before by solemn vote ; the like was done by the parliament of scotland also , by a publick joynt declaration , which in regard ther came nothing of it , tended little to the honour of either nation abroad ) his majesty gave his royal assent to any propositions or acts for raising of men , money and arms to perform the work . but hereby no man is so simple as to think his majesty shold absolutely give over his own personal care and protection of that his kingdom , it being a rule , that a king can no more desert the protection of his own people , then they their subjection to him . in all his declarations ther was nothing that he endear'd and inculcated more often , and with greater aggravation and earnestness unto them , then the care of his poor subjects their fellow-protestants in ireland : nay , he resented their condition so far , and took the business so to heart , that he offered to passe over in person for their relief : and who can deny but this was a magnanimous and king-like resolution ? which the scots by publick act of counsel , did highly approve of , and declared it to be an argument of care and courage in his majesty . and questionless it had done infinite good in the opinion of them that have felt the pulse of the irish people , who are daily ore-heard to groan , how they have bin any time these 400. years under the english crown , and yet never saw but two of their kings all the while upon irish ground , though ther be but a salt 〈◊〉 of a few hours sail to pass over . and much more welcom shold his majesty , now regnant , be amongst them , who by general tradition , they confess and hold to come on the paternal side from 〈◊〉 ( by legal and lineal descent ) who was an irish prince , and after king of scotland , wheras the title of all our former kings and queens was stumbled at alwaies by the vulgar . his majesty finding that this royall proffer of engaging his own person , was rejected with a kind of scorn , coucht in smooth language , though the main businesse concerned himself nearest , and indeed solely himself , that kingdom being his own hereditary right . understanding also , what base sinister use ther was made of this insurrection by som trayterous malevolent persons , who , to cast aspersions upon his majesty , and to poyson the hearts of his people , besides publick infamous reports , counterfeited certain commissions in his majesties name to authorize the businesse , as if he were privy to it , though i dare pawn my soul his ( or her ) majesty knew no more of it then the great mogor did . finding also that the commissioners imployed hence for the managing and composing matters in that kingdom , though nominated by the parliament , and by their recommendation authorized by his majesty , did not observe their instructions , and yet were conniv'd at . understanding also , what an inhumane design ther was between them and the scot , in lieu of suppressing an insurrection to eradicat and extinguish a whole nation to make booty of their lands ( which hopes the london adventurers did hugge , and began to divide the bears-skin before he was taken , as his majesty told them ▪ an attempt the spaniard nor any other christian state ever intended against the worst of savages ; the conceit wherof in●…used such a desperate courage , eagerness and valour into the irish , that it made them turn necessity into a kind of vertu . moreover , his majesty taking notice that those royal subsidies , with other vast contributions wherunto he had given way , with the sums of particular adventurers ( amongst whom som aliens ( hollanders ) were taken in , besides the scot to share the country ) were misapplyed , being visibly imployed , rather to feed an english rebellion , then to suppress an irish : nay , understanding that those charitable collections which were made for the reliefe of those distressed protestants , who being stripped of all their livelihood in ireland , were forced to fly over to england , were converted to other uses , and the charity not dispensed according to the givers intention . hearing also that those 5000. men which had been levyed and assigned to goe under the lord wharton , the lord of kerry , sir faithfull fortescue and others were diverted from going to the west of ireland , and imployed to make up the earl of essex army : and having notice besides that the earl of warwicke had stayd certaine ships going thither with supplies , and that there was an attempt to send for over to england some of those scottish forces which were in ulster , without his privity . lastly , his majesty finding himself unfitted , and indeed disabled to reach those his distressed subjects , his owne royal armie all his navall strength , revenues and magazines being out of his hands ; and having as hard a game to play still with the scot , and as pernicious a fire to quench in england , as any of his progenitors ever had : receiving intelligence also daily from his protestant nobility and gentry thence , in what a desperate case the whole kingdome stood , together with the report of the committee that attended his majesty from them expresly for that service , who amongst other deplorable passages in their petition , represented , that all means by which comfort and life should be conveyed unto that gasping kingdome , seemed to be totally obstructed , and that unlesse 〈◊〉 reliefe were afforded , his loyall subject●… there must yeeld their fortunes for a prey , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a sacrifice , and their religion for a 〈◊〉 to the mercilesse rebels . his majesty ( as it was high time for 〈◊〉 ) taking into his princely thoughts those wofull complainrs and cryes of his poore subjects , condescended at last to appoint some persons of honour to heare what the irish could say for themselves , as they had often petitioned ; and god forbid but the king of ireland should receive his subjects petitions , as well as the king of scotland . but his majesty being unsatisfied with what they propounded then , the lord marquess of ormond marched with considerable forces against them , and though he came off with honour , yet no reliefe at all comming thither for many moneths after from the parliament here , who had undertaken the businesse , and had received all the summes and subsidies , with other unknown contributions to that end , matters grew daily worse and worse . to sum up all , his majesty receiving express and positive advice from his lord justices and counsell of state ther , that the whole kingdom was upon point of utter perdition , which was co-intimated the same time to the parliament here , by a special letter to the speaker ; i say his majesty finding that he had neither power of himself , it being transmitted to others ; and that those trustees did misapply that power and trust he had invested in them ( for the time ) to make good their undertaking for preservation of that his fruitfull kingdome ; being impelled by all these forcible reasons , his majesty sent a commission to the lord marquesse of ormond his lievtenant generall ( a most known sincere protestant ) to hearken to a treaty according to their petition ; and if any thing was amisse in that treaty in poynt of honour ( as it shall appeare by comparing it with others , there was none ) we know whom to thank . for out of these premises also , doth result this second conclusion , that they who misapplied those moneys , and mis imployed those men which were levyed with his majesties royall assent for the reduction of ireland : they who set afoot that most sanguinary design of extirpating , at least of enslaving a whole ancient nation , who were planted there by the hand of providence from the beginning : they who hindred his majesties transfretation thither to take cognizance of his own affairs , and expose the countenance of his own royall person for composing of things : they , they may be said to be the true causes of that unavoydable necessity and as the heathen poetsings , the gods , themselvs cannot resist necessity ) which enforced his majesty to capitulat with the irish , and assent to a cessation . it was the saying of one of the bravest roman emperours , and it was often used by henry the great of france , her majesties father , that he had rather save the life of one loyall subject then kill a hundred enemies : it may well be thought that one of the prevalentst inducements that moved his majesty ( besides those formerly mentioned ) to condescend to this irish cessation , was a sense he had of the effusion of his own poor subjects blood , the hazard of the utter extirpation of the protestants there , and a totall irrecoverable losse of that kingdome , as was advertised both in the petition of the protestants themselves , the relation of the committee imployd thither to that purpose , and the expresse letters of the lords justices and counsell there . to prove now , that this cessation of arms in ireland was more honourable and fuller of piety , prudence and necessity , then either the pacification or peace with the scot. i hope , these few ensuing arguments ( above divers others which cannot be inserted here , in regard of the force intended brevity of this discourse ) will serve the turne . 1. in primis , when the pacification was made with scotland his majesty was there personally present , attended on by the floure of his english nobility , gentry and servants , and the enemy was hard by ready to face him. at the concluding of the irish cessation , his majesty was not there personally present , but it was agitated and agreed on by his commissioner , and it hath been held alwaies less dishonourable for a king to capitulate in this kind with his own subjects by his deputy , then in his own person , for the further off he is , the lesse reflects upon him . 2. upon the pacification and peace with scotland , there was an amnestia , a generall pardon , and an abolition of all by-passed offences published , there were honours and offices conferred upon the chiefest sticklers in the war. at the cessation in ireland there was no such thing . 3. when the pacification and peace was made with the scots , there was mony given unto them , as it is too well knowne . but upon the setling of this cessation , the irish received none but gave his majesty a considerable summe as an argument of their submission and gratitude , besides the maintainance of some of his garrisons in the interim ; and so much partly in point of honour . 4. at the concluding of the pacification and peace with scotland , there was a vigorous , fresh , unfoiled english army a foot , and in perfect equipage ; there wanted neither ammunition , armes , money , cloaths , victuals or any thing that might put heart into the souldier and elevat his spirits . but the protestant army in ireland had not any of all these in any competent proportion , but were ready to perish , though there had been no other enemy then hunger and cold : and this implies a farre greater necessity for the said cessation . 5. in ireland there was imminent danger of an instant losse of the whole kingdome , and consequently , the utter subversion of the protestant religion there , as was certified both to king and parliament by sundry letters and petitions which stand upon record : there was no such danger in the affairs of scotland , either in respect of religion or kingdome ; therefore there was more piety shown in preserving the one , and prudence in preserving the other in ireland , by plucking both ( as it were ) out of the very jawes of destruction by the said cessation . we know that in the medley of mundane casualties , of two evils , the least is to be chosen , and a small inconvenience is to be born withall , to prevent a greater . if one make research into the french story , he will find , that many kinds of pacifications and suspensions of armes were covenanted 'twixt that king and som of his subjects , trenching far more upon regall dignity then this in ireland . the spaniard was forced to declare the hollanders free-states , before they could be brought to treat of a truce : and now the catalans scrue him up almost to as high conditions . but what need i rove abroad so far ? it is well known , nor is it out of the memory of man ( in queen elizabeths raign ) that in ireland it self ther have bin cessations , all circumstances well weighed , more prejudiciall to majesty then this . but that which i hear murmured at most as the effect of this cessation , is the transport of som of those souldiers to england for recruting his majesties armies , notwithstanding that the greatest number of them be perfect and rigid protestants , and were those whom our parliament it self imployed against the irish. but put case they were all papists , must his majesty therfore be held a favourer of popery ? the late king of france might have bin said as well to have bin a favourer of hugonotts , because in all his wars he imployed them most of any in places of greatest trust against the house of austria ; wheras all the world knows , that he perfectly hated them in the generall , and one of the reaches of policy he had , was to spend and waste them in the wars . was it ever known but a soveraign prince might use the bodies and strength of his own naturall-born subjects , and liege men for his own defence ? when his person hath been sought and aimed at in open field by small and great shot , and all other engines of hostility and violence : when he is in danger to be surprized or besieg'd in that place wher he keeps his court : when all the flowers of his crown his royal prerogatives which are descended upon him from so many successive progenitors ) are like to be plucked off and trampled under foot : when ther is a visible plot to alter and overturn that religion he was born , baptized , and bred in : when he is in dan●…er to be forced to infringe that solemn sacramental oath he took at his coronation to maintain the said religion , with the rights and rites of the holy anglican church , which som brain-sick schismaticks wold transform to a kirk and her discipline , to som chimerical form of government they know not what . francis the first and other christian princes , made use of the turk upon lesse occasions ; and if one may make use of a horse , or any other bruit animal , or any inanimat engine or instrument for his own defence against man , much more may man be used against man , much more may one rational creature be used against another though for destructive ends in a good cause , specially when they are commanded by a soveraign head , which is the main thing that goes to justifie a war. now touching the roman catholicks , whether english , welsh , irish , or scottish , which repaire to his majesties armies either for service or security . he looks not upon them ●…s papists , but as his subjects , not upon their religion , but their allegiance , and in that ●…uality he entertains them : nor can the pa●…ist be denyed the character of a good subject , all the while he conforms himself to the lawes in generall , and to those lawes also that are particularly enacted against him , and so keeps himself within the bounds of his civil obedience : as long as he continues so , he may challenge protection from his prince by way of right , and if his prince by som accident be not in case to protect him , he is to give him leave to defend himself the best he can , for the law of nature allowes every one to defend himself , and ther is no positive law of man can annul the law of nature . now if the subject may thus claim protection from his prince , it followeth , the prince by way of reciprocation may require assistance , service and supplies from the subject upon all publick occasions , as to suppress at this time a new race of recusants , which have done more hurt then ever the old did , and are like to prove more dangerous to his crown and regal authority then any foreign enemy . but whosoever will truly observe the genius , and trace the actions of this fatal faction which now swayes with that boundless , exorbitant , arbitrary and antinomian power , will find , that it is one of their prime pieces of policy , to traduce and falsifie any thing that is not conducible to their own ends : yet what comes from them must be so magisterial , it must be so unquestionably and incontroulably tru & lawful , that it must be believed by an implicite faith , as proceeding from an in-erring oracle ( as if these zealots were above the common condition of mankind , to whom errour is as hereditary as any other infirmity ) though the thing it self encroach never so grosly both upon the common liberty , the states and souls of men . but if any thing bear the stamp of royal authority , be it never so just and tending to peace and the publick good , yea , though it be indifferent to either side , it is presently countermanded , cryed down , and stifled ; or it is calumniated and aspersed with obloquies , false glosses and misprisions ; and this is become now the common theam wherwith their pulpits ring which makes me think , that these upstart politicians have not long to reign ; for , as the common proverb saith , fraud and frost end foul and are short-lived , so that policy , those counsels which are grounded upon scandals , reproaches and lies , will quickly moulder and totter away , and bring their authors at last to deserved infamy and shame , and make them find a tomb in their own ruines . adde hereunto as further badges of their nature , that black irreconcilable malice and desire of revenge which rageth in them , the aversness they have to any sweetness of conformity and union , the violent thirst they have of bloud , which makes me think on that dis●…ique of prudentius , who seemed to be a prophet as well as poet ( a tru vates ) in displaying the humors of these fiery dogmatists , this all-confounding faction which now hath the vogue , to the punishment , i will not say yet , the perdition of this poor island . sic m●…res produnt animum , & mihi credite , junctus semper cum falso est dogmate coedis amor . thus in english. manners betray the mind , and credit me , ther 's alwayes thirst of bloud with heresie . the sway of the sword ; or a discours of the militia train'd-bands , or common soldiery of the land ; proving , that the power and command therof in chief belongs to the ruling prince , and to no other . sine gladio nulla defensio . the author's apology . t is confefs'd that the subject of this discours were more proper to one of the long-robe , which i am not , i am no lawyer otherwise then what nature hath made me , so every man , as he is born the child of reason , is a lawyer , and a logitian also who was the first kind of lawyer : this discoursive faculty of reason comes with us into the world accompanied with certain general notions and principles to distinguish right from wrong , and falshood from truth : but touching this following discourse , because it relates somthing to law , the author wold not have adventured to have exposed it to the world , if , besides those common innate notions of reason , and some private notes of his own , he had not inform'd and ascertain'd his judgment by conference with som professed lawyers , and those the eminentest in the land , touching the truth of what it treats of ; therfore he dares humbly aver that it contains nothing but what is consonant to the fundamentall and fixed constitutions , to the known clear lawes of this kingdom . from the prison of the flcet 3. nonas mail 1645. i. h. touching the polemical svvord , and command in chief of the militia , &c. government is an ordinance of god for mans good ; the kinds of government are ordinances of men for gods glory : now , among all wo●…ldly affairs there is not any thing so difficult , and fuller of incertitudes as the art of ruling man , for those nimble spirits ( as it is spoken elswhere ) who from apprentices have been made freemen of the trade , and at last thought themselves masters , having spent their youth , their manhood , and a long time of old age therein , yet when they came to leave the world they professed themselves still to be but novices in the trade . there is a known way to break , guide , and keep in awe all other animals , though never so savage and strong ; but there is no such certaine way to govern multitudes of men , in regard of such turbulences of spirit and diversity of opinions that proceed from the rational faculty , which other cretures that are contented only with sense , are not subject unto ; and this the philosopher holds to be one of the inconveniences that attend humane reason , and why it is given man as a part of his punishment . now , why the government over men is ●…o difficult , there may be two main reasons alledg'd , the first is the various events , and world of inexpected contingencies that attend humane negotiations , specially matters of state , which , as all other sublunary things , are subject to alterations , miscarriages , and change , this makes the mindes of men ▪ and consequently the moulds of policy so often to alter , scarce one amongst twenty is the same man as he was twenty yeares ago in point of judgement , which turns and changeth according to the successe and circumstances of things , the wisedome of one day is the foolishnesse of another , posterior dies est prioris magister , the day following becomes the former dayes teacher . the second reason is , the discrepant , and wavering fancies of mens braines , specially of the common peeple , who ( if not restrained ) are subject to so many crotchets and chymeras , with extravagant wanton desires , and gaping after innovations . insulary peeple are observed to be more transported with this instability then those of the continent , and the inhabitants of this i le more then others , being a well-fed spriteful peeple ; in so much , that it is grown a proverb abroad , that the englishman doth not know when he is well : now the true polititian doth use to fit his government to the fancy of the peeple , the ruler must do as the rider , some peeple are to be rid with strong bitts and curbs , and martingalls , as the napollitan , and french our next neighbour , which is the cause that a kind of slavery is entail'd upon him , for the french peasant is born with chains ; other nations may be rid with a gentle small bridle , as the venetian and the hollander , who hath not such boiling spirits as others ; a bridle doth serve also the spaniard , who is the gretest example of stability , and exact obedience to authority , of any peeple ; for though spain be the hottest countrey in christendom , yet it is not so subject to feavers as others are , i mean to fits of intestin commotions : and this was never so much tryed as of late yeers ; for though the present king hath such known frail●…ies , though he hath bin so infortunat , as to have many countreys quite revolted , and rent away from him ; though the ragingst plague that ever was in spain under any king , happen'd of late yeers , which sweep'd away such a world of peeple ; though his taxes be higher then ever were any , though he hath call'd in and engrossed all the common coyn of the countrey , and delivered but the one halfe back again , reserving the other half for himself ; though there 's no legall instrument , no bond , bill , or specialty can be writ but upon his seal'd paper , with sundry other exactions , yet his subjects are still as obedient , and awful unto him , they are as conformable and quiet , as if he were the most vertuous , and victorious prince that ever was ; and this they do principally for their own advantage , for if ther were another governour set up , it would inevitably hurle the whole countrey into combustion and tumults ; besides , they are taught , that as in choice of wives , so the rule holds in governments , seldome comes a better . touching the originals of government and ruling power , questionless the first among mankind was that naturall power of the father over his children , and that despotical domestique surintendence of a master of a house over his family ; but the world multiplying to such a masse of peeple , they found that a confused equality , and a loose unbridled way of living like ●…rute animals to be so inconvenient , that they chose one person to protect and govern ; not so much out of love to the ●…erson , as for their own conveniency and advantage , that they might live more regularly , and be secur'd from rapine , and op●…ression ; as also that justice might be administted ; and every one enjoy his own without fear , and danger : such govern●…urs had a power invested accordingly in ●…hem , also as to appoint subservient , able mi●…isters under them to help to bear the ●…urden . concerning the kinds of government , ●…ll polititians agree that monarchall is the best and noblest sort of sway , having the neerest analogy with that of heaven , viz. a supreme power in one single person ; god almighty is the god of unity , as well as of entity , and all things that have an entity do naturally propend to unity ; unity is as necessary for a well being , as entity is for a being , for nothing conduceth more to order , tranquillity , and quietude , nor is any strength so operative as the united ; the fist is stronger then the hand , though it be nothing but the hand , viz. the fingers united by contraction ; the republick of venice which is accounted the most eagle-ey'd and lastingst state in the world , fo●… she hath continued a pure virgin , and shin'd within her watry orb nere upon thirteen ages , is the fittest to give the world advice herein , for if ever any have brought policy to be a science which consists of certitudes , this state is shee , who is grown a●… dexterous in ruling men as in rowing of 〈◊〉 gally . but whereas the vulgar opinion is that the common peeple there have a shar●… in the government , 't is nothing so , for he great counsel which is the maine hing whereon the republick turns , is compose●… onely of gentlemen who are capable b●… their birth to sit there , having passed twenty five years of age ; to which purpose they must bring a publick testimonial that they are descended of a patrician or noble family . but to return to the main matter , this sage republick who may prescribe rules of policy to all mankind , having tryed at first to govern by consuls and tribunes for som years , she found it at last a great inconvenience , or deformity rather , to have two heads upon one body ; therefore she did set up one soveraign prince ; and in the records of venice the resons are yet extant which induc'd her thereunto , whereof one of the remarkablest was this ; we have observed that in this vast university of the world all bodies according to their several natures have multiplicity of motions , yet they receive vertue and vigour but from one , which is the sun ; all causes derive their originals from one supreme cause ; we see that in one creture there are many differing members , and faculties which have various functions , yet they are all guided by one soul , &c. the island of great britain hath bin alwaies a royal isle from her first creation , and infancy ; she may be said to have worn a crown in her cradle ; and though she had so many revolutions , and changes of masters , yet she continued still royal ; nor is there any species of government that suits better , either with the quality of the countrey , and genius of the inhabitants , or relates more directly to all the ancient lawes , constitutions , and customs of the land , then monarchal ; which any one that is conversant in the old records can justifie ; britannia ab initio mundi semper regia , & regimen illius simile illi caelorum . concerning the many sorts of trust●… which were put in the supreme governor of this land ( for ther must be an implicite and unavoidable necessary trust reposed in every soveraign magistrate ) the power of the sword was the chiefest ; and it was agreeable to holy scripture he shold have it , where we know 't is said , the king beareth not the sword in vain ; the lawes of england did ever allow it to be the inalienable prerogative of the soveraign prince , nor was it ever known ( humbly under favour ) that any other power whatsoever managing conjunctly or singly , did ever pretend to the power of the publick sword , or have the militia invested in them , but this ever remained intire and untransferrible in the person of the ruler in chief , whose chiefest instrument to govern by is the sword , without which crownes , scepters , globes and maces are but bables . it is that instrument which causeth tru obedience , makes him a dread soveraign , and to be feared at home and abroad ; now 't is a maxime in policy , that ther can be no tru obedience without fear ; the crown and scepter draw only a loose kind of voluntary love , and opinion from the people , but 't is the sword that draws reverence and awe , which two are the chiefest ingredients of allegeance , it being a principle , that the best government is made of fear and love , viz. when by fear love is drawn as threed through the eye of a needle ; the surest obedience , and loyalty is caused thus , for fear being the wakefullest of our passions works more powerfully in us and predominates over all the rest ; primus in orbe deus fecit timor . to raise up a soveraign magistrate without giving him the power of the sword , is to set one up to rule a metall'd horse without a bridle ; a chief ruler without a sword , may be said to be like that logg of wood which iupiter threw down among the froggs to be their king , as it is in the fable . moreover , one of the chiefest glories of a nation is to have their supreme governor to be esteem'd , and redouted abroad as well as at home . and what forren nation will do either of these to the king of england if he be armless , and without a sword ? who will give any respect o●… precedence to his ambassadors , and ministers of state ? the sword also is the prime instrument of publick protection , therefore that king who hath not the power of the sword , must have another title given him , the protector of his peeple . now , in a successive hereditary kingdom , as england is known , and acknowledged to be by all parties now in opposition , there are three things which are inalienable from the person of the king : they are , 1. the crowne . 2. the scepter . 3. the sword. the one , he is to carry on his head , the other in his hand , and the third at his side ; and they may be termed all three the ensignes or peculiar instruments of a king : by the first , he reignes , by the second he makes lawes , by the third he defends them : and the two first are but bables without the last , as was formerly spoken . 1. touching the crown or royal diadem of england , ther is none , whether presbyterian , independent , protestant , or others now in action , but confess that it descends by a right hereditary line , ( though through divers races , and som of them conquerours ) upon the head of charles the first now regnant : 't is his own by inherent birth-right and nature , by gods law , and the law of the land , and these parliament-men at their first sitting did agnize subjection unto him accordingly , and recognize him for their soveraign liege lord : nay , the roman catholick denies not this , for though there were bulls sent to dispense with the english subjects for their allegiance to queen elizabeth , yet the pope did this against her as he took her for a heretick , not an usurpresse , though he knew well enough that she had bin declared illegitimate by the act of an english parliament . this imperial crown of england is adorned and deckd with many fair flowers , which are called , royal prerogatives ; and they are of such a transcendent nature , that they are unforfeitable , individual , and untransferrable to any other : the king can only summon and dissolve parliaments : the king can only pardon ( for when he is crowned , he is sworn to rule in mercy as well as in justice : ) the king can only coyn money , and enhance or decry the value of it : the power of electing officers of state , of justices of peace and assize is in the king ; he can only grant soveraign commissions : the king can only wage war , and make out-landish leagues : the king may make all the courts of justice ambulatory with his person , as they were used of old ▪ 't is tru , the court of common pleas must be sedentary in som certain place for such a time ; but that expired , 't is removeable at his pleasure : the king can only employ ambassadours and treat with forraign states , &c. these , with other royal prerogatives which i shall touch hereafter , are those rare and wholsom flowers wherewith the crown of england is embellished , nor can they stick any where else but in the crown , and all confess the crown is as much the king 's , as any private man's cap is his own . 2. the second regall instrument is the scepter , which may be called an inseparable companion , or a necessary appendix to the crown ; this invests the king with the sole authority of making lawes , for before his confirmation all results and determinations of parliament are but bills or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are but abortive things , and meer embryos ; nay , they have no life at all in them till the king puts breath and vigour into them : and the ancient custome was for the king to touch them with his scepter , then they are lawes , and have a vertue in them to impose an obligation of universall obedience upon all sorts of people , it being an undeniable maxime , that nothing can be generally binding without the king 's royall assent , nor doth the law of england take notice of any thing without it : this being done they are ever after styl'd the kings lawes , and the judges are said to deliver the king's judgments , which agrees with the holy text , the king by judgment shall stablish the land : nay , the law presumes the king to be alwaies the sole judge paramount , and lord chief justice of england , for he whom he pleaseth to depute for his chiefest justice , is but styl'd lord chief iustice of the rings ●…ench , not lord chief justice of england , which title is peculiar to the king himself , and observable it is , that whereas he grants commissions and patents to the lord chancellour ( who is no other then keeper of his conscience ) and to all other judges , he names the chief justice of his own bench by a short writ only containing two or three lines : which run thus , regina iohanni popham militi salutem , sciatis quod constitutmus vos justiciarium nostrum capitalem ad placita coram nobis terminandum durante beneplacito nostro ; teste &c. now , though the king be liable to the laws , and is contented to be within their verge , because they are chiefly his own productions , yet he is still their protector , moderator , and soveraigne , which attributes are incommunicable to any other conjunctly or separately . thus the king with his scepter , and by the mature advice of his two houses of parl. which are his highest councel and court , hath the sole power of making laws ; other courts of judicature doe but expound them and distribute them by his appointment , they have but iuris dati dictionem or declarationem , and herein , i meane for the exposition of the lawes the twelve iudges are to be believed before the whole kingdom besides . they are as the areopagites in athens , the chief presidents in france and spaine in an extraordinary iunta , as the cape-syndiques in the rota's of rome , and the republique of venice , whose judgments in point of interpreting lawes are incontroulable , and preferred before the opinion of the whole senate whence they received their being ; and who hath still power to repeal them , though not to expound them . in france they have a law maxime , arrest donné en rebbe rouge est irrevocable , which is , a scarlet sentence is irrevocable , meaning when all the judges are met in their robes , and the client against whom the cause goes , may chafe and chomp upon the bit , and say what he will for the space of twenty foure howers against his judges , but if ever after he traduces them , he is punishable : it is no otherwise here where every ignorant peevish client , every puny barister , specially if he become a member of the house will be ready to arraign and vie knowledge with all the reverend judges in the land , whose judgement in points of law shold be onely tripodicall and sterling : so that he may be truly call'd a just king , and to rule according to law , who rules according to the opinion of his judges ; therefore , under favour , i do not see how his majesty for his part could be call'd injust when he leavied the ship-money , considering he had the judges for it . i now take the sword in hand , which is the third instrument of a king , ( and which this short discours chiefly points at ) it is as well as the two first incommunicable and inalienable from his person ; nothing concernes his honor more both at home and abroad ; the crown and the scepter are but unweildy and impotent naked indefensible things without it . there 's none so simple as to think there 's meant hereby an ordinary single sword , such as ev'ry one carrieth by his side , or som imaginary thing or chymera of a sword ; no , 't is the polemicall publique sword of the whole kingdom , 't is an aggregative compound sword , and 't is moulded of bell-metall ; for 't is made up of all the ammunition and armes small and great , of all the military strengths both by land and sea , of all the forts , castles and tenable places within and round about the whole i le : the kings of engl. have had this sword by vertue of their royall signory from all times , the laws have girded it to their sides , they have employed it for repeling all foren force , for revenging all forren wrongs or affronts , for quelling all intestine tumults , and for protecting the weal of the whole body politicke at home : the peeple were never capable of this sword , the fundamentall constitutions of this kingdom deny it them ; 't is all one to put the sword in a mad mans hand , as in the peeples ; or for them to have a disposing power in whose hands it shall be . such was the case once of the french sword , in that notorious insurrection call'd to this day la iaqueris de beauvoisin , when the pesants and mechanicks had a design to wrest it out of the kings hand , and to depresse all the peers and gentry of the kingdom ; and the businesse had gone so far that the peasans might have prevail'd , had not the prelats stuck close to the nobility ; but afterwards poor hare ▪ brain'd things they desire the king upon bended knees to take it againe ; such popular puffs have blowen often in poland , naples and other places , where while they sought and fought for liberty by retrenching the regall power , they fool'd themselfs into a slavery unawares , and found the rule right , that excesse of freedom turns to thraldom , and ushers in all confusions . if one shold go back to the nonage of the world , when governers and rulers began first , one will find the peeple desir'd to live under kings for their own advantage , that they might be restrain'd from wild exorbitant liberty , and kept in unity ; now unity is as requisit for the wel-being of all naturall things , as entity is for their being , and 't is a receiv'd maxime in policy , that nothing preserves unity more exactly then royal government : besides , 't is known to be the noblest sort of sway ; in so much that by the law of nations , if subjects of equal degrees , and under differing princes shold meet , the subjects of a king shold take precedency of those under any republique . but to take up the sword again . i say that the sword of public power and authority is fit only to hang at the kings side , and so indeed shold the great seal hang only at his girdle , because 't is the key of the kingdom : which makes me think of what i read of charlemain , how he had the imperial seal emboss'd alwaies upon the pommell of his sword , and his reason was , that he was ready to maintain whatsoever he signed , and sealed . the civilians , who are not in all points so great friends to monarchy as the common law of england is , say , there are six iura regalia , six regal rights , viz. 1. potestas iudicatoria , 2. potestas vitae & necis , 3. armamenta , 4. bona adespota , 5. census , 6. monetarum valor : to wit , power of iudicature , power of life and death , all kind of arming , masterless goods , s●…issements , and the value of money . among these regalia's , we find that arming , which in effect is nought else but the kings sword , is among the chiefest ; and 't is as proper and peculiar to his person , as either crown or scepter . by these two he drawes a loose voluntary love and opinion only from his subjects , but by the sword he draws reverence and awe , which are the chiefest ingredients of allegiance , it being a maxime , that the best mixture of government is made of fear and love . with this sword he conferrs honor , he dubbs knights , he creates magistrates , the lord deputy of ireland , the lord mayor of london with all other corporations have their swords from him , and when he entereth any place corporate , we know the first thing that is presented him is the sword : with this sword he shields and preserves all his people that every one may sit quietly under his own vine , sleep securely in his own house , and enjoy sweetly the fruits of his labours . nor doth the point of this sword reach only to every corner of his own dominions , but it extends beyond the seas to gard his subjects from oppression , and denial of justice , as well as to vindicate the publick wrongs , make good the interests of his crown , and to assist his confederates ; this is the sword that edward the third tied the flower deluces unto ( which stick still unto it , ) when having sent to france to demand that crown by maternal right , the counsell ther sent him word that the crown of france was not tied to a distaff , to which scoffing answer he replied , that then he wold tie it to his sword , and he was as good as his word . nor is this publick sword concredited or intrusted by the peeple in a fiduciary conditionall way to the king , but it is properly and peculiarly belonging unto him , as an inseparable concomitant , perpetual usher and attendant to his crown . the king , we know , useth to maintain all garrisons upon his own charge , not the peeples ; he fortifies upon his own charge , not the peeples : and though i will not averr , that the king may impresse any of his subjects , unlesse it be upon an actuall vasion by sea , or a sudden irruption into his kingdom by land , as the scots have often done , yet at any time the king may raise volunteers , and those who have received his money , the law makes it felony , if they forsake his service . thus we see there 's nothing that conduceth more to the glory , and indeed the very essence of a king then the sword , which is the armes and military strength of his kingdom ; wherfore under favour , ther cannot be a greater point of dishonour to a king then to be disarmed , then to have his sword taken from him , or dispos'd of and intrusted to any but those whom he shall appoint ; for as à minori ad majus the argument often holds , if a private gentleman chance to be disarm'd upon a quarrell , 't is held the utmost of disgraces , much greater and more public is the dishonor that falls upon a king , if after som traverses of difference 'twixt him and his subjects , they shold offer to disarm him , or demand his sword of him : when the eagle parted with his talons , and the lion with his teeth and ongles , the apolog tells us how contemptible afterwards the one grew to be among birds , the other among birds , the other among beasts . for a king to part with the sword politic is to render himself such a ridiculous king , as that logg of wood was which iupiter let down among the froggs for their king at the importunity of their croaking ; 't is to make him a king of clouts , or as the spaniard hath it , rey de havas , a bean king , such as we use to choose in sport at twelfnight . but my hopes are , that the two present houses of parliament ( for now they may be call'd so , because they begin to parley with their king , ) will be more tender of the honour of their soveraign liege lord , which , together with all his rights and dignities , by severall solemn oaths , aud by their own binding instruments of protestation and covenant , ( not yet revok'd ) they are sworne to maintaine , and that they will demand nothing of him which may favour of aspertè or force , but what may hold water hereafter : but now , touching the militia or sword of the kingdom , i think , under favour , the king cannot transfer it to any other ; for that were to desert the protection of his people , which is point blank against his coronation oath and his office : what forren prince or state will send either ambassador , resident or agent to him , when they understand his sword is taken from him ? what reformed forein church will acknowledg him defendor of the faith , when they hear of this ? nay , they who wish england no good will , will go near to paint him out , as not long since another king was , with a fair velvet scabbard , a specious golden hilt and chape , but the blade within was of wood . i hope that they who sway now , will make better use of their successes : many of them know 't is as difficult a thing to use a victory well , as to get one ; ther is as much prudence requir'd in the one , as prowesse in the other ; they will be wiser sure then turn it to the dishonor of their king : it being a certain rule , that the glory of a nation all the world over depends upon the glory of their king , and if he be any way obscur'd , the whole kingdom is under an eclipse . i have observed , that among other characters of gallantry , which forein writers appropriat to the english nation , one is , that they use to be most zealous to preserve the honor of their king ; i trust that they who are now up will return to the steps of their progenitors , both in this particular and divers other ; that their successes may serve to sweeten and moderat things , and suppress the popular sword which still rages ; and it had bin heartily wished that a suspension of arms had preceded this treaty , which useth to be the ordinary fore-runner , and a necessary antecedent to all treaties ; for while acts of hostility continue , som ill-favour'd newes may intervene which may imbitter and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ nor can it be expected that the proceedings will go on with that candor and confidence , while the old rancor is still in action ▪ 't is impossible a sore shold heal till the inflamation be taken away ; to cast water into a wound instead of oyle is not the way to cure it : or to cast oyle upon a fire instead of water is not the way to quench it ; poor england hath had a consuming fire within her bowels many years , she is also mortally wounded in all her members , that she is still in a high fever , which hath made her rave and speak idle a long time ; and 't is like to turn to a hectic , if not timely prevented . i pray god she may have no occasion to make use of the same complaint as alexander the great made when he was expiring his last , perii turba medicorum : too many physitians have undon me . to conclude in a word , ther is but one only way , under favor , to put a period to all these fearful confusions ; it is , to put the great master-wheel in order , and in its due place again , and then all the inferior wheels will move regularly ; let the king be restor'd , and ev'ry one will come to his own , all interests will be satisfied , all things quickly rectified ; till this be done , 't is as absurd to attempt the setling of peace , as if one shold go about to set a watch by the gnomen of an horizontall diall when the sun is in a cloud . i. h. an italian prospective , through which great britain ( without any multiplying art ) may cleerly see her present danger , and foresee her future destruction , if not timely prevented . perditio tua ex te anglia . paraenesis angliae . o england ( specially thou besotted city of london ) if thou be'st not quite past cure , or grown careless and desperat of thy self , if the least spark of grace , or ray of reson be yet remaining in thee , be warn'd , be warn'd by this stranger , who having felt thy pulse , and cast thy water very exactly , discovers in thee symptoms of inevitable ruine if thou holdst on this cours . divers of thy own children oftentimes admonish'd thee with tears in their eyes , and terror in their hearts , to recollect thy self , and return to thy old road of obedience to thy soverain prince , but they have bin little regarded , let a foreiners advice then take place , and make som impressions in thee to prevent thy utter destruction . from the prison of the fleet 2. aug. 1647. i. h. an account of the deplorable , and desperat condition that england stands in , sent from london , anno 1647. to the lord francisco barberini , cardinal of the most holy apostolick see , and protector of the english nation , at his palaces in rome . my last to your eminence was but short , in regard i had been but a short time in this countrey , i have now made a longer sojourn here , and taken a leisurely information of all matters ; therefore i shall give your eminence an account proportionably : for by conversation with the most indifferent , and intelligenc'd men , and by communication with the ambassadors here resident , i have taken some paines to pump out the truth of things , and penetrat the interest of all parties . and truly , i find , that that angry star , which hath lowr'd so long upon europe in generall , hath been as predominant , and cast as direfull aspects upon this poor iland , as it hath done upon any other part : truly , my lord , in all probability this peeple have pass'd the meridian of their happinesse , and begin to decline extreamly , as well in repute abroad , as also in the common notions of religion , and indeed in the ordinary faculty of reason : i think verily the ill spirit never reign'd so much in any corner of the earth by those inhumane aud horrid things that i have observ'd among them . nor is it a petty spirit , but one of the greatest cacod●…mons that thus drives them on , and makes them so active in the pursuance of their own perdition . to deduce matters from their originall , your eminency may please to understand , that this king at his accesse to the crown had deep debts to pay , both of his fathers , and his own , he was left ingaged in a fresh warre with spain ; and had another presently after which france , and both at one time , but he came off well enough of those : afterwards never any countrey flourished in that envied happinesse , and wanton kind of prosperity ; this city of london was grown to be the greatest mart , and mistress of trade , of any in the world ; insomuch , as i have been certainly inform'd , the king might have spent meerly upon his customes 4000 crowns a day : moreover , she had a vast bank of money being made the scale of conveying the king of spains treasure to flanders : insomuch that in a few yeers she had above ten millions of his moneys brought hither , which she might have remitted in specie or in marchandize , and for which this king had five in the hundred for coynage : yet could he not get beforehand with the world , having a sister with so many nephews and neeces , having a queen with diverse children of his own , ( at least 16 of the blood-royall ) to maintaine , with divers profuse courtiers besides , which made him more parsimonious then ordinary . the warres then growing more active 'twixt spaine and france , as also 'twixt holland and spaine both by land and sea , and divers great fleets of men of war as well french ( who were growne powerfull that way ) as dunkerkers , spaniards hollanders , and hamburgers , appearing daily in his narrow seas , and sayling close by his chambers , the world wondred this king had no greater strength at sea , in case that any of the foresaid nations should doe him an affront , as some of them had already done , by denying to dash their colours to his ships : insomuch that in holland and other places he was pasquill'd at , and pourtrayed lying in his cradle lullaby'd and rock'd asleep by the spaniard : hereupon being by advertisements from his agents abroad , and frequent advice of his privie councell at home , made sensible of the danger , and a kind of dishonour he was faln into , and having intelligence that the french cardinall began to question his title to the dominion of the narrow seas , considering he employed no visible power to preserve it , he began to consult of meanes to set forth a royall fleet : but in regard the purse of the crowne was lightly ballasted , and that he had no mind to summon the three estates , because of some indignities he had received in former parliaments by the puritan party ( a race of people averse to all kingly government , unlesse they may pare it as they please ) his then atturney generall ( noy ) a great cryed-up-lawyer , put it in his head to impose an old tax called ship-mony upon the subject , which the said lawyer did warrant upon his life to be legall , for he could produce divers records how many of his progenitors had done the like : the king not satisfied with his single opinion , refer'd it to his learn'd council , & they unanimously averred it to be agreeable to the law of the land ; yet this would not fully satisfie the king , but he would have the opinion of his twelve judges , and they also affirmed by their single vouches the said tax to be warrantable ; hereupon it was imposed and leavied , but some refusing to pay it , there was a suite commenc'd , during which all the judges were to re-deliver their opinions joyntly , and the businesse being maturely debated and canvased in open court divers months , and all arguments produc'd pro & con , nine of the said twelve judges concluded it legal . thereupon the king continued the imposition of the said tax , and never was mony imployed so much for the honour and advantage of a countrey , for he sent out every summer a royall fleet to scowre and secure the seas ; he caused a galeon to be built , the greatest and gallantest that ever spread saile : nor did he purse up , and dispose of one peny of this money to any other use , but added much of his own revenues yeerly thereunto : so the world abroad cried up the king of england to be awake againe ; trade did wonderfully encrease , both domestic and forrein in all the three kingdomes ; ireland was reduced to an absolute settlement , the arrears of the crown payed , and a considerable revenue came thence cleerly to the exchequer of england every year , the salaries of all officers , with the pay of the standing army ●…here , and all other charges being defrayed by ireland her self , which was never done before . yet for all this height of pappinesse , and the glorious fruites of the said ship-money , ( which was but a kind of petty insensible tax , & a thing of nothing to what hath hapened since ) there were some foolish peeple in this land which murmured at it , and cryed nothing else but a parliament , a parliament ; and they have had a parliament since with a vengeance . but before this occasion , it was observed , that the seeds of disobedience , and a spirit of insurrection was a long time engendring in the hearts of som of this peace-pampred people , which is conceived to proceed from their conversation and commerce with three sorts of men , viz. the scot , the hollander and the french huguenot . now an advantage happened that much conduced to necessitate the convoking of a parliament , which was an ill-favoured traverse that fell out in scotland ; for the king intending an uniformity of divine worship in all his three kingdoms , sent thither the liturgy of this church , but it found cold and course entertainment ther , for the whole nation , men , women and children rise up a gainst them : here upon the king absolutely revoked it by proclamation , wherein he declared 't was never his purpose to press the practise therof upon the consciences of any ; therfore commanded that all things shold be in statu quo prius , but this wold not serve the turn , the scot took advantge hereby to destroy hierarchy , and pull down the bishops to get their demeans : to which purpose they came with an army in open field against their own native king , who not disgesting this indignity , mustred another english army ; which being upon the confines of both kingdoms , a kind of pacification was plaistred over for the present . the king returning to london , and consulting his second thoughts , resented that insolency of the scots more then formerly : hereupon he summons a parliament , and desires aid to vindicat that affront of the scot. the scot had strong intelligence with the puritan faction in the english parliament , who seemed to abet his quarrel , rather then to be sensible of any national dishonour received from him ; which caused that short-lived parliament to dissolve in discontent , and the king was forced to find other means to raise and support an army by privat loanes of his nobler sort of subjects and servants : the scot having punctual advertisements of every thing that passed ; yea , in the kings cabinet councel was not idle all this while , but rallies what was left of the former army ( which by the articles of pacification ( a little before ) should have bin absolutely dismissed ) and boldly invades england , which he durst never have done , if he had not well known that this puritan party which was now grown very powerful here , and indeed had invited him to this expedition , wold stand to him . this forein army being by the pernicious close machinations of som mongrel englishmen aforementioned , entred into the bowels of the country , the king was forced to call this present parliament , with whom he complyed in every thing , so far as to sacrifice unto them both iudge , bishop , councellor and courtier ; yea , he yielded to the tumbling down of many tribunals of justice , which were an advantage to his prerogative ; he assented that the prelates , who were the most ancient and prime members of the upper house , and had priority of all others , since the first constitution of parliament in the enrollment of all acts , he assented i say that these , who were the greatest prop of his crown shold be quite outed from among the peers ; he granted them also a trienniall parliament , and after that , this perpetuall ; which words , to the apprehension of any rational man , carry with them a grosse absurdity in the very sense of the thing : and touching this last grant , i had it from a good hand , that the queen was a friend to this parliament , and your eminence knows how they have requited her since , but the main open councellor to this fatall act was a scot. now the reason which they alledged for this everlasting parliament was one of the baldest that ever i heard of , it was , that they might have time enough to pay the scots army , wheras in one morning they might have dispatched that , by passing so many subsidies for that use , and upon the credit of those , they might have raised what money they wold . the parliament finding the king so plyable , and his pulse to beat so gently , like ill-natur'd men they fall from inches to ells in seeking their advantages : they grew so peremptory as to demand all the military strength of the kingdom , the tower of london , with the whole royal navy , which they found in an excellent equipage , gramercy ship-money ; so that the benefit of ship-money , which they so clamoured at , turned most to their advantage of any thing afterwards . the scot being fidler-like returned to his country with meat , drink , and money , the king went a while after to keep a parliament ther , wherein he filled every blank , they did but ask and have , for he granted them what possibly they could propound , both for their kirk and state , many received honour , and they divided bishops lands amongst them : for all which unparallel'd concessions of princely grace , they caused an act already in force to be published , viz. that it shold be damnable treason in the highest degree that could be , for any of the scots nation conjunctly or singly to levy armes , or any military forces , upon any pretext whatsoever , without his majesties royal commission ; and this they caused to be don by way of gratitude , but how they perform'd it afterwards the world knowes too well . the king returning to london , in lieu of a welcom to his two houses of parliament ( to whom also before his departure he had passed more acts of grace then all his progenitors , take them all in a lump ) they had patch'd up a kind of remonstrance , which was voted in dead of the night , wherein they expos'd to the world the least moat in former government , and aggravated to the very height every grievance , notwithstanding that the king had redressed all before ; and this remonstrance , which breath'd nothing but a base kind of malice , they presented as a nosegay to their soveraign prince , to congratulat his safe return from a forein countrey ; which remonstrance they caus'd to be printed and publish'd before he could give any answer thereunto . the king finding such a virulent spirit still raign in the house , and knowing who were chiefly possess'd with it ( viz. those whom he had impeach'd before , but saw he could get no justice against them ) in such an extremity , he did an act like a generous prince , for taking the palsgrave with him , he took the first coach he met withall at his court-gate , and went to his house of commons in person , to demand five members , which he wold prove to be traitors in the highest degree 〈◊〉 to be the authors of all these distempers , protesting upon the word of a king , that they shold have as fair & legal a tryal as ever men had ; in the interim he only desir'd that their persons might be secur'd . the walls of both houses , and the very stones in london street did seem to ring of this high cariage of the kings , and the sound went thence to the country , whence the silly plebeians came presently in whole herds to this city , who strutting up and down the streets , had nothing in their mouths , but that the priviledg of parlement , the priviledg of parlement was broken , though it be the known clear law of the land , that the parlement cannot supersede or shelter any treason . the king finding how violently the pulse of the grosly seduced people did beat , and ther having bin formerly divers riotous crues of base mechaniques and mariners , who had affronted both his own court , and the two houses besides , which the commons , to their eternal reproach , conniv'd at , notwithstanding that divers motions were made by the lords to suppresse them , the king also having privat intelligence that ther was a mischievous plot to surprize his person , remov'd his court to the countrey . the king departing , or rather being driven away thus from his two houses , by this mutinous city , he might well at his going away have ubraided her in the same words as h. the 3. did upbraid paris , who being by such another tumultuous rabble driven out of her in the time of the ligue , as he was losing sight of her , he turn'd his face back , and said , farewel ingratefull city , i will never see thee again till i make my way into thee through thy walls : yet though the king absented himself in person thus from the two houses , he sent them frequent messages , that they wold draw into acts what he had already assented unto , and if any thing was left yet undon by him , he wold do it ; therfore he will'd them to leave off those groundless feares and jealousies wherwith they had amus'd both city and country ; and he was ready to return at all times to his palace in westminster , provided that his person might be secur'd from the former barbarisms and outrages : but in lieu of a dutiful compliance with their prince , the thoughts of the two houses ran upon nothing but war : the king then retiring into the north , and thinking with a few of his servants only to go visit a town of his ( hull ) he was denyed entrance by a fatal unlucky wretch ( hotham ) who afterwards was shamefully executed with his eldest son , by command of his new masters of the parlement : the king being thus shut out of his own town ( which open'd the first dore to a bloudy war ) put forth a declaration , wherin he warn'd all his people that they shold look to their proprieties , for if he was thus barr'd of his own , how could any privat subject be sure to be master of any thing he had , and herein he was as much prophet as prince ; for the parlement-men afterwards made themselfs land-lords of the whole kingdom , it hath bin usual for them to thrust any out of his freehold , to take his bed from under him , and his shirt from off his very back . the king being kept thus out of one of his townes , might suspect that he might be driven out of another , therfore 't was time for him to look to the preservation of his person , and the country came in voluntarily unto him by thousands to that purpose , but he made choice of a few only to be his gard , as the parlementeers had done a good while before for themselfs : but now they went otherwise to work , for they fell a levying , listing and arming men by whole regiments and brigades till they had a very considerable army afoot , before the king had one musqueteer or trooper on his side ; yet these men are so notoriously impudent , as to make the king the first aggressor of the war , and to lay upon him all the bloud that was split to this day , wherein the devil himself cannot be more shamelesse . the parliamenteers having an army of foot and horse thus in perfect equipage , 't was high time for the king to look to himself , therefore he was forced to display his royal standard , and draw his sword quite out : thus a cruel and most cruentous civil war began which lasted near upon four years without intermission , wherein there happen'd more batta les , sieges and skirmishes , then passed in the nether-lands in fourscore years , and herein the englishmen may be said to get som credit abroad in the world , that they have the same bloud running in their veines ( though not the same braines in their sculls ) which their ancestors had , who were observed to be the activest people in the field , impatient of delay , and most desirous of battaile then any nation . but it was one of the greatest miracles that ever happen'd in this land , how the king was able to subsist so long against the parlamenteers , considering the multiplicity of infinite advantages they had of him by water and land : for they had the scot , the sea and the city on their side ; touching the first , he rushed in as an auxiliary with above 20000. horse and foot compleatly furnish ▪ d both with small and great ammunition and arms , well cloth'd and money'd : for the second , they had all the kings ships well appointed , which are held to be the greatest security of the island both for defence and offence , for every one of them is accounted one of the moving castles of the kingdom : besides , they had all the other standing stone-castles , forts , and tenable places to boot : concerning the last , ( viz. the city ) therein they had all the wealth , bravery , and prime ammunition of england , this being the only magazin of men and money : now if the k. had had but one of these on his side , he had in all probability crush'd them to nothing : yet did he bear up strangely against them a long time , and might have done longer , had he kept the campane , and not spent the spirits of his men before townes ; had he not made a disadvantagious election of som commanders in chief , and lastly , had he not had close traitors within dores , as well as open rebels without ; for his very cabinet councel , and bed-chamber were not free of such vermin , and herein the parlementeers spent unknown sums and were very prodigal of the kingdoms money . the king , after many traverses of war , being reduced to a great strait by crosse successes and counsels , rather then to fall into the hands of the parlementeers , withdrew himself in a serving-mans disguise to the scots army , as his last randevous , and this plot was manag'd by the french agent then residing here ; a man wold think that that nation wold have deem'd it an eternal honour unto them to have their own king and countrey-man throw himself thus into their armes , and to repose such a singular trust in them upon such an extremity : but they corresponded not so well with him as he expected , for though at first when the parlamenteers sollicited their dear brethren for a delivery of the kings person unto them , their note was then , if any forein petty prince had so put himself upon them , they could not with honour deliver him , much less their own native king ; yet they made a sacrifice of him at last for 800000. crownes ; wherupon bellieure the french ambassador being convoyed by a troop of horse from the king towards london , to such a stand , in lieu of larges to the souldiers , he drew out an half crown piece , and ask'd them how many pence that was , they answered 30. he replyed , for so much did iudas betray his master , and so he departed . and now , that in the cours of this historical narration , i have touch'd upon france , your eminence may please to understand , that nothing almost could tend more to the advantage of that k. then these commotions in england , considering that he was embark'd in an actuall war with the house of austria and that this iland did do spain some good offices ; among other , by transport of his treasure to dunkerk in english bottomes , whereunto this king gave way , and sometimes in his own galeons , which sav'd the spaniard neer upon 20. in the hundred , then if he had sent it by way of genoa ; so that som think , though france made semblance to resent the sad condition of her neighbour , and thereupon sent the prince of harcour , and the foresaid monsieur bellieure to compose matters , yet she never really intended it , as being against her present interest and engagements : yet the world thinks it much that she shold publiquely receive an agent from these parlamenteeres , and that the french nobility who were us'd to be the gallantest men in the world to vindicate the quarrels of distressed ladies , are not more sensible of the outrages that have bin offer'd a daughter of france , specially of henry the greats . but to resume the threed of my narration , the king ( and with him , one may say , england also ) being thus bought and sold , the parlamenteers insteed of bringing him to westminster , which had put a period to all distempers , toss'd him up and downe to private houses , and kept the former army still afoot : and truly i think there was never prince so abus'd , or poor peeple so baffled , and no peeple but a purblind besotted peeple wold have suffred themselves to be so baffled : for notwithstanding that no enemy appeer'd in any corner of the kingdome , yet above 20000. tagaroones have bin kept together ever since to grind the faces of the poor , and exhaust the very vitall spirits of town and countrey , and keep them all in a perfect slavery : had the parlament-men , when the scots were gone , brought their king in a generous and frank way ( as had well becom'd englishmen ) to sit among them , and trusted to him ( which of necessity they must do at last ) as they had gain ▪ d more honor far in the world abroad , so they had gain'd more upon his affections then i beleeve they will ever do hereafter . but to proceed , the king having bin a good while prisoner to the parlement , the army snatch'd him away from them , and som of the chiefest commanders having pawn'd their soules unto him to restore him speedily , in lieu thereof they tumbled him up and down to sundry places , till they juggled him at last to that small ile where now he is surrounded with a gard of strange faces ; and if happly he beginns to take delight in any of those faces , he is quickly taken out of his sight . these harsh usages hath made him become all gray and oregrown with hair so that he lookes rather like som silvan satyr then a soverain prince : and truly my lord the meanest slave in st. marks gallies or the abjects captif in algier bannier is not so miserable as he in divers kinds , for they have the comfort of their wifes , children and frends , they can convey and receive letters , send messengers upon their errands , and have privat discours with any ; all which is denied to the king of great britain , nay the young princes his children are not permitted as much as to ask him blessing in a letter . in so much that if he were not a great king of his passions , and had a heart cast in on extraordinary mould , these pressures and those base aspersions that have bin publiquely cast upon him by the parlement it self , had bin enough to have sent him out of the world e're this , and indeed 't is the main thing they drive at , to torture his braine , and tear his very heart strings if they could : so that whereas this foolish ignorant peeple speak such horrid things of our inquisition , truly my lord 't is a most gentle way of proceeding being compar'd to this kings persecutions . as the king himselfe is thus in quality of a captif , so are all his subjects becom perfect slaves , they have fool'd themselfs into a worse slavery then iew or greek under the ottomans , for they know the bottom of their servitude by paying so many sultanesses for every head ; but here , people are put to endless , unknown , tyrannical taxes , besides plundering and accize , which two words , and the practise of them ( with storming of towns ) they have learnt of their pure brethren of holland : and for plundrings , these parliamenteer-saints think they may robb any that adheres not to them as lawfully as the iewes did the egyptians : 't is an unsommable masse of money these reformers have squandred in few years , whereof they have often promis'd and solemnly voted a publick account to satisfie the kingdom : but as in a hundred things more , so in this precious particular they have dispens'd with their votes : they have consumed more treasure with pretence to purge one kingdom , then might have served to have purchas'd two ; more ( as i am credibly told ) then all the kings of england spent of the public stock since the saxon conquest : thus have they not only begger'd the whole island , but they have hurld it into the most fearfull ▪ st chaos of confusion that ever poor countrey was in ; they have torn in pieces the reines of all government , trampled upon all lawes of heaven and earth , and violated the very dictamens of nature , by making mothers to betray their sons , and the sons their fathers , but specially that great charter , which is the pandect of all the laws and liberties of the free-born subject , which at their admission to the house they are solemnly sworn to maintain , is torn in flitters : besides those severall oaths they forg'd themselfs , as the protestation and covenant , where they voluntarily swear to maintain the kings honour and rights , together with the established laws of the land , &c. now i am told , that all acts of parlement here are lawes , and they carry that majesty with them , that no power can suspend or repeal them , but the same power that made them , which is the king sitting in full parlement ; these mongrell polititians have bin so notoriously impudent as to make an inferiour ordinance of theirs to do it , which is point-blanck against the very fundamentals of this government , and their own oaths , which makes me think that there was never such a perjur'd pack of wretches upon earth , never such monsters of mankind . yet this simple infatuated peeple have a saint-like opinion of these monsters , this foolish citie gards them daily with horse and foot , whereby she may be sayd to kisse the very stones that are thrown at her , and the hand whence they came , which a dogg would not do : but she falls to recollect her self now that shee begins to be pinch'd in trade , and that her mint is starv'd , yet the leading'st men in her common-councell care not much for it , in regard most of them have left traffiquing abroad , finding it a more easie and gainefull way of trading at home , by purchasing crown or church lands , plunder'd goods , and debts upon the publick faith , with soldiers debenters ; thus the saints of this iland turne godlinesse into gaine . truly my lord , i give the english for a lost nation , if they continue long thus , never was ther a more palpable oblaesion of the brain , and a more visible decay of reason in any race of men : it is a sore judgment from heaven , that a people shold not be more sensible how they are become slaves to rebells , and those , most of them the scumm of the nation , which is the basest of miseries : how they suffer them to tyrannize by a meer arbitrary extrajudicial power o're their very souls and bodies ▪ o're their very lifs and livelihoods ; how their former freedom is turn'd to fetters , molehills into mountains of grievances , ship-money into accize , justice into tyranny : for nothing hath bin and is daily so common amongst them as imprisonment without charge , and a charge without an accuser , condemnation without apparance , and forfeitures without conviction . to speak a little more of the king , if all the infernal fiends had ligu'd against him , they could not have design'd or disgorged more malice : they wold have laid to his charge his fathers death , as arrand a lie as ever was forg'd in hell : they wold make him fore-know the insurrection in ireland , wheras the spanish ambassador here , and his confessor who is a very reverend irish-man , told me , that he knew no more of it then the grand mogor did : they charge him with all the bloud of this civil war , wheras they and their instruments were the first kindlers of it , and that first prohibited trade and shut him out of his own town : they have intercepted and printed his privat letters to his queen , and hers to him , ( oh barbarous basenesse ! ) but therin they did him a pleasure , though the intent was malitious , their aim in all things being to envenom the hearts of his people towards him ; and this was to render him a glorious and well-belov'd prince , as likewise for making him rich , ( all which they had vow'd to do upon passing the act of continuance , ) but now they have made him poorer then the meanest of all his vassals , they have made him to have no propriety in house , goods , or lands , or as one may say , in his wife and children : 't was usual for the father to hunt in his park while the son hunted for his life in the field , for the wife 〈◊〉 lie in his bedds , while the husband layed wait to murther him abroad ; they have seiz'd upon and sold his privat hangings an●… plate , yea his very cabinets , jewels , pictures , statues , and books . nor are they the honorablest sort of peeple , and men nobly extracted ( as in scotland ) that do all this , ( for then it were not so much to be wondred at ) but they are the meanest sort of subjects , many of them illiterat mechaniques , wherof the lower house is full ; specially the subordinat committees , who domineer more o're nobles and gentry , then the parliament members themselfs their masters use to do . touching those few peers that sit now voting in the upper house , they may be said to be but meer cyphers , they are grown so degenerat as to suffer the commons to give them the law , to ride upon their backs , and do most things without them : ther be many thousand petitions that have bin recommended by these lords to the lower house , which are scornfully thrown into corners and never read ; their messengers have us'd to dance attendance divers hours and days before they were vouchsafed to be let in or heard , to the eternal dishonour of those peers , and yet poor spirited things they resent it not : the commons now command all , and though , as i am inform'd , they are summon'd thither by the kings original writ but to consent to what the king and his great counsel of peers ( which is the tru court of parlement ) shall resolve upon ; the commons i say are now from consenters become the chiefest counsellors , yea controulers of all ; nay som of this lower house fly so high as to term themselfs conquerors , and though in all conferences with the lords they stand bare before them , yet by a new way of mix'd committees they carry themselfs as collegues : these are the men that now have the vogue , and they have made their priviledges so big swoln , that they seem to have quite swallowed up both the kings prerogatives , and those of the lords : these are the grandees , and sages of the times , though most of them have but crack'd braines and crazy fortunes god wot ; nay som of them are such arrand knaves and coxcombs , that 't is questionable whether they more want common honesty , or common sense ; nor know no more what belongs to tru policy then the left leg of a joynt-stool : they are grown so high a tiptoes , that they seem to scorn an act of amnestia , or any grace from their king , wheras som of them deserve to be hang'd as oft as they have haires upon their heads ; nor have they any more care of the common good of england then they have of lapland , so they may secure their own persons , and continue their power now , authority is sweet , though it be in hell. thus , my lord , is england now govern'd , so that 't is an easie thing to take a prospect of her ruine if she goes on this pace : the scot is now the swaying man , who is the third time struck into her bowels with a numerous army : they say he hath vow'd never to return till he hath put the crown on the kings head , the scept●…r in his hand , and the sword by his side ; if he do so , it will be the best thing that ever he did , though som think that he will never be able to do england as much good as he hath done her hurt ; he hath extremely out-witted the english of late years : and they who were the causers of his first and last coming in , i hold to be the most pernicious enemies that ever this nation had ; for t is probable that germany ( viz. ponterland and breme ) will be sooner free of the swed , then england of the scot , who will stick close unto him like a bur , that he cannot shake him off ; he is becom already master of the englishmans soul , by imposing a religion upon him , and he may hereafter be master of his body . your eminence knows there is a periodicall fate hangs over all kingdoms after such a revolution of time , and rotation of fortunes wheele ; the cours of the world hath bin for one nation , like so many nailes , to thrust out another ; but for this nation , i observe by conference with divers of the saddest and best weighdst men among them , that the same presages foretell their ruine as did the israelites of old , which was a murmuring against their governors ; it is a long time that both iudges , bishops and privy counsellors have bin mutter'd at , whereof the first shold be the oracles of the law , the other of the gospell , the last of state-affaires , and that our judgments shold acquiesce upon theirs ; here as i am inform'd ; 't was common for evry ignorant client to arraign his iudg ; for evry puny curat to censure the bishop ; for evry shallow-brain home-bred fellow to descant upon the results of the councell table : and this spirit of contradiction and contumacy hath bin a long time fomenting in the minds of this peeple , infus'd into them principally , by the puritanicall faction . touching the second of the three aforesaid ( i mean bishops ) they are grown so odious ( principally for their large demeanes ) among this peeple , as the templers were of old , and one may say it is a just judgment fallen upon them , for they were most busy in demolishing convents and monasteries , as these are in destroying cathedralls and ministers ; but above all , it hath bin observ'd that this peeple hath bin a long time rotten-hearted towards the splendor of the court , the glory of their king , and the old establish'd government of the land : 't is true there were a few small leakes sprung in the great vessel of the st●…te , ( and what vessel was ever so ●…ite but was subject to leakes ? ) but these wise-akers in stopping of one have made a hundred : yet if this kings raign were parallell'd to that of queen elizabeth's , who was the greatest minion of a peeple that ever was , one will find that she stretch'd the prerogative much further ; in her time as i have read in the latin legend of her life , som had their hands cut off for only writing against her matching with the duke of aniou , others were hang'd at tyburn for traducing her government ; she pardon'd thrice as many roman priests as this king did , she pass'd divers monopolies , she kept an agent at rome , she sent her sergeant at armes to pluck out a member then sitting in the house of commons by the eares , and clapt him in prison ; she call'd them sawcy fellowes to meddle with her prerogative , or with the government of her houshold , she mannag'd all forren affaires , specially the warrs with ireland soly by her privy counsell ; yet there was no murmuring at her raign , and the reason i conceave to be , that there was neither scot or puritan had then any stroke in england . yet , for all their disobedience and grumblings against their liege lord the king , this peeple are exactly obedient to their new masters of the house of commons , though they sit there but as their servants and entitle themselfs so ; and also though in lieu of the small scratches which england might happily have receiv'd before ( all which the king had cur'd ) these new masters have made such deep gashes in her , and given her such deadly wounds that i believe are incurable . my lord , i find by my researches , that there are two great idolls in this kingdom , the greatest that ever were , they are the parliament and the pulpit ; t is held high treson to speak against the one , and the whole body of religion is nailed unto the other , for there is no devotion here at all but preaching , which god wot is little better then prating . the abuse of these two hath bin the source of all the distempers which now raign : touching the latter , it hath serv'd as a subvervient engin to prop up the power and popularity of the first ; these malicious pulpit-men breath out nothing thence but either sedition , schisme or blasphemy : poor shallow brain'd sciolists , they wold question many things in the old testament , and find apocrypha in the new : and such is the violence wherewith the minds of men and women are transported towards these preachmen , and no other part of devotion besides , that in all probability they will in time take a surfet of them : so that give this giddy peeple line enough ther will be no need of catholique arms to reduce them to the apostolick church , they will in time pave the way to it themselves , and be glad to return to rome to find out a religion again . there was here before , as i am informed , a kind of a face of a church , there were some solemnities , venerations and decencies us'd that a man might discover som piety in this peeple ; there was a publick lyturgie that in pithy pathetical prayers reach'd all occasions ; the sacraments were administred with som reverence , their churches were kept neat and comly ; but this nasty race of miscreants have nothing at all of sweetnesse , of piety and devotion in them ; 't is all turn'd to a fatuous kind of zeal after more learning , as if christianity had no sobriety , consistence or end of knowledg at all : these silly things , to imitat the apostles time , wold have the same form of discipline to govern whole nations , as it did a chamberfull of men in the infancy of the church , they wold make the same coat serve our savious at 30. yeers , which fitted him at three : 't is incredible how many ugly sorts of heresies they daily hatch , but they are most of them old ones newly furbish'd ; they all relate to aerius , a perfect hater of bishops , because he could not be one himself . the two sectaries which sway most , are the presbyterians and independents , the presbyterian is a spawn of a puritan , and the independent a spawn of the presbyterian : there 's but one hop 'twixt the first and a iew , and but half a hop 'twixt the other and an infidell ; they are both opposit to monarchy and hierarchy ; and the latter wold have no government at all , but a parity and promiscuous confusion , a race of creatures fit only to inhabit hell : and one of the fruits of this blessed parlement , and of these two sectaries is , that they have made more jewes and athiests then i think there is in all europe besides ; but truly , my lord , i think the judgments of heaven were never so visible in any part of the earth , as they are now here , for there is rebell against rebell , house against house , cittie against army , parlement against scot , but these two sectaries , i mean the presbyterian and independent who were the fire-brands that put this poor iland first in a flame , are now in most deadly feud one against the other , though they both concur in this to destroy government : and if the king had time enough to look only upon them , they would quickly hang , draw , and destroy one another . but indeed all christian princes shold observe the motions and successes of these two unlucky incendiaries , for if they shold ligue together again , ( as they have often plaid fast and loose one with another ) and prevail here , this iland wold not terminat their designs , they wold puzzle all the world besides . their preachmen ordinarily cry out in the pulpit , ther is a great work to be done upon earth , for the reforming all mankind , and they are appointed by heaven to be the chief instruments of bringing it about ▪ they have already bin so busie abroad , that ( with vast sommes of money ) they brought the swed upon the dane , and the very savages upon the english cavaliers in virginia ; and could they confederat with turk , or tartar , or hell it self against them , they wold do it : they are monstrously puff'd up with pride , that they stick not to call themselfs conquerors , and one of the chief ringleaders of them , an ignorant home bred kind of brewer , was not ashamed to vant it publiquely in the commons house , that if he had but 20000. men , he wold undertake to march to constantinople , and pull the ottoman emperour out of the seralio . touching the other grand idoll the parlement , 't is true that the primitive constitution of parlement in this iland was a wholesom piece of policy , because it kept a good correspondence , and clos'd all ruptures 'twixt the king and his peeple , but this thing they call parlement now , may rather be term'd a cantle of one , or indeed a conventicle of schismatiques , rather than a great counsell ; 't is like a kind of headless monster , or som estropiated carkas ; for ther is neither king nor prelat , nor scarce the seventh part of peers and commons , no not the twelfth part fairly elected ; nevertheless they draw the peeple , specially this city , like so many stupid animalls , to adore them . yet though this institution of parlement be a wholsom thing in it self , there is in my judgment a great incongruity in one particular ; and i believe it hath bin the cause of most distempers ; it is , that the burgesses are more in number than the knights of the shires ; for the knights of the shires are commonly gentlemen well born , and bred , and vers'd in the laws of the land , as well as forren governments , ( divers of them ) but the burgesses of towns are commonly tradesmen , and being bred in corporations they are most of them inclining to puritanism , and consequently to popular government ; these burgesses exceeding the knights in number , carry all before them by plurality of voices , and so puzzle all : and now that ▪ i have mentioned corporations , i must tell your lordship , that the greatest soloecism in the policy of this kingdom , is the number of them ; especially this monstrous city , which is compos'd of nothing els but of corporations ; and the greatest errors that this king , specially his father , committed , was to suffer this town to spread her wings so wide ▪ for she bears no proportion with the bignes of the iland , but may fit a kingdom thrice as spacious ; she engrosseth and dreins all the wealth and strength of the kingdom ; so that i cannot compare england more properly than to one of our cremona geese , where the custom is to fatten only the heart , but in doing so the whole body growes lank . to draw to a conclusion , this nation is in a most sad and desperat condition , that they deserve to be pittied , and preserved from sinking , and having cast the present state of things and all interests into an equal balance , i find , my lord , ther be three ways to do it , one good , and two bad . 1. the first of the bad ones is the sword ▪ which is one of the scourges of heaven , especially the civill sword . 2. the second bad one is the treaty , which they now offer the king in that small island wher he hath bin kept captif so long , ( 〈◊〉 which quality the world will account him still while he is detain'd there ) and by tha●… treaty to bind him as fast as they can , an●… not trust him at all . 3. the good way is , in a free confiding brave way ( englishmen-like ) to send for their king to london , where city and country shold petition him to summon a new and free full parlement , which he may do as justly as ever he did thing in his life , these men having infring'd as well all the essentiall priviledges of parlement , as every puntillio of it , for they have often risen up in a confusion without adjournment , they had two speakers at once , they have most perjuriously and beyond all imagination betrayed the trust both king and country repos'd in them , subverted the very sundamentals of all law , and plung'd the whole kingdom in this bottomless gulf of calamities : another parlement may haply do som good to this languishing island , and cure her convulsions , but for these men that arrogat to themselfs the name of parlement ( by a local puntillio only because they never stir'd from the place where they have bin kept together by meer force ) i find them by their actions to be so pervers , so irrational and refractory , so far given over to a reprobat sense , so fraught with rancor , with an irreconcileable malice and thirst of bloud , that england may well despaire to be heal'd by such phlebotomists , or quack-salvers ; be sides they are so full of scruples , apprehensions , and jealousies proceeding from blac●… guilty souls , and gawl'd consciences , that they will do nothing but chop logic with their king , and spin out time to continue their power , and evade punishment , which they think is unavoidable if ther shold be a free-parlement . touching the king he comports himself with an admired temper'd equanimity , he invades and o're-masters them more and more in all his answers by strength of reson , though he have no soul breathing to consult withall , but his own genius : he gains wonderfully upon the hearts and opinion of his peeple , and as the sun useth to appear bigger in winter , and at his declension in regard of the interposition of certain meteors 'twixt the eye of the beholder and the object , so this king being thus o're-clouded and declined , shines far more glorious in the eyes of his people ; and certainly these high morall vertues of constancy , courage and wisdom come from above ; and no wonder , for kings as they are elevated above all other peeple and stand upon higher ground , they sooner receive the inspirations of heaven ; nor doth he only by strength of reason out 〈◊〉 them , but he wooes them by gentlenesse and mansuetude ; as the gentleman of paris who having an ape in his house that had taken his only child out of the cradle , and dragged him up to the ridge of the house , the parent with ruthful he art charmed the ape by fair words and other bland●…ments to bring him softly down , which he did ; england may be said to be now just upon such a precipice , ready to have her braines dash'd out , and i hope these men will not be worse natur'd then that brute animal , but will save her . thus have i given your eminence a rough account of the state of this poor and pittifully deluded peeple , which i will perfect when i shall come to your presence , which i hope will be before this autumnal equinox ; i thought to have sojourn'd here longer , but that i am grown weary of the clime , for i fear there 's the other two scourges of heaven that menace this island , i mean the famin and pestilence , especially this city , for their prophanness , rebellion , and sacriledge ▪ it hath bin a talk a great while whether anti-christ be come to the world or no , i am sure anti-iesus , which is worse , is among this people , for they hold all veneration , though voluntary proceeding from the inward motions of a sweet devoted soul , and causing an outward genuflection , to be superstitious , insomuch that one of the synodical saints here printed and published a book entitling it against iesu worship . so in the profoundest posture of reverence i kisse your vest , as being , london this 12 , of august , 1647. my lord , your eminences most humbly devoted , i. h. a nocturnal progres , or a perambulation of most countreys in christendom , perform'd in one night by strength of the imagination ; which progresse terminats in these north-west iles , and declares the woful confusions they are involv'd at present . the progress of the soul by an usuall dream . it was in the dead of a long winter night , when no eyes were open but watchmens and centinels , that i was fallen soundly asleep , the cinq-out-ports were shut up closer then usually , for my senses were so trebly lock'd , that the moon , had she descended from her watry orb , might have done much more to me then she did to endymion when he lay snoaring upon the brow of latmus hill ; nay , ( be it spoken without prophanenesse ) if a rib had bin taken out of me that night , to have made a new mo●… of a woman , i shold hardly have felt it . yet , though the cousin german of death had so strongly seiz'd thus upon the exterior parts of this poor tabernacle of flesh , my inward parts were never more actif , and fuller of employments then they were that night . pictus imaginibus , formisque fugacib●… adstat morpheus , & variis fingit nova vultibus ora . methought my soul made a sally abroad into the world , and fetch'd a vast compas ; she seem'd to soar up and slice the air to cross seas , to clammer up huge hills , and never rested till she had arriv'd at the antipodes : now som of the most judicious geometricians and chorographers hold that the whole mass of the earth being round like the rest of her fellow elements , ther be places , and poizing parts of the continent , ther be peninsulas , promontories and ilands upon the other face of the earth that correspond and concenter with all those regions and iles that are upon this superficies which we read , countries that symbolize with them in qualities , in temperature of air and clime , as well as in nature of soil ; the inhabitants also of those places which are so perpendicularly opposit , do sympathize one with another in disposition , complexions and humors , though the astronomers wold have their east to be our west , and so all things vice versa in point of position , which division of the heaven is onely mans institution . but to give an account of the strange progresse my soul made that night ; the first country she lighted on was a very low flat country , and it was such an odde amphibious country , being so indented up and down with rivers and arms of the sea , that i made a question whether i shold call it water or land ; yet though the sea be invited and usher'd in into som places , he is churlistly pen'd out in som other , so that though he foam and swell , and appear as high walls hard-by , yet they keep him out , maugre all his roaring and swelling . as i wandred up and down in this watry region , i might behold from a streight long dike wheron i stood , a strange kind of forrest , for the trees mov'd up and down ; they look'd afar off as if they had bin blasted by thunder ; for they had no leafs at all ; but making a nearer approach unto them , i found they were a nomberlesse company of ship-masts , and before them appear'd a great town ( amsterdam ) incorporated up and down with water ; as i mus'd with my self upon the sight of all this , i concluded , that the inhabitants of that country were notable industrious people , who could give law so to the angry ocean , and occupie those places where the great leviathan shold tumble and take his pastime in ; as my thought ran thus , i met with a man , whom i conjectur'd to be 'twixt a marchant and a mariner , his salutation was so homely ; the air also was so foggy , that methought it stuck like cobwebs in his mustachos ; and he was so dull in point of motion , as if the bloud in his veines had bin half frozen : i began to mingle words with him , and to expostulat somthing about that country and people ; and then i found a great deal of down-right civilities in him : he told me that they were the only men who did miracles of late years ; those innumerable piles of stones you see before you in such comly neat frabriques , is a place ( said he ) that from a fish market in effect is come to be one of the greatest marts in this part of the world , which hath made her swel thrice bigger the●… she was 50. years ago ; and as you behold this floating forrest of masts before her mole , so if you could see the foundations of her houses , you shold see another great forrest , being rear'd from under-ground upon fair piles of timber , which if they chance to sink in this marshy soil , we have an art to scrue them up again . we have for 70. years and above without any intermission , except a short-liv'd truce that once was made , wrastled with one of the greatest potentates upon earth , and born up stoutly against him , gramercy our two next neighbour kings , and their reason of state , with the advantage of our situation . we have fought our selfs into a free-state , and now quite out of that ancient allegeance we ow'd him ; and though we pay twenty times more in taxes of all sorts then we did to him , yet we are contented : we have turn'd war into a trade , and that which useth to beggar others , hath benefited us : besides , we have bin and are still the rendevous of most discontented subjects , when by the motions of unquiet consciences in points of religion , or by the fury of the sword , they are forc'd to quit their own countreys , who bring their arts of manufacture , and moveables , hither ; insomuch that our lombards are full of their goods , and our banks superabound with their gold and silver which they bring hither in specie . to secure our selfs , and cut the enemy more work , and to engage our confederats in a war with him , we have kindled fires in every corner , and now that they are together by the eares , we have bin content lately , being long woo'd thereunto , to make a peace with that king to whom we once acknowledged vassalage ; which king out of a height of spirit , hath spent 500. times more upon us for our reduction , then all our country is worth ; but now he hath bin well contented to renounce and abjure all claimes and rights of soverainity over us ; in so much , that being now without an enemy , we hope in a short time to be masters of all the comerce in this part of the world , and to eat our neighbours out of trade in their own commodities : we fear nothing but that exces of wealth , and a surfet of ease may make us careles and breed quarrells among our selfs , and that our generall , being married to a great kings daughter may — . here he suddenly broke the threed of his discourse , and got hastily away , being haul'd by a ship that was sailing hard by ▪ hereupon my soul took wing again , and cut her way through that foggy condens'd aire , till she lighted on a fair spacious , cleare continent , a generous and rich soile mantled up and downe with large woods , where , as i rang'd to and fro , i might see divers faire houses , townes , palaces and castles , looking like so many carkases , for no humane soul appear'd in them ; methought i felt my he art melting within me in a soft resentment of the case of so gallant a countrey , and as i stood at amaze , and in a kind of astonishment , a goodly personage makes towards me , whom both for his comportment , and countenance , i perceiv'd to be of a finer mould then that companion i had met withall before : by the trace of his looks i guessed he might be som nobleman that had bin ruin'd by som disaster : having acosted him with a fitting distance , he began in a masculin strong winded language full of aspirations and tough collision of consonants , to tell me as followeth : sir , i find you are a stranger in this countrey , because you stand so agast at the devastations of such a fair piece of the continent , then know sir , because i beleeve you are curious to carry away with you the causes thereof , that these ruthfull objects which you behold , are the effects of a long lingring war , and of the fury of the sword , a cruentous civill war that hath rag'd here above thirty yeares : one of the grounds of it was the infortunate undertaking of a prince , who liv'd not far off in an affluence of all earthly felicity ; he had the greatest lady to his wife , the bes●… purse of money , the fairest stable of horse ▪ and choicest library of books of any other of his neighbour princes . but being by desperat and aspiring counsells put upon a kingdom , while he was catching at the shadow of a crown , he lost the substance of all his own ancient possessions : by the many powerfull alliances he had ( which was the cause he was pitched upon ) the fewd continued long ; for among others a northern king took advantage to rush in , who did a world of mischiefs , but in a few yeers that king and hee found their graves in their own ruins neer upon the same time ; but now , may heaven have due thanks for it , there is a peace concluded , a peace which hath bin 14. long yeers a moulding , and will i hope , be shortly put in execution ; yet 't is with this fatall disadvantage , that the said northern people , besides a masse of ready money we are to give them , are to have firme footing , and a warm nest ever in this countrey hereafter , so that i fear we shall hear from them too often : upon these words this noble personage fetch'd a deep sigh , but in such a generous manner that he seem'd to break and check it before it came halfe forth . thence my soul taking her flight o're divers huge and horrid cacuminous mountaines ( the alpes ) at last i found my self in a great populous town ( naples ) but her buildings were miserably battered up and down , she had a world of palaces , castles , convents and goodly churches : as i stepped out of curiosity into one of them , upon the west side there was a huge grate , where a creature all in white beckned at me , making my approach to the grate , i found her to be a nun , a lovely creature she was , for i could not distinguish which was whiter , her hue or her habit , which made me remember ( though in a dream my self ) that saying , if dreams and wishes had been tru , there had not been found a tru maid to make a nun of , ever since a cloyster'd life began first among women ; i asked her the reason how so many ugly devastations shold befall so beautifull a city , she in a dolorous gentle tone , and ruthfull accents , the teares trickling down her cheeks like so many pearles , ( such pearly teares that wold have dissolv'd a diamond ) sobb'd out unto me this speech : gentle sir , 't is far beyond any expressions of mine , and indeed beyond humane imagination to conceive the late calamities which have befallen this faire though infortunat city , a pernicious popular rebellion broke out here upon a sudden into most horrid barbarismes , a fate that hangs over most rich popular places that swim in luxe and plenty ; but touching the grounds thereof , one may say that rebellion entred into this city , as sin first entred into the world by an apple : for our king now in his great extremities having almost halfe the world banding against him ; and putting but a small tax upon a basket of fruit to last only for a time , this fruit-tax did put the peeples teeth so on edge , that it made them gnash against the government , and rush into armes ; but they are sensible now of their own follies , for i think never any place suffered more in so short a time : the civill combustions abroad in other kingdomes may be said to be but small squibs compar'd to those horrid flakes of fire which have rag'd here , and much adoe we had to keep our vest all fire free from the fury of it : in lesse then the revolution of a yeer it consum'd above fourscore thousand soules within the walls of this city ; but 't is not the first time of forty , that this luxurious foolish peeple hath smarted for their insurrections and insolencies , and that this mad horse hath o'rethrown his rider , and drawn a worse upon his back ; who instead of a saddle , put a pack-saddle and panniers upon him : but indeed the voluptuousnesse of this peeple was grown ripe for the judgement of heaven . she was then beginning to expostulat with me about the state of my country , and i had a mighty mind to satisfie her , for i could have corresponded with her in the re●…ation of as strange things , but the lady a●…adesse calling her away , she departed in an ●…nstant , obedience seem'd to be ther so precise and punctual . i steer'd my course thence through a most delicious country to another city that lay in the very bosom of the sea , ( venice ) she was at first nothing els but a kind of posie made up of dainty green hillocks , tied together by above 400. bridges , and so coagulated into a curious city ; though she be espous'd to neptune very solemnly once evry ●…eer , yet she still reserves her maydenhead , ●…ad bears the title of the virgin city in that part of the world ; but i found her tugging mainly with a huge giant that wold ravish her ; he hath shrewdly set on her skirts , and a great shame it is , that she is not now assisted by her neighbours , and that they shold be together by the ears when they shold do so necessary a work , considering how that great giant is their common enemy ; and hath lately vow'd seven yeers wars against her ; specially considering , that if he comes once to ravish her , he will quickly ruin her said neighbours , she ( to her high honor be it spoken ) being their only rampart against the incursion of the said giant , and by consequence their greatest security . from this maiden city , mee thought , i was in a trice carried over a long gulf , and so through a midland sea , into another kingdom , ( spain ) where i felt the clime hotter by some degrees ; a rough-hew'n soile , for the most part , it was full of craggy barren hills ; but where there were valleys and water enough , the country was extraordinarily fruitful , whereby nature ( it seems ) made her a compensation for the sterility of the rest . yet notwithstanding the hardship of the soyl , i found her full of abbeys , monasteries , hermitages , convents , churches , and other places of devotion ; as i rov'd there a while , i encountred a grave man in a long black cloak , by the fashion whereof , and by the brimms of his hat , i perceived him to be a iesuit ; i clos'd with him , and question'd him about that country : he told me the king of that country was the greatest potentat of that part of the world ; and , to draw power to a greater unity , they of our order could be well contented , that he were universall head over temporalls , because 't is most probable to be effected by him , as we have already one universall head over spiritualls : this is the monark of the mines , i mean of gold and silver , who furnishes all the world , but most of all his own enemies with mony , which mony foments all the wars in this part of the world : never did any earthly monark thrive so much in so short a tract of time , but of late yeers he hath been ill-favouredly shaken by the revolt and utter defection of two sorts of subjects , who are now in actual arms against him on both sides of him at his own doors . ther hath bin also a long deadly feud 'twixt the next tramontan kingdom ( france ) and him , though the q. that rules there be his own sister , an unnaturall odious thing : but it seems god almighty hath a quarrel of late yeers with all earthly potentats ; for in so short a time ther never happen'd such strange shocks and revolutions : the great emperour of ethiopia hath bin outed , he and all his children by a petty companion : the king of china , a greater emperour than he , hath lost almost all that huge monarchy by the incursion of the tartar , who broke ore the wall upon him : the grand turk hath bin strangled , with 30. of his concubines ; the emperour of muscovy hath bin content to beg his life of his own vassals , and to see before his face divers of his chief officers hack'd to pieces , and their heads cut off and steep'd in strong water , to make them burn more bright in the market place . besides the above mentioned , this king hath also divers enemies more , yet he bears up against them all indifferently well , though with infinit expence of treasure , and the church , specially our society , hath stuck close unto him in these his exigents : whence may be inferr'd , that let men repine as long as they will at the possessions of the church , they are the best anchors to a state in a storm , and in time of need to preserve it from sinking ; besides , acts of charity wold be quite lost among men , did not the wealth of the church keep life in them : hereupon drawing a huge pair of beads from under his cloak , he began to ask me of my religion ; i told him i had a long journy to go , so that i could not stay to wait on him longer ; so we parted , and me thought i was very glad to be rid of him so well . my soul then made another flight over an assembly of hideous high hills , ( pyreneys ) and lighted under another clime , on a rich and copious country ( france ) resembling the form of a lozenge , but me thought , i never saw so many poor peeple in my life ; i encountred a pesan , and asked him what the reason was , that ther shold be so much poverly in a country wher ther was so much plenty : sir , they keep the commonalty poor in pure policy here , for being a peeple , as the world observes us to be , that are more humerous than others , and that love variety and change , if we were suffered to be pamper'd with wealth , we wold ever and anon rise up in tumults , and so this kingdom shold never be quiet , but subject to intestine broils , and so to the hazard of any invasion : but ther was of late a devillish cardinal , whose humour being as sanguin as his habit , and working upon the weaknes of his master , hath made us not only poor , but stark beggars , and we are like to continue so by an eternal war , wherein he hath plung'd this poor kingdom , which war must be maintained with our very vital spirits : but as dejected and indigent as we are , yet upon the death of that ambitious cardinal , we had risen up against this , who hath the vogue now , ( with whom he hath left his principles ) had not the fearful example of our next transmarin western neighbours ( the english ) and the knowledg we have of a worse kind of slavery , of those endles arbitrary taxes , and horrid confusions they have fool'd themselfs lately into , utterly deterr'd us , though we have twenty times more reason to rise then ever they had : yet our great city ( paris ) hath shew'd her teeth , and gnash'd them ill-favouredly of late , but we find she hath drawn water only for her own mill , we fare little the better , yet we hope it will conduce to peace , which hath bin so long in agitation . i cannot remember how i parted with that peasan , but in an instant i was landed upon a large island , and methought , 't was the temperat'st region i had bin in all the while ( england ; ) the heat of the sun ther is as harmless as his light , the evening serene●… are as wholsom ther as the morning dew ; the dog-daies as innocuous as any of the two equinoxes . as i rang'd to and fro that fair island , i spyed a huge city ( london ) whose length did far exceed her latitude , but ne●…ther for length or latitude did she seem to bear any politicall proportion with that island : she look'd , methought , like the iesuits hat whom i had met withall before , whose brimms were bigger then the crown , or like a peticoat , whose fringe was longer then the body . as i did cast my eyes upwards , methought i discern'd a strange inscription in the aire which hung just over the midst of that city written in such huge visible characters , that any one might have read it , which was this : woe be to the bloudy city . hereupon a reverend bishop presented himself to my view , his gray haires , and grave aspect struck in me an extraordinary reverence of him : so performing those complements which were fitting , i asked him of the condition of the place , he in a submiss sad tone , with clouds of melancholy waving up and down his looks , told me ; sir this island was reputed few years since to have bin in the completest condition of happiness of any part on earth , insomuch that she was repin'd a●… for her prosperity and peace by all her neighbours who were plung'd in war round about her , but now she is fallen into as deep a gulf of misery , and servitude , as she was in a height of felicity & freedom before : touching the grounds of this change , i cannot impute it to any other then to a surfet of happiness ; now , there is no surfet so dangerous as that of happinesse : ther are such horrid divisions here , that if they were a foot in hell , they were able to destroy the kingdom of satan : truly sir , ther are crep'd in more opinions among us about matters or religion , then the pagans had of old of the summum bonum , which varro saith were 300. the understandings of poor men were never so puzzled and distracted ; a great while there were two opposit powers ( king and parlement ) who swayed here in a kind of equality that peeple knew not whom to obey , many thousands complyed with both , as the men of calecut who adore god and the devil , tantum squantum , as it is in the indian language ) they adore the one for love , the other for fear : ther is a monstrous kind of wild liberty here that ever was upon earth ; that which was complained of as a stalking horse to draw on our miseries at first , is now only in practice , which is meer arbitrary rule ; for now both law , religion and allegiance are here arbitrary : touching the last , 't is quite lost , 't is permitted that any may prate , preach or print what they will in derogation of their annointed king : which word king was once a monosyllable of som weight in this i le , but 't is as little regarded now as the word pope ( among som ) which was also a mighty monosyllable once among us : the rule of the law is , that the king can do no wrong , ther is a contrary rule now crept in , that the king can receive no wrong ; and truly sir , 't is a great judgement both upon prince and peeple ; upon the one , that the love of so many of his vassals shold be so alienated from him ; upon the other , that their hearts shold be so poyson'd , and certainly 't is the effect of an ill spirit ; both the one and the other in all probability tend to the ruine of this kingdom . but now sir , ( because i see you are so attentive , and seem to be much mov'd at this discourse ) as i have discover'd unto you the general cause of our calamities , which was not only a satiety but a surfet of happinesse , so i will descend now to a particular cause of them ; it was a northern nation ( scot ) that brought these cataracts of mischiefs upon us ; and you know the old saying , out of the north all ill comes forth . far be it from me to charge the whole nation herewith ; no , but onely som pernicious instruments that had insinuated themselfs , and incorporated among us , and sway'd both in our court and counsels : they had a hand in every monopoly ; they had out of our exchequer , and customs near upon 400000. crowns in yearly pensions , viis & modis ; yet they could not be content , but they must puzzle the peace and policy of this church and state : and though they are a peeple of a differing genius , differing laws , customs , and manners unto us , yet for matter of conscience they wold bring our necks into their yoak , as if they had a greater talent of reason , and clearer illuminations , as if they understood scripture better , and were better acquainted with god almighty then we , who brought them first from paganisme to christianity , and also to be reformed christians : but it seems , matters have little thriven with them ; nay the visible hand of heaven hath bin heavily upon them divers waies since they did lift their hands against their native king ; for notwithstanding the vast summs they had hence , yet is the generality of them as beggarly as ever they were ; besides , the civil sword hath rag'd ther as furiously as here , and did as much execution among them . moreover the pestilence hath bin more violent , and sweeping in their chief town ( edenburgh ) then ever it was since they were a peeple . and now lately ther 's the notablest dishonour befaln them that possibly could light upon a nation , in that 7000. of ours shold upon even ground encounter , kill , slay , rout and utterly discomfit thrice as many of theirs , though as well appointed and arm'd as men could be : and truly sir , the advantages that accrue to this nation are not a few by that exploit ; for of late years that nation was cryed up abroad to be a more martial peeple then we , and to have baffled us in open field in divers traverses : besides , i hope a small matter will pay now their arrerages here , and elsewhere ; but principally , i hope they will not be so busie hereafter in our court and counsel , as they have bin formerly . another cause of our calamity is a strange race of peeple ( the puritans ) sprung up among our selfs , who were confederat with those of the north ; they wold make gods house cleane , and by putting out the candle of all ancient learning and knowledge , they would sweep it only by the light of an ignis fatuus : but 't is visibly found that they have brought much more rubbage into it , and wheras in reforming this house , they shold rather find out the groat that is lost , they go about to take away the mite that 's left , and so put christs spouse to live on meer almes : true it is , there is a kind of zeal that burns in them , ( and i could wish there were so much piety ) but this zeal burns with too much violence and presumption , which is no good symptom of spirituall health , it being a rule , that as the naturall heat , so the spirituall shold be moderat , els it commonly turns to a frenzy , and that is the thing which causeth such a giddinesse and distraction in their braines ; this ( proceeding from the suggestions of an ill spirit ) puffs them up with so much spirituall pride ; for the devill is so cunning a wrastler , that he oftentimes lifts men up to give them the greater fall : they think they have an inerring spirit , and that their diall must needs go tru , howsoever the sun goes : they wold make the gospell , as the caddies make the alchoran , to decide all civill temporall matters under the large notion of slander , whereof they forsooth to be the judges , and so in time to hook in all things to their classis : i believe if these men were dissected when they are dead , they would be a great deale of quicksilver found in their braines . proh superi , quantum mortalia pectora coecae noctis habent ! — but i could pitty the giddinesse of their braines , had they not so much gaul in their breasts , were they not so thirsting after blood , so full of poison and irreconcileable malice ; in so much that it may be very well thought , these men are a kin to that race which sprung out of the serpents teeth : these are they which have seduced our great counsell , and led this foolish city by the nose to begin and foment this ugly war , insomuch that if those numberless bodies which have perish'd in these commotions , were cast into her streets , and before her doores , many thousand citizens noses would bleed of pure guilt . not to hold you long , these are the men who have baffled common sence , blasted the beams of nature , and offered violence to reason it self ; these are they who have infatuated most of the peeple of this iland ; so that whereas in times past , som call'd her the i le of angels , she may be term'd now the i le of gulls , or more properly the i le of doggs , or rather indeed ●…he i le of wolfs , there is such a true lycanthrepy com in among us : i am loth to call her the iland of devills , though she hath bin branded so abroad . to conclude sir , the glory of this isle is quite blasted ; 't is tru they speak of peace , but while the king speakes to them of it , they make themselves ready for battle ; i much fear , that ixion-like we imbrace a cloud for peace , out of which there will issue out centaures , and monsters , as sprung out of that cloud . touching that ancient'st holy order whereof you see me to be ; i well hoped , that in regard they pretended to reforme things only , they wold not have quite extirpated , but regulated only this order : it had bin enough to brayle our wings , not to have ●…ear'd them : to have lopp'd and prun'd , not to have destroyed root and branch of that ancient tree which was planted by the hands of the apostles themselfs : in fine sir , we are a lost peeple , 't is no other dedalus , but the high deity of heaven can clue us out of this labyrinth of confusions , can extricat us out of this maze of miseries : the philosopher saith , 't is impossible for man to quadrat a circle ; so 't is not in the power of man , but of god alone , to make a loyall subject of a round head : among other things that strangers report of this iland , they say that winter here hath too many teares in his eyes : helas sir , 't is impossible he shold have too many now , to bewaile the lamentable base slavery , that a free-born peeple is com to : and though they are grown so tame as to kisse the rod that whips them , yet their taskmasters will not throw it into the fire . truly sir , as my tongue is too feeble to expresse our miseries , so the plummet of the best understanding is too short to fadom the depth of them . with this , the grave venerable bishop giving me his benediction , fetcht such a sigh , that would have rended a rock asunder ; and suddenly vanish'd ( methought ) out out of my sight up towards heaven . i presently after awoke about the dawnings of the day , when one could hardly discern dog from wolf ; and my soul , my arimula vagula blandula , being re-entred through the horn gate of sleep into her former mansion , half tyr'd after so long a peregrination ; and having rub'd my eyes , distended my limms , and return'd to a full expergefaction , i began to call my self to account touching those world of objects my fancy had represented unto me that night ; and when by way of reminiscence i fel to examin●… and ruminate upon them ; lord , what a masse of ideas ran in my head ! but when i call'd to mind the last countrey my soul wandred in , methought i felt my heart like a lump of lead within me , when i considered how pat every circumstance might be applyed to the present condition of england : i was meditating with my self what kind of dream this might be ; wherupon i thought upon the common division that philosophers make of dreams , that they are either divine , diabolicall , naturall , or humane . for the first , they are visions more properly or revelations , wherof ther are divers examples in the holy oracles of god , but the puddled cranies of my brain are not rooms clean enough to entertain such : touching the second kind , which come by the impulses of the devil , i have heard of divers of them , as when one did rise up out of his sleep , and fetcht a poyniard to stab his bed-fellow , which he had done , had he not bin awake ; another went to the next chamber abed to his mother , and wold have ravish'd her ; but i thank god this dream of mine was not of that kind . touching the third species of dreams ; which are naturall dreams , they are according to the humor which predominats ; if melancholy sway , we dream of black darksom devious places ; if phlegm , of waters ; if choler , of frayes , fightings , and troubles ; if sanguin predominat , we dream of green fields , gardens , and other pleasant representations ; and the physitian comes often to know the quality of a disease by the nocturnal objects of the patients fancy . humane dreams the last sort relate to the actions of the day past , or of the day following , and som representations are clear and even ; others are amphibious , mongrell , distorted and squalid objects , ( according to the species of trees over troubled waters : ) and the object is clear or otherwise , accorning to the tenuity or grossenesse of the vapors which ascend from the ventricle up to the brain . touching my dream , i think it was of this last kind ; for i was discoursing of , and condoling the sad distempers of our times the day before : i pray god som part of it prove not propheticall ; for , although the frenchman sayeth , songes sont mensonges , dreames are delusions , and that they turn to contraries , yet the spaniard hath a saying , et ciego sonnava que via yera lo que querria . the blind man dreamt he did see light , the thing he wish'd for happen'd right . insomuch that some dreams oftentimes prove tru ; as s. austin makes mention of a rich merchant in milan , who being dead , one of his creditors comes to his son to demand such a sum of money which he had lent his father ; the son was confident 't was paid , but not finding the creditors receipt , he was impleaded and like to be cast in the sute , had not his fathers ghost appeared to him , and directed him to the place where the acquittance was , which he found the next day accordingly . galen speaks of one that dreamt he had a wooden leg , and the next day he was taken with a dead palsie in one whole side . such a dream was that of william rufus , when he thought he had felt a cold gust passing through his bowels ; and the next day he was slain in the guts , by the glance of an arrow , in new forrest , a place where he and his father had committed so many sacrileges . i have read in artimedorus , of a woman that dreamt she had seen the pictures of three faces in the moone like her self , and she was brought to bed of three daughters a little after , who all died within the compas of a moneth . another dreamt , that xanthus water ran red , and the next day he fell a spitting of blood . to this i will add another fore-telling dream , whereof i have read , which was thus : two young gentlemen being travelling abroad in strange countreyes , and being come to a great towne , the one lay far in the citie , the other in an hostry without the wall in the suburbs : he in the city did dream in the dead of night , that his friend which he had left in the suburbs rush'd into his chamber panting and blowing , being pursued by others ; he dreamt so againe , and the third time he might see his friends ghost appearing at his beds side with bloud trickling down his throat , and a poyniard in his brest , telling him , dear friend , i am come now to take my last farewell of thee , and if thou rise betimes , thou shalt meet me in the way going to be buryed ; the next morning his friend going with his host towards the inn in the suburbs wher he left his friend , they met with a cart laden with dung in the way , which being staid and search'd , the dead body was found naked in the dung . i will conclude with a notable dream that osman the great turk had not many years since , a few days before he was murthered by his janizaries , 1623. he dreamt , that being mounted upon a huge camel , he could not make him go , though he switch'd and spur'd him never so much ; at last the camel overthrew him , and being upon the ground , only the bridle was left in his hand , but the body of the camel was vanished : the mufti not being illuminated enough to interpret this dream , a santon who was a kind of idiot , told him , the camel represented the ottoman empire , which he not being able to govern , he shold be o'rethrown , which two dayes after proved tru . by these , and a cloud of examples more , we may conclude , that dreams are not altogether impertinent , but somthing may be gathered out of them ; though the application and meaning of them be denyed to man , unless by special illumination . somnia venturi sunt praescia saepe diei . by dreams we oft may guesse at the next dayes successe . thus have you a rough account of a rambling noctivagation up and down the world : i may boldly say , that neither sir iohn mandevile , or coryat himself travell'd more in so short a time : whence you see what nimble postillions the animal spirits are ; and with what incredible celerity the imagination can crosse the line , cut the tropiques , and pass to the other hemisphere of the world ; which shews that humane souls have somthing in them of the almighty , that their faculties have a kind of ubiquitary freedom , though the body be never so under restraint , as the authors is . they erre as much who think all dreams false , as they who think them alwayes tru . in the prison of the fleet 3. idus decembris 1645. i. h. a vindication of his majesty , touching a letter he writ to rome from the court of spain , in answer to a letter which pope gregory the 15th . had sent him upon passing the dispensation for concluding the match with the i●…fanta . which letter mr. pryn mention's in his book call'd the popish royal favorit , wherby the world is apt to beleeve that his majesty had inclinations to pope●…y . ther goe's also herewith , a clearing of som aspersions that the said mr. pryn cast's upon the author hereof in the same pamphlet , viz. that he was a malignant , and no friend to parlements . wherby , he takes occasion to speak somthing of the first rise , and also of the duty as well as the authority of parlements . to my worthily honor'd friend sir w. s. knight . sir , i have many thanks to give you for the book you pleased to send me , called the popish royal favorite ; and according to your advice ( which i value in a high degree ) i did put pen to paper , and somthing you may see i have done ( though in a poor pamphleting way ) to clear my self of those aspersions that seem to be cast upon his majesty ; but truly sir , i was never so unfit for such a task ; all my papers , manuscripts , and notes having bin long since seized upon and kept from me : adde hereunto , that besides this long pressure and languishment of close restraint ( the sense wherof i find hath much stupified my spirits ) it pleased god to visit me lately with a dangerous fit of sickness , a high burning fever , with the new disease , wherof my body as well as my mind is yet somwhat crazie : so that ( take all afflictions together ) i may truly say , i have passed the ordeal , the fiery tryal . but it hath pleased god to reprieve me to see better daies i hope ; for out of this fatal black cloud , which now ore-sets this poor island , i hope ther will break a glorious sun-shine of peace and firm happinesse : to effect which , had i a jury , a grand-jury of lives , i wold sacrifice them all , and triumph in the oblation . so i most affectionately kiss your hands , and rest your faithfull ( though afflicted ) servant , from the prison of the fleet. i. h. the pre-eminence , and duty of parlement . sectio prima . i am a free-born subject of the realm of england ; wherby i claim as my native inheritance , an undoubted right , propriety , and portion in the laws of the land : and this distinguisheth me from a slave . i claim likewise protection from my soverain prince , who as he is my liege lord is obliged to protect me , and i being one of his liege peeple am obliged to obey him by way of reciprocation ; i claim also an interest and common right in the high national court of parlement , and in the power , the priviledges and jurisdiction therof , which i put in equal ballance with the laws , in regard it is the fountain whence they spring ; and this i hold also to be a principall part of my birth-right ; which great councell i honour , respect , value , and love in as high a degree as can be , as being the bulwark of our liberties , the main boundary and bank which keeps us from slavery , from the inundations of tyrannicall rule , and unbounded will-government . and i hold my self obliged in a tye of indispensable obedience , to conform and submit my self to whatsoever shall be transacted , concluded , and constituted by its authority in church or state with the royal assent , whether it be by making , enlarging , altering , diminishing , disanulling , repealing , or reviving of any law , statute , act , or ordinance whatsoever , either touching matters ecclesiastical , civil , common , capital , criminall , martial , maritime , municipall , or any other ; of all which the transcendent and uncontrollable jurisdiction of that court is capable to take cognizance . amongst the three things which the athenian captain thank'd the gods for , one was , that he was born a grecian , and not a barbarian ; for such was the vanity of the greeks , and after them of the romans in the flourish of their monarchy , to arrogat all civility to themselves , and to terme all the world besides barbarians : so i may say to rejoyce , that i was born a vassall to the crown of england ; that i was born under so well-moulded and tempered a government , which endows the subject with such liberties and infranchisements that bear up his naturall courage , and keep him still in heart ; such liberties that fence and secure him eternally from the gripes and tallons of tyranny : and all this may be imputed to the authority and wisedome of this high court of parlement , wherein there is such a rare co-ordination of power ( though the soveraignty remain still entire , and untransferrable in the person of the prince ) there is such a wholsom mixture 'twixt monarchy , optimacy , and democracy , 'twixt prince , peers , and commonalty , during the time of consultation , that of so many distinct parts , by a rare co-operation and unanimity they make but one body politick , ( like that shea●…e of arrows in the emblem ) one entire concentricall peece , the king being still the head , and the results of their deliberations but as so many harmonious diapasons arising from different strings . and what greater immunity and happinesse can there be to a peeple , than to be liable to no laws but what they make themselves ? to be subject to no contribution , assessement , or any pecuniary erogations whatsoever , but what they vote , and voluntarily yeeld unto themselves ? for in this compacted politick body , there be all degrees of peeple represented ; both the mechanick , tradesman , merchant , and yeoman have their inclusive vote , as well as the gentry , in the persons of their trustees , their knights and burgesses , in passing of all things . nor is this soveraign surintendent councell an epitome of this kingdom only , but it may be said to have a representation of the whole universe ; as i heard a fluent well-worded knight deliver the last parliameut , who compared the beautifull composure of that high court to the great work of god , the world it self : the king is as the sun , the nobles the fixed stars , the itineant judges and other officers ( that go upon messages 'twixt both houses ) to the planets ; the clergy , to the element of fire ; the commons , to the solid body of earth , and the rest of the elements . and to pursue this comparison a little farther ; as the heavenly bodies , when three of them meet in conjunction , do use to produce some admirable effects in the elementary world ; so when these three states convene and assemble in one solemne great iunta , some notable and extraordinary things are brought forth , tending to the welfare of the whole kingdom our microcosme . he that is never so little versed in the annals of this i le , will find that it hath bin her fate to be four times conquered , i exclude the scot for the scituation of his country , and the quality of the clime hath been such an advantage and security to him , that neither the roman eagles would fly thither for fear of freezing their wings , nor any other nation attempt the work . these so many conquests must needs bring with them many tumblings and tossings , many disturbances and changes in government ; yet i have observed , that notwithstanding these tumblings , it retained still the forme of a monarchy , and something there was always that had an analogy with the great assembly of parlement . the first conquest i find was made by claudius caesar , at which time ( as some well observe ) the roman ensignes , and the standard of christ came in together : it is well known what lawes the roman had ; he had his comitia , which bore a resemblance with our convention in parlement ; the place of their meeting was called praetorum , and the laws which they enacted , plebiscita . the saxon conquest succeeded next , which were the english , there being no name in welsh or irish for an english man , but saxon , to this day ; they also governed by parlement , though it were under other names , as michel sinoth , michel gemote , and witenage mote . there are records above a thousand years old of these parlements in the reigns of king ina , offa , ethelbert , and the rest of the seven kings during the heptarchy : the british kings also , who retain'd a great while some part of the isle unconquered , governed and made laws by a kind of parlementary way ; witnesse the famous laws of prince howell , called howell dha , ( the good prince howell ) whereof there are yet extant some british records : parlements were also used after the heptarchy by king kenulphus , alphred , and others ; witnesse that renowned parliament held at grately by king athelstan . the third conquest was by the danes , and they govern'd also by such generall assemblies , ( as they do to this day ) witnesse that great and so much celebrated parlement held by that mighty monarch canutus , who was king of england , denmark , norway , and other regions 150 years before the compiling of magna charta ; and this the learned in the laws do hold to be one of the specialst , and most authentick peeces of antiquity we have extant . edward the confessor made all his laws thus , ( and he was a great legis-lator , ) which the norman conquerour ( who liking none of his sons , made god almighty his heir by bequeathing unto him this island for a legacy ) did ratifie and establish , and digested them into one entire methodicall systeme , which being violated by rufus , ( who came to such a disastrous end as to be shot to death in lieu of a buck for his sacriledges ) were restor'd by henry the first , and so they continued in force till king iohn ; whose reign is renowned for first confirming magna charta , the foundation of our liberties ever since : which may be compar'd to divers outlandish graffes set upon one english stock ; or to a posie of sundry fragrant flowers ; for the choicest of the british , the roman , saxon , danish , and norman laws , being cull'd and pick'd out and gathered as it were into one bundle , out of them the foresaid grand charter was extracted ; and the establishment of this great charter was the work of a parliament . nor are the lawes of this island only , and the freedome of the subject conserved by parlement , but all the best policed countries of europe have the like . the germanes have their diets , the danes and swedes their rijcks dachs ; the spaniard calls his parlement las cortes ; and the french have , ( or should have at least ) their assembly of three states , though it be growne now in a manner obsolete , because the authority thereof was ( by accident ) devolv'd to the king. and very remarkable it is , how this happened ; for when the english had taken such large footing in most parts of france , having advanced as far as orleans and driven their then king charles the seventh , to bourges in berry the assembly of the three states in these pressures , being not able to meet after the usuall manner in full parlement because the countrey was unpassable , the enemy having made such firme invasions up and down through the very bowels of the kingdom ; that power which formerly was inhaerent in the parlementary assembly , of making laws , of assessing the subject with taxes , subsidiary levies , and other impositions , was transmitted to the king during the war ; which continueth many years , that entrusted power by length of time grew as it were habitual in him , and could never after be re-assumed and taken from him ; so that ever since , his edicts countervaile acts of parlement . and that which made the businesse more feasable for the king , was , that the burthen fell most upon the communalty ( the clergy and nobility not feeling the weight of it ) who were willing to see the peasan pull'd down a little , because not many years before , in that notable rebellion , call'd la jaquerie de beauvoisin , which was suppressed by charles the wise , the common people put themselves boldly in arms against the nobility and gentry , to lessen their power . adde hereunto as an advantage to the work , that the next succeeding king lewis the eleventh , was a close cunning prince , and could well tell how to play his game , and draw water to his own mill ; for amongst all the rest , he was said to be the first that put the kings of france , hors de page , out of their minority , or from being pages any more , though therby he brought the poor peasans to be worse than lacquays , and they may thank themselfs for it . neverthelesse , as that king hath an advantage hereby one way , to monarchize more absolutely , and never to want money , but to ballast his purse when he will ; so ther is another mighty inconvenience ariseth to him and his whole kingdom another way ; for this peeling of the peasan hath so dejected him , and cowed his native courage so much by the sense of poverty ( which brings along with it a narrownesse of 〈◊〉 ) that he is little usefull for the war : which put 's the french king to make other nations mercenary to him , to fill up his infantery : insomuch , that the kingdom of france may be not unfitly compared to a body that hath all it's bloud drawn up into the arms , breast and back , and scarce any le●…t from the girdle downwards , to cherish and bear up the lower parts , and keep them from starving . all this seriously considered , ther cannot be a more proper and pregnant example than this of our next neighbours , to prove how infinitly necessary the parlement is to assert , to prop up and preserve the publick liberty , and national rights of a peeple , with the incolumity and well-fare of a countrey . nor doth the subject only reap benefit thus by parlement , but the prince , ( if it be well consider'd ) hath equal advantage therby ; it rendreth him a king of free and able men , which is far more glorious than to be a king of cowards , beggars , and bankrupts ; men that by their freedom , and competency of wealth , are kept still in heart to do him service against any forrain force . and it is a tru maxime in all states , that 't is lesse danger and dishonour for the prince to be poor , than his people : rich subjects can make their king rich when they please , if he gain their hearts , he will quickly get their purses . parlement encreaseth love and good intelligence 'twixt him and his peeple , it acquaints him with the reality of things , and with the tru state and diseases of his kingdom , it brings him to the knowledg of his better sort of subjects , and of their abilities , which he may employ accordingly upon all occasions ; it provides for his royal issue , pays his debts , finds means to fill his coffers : and it is no ill observation , that parlementmoneys ( the great aid ) have prospered best with the kings of england ; it exceedingly raiseth his repute abroad , and enableth him to keep his foes in fear , his subjects in awe , his neighbours and confederates in security , the three main things which go to aggrandize a prince , and render him glorious . in summe , it is the parlement that supports , and bears up the honour of his crown , and settles his throne in safety , which is the chief end of all their consultations : for whosoever is entrusted to be a member of this high court , carryeth with him a double capacity ; he sits ther as a patriot , and as a subject : as he is the one , the country is his object , his duty being to vindicat the publick liberty , to make wholsom lawes , to put his hand to the pump , and stop the leaks of the great vessel of the state , to pry into , and punish corruption and oppression , to improve and advance trade , to have the grievances of the place he serves for redressed , and cast about how to find somthing that may tend to the advantage of it . but he must not forget that he sits ther also as a subject , and according to that capacity , he must apply himself to do his soveraignt businesse , to provide not only for his publick , but his personall wants ; to bear up the lustre and glory of his court ; to consider what occasions of extraordinary expences he may have , by encrease of royal issue , or maintenance of any of them abroad ; to enable him to vindicat any affront or indignity that might be offered to his person , crown , or dignity , by any forrain state or kingdom , or intestin rebellion ; to consult what may enlarge his honour , contentment , and pleasure . and as the french tacitus ( comines ) hath ●…t , the english nation was used to be more ●…orward and zealous in this particular than ●…ny other ; according that to ancient eloquent speech of a great lawyer , domus regis vigi●…a defendit omnium , otium illius labor omni●…m , deliciae illius industria omnium , vacatio ●…lius occupatio omnium , salus illius periculum ●…nium , honor illius objectum omnium . eve●… one shold stand centinell to defend the kings house , his safety shold be the danger of 〈◊〉 , his pleasures the industry of all , his ease ●…old be the labour of all , his honour the ob●…ct of all . out of these premisses this conclusion ●…ay be easily deduced , that , the principall ●…ntain whence the king derives his happiness and safety , is his parlement ; it is that great conduit-pipe which conveighes unto him his peoples bounty and gratitude ; the truest looking-glasse wherin he discernes their loves ; ( now the subjects love hath been always accounted the prime cittadell of a prince . ) in his parlement he appears as the sun in the meridian , in the altitude of his glory , in his highest state royal , as the law tells us . therfore whosoever is averse or disaffected to his soveraign law-making court ▪ cannot have his heart well planted within him , he can be neither good subject , no●… good patriot , and therfore unworthy to breath english aire , or have any benefit , advantage , or protection from the laws . sectio secunda . by that which hath bin spoken , which is the language of my heart , i hope no indifferent judicious reader will doubt of the cordiall affection , of the high respects and due reverence i bear to parlement , as being the wholsomest constitution , ( and done by the highest and happiest reach of policy that ever was established in this island ) to perpetuate the happinesse therof . therfore i must tell that gentleman , who was author of a book entituled the popish royal favorite , ( lately printed and exposed to the world ) that he offers me very hard measure ; nay , he doth me apparent wrong , to term me therin , no friend to parlement , and a malignant ▪ a character , which as i deserve it not , so i disdain it . for the first part of his charge , i wold have him know , that i am as much a friend and as reall an affectionat humble servant and votary to the parlement as possibly he can be , and will live and die with these affections about me : and i could wish , that he were secretary of my thoughts a while , or if i may take the boldnesse to apply that comparison his late majesty used in a famous speech to one of his parlements , i could wish ther were a chrystal window in my breast , through which the world might espye the inward motions and palpitations of my heart , then would he be certified of the sincerity of this protestation . for the second part of his charge , to be a malignant , i must confesse to have som malignity that lurks within me much against my will ; but it is no malignity of mind , it is amongst the humors , not in my intellectuals ; and i believe , ther is no naturall man , let him have his humors never so well ballanced , but hath som of this malignity reigning within him ; for as long as we are composed of the four elements , whence these humors are derived , and with whom they symbolize in qualities ; which elements the philosophers hold to be in a restlesse contention amongst themselves ( and the stoick thought that the world subsisted by this innated mutual strise ) as long i say , as the four humors , in imitation of their principles ( the elements ) are in perpetual reluctancy and combate for praedominancy , ther must be som malignity lodg'd within us , as adusted choler , and the like ; wherof i had late experience , in a dangerous fit of sicknesse it pleased god to lay upon me , which the physitians told me proceeded from the malignant hypocondriacall effects of melancholy ; having bin so long in this saturnine black condition of close imprisonment , and buryed alive between the walls of this fatal fleet : these kinds of malignities , i confesse are very rife in me , and they are not only incident , but connaturall to every man according to his complexion ; and were it not for this incessant strugling and enmity amongst the humors for mastery , which produceth such malignant effects in us , our souls wold be loth ever to depart from our bodies , or to abandon this mansion of clay . now what malignity my accuser means , i know not ; if he means malignity of spirit , as som antipathy or ill impression upon the mind , arising from disaffection , hatred , or rancor , with a desire of som destructive revenge , he is mightily deceived in me ; i maligne or hate no creature that ever god made but the devill , who is the author of all malignity ; and therfore is most commonly called in french le malin esprit , the malignant spirit . every night before i go to bed , i have the grace , i thank god for it , to forgive all the world , and not to harbour , or let roost in my bosom the least malignant thought ; yet none can deny , but the publick aspersions which this my accuser casts upon me , were enough to make me a malignant towards him ; yet it could never have the power to do it : for i have prevail'd with my self to forgive him this his wrong censure of me , issuing rather from his notknowledge of me , than from malice , for we never mingled speech , or saw one another in our lives to my remembrance ; which makes me wonder the more , that a professor of the law , as he is , shold pronounce such a positive sentence against me so slightly . but methinks i over-hear him say , that my precedent discourse of parlement is invol'd in generals , and the topique axiome tells us , that dolus versatur in universalibus , ther is double dealing in universals : his meaning is , that i am no friend to this present parlement ( though he speaks in the plurall number parlements ) and consequently , he concludes me a malignant ; therin i must tell him also , that i am traduc'd , and i am confident it will be never prov'd against me , from any actions , words , or letters ( though divers of mine have bin intercepted ) or any other misdemeanor , though som things are father'd upon me which never drop'd from my quill . alas , how unworthy and uncapable am i to censure the proceedings of that great senate , that high synedrion , wherin the wisdom of the whole state is epitomized ? it were a presumption in me , of the highest nature that could be : it is enough for me to pray for the prosperous successe of their consultations : and as i hold it my duty , so i have good reason so to do , in regard i am to have my share in the happinesse ; and could the utmost of my poor endeavours , by any ministerial humble office ( and somtimes the meanest boat-swain may help to preserve the ship from sinking ) be so happy , as to contribut any thing to advance that great work ( which i am in despair to do , while i am thus under hatches in this fleet , ) i wold esteem it the greatest honor that possibly could befall me , as i hold it now to be my greatest disaster , to have fallen so heavily under an affliction of this nature , and to be made a sacrifice to publick fame , than which there is no other proof , nor that yet urg'd against me , or any thing else produc'd after so long , so long captivity which hath brought me to suck a low ebbe , and put me so far behind in the course of my poor fortunes , and indeed more than halfe undone me . for although my whole life ( since i was left to my self to swim , as they say , without bladders ) has bin nothing else but a continued succession of crosses , and that there are but few red letters found ( god wot ) in the almanack of my age , ( for which i account not my self a whit the lesse happy ) yet this crosse has carried with it a greater weight , it hath bin of a larger extent , longer continuance , and lighted heavier upon me than any other ; and as i have present patience to beare it , so i hope for subsequent grace to make use of it accordingly , that my old motto may be still confirmed , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he produceth my attestation for some passages in spaine at his majesties being there , and he quotes me right , which obligeth me to him ; and i hope all his quotations wherein he is so extraordinarily copious and elaborate in all his workes , are so ; yet i must tel him , that those interchangeable letters which pass'd between his majesty & the pope , which were originally couch'd in latin , the language wherin all nations treat with rome , and the empire with all the princes thereof , those letters i say are adulterated in many places , which i impute not to him , but to the french chronicler , from whom he took them in trust . the truth of that businesse is this ; the world knows there was a tedious treaty of an alliance 'twixt the infanta dona maria ( who now is empresse ) and his majesty , which in regard of the slow affected pace of the spaniard , lasted above ten yeares , as that in henry the sevenths time , 'twixt prince arthur , and ( afterwards ) queen katherine , was spun out above seven : to quicken , or rather to consummate the work , his majesty made that adventurous journey through the whole continent of france into spaine ; which voyage , though there was a great deale of gallantry in it ( wherof all posterity will ring untill it turne at last to a romance ) yet it prov'd the bane of the businesse , which 't is not the errand of so poor a pamphlet as this to unfold . his majesty being there arriv'd , the ignorant common people cried out , the prince of wales came thither to make himself a christian ; the pope writ to the inquisitor generall , and others , to use all industry they could to reduce him to the romane religion ; and one of olivares first complements to him , was , that he doubted not but that his highnesse came thither to change his religion : whereunto he made a short answer , that he came not thither for a religion but for a wife : there were extraordinary processions made , and other artifices us'd by protraction of things , to make him stay ther of purpose till the spring following , to work upon him the better ; and the infanta her self desir'd him ( which was esteem'd the greatest favour he received from her all the while ) to visit the nunne of carton , hoping that the say'd nunne , who was so much cried up for miracles , might have wrought one upon him ; but her art failed her , nor was his highness so weak a subject to work upon according to his late majesties speech to doctor mawe and wren , who when they came to kisse his hands before they went to spaine to attend the prince their master , he wish ed them to have a care of buckinham ; as touching his sonne charles , he apprehended no feare at all of him ; for he knew him to be so well grounded a protestant , that nothing could shake him in his religion . the arabian proverb is , that the sun never soiles in his passage , though his beams reverberate never so strongly , and dwell never so long upon the myry lake of maeotis , the black turf'd moores of holland , the aguish woose of kent and essex , or any other place , be it never so dirty ; though spaine be a hot countrey , yet one may passe and repasse through the very center of it , and never be sun-burnt , if he carry with him a bongrace , and such a one his majesty had . well , after his majesties arrivall to madrid , the treaty of marriage went on still , ( though he told them at his first comming , that he came not thither like an ambassador to treat of a marriage , but as a prince , to fetch home a wife ; ) and in regard they were of different religions , it could not be done without a dispensation from the pope , and the pope would grant none , unlesse some capitulations were stipulated in favour of the romish catholikes in england , ( the same in substance were agreed on with france . ) well , when the dispensation came , which was negotiated solely by the king of spains ministers ( because his majesty would have as little to do as might be with rome ) pope gregory the fifteenth , who died a little after , sent his majesty a letter , which was delivered by the nuncio , whereof an answer was sent a while after : which letters were imprinted and exposed to the view of the world , because his majesty would not have people whisper , that the businesse was carried in a clandestine manner . and truly besides this , i do not know of any letter , or message , or complement , that ever pass'd twixt his majesty and the pope afore or after ; some addresses peradventure might be made to the cardinalls , to whom the drawing of those matrimoniall dispatches was referred to quicken the work , but this was only by way of civil negotiation . now touching that responsory letter from his majesty , it was no other than a complement in the severest interpretation ; and such formalities passe 'twixt the crown of england , the great turke , the mogor and divers heathen princes . the pope writ first , and no man can deny , but by all morall rules , and in common humane civility his majesty was bound to answer it , specially considering how punctual they are in those countries to correspond in this kind , how exact they are repaying visits , with the performance of such ceremonies ; and had this compliance bin omitted , it might have made very ill impressions , as the posture of things stood then ; for it had prejudiced the great work in hand , i mean , the match , which was then in the heat and height of agitation , his majesties person was ther engaged , besides , and so it was no time to give the least offence : they that are never so little vers'd in businesse abroad , do know that ther must be addresses , compliances , and formalities of this nature us'd in the carriage of matters of state , as this great businesse was , wheron the eyes of all christendom were so greedily fix'd ; a businesse which was like to bring with it such an universal good , as the restitution of the palatinat , the quenching of those hideous fires in germany , and the establishing of a peace throughout all the christian world. i hope none will take offence , that in this particular which comes within the compasse of my knowledg ( being upon the stage when his scene was acted ) i do this right to the king my master , in displaying the truth , and putting her forth in her own colours , a rare thing in these days . touching the vocall forrest , an allegorical discourse , that goes abroad under my name , a good while before the beginning of this parlement , which this gentleman cites ( and that very faithfully , ) i understand ther be som that mutter at certain passages therin , by putting ill glosses upon the text , and taking with the left hand , what i offer with the right , ( nor is it a wonder for trees which ly open , and stand exposed to all weathers to be nipt . ) but i desire this favour , which in common justice , i am sure in the court of chancery cannot be denyed me , it being the priviledge of every author , and a received maxime through the world , cujus est condere , ejus est interpretari ; i say , i crave this favour , to have leave to expound my own text , and i doubt not then but to rectifie any one in his opinion of me , and that in lieu of the plums which i give him from those trees , he will not throw the stones at me . moreover , i desire those that are over criticall censu●…ers of that peece , to know , that as in divinity it is a rule , scriptur a parabolica non est argumentativa , so it is in all other kind of knowledg ; parables ( wherof that discourse is composed ) though pressed never so hard , prove nothing . the●… is another rule also , that parables must be gently used , like a nurses breast ; which if you presse too hard , you shall have bloud in stead of milk . but as the author of the vocall forrest thinks he hath done , neither his countrey , nor the common wealth of learning any prejudice therby ( that maiden fancy having received so good entertainment and respect abroad , as to be translated into divers languages , and to gain the publick approbation of som famous universities ) so he makes this humble protest unto all the world , that though the designe of that discourse was partly satyricall ( which peradventure induc'd the author to shrowd it of purpose under the shadowes of trees , and where should satyres be but amongst trees ? ) yet it never entred into his imagination to let fall from him the least thing that might give any offence to the high and honourable court of parlement , whereof he had the honour to be once a member , and hopes he may be thought worthy again : and were he guilty of such an offence , or piacle rather , he thinks he shold never forgive himself , though he were appointed his own judge . if ther occur any passages therin , that may admit a hard construction , let the reader observe , that the author doth not positively assert , or passe a judgement on any thing in that discourse , which consists principally of concise , cursory narrations of the choisest ▪ occurrences and criticismes of state , according as the pulse of time did beat then : and matters of state , as all other sublunary things , are subject to alterations , contingencies and change , which makes the opinions and minds of men vary accordingly . i will conclude with this modest request to that gentleman of the long robe ; that having unpassionately perus'd what i have written in this small discourse , in penning wherof , my conscience guided my quill all along as well as my hand , he wold please to be so charitable and just , as to reverse that harsh sentence upon me , to be no friend to parlements and a malignant . a glance upon the i le of wight , and upon the unparallell'd concessions of grace his majesty pass'd in that trety , &c. concluding with the horrid murther committed afterwards upon his sacred person . cui dabit partes scelus expiant iupiter ? a glance upon the i le of wight , or an inquisition after truth . who vindicats truth doth a good office not onely to his own country , but to all mankind ; it is the scope of this short discourse , viz. to make som researches after truth , and to rectifie the world accordingly in point of opinion , specially touching the first author and aggressor of the late ugly war in england , which brought with it such an inundation of bloud , and so did let in so huge a torrent of mischiefs to rush upon us . ther be many , and they not only presbyterians and independents , but cavaliers also , who think that the king had taken the guilt of all this bloud upon himself , in regard of that concession he passed in the preamble of the late treaty at the isle of wight ; the aim of this paper is to clear that point , but in so temperat a way , that i hope 't will give no cause of exception , much lesse of offence to any : the bloud that 's sought after here , shall not be mingled with gaule , much lesse with any venom at all . we know ther is no principle either in divinity , law or philosophy , but may be wrested to a wrong sense ; ther is no truth so demonstrative and clear , but may be subject to cavillations ; no tenet so plain , but perverse inferences may be drawn out of it ; such a fate befell that preambular concession his majesty passed at the transactions of the late treaty , in that he acknowledg'd therin that the two houses of parlement were necessitated to undertake a war in their own just and lawful defence , &c. and that therfore all oaths , declarations , or other public instruments against the houses of parlement , or any for adhering to them , &c. be declared null , suppressed , and forbidden . 't is true , his majesty passed this grant , but with this weighty consideration as it had reference to two ends . first , to smoothen and facilitate things thereby to open a passage , and pave the way to a happy peace , which this poor iland did so thirst after , having bin so long glutted with civil blood . secondly , that it might conduce to the further security , and the indemnifying of the two houses of parlement , with all their instruments , assistants , and adherents , and so rid them of all jealousies , and fear of future dangers which still lodg'd within them . now touching the expressions and words of this grant , they were not his own , nor did he give order for the dictating or penning thereof ; the king was not the author of them , but an assentor only unto them : nor was he or his party accus'd , or as much as mentioned in any of them , to draw the least guilt upon themselves . besides , he pass'd them as he doth all lawes and acts of parlement , which in case of absence another may do for him in his politic capacity , therfore they cannot prejudice his person any way . i am loth to say that he condescended to this grant , — cum strict a novacula supra , when the razor was as it were at his throat , when ther was an army of about thirty thousand effectif horse and foot that were in motion against him , when his person had continued under a black long lingring restraint , and dangerous menacing petitions and papers daily ob●…ruded against him . moreover , his majesty pass'd this concession with these two provisos and reservations , first , that it should be of no vertu or validity at all , till the whole treaty were intirely consummated ; secondly , that he might when he pleas'd inlarge and cleer the truth with the reservednesse of his meaning herein , by public declaration : now the treaty being confusedly huddled up , without discussing , or as much as receiving any proposition from himself as was capitulated , ( and reciprocall proposalls are of the essence of all treaties ) it could neither bind him , or turne any way to his disadvantage : therfore under favour , ther was too much hast us'd by the parlement , to draw that hipothetick or provisional concession to the form of an act so suddenly after in the very heat of the treaty , without his majesties knowledg , or the least intimation of his pleasure . add hereunto , that this grant was but a meer preambular proposition , 't was not of the essence of the treaty it self : and as the philosophers and schoolemen tell us , there is no valid proof can be drawn out of proemes , introductions or corollaries in any science , but out of the positive assertions and body of the text , which is only argument-proof ; so in the constitutions and laws of england , as also in all accusations and charges , forerunning prefaces & preambles ( which commonly weak causes want most ) are not pleadable : and though they use to be first in place , like gentlemen-ushers , yet are they last in dignity , as also in framing , nor had they ever the force of laws , but may be term'd their attendants to make way for them . besides , ther 's not a syllable in this preface which repeals or connives at any former law of the land , therefore those laws that so strictly inhibit english subjects to raise armes against their liege lord the king , and those lawes è contrario which exempt from all dangers , penalties or molestation , any subject that adheres to the person of the king in any cause or buarrell whatsoever , are still in force . furthermore , this introductory concession of the kings , wherein he is contented to declare , that the two houses were necessitated to take armes for their defence , may be said to have relation to the necessity , à parte pòst , not à parte antè : self-defence is the universall law of nature , and it extends to all other cretures , as well as to the rationall : as the fluent roman orator in that sentence of his , which is accounted among the critiques the excellentest that ever drop'd from cicero ; est enim haec non scripta , sed nata lex quam non didicimus , accepimus , legimus , verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus , hausimus , expressimus , ad quam non docti , sed facti , non instituti , sed imbuti sum●…s , ut si vita nostra in &c. for this ( meaning self-defence ) is not a written , but a law born with us ; a law which we have not learnt , receiv'd or read , but that which we have suck'd , drawn forth , and wrung out of the very brests of nature her self ; a law to which we are not taught , but made unto , wherwith we are not instructed , but indued withall , that if our lifes be in jeopardy , &c. we may repel force by force . therfore when the house of parliament had drawn upon them a necessity of self defence ( and i could have wish'd it had bin against any other but their own soverain prince ) his majesty was contented to acknowledge that necessity . as for example : a man of war meets with a marchant man at sea , he makes towards him , and assaults him ; the marchant man having a good stout vessell under him , and resolute , generous seamen , bears up against him , gives him a whole broad-side , and shoots him 'twixt wind and water ; so there happens a furious fight betwixt them , which being ended , the marchant cannot deny but that the man of war , though the first assailant , was necessitated to fight , and that justly in his own defence , which necessity he drew upon himself , and so was excusable , à posteriori , not à priori ; as the civilians speak of a clandestine marriage , fieri non debuit , sed factum valet ; it ought not to have been , but being done 't is valid : wherunto relates another saying , multa sunt quae non nisi per acta approbantur . ther are many things which are not allowable til they are pass'd . the kings of france have had sundry civil wars , they have had many bloudy encounters and clashes with their subjects , specially the last king lewis the thirteenth , which turn'd all at last to his advantage ; among other treaties in that of loudun , he was by force of article to publish an edict , dont lequel le roy approuvoit tout le passé comme ayant esté fait pour son service , &c. wherin the king approv'd of all that w●…s pass'd , as done for his service , &c. and these concessions and extenuations are usuall at the close of most civil wars , but ther was never any further advantage made of them , then to make the adverse party more capable of grace and pardon , as also to enable them to bear up against the brunt of laws , and secure them more firmly from all after-claps ; they were pass'd in order to an act of abolition , to a generall pardon , and consequently to a re-establishment of peace ; now , peace and war ( we know ) are like water and ice , they engender one another : but i do not remember to have read either in the french history , or any other , that such royal concessions at the period of any intestin war were ever wrung so hard , as to draw any inference from them , to cast therby the guilt of bloud , or indeed the least stain of dishonour upon the king ; for royal indulgences and grants of this nature are like nurses breasts , if you presse them gently ther will milk come forth , if you wring them too hard you will draw forth bloud in lieu of milk : and i have observed that the conclusion of such treaties in france , both parties wold hugg and mutually embrace one another in a gallant way of national humanity ; all rancor , all plundrings , sequestration , and imprisonment wold cease , nor wold any be prosecuted , much lesse made away afterwards in cold bloud . touching the comencer of this monstrous war of ours , the world knows too well , that the first man of bloud was blew-cap , who shew'd subjects the way , how to present their king with petitions upon the pikes point , and what visible judgements have fallen upon him since , by such confusions of discord and pestilence at home , and irreparable dishonour abroad , let the world judge . the irish took his rise from him : and wheras it hath bin often suggested , that his majesty had foreknowledge therof , among a world of convincing arguments which may clear him in this particular , the lord maguair upon the ladder , and another upon the scaffold , when they were ready to breath their last , and to appear before the tribunall of heaven , did absolutely acquit the king , and that spontaneously of their own accord , being unsought unto , but only out of a love to truth , and discharge of a good conscience : but touching those cruentous irish wars , in regard ther was nothing wherof more advantage was made against his late majesty , to imbitter and poyson the hearts of his subjects against him then that rebellion , i will take leave to wind up the main causes of them upon a small bottom as was spoken elsewhere . 1. they who kept intelligence and complyed with the scot , in his first and second insurrection . 2. they who dismiss'd the first irish commissioners ( who came of purpose to attend our parlement with som grievances ) with such a short unpolitic harsh answer . 3. they who took off straffords head , ( which had it stood on , that rebellion had never been ) and afterwards retarded the dispatch of the earl of leicester from going over to be lord-lievtenant . 4. lastly , they , who hindred part of that disbanded army of 8000 men rais'd there by the earl of strafford , which his majesty , in regard they were souldiers of fortune , and loose casheer'd men , to prevent the mischiefs that might befall that kingdome , by their insolencies , had promised the two spanish ambassadors , the marquesses of veloda and malvezzi , then resident in this court ; which souldiers rise up first of any , and put fire to the tumult to find somthing to do . they , i say , who did all this , may be justly said to have bin the tru causes of that horrid insurrection in ireland ; and consequently 't is easie to judge upon the account of whose souls must be laid the bloud of those hundred and odd thousand poor christians who perished in that war ▪ and had it bin possible to have brought o're their bodies unputrified to england , and to have cast them at the lower house door , and in the presence of som members , which are now either secluded , or gone to give an account in another world , i believe their noses wold have gush'd out with bloud for discovery of the tru murtherers . touching this last fire-brand of war , which was thrown into england , who they were that kindled it first , the consciences of those indifferent and unbiassed men are sittest to be judges , who have bin curious to observe with impartial eyes , the carriage of things from the beginning . i confesse , 't was a fatal unfortunat thing , that the king shold put such a distance 'twixt his person and his parlement , but a more fatal and barbarous thing it was , that he should be driven away from it , that there should be a desperate designe to surprize his person , that ven with his myrmidons , and bourges with his bandogs , ( for so ▪ they calld the riffraff of the city they brought along with them ) should rabble him away , with above four parts in five of the lords , and near upon two parts in three of the commons : yet 't is fit it should be remembred , what reiterated messages his majesty sent from time to time afterward , that he was alwaies ready to return , provided there might be a course taken to secure his person , with those peers and other who were rioted away from the houses , 't is fit it should be remembred , that there was not the least motion of war at all , till hotham kept his majesty out of his own town kingston upon hull , ( for the name whereof shew'd whose town it was ) where being attended by a few of his meniall servants , he came onely to visit her , having peaceably sent the duke of york , and the palsgrave thither the day before ) which act of hotham's by shutting the gates against him was voted warrantable by the house of commons , and it may be call'd the first thunderbolt of war : 't is fit it should be remembred , that a while after there was a compleate army of 16000. effectif horse and foot inrolled in and about london to fetch him to his parliament by force , and remove ill counsellours from about him , ( long before he put up his royal standard ) and the generall then nam'd was to live and die with them : and very observable it is , how that generalls father was executed for a traytor , for but attempting such a thing upon queen elizabeth , i mean to remove ill counsellors from about her by force . 't is also to be observed , that the same army which was rais'd to bring him to his parliament , was continued to a clean contrary end two years afterwards to keep him from his parliament . 't is fit it should be remembred , who interdicted trade first , and brought in forraigners to help them , and whose commissions of war were neere upon two moneths date before the kings . 't is fit it should be remembred how his majesty in all his declarations and publick instruments made alwaies deep protestations , that 't was not against his parliament he raised armes , but against some seditious members , against whom he had onely desired the common benefit of the law , but could not obtain it ; 't is fit to remember , that after any good successes and advantages of his , he still courted both parliament and city to an accommodation ; how upon the treaty at uxbridge , with much importunity for the generall advantage and comfort of his peeple , and to prepare matters more fitly for a peace , he desired there might be freedom of trade from town to town , and a cessation of all acts of hostility for the time , that the inflammation being allayed , the wound might be cur●…d the sooner ; all which was denyed him . 't is fit to remember how a noble lord ( the earl of southampton ) at that time told the parliaments commissioners in his majesties name , at the most unhappy rupture of the said treaty , that when he was at the highest he would be ready to treat with them , and fight them when he was at the lowest : 't is fit the present army should remember how often both in their proposalls , and publick declarations they have inform'd the world , and deeply protested that their principall aime was to restore his majesty to honour , freedom and safety , whereunto they were formerly bound , both by their own protestation and covenant , that the two commanders in chief pawn'd unto him their soules thereupon . let them remember , that since he was first snatch'd away to the custody of the army by cromwells plot , who said , that if they had the person of the king in their power , they had the parliament in their pockets . i say being kept by the army , he never displeas'd them in the least particular , but in all his overtures for peace , and in all his propositions he had regard still that the army should be satisfied : let it be remembred , that to settle a blessed peace , to preserve his subjects from rapine and ruine , and to give contentment to his parliament , he did in effect freely part with his sword , scepter , and crown , and ev'ry thing that was proprietary to him : let it be remembred with what an admired temper , with what prudence and constancy , with what moderation and mansuetude he comported himself since his deep afflictions , insomuch that those commissioners and others who resorted unto him , and had had their hearts so averse unto him before , return'd his converts , crying him up to be one of the sanctifiedst persons upon earth : and will not the bloud of such a prince cry loud for vengeance ? bloud is a crying sin , but that of kings cryes loudest for revenge , and ruine brings . let it be remembred , that though there be some precedents of deposing kings in his kingdom , and elsewhere , when there was a competition for the right title to the crown by some other of the bloud royall , yet 't is a thing not onely unsampled , but unheard of in any age , that a king of england whose title was without the least scruple , should be summon'd and arraign'd , tryed , condemned , and executed in his own kingdom , by his own subjects , and by the name of their own king , to whom they had sworn alleagiance . the meanest student that hath but tasted the laws of the land can tell you , that it is an unquestionable fundamentall maxime , the king can do no wrong , because he acts by the mediation of his agents and ministers , he heares with other mens eares , he sees with other mens eyes , he consults with other mens braines , he executes with other mens hands , and judges with other mens consciences ; therefore his officers counsellors or favorites are punishable , not he : and i know not one yet whom he hath spar'd , but sacrificed to justice . the crown of england is of so coruscant and pure a mettall ▪ that it cannot receive the least taint or blemish ; and if there were any before in the person of the prince , it takes them all away and makes him to be rectus in curia . this as in many others may be exemplified in henry the seventh , and the late queen elizabeth : when she first came to the crown 't was mention'd in parlement , that the attainder might be taken off him , under which he lay all the time he liv'd an exile in france ; it was then by the whole house of parlement resolv'd upon the question , that it was unnecessary , because the crown purg'd all . so likewise when queen elizabeth was brought as it were from the scaffold to the throne ; though she was under a former attainder , yet 't was thought superfluous to take it off , for the crown washeth away all spots , and darteth such a brightnesse , such resplendent beams of majesty , that quite dispell all former clouds : so that put case king iames died a violent death , and his son had been accessary to it , ( which is as base a lie as ever the devil belch'd out ) yet his accesse to the crown had purged all . this businesse about the playster which was applyed to king iames , was sifted and winnow'd as narrowly as possibly a thing could be in former parlements , yet when it was exhibited as an article against the duke of buckingham , 't was term'd but a presumption or misdemeanure of a high nature : and 't is strange that these new accusers shold make that a parricide in the king , which was found but a presumption in the duke , who in case it had been so , must needs have been the chiefest accessary . and as the ancient crown and royall diadem of england is made of such pure allay , and cast in so dainty a mould , that it can receive no taint , or contract the least speck of enormity and foulenesse in it self , so it doth endow the person of the prince that weares it with such high prerogatives ; that it exempts him from all sorts of publique blemishes ; from all attainders , empeachments , summons , arraignments and tryalls ; nor is there or ever was any law or precedent in this land , to lay any crime or capitall charge against him , though touching civill matters : touching propertie of meum and tuum , he may be impleaded by the meanest vassall that hath sworn fealty to him ; as the subjects of france and spaine may against their kings , though never so absolute monarchs . in the constitutions of england , there are two incontroulable maximes , whereof the meanest mootman that hath but saluted littleton cannot be ignorant : the first is , rex in suis dominiis neque habet parem , nec superiorem . the king in his own dominions hath neither peer , or superior . the other is satis habet rex ad poenam quod deum expectet ultorem : 't is punishment enough for a king that god will take revenge of him : therefore if it be the fundamentall constitution of the land , that all just tryalls must be by teers , and that the law proclaimes the king to have no peer in his own dominions , i leave the world to judg , what capacity or power those men had to arraign their late king , to be in effect his accusers and iudges ; and that an exorbitant unsampled tribunall should be erected , with power and purpose to condemn all to cleer none , and that sentence of death should passe without conviction or law upon him that was the heard and protector of all the lawes . lastly , that they who by their own confession represent but the common people , should assume power to cut off him who immediately represented god , cui dabit partes scelus expiandi iupiter ? — well , we have seen such portentous things , that former ages never beheld , nor will future ages ever be witnesse of the like : nay , posterity , after a century or two of yeers will hold what is now really acted to be but romances . and now with thoughts full of consternation and horror , and a heart trembling with amazement and sorrow for the crying flagrant sins of this forlorn nation , specially for that fresh infandous murther committed upon the sacred person of his majesty , i conclude with this hepastick , wherein all cretures ( though irrationall ) that have sence , yea the very vegetalls seeme to abhor so damnable a fact . so fell the royal oake by a wild crew of mongrel shrubs which underneath him grew ; so fell the lion by a pack of currs ; so the rose witherd 'twixt a knot of burrs . so fell the eagle by a swarme of gnatts , so the whale perish'd by a shoale of spratts . in the prison of the fleet 25. febr. 1648. i. h. advice sent from the prime statesmen of florence , how england may come to herself again , which is , to call in the king , not upon articles , but in a free confident way : which advice came immediatly upon the readmission of the secluded members , and coppies therof being delivered to the chiefest of them. it produc'd happy effects . a letter sent from the city of florence , written by a great counsellor there , touching the present distempers of england ; wherein he , with som of the prime statesmen in florence passe their iudgements which is the onely way to compose the said distempers . to my honored , and most endeared patron . it is no small diminution to my former happinesse that i have not receiv'd your commands any time these two moneths , which makes me lodg within me certain apprehensions of fear that som disaste●… might befall you in those new distractions , therefore i pray be pleased to pull this thorn out of my thoughts as speedily as it may stand with your conveniency . we are not here so barren of intelligence , but we have weekly advice of your present confusions , and truly the severest sort of speculative persons here who use to observe the method of providence , do not stick to say , that the hand of heaven doth visibly stirre therein , and that those distractions in army , state , and city are apparent judgements from above , for if one revolve the stories of former times , as i have done many ( but you more ) he will find that it hath been alwaies an inevitable fate which useth to hang over all popular insurrections to end in confusion and disorders among the chief actors themselfs at last ; and we have had divers examples thereof here among us , which hath caus'd us to be so long in quietnesse and peace . but truly sir , give me leave to tell you that your nation hath lost much of their repute abroad all the world over in statu quo nunc ; som do laugh at you ; others do scorn , and hate you ; and som do pitty and comiserat you . they who laugh at you , think you are no better than mand men ▪ having strange magots in your brains bred out of the fat of so long wanton plenty , and peace . they who scorn and hate you , do it for your sacriledge , your horrendous sacrileges , the like whereof was never committed on earth since christianity had first a hole to put her head in . they who pitty you are few , and we are of the nomber of them , as well in the common sense of humanity , as for the advantages , and improvement of wealth which this state hath receiv'd by your trading at ligorne , for that town doth acknowledge her prosperity , and that she is arrived to this flourishing estate of riches , of buildings and bravery by the correspondence she hath had this latter age with england in point of commerce , which yet we find doth insensibly impair every day , and i believe you feel it more ; therefore out of the well-wishes , and true affections we bear unto england , some of the most serious , and soberest persons of this place who are well seasoned in the world , and have studyed men under divers climes , and conversed also much with heavenly bodies , had lately a private junto , or meeting , whereunto i was admitted for one , and two of us had been in england where we received sundry free civilities ; our main businesse was to discourse , and descant upon these sad confusions , and calamitous condition wherein england with the adjoyning kingdomes are at present involved , and what might extricate her out of this labyrinth of distractions , and reduce her to a setled government ; having long canvased the businesse , and banded arguments pro & con with much earnestnesse , all our opinious did concenter at last in this point , that there was no probable way under heaven to settle a fast , and firm government among you , then for the men that are now upon the stage of power to make a speedy application to their own king , their own liege lord and soveraigne , whom god , and nature hath put over them ; let●… them beat their brains , scrue up their witts , and put all the policy they have upon the tenterhooks as farre as possibly they can , yet they will never be able to establish a durable standing government otherwise , they do but dance in a circle all this while , for the government will turn at last to the same point it was before ▪ viz. to monarchy , and this king will be restored to his royall inheritances , maugre all the cacodaemons of hell : our astrologers here , specially the famous antonio fiselli hath had notes to look into the horoscope of his nativity , and what predictions he hath made hitherto of him have proved true to my knowledge , he now confidently averrs , with the concurrence of the rest , that the aspect of all the starrs , and conjunction of the planetts much favour him the next two yeares ; nam medium coeli in genitura caroli secundi regis angliae juxta axiomata astrologiae genethliacae dirigitur ad radios sextiles lun●… anno domini 1660. & significat acc●…ssum ad dominum , for the medium coeli in the geniture of charles the second according to the axiomes of genethliacall astrology is directed to the sextile rayes of the moon , and signifies an accesse to dominion . adde hereunto that a most lucky conjunction followes the same year , in the very centre of the said kings horoscope betwixt iupiter and sol in the moneth of september . when i was employed by this state in paris not many years agoe , i had occasion to make my addresse to your young king , and when i observed his physiognomy , and the lineaments of his face , i seemed to discern in it something extraordinary above vulgar countenances , and that he carryed a majesty in his very looks , and noting besides the goodly procerity , and constitution of his body , he seemed to be cut out for a king. now , in point of extraction , and lineage , it cannot be denyed but he is one of the greatest born princes that ever was in the world ; for whereas his grand-father , and father were allyed onely if you regard forraigne consanguinity , to the house of denmark and the guyses , this king bears in his veines not onely that bloud , but also the blouds of all the great princes of christendom , being nearly linked to the house of bourbon and france , to the house of austria , and consequently to the emperour , and spaine , as also to the duke of savoy , and our grand-duke : moreover he is nearly allyed to all the greatest princes of germany , as the saxe , brandenburg , bavaria , the palsgrave , and to the duke of lorain who descends in the directest line from charlemain ; adde hereunto that the young prince of orenge is his nephew , and which is considerable he is a pure englishman born , whereas your two former kings were forreigners . the queen his mother is of as glorious an extraction , which makes me admire the frontlesse impudence of some of your poor pamphletors who call her ever and anon the little queen , notwithstanding that the world knowes her to be the daughter of henry the great , and queen of great britain , which title and character is indelible , and must die with her. hereunto may be adjoyn'd , that this young king is now mounted to the meridian of his age , and maturity of judgement to govern , and doubtlesse hee is like to make a rare governour , having this advantage of all other soverain princes in the world to have been bredd up in the schoole of affliction so long , to have travelled so many strange countreys and observed the humors of so many nations . but to come to the cardinall point of our communication , after divers debates , and alterations how england might be brought to a stable condition of tranquility and perfect peace , to her former lustre , and glory , the finall result of all , ended in this , that there was no other imaginable meanes to do it then for you to make a timely and fitting humble addresse unto your own king , and without question it is in his power to grant you such an absolute pardon , such an abolition of all things pass'd , such a gracious amnestia , such royall concessions that may extend to the security of every person for the future that was engaged in these your revolutions , both touching his life and fortunes ; unlesse their guilt of conscience be such that like cain or iudas they thinke their sinne is greater then can be forgiven them . now the mode of your application to him may avail much , for if you chopp logique with him too farr , and stand upon puntillios , and too rigid termes , if you shew your selfs full of feares , jealousies , and distrusts , it will intangle , and quite marr the businesse , for in a soveraign prince ther must be an implicit , unavoidable necessary trust repos'd by his peeple , which all the laws that mans brain can possibly invent cannot provide against ; therefore if you proceed in a frank , and confident tru english way you may work upon his affections more powerfully , and overcome him sooner so , then by any outward arms , this way will make such tender impressions , upon that he will grant more then you can possibly expect . some forein historians as the french comines and our guicciardin do cry up the english nation for using to love their king in a more intense degree then other peeple , and to regard his honour in a higher strain , to support which they have bin alwayes so ready , and cheerful both with their persons and purses ; there is now a fair opportunity offered to rake up the embers of these old affections , and to recover the reputation of tru englishmen ; there is no peeple but may sometimes stand in their own light , go astray , and err , for error was one of the first frailties that were entayled upon man ( and his posterity ) as soon as he was thrust out of paradis ; 't is a human thing to err , but to persevere in an error is diabolicall ; you shall do well and wisely to follow the example of the spanish mule , who out of a kind of wantonesse being gone out of the high beaten road into a by path , which led her to a dirty narrow lane full of pitts and holes , at last she came to the top of a huge hideous rock where she could go no farther , for before her ther was inevitable destruction , and the lane was so narrow that she could not turn her body back , therupon in this extremity she put one foot gently after an other , and crablike went backward untill she came again to the common road ; this must be your course , by a gentle retrogradation to come into the kings high road again , and ther is no question but he will meet you more than three parts of the way : if you do not , truly in our opinions you will precipitat your selfs down a rock of inevitable destruction ; for heaven and earth are conspir'd to restore him , and though all the spirits of the air shold joyn with you , you shall not be able to oppose it . i presume you are not ignorant how ●…he two great monarks of spain and france ( which may be said to be the main poles wheron europe doth move ) have comprehended him within the private capitulations of peace , the emperour hath promised to wed his quarrell , and there is no prince or state in christendom but would gladly reach a frendly hand to restore him , being depriv'd of his birth-right , and his royal indubitable inheritance ( as you your felfs confesse ) for observing the fifth commandement , for obeying his father and mother ; from which birth-right he may be said to have been thrust out when he was in the state of innocency , being but in a manner a child , and very young then . now touching your selfs i will not flatter you , but plainly tell you that you have not one friend any where beyond the seas , nay your great confederate the swed ( as i had good intelligence ) could upbraid one of your ambassadors that are now there , that he had not washed his hands clean since they had been embrued in his princes bloud . the time that i sojourned in england i was curious to read your annals , and to make some inspections into your laws , and method of government ; as also into the genius of the peeple , and i find there is no species of government that suits better with the nature of the inhabitants , the quality of the clime , and relates more directly to the civil constitutions , laws , and customs of the land then monarchal ; the i le of great britain hath been alwaies a royall island from her very creation , from her infancy , she may be said to have worn a crown in her cradle , and although she had four or five revolutions and changes of masters , yet she still continued royal , whereunto alludes a saying that i observed in your old records , britannia ab initio mundi semper fuit regia , & regimen illiu●… simile illi caelorum : great britain hath been from the beginning of the world royall , and her government like that of the heavens . therefore , all these premises being weighed in the balance of true judgement you shall do well , and wisely to recollect your selfs , and call in your hopefull young king , whose title your consciences do acknowledge to be unquestionable , otherwise it is not onely improbable but impossible for england to be her self again , and to be setled in any stable government which may reach to posterity ; you may wind up your wits as high as you can , you may consult with your first , second , and third thoughts , but will never be able to settle a fixed government , you will be still at a losse , your debates will be like a skeyn of ravell'd threed , you will be in a labyrinth of confusions , and the end of one , will be still the beginning of another . to conclude , the current and concurrent opinion of all ministers of state here both forren and florentine is , that if you do not make a timely application to your king , you will have all the princes of christendom about your ears , and what a sad calamitous country , what an aceldama will england be then ? therefore if there be a true patriot , and publick soul amongst you , if there be ever any drops of true english bloud running in your veins , or the least spark of nationall fire and affections glowing in your bosoms toward your own dear country , prevent these imminent dangers , and invite your king by discreet and moderate proposals ; the gallant samnit general could tell the romans who had over powred them , that if they gave them easie and gentle capitulations they would perform them , but if they would tye them to too high and strict terms , they would observe them no longer then they cold have opportunity to break them . touching the affairs of italy , we are like to have a general blessed peace this side the alpes , and lombardy who hath been so pittifully harass'd a long time , and hath had her face so often scratch'd , is in a fair way to recover her former beauty ; signor giovanni palavicino , and d. lorenzo minuccio convey their most affectionate respects unto you , and so doth your entire , and faithfull servant . florence this 12th . of march , 1659. ther are divers other large peeces tending to the same subject , which shall be published in the second tome . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a70276-e19310 finch , &c. mechanicks ▪ mariners . 〈◊〉 stra●… . bishops . sco●… . m. hert. e. south . e. westm. e. worce . e. dover . wales . digbies . e. pemb. e wa●…w . arondelle . her majesty . notes for div a70276-e20430 m. hamilt . scot. plut. notes for div a70276-e21690 the scot. the irish. england .