Humane nature, or, The fundamental elements of policy being a discovery of the faculties, acts, and passions of the soul of man from their original causes, according to such philosophical principles as are not commonly known or asserted / by Tho. Hobbs.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.
This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A43995 of text R27431 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing H2244). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread
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Humane nature, or, The fundamental elements of policy being a discovery of the faculties, acts, and passions of the soul of man from their original causes, according to such philosophical principles as are not commonly known or asserted / by Tho. Hobbs.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.
This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A43995 of text R27431 in the English Short Title Catalog (Wing H2244). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread
[9], 89, [1] p.
Printed for Matthew Gilliflower, Henry Rogers, and Tho. Fox,
London :
1684.
Reproduction of original in the Union Theological Seminary Library, New York.
eng
Soul.
Free will and determinism.
A43995 R27431 (Wing H2244). civilwar no De corpore politico. Or The elements of law, moral & politick. With discourses upon severall heads; as of the law of nature. Oathes and cove Hobbes, Thomas 1652 25984 6 25 0 0 0 0 12 C The rate of 12 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the C category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words.
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Humane
Nature
:
OR
The
Fundamental
Elements
OF
POLICY
.
BEING
A
Discovery
of
the
Faculties
Acts
and
Passions
of
the
SOUL
of
MAN
,
From
their
Original
causes
;
According
to
such
Philosophical
Principles
As
are
not
commonly
known
or
asserted
.
The
Third
Edition
,
Augmented
and
much
corrected
by
the
Authors
own
hand
.
By
Tho.
Hobbs
of
Malmsbury
.
LONDON
,
Printed
for
Matthew
Gilliflower
,
Henry
Rogers
,
and
Tho.
Fox
,
Booksellers
in
Westminster-Hall
.
MDCLXXXIV
.
To
the
Right
Honourable
,
WILLIAM
EARL
OF
NEW-CASTLE
,
Governour
to
the
Prince
his
Highness
,
One
of
His
Majesties
Most
Honourable
Privy
Council
.
My
most
Honoured
Lord
,
FRom
the
principal
parts
of
Nature
,
Reason
and
Passion
,
have
proceeded
two
kinds
of
Learning
,
Mathematical
and
Dogmatical
:
the
former
is
free
from
Controversie
and
Dispute
,
because
it
consisteth
in
comparing
Figure
and
Motion
only
;
in
which
things
,
Truth
,
and
the
Interest
of
Men
,
oppose
not
each
other
:
but
in
the
other
there
is
nothing
undisputable
,
because
it
compareth
Men
,
and
medleth
with
their
Right
and
Profit
;
in
which
,
as
oft
as
Reason
is
against
a
Man
,
so
oft
will
a
Man
be
against
Reason
.
And
from
hence
it
cometh
,
that
they
who
have
written
of
Justice
and
Policy
in
General
,
do
all
invade
each
other
and
themselves
with
Contradictions
.
To
reduce
this
Doctrine
to
the
Rules
and
Infallibility
of
Reason
,
there
is
no
way
but
,
first
,
put
such
Principles
down
for
a
Foundation
,
as
Passion
,
not
mistrusting
,
may
not
seek
to
displace
;
and
afterwards
to
build
thereon
the
Truth
of
Cases
in
the
Law
of
Nature
(
which
hitherto
have
been
built
in
the
Air
)
by
degrees
,
till
the
whole
have
been
inexpugnable
.
Now
,
my
Lord
,
the
Principles
fit
for
such
a
Foundation
,
are
those
which
heretofore
I
have
acquainted
your
Lordship
withal
in
private
Discourse
,
and
which
by
your
Command
I
have
here
put
into
a
Method
.
To
examine
Cases
thereby
between
Soveraign
and
Soveraign
,
or
between
Soveraign
and
Subject
,
I
leave
to
them
that
shall
find
Leasure
and
Encouragement
thereto
:
For
my
part
,
I
present
this
to
your
Lordship
for
the
true
and
only
Foundation
of
such
Science
.
For
the
Stile
,
it
is
therefore
the
worse
,
because
,
whilest
I
was
writing
,
I
consulted
more
with
Logick
than
with
Rhetorick
:
But
for
the
Doctrine
,
it
is
not
slightly
proved
;
and
the
Conclusions
thereof
of
such
Nature
,
as
,
for
want
of
them
.
Government
and
Peace
have
been
nothing
else
,
to
this
day
,
but
mutual
Fears
:
And
it
would
be
an
incomparable
benefit
to
Commonwealth
,
that
every
one
held
the
Opinion
concerning
Law
and
Policy
here
delivered
.
The
ambition
therefore
of
this
Book
,
in
seeking
by
your
Lordships
countenance
to
insinuate
it self
with
those
whom
the
matter
it
containeth
most
nearly
concerneth
,
is
to
be
excused
.
For
my self
,
I
desire
no
greater
honour
than
I
enjoy
already
in
your
Lordship's
favour
,
unless
it
be
that
you
would
be
pleased
,
in
Continuance
thereof
,
to
give
me
more
Exercise
in
your
commands
;
which
,
as
I
am
bound
by
your
many
great
Favours
,
I
shall
obey
,
being
,
My
most
honoured
Lord
,
Your
most
humble
,
and
most
obliged
Servant
,
THO.
HOBBS
.
May
9.
1640.
IN
Libellum
praestantissimi
THO.
HOBBII
Veri
verè
Philosophi
,
de
Naturâ
Hominis
.
QVae
magna
Coeli
moenia
,
&
tractae
Maris
,
Terraeque
fines
siquid
aut
ultra
est
,
capit
Mens
ipsa
,
tandem
capitur
:
Omnia
hactenus
Quae
nôsse
potuit
,
nota
jam
primùm
est
Sibi
.
Accede
,
Lector
,
disce
quis
demùm
sies
;
Tranquilinam
jecoris
agnoscas
tui
,
Quî
propiùs
haeret
nil
tibi
,
&
nil
tam
procul
.
Non
hic
Scholarum
frivola
,
aut
cassi
logâ
,
Quales
per
annos
fortè
plus
septem
legit
;
Ut
folle
pleno
prodeat
,
Rixae
Artifex
;
Vanasque
merces
futili
linguâ
crepet
:
Sed
sancta
Rerum
pondera
,
&
sensus
graves
Quales
parari
decuit
,
ipsa
cùm
fuit
Pingenda
Ratio
,
&
vindici
suo
adstitit
.
Panduntur
omnes
Machinae
gyri
tuae
,
Animaeque
Vectes
,
Trochleae
,
Cunei
,
Rotae
;
Quâ
concitetur
arte
,
quo
sufflamine
Sistatur
illa
rursus
,
&
constet
sibi
:
Nec
,
si
Fenestram
pectori
humano
suam
Aptâsset
ipse
Momus
,
inspiceret
magis
.
Hîc
cerno
levia
Affectuum
vestigia
,
Gracilesque
Sensûs
lineas
;
video
quibus
Vehantur
alis
blanduli
Cupidines
,
Quibusque
stimulis
urge●nt
Ir●
graves
.
Hîc
&
Dolores
,
&
Voluptates
suos
Produnt
recessus
;
ipse
nec
Timor
latet
.
Has
nôrit
artes
quisquis
in
foro
velit
Animorum
habenas
flectere
,
&
populos
cupit
Aptis
ligatos
nexibus
jungi
sibi
.
Hîc
Archimedes
publicus
figat
podem
,
Siquando
regna
machinis
politicis
Vrgere
satagit
,
&
feras
gentes
ciet
,
Imisque
motum
sedibus
mundum
quatit
:
Facile
domabit
cuncta
,
qui
Menti
imperat
.
Consultor
audax
,
&
Promethei
potens
Facinoris
Anime
!
quis
tibi
dedit
Deus
Haec
intueri
saeculis
longè
abdita
,
Oculosque
luce
tinxit
ambrosiâ
tuos
?
Tu
mentis
omnis
,
at
Tuae
nulla
est
capax
.
Hâc
laude
Solus
fruere
:
Divinum
est
opus
Animam
Creare
;
proximum
huic
,
Ostendere
.
RAD.
BATHURST
,
A.
M.
Col.
Trin.
Oxon.
Humane
Nature
:
OR
THE
Fundamental
Elements
OF
POLICY
.
THE
true
and
perspicuous
Explication
of
the
Elements
of
Laws
Natural
and
Politick
(
which
is
my
present
Scope
)
dependeth
upon
the
Knowledge
of
what
is
Humane
Nature
,
what
is
Body
Politick
,
and
what
it
is
we
call
a
Law
;
concerning
which
Points
,
as
the
Writings
of
Men
from
Antiquity
down
wards
have
still
increased
,
so
also
have
the
Doubts
and
Controversies
concerning
the
same
:
And
seeing
that
true
Knowledge
begetteth
not
Doubt
nor
Controversie
,
but
Knowledge
,
it
is
manifest
from
the
present
Controversies
,
That
they
which
have
heretofore
written
thereof
,
have
not
well
understood
their
own
Subject
.
2.
Harm
I
can
do
none
,
though
I
err
no
less
than
they
;
for
I
shall
leave
Men
but
as
they
are
,
in
Doubt
and
Dispute
:
but
,
intending
not
to
take
any
Principle
upon
Trust
,
but
only
to
put
Men
in
Mind
of
what
they
know
already
,
or
may
know
by
their
own
Experience
,
I
hope
to
erre
the
less
;
and
when
I
do
,
it
must
proceed
from
too
hasty
Concluding
,
which
I
will
endeavour
as
much
as
I
can
to
avoid
.
3.
On
the
other
side
,
if
Reasoning
aright
win
not
Consent
,
which
may
very
easily
happen
,
from
them
that
being
confident
of
their
own
Knowledg
weigh
not
what
is
said
,
the
Fault
is
not
mine
but
theirs
;
for
as
it
is
my
Part
to
shew
my
Reasons
,
so
it
is
theirs
to
bring
Attention
.
4.
Mans
Nature
is
the
Summ
of
his
natural
Faculties
and
Powers
,
as
the
Faculties
of
Nutrition
,
Motion
,
Generation
,
Sense
,
Reason
,
&c.
These
Powers
we
do
unanimously
call
Natural
,
and
are
contained
in
the
Definition
of
Man
,
under
these
words
,
Animal
and
Rational
.
5.
According
to
the
two
principal
Parts
of
Man
,
I
divide
his
Faculties
into
two
sorts
,
Faculties
of
the
Body
,
and
Faculties
of
the
Mind
.
6.
Since
the
minute
and
distinct
Anatomy
of
the
Powers
of
the
Body
is
nothing
necessary
to
the
present
Purpose
,
I
will
only
summ
them
up
in
these
Three
Heads
,
Power
Nutritive
,
Power
Motive
,
and
Power
Generative
.
7.
Of
the
Powers
of
the
Mind
there
be
two
Sorts
,
Cognitive
,
Imaginative
,
or
Conceptive
and
Motive
;
and
first
of
Cognitive
.
For
the
understanding
of
what
I
mean
by
the
Power
Cognitive
,
we
must
remember
and
acknowledge
that
there
be
in
our
Minds
continually
certain
Images
or
Conceptions
of
the
Things
without
us
,
insomuch
that
if
a
Man
could
be
alive
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
World
annihilated
,
he
should
nevertheless
retain
the
Image
thereof
;
and
all
those
Things
which
he
had
before
seen
or
perceived
in
it
;
every
one
by
his
own
Experience
knowing
,
that
the
Absence
or
Destruction
of
things
once
imagined
doth
not
cause
the
Absence
or
Destruction
of
the
Imagination
it self
;
This
Imagery
and
Representations
of
the
Qualities
of
the
Thing
without
,
is
that
we
call
our
Conception
,
Imagination
,
Ideas
,
Notice
or
Knowledg
of
them
;
and
the
Faculty
or
Power
by
which
we
are
capable
of
such
Knowledge
,
is
that
I
here
call
Cognitive
Power
,
or
Conceptive
,
the
Power
of
Knowing
or
Conceiving
.
CHAP.
II.
2.
Definition
of
Sense
.
4.
Four
Propositions
concerning
the
nature
of
Conceptions
.
5.
The
First
proved
.
6.
The
Second
proved
.
7
,
8.
The
Third
proved
.
9.
The
Fourth
proved
.
10
▪
The
main
Deception
of
Sense
.
1.
HAving
declared
what
I
mean
by
the
Word
Conception
,
and
other
Words
equivalent
thereunto
,
I
come
to
the
Conceptions
themselves
,
to
shew
their
Differences
,
their
Causes
,
and
the
Manner
of
the
Production
,
so
far
as
is
necessary
for
this
Place
.
2.
Originally
all
Conceptions
proceed
from
the
Action
of
the
thing
it self
,
whereof
it
is
the
Conception
:
Now
when
the
Action
is
present
,
the
Conception
it
produceth
is
also
called
Sense
;
and
the
Thing
by
whose
Action
the
same
is
produced
,
is
called
the
Object
of
the
Sense
.
3
By
our
several
Organs
we
have
several
Conceptions
of
several
Qualities
in
the
Objects
;
for
by
Sight
we
have
a
Conception
or
Image
composed
of
Colour
and
Figure
,
which
is
all
the
Notice
and
Knowledge
the
Object
imparteth
to
us
of
its
Nature
by
the
Eye
.
By
Hearing
we
have
a
Conception
called
Sound
,
which
is
all
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
the
Quality
of
the
Object
from
the
Ear
.
And
so
the
rest
of
the
Senses
are
also
Conceptions
of
several
Qualities
,
or
Natures
of
their
Objects
.
4.
Because
the
Image
in
Vision
consisting
of
Colour
and
Shape
is
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
the
Qualities
of
the
Object
of
that
Sense
;
it
is
no
hard
matter
for
a
Man
to
fall
into
this
Opinion
,
that
the
same
Colour
and
Shape
are
the
very
Qualities
themselves
;
And
for
the
same
cause
,
that
Sound
and
Noise
are
the
Qualities
of
the
Bell
,
or
of
the
Air
.
And
this
Opinion
hath
been
so
long
received
,
that
the
contrary
must
needs
appear
a
great
Paradox
;
and
yet
the
Introduction
of
Species
visible
and
intelligible
(
which
is
necessary
for
the
Maintenance
of
that
Opinion
)
passing
to
and
fro
from
the
Object
,
is
worse
than
any
Paradox
,
as
being
a
plain
Impossibility
.
I
shall
therefore
endeavour
to
make
plain
these
Points
:
That
the
Subject
wherein
Colour
and
Image
are
inherent
,
is
not
the
Object
or
thing
seen
.
That
there
is
nothing
without
us
(
really
)
which
we
call
an
Image
or
Colour
.
That
the
said
Image
or
Colour
is
but
an
apparition
unto
us
of
the
Motion
,
Agitation
,
or
Alteration
,
which
the
Object
worketh
in
the
Brain
,
or
Spirits
,
or
some
internal
Substance
of
the
Head
.
That
as
in
Vision
,
so
also
in
Conceptions
that
arise
from
the
other
Senses
,
the
Subject
of
their
inherence
is
not
the
Object
,
but
the
Sentient
.
5.
Every
Man
hath
so
much
Experience
as
to
have
seen
the
Sun
and
the
other
visible
Objects
by
Reflection
in
the
Water
and
Glasses
;
and
this
alone
is
sufficient
for
this
Conclusion
,
that
Colour
and
Image
may
be
there
where
the
Thing
seen
is
not
.
But
because
it
may
be
said
that
notwithstanding
the
Image
in
the
Water
be
not
in
the
Object
,
but
a
Thing
meerly
Phantastical
,
yet
there
may
be
Colour
really
in
the
Thing
it self
:
I
will
urge
further
this
Experience
,
that
divers
Times
Men
see
directly
the
same
Object
double
;
as
two
Candles
for
one
,
which
may
happen
from
Distemper
or
otherwise
without
Distemper
if
a
Man
will
,
the
Organs
being
either
in
their
right
Temper
,
or
equally
distempered
,
the
Colours
and
Figures
in
two
such
Images
of
the
same
Thing
cannot
be
inherent
therein
,
because
the
Thing
seen
cannot
be
in
two
Places
.
One
of
these
Images
therefore
is
not
inherent
in
the
Object
:
but
seeing
the
Organs
of
the
Sight
are
then
in
equal
Temper
or
Distemper
,
the
one
of
them
is
no
more
inherent
than
the
other
;
and
consequently
neither
of
them
both
are
in
the
Object
;
which
is
the
First
Proposition
,
mentioned
in
the
precedent
Number
.
6.
Secondly
,
that
the
Image
of
any
Thing
by
Reflection
in
a
Glass
or
Water
or
the
like
,
is
not
any
Thing
in
or
behind
the
Glass
,
or
in
or
under
the
Water
,
every
Man
may
grant
to
himself
;
which
is
the
Second
Proposition
.
7.
For
the
Third
,
we
are
to
consider
,
First
that
every
great
Agitation
or
Concussion
of
the
Brain
(
as
it
happeneth
from
a
Stroak
,
especially
if
the
Stroak
be
upon
the
Eye
)
whereby
the
Optick
Nerve
suffereth
any
great
Violence
,
there
appeareth
before
the
Eyes
a
certain
Light
,
which
Light
is
nothing
without
,
but
an
Apparition
only
,
all
that
is
real
being
the
Concussion
or
Motion
of
the
Parts
of
that
Nerve
;
from
which
Experience
we
may
conclude
,
That
Apparition
of
Light
is
really
nothing
but
Motion
within
.
If
therefore
from
lucid
Bodies
there
can
be
derived
Motion
,
so
as
to
affect
the
Optick
Nerve
in
such
manner
as
is
proper
thereunto
,
there
will
follow
an
Image
of
Light
somewhere
in
that
Line
by
which
the
Motion
was
last
derived
to
the
Eye
;
That
is
to
say
,
In
the
Object
,
if
we
look
directly
on
it
,
and
in
the
Glass
or
Water
,
when
we
look
upon
it
in
the
Line
of
Reflection
,
which
in
Effect
is
the
Third
Proposition
;
namely
,
That
Image
and
Colour
is
but
an
Apparition
to
us
of
that
Motion
,
Agitation
,
or
Alteration
which
the
Object
worketh
in
the
Brain
or
Spirits
,
or
some
internal
Substance
in
the
Head
.
8.
But
that
from
all
lucid
,
shining
and
illuminate
Bodies
,
there
is
a
Motion
produced
to
the
Eye
,
and
,
through
the
Eye
,
to
the
Optick
Nerve
,
and
so
into
the
Brain
,
by
which
that
Apparition
of
Light
or
Colour
is
affected
,
is
not
hard
to
prove
.
And
first
,
it
is
evident
that
the
Fire
,
the
only
lucid
Body
here
upon
Earth
,
worketh
by
Motion
equally
every
Way
;
insomuch
as
the
Motion
thereof
stopped
or
inclosed
,
it
is
presently
extinguished
,
and
no
more
Fire
.
And
further
,
that
that
Motion
whereby
the
Fire
worketh
,
is
Dilation
,
and
Contraction
of
it self
alternately
,
commonly
called
Scintillation
or
Glowing
,
is
manifest
also
by
Experience
.
From
such
Motion
in
the
Fire
must
needs
arise
a
Rejection
or
casting
from
it self
of
that
part
of
the
Medium
which
is
contiguous
to
it
,
whereby
that
part
also
rejecteth
the
next
,
and
so
successively
one
part
beateth
back
another
to
the
very
Eye
;
and
in
the
same
manner
the
exteriour
part
of
the
Eye
presseth
the
interiour
,
(
the
Laws
of
Refraction
still
observed
.
)
Now
the
interiour
coat
of
the
Eye
is
nothing
else
but
a
piece
of
the
Optick
Nerve
;
and
therefore
the
Motion
is
still
continued
thereby
into
the
Brain
,
and
by
Resistance
or
Re-action
of
the
Brain
,
is
also
a
Rebound
into
the
Optick
Nerve
again
;
which
we
not
conceiving
as
Motion
or
Rebound
from
within
,
do
think
it
is
without
,
and
call
it
Light
;
as
hath
been
already
shewed
by
the
Experience
of
a
Stroak
.
We
have
no
Reason
to
doubt
,
that
the
Fountain
of
Light
,
the
Sun
,
worketh
by
any
other
Ways
than
the
Fire
,
at
least
in
this
Matter
.
And
thus
all
Vision
hath
its
Original
from
such
Motion
as
is
here
described
:
for
where
there
is
no
Light
,
there
is
no
Sight
;
and
therefore
Colour
also
must
be
the
same
Thing
with
Light
,
as
being
the
Effect
of
the
lucid
Bodies
:
their
Difference
being
only
this
,
that
when
the
Light
cometh
directly
from
the
Fountain
to
the
Eye
,
or
indirectly
by
Reflection
from
clean
and
polite
Bodies
,
and
such
as
have
not
any
particular
Motion
internal
to
alter
it
,
we
call
it
Light
;
but
when
it
cometh
to
the
Eye
by
Reflection
from
une●en
,
rough
,
and
coarse
Bodies
,
(
or
such
as
are
affected
with
internal
Motion
of
their
own
that
may
alter
it
)
then
we
call
it
Colour
;
Colour
and
Light
differing
only
in
this
,
that
the
one
is
pure
,
and
the
other
perturbed
Light
.
By
that
which
hath
been
said
,
not
only
the
Truth
of
the
Third
Proposition
,
but
also
the
whole
Manner
of
producing
Light
and
Colour
,
is
apparent
.
9.
As
Colour
is
not
inherent
in
the
Object
,
but
an
Effect
thereof
upon
us
,
caused
by
such
Motion
in
the
Object
,
as
hath
been
described
:
so
neither
is
Sound
in
the
Thing
we
hear
,
but
in
our selves
.
One
manifest
Sign
thereof
,
is
,
that
as
a
Man
may
see
,
so
also
he
may
hear
double
or
treble
,
by
Multiplication
of
Echoes
,
which
Echoes
are
Sounds
as
well
as
the
Original
;
and
not
being
in
one
and
the
same
Place
,
cannot
be
inherent
in
the
Body
that
maketh
them
:
Nothing
can
make
any
Thing
which
is
not
in
it self
:
the
Clapper
hath
no
Sound
in
it
,
but
Motion
,
and
maketh
Motion
in
the
internal
Parts
of
the
Bell
;
so
the
Bell
hath
Motion
,
and
not
Sound
,
that
imparteth
Motion
to
the
Air
;
and
the
Air
hath
Motion
,
but
not
Sound
;
the
Air
imparteth
Motion
by
the
Ear
and
Nerve
unto
the
Brain
;
and
the
Brain
hath
Motion
,
but
not
Sound
:
from
the
Brain
,
it
reboundeth
back
into
the
Nerves
outward
,
and
thence
it
becometh
an
Apparition
without
,
which
we
call
Sound
.
And
to
proceed
to
the
rest
of
the
Senses
,
it
is
apparent
enough
,
that
the
Smell
and
Taste
of
the
same
Thing
,
are
not
the
same
to
every
Man
;
and
therefore
are
not
in
the
Thing
smelt
or
tasted
,
but
in
the
Men
.
So
likewise
the
Heat
we
feel
from
the
Fire
is
manifestly
in
us
,
and
is
quite
different
from
the
Heat
which
is
in
the
Fire
:
for
our
Heat
is
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
according
as
it
is
great
or
moderate
;
but
in
the
Coal
there
is
no
such
Thing
.
By
this
the
Fourth
and
last
Proposition
is
proved
,
viz.
That
as
in
Vision
,
so
also
in
Conceptions
that
arise
from
other
Senses
,
the
Subject
of
their
Inherence
is
not
in
the
Object
,
but
in
the
Sentient
.
10.
And
from
hence
also
it
followeth
,
that
whatsoever
Accidents
or
Qualities
our
Senses
make
us
think
there
be
in
the
World
,
they
be
not
there
,
but
are
Seeming
and
Apparitions
only
:
the
Things
that
really
are
in
the
World
without
us
,
are
those
Motions
by
which
these
Seemings
are
caused
.
And
this
is
the
great
Deception
of
Sense
,
which
also
is
to
be
by
Sense
corrected
:
for
as
Sense
telleth
me
,
when
I
see
directly
,
that
the
Colour
seemeth
to
be
in
the
Object
;
so
also
Sense
telleth
me
,
when
I
see
by
Reflection
,
that
Colour
is
in
the
Object
.
CHAP.
III.
1.
Imagination
defined
.
2.
Sleep
and
Dreams
defined
.
3.
Causes
of
Dreams
.
4.
Fiction
defined
.
5.
Phantasms
defined
.
6.
Remembrances
defined
.
7.
Wherein
Remembrance
consisteth
.
8.
Why
in
a
Dream
a
Man
never
thinks
he
dreams
.
9.
Why
few
Things
seem
strange
in
Dreams
.
10.
That
a
Dream
may
be
taken
for
Reality
and
Vision
.
1.
AS
standing
Water
put
into
Motion
by
the
Stroak
of
a
Stone
,
or
blast
of
Wind
,
doth
not
presently
give
over
moving
as
soon
as
the
Wind
ceaseth
,
or
the
Stone
setleth
:
so
neither
doth
the
Effect
cease
which
the
Object
hath
wrought
upon
the
Brain
,
so
soon
as
ever
,
by
turning
aside
of
the
Organs
the
Object
ceaseth
to
work
;
that
is
to
say
,
Though
the
Sense
be
past
,
the
Image
or
Conception
remaineth
;
but
more
obscure
while
we
are
awake
,
because
some
Object
or
other
continually
plieth
and
solliciteth
our
Eyes
,
and
Ears
,
keeping
the
Mind
in
a
stronger
Motion
,
whereby
the
weaker
doth
not
easily
appear
.
And
this
obscure
Conception
is
that
we
call
Phantasie
,
or
Imagination
:
Imagination
being
(
to
define
it
)
Conception
remaining
,
and
by
little
and
little
decaying
from
and
after
the
Act
of
Sense
.
2.
But
when
present
Sense
is
not
,
as
in
Sleep
,
there
the
Images
remaining
after
Sense
(
when
there
be
many
)
as
in
Dreams
,
are
not
obscure
,
but
strong
and
clear
,
as
in
Sense
it self
.
The
Reason
is
,
That
which
obscured
and
made
the
Conceptions
weak
,
namely
Sense
,
and
present
Operation
of
the
Object
,
is
removed
:
for
Sleep
is
the
Privation
of
the
Act
of
Sense
,
(
the
Power
remaining
)
and
Dreams
are
the
Imagination
of
them
that
sleep
.
3.
The
Causes
of
Dreams
(
if
they
be
natural
)
are
the
Actions
or
Violence
of
the
inward
Parts
of
a
man
upon
his
Brain
,
by
which
the
Passages
of
Sense
by
Sleep
benummed
,
are
restored
to
their
Motion
.
The
Signs
by
which
this
appeareth
to
be
so
,
are
the
Differences
of
Dreams
(
old
Men
commonly
dream
oftener
,
and
have
their
Dreams
more
painful
than
young
)
proceeding
from
the
different
Accidents
of
Mans
Body
;
as
Dreams
of
Lust
,
as
Dreams
of
Anger
,
according
as
the
Heart
,
or
other
Parts
within
,
work
more
or
less
upon
the
Brain
,
by
more
or
less
Heat
;
so
also
the
Descents
of
different
sorts
of
Flegm
maketh
us
a
Dream
of
different
Tastes
of
Meats
and
Drinks
;
and
I
believe
there
is
a
Reciprocation
of
Motion
from
the
Brain
to
the
Vital
Parts
,
and
back
from
the
Vital
Parts
to
the
Brain
;
whereby
not
only
Imagination
begetteth
Motion
in
those
Parts
;
but
also
Motion
in
those
Parts
begetteth
Imagination
like
to
that
by
which
it
was
begotten
.
If
this
be
true
,
and
that
sad
Imaginations
nourish
the
Spleen
,
then
we
see
also
a
Cause
,
why
a
strong
Spleen
reciprocally
causeth
fearful
Dreams
,
and
why
the
Effects
of
Lasciviousness
may
in
a
Dream
produce
the
Image
of
some
person
that
had
caused
them
.
Another
Sign
that
Dreams
are
caused
by
the
Action
of
the
inward
Parts
,
is
the
Disorder
and
casual
Consequence
of
one
Conception
or
Image
to
another
:
for
when
we
are
waking
,
the
Antecedent
thought
or
Conception
introduceth
,
and
is
cause
of
the
Consequent
,
(
as
the
Water
followeth
a
mans
Finger
upon
a
dry
and
level
Table
(
but
in
Dreams
there
is
commonly
no
Coherence
,
(
and
when
there
is
,
it
is
by
Chance
)
which
must
needs
proceed
from
this
,
That
the
Brain
in
Dreams
is
not
restored
to
its
Motion
in
every
Part
alike
;
whereby
it
cometh
to
pass
,
that
our
Thoughts
appear
like
the
Stars
between
the
flying
Clouds
,
not
in
the
Order
which
a
Man
would
chuse
to
observe
them
,
but
as
the
uncertain
Flight
of
broken
Clouds
permits
.
4.
As
when
the
Water
,
or
any
liquid
Thing
moved
at
once
by
divers
Movents
,
receiveth
one
Motion
compounded
of
them
all
;
so
also
the
Brain
or
Spirit
therein
,
having
been
stirred
by
divers
Objects
,
composeth
an
Imagination
of
divers
Conceptions
that
appeared
single
to
the
Sense
.
As
for
Example
,
the
Sense
sheweth
at
one
Time
the
Figure
of
a
Mountain
,
and
at
another
Time
the
Colour
of
Gold
;
but
the
Imagination
afterwards
hath
them
both
at
once
in
a
golden
Mountain
.
From
the
same
Cause
it
is
,
there
appear
unto
us
Castles
in
the
Air
,
Chimaera's
,
and
other
Monsters
which
are
not
in
Rerum
Natura
,
but
have
been
conceived
by
the
Sense
in
Pieces
at
several
Times
.
And
this
Composition
is
that
which
we
commonly
call
Fiction
of
the
Mind
.
5.
There
is
yet
another
Kind
of
Imagination
,
which
for
Clearness
contendeth
with
Sense
,
as
well
as
a
Dream
;
and
that
is
,
when
the
Action
of
Sense
hath
been
long
or
vehement
:
and
the
Experience
thereof
is
more
frequent
in
the
Sense
of
Seeing
,
than
the
rest
.
An
Example
whereof
is
,
the
Image
remaining
before
the
Eye
after
looking
upon
the
Sun
.
Also
,
those
little
Images
that
appear
before
the
Eyes
in
the
dark
;
whereof
I
think
every
Man
hath
Experience
,
(
but
they
most
of
all
,
who
are
timorous
or
superstitious
)
are
Examples
of
the
same
.
And
these
,
for
Distinction-sake
,
may
be
called
Phantasms
.
6.
By
the
Senses
,
which
are
numbred
according
to
the
Organs
to
be
five
,
we
take
Notice
(
as
hath
been
said
already
)
of
the
Objects
without
us
;
and
that
Notice
is
our
Conception
thereof
:
but
we
take
Notice
also
some
Way
or
other
of
our
Conceptions
:
for
when
the
Conception
of
the
same
Thing
cometh
again
,
we
take
Notice
that
is
again
;
that
is
to
say
,
that
we
have
had
the
same
Conception
before
;
which
is
as
much
as
to
imagine
a
Thing
past
;
which
is
impossible
to
the
Sense
,
which
is
only
of
Things
present
.
This
therefore
may
be
accounted
a
Sixth
Sense
,
but
internal
,
(
not
external
,
as
the
rest
)
and
is
commonly
called
Remembrance
.
7.
For
the
Manner
by
which
we
take
Notice
of
a
Conception
past
,
we
are
to
remember
,
that
in
the
Definition
of
Imagination
,
it
is
said
to
be
a
Conception
by
little
and
little
decaying
,
or
growing
more
obscure
.
An
obscure
Conception
is
that
which
representeth
the
whole
Object
together
,
but
none
of
the
smaller
Parts
by
themselves
;
and
as
more
or
fewer
Parts
be
represented
,
so
is
the
Conception
or
Representation
said
to
be
more
or
less
clear
.
Seeing
then
the
Conception
,
which
when
it
was
first
produced
by
Sense
,
was
clear
,
and
represented
the
Parts
of
the
0bject
distinctly
;
and
when
it
cometh
again
is
obscure
,
we
find
missing
somewhat
that
we
expected
;
by
which
we
judge
it
past
and
decayed
.
For
Example
,
a
Man
that
is
present
in
a
Foreign
City
,
seeth
not
only
whole
Streets
,
but
can
also
distinguish
particular
Houses
,
and
Parts
of
Houses
;
but
departed
thence
,
he
cannot
distinguish
them
so
particularly
in
his
Mind
as
he
did
,
some
House
or
Turning
escaping
him
:
yet
is
this
to
remember
;
when
afterwards
there
escape
him
more
Particulars
,
this
is
also
to
remember
,
but
not
so
well
.
In
Process
of
Time
,
the
Image
of
the
City
returneth
but
as
a
Mass
of
Building
only
,
which
is
almost
to
have
forgotten
it
.
Seeing
then
Remembrance
is
more
or
less
,
as
we
find
more
or
less
Obscurity
,
Why
may
not
we
well
think
Remembrance
to
be
nothing
else
but
the
missing
of
Parts
,
which
every
man
expecteth
should
succeed
after
they
have
a
Conception
of
the
Whole
?
To
see
at
a
great
Distance
of
Place
,
and
to
remember
at
great
Distance
of
Time
,
is
to
have
like
Conceptions
of
the
Thing
:
for
there
wanteth
Distinction
of
Parts
in
both
;
the
one
Conception
being
weak
by
Operation
at
Distance
,
the
other
by
Decay
.
8.
And
from
this
that
hath
been
said
,
there
followeth
,
That
a
Man
can
never
know
he
dreameth
;
he
may
dream
he
doubteth
,
whether
it
be
a
Dream
or
no
:
but
the
Clearness
of
the
Imagination
representeth
every
Thing
with
as
many
Parts
as
doth
Sense
it self
,
and
consequently
,
he
can
take
Notice
of
nothing
but
as
present
;
whereas
to
think
he
dreameth
,
is
to
think
those
his
Conceptions
,
that
is
to
say
,
obscurer
than
they
were
in
the
Sense
:
so
that
he
must
think
them
both
as
clear
,
and
not
as
clear
as
Sense
;
which
is
impossible
.
9.
From
the
same
Ground
it
proceedeth
,
that
Men
wonder
not
in
their
Dreams
at
Place
and
Persons
,
as
they
would
do
waking
:
for
waking
,
a
Man
would
think
it
strange
to
be
in
a
Place
where
he
never
was
before
,
and
remember
nothing
of
how
he
came
there
;
but
in
a
Dream
,
there
cometh
little
of
that
kind
into
Consideration
.
The
Clearness
of
Conception
in
a
Dream
,
taketh
away
Distrust
,
unless
the
Strangeness
be
excessive
,
as
to
think
himself
fallen
from
on
high
without
hurt
,
and
then
most
commonly
he
waketh
.
10.
Nor
is
it
possible
for
a
Man
to
be
so
far
deceived
,
as
when
his
Dream
is
past
,
to
think
it
real
:
for
if
he
dream
of
such
Things
as
are
ordinarily
in
his
Mind
,
and
in
such
Order
as
he
useth
to
do
waking
,
and
withal
that
he
laid
him
down
to
sleep
in
the
Place
were
he
findeth
himself
when
he
awaketh
;
all
which
may
happen
:
I
know
no
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
or
Mark
by
which
he
can
discern
whether
it
were
a
Dream
or
not
,
and
therefore
do
the
less
wonder
to
hear
a
Man
sometimes
to
tell
his
Dream
for
a
Truth
,
or
to
take
it
for
a
Vision
.
CHAP.
IV.
1.
Discourse
.
2.
The
Cause
of
Coherence
of
Thoughts
.
3.
Ranging
.
4.
Sagacity
.
5.
Reminiscence
.
6.
Experience
.
7.
Expectation
.
8.
Conjecture
.
9.
Signs
.
10.
Prudence
.
11.
Caveats
of
concluding
from
Experience
.
1.
THe
Succession
of
Conceptions
in
the
Mind
,
Series
or
Consequence
of
one
after
another
,
may
be
casual
and
incoherent
,
as
in
Dreams
for
the
most
part
;
and
it
may
be
orderly
,
as
when
the
former
Thought
introduceth
the
latter
;
and
this
is
Discourse
of
the
Mind
.
But
because
the
Word
Discourse
is
commonly
taken
for
the
Coherence
and
Consequence
of
Words
,
I
will
,
to
avoid
Aequivocation
,
call
it
Discursion
.
2.
The
Cause
of
the
Coherence
or
Consequence
of
one
Conception
to
another
,
is
their
first
Coherence
or
Consequence
at
that
Time
when
they
are
produced
by
Sense
:
As
for
Example
,
from
St.
Andrew
the
Mind
runneth
to
St.
Peter
,
because
their
Names
are
read
together
;
from
S.
Peter
to
a
Stone
,
for
the
same
Cause
;
from
Stone
to
Foundation
,
because
we
see
them
together
;
and
for
the
same
Cause
,
from
Foundation
to
Church
,
and
from
Church
to
People
,
and
from
People
to
Tumult
:
and
according
to
this
Example
,
the
Mind
may
run
almost
from
any
Thing
to
any
Thing
.
But
as
in
the
Sense
the
Conception
of
Cause
and
Effect
may
succeed
one
another
;
so
may
they
after
Sense
in
the
Imagination
:
And
for
the
most
part
they
do
so
;
the
Cause
whereof
is
the
Appetite
of
them
,
who
,
having
a
Conception
of
the
End
,
have
next
unto
it
a
Conception
of
the
next
Means
to
that
End
;
As
,
when
a
Man
,
from
a
Thought
of
Honour
to
which
he
hath
an
Appetite
,
cometh
to
the
Thought
of
Wisdom
,
which
is
the
next
Means
thereunto
;
and
from
thence
to
the
Thought
of
Study
,
which
is
the
next
Means
to
Wisdom
.
3.
To
omit
that
kind
of
Discursion
by
which
we
proceed
from
any
Thing
to
any
Thing
,
there
are
of
the
other
Kind
divers
Sorts
:
As
first
,
in
the
Senses
there
are
certain
Coherences
of
Conceptions
,
which
we
may
call
ranging
:
Examples
whereof
are
;
A
Man
casteth
his
Eye
upon
the
Ground
,
to
look
about
for
some
small
Thing
lost
;
the
Hounds
casting
about
at
a
Fault
in
hunting
;
and
the
Ranging
of
Spaniels
:
and
herein
we
take
a
Beginning
arbitrary
.
4.
Another
sort
of
Discursion
is
,
when
the
Appetite
giveth
a
Man
his
Beginning
,
as
in
the
Example
before
,
where
Honour
to
which
a
Man
hath
Appetite
,
maketh
him
think
upon
the
next
Means
of
attaining
it
,
and
that
again
of
the
next
,
&c.
And
this
the
Latines
call
Sagacitas
▪
and
We
may
call
Hunting
or
Tracing
,
as
Dogs
trace
Beasts
by
the
Smell
,
and
Men
hunt
them
by
their
Footsteps
;
or
as
Men
hunt
after
Riches
,
Place
,
or
Knowledge
.
5.
There
is
yet
another
Kind
of
Discursion
beginning
with
the
Appetite
to
recover
something
lost
,
proceeding
from
the
present
backward
,
from
Thought
of
the
Place
where
we
miss
at
,
to
the
Thought
of
the
Place
from
whence
we
came
last
;
and
from
the
Thought
of
that
,
to
the
Thought
of
a
Place
before
,
till
we
have
in
our
Mind
some
Place
,
wherein
we
had
the
Thing
we
miss
:
and
this
is
called
Reminiscence
.
6.
The
Remembrance
of
Succession
of
one
Thing
to
another
,
that
is
,
of
what
was
antecedent
,
and
what
consequent
,
and
what
concomitant
,
is
called
an
Experiment
;
whether
the
same
be
made
by
us
voluntarily
,
as
when
a
Man
putteth
any
Thing
into
the
Fire
,
to
see
what
Effect
the
Fire
will
produce
upon
it
:
or
not
made
by
us
,
as
when
we
remember
a
fair
Morning
after
a
red
Evening
.
To
have
had
many
Experiments
,
is
that
we
call
Experience
,
which
is
nothing
else
but
Remembrance
of
what
Antecedents
have
been
followed
by
what
Consequents
.
7.
No
man
can
have
in
his
Mind
a
Conception
of
the
future
;
for
the
future
is
not
yet
:
but
of
our
Conceptions
of
the
past
,
we
make
a
future
;
or
rather
,
call
past
,
future
relatively
.
Thus
after
a
Man
hath
been
accustomed
to
see
like
Antecedents
follow
by
like
Consequents
,
whensoever
he
seeth
the
like
come
to
pass
to
any
Thing
he
had
seen
before
,
he
looks
there
should
follow
it
the
same
that
followed
then
:
As
for
Example
,
because
a
Man
hath
often
seen
Offences
followed
by
Punishment
,
when
he
seeth
an
Offence
in
present
,
he
thinketh
Punishment
to
be
consequent
thereto
;
but
consequent
unto
that
which
is
present
,
Men
call
future
:
And
thus
we
make
Remembrance
to
be
the
Prevision
of
Things
to
come
,
or
Expectation
or
Presumption
of
the
future
.
8.
In
the
same
Manner
,
if
a
Man
seeth
in
present
that
which
he
hath
seen
before
,
he
thinks
that
that
which
was
antecedent
to
that
which
he
saw
before
,
is
also
antecedent
to
that
he
presently
seeth
:
As
for
Example
,
He
that
hath
seen
the
Ashes
remain
after
the
Fire
,
and
now
again
seeth
ashes
,
concludeth
again
there
hath
been
Fire
:
And
this
is
called
again
Conjecture
of
the
past
,
or
Presumption
of
the
Fact
.
9.
When
a
Man
hath
so
often
observed
like
Antecedents
to
be
followed
by
like
Consequents
,
that
whensoever
he
seeth
the
Antecedent
,
he
looketh
again
for
the
Consequent
;
or
when
he
seeth
the
Consequent
,
maketh
account
there
hath
been
the
like
Antecedent
;
then
he
calleth
both
the
Antecedent
and
the
Consequent
,
Signs
one
of
another
,
as
Clouds
are
Signs
of
Rain
to
come
,
and
Rain
of
Clouds
past
.
10.
This
taking
of
Signs
by
Experience
,
is
that
wherein
Men
do
ordinarily
think
,
the
Difference
stands
between
Man
and
Man
in
Wisdom
,
by
which
they
commonly
understand
a
Mans
whole
Ability
or
Power
cognitive
;
but
this
is
an
Errour
:
for
the
Signs
are
but
conjectural
;
and
according
as
they
have
often
or
seldom
failed
,
so
their
Assurance
is
more
or
less
;
but
never
full
and
evident
:
for
though
a
Man
have
always
seen
the
Day
and
Night
to
follow
one
another
hitherto
;
yet
can
he
not
thence
conclude
they
shall
do
so
,
or
that
they
have
done
so
eternally
:
Experience
concludeth
nothing
universally
.
If
the
Signs
hit
twenty
times
for
one
missing
,
a
Man
may
lay
a
Wager
of
Twenty
to
One
of
the
Event
;
but
may
not
conclude
it
for
a
Truth
.
But
by
this
it
is
plain
,
that
they
shall
conjecture
best
,
that
have
most
Experience
,
because
they
have
most
Signs
to
conjecture
by
;
which
is
the
Reason
old
Men
are
more
prudent
,
that
is
,
conjecture
better
,
caeteris
paribus
,
than
young
:
for
,
being
old
,
they
remember
more
;
and
Experience
is
but
remembrance
.
And
men
of
quick
imagination
,
caeteris
paribus
,
are
more
prudent
than
those
whose
Imaginations
are
slow
:
for
they
observe
more
in
less
Time
.
Prudence
is
nothing
but
Conjecture
from
Experience
,
or
taking
of
Signs
from
Experience
warily
,
that
is
,
that
the
Experiments
from
which
he
taketh
such
Signs
be
all
remembred
;
for
else
the
Cases
are
not
alike
that
seem
so
.
11.
As
in
Conjecture
concerning
things
past
and
future
,
it
is
Prudence
to
conclude
from
Experience
,
what
is
like
to
come
to
pass
,
or
to
have
passed
already
;
so
it
is
an
errour
to
conclude
from
it
,
that
it
is
so
or
so
called
;
that
is
to
say
,
We
cannot
from
Experience
conclude
,
that
any
Thing
is
to
be
called
just
or
unjust
,
true
or
false
,
or
any
Proposition
universal
whatsoever
,
except
it
be
from
Remembrance
of
the
Use
of
Names
imposed
arbitrarily
by
Men
:
For
Example
,
to
have
heard
a
Sentence
given
in
the
like
Case
,
the
like
Sentence
a
thousand
times
is
not
enough
to
conclude
that
the
Sentence
is
just
;
though
most
Men
have
no
other
Means
to
conclude
by
:
But
it
is
necessary
,
for
the
drawing
of
such
Conclusion
,
to
trace
and
find
out
,
by
many
Experiences
,
what
Men
do
mean
by
calling
Things
just
and
unjust
.
Further
,
there
is
another
Caveat
to
be
taken
in
concluding
by
Experience
,
from
the
tenth
Section
of
the
second
Chapter
;
that
is
,
That
we
conclude
such
Things
to
be
without
,
that
are
within
us
.
CHAP.
V.
1.
Of
Marks
.
2.
Names
or
Appellations
.
3.
Names
positive
and
privative
.
4.
Advantage
of
Names
maketh
us
capable
of
Science
.
5.
Names
universal
and
singular
.
6.
Vniversals
not
in
Rerum
Natura
.
7.
Aequivocal
Names
.
8.
Vnderstanding
.
9.
Affirmation
,
Negation
,
Proposition
.
10.
Truth
,
Falsity
.
11.
Ratiocination
.
12.
According
to
Reason
,
against
Reason
.
13.
Names
Causes
of
Knowledge
,
so
of
Errour
.
14.
Translation
of
the
Discourse
of
the
Mind
into
the
Discourse
of
the
Tongue
,
and
of
the
Errours
thence
proceeding
.
1.
SEeing
the
Succession
of
Conceptions
in
the
Mind
are
caused
,
as
hath
been
said
before
,
by
the
Succession
they
had
one
to
another
when
they
were
produced
by
the
Senses
,
and
that
there
is
no
Conception
that
hath
not
bin
produced
immediately
before
or
after
innumerable
others
,
by
the
innumerable
Acts
of
Sense
;
it
must
needs
follow
,
that
one
Conception
followeth
not
another
,
according
to
our
Election
,
and
the
need
we
have
of
them
,
but
as
it
chanceth
us
to
hear
or
see
such
Things
as
shall
bring
them
to
our
Mind
.
The
Experience
we
have
hereof
,
is
in
such
Brute
Beasts
,
which
,
having
the
providence
to
hide
the
Remains
and
Superfluity
of
their
Meat
,
do
nevertheless
want
the
Remembrance
of
the
Place
where
they
hide
it
,
and
thereby
make
no
Benefit
thereof
in
their
Hunger
:
but
Man
,
who
in
this
Point
beginneth
to
rank
himself
somewhat
above
the
Nature
of
Beasts
,
hath
observed
and
remembred
the
Cause
of
this
Defect
,
and
to
amend
the
same
,
hath
imagined
or
devised
to
set
up
a
visible
or
other
sensible
Mark
,
the
which
,
when
he
seeth
it
again
,
may
bring
to
his
Mind
the
Thought
he
had
when
he
set
it
up
.
A
Mark
therefore
is
a
sensible
Object
which
a
Man
erecteth
voluntarily
to
himself
,
to
the
End
to
remember
thereby
somewhat
past
,
when
the
same
is
objected
to
his
Sense
again
:
As
men
that
have
past
by
a
Rock
at
Sea
,
set
up
some
Mark
,
thereby
to
remember
their
former
Danger
,
and
avoid
it
.
2.
In
the
Number
of
these
Marks
,
are
those
Humane
Voices
,
which
we
call
the
Names
or
Appellations
of
Things
sensible
by
the
Ear
,
by
which
we
recall
into
our
Mind
some
Conceptions
of
the
Things
to
which
we
gave
those
Names
or
Appellations
;
as
the
Appellation
White
bringeth
to
remembrance
the
Quality
of
such
Objects
as
produce
that
Colour
or
Conception
in
us
.
A
Name
or
Appellation
therefore
is
the
Voice
of
a
Man
arbitrary
,
imposed
for
a
Mark
to
bring
into
his
Mind
some
Conception
concerning
the
thing
on
which
it
is
imposed
.
3.
Things
named
,
are
either
the
Objects
themselves
,
as
a
Man
;
or
the
Conception
it self
that
we
have
of
Man
,
as
Shape
and
Motion
:
or
some
Privation
,
which
is
when
we
conceive
that
there
is
something
which
we
conceive
not
,
in
him
;
as
when
we
conceive
he
is
not
just
,
not
finite
,
we
give
him
the
Name
of
unjust
,
of
infinite
,
which
signifie
Privation
or
Defect
;
and
to
the
Privations
themselves
we
give
the
Names
of
Injustice
and
Infiniteness
:
so
that
here
be
Two
Sorts
of
Names
;
One
of
Things
,
in
which
we
conceive
something
;
or
of
the
Conceptions
themselves
,
which
are
called
positive
:
the
other
of
Things
wherein
we
conceive
Privation
or
Defect
,
and
those
Names
are
called
Privative
.
4.
By
the
Advantage
of
Names
it
is
that
we
are
capable
of
Science
,
which
Beasts
,
for
want
of
them
are
not
;
nor
Man
,
without
the
Use
of
them
:
for
as
a
Beast
misseth
not
one
or
two
out
of
many
her
young
Ones
,
for
want
of
those
Names
of
order
,
One
,
Two
,
and
Three
,
and
which
we
call
Number
;
so
neither
would
a
Man
,
without
repeating
orally
or
mentally
the
Words
of
Number
,
know
how
many
Pieces
of
Money
or
other
Things
lie
before
him
.
5.
Seeing
there
be
many
Conceptions
of
one
and
the
same
Thing
,
and
for
every
Conception
we
give
it
a
several
Name
;
it
followeth
that
for
one
and
the
same
Thing
,
we
have
many
Names
or
Attributes
;
as
to
the
same
Man
we
give
the
Appellations
of
Just
,
Valiant
,
&c.
for
divers
Vertues
;
of
Strong
,
Comely
,
&c.
for
divers
Qualities
of
the
Body
.
And
again
,
because
from
divers
Things
we
receive
like
Conceptions
,
many
Things
must
needs
have
the
same
Appellation
:
as
to
all
Things
we
see
,
we
give
the
same
Name
of
Visible
;
and
to
all
Things
we
see
moveable
,
we
give
the
Appellation
of
Moveable
:
and
those
Names
we
give
to
many
,
are
called
universal
to
them
all
;
as
the
Name
of
Man
to
every
particular
of
Mankind
:
such
Appellation
as
we
give
to
one
only
Thing
,
we
call
individual
,
or
singular
;
as
Socrates
,
and
other
proper
Names
:
or
,
by
Circumlocution
,
he
that
writ
the
Iliads
,
for
Homer
.
6.
The
Universality
of
one
Name
to
many
Things
,
hath
been
the
Cause
that
Men
think
the
Things
are
themselves
universal
;
and
so
seriously
contend
,
that
besides
Peter
and
John
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
Men
that
are
,
have
been
,
or
shall
be
in
the
World
,
there
is
yet
something
else
that
we
call
Man
,
viz.
Man
in
general
,
deceiving
themselves
,
by
taking
the
universal
,
or
general
Appellation
,
for
the
thing
it
signifieth
:
For
if
one
should
desire
the
Painter
to
make
him
the
Picture
of
a
Man
,
which
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
of
a
Man
in
general
;
he
meaneth
no
more
,
but
that
the
Painter
should
chuse
what
Man
he
pleaseth
to
draw
,
which
must
needs
be
some
of
them
that
are
,
or
have
been
,
or
may
be
,
none
of
which
are
universal
.
But
when
he
would
have
him
to
draw
the
Picture
of
the
King
,
or
any
particular
Person
,
he
limiteth
the
Painter
to
that
one
Person
he
chuseth
.
It
is
plain
therefore
,
that
there
is
nothing
universal
but
Names
;
which
are
therefore
called
indefinite
;
because
we
limit
them
not
our selves
,
but
leave
them
to
be
applied
by
the
Hearer
:
whereas
a
singular
Name
is
limited
and
restrained
to
one
of
the
many
Things
it
signifieth
;
as
when
we
say
,
This
Man
,
pointing
to
him
,
or
giving
him
his
proper
Name
,
or
by
some
such
other
Way
.
7.
The
Appellations
that
be
universal
,
and
common
to
many
Things
,
are
not
always
given
to
all
the
particulars
,
(
as
they
ought
to
be
)
for
like
Conceptions
,
and
like
Considerations
in
them
all
;
which
is
the
Cause
that
many
of
them
are
not
of
constant
Signification
,
but
bring
into
our
Mind
other
Thoughts
than
these
for
which
they
were
ordained
,
and
those
are
called
aequivocal
.
As
for
Example
,
the
Word
Faith
signifieth
the
same
with
Belief
;
sometimes
it
signifieth
particularly
that
Belief
which
maketh
a
Christian
;
and
sometime
it
signifieth
the
keeping
of
a
Promise
.
Also
all
Metaphors
are
by
Profession
aequivocal
:
and
there
is
scarce
any
Word
that
is
not
made
aequivocal
by
divers
Contextures
of
Speech
,
or
by
Diversity
of
Pronunciation
and
Gesture
.
8.
This
Aequivocation
of
Names
maketh
it
difficult
to
recover
those
Conceptions
for
which
the
Name
was
ordained
;
and
that
not
only
in
the
Language
of
other
Men
,
wherein
we
are
to
consider
the
Drift
and
Occasion
,
and
Contexture
of
the
Speech
,
as
well
as
the
Words
themselves
;
but
also
in
our
Discourse
,
which
being
derived
from
the
Custom
and
common
Use
of
Speech
,
representeth
unto
us
not
our
own
Conceptions
.
It
is
therefore
a
great
Ability
in
a
Man
,
out
of
the
Words
,
Contexture
,
and
other
Circumstances
of
Language
,
to
deliver
himself
from
Aequivocation
,
and
to
find
out
the
true
Meaning
of
what
it
said
:
And
this
is
it
we
call
Vnderstanding
.
9.
Of
two
Appellations
,
by
the
Help
of
this
little
Verb
is
,
or
something
equivalent
,
we
make
an
Affirmation
or
Negation
,
either
of
which
in
the
Schools
we
call
also
a
Proposition
,
and
consisteth
of
two
Appellations
joyned
together
by
the
said
Verb
is
:
As
for
Example
,
Man
is
a
living
creature
;
or
thus
,
Man
is
not
righteous
:
whereof
the
former
is
called
an
Affirmation
,
because
the
Appellation
,
Living
Creature
is
Positive
;
the
latter
a
Negative
,
because
not
righteous
is
Privative
.
10.
In
every
Proposition
,
be
it
Affirmative
or
Negative
,
the
latter
Appellation
either
comprehendeth
the
former
,
as
in
this
Proposition
,
Charity
is
a
Vertue
,
the
Name
of
Vertue
comprehendeth
the
Name
of
Charity
,
and
many
other
Vertues
beside
;
and
then
is
the
Proposition
said
to
be
true
,
or
Truth
:
For
,
Truth
,
and
a
true
Proposition
,
is
all
one
.
Or
else
the
latter
Appellation
comprehendeth
not
the
former
:
as
in
this
Proposition
,
Every
Man
is
just
;
the
name
of
Just
comprehendeth
not
Every
Man
;
for
Unjust
is
the
Name
of
the
far
greater
Part
of
Men
:
And
the
Proposition
is
said
to
be
false
,
or
Falsity
:
Falsity
and
a
false
Proposition
being
also
the
same
Thing
.
11.
In
what
manner
of
two
Propositions
,
whether
both
Affirmative
,
or
one
Affirmative
,
the
other
Negative
,
is
made
a
Syllogism
,
I
forbear
to
write
.
All
this
that
hath
been
said
of
Names
or
Propositions
,
though
necessary
,
is
but
dry
Discourse
:
and
this
Place
is
not
for
the
whole
Art
of
Logick
,
which
if
I
enter
further
into
,
I
ought
to
pursue
:
Besides
,
it
is
not
needfull
;
for
there
be
few
Men
which
have
not
so
much
natural
Logick
,
as
thereby
to
discern
well
enough
,
whether
any
Conclusion
I
shall
make
in
this
Discourse
hereafter
,
be
well
or
ill
collected
:
Only
thus
much
I
say
in
this
Place
,
that
Making
of
Syllogisms
is
that
we
call
Ratiocination
or
Reasoning
.
12.
Now
when
a
man
reasoneth
from
Principles
that
are
found
indubitable
by
Experience
,
all
Deceptions
of
Sense
and
Aequivocation
of
Words
avoided
,
the
Conclusion
he
maketh
is
said
to
be
according
to
right
Reason
:
But
when
from
his
Conclusion
a
Man
may
,
by
good
Ratiocination
,
derive
that
which
is
contradictory
to
any
evident
Truth
whatsoever
,
then
he
is
said
to
have
concluded
against
Reason
:
And
such
a
Conclusion
is
called
Absurdity
.
13.
As
the
Invention
of
Names
hath
been
necessary
for
the
drawing
Men
out
of
Ignorance
,
by
calling
to
their
Remembrance
the
necessary
Coherence
of
one
Conception
to
another
;
so
also
hath
it
on
the
other
side
precipitated
Men
into
Errour
:
Insomuch
,
that
whereas
by
the
Benefit
of
Words
and
Ratiocination
they
exceed
brute
Beasts
in
Knowledge
,
and
the
Commodities
that
accompany
the
same
;
so
they
exceed
them
also
in
Errour
:
For
,
true
and
false
are
Things
not
incident
to
Beasts
,
because
they
adhere
not
to
Propositions
and
Language
;
nor
have
they
Ratiocination
,
whereby
to
multiply
one
Untruth
by
another
,
as
Men
have
.
14.
It
is
the
Nature
almost
of
every
Corporal
Thing
,
being
often
moved
in
one
and
the
same
Manner
,
to
receive
continually
a
greater
and
greater
Easiness
and
Aptitude
to
the
same
Motion
,
insomuch
as
in
Time
the
same
becometh
so
habitual
,
that
,
to
beget
it
,
there
needs
no
more
than
to
begin
it
.
The
Passions
of
Man
,
as
they
are
the
Beginning
of
voluntary
Motions
;
so
are
they
the
Beginning
of
Speech
,
which
is
the
Motion
of
the
Tongue
.
And
Men
desiring
to
shew
others
the
Knowledge
,
Opinions
,
Conceptions
and
Passions
which
are
in
themselves
,
and
to
that
End
having
invented
Language
,
have
by
that
Means
transferred
all
that
Discursion
of
their
Mind
mentioned
in
the
former
Chapter
,
by
the
Motion
of
their
Tongues
,
into
Discourse
of
Words
:
And
Ratio
now
is
but
Oratio
,
for
the
most
part
,
wherein
Custom
hath
so
great
a
Power
,
that
the
Mind
suggesteth
only
the
first
Word
;
the
rest
follow
habitually
,
and
are
not
followed
by
the
Mind
;
as
it
is
with
Beggars
,
when
they
saw
their
Pater
noster
,
putting
together
such
Words
,
and
in
such
manner
,
as
in
their
Education
they
have
learned
from
their
Nurses
,
from
their
Companies
,
or
from
their
Teachers
,
having
no
Images
or
Conceptions
in
their
Mind
,
answering
to
the
Words
they
speak
:
and
as
they
have
learned
themselves
,
so
they
teach
Posterity
.
Now
if
we
consider
the
Power
of
those
Deceptions
of
the
Sense
,
mentioned
Chap
2.
Sect.
10
and
also
how
unconstantly
Names
have
been
setled
,
and
how
subject
they
are
to
Aequivocation
,
and
how
diversified
by
Passion
,
(
scarce
two
Men
agreeing
what
is
to
be
called
Good
,
and
what
Evil
;
what
Liberality
,
what
Prodigality
;
what
Valour
,
what
Temerity
)
and
how
subject
Men
are
to
Paralogism
or
Fallacy
in
Reasoning
,
I
may
in
a
Manner
conclude
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
rectifie
so
many
Errours
of
any
one
Man
,
as
must
needs
proceed
from
those
Causes
,
without
beginning
a-new
from
the
very
first
Grounds
of
all
our
Knowledge
and
Sense
;
and
instead
of
Books
,
reading
over
orderly
ones
own
Conceptions
:
In
which
Meaning
,
I
take
Noste
teipsum
for
a
Precept
worthy
the
Reputation
it
hath
gotten
.
CHAP.
VI
1.
Of
the
two
Kinds
of
Knowledge
2.
Truth
and
Evidence
necessary
to
Knowledge
.
3.
Evidence
defined
.
4.
Science
defined
.
5.
Supposition
defined
.
6.
Opinion
defined
.
7.
Belief
defined
.
8.
Conscience
defined
.
9.
Belief
,
in
some
Cases
,
no
less
from
Doubt
than
Knowledge
.
1.
THere
is
a
Story
somewhere
,
of
one
that
pretends
to
have
been
miraculously
cured
of
Blindness
(
wherewith
he
was
born
)
by
St.
Albane
or
other
Saints
,
at
the
Town
of
St.
Albans
;
and
that
the
Duke
of
Glocester
being
there
,
to
be
satisfied
of
the
Truth
of
the
Miracle
,
asked
the
Man
,
What
Colour
is
this
?
Who
,
by
answering
,
It
was
Green
,
discovered
himself
,
and
was
punished
for
a
Counterfeit
:
for
though
by
his
Sight
newly
received
he
might
distinguish
between
Green
,
and
Red
,
and
all
other
Colours
,
as
well
as
any
that
should
interrogate
him
,
yet
he
could
not
possibly
know
at
first
Sight
which
of
them
was
called
Green
,
or
Red
,
or
by
any
other
Name
.
By
this
we
may
understand
,
there
be
two
Kinds
of
Knowledge
,
whereof
the
one
is
nothing
else
but
Sense
,
or
Knowledge
original
,
as
I
have
said
in
the
Beginning
of
the
second
Chapter
,
and
Remembrance
of
the
same
;
the
other
is
called
Science
or
Knowledge
of
the
Truth
of
Propositions
,
and
how
Things
are
called
;
and
is
derived
from
Vnderstanding
.
Both
of
these
Sorts
are
but
Experience
;
The
former
being
the
Experience
of
the
Effects
of
Things
that
work
upon
us
from
without
;
and
the
latter
Experience
Men
have
from
the
proper
Use
of
Names
in
Language
:
and
all
Experience
being
,
as
I
have
said
,
but
Remembrance
,
all
Knowledge
is
Remembrance
:
and
of
the
former
,
the
Register
we
keep
in
Books
,
is
called
History
;
But
the
Registers
of
the
latter
are
called
the
Sciences
.
2.
There
are
two
Things
necessarily
implied
in
this
Word
Knowledge
;
the
one
is
Truth
,
the
other
Evidence
:
for
what
is
not
Truth
,
can
never
be
known
.
For
,
let
a
Man
say
he
knoweth
a
Thing
never
so
well
,
if
the
same
shall
afterwards
appear
false
,
he
is
driven
to
Confession
,
that
it
was
not
Knowledge
,
but
Opinion
.
Likewise
,
if
the
Truth
be
not
evident
,
though
a
Man
holdeth
it
,
yet
is
his
Knowledge
thereof
no
more
than
theirs
who
hold
the
contrary
:
for
if
Truth
were
enough
to
make
it
Knowledge
,
all
Truth
were
known
;
which
is
not
so
.
3.
What
Truth
is
,
hath
been
defined
in
the
precedent
Chapter
;
What
Evidence
is
,
I
now
set
down
:
and
it
is
the
Concomitance
of
a
Mans
Conception
with
the
Words
that
signifie
such
Conception
in
the
Act
of
Ratiocination
:
for
when
a
Man
reasoneth
with
his
Lips
only
,
to
which
the
Mind
suggesteth
only
the
Beginning
,
and
followeth
not
the
Words
of
his
Mouth
with
the
Conceptions
of
his
Mind
,
out
of
Custom
of
so
speaking
;
though
he
begin
his
Ratiocination
with
True
Propositions
,
and
proceed
with
certain
Syllogisms
,
and
thereby
make
always
true
Conclusions
;
yet
are
not
his
Conclusions
evident
to
him
,
for
Want
of
the
Concomitance
of
Conception
with
his
Words
:
for
if
the
Words
alone
were
sufficient
,
a
Parrot
might
be
taught
as
well
to
know
Truth
,
as
to
speak
it
.
Evidence
is
to
Truth
,
as
the
Sap
to
the
Tree
,
which
,
so
far
as
it
creepeth
along
with
Body
and
Branches
,
keepeth
them
alive
;
where
it
forsaketh
them
,
they
die
:
for
this
Evidence
,
which
is
Meaning
with
our
Words
,
is
the
Life
of
Truth
.
4.
Knowledge
therefore
which
we
call
Science
,
I
define
to
be
Evidence
of
Truth
,
from
some
Beginning
or
Principle
of
Sense
:
for
the
Truth
of
a
Proposition
is
never
evident
,
until
we
conceive
the
Meaning
of
the
Words
or
Terms
whereof
it
consisteth
,
which
are
always
Conceptions
of
the
Mind
:
Nor
can
we
remember
those
Conceptions
,
without
the
Thing
that
produced
the
same
by
our
Senses
.
The
first
Principle
of
Knowledge
is
,
that
we
have
such
and
such
Conceptions
;
the
second
,
that
we
have
thus
and
thus
named
the
Things
whereof
they
are
Conceptions
;
the
third
is
,
that
we
have
joyned
those
Names
in
such
Manner
as
to
make
true
Propositions
;
the
fourth
and
last
is
,
that
we
have
joyned
those
Propositions
in
such
Manner
as
they
be
concluding
,
and
the
Truth
of
the
Conclusion
said
to
be
known
.
And
of
these
two
Kinds
of
Knowledge
,
whereof
the
former
is
Experience
of
Fact
,
and
the
later
of
Evidence
of
Truth
;
as
the
former
,
if
it
be
great
,
is
called
Prudence
;
so
the
latter
,
if
it
be
much
,
hath
usually
been
called
,
both
by
Ancient
and
Modern
Writers
,
Sapience
or
Wisdom
:
and
of
this
latter
,
Man
only
is
capable
;
of
the
former
,
brute
Beasts
also
participate
.
5.
A
Proposition
is
said
to
be
supposed
,
when
,
being
not
evident
,
it
is
nevertheless
admitted
for
a
Time
,
to
the
End
,
that
,
joyning
to
it
other
Propositions
,
we
may
conclude
something
;
and
to
proceed
from
Conclusion
to
Conclusion
,
for
a
Trial
whether
the
same
will
lead
us
into
any
absurd
or
impossible
Conclusion
;
which
if
it
do
,
then
we
know
such
Supposition
to
have
been
false
.
6.
But
if
,
running
thorow
many
Conclusions
,
we
come
to
none
that
are
absurd
,
then
we
think
the
Proposition
probable
:
likewise
we
think
probable
whatsoever
Proposition
we
admit
for
Truth
by
Errour
of
Reasoning
,
or
from
trusting
to
other
Men
:
And
all
such
Propositions
as
are
admitted
by
Trust
or
errour
,
we
are
not
said
to
know
,
but
think
them
to
be
true
;
and
the
Admittance
of
them
is
called
Opinion
.
7.
And
particularly
,
when
the
Opinion
is
admitted
out
of
Trust
to
other
Men
,
they
are
said
to
believe
it
;
and
their
Admittance
of
it
is
called
Belief
,
and
sometimes
Faith
.
8.
It
is
either
Science
or
Opinion
which
we
commonly
mean
by
the
Word
Conscience
:
for
Men
say
that
such
and
such
a
thing
is
true
in
or
upon
their
Conscience
;
which
they
never
do
,
when
they
think
it
doubtful
;
and
therefore
they
know
,
or
think
they
know
it
to
be
true
.
But
Men
,
when
they
say
Things
upon
their
Conscience
,
are
not
therefore
presumed
certainly
to
know
the
Truth
of
what
they
say
:
It
remaineth
then
,
that
that
Word
is
used
by
them
that
have
an
Opinion
,
not
only
of
the
Truth
of
the
Thing
,
but
also
of
their
Knowledge
of
it
,
to
which
the
Truth
of
the
Proposition
is
consequent
.
Conscience
I
therefore
define
to
be
Opinion
of
Evidence
.
9.
Belief
,
which
is
the
admitting
of
Propositions
upon
Trust
,
in
many
Cases
is
no
less
free
from
Doubt
,
than
perfect
and
manifest
Knowledge
:
for
as
there
is
nothing
whereof
there
is
not
some
Cause
;
so
,
when
there
is
Doubt
,
there
must
be
some
Cause
thereof
conceived
Now
there
be
many
Things
which
we
receive
from
Report
of
others
,
of
which
it
is
impossible
to
imagine
any
Cause
of
Doubt
:
for
what
can
be
opposed
against
the
Consent
of
all
Men
,
in
Things
they
can
know
,
and
have
no
Cause
to
report
otherwise
than
they
are
,
(
such
as
is
great
Part
of
our
Histories
)
unless
a
Man
would
say
that
all
the
World
had
conspired
to
deceive
him
.
And
thus
much
of
Sense
,
Imagination
,
Discursion
,
Ratiocination
,
and
Knowledge
,
which
are
the
Acts
of
our
Power
cognitive
,
or
conceptive
.
That
Power
of
the
Mind
which
we
call
motive
,
differeth
from
the
Power
motive
of
the
Body
:
for
the
Power
motive
of
the
Body
is
that
by
which
it
moveth
other
Bodies
,
and
we
call
Strength
;
but
the
Power
motive
of
the
Mind
,
is
that
by
which
the
Mind
giveth
animal
Motion
to
that
Body
wherein
it
existeth
:
the
Acts
hereof
are
our
Affections
and
Passions
,
of
which
I
am
to
speak
in
general
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
Delight
,
Pain
,
Love
,
Hatred
.
Appetite
,
Aversion
,
Fear
.
Good
,
Evil
,
Pulchritude
,
Turpitude
.
End
,
Fruition
.
Profitable
,
Vse
,
Vain
.
Felicity
.
Good
and
Evil
mixt
Sensual
Delight
,
and
Pain
;
Joy
and
Grief
.
IN
the
eighth
Section
of
the
second
Chapter
is
shewed
,
that
Conceptions
and
Apparitions
are
nothing
really
,
but
Motion
in
some
internal
Substance
of
the
Head
;
which
Motion
not
stopping
there
,
but
proceeding
to
the
Heart
,
of
Necessity
must
there
either
help
or
hinder
the
Motion
which
is
called
Vital
:
when
it
helpeth
,
it
is
called
Delight
,
Contentment
,
or
Pleasure
,
which
is
nothing
really
but
Motion
about
the
Heart
,
as
Conception
is
nothing
but
Motion
in
the
Head
;
and
the
Objects
that
cause
it
are
called
pleasant
or
delightful
,
or
by
some
Name
equivalent
;
The
Latines
have
Jucundum
,
à
juvando
,
from
helping
;
and
the
same
Delight
,
with
Reference
to
the
Object
,
is
called
Love
:
but
when
such
Motion
weakeneth
or
hindereth
the
vital
Motion
,
then
it
is
called
Pain
;
and
in
Relation
to
that
which
causeth
it
,
Hatred
,
which
the
Latines
express
sometimes
by
Odium
,
and
sometimes
by
Taedium
.
2.
This
Motion
in
which
consisteth
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
is
also
a
Solicitation
or
Provocation
either
to
draw
near
to
the
Thing
that
pleaseth
,
or
to
retire
from
the
Thing
that
displeaseth
;
and
this
Solicitation
is
the
Endeavour
or
internal
Beginning
of
animal
Motion
,
which
when
the
Object
delighteth
,
is
called
Appetite
;
when
it
displeaseth
,
it
is
called
Aversion
,
in
Respect
of
the
Displeasure
present
;
but
in
Respect
of
the
Displeasure
expected
,
Fear
.
So
that
Pleasure
,
Love
,
and
Appetite
,
which
is
also
called
Desire
,
are
divers
Names
for
divers
Considerations
of
the
same
Thing
.
3.
Every
Man
,
for
his
own
Part
,
calleth
that
which
pleaseth
,
and
is
delightful
to
himself
,
Good
;
and
that
Evil
which
displeaseth
him
:
insomuch
that
while
every
Man
differeth
from
other
in
Constitution
,
they
differ
also
from
one
another
concerning
the
common
Distinction
of
Good
and
Evil
.
Nor
is
there
any
such
Thing
as
Absolute
Goodness
,
considered
without
Relation
:
for
even
the
Goodness
which
we
apprehend
in
God
Almighty
,
is
his
Goodness
to
us
.
And
as
we
call
Good
and
Evil
the
Things
that
please
and
displease
;
so
call
we
Goodness
and
Badness
,
the
Qualities
or
Powers
whereby
they
do
it
:
And
the
Signs
of
that
Goodness
are
called
by
the
Latines
in
one
Word
Pulchritudo
,
and
the
Signs
of
Evil
,
Turpitudo
;
to
which
we
have
no
Words
precisely
answerable
.
4.
As
all
Conceptions
we
have
immediately
by
the
Sense
,
are
,
Delight
,
or
Pain
,
or
Appetite
,
or
Fear
;
so
are
all
the
Imaginations
after
Sense
.
But
as
they
are
weaker
Imaginations
,
so
are
they
also
weaker
Pleasures
,
or
weaker
Pain
.
5.
As
Appetite
is
the
Beginning
of
animal
Motions
towards
something
that
pleaseth
us
;
so
is
the
attaining
thereof
,
the
End
of
that
Motion
,
which
we
also
call
the
Scope
,
and
Aim
,
and
final
Cause
of
the
same
:
and
when
we
attain
that
End
,
the
Delight
we
have
thereby
is
called
the
Fruition
:
So
that
Bonum
and
Finis
are
different
Names
,
but
for
different
Considerations
of
the
same
Thing
.
6.
And
of
Ends
,
some
of
them
are
called
propinqui
,
that
is
,
near
at
hand
;
others
remoti
,
far
off
:
but
when
the
Ends
that
be
nearer
attaining
,
be
compared
with
those
that
be
further
off
,
they
are
called
not
Ends
,
but
Means
,
and
the
Way
to
those
.
But
for
an
utmost
End
,
in
which
the
ancient
Philosophers
have
placed
Felicity
,
and
disputed
much
concerning
the
Way
thereto
,
there
is
no
such
Thing
in
this
World
,
nor
Way
to
it
,
more
than
to
Vtopia
:
for
while
we
live
,
we
have
Desires
,
and
Desire
presupposeth
a
further
End
.
Those
Things
which
please
us
,
as
the
Way
or
Means
to
a
further
End
,
we
call
profitable
;
and
the
Fruition
of
them
,
Vse
;
and
those
Things
that
profit
not
,
vain
.
7.
Seeing
all
Delight
is
Appetite
,
and
presupposeth
a
further
End
,
there
can
be
no
Contentment
but
in
proceeding
:
and
therefore
we
are
not
to
marvel
,
when
we
see
,
that
as
Men
attain
to
more
Riches
,
Honour
,
or
other
Power
;
so
their
Appetite
continually
groweth
more
and
more
;
and
when
they
are
come
to
the
utmost
Degree
of
some
Kind
of
Power
,
they
pursue
some
other
,
as
long
as
in
any
Kind
they
think
themselves
behind
any
other
:
of
those
therefore
that
have
attained
to
the
highest
Degree
of
Honour
and
Riches
,
some
have
affected
Mastery
in
some
Art
;
as
Nero
in
Musick
and
Poetry
,
Commodus
in
the
Art
of
a
Gladiator
;
and
such
as
affect
not
some
such
Thing
,
must
find
Diversion
and
Recreation
of
their
Thoughts
in
the
Contention
either
of
Play
or
Business
:
and
Men
justly
complain
of
a
great
Grief
,
that
they
know
not
what
to
do
.
Felicity
therefore
,
by
which
we
mean
continual
Delight
,
consisteth
not
in
having
prospered
,
but
in
prospering
.
8.
There
are
few
Things
in
this
World
,
but
either
have
Mixture
of
Good
and
Evil
,
or
there
is
a
Chain
of
them
so
necessarily
linked
together
,
that
the
one
cannot
be
taken
without
the
other
:
As
for
Example
,
the
Pleasures
of
Sin
,
and
the
Bitterness
of
Punishment
,
are
inseparable
;
as
is
also
Labour
and
Honour
,
for
the
most
part
.
Now
when
in
the
whole
Chain
,
the
greater
Part
is
good
,
the
Whole
is
called
Good
;
and
when
the
Evil
over-weigheth
,
the
Whole
is
called
Evil
.
9.
There
are
two
Sorts
of
Pleasure
,
whereof
the
one
seemeth
to
affect
the
corporeal
Organ
of
the
Sense
,
and
that
I
call
sensual
;
the
greatest
Part
whereof
,
is
that
by
which
we
are
invited
to
give
Continuance
to
our
Species
;
and
the
next
,
by
which
a
Man
is
invited
to
Meat
,
for
the
Preservation
of
his
individual
Person
:
The
other
Sort
of
Delight
is
not
particular
to
any
Part
of
the
Body
,
and
is
called
The
Delight
of
the
Mind
,
and
is
that
which
we
call
Joy
.
Likewise
of
Pains
,
some
affect
the
Body
,
and
are
therefore
called
the
Pains
of
the
Body
;
and
some
not
,
and
those
are
called
Grief
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
1
,
2.
Wherein
consist
the
Pleasures
of
Sense
.
3
,
4.
Of
the
Imagination
,
or
Conception
of
Power
in
Man
.
5.
Honour
,
honourable
,
Worth
.
6.
Signs
of
Honour
.
7.
Reverence
.
1.
HAving
in
the
first
Section
of
the
precedent
Chapter
presupposed
,
that
Motion
and
Agitation
of
the
Brain
which
we
call
Conception
,
to
be
continued
to
the
Heart
,
and
there
to
be
called
Passion
;
I
have
therefore
obliged
my self
,
as
far
forth
as
I
am
able
,
to
search
out
and
declare
from
what
Conception
proceedeth
every
one
of
those
Passions
which
we
commonly
take
notice
of
:
for
,
seeing
the
Things
that
please
and
displease
,
are
innumerable
,
and
work
innumerable
Ways
,
Men
have
not
taken
notice
but
of
a
very
few
,
which
also
are
many
of
them
without
Name
.
2.
And
first
,
we
are
to
consider
,
that
of
Conceptions
there
are
three
Sorts
,
whereof
one
is
of
that
which
is
present
,
which
is
Sense
;
another
,
of
that
which
is
past
,
which
is
Remembrance
;
and
the
third
,
of
that
which
is
future
,
which
we
call
Expectation
:
all
which
have
been
manifestly
declared
in
the
second
and
third
Chapters
;
and
every
of
these
Conceptions
is
Pleasure
or
Pain
present
.
And
first
for
the
Pleasures
of
the
Body
which
affect
the
Sense
of
Touch
and
Tast
,
as
far
forth
as
they
be
Organical
,
their
Conceptions
are
Sense
:
so
also
is
the
Pleasure
of
all
Exonerations
of
Nature
:
All
which
Passions
I
have
before
named
,
Sensual
Pleasures
;
and
their
contrary
,
Sensual
Pains
:
to
which
also
may
be
added
the
Pleasures
and
Displeasures
of
Odours
,
if
any
of
them
shall
be
found
Organical
,
which
for
the
most
Part
they
are
not
,
as
appeareth
by
this
Experience
which
every
Man
hath
,
that
the
same
Smells
,
when
they
seem
to
proceed
from
others
,
displease
,
though
they
proceed
from
our selves
;
but
when
we
think
they
proceed
from
our selves
,
they
displease
not
,
though
they
come
from
others
:
the
Displeasure
of
this
is
a
Conception
of
Hurt
thereby
from
those
Odours
,
as
being
unwholesom
,
and
is
therefore
a
Conception
of
Evil
to
come
,
and
not
present
.
Concerning
the
Delight
of
Hearing
,
it
is
diverse
,
and
the
Organ
it self
not
affected
thereby
:
Simple
Sounds
please
by
Aequality
,
as
the
Sound
of
a
Bell
or
Lute
:
insomuch
as
it
seems
,
an
Equality
continued
by
the
Percussion
of
the
Object
upon
the
Ear
,
is
Pleasure
;
the
Contrary
is
called
Harshness
,
such
as
is
Grating
,
and
some
other
Sounds
,
which
do
not
always
affect
the
Body
,
but
only
sometime
,
and
that
with
a
Kind
of
Horrour
beginning
at
the
Teeth
.
Harmony
,
or
many
Sounds
together
agreeing
,
please
by
the
same
Reason
as
the
Vnison
,
which
is
the
Sound
of
equal
Strings
equally
stretched
.
Sounds
that
differ
in
any
Height
,
please
by
Inequality
and
Aequality
alternate
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
higher
Note
striketh
twice
,
for
one
Stroke
of
the
other
,
whereby
they
strike
together
every
second
Time
;
as
is
well
proved
by
Galileo
,
in
the
first
Dialogue
concerning
local
Motion
:
where
he
also
sheweth
,
that
two
Sounds
differing
a
fifth
,
delight
the
Ear
by
an
Aequality
of
striking
after
two
Inequalities
;
for
the
higher
Note
striketh
the
Ear
thrice
,
while
the
other
strikes
but
twice
.
In
like
Manner
he
sheweth
wherein
consisteth
the
Pleasure
of
Concord
,
and
the
Displeasure
of
Discord
,
in
other
Difference
of
Notes
.
There
is
yet
another
Pleasure
and
Displeasure
of
Sounds
,
which
consisteth
in
Consequence
of
one
Note
after
another
,
diversified
both
by
Accent
and
Measure
;
whereof
that
which
pleaseth
is
called
Air
;
but
for
what
Reason
Succession
in
Tone
and
Measure
is
more
Air
than
another
,
I
confess
I
know
not
;
but
I
conjecture
the
Reason
to
be
,
for
that
some
of
them
imitate
and
revive
some
Passion
which
otherwise
we
take
no
Notice
of
,
and
the
other
not
;
for
no
Air
pleaseth
but
for
a
time
,
no
more
doth
Imitation
.
Also
the
Pleasures
of
the
Eye
consist
in
a
certain
Aequality
of
Colour
:
for
Light
,
the
most
glorious
of
all
Colours
,
is
made
by
equal
Operation
of
the
Object
;
whereas
Colour
is
perturbed
,
that
is
to
say
,
unequal
Light
,
as
hath
been
said
,
Chap.
2.
Sect.
8.
And
therefore
Colours
,
the
more
Equality
is
in
them
,
the
more
resplendent
they
are
:
and
as
Harmony
is
pleasure
to
the
Ear
,
which
consisteth
of
divers
Sounds
;
so
perhaps
may
some
Mixture
of
divers
Colours
be
Harmony
to
the
Eye
,
more
than
another
Mixture
.
There
is
yet
another
Delight
by
the
Ear
,
which
happeneth
onely
to
Men
of
skill
in
Musick
,
which
is
of
another
Nature
,
(
and
not
as
these
)
Conception
of
the
present
,
but
rejoycing
of
their
own
Skill
;
of
which
nature
are
the
Passions
of
which
I
am
to
speak
next
.
3.
Conception
of
the
future
,
is
but
a
Supposition
of
the
same
,
proceeding
from
Remembrance
of
what
is
past
;
and
we
so
far
conceive
that
any
Thing
will
be
hereafter
,
as
we
know
there
is
something
at
the
present
that
hath
Power
to
produce
it
:
and
that
any
Thing
hath
Power
now
to
produce
another
Thing
hereafter
,
we
cannot
conceive
,
but
by
Remembrance
that
it
hath
produced
the
like
heretofore
.
Wherefore
all
Conception
of
future
,
is
Conception
of
Power
able
to
produce
something
.
Whosoever
therefore
expecteth
Pleasure
to
come
,
must
conceive
withal
some
Power
in
himself
by
which
the
same
may
be
attained
.
And
because
the
Passions
,
whereof
I
am
to
speak
next
,
consist
in
Conception
of
the
future
,
that
is
to
say
,
in
Conception
of
Power
past
,
and
the
Act
to
come
;
before
I
go
any
further
,
I
must
in
the
next
Place
speak
somewhat
concerning
this
Power
.
4.
By
this
Power
I
mean
the
same
with
the
Faculties
of
the
Body
,
Nutritive
,
Generative
,
Motive
,
and
of
the
Mind
,
Knowledge
;
and
besides
these
,
such
further
Power
as
by
them
is
acquired
,
viz.
Riches
,
Place
of
Authority
,
Friendship
or
Favour
,
and
Good
Fortune
;
which
last
is
really
nothing
else
but
the
Favour
of
God
Almighty
.
The
Contraries
of
these
are
Impotencies
,
Infirmities
,
or
Defects
of
the
said
Powers
respectively
.
And
because
the
Power
of
one
Man
resisteth
and
hindereth
the
Effects
of
the
Power
of
another
,
Power
simply
is
no
more
,
but
the
Excess
of
the
Power
of
one
above
that
of
another
:
for
equal
Powers
opposed
,
destroy
one
another
;
and
such
their
Opposition
is
called
Contention
.
5.
The
Signs
by
which
we
know
our
own
Power
,
are
those
Actions
which
proceed
from
the
same
;
and
the
Signs
by
which
other
Men
know
it
,
are
such
Actions
,
Gesture
,
Countenance
and
Speech
,
as
usually
such
Powers
produce
:
and
the
Acknowledgement
of
Power
is
called
Honour
;
and
to
honour
a
Man
inwardly
,
is
to
conceive
or
acknowledge
that
that
Man
hath
the
odds
or
Excess
of
that
Power
above
him
with
whom
he
contendeth
or
compareth
himself
.
And
honourable
are
those
Signs
for
which
one
Man
acknowledgeth
Power
or
Excess
above
his
Concurrent
in
another
:
As
for
Example
,
Beauty
of
Person
,
consisting
in
a
lively
Aspect
of
the
Countenance
,
and
other
Signs
of
Natural
Heat
,
are
honourable
,
being
Signs
precedent
of
Power
generative
,
and
much
Issue
;
as
also
,
general
Reputation
among
those
of
the
other
Sex
,
because
Signs
consequent
of
the
same
.
And
Actions
proceeding
from
Strength
of
Body
,
and
open
Force
,
are
honourable
,
as
Signs
consequent
of
Power
motive
,
such
as
are
Victory
in
Battel
or
Duel
;
A
d'avoir
tué
son
homme
.
Also
to
adventure
upon
great
Exploits
and
Danger
,
as
being
a
Sign
consequent
of
Opinion
of
our
own
Strength
,
and
that
Opinion
a
Sign
of
the
Strength
it self
.
And
to
teach
or
perswade
are
honourable
,
because
they
be
Signs
of
Knowledge
.
And
Riches
are
honourable
;
as
Signs
of
the
Power
that
acquired
them
:
And
Gifts
,
Cost
,
and
Magnificence
of
Houses
,
Apparel
,
and
the
like
,
are
honourable
,
as
Signs
of
Riches
.
And
Nobility
is
honourable
by
Reflection
,
as
a
Sign
of
Power
in
the
Ancestors
:
And
Authority
,
because
a
Sign
of
the
Strength
,
Wisdom
,
Favour
or
Riches
by
which
it
is
attained
.
And
Good
Fortune
or
casual
Prosperity
is
honourable
,
because
a
Sign
of
the
Favour
of
God
,
to
whom
is
to
be
ascribed
all
that
cometh
to
us
by
Fortune
,
no
less
than
that
we
attain
unto
by
Industry
.
And
the
Contraries
and
Defects
of
these
Signs
are
dishonourable
;
and
according
to
the
Signs
of
Honour
and
Dishonour
,
so
we
estimate
and
make
the
Value
or
Worth
of
a
Man
:
for
so
much
worth
is
every
Thing
,
as
a
Man
will
give
for
the
Use
of
all
it
can
do
.
6.
The
Signs
of
Honour
are
those
by
which
we
perceive
that
one
Man
acknowledgeth
the
Power
and
Worth
of
another
;
such
as
these
,
to
praise
,
to
magnifie
,
to
bless
,
to
call
happy
,
to
pray
or
supplicate
to
,
to
thank
,
to
offer
unto
or
present
,
to
obey
,
to
hearken
unto
with
Attention
,
to
speak
to
with
Consideration
,
to
approach
unto
in
decent
Manner
,
to
keep
Distance
from
,
to
give
way
to
,
and
the
like
,
which
are
the
Honour
the
Inferior
giveth
to
the
Superiour
.
But
the
Signs
of
Honour
from
the
Superiour
to
the
Inferiour
,
are
such
as
these
;
to
praise
or
prefer
him
before
his
Concurrent
,
to
hear
more
willingly
,
to
speak
to
him
more
familiarly
,
to
admit
him
nearer
,
to
employ
him
rather
,
to
ask
his
advice
rather
,
to
take
his
opinions
,
and
to
give
him
any
Gifts
rather
than
Money
;
or
if
Money
,
so
much
as
may
not
imply
his
Need
of
a
little
:
for
Need
of
a
little
is
greater
Poverty
than
Need
of
much
.
And
this
is
enough
for
Examples
of
the
Signs
of
Honour
and
Power
.
7.
Reverence
is
the
Conception
we
have
concerning
another
,
that
he
hath
the
Power
to
do
unto
us
both
Good
and
Hurt
,
but
not
the
Will
to
do
us
Hurt
.
8.
In
the
Pleasure
men
have
,
or
Displeasure
from
the
Signs
of
Honour
or
Dishonour
done
unto
them
,
consisteth
the
Nature
of
the
Passions
,
whereof
we
are
to
speak
in
the
next
Chapter
.
CHAP.
IX
.
1.
Glory
aspiring
,
false
Glory
,
vain
Glory
.
2.
Humility
and
Dejection
.
3.
Shame
.
4.
Courage
.
5.
Anger
.
6.
Revengefulness
.
7.
Hope
,
Despair
,
Diffidence
.
8.
Trust
.
9.
Pity
and
Hardness
of
Heart
.
10.
Indignation
.
11.
Emulation
and
Envie
.
12.
Laughter
.
13.
Weeping
.
14.
Lust
.
15.
Love
.
16.
Charity
,
17.
Admiration
and
Curiosity
.
18.
Of
the
Passion
of
them
that
flock
to
see
Danger
.
19.
Of
Magnanimity
and
Pusillanimity
.
20.
A
View
of
the
Passions
represented
in
a
Race
.
GLory
,
or
internal
Gloriation
or
Triumph
of
the
Mind
,
is
the
Passion
which
proceedeth
from
the
Imagination
or
Conception
of
our
own
Power
above
the
Power
of
him
that
contendeth
with
us
;
the
Signs
whereof
,
besides
those
in
the
Countenance
,
and
other
Gestures
of
the
Body
which
cannot
be
described
,
are
,
Ostentation
in
Words
,
and
Insolency
in
Actions
:
and
this
Passion
,
of
them
whom
it
displeaseth
,
is
called
Pride
;
by
them
whom
it
pleaseth
,
it
is
termed
a
just
Valuation
of
himself
.
This
Imagination
of
our
Power
or
Worth
,
may
be
from
an
assured
and
certain
Experience
of
our
own
Actions
;
and
then
is
that
Glory
just
,
and
well
grounded
,
and
begetteth
an
Opinion
of
increasing
the
same
by
other
Actions
to
follow
;
in
which
consisteth
the
Appetite
which
we
call
Aspiring
,
or
Proceeding
from
one
Degree
of
Power
to
another
.
The
same
Passion
may
proceed
not
from
any
Conscience
of
our
own
Actions
,
but
from
Fame
and
Trust
of
others
,
whereby
one
may
think
well
of
himself
,
and
yet
be
deceived
;
and
this
is
false
Glory
,
and
the
Aspiring
consequent
thereto
procureth
ill
Success
.
Further
,
the
Fiction
(
which
is
also
Imagination
)
of
Actions
done
by
our selves
,
which
never
were
done
,
is
Glorying
;
but
because
it
begetteth
no
Appetite
nor
endeavour
to
any
further
Attempt
,
it
is
meerly
vain
and
unprofitable
;
as
when
a
Man
imagineth
himself
to
do
the
Actions
whereof
he
readeth
in
some
Romance
,
or
to
be
like
unto
some
other
Man
whose
Acts
he
admireth
:
And
this
is
called
Vain
Glory
;
and
is
exemplied
in
the
Fable
,
by
the
Fly
sitting
on
the
Axletree
,
and
saying
to
himself
,
What
a
Dust
do
I
make
rise
!
The
expression
of
Vain
Glory
is
that
Wish
,
which
some
of
the
School
mistaking
for
some
Appetite
distinct
from
all
the
rest
,
have
called
Velleity
,
making
a
new
Word
,
as
they
made
a
new
Passion
which
was
not
before
.
Signs
of
Vain
Glory
in
the
Gesture
;
are
,
Imitation
of
others
,
Counterfeiting
and
Usurping
the
Signs
of
Vertue
they
have
not
;
Affectation
of
Fashions
,
Captation
of
Honour
from
their
Dreams
,
and
other
little
Stories
of
themselves
,
from
their
Country
,
from
their
Names
,
and
from
the
like
.
2.
The
Passion
contrary
to
Glory
,
proceeding
from
Apprehension
of
our
own
Infirmity
,
is
called
Humility
by
those
by
whom
it
is
approved
;
by
the
rest
,
Dejection
and
Poorness
:
which
Conception
may
be
well
or
ill
grounded
;
if
well
,
it
produceth
Fear
to
attempt
any
Thing
rashly
;
if
ill
,
it
utterly
cows
a
Man
,
that
he
neither
dares
speak
publickly
,
nor
expect
good
Success
in
any
Action
.
3.
It
happeneth
sometimes
,
that
he
that
hath
a
good
Opinion
of
himself
,
and
upon
good
ground
,
may
nevertheless
,
by
Reason
of
the
Frowardness
which
that
Passion
begetteth
,
discover
in
himself
some
Defect
or
Infirmity
,
the
Remembrance
whereof
dejecteth
him
;
and
this
Passion
is
called
Shame
;
by
which
being
cooled
and
checked
in
his
Forwardness
,
he
is
more
wary
for
the
Time
to
come
,
This
Passion
,
as
it
is
a
Sign
of
Infirmity
,
which
is
Dishonour
;
so
also
it
is
a
Sign
of
Knowledge
,
which
is
Honour
.
The
Sign
of
it
is
Blushing
,
which
appeareth
less
in
Men
conscious
of
their
own
Defect
,
because
they
less
betray
the
Infirmities
they
acknowledge
.
4.
Courage
,
in
a
large
Signification
,
is
the
Absence
of
Fear
in
the
Presence
of
any
evil
whatsoever
:
but
in
a
Strict
and
more
common
Meaning
,
it
is
Contempt
of
Wounds
and
Death
,
when
they
oppose
a
Man
in
the
Way
to
his
End
.
5.
Anger
or
sudden
Courage
is
nothing
but
the
Appetite
or
desire
of
overcoming
present
Opposition
.
It
hath
been
defined
commonly
to
be
Grief
proceeding
from
an
Opinion
of
Contempt
;
which
is
confuted
by
the
often
Experience
which
we
have
of
being
moved
to
anger
by
things
inanimate
,
and
without
Sense
,
and
consequently
incapable
of
contemning
us
.
6.
Revengefulness
is
that
Passion
which
ariseth
from
an
Expectation
or
Imagination
of
making
him
that
hath
hurt
us
,
find
his
own
Action
hurtful
to
himself
,
and
to
acknowledge
the
same
;
and
this
is
the
Height
of
Revenge
:
for
though
it
be
not
hard
,
by
returning
Evil
for
Evil
,
to
make
ones
Adversary
displeased
with
his
own
Fact
;
yet
to
make
him
acknowledge
the
same
,
is
so
difficult
,
that
many
a
Man
had
rather
die
than
do
it
.
Revenge
aimeth
not
at
the
Death
,
but
at
the
Captivity
or
Subjection
of
an
Enemy
;
which
was
well
expressed
in
the
Exclamation
of
Tiberius
Caesar
,
concerning
one
,
that
,
to
frustrate
his
Revenge
,
had
killed
himself
in
Prison
;
Hath
he
escaped
me
?
To
kill
,
is
the
aim
of
them
that
hate
,
to
rid
themselves
out
of
Fear
:
Revenge
aimeth
at
Triumph
,
which
over
the
Dead
is
not
.
7.
Repentance
is
the
Passion
which
proceedeth
from
Opinion
or
Knowledge
that
the
Action
they
have
done
is
out
of
the
Way
to
the
End
they
would
attain
:
the
Effect
whereof
is
,
to
pursue
that
Way
no
longer
,
but
,
by
the
Consideration
of
the
End
,
to
direct
themselves
into
a
better
.
The
first
Motion
therefore
in
this
Passion
is
Grief
;
but
the
Expectation
or
Conception
of
returning
again
into
the
Way
,
is
Joy
;
and
consequently
,
the
Passion
of
Repentance
is
compounded
and
allayed
of
both
:
but
the
predominant
is
Joy
;
else
were
the
Whole
Grief
,
which
cannot
be
,
forasmuch
as
he
that
proceedeth
towards
the
End
,
he
conceiveth
Good
,
proceedeth
with
Appetite
;
and
Appetite
is
Joy
,
as
hath
been
said
,
Chap.
7.
Sect.
2.
8.
Hope
is
Expectation
of
Good
to
come
,
as
Fear
is
the
Expectation
of
Evil
:
But
when
there
be
Causes
,
some
that
make
us
expect
Good
,
and
some
that
make
us
expect
Evil
,
alternately
working
in
our
Mind
;
if
the
Causes
that
make
us
expect
Good
,
be
greater
than
those
that
make
us
expect
Evil
,
the
whole
Passion
is
Hope
;
if
contrarily
the
Whole
is
Fear
.
Absolute
Privation
of
hope
is
Despair
,
a
degree
whereof
is
Diffidence
.
9.
Trust
is
a
Passion
proceeding
from
the
Belief
of
him
from
whom
we
expect
or
hope
for
Good
,
so
free
from
Doubt
that
upon
the
same
we
pursue
no
other
Way
to
attain
the
same
Good
:
as
Distrust
or
Diffidence
is
Doubt
that
maketh
him
endeavour
to
provide
himself
by
other
Means
And
that
this
is
the
Meaning
of
the
Words
Trust
and
Distrust
,
is
manifest
from
this
,
that
a
Man
never
provideth
himself
by
a
second
Way
,
but
when
he
mistrusteth
that
the
first
will
not
hold
10.
Pity
is
Imagination
or
Fiction
of
future
Calamity
to
our
selves
,
proceeding
from
the
Sense
of
another
Mans
Calamity
.
But
when
it
lighteth
on
such
as
we
think
have
not
deserved
the
same
,
the
Compassion
is
greater
,
because
then
there
appeareth
more
Probability
that
the
same
may
happen
to
us
:
for
,
the
Evil
that
happeneth
to
an
innocent
Man
,
may
happen
to
every
Man
.
But
when
we
see
a
Man
suffer
for
great
Crimes
,
which
we
cannot
easily
think
will
fall
upon
our selves
,
the
Pity
is
the
less
.
And
therefore
Men
are
apt
to
pity
those
whom
they
love
:
for
,
whom
they
love
,
they
think
worthy
of
Good
,
and
therefore
not
worthy
of
Calamity
.
Thence
it
is
also
,
that
Men
pity
the
Vices
of
some
Persons
at
the
first
Sight
only
,
out
of
Love
to
their
Aspect
.
The
Contrary
of
Pity
is
Hardness
of
Heart
,
proceeding
either
from
Slowness
of
Imagination
,
or
some
extreme
great
Opinion
of
their
own
Exemption
from
the
like
Calamity
,
or
from
hatred
of
all
or
most
Men
.
11.
Indignation
is
that
Grief
which
consisteth
in
the
Conception
of
good
Success
happening
to
them
whom
they
think
unworthy
thereof
.
Seeing
therefore
Men
think
all
those
unworthy
whom
they
hate
,
they
think
them
not
only
unworthy
of
the
good
Fortune
they
have
,
but
also
of
their
own
Vertues
.
And
of
all
the
Passions
of
the
Mind
,
these
two
,
Indignation
and
Pity
,
are
most
raised
and
increased
by
Eloquence
:
for
,
the
Aggravation
of
the
Calamity
,
and
Extenuation
of
the
Fault
,
augmenteth
Pity
;
and
the
Extenuation
of
the
Worth
of
the
Person
,
together
with
the
magnifying
of
his
Success
,
which
are
the
Parts
of
an
Orator
,
are
able
to
turn
these
two
Passions
into
Fury
.
12.
Emulation
is
Grief
arising
from
seeing
ones
self
exceeded
or
excelled
by
his
Concurrent
,
together
with
Hope
to
equal
or
exceed
him
in
Time
to
come
,
by
his
own
Ability
.
But
,
Envy
is
the
same
Grief
joyned
with
Pleasure
conceived
in
the
Imagination
of
some
ill
Fortune
that
may
befall
him
.
13.
There
is
a
Passion
that
hath
no
Name
;
but
the
Sign
of
it
is
that
Distortion
of
the
Countenance
which
we
call
Laughter
,
which
is
always
Joy
:
but
what
joy
,
what
we
think
,
and
wherein
we
triumph
when
we
laugh
,
is
not
hitherto
declared
by
any
.
That
it
consisteth
in
Wit
,
or
,
as
they
call
it
,
in
the
Jest
,
Experience
confuteth
:
for
Men
laugh
at
Mischances
and
Indecencies
,
wherein
there
lieth
no
Wit
nor
jest
at
all
.
And
forasmuch
as
the
same
Thing
is
no
more
ridiculous
when
it
groweth
stale
or
usual
,
whatsoever
it
be
that
moveth
Laughter
,
it
must
be
new
and
unexpected
.
Men
laugh
often
(
especially
such
as
are
greedy
of
Applause
from
every
Thing
they
do
well
)
at
their
own
Actions
performed
never
so
little
beyond
their
own
Expectations
;
as
also
at
their
own
Jests
:
And
in
this
Case
it
is
manifest
,
that
the
Passion
of
Laughter
proceedeth
from
a
sudden
conception
of
some
Ability
in
himself
that
laugheth
.
Also
Men
laugh
at
the
Infirmities
of
others
,
by
Comparison
wherewith
their
own
Abilities
are
set
off
and
illustrated
.
Also
Men
laugh
at
Jests
,
the
Wit
whereof
always
consisteth
in
the
elegant
Discovering
and
Conveying
to
our
minds
some
Absurdity
of
another
:
And
in
this
case
also
the
Passion
of
Laughter
proceedeth
from
the
sudden
Imagination
of
our
own
Oddes
and
Eminency
:
for
what
is
else
the
Recommending
of
our selves
to
our
own
good
Opinion
,
by
Comparison
with
another
Mans
Infirmity
or
absurdity
?
For
when
a
Jest
is
broken
upon
our selves
,
or
Friends
of
whose
Dishonour
we
participate
,
we
never
laugh
thereat
.
I
may
therefore
conclude
,
that
the
Passion
of
Laughter
is
nothing
else
but
sudden
Glory
arising
from
some
sudden
Conception
of
some
Eminency
in
our selves
,
by
Comparison
with
the
Infirmity
of
others
,
or
with
our
own
formerly
:
for
Men
laugh
at
the
follies
of
themselves
past
,
when
they
come
suddenly
to
Remembrance
,
except
they
bring
with
them
any
present
Dishonour
.
It
is
no
wonder
therefore
that
Men
take
hainously
to
be
laughed
at
or
derided
,
that
is
,
triumphed
over
.
Laughing
without
Offence
,
must
be
at
Absurdities
and
Infirmities
abstracted
from
Persons
,
and
when
all
the
Company
may
laugh
together
:
for
,
laughing
to
ones
self
putteth
all
the
rest
into
Jealousie
,
and
Examination
of
themselves
.
Besides
,
it
is
Vain-Glory
,
and
an
Argument
of
little
Worth
,
to
think
the
Infirmity
of
another
,
sufficient
Matter
for
his
Triumph
.
14.
The
Passion
opposite
hereunto
,
(
whose
Signs
are
another
Distortion
of
the
Face
with
Tears
)
called
Weeping
,
is
the
sudden
Falling
out
with
our selves
,
or
sudden
Conception
of
Defect
;
and
therefore
Children
weep
often
:
for
seeing
they
think
that
every
Thing
ought
to
be
given
them
which
they
desire
,
of
Necessity
every
Repulse
must
be
a
Check
of
their
Expectation
,
and
puts
them
in
mind
of
their
too
much
Weakness
to
make
themselves
Masters
of
all
they
look
for
.
For
the
same
Cause
Women
are
more
apt
to
weep
than
men
,
as
being
not
only
more
accustomed
to
have
their
Wills
,
but
also
to
measure
their
Powers
by
the
Power
and
Love
of
others
that
protect
them
.
Men
are
apt
to
weep
that
prosecute
Revenge
,
when
the
Revenge
is
suddenly
stopt
or
frustrated
by
the
Repentance
of
their
Adversary
;
and
such
are
the
Tears
of
Reconciliation
.
Also
revengeful
Men
are
subject
to
this
Passion
upon
the
beholding
those
Men
they
pity
,
and
suddenly
remember
they
cannot
help
.
Other
weeping
in
Men
proceedeth
for
the
most
part
from
the
same
Cause
it
proceedeth
from
in
Women
and
Children
.
15.
The
Appetite
which
Men
call
Lust
,
and
the
Fruition
that
appertaineth
thereunto
,
is
a
Sensual
Pleasure
,
but
not
only
that
;
there
is
in
it
also
a
Delight
of
the
Mind
:
for
it
consisteth
of
two
Appetites
together
,
to
please
,
and
to
be
pleased
;
and
the
Delight
Men
take
in
delighting
,
is
not
sensual
,
but
a
Pleasure
or
joy
of
the
Mind
consisting
in
the
Imagination
of
the
Power
they
have
so
much
to
please
.
But
the
Name
Lust
is
used
where
it
is
condemned
;
otherwise
it
is
called
by
the
general
Word
Love
:
for
the
Passion
is
one
and
the
same
indefinite
Desire
of
different
Sex
,
as
natural
as
Hunger
.
16.
Of
Love
,
by
which
is
understood
the
Joy
Man
taketh
in
the
Fruition
of
any
present
Good
,
hath
been
already
spoken
of
in
the
first
Section
,
Chap.
7.
under
which
is
contained
the
Love
Men
bear
to
one
another
,
or
Pleasure
they
take
in
one
anothers
Company
;
and
by
which
Nature
,
Men
are
said
to
be
sociable
.
But
there
is
another
Kind
of
Love
,
which
the
Greeks
call
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
,
and
is
that
which
we
mean
,
when
we
say
that
a
Man
is
in
Love
:
Forasmuch
as
this
Passion
cannot
be
without
Diversity
of
Sex
,
it
cannot
be
denied
but
that
it
participateth
of
that
indefinite
Love
mentioned
in
the
former
Section
.
But
there
is
a
great
Difference
betwixt
the
Desire
of
a
Man
indefinite
,
and
the
same
Desire
limited
ad
hunc
;
and
this
is
that
Love
which
is
the
great
Theme
of
Poets
:
But
notwithstanding
their
Praises
,
it
must
be
defined
by
the
Word
Need
:
for
it
is
a
Conception
a
Man
hath
of
his
Need
of
that
one
Person
desired
.
The
Cause
of
this
Passion
is
not
always
nor
for
the
most
part
Beauty
,
or
other
Quality
in
the
Beloved
,
unless
there
be
withall
Hope
in
the
Person
that
loveth
:
which
may
be
gathered
from
this
,
that
in
great
Difference
of
Persons
,
the
greater
have
often
faln
in
love
with
the
meaner
;
but
not
contrary
.
And
from
hence
it
is
,
that
for
the
most
part
they
have
much
better
Fortune
in
Love
,
whose
Hopes
are
built
upon
something
in
their
Person
,
than
those
that
trust
to
their
Expressions
and
Service
;
and
they
that
care
less
,
than
they
that
care
more
:
which
not
perceiving
,
many
Men
cast
away
their
Services
,
as
one
Arrow
after
another
,
till
,
in
the
End
,
together
with
their
Hopes
,
they
lose
their
Wits
.
17.
There
is
yet
another
Passion
sometimes
called
Love
,
but
more
properly
good
Will
or
Charity
.
There
can
be
no
greater
Argument
to
a
Man
,
of
his
own
Power
,
than
to
find
himself
able
not
only
to
accomplish
his
own
Desires
,
but
also
to
assist
other
Men
in
theirs
:
and
this
is
that
Conception
wherein
consisteth
Charity
.
In
which
,
first
,
is
contained
that
natural
Affection
of
Parents
to
their
Children
,
which
the
Greeks
call
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
,
as
also
,
that
Affection
wherewith
Men
seek
to
assist
those
that
adhere
unto
them
.
But
the
Affection
wherewith
Men
many
times
bestow
their
Benefits
on
Strangers
,
is
not
to
be
called
Charity
,
but
either
Contract
,
whereby
they
seek
to
purchase
friendship
;
or
Fear
,
which
maketh
them
to
purchase
peace
.
The
Opinion
of
Plato
concerning
honourable
Love
,
delivered
according
to
his
Custom
in
the
Person
of
Socrates
,
in
the
Dialogue
intituled
Convivium
,
is
this
,
That
a
Man
full
and
pregnant
with
Wisdom
and
other
Vertues
,
naturally
seeketh
out
some
beautiful
Person
,
of
Age
and
Capacity
to
conceive
,
in
whom
he
may
,
without
sensual
Respects
,
ingender
and
produce
the
like
.
And
this
is
the
Idea
of
the
then
noted
Love
of
Socrates
wise
and
continent
,
to
Alcibiades
young
and
beautiful
:
In
which
,
Love
is
not
the
sought
Honour
,
but
the
Issue
of
his
Knowledge
;
contrary
to
the
common
Love
,
to
which
though
Issue
sometimes
follows
,
yet
Men
seek
not
that
,
but
to
please
,
and
to
be
pleased
.
It
should
be
therefore
this
Charity
,
or
Desire
to
assist
and
advance
others
.
But
why
then
should
the
Wise
seek
the
Ignorant
,
or
be
more
charitable
to
the
Beautiful
than
to
others
?
There
is
something
in
it
savouring
of
the
Use
of
that
time
:
in
which
Matter
though
Socrates
be
acknowledged
for
continent
,
yet
the
Continent
have
the
Passion
they
contain
,
as
much
and
more
than
they
that
satiate
the
Appetite
;
which
maketh
me
suspect
this
Platonick
Love
for
meerly
sensual
;
but
with
an
honourable
Pretence
for
the
Old
to
haunt
the
Company
of
the
young
and
beautiful
.
18.
Forasmuch
as
all
Knowledge
beginneth
from
Experience
,
therefore
also
new
Experience
is
the
Beginning
of
new
Knowledge
,
and
the
Increase
of
Experience
the
Beginning
of
the
Increase
of
Knowledge
.
Whatsoever
therefore
happeneth
new
to
a
Man
,
giveth
him
Matter
of
Hope
of
knowing
somewhat
that
he
knew
not
before
.
And
this
Hope
and
Expectation
of
future
Knowledge
from
any
Thing
that
happeneth
new
and
strange
,
is
that
Passion
which
we
commonly
call
Admiration
;
and
the
same
considered
as
Appetite
,
is
called
Curiosity
,
which
is
Appetite
of
Knowledge
.
As
in
the
discerning
of
Faculties
,
Man
leaveth
all
Community
with
Beasts
at
the
Faculty
of
imposing
Names
;
so
also
doth
he
surmount
their
Nature
at
this
Passion
of
Curiosity
.
For
when
a
Beast
seeth
any
Thing
new
and
strange
to
him
,
he
considereth
it
so
far
only
as
to
discern
whether
it
be
likely
to
serve
his
turn
,
or
hurt
him
,
and
accordingly
approacheth
nearer
to
it
,
or
fleeth
from
it
:
Whereas
Man
,
who
in
most
Events
remembereth
in
what
manner
they
were
caused
and
begun
,
looketh
for
the
Cause
and
Beginning
of
every
Thing
that
ariseth
new
unto
him
.
And
from
this
Passion
of
Admiration
and
Curiosity
,
have
arisen
not
only
the
Invention
of
Names
,
but
also
Supposition
of
such
Causes
of
all
Things
as
they
thought
might
produce
them
.
And
from
this
Beginning
is
derived
all
Philosophy
;
as
Astronomy
from
the
Admiration
of
the
Course
of
Heaven
;
Natural
Philosophy
from
the
strange
Effects
of
the
Elments
and
other
Bodies
.
And
from
the
Degrees
of
Curiosity
,
proceed
also
the
Degrees
of
Knowledge
amongst
Men
:
For
,
to
a
Man
in
the
Chace
of
Riches
or
Authority
,
)
which
in
Respect
of
Knowledge
are
but
Sensuality
)
it
is
a
Diversity
of
little
Pleasure
,
whether
it
be
the
Motion
of
the
Sun
or
the
Earth
that
maketh
the
Day
,
or
to
enter
into
other
Contemplations
of
any
strange
Accident
,
than
whether
it
conduce
or
not
to
the
End
he
pursueth
.
Because
Curiosity
is
Delight
,
therefore
also
Novelty
is
so
,
but
especially
that
Novelty
from
which
a
Man
conceiveth
an
Opinion
true
or
false
of
bettering
his
own
Estate
;
for
,
in
such
Case
,
they
stand
affected
with
the
Hope
that
all
Gamesters
have
while
the
Cards
are
shuffling
.
19.
Divers
other
Passions
there
be
,
but
they
want
Names
:
whereof
some
nevertheless
have
been
by
most
Men
observed
:
For
Example
;
from
what
Passion
proceedeth
it
,
that
Men
take
pleasure
to
behold
from
the
Shore
the
Danger
of
them
that
are
at
Sea
in
a
Tempest
,
or
in
Fight
,
or
from
a
safe
Castle
to
behold
two
Armies
charge
one
to
another
in
the
Field
?
It
is
certainly
,
in
the
whole
Summ
,
Joy
;
else
Men
would
never
flock
to
such
a
Spectacle
.
Nevertheless
there
is
in
it
both
Joy
and
Grief
:
for
as
there
is
Novelty
and
Remembrance
of
our
own
Security
present
,
which
is
Delight
:
so
there
is
also
Pity
,
which
is
Grief
:
But
the
Delight
is
so
far
predominant
,
that
Men
usually
are
content
in
such
a
Case
to
be
Spectators
of
the
Misery
of
their
Friends
.
20.
Magnanimity
is
no
more
than
Glory
,
of
the
which
I
have
spoken
in
the
first
Section
;
but
Glory
well
grounded
upon
certain
Experience
of
a
Power
sufficient
to
attain
his
End
in
open
Manner
.
And
Pusillanimity
is
the
Doubt
of
that
.
Whatsoever
therefore
is
a
Sign
of
Vain
Glory
,
the
same
is
also
a
Sign
of
Pusillanimity
:
for
sufficient
Power
maketh
Glory
a
Spur
to
ones
End
.
To
be
pleased
or
displeased
with
Fame
true
or
false
,
is
a
Sign
of
that
same
,
because
he
that
relieth
on
Fame
hath
not
his
Success
in
his
own
Power
.
Likewise
Art
and
Fallacy
are
Signs
of
Pusillanimity
,
because
they
depend
not
upon
our
own
Power
,
but
the
Ignorance
of
others
.
Also
Proneness
to
Anger
,
because
it
argueth
Difficulty
of
proceeding
.
Also
Ostentation
of
Ancestors
,
because
all
Men
are
more
inclined
to
make
shew
of
their
own
Power
when
they
have
it
,
than
of
anothers
.
To
be
at
Enmity
and
Contention
with
Inferiours
,
is
a
Sign
of
the
same
,
because
it
proceedeth
from
Want
of
Power
to
end
the
War
.
To
laugh
at
others
,
because
it
is
an
Affectation
of
Glory
from
other
Mens
Infirmities
,
and
not
from
any
Ability
of
their
own
.
Also
Irresolution
,
which
proceedeth
from
Want
of
power
enough
to
contemn
the
little
Difficulties
that
make
Deliberations
hard
.
21.
The
Comparison
of
the
Life
of
Man
to
a
Race
,
though
it
hold
not
in
every
Part
,
yet
it
holdeth
so
well
for
this
our
Purpose
,
that
we
may
thereby
both
see
and
remember
almost
all
the
Passions
before
mentioned
.
But
this
Race
we
must
suppose
to
have
no
other
Goal
,
nor
other
Garland
,
but
being
formost
,
and
in
it
To
endeavour
,
is
Appetite
.
To
be
remiss
,
is
Sensuality
.
To
consider
them
behind
,
is
Glory
.
To
consider
them
before
,
is
Humility
.
To
lose
Ground
with
looking
back
,
Vain-Glory
.
To
be
holden
,
Hatred
.
To
turn
back
,
Repentance
.
To
be
in
breath
,
Hope
.
To
be
weary
,
Despair
.
To
endeavour
to
overtake
the
next
,
Emulation
.
To
supplant
or
overthrow
,
Envie
.
To
resolve
to
break
thorow
a
Stop
foreseen
,
Courage
.
To
break
thorow
a
sudden
Stop
,
Anger
.
To
break
thorow
with
Ease
,
Magnanimity
.
To
lose
Ground
by
little
Hindrances
,
Pusillanimity
.
To
fall
on
the
sudden
,
is
Disposition
to
weep
.
To
see
another
fall
,
is
Disposition
to
laugh
.
To
see
one
out-gone
whom
we
would
not
,
is
Pity
.
To
see
one
out-goe
whom
we
would
not
,
is
Indignation
.
To
hold
fast
by
another
,
is
to
love
.
To
carry
him
on
that
so
holdeth
,
is
Charity
.
To
hurt
ones
self
for
hast
,
is
Shame
.
Continually
to
be
out-gone
is
Misery
.
Continually
to
out-go
the
next
before
,
is
Felicity
.
And
to
forsake
the
Course
,
is
to
die
.
CHAP.
X.
1.
HAving
shewed
in
the
precedent
Chapters
,
that
Sense
proceedeth
from
the
Action
of
external
Objects
upon
the
Brain
,
or
some
internal
Substance
of
the
Head
;
and
that
the
Passions
proceed
from
the
Alteration
there
made
,
and
continued
to
the
Heart
:
It
is
consequent
in
the
next
Place
,
seeing
the
Diversity
of
Degrees
in
Knowlege
in
divers
Men
,
to
be
greater
than
may
be
ascribed
to
the
divers
Tempers
of
their
Brain
,
to
declare
what
other
Causes
may
produce
such
Oddes
,
and
Excess
of
Capacity
,
as
we
daily
observe
in
one
Man
above
another
.
As
for
that
Difference
which
ariseth
from
Sickness
,
and
such
accidental
Distempers
,
I
omit
the
same
,
as
impertinent
to
this
Place
,
and
consider
,
it
only
in
such
as
have
their
Health
,
and
Organs
well
disposed
.
If
the
Difference
were
in
the
natural
Temper
of
the
Brain
,
I
can
imagin
no
Reason
why
the
same
should
not
appear
first
and
most
of
all
in
the
Senses
,
which
being
equal
both
in
the
wise
and
less
wise
,
infer
an
equal
Temper
in
the
common
Organ
(
namely
the
Brain
)
of
all
the
Senses
.
2.
But
we
see
by
Experience
,
that
Joy
and
Grief
proceed
not
in
all
Men
from
the
same
Causes
,
and
that
men
differ
very
much
in
the
Constitution
of
the
Body
;
whereby
,
that
which
helpeth
and
furthereth
vital
Constitution
in
one
,
and
is
therefore
delightful
,
hindereth
it
and
crosseth
it
in
another
,
and
therefore
causeth
Grief
.
The
Difference
therefore
of
Wits
hath
its
Original
from
the
different
Passions
,
and
from
the
Ends
to
which
the
Appetite
leadeth
them
.
3.
And
first
,
those
Men
whose
Ends
are
sensual
Delight
,
and
generally
are
addicted
to
Ease
,
Food
,
Onerations
and
Exonerations
of
the
Body
,
must
needs
be
the
less
thereby
delighted
with
those
Imaginations
that
conduce
not
to
those
Ends
,
such
as
are
Imaginations
of
Honour
and
Glory
,
which
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
have
Respect
to
the
future
:
For
Sensuality
consisteth
in
the
Pleasure
of
the
Senses
,
which
please
only
for
the
present
,
and
take
away
the
Inclination
to
observe
such
Things
as
conduce
to
Honour
,
and
consequently
maketh
Men
less
curious
,
and
less
ambitious
,
whereby
they
less
consider
the
Way
either
to
Knowledge
or
other
Power
:
in
which
two
consisteth
all
the
Excellency
of
Power
cognitive
.
And
this
is
it
which
Men
call
Dulness
,
and
proceedeth
from
the
Appetite
of
sensual
or
bodily
Delight
.
And
it
may
well
be
conjectured
,
that
such
Passion
hath
its
Beginning
from
a
Grossness
and
Difficulty
of
the
Motion
of
the
Spirit
about
the
Heart
.
4.
The
Contrary
hereunto
,
is
that
quick
Rangeing
of
Mind
described
,
Chap.
4.
Sect.
3.
which
is
joyned
with
Curiosity
of
comparing
the
Things
that
come
into
the
Mind
,
one
with
another
:
in
which
Comparison
,
a
Man
delighteth
himself
either
with
finding
unexpected
Similitude
of
Things
,
otherwise
much
unlike
,
in
which
Men
place
the
Excellency
of
Fancy
,
and
from
whence
proceed
those
grateful
Similies
,
Metaphors
,
and
other
Tropes
,
by
which
both
Poets
and
Orators
have
it
in
their
Power
to
make
Things
please
or
displease
,
and
shew
well
or
ill
to
others
,
as
they
like
themselves
;
or
else
in
discerning
suddenly
Dissimilitude
in
Things
that
otherwise
appear
the
same
.
And
this
Vertue
of
the
Mind
is
that
by
which
Men
attain
to
exact
and
perfect
Knowledge
;
and
the
Pleasure
thereof
consisteth
in
continual
Instruction
,
and
in
Distinction
of
Places
,
Persons
,
and
Seasons
,
and
is
commonly
termed
by
the
Name
of
Judgement
:
for
,
to
judge
is
nothing
else
,
but
to
distinguish
or
discern
:
And
both
Fancy
and
Judgement
are
commonly
comprehended
under
the
Name
of
Wit
,
which
seemeth
to
be
a
Tenuity
and
Agility
of
Spirits
,
contrary
to
that
Restiness
of
the
Spirits
supposed
in
those
that
are
dull
.
5.
There
is
another
Defect
of
the
Mind
,
which
Men
call
Levity
,
which
betrayeth
also
Mobility
in
the
Spirits
,
but
in
Excess
.
An
Example
whereof
is
in
them
that
in
the
midst
of
any
serious
Discourse
,
have
their
Minds
diverted
to
every
little
Jest
or
witty
Observation
;
which
maketh
them
depart
from
their
Discourse
by
a
Parenthesis
,
and
from
that
Parenthesis
by
another
,
till
at
length
they
either
lose
themselves
,
or
make
their
Narration
like
a
Dream
,
or
some
studied
Nonsence
.
The
Passion
from
whence
this
proceedeth
,
is
Curiosity
,
but
with
too
much
Equality
and
Indifference
:
for
when
all
Things
make
equal
Impression
and
Delight
,
they
equally
throng
to
be
expressed
.
6.
The
Vertue
opposite
to
this
Defect
,
is
Gravity
,
or
Steadiness
;
in
which
the
End
being
the
great
and
Master-Delight
,
directeth
and
keepeth
in
the
Way
thereto
all
other
Thoughts
.
7.
The
Extremity
of
Dulness
is
that
natural
Folly
which
may
be
called
Stolidity
:
But
the
Extream
of
Levity
,
though
it
be
natural
Folly
distinct
from
the
other
,
and
obvious
to
every
Mans
Observation
,
I
know
not
how
to
call
it
.
8.
There
is
a
Fault
of
the
Mind
called
by
the
Greeks
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
,
which
is
Indocibility
,
or
Difficulty
of
being
taught
;
the
which
must
needs
arise
from
a
false
Opinion
that
they
know
already
the
Truth
of
that
is
called
in
question
:
for
certainly
Men
are
not
otherwise
so
unequal
in
capacity
as
the
Evidence
is
unequal
between
what
is
taught
by
the
Mathematicians
,
and
what
is
commonly
discoursed
of
in
other
Books
:
and
therefore
if
the
Minds
of
Men
were
all
of
white
Paper
,
they
would
all
most
equally
be
disposed
to
acknowledge
whatsoever
should
be
in
right
Method
,
and
by
right
Ratiocination
delivered
to
them
:
But
when
Men
have
once
acquiesced
in
untrue
Opinions
,
and
registred
them
as
Authentical
Records
in
their
Minds
,
it
is
no
less
impossible
to
speak
intelligibly
to
such
Men
,
than
to
write
legibly
upon
a
Paper
already
scribled
over
.
The
immediate
Cause
therefore
of
Indocibility
,
is
Prejudice
;
and
of
prejudice
,
false
Opinion
of
our
own
Knowledge
.
9.
Another
,
and
a
principal
Defect
of
the
Mind
,
is
that
which
Men
call
Madness
,
which
appeareth
to
be
nothing
else
but
some
Imagination
of
some
such
Predominancy
above
the
rest
,
that
we
have
no
Passion
but
from
it
;
and
this
Conception
is
nothing
else
but
excessive
vain
Glory
,
or
vain
Dejection
:
which
is
most
propable
by
these
Examples
following
,
which
proceed
in
Appearance
every
one
of
them
from
Pride
,
or
some
Dejection
of
Mind
.
As
first
,
we
have
had
the
Example
of
one
that
preached
in
Cheapside
from
a
Cart
there
,
instead
of
a
Pulpit
,
that
he
himself
was
Christ
,
which
was
spiritual
Pride
or
Madness
.
We
have
had
also
divers
Examples
of
Learned
Madness
,
in
which
Men
have
manifestly
been
distracted
upon
any
Occasion
that
hath
put
them
in
Remembrance
of
their
own
Ability
.
Amongst
the
learned
Men
,
may
be
remembred
(
I
think
also
)
those
that
determine
of
the
Time
of
the
Worlds
End
,
and
other
such
the
Points
of
Prophecy
.
And
the
gallant
Madness
of
Don
Quixotte
is
nothing
else
but
an
Expression
of
such
Height
of
vain
Glory
as
reading
of
Romance
may
produce
in
pusillanimous
Men
.
Also
Rage
and
Madness
of
Love
,
are
but
great
Indignations
of
them
in
whose
Brains
is
predominant
Contempt
from
their
Enemies
,
or
their
Mistresses
.
And
the
Pride
taken
in
Form
and
Behaviour
,
hath
made
divers
Men
run
mad
,
and
to
be
so
accounted
,
under
the
Name
of
Fantastick
.
10.
And
as
these
are
the
Examples
of
Extremities
,
so
also
are
there
Examples
too
many
of
the
Degrees
,
which
may
therefore
be
well
accounted
Follies
;
as
it
is
a
Degree
of
the
first
,
for
a
Man
,
without
certain
Evidence
,
to
think
himself
to
be
inspired
,
or
to
have
any
other
Effect
of
Gods
holy
Spirit
than
other
godly
Men
have
.
Of
the
second
,
for
a
Man
continually
to
speak
his
mind
in
a
Cento
of
other
Mens
Greek
or
Latine
Sentences
.
Of
the
third
,
much
of
the
present
Gallantry
in
Love
and
Duel
.
Of
Rage
,
a
Degree
is
Malice
;
and
of
Fantastick
Madness
,
Affection
.
11.
As
the
former
Examples
exhibit
to
us
Madness
,
and
the
Degrees
thereof
,
proceeding
from
the
Excess
of
Self-Opinion
;
so
also
there
be
other
Examples
of
Madness
,
and
the
Degrees
thereof
,
proceeding
from
too
much
vain
Fear
and
Dejection
;
as
in
those
melancholy
Men
that
have
imagined
themselves
brittle
as
Glass
,
or
have
had
some
other
like
Imagination
:
and
Degrees
hereof
are
all
those
exorbitant
and
causless
Fears
,
which
we
commonly
observe
in
melancholy
Persons
.
CHAP.
XI
.
1.
HItherto
of
the
Knowledge
of
Things
natural
and
of
the
Passions
that
arise
naturally
from
them
.
Now
forasmuch
as
we
give
Names
not
only
to
Things
natural
,
but
also
to
supernatural
;
and
by
all
Names
we
ought
to
have
some
Meaning
and
Conception
:
It
followeth
in
the
next
Place
,
to
consider
what
Thoughts
and
Imaginations
of
the
Mind
we
have
,
when
we
take
into
our
Mouths
the
most
blessed
Name
of
GOD
,
and
the
Names
of
those
Vertues
we
attribute
unto
him
;
as
also
,
what
Image
cometh
into
the
Mind
at
hearing
the
Name
of
Spirit
,
or
the
Name
of
Angel
,
good
or
bad
.
2.
And
forasmuch
as
God
Almighty
is
incomprehensible
,
it
followeth
,
that
we
can
have
no
Conception
or
Image
of
the
Deity
,
and
consequently
,
all
his
Attributes
signifie
our
Inability
and
Defect
of
Power
to
conceive
any
Thing
concerning
his
Nature
,
and
not
any
Conception
of
the
same
,
excepting
only
this
,
That
there
is
a
God
:
For
the
Effects
we
acknowledge
naturally
,
do
include
a
Power
of
their
producing
,
before
they
were
produced
;
and
that
Power
presupposeth
something
existent
that
hath
such
Power
:
And
the
Thing
so
existing
with
Power
to
produce
,
if
it
were
not
Eternal
,
must
needs
have
been
produced
by
somewhat
before
it
,
and
that
again
by
something
else
before
that
,
till
we
come
to
an
Eternal
(
that
is
to
say
,
the
first
)
Power
of
all
Powers
,
and
first
Cause
of
all
Causes
:
And
this
is
it
which
all
Men
conceive
by
the
Name
of
GOD
,
implying
Eternity
,
Incomprehensibility
,
and
Omnipotency
.
And
thus
all
that
will
consider
,
may
know
that
God
is
,
though
not
what
he
is
:
even
a
Man
that
is
born
blind
,
though
it
be
not
possible
for
him
to
have
any
Imagination
what
Kind
of
thing
Fire
is
;
yet
he
cannot
but
know
that
somewhat
there
is
that
Men
call
Fire
,
because
it
warmeth
him
.
2.
And
whereas
we
attribute
to
God
Almighty
,
Seeing
,
Hearing
,
Speaking
,
Knowing
,
Loving
,
and
the
like
,
by
which
Names
we
understand
something
in
Men
to
whom
we
attribute
them
,
we
understand
nothing
by
them
in
the
Nature
of
God
:
For
,
as
it
is
well
reasoned
,
Shall
not
the
God
that
made
the
Eye
,
see
;
and
the
Ear
,
hear
?
So
it
is
also
,
if
we
say
,
Shall
God
,
which
made
the
Eye
,
not
see
without
the
Eye
;
or
that
made
the
Ear
,
not
hear
without
the
Ear
;
or
that
made
the
Brain
,
not
know
without
the
Brain
;
or
that
made
the
Heart
,
not
love
without
the
Heart
?
The
Attributes
therefore
given
unto
the
Deity
,
are
such
as
signifie
either
our
Incapacity
or
our
Reverence
:
Our
Incapacity
,
when
we
say
Incomprehensible
and
Infinite
;
our
Reverence
,
when
we
give
him
those
Names
,
which
amongst
us
are
the
Names
of
those
Things
we
most
magnifie
and
commend
,
as
Omnipotent
,
Omniscient
,
Just
,
Merciful
,
&c.
And
when
God
Almighty
giveth
those
Names
to
himself
in
the
Scriptures
,
it
is
but
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
{non-Roman}
,
that
is
to
say
,
by
descending
to
our
Manner
of
speaking
;
without
which
we
are
not
capable
of
understanding
him
.
4.
By
the
Name
of
Spirit
,
we
understand
a
Body
natural
,
but
of
such
Subtilty
,
that
it
worketh
not
upon
the
Senses
;
but
that
filleth
up
the
Place
which
the
Image
of
a
visible
Body
might
fill
up
.
Our
Conception
therefore
of
Spirit
consisteth
of
Figure
without
Colour
;
and
in
Figure
is
understood
Dimension
,
and
consequently
,
to
conceive
a
Spirit
,
is
to
conceive
something
that
hath
Dimension
.
But
Spirits
supernatural
commonly
signifie
some
Substance
without
Dimension
;
which
two
Words
do
flatly
contradict
one
another
:
and
therefore
when
we
attribute
the
Name
of
Spirit
unto
God
,
we
attribute
it
not
as
the
Name
of
any
Thing
we
conceive
,
no
more
than
we
ascribe
unto
him
Sense
and
Understanding
;
but
,
as
a
Signification
of
our
Reverence
,
we
desire
to
abstract
from
him
all
corporal
Grosness
.
5.
Concerning
other
Things
,
which
some
Men
call
Spirits
incorporeal
,
and
some
corporeal
,
it
is
not
possible
by
natural
Means
only
,
to
come
to
Knowledge
of
so
much
,
as
that
there
are
such
Things
.
We
that
are
Christians
acknowledge
that
there
be
Angels
good
and
evil
,
and
that
there
are
Spirits
,
and
that
the
Soul
of
Man
is
a
Spirit
,
and
that
those
Spirits
are
immortal
:
but
,
to
know
it
,
that
is
to
say
,
to
have
natural
Evidence
of
the
same
,
it
is
impossible
:
For
,
all
Evidence
is
Conception
,
as
it
is
said
,
Chap.
6.
Sect.
3.
and
all
Conception
is
Imagination
,
and
proceedeth
from
Sense
,
Chap.
3.
Sect.
1.
And
Spirits
we
suppose
to
be
those
Substances
which
work
not
upon
the
Sense
;
and
therefore
not
conceptible
.
But
though
the
Scripture
acknowledge
Spirits
,
yet
doth
it
no where
say
,
that
they
are
incorporeal
,
meaning
thereby
,
without
Dimension
and
Quality
:
Nor
,
I
think
,
is
that
Word
Incorporeal
at
all
in
the
Bible
;
but
it
is
said
of
the
Spirit
,
that
it
abideth
in
Men
;
sometimes
that
it
dwelleth
in
them
,
sometimes
that
it
cometh
on
them
,
that
it
descendeth
,
and
goeth
,
and
cometh
;
and
that
Spirits
are
Angels
,
that
is
to
say
,
Messengers
:
all
which
Words
do
imply
Locality
;
and
Locality
is
Dimension
;
and
whatsoever
hath
Dimension
,
is
Body
,
be
it
never
so
subtil
.
To
me
therefore
it
seemeth
,
that
the
Scripture
favoureth
them
more
,
who
hold
Angels
and
Spirits
corporeal
,
than
them
that
hold
the
contrary
.
And
it
is
a
plain
Contradiction
in
natural
Discourse
,
to
say
of
the
Soul
of
Man
,
that
it
is
tota
in
toto
,
&
tota
in
qualibet
Parte
Corporis
,
grounded
neither
upon
Reason
nor
Revelation
,
but
proceeding
from
the
Ignorance
of
what
those
Things
are
which
are
called
Spectra
,
Images
,
that
appear
in
the
dark
to
Children
,
and
such
as
have
strong
Fears
,
and
other
strange
Imaginations
,
as
hath
been
said
,
Chap.
3.
Sect.
5.
where
I
call
them
Phantasms
:
For
,
taking
them
to
be
Things
real
,
without
us
,
like
Bodies
,
and
seeing
them
to
come
and
vanish
so
strangely
as
they
do
,
unlike
to
Bodies
;
what
could
they
call
them
else
,
but
incorporeal
Bodies
?
which
is
not
a
Name
,
but
an
Absurdity
of
Speech
.
6.
It
is
true
,
that
the
Heathens
,
and
all
Nations
of
the
World
,
have
acknowledged
that
there
be
Spirits
,
which
for
the
most
part
they
hold
to
be
incorporeal
;
whereby
it
might
be
thought
,
that
a
Man
by
natural
Reason
,
may
arrive
,
without
the
Scriptures
,
to
the
Knowledge
of
this
,
That
Spirits
are
:
But
the
erroneous
Collection
thereof
by
the
Heathens
,
may
proceed
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
from
the
Ignorance
of
the
Cause
of
Ghosts
and
Phantasms
,
and
such
other
Apparitions
.
And
from
thence
had
the
Grecians
their
Number
of
Gods
,
their
Number
of
Daemons
good
or
bad
,
and
for
every
Man
his
Genius
;
which
is
not
the
Acknowledging
of
this
Truth
,
That
Spirits
are
;
but
a
false
Opinion
concerning
the
Force
of
Imagination
.
7.
And
seeing
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
Spirits
,
is
not
natural
Knowledge
,
but
Faith
from
supernatural
Revelation
given
to
the
holy
Writers
of
the
Scriptures
;
it
followeth
,
that
of
Inspirations
also
,
which
is
the
Operation
of
Spirit
in
us
,
the
Knowledge
which
we
have
,
must
all
proceed
from
Scripture
.
The
Signs
there
set
down
of
Inspiration
,
are
Miracles
,
when
they
be
great
,
and
manifestly
above
the
Power
of
Men
to
do
by
Imposture
:
As
for
Example
,
the
Inspiration
of
Elias
was
known
by
the
miraculous
Burning
of
the
Sacrifice
.
But
the
Signs
to
distinguish
whether
a
Spirit
be
good
or
evil
,
are
the
same
by
which
we
distinguish
whether
a
Man
or
a
Tree
be
good
or
evil
,
namely
,
Actions
and
Fruit
:
For
there
are
lying
Spirits
,
wherewith
Men
are
inspired
sometimes
,
as
well
as
with
Spirits
of
Truth
.
And
we
are
commanded
in
Scripture
,
to
judge
of
the
Spirits
by
their
Doctrine
,
and
not
of
the
Doctrine
by
the
Spirits
.
For
Miracles
,
our
Saviour
hath
forbidden
us
to
rule
our
Faith
by
them
,
Matth.
24.24
.
And
Saint
Paul
saith
,
Gal.
1.8
.
Though
an
Angel
from
Heaven
preach
to
you
otherwise
,
&c.
let
him
be
accursed
.
Where
it
is
plain
,
that
we
are
not
to
judge
whether
the
Doctrine
be
true
or
not
,
by
the
Angel
;
but
whether
the
Angel
say
true
or
no
,
by
the
Doctrine
.
So
likewise
,
1
Joh.
4.1
.
Believe
not
every
Spirit
:
for
false
Prophets
are
gone
out
into
the
World
.
Vers.
2.
Hereby
shall
ye
know
the
Spirit
of
God
.
Vers.
3.
Every
Spirit
that
confesseth
not
that
Jesus
Christ
is
come
in
the
Flesh
,
is
not
of
God
:
and
this
is
the
Spirit
of
Antichrist
.
Vers.
15.
Whosoever
confesseth
that
Jesus
is
the
Son
of
God
,
in
him
dwelleth
God
,
and
he
in
God
.
The
Knowledge
therefore
we
have
of
good
and
evil
Inspiration
,
cometh
not
by
Vision
of
an
Angel
that
may
teach
it
,
nor
by
a
Miracle
that
may
seem
to
confirm
it
;
but
by
Conformity
of
Doctrine
with
this
Article
and
Fundamental
Point
of
Christian
Faith
,
which
also
Saint
Paul
saith
is
the
sole
Foundation
,
That
Jesus
Christ
is
come
in
the
Flesh
,
1
Cor.
3.11
8.
But
if
Inspiration
be
discerned
by
this
Point
,
and
this
Point
be
acknowledged
and
believed
upon
the
Authority
of
the
Scriptures
;
How
(
may
some
Men
ask
)
know
we
that
the
Scripture
deserveth
so
great
Authority
,
which
must
be
no
less
than
that
of
the
lively
Voice
of
God
;
that
is
,
how
we
know
the
Scriptures
to
be
the
Word
of
God
?
And
first
,
it
is
manifest
,
that
if
by
Knowledge
we
understand
Science
infallible
and
natural
,
as
is
defined
,
Chap.
6.
Sect.
4.
proceeding
from
Sense
,
we
cannot
be
said
to
know
it
,
because
it
proceedeth
not
from
the
Conceptions
ingendered
by
Sense
.
And
if
we
understand
Knowledge
as
supernatural
,
we
cannot
have
it
but
by
Inspiration
:
And
of
that
Inspiration
we
cannot
judge
,
but
by
the
Doctrine
:
It
followeth
,
that
we
have
not
any
Way
,
natural
or
supernatural
,
of
the
Knowledge
thereof
,
which
can
properly
be
called
Infallible
Science
and
Evidence
.
It
remaineth
,
that
the
Knowledge
that
we
have
that
the
Scriptures
are
the
Word
of
God
,
is
only
Faith
,
which
Faith
therefore
is
also
by
Saint
Paul
defined
,
Heb.
11.1
.
to
be
the
Evidence
of
Things
not
seen
;
that
is
to
say
,
not
otherwise
evident
but
by
Faith
:
for
,
whatsoever
either
is
evident
by
Natural
Reason
,
or
Revelation
supernatural
,
is
not
called
Faith
;
else
should
not
Faith
cease
,
no
more
than
Charity
,
when
we
are
in
Heaven
;
which
is
contrary
to
the
Doctrine
of
the
Scripture
.
And
,
we
are
not
said
to
believe
,
but
to
know
those
Things
that
be
evident
.
9.
Seeing
then
the
Acknowledgment
of
Scriptures
to
be
the
Word
of
God
,
is
not
Evidence
,
but
Faith
,
and
Faith
(
Chap.
6.
Sect.
7.
)
consisteth
in
the
Trust
we
have
of
other
Men
,
it
appeareth
plain
,
that
the
Men
so
trusted
,
are
the
holy
Men
of
Gods
Church
succeeding
one
another
from
the
Time
of
those
that
saw
the
wondrous
Works
of
God
Almighty
in
the
Flesh
.
Nor
doth
this
imply
that
God
is
not
the
Worker
or
Efficient
Cause
of
Faith
,
or
that
Faith
is
begotten
in
Man
without
the
Spirit
of
God
:
for
,
all
those
good
Opinions
which
we
admit
and
believe
,
though
they
proceed
from
Hearing
,
and
Hearing
from
Teaching
,
both
which
are
natural
,
yet
they
are
the
Work
of
God
:
for
,
all
the
Works
of
Nature
are
his
,
and
they
are
attributed
to
the
Spirit
of
God
:
As
for
Example
,
Exod.
28.3
.
Thou
shalt
speak
unto
all
cunning
Men
,
whom
I
have
filled
with
the
SPIRIT
of
Wisdom
,
that
they
may
make
Aaron's
Garments
for
his
Consecration
,
that
he
may
serve
me
in
the
Priests
Office
.
Faith
therefore
wherewith
we
believe
,
is
the
Work
of
the
Spirit
of
God
in
that
Sense
,
by
which
the
Spirit
of
God
giveth
to
one
Man
Wisdom
and
cunning
in
Workmanship
more
than
another
,
and
by
which
he
effecteth
also
in
other
Points
pertaining
to
our
ordinary
Life
;
that
one
Man
believeth
that
,
which
,
upon
the
same
Grounds
,
another
doth
not
;
and
one
Man
reverenceth
the
Opinion
,
and
obeyeth
the
Commands
of
his
Superiour
,
and
others
not
.
10.
And
seeing
our
Faith
,
that
the
Scriptures
are
the
Word
of
God
,
began
from
the
Confidence
and
Trust
we
repose
in
the
Church
;
there
can
be
no
Doubt
but
that
their
Interpretation
of
the
same
Scriptures
(
when
any
Doubt
or
Controversie
shall
arise
,
by
which
this
Fundamental
Point
,
That
Jesus
Christ
is
come
in
the
Flesh
,
may
be
called
in
question
)
is
safer
for
any
Man
to
trust
to
,
than
his
own
,
whether
Reasoning
or
Spirit
,
that
is
to
say
,
his
own
Opinion
.
11.
Now
concerning
Mens
Affections
to
God-ward
,
they
are
not
the
same
always
that
are
described
in
the
Chapter
concerning
Passions
There
,
for
to
love
,
is
to
be
delighted
with
the
Image
or
Conception
of
the
Thing
loved
;
but
God
is
unconceivable
:
To
love
God
therefore
,
in
the
Scripture
,
is
to
obey
his
Commandments
,
and
to
love
one
another
.
Also
to
trust
God
,
is
different
from
our
trusting
one
another
:
for
,
when
a
Man
trusteth
a
Man
,
(
Chap.
9.
Sect.
8.
)
he
layeth
aside
his
own
Endeavours
:
but
if
we
do
so
in
our
Trust
to
God
Almighty
,
we
disobey
him
;
and
how
shall
we
trust
to
him
whom
we
know
we
disobey
?
To
trust
to
God
Almighty
therefore
,
is
to
referr
to
his
good
Pleasure
all
that
is
above
our
own
Power
to
effect
:
and
this
is
all
one
with
Acknowledging
one
only
God
,
which
is
the
first
Commandment
.
And
to
trust
in
Christ
,
is
no
more
but
to
acknowledge
him
for
God
;
which
is
the
fundamental
Article
of
our
Christian
Faith
:
And
consequently
,
to
trust
,
rely
,
or
,
as
some
express
it
,
to
cast
and
roll
our selves
on
Christ
,
is
the
same
Thing
with
the
Fundamental
Point
of
Faith
,
namely
,
that
Jesus
Christ
is
the
Son
of
the
living
God
.
12.
To
honour
God
internally
in
the
Heart
,
is
the
same
Thing
with
that
we
ordinarily
call
Honour
amongst
Men
:
for
it
is
nothing
but
the
Acknowledging
of
his
Power
;
and
the
Signs
thereof
,
the
same
with
the
Signs
of
the
Honour
due
to
our
Superiours
,
mentioned
Chap.
8.
Sect.
6.
viz.
to
praise
,
to
magnifie
,
to
bless
;
to
pray
to
him
,
to
thank
him
,
to
give
Oblations
and
Sacrifices
to
him
,
to
give
Attention
to
his
Word
,
to
speak
to
him
in
Prayer
with
Consideration
,
to
come
into
his
Presence
with
humble
Gesture
,
and
in
decent
Manner
,
and
to
adorn
his
Worship
with
Magnificence
and
Cost
:
and
these
are
natural
Signs
of
our
honouring
him
internally
:
And
therefore
the
Contrary
hereof
,
To
neglect
prayer
,
to
speak
to
him
extempore
,
to
come
to
Church
slovenly
,
to
adorn
the
Place
of
his
Worship
worse
than
our
own
Houses
,
to
take
up
his
Name
in
every
idle
Discourse
,
are
the
manifest
Signs
of
Contempt
of
the
Divine
Majesty
.
There
be
other
Signs
which
are
arbitrary
;
as
,
to
be
uncovered
,
(
as
we
be
here
)
;
to
put
off
their
Shooes
,
as
Moses
at
the
fiery
Bush
,
and
some
other
of
that
Kind
,
which
in
their
own
Nature
are
indifferent
,
till
,
to
avoid
Indecency
and
Discord
,
it
be
otherwise
determined
by
common
Consent
.
CHAP.
XII
.
1.
IT
hath
been
declared
already
,
how
external
Objects
cause
Conceptions
,
and
Conceptions
,
Appetite
and
Fear
,
which
are
the
first
unperceived
Beginnings
of
our
Actions
:
for
either
the
Actions
immediately
follow
the
first
Appetite
,
as
when
we
do
any
Thing
upon
a
sudden
;
or
else
to
our
first
Appetite
there
succeedeth
some
Conception
of
Evil
to
happen
to
us
by
such
Actions
,
which
is
Fear
,
and
which
holdeth
us
from
proceeding
.
And
to
that
Fear
may
succeed
a
new
Appetite
,
and
to
that
Appetite
another
Fear
alternately
,
till
the
Action
be
either
done
,
or
some
Accident
come
between
,
to
make
it
impossible
;
and
so
this
alternate
Appetite
and
Fear
ceaseth
.
This
alternate
Succession
of
Appetite
and
Fear
during
all
the
time
the
Action
is
in
our
Power
to
do
or
not
to
do
,
is
that
we
call
Deliberation
;
which
Name
hath
been
given
it
for
that
Part
of
the
Definition
wherein
it
is
said
that
it
lasteth
so
long
as
the
Action
,
whereof
we
deliberate
,
is
in
our
Power
:
for
,
so
long
we
have
Liberty
to
do
or
not
to
do
;
and
Deliberation
signifieth
a
Taking
away
of
our
own
Liberty
.
2.
Deliberation
therefore
requireth
in
the
Action
deliberated
two
Conditions
;
one
,
that
it
be
future
;
the
other
,
that
there
be
Hope
of
doing
it
,
or
possibility
of
not
doing
it
;
for
,
Appetite
and
Fear
are
Expepectations
of
the
future
;
and
there
is
no
Expectation
of
Good
,
without
Hope
;
or
of
Evil
,
without
Possibility
:
of
Necessaries
therefore
there
is
no
Deliberation
.
In
Deliberation
,
the
last
Appetite
,
as
also
the
last
Fear
,
is
called
Will
,
viz.
the
last
Appetite
,
Will
to
do
,
or
Will
to
omit
.
It
is
all
one
therefore
to
say
Will
,
and
last
Will
:
for
,
though
a
Man
express
his
present
Inclination
and
Appetite
concerning
the
disposing
of
his
Goods
,
by
Words
or
Writing
;
yet
shall
it
not
be
counted
his
Will
,
because
he
hath
still
Liberty
to
dispose
of
them
other
ways
:
but
when
Death
taketh
away
that
Liberty
,
then
it
is
his
Will
.
3.
Voluntary
Actions
and
Omissions
are
such
as
have
Beginning
in
the
Will
;
all
other
are
involuntary
,
or
〈◊〉
voluntary
,
such
as
a
Man
doth
upon
Appetite
or
Fear
;
involuntary
,
such
as
he
doth
by
Necessity
of
Nature
,
as
when
he
is
pushed
,
or
falleth
,
and
thereby
doth
Good
or
hurt
to
another
:
mixt
,
such
as
participate
of
both
;
as
when
a
Man
is
carried
to
Prison
,
Going
is
voluntary
,
to
the
Prison
,
is
involuntary
:
The
Example
of
him
that
throweth
his
Goods
out
of
a
Ship
into
the
Sea
,
to
save
his
Person
,
is
of
an
Action
altogether
voluntary
;
for
,
there
is
nothing
therein
involuntary
,
but
the
Hardness
of
the
Choice
,
which
is
not
his
Action
,
but
the
Action
of
the
Winds
:
what
he
himself
doth
,
is
no
more
against
his
Will
,
than
to
flee
from
Danger
is
against
the
Will
of
him
that
seeth
no
other
Means
to
preserve
himself
.
4.
Voluntary
also
are
the
Actions
that
proceed
from
sudden
Anger
,
or
other
sudden
Appetite
in
such
Men
as
can
discern
Good
or
Evil
:
for
,
in
them
the
Time
precedent
is
to
be
judged
Deliberation
;
for
then
also
he
deliberateth
in
what
Cases
it
is
good
to
strike
,
deride
,
or
do
any
other
Action
proceeding
from
Anger
or
other
such
sudden
Passion
.
5.
Appetite
,
Fear
,
Hope
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Passions
are
not
called
voluntary
;
for
they
proceed
not
from
,
but
are
the
Will
,
and
the
Will
is
not
voluntary
:
for
,
a
Man
can
no
more
say
he
will
will
,
than
he
will
will
will
,
and
so
make
an
infinite
Repetition
of
the
Word
[
will
]
;
which
is
absurd
,
and
insignificant
.
6.
Forasmuch
as
Will
to
do
is
Appetite
,
and
Will
to
omit
,
Fear
;
the
Cause
of
Appetite
and
Fear
is
the
Cause
also
of
our
Will
:
But
the
propounding
of
the
Benefits
and
of
Harms
,
that
is
to
say
,
of
Reward
and
Punishment
,
is
the
Cause
of
our
Appetite
,
and
of
our
Fears
,
and
therefore
also
of
our
Wills
,
so
far
forth
as
we
believe
that
such
Rewards
and
Benefits
as
are
propounded
,
shall
arrive
unto
us
;
and
consequently
,
our
Wills
follow
our
Opinions
,
as
our
Actions
follow
our
Wills
;
in
which
Sense
they
say
truly
,
and
properly
,
that
say
the
World
is
governed
by
Opinion
.
7.
When
the
Wills
of
many
concur
to
one
and
the
same
Action
and
Effect
,
this
Concourse
of
their
Wills
is
called
Consent
;
by
which
we
must
not
understand
one
Will
of
many
Men
(
for
every
Man
hath
his
several
Will
)
but
many
Wills
to
the
producing
of
one
Effect
:
But
when
the
Wills
of
two
divers
Men
produce
such
Actions
as
are
reciprocally
resistant
one
to
the
other
,
this
is
called
Contention
;
and
,
being
upon
the
Persons
one
of
another
,
Battel
:
whereas
Actions
proceeding
from
Consent
,
are
mutual
Aid
.
8.
When
many
Wills
are
involved
or
included
in
the
Will
of
one
or
more
consenting
,
(
which
how
it
may
be
,
shall
be
hereafter
declared
)
then
is
that
involving
of
many
Wills
in
one
or
more
,
called
Vnion
.
9.
In
Deliberations
interrupted
,
as
they
may
be
by
Diversion
of
other
Business
,
or
by
Sleep
,
the
last
Appetite
of
such
Part
of
the
Deliberation
is
called
Intention
,
or
Purpose
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
1.
HAving
spoken
of
the
Powers
and
Acts
of
the
Mind
,
both
cognitive
and
motive
,
considered
in
every
Man
by
himself
,
without
Relation
to
other●
;
it
will
fall
fitly
into
this
Chapter
,
to
speak
of
the
Effects
of
the
same
Power
one
upon
another
;
which
Effects
are
also
the
Signs
,
by
which
one
taketh
notice
what
another
conceiveth
and
intendeth
.
Of
these
Signs
,
some
are
such
as
cannot
easily
be
counterfeited
;
as
Actions
and
Gestures
,
especially
if
they
be
sudden
,
whereof
I
have
mentioned
some
;
(
for
Example
,
look
in
Chap.
9.
)
with
the
several
Passions
whereof
they
are
Signs
:
Others
there
are
which
may
be
counterfeited
;
and
those
are
Words
or
Speech
;
of
the
Use
and
Effects
whereof
,
I
am
to
speak
in
this
Place
.
2.
The
first
Use
of
Language
,
is
the
expression
of
our
Conceptions
,
that
is
,
the
begetting
in
one
another
the
same
Conceptions
that
we
have
in
our selves
;
and
this
is
called
Teaching
;
wherein
,
if
the
Conception
of
him
that
teacheth
continually
accompany
his
Words
,
beginning
at
something
true
in
Experience
,
then
it
begetteth
the
like
Evidence
in
the
Hearer
that
understandeth
them
,
and
maketh
him
to
know
something
,
which
he
is
therefore
said
to
learn
:
but
if
there
be
not
such
Evidence
,
then
such
teaching
is
called
Perswasion
,
and
begetteth
no
more
in
the
Hearer
,
than
what
is
in
the
Speakers
bare
Opinion
.
And
the
Signs
of
two
Opinions
contradictory
one
to
another
;
namely
,
Affirmation
and
Negation
of
the
same
Thing
,
is
called
Controversie
:
but
both
Affirmations
,
or
both
Negations
,
Consent
in
Opinion
.
3.
The
infallible
Sign
of
teaching
exactly
,
and
without
errour
,
is
this
,
that
no
Man
hath
ever
taught
the
Contrary
:
Not
that
few
,
how
few
soever
,
if
any
;
for
commonly
Truth
is
on
the
side
of
a
few
,
rather
than
of
the
Multitude
:
But
when
in
Opinions
and
Questions
considered
and
discussed
by
many
,
it
happeneth
that
not
any
one
of
the
Men
that
so
discuss'd
them
differ
from
another
,
then
it
may
be
justly
inferred
,
they
know
what
they
teach
,
and
that
otherwise
they
do
not
.
And
this
appears
most
manifestly
to
them
that
have
considered
the
divers
Subjects
wherein
they
have
exercised
their
Pens
,
and
the
divers
Ways
in
which
they
have
proceeded
,
together
with
the
Diversity
of
the
Success
thereof
:
for
,
those
Men
who
have
taken
in
hand
to
consider
nothing
else
but
the
Comparison
of
Magnitudes
,
Numbers
,
Times
,
and
Motions
,
and
how
their
Proportions
are
to
one
another
,
have
thereby
been
the
Authors
of
all
those
Excellencies
by
which
we
differ
from
such
savage
People
as
now
inhabit
divers
places
in
America
;
and
as
have
been
the
Inhabitants
heretofore
of
those
Countries
where
at
this
day
Arts
and
Sciences
do
most
flourish
:
for
,
from
the
Studies
of
these
Men
,
have
proceeded
whatsoever
cometh
to
us
for
Ornament
by
Navigation
,
and
whatsoever
we
have
beneficial
to
humane
Society
by
the
Division
,
Distinction
,
and
Portraicting
the
Face
of
the
Earth
;
whatsoever
also
we
have
by
the
Account
of
Times
,
and
Foresight
of
the
Course
of
Heaven
;
whatsoever
by
Measuring
Distances
,
Plains
,
and
Solids
of
all
Sorts
;
and
whatsoever
either
elegant
or
defensible
in
Building
:
All
which
supposed
a
Way
,
what
do
we
differ
from
the
wildest
of
the
Indians
?
Yet
to
this
day
was
it
never
heard
of
,
that
there
was
any
Controversie
concerning
any
Conclusion
in
this
Subject
;
the
Science
whereof
hath
nevertheless
been
continually
amplified
and
enriched
by
the
Conclusions
of
most
difficult
and
profound
Speculation
.
The
Reason
whereof
is
apparent
to
every
Man
that
looketh
into
their
Writings
;
for
they
proceed
from
most
low
and
humble
Principles
,
evident
even
to
the
meanest
Capacity
;
going
on
slowly
,
and
with
most
scrupulous
Ratiocination
;
viz.
from
the
Imposition
of
Names
,
they
inferr
the
Truth
of
their
first
Propositions
;
and
from
two
of
the
first
,
a
third
;
and
from
any
two
of
the
three
,
a
fourth
;
and
so
on
,
according
to
the
Steps
of
Science
,
mentioned
Chap.
6.
Sect.
4.
On
the
other
side
,
those
Men
who
have
written
concerning
the
Faculties
,
Passions
,
and
Manners
of
Men
,
that
is
to
say
;
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
and
of
Policy
,
Government
,
and
Laws
,
whereof
there
be
infinite
Volumes
,
have
been
so
far
from
removing
Doubt
and
Controversie
in
the
Questions
they
have
handled
,
that
they
have
very
much
multiplied
the
same
:
Nor
doth
any
Man
at
this
day
so
much
as
pretend
to
know
more
than
hath
been
delivered
Two
thousand
Years
ago
by
Aristotle
:
and
yet
every
Man
thinks
that
in
this
Subject
he
knoweth
as
much
as
any
other
;
supposing
there
needeth
thereunto
no
Study
but
that
accrueth
unto
them
by
natural
Wit
;
though
they
play
,
or
imploy
their
Mind
otherwise
in
the
Purchace
of
Wealth
or
Place
.
The
Reason
whereof
is
no
other
,
than
that
in
their
Writings
and
Discourses
they
take
for
Principles
those
Opnions
which
are
already
vulgarly
received
;
whether
true
or
false
,
being
for
the
most
part
false
.
There
is
therefore
a
great
deal
of
Difference
between
Teaching
and
Perswading
;
the
Sign
of
this
being
Controversie
;
the
Sign
of
the
former
,
no
Controversie
.
4.
There
be
two
Sorts
of
Men
that
commonly
be
called
learned
:
One
is
that
Sort
that
proceedeth
evidently
from
humble
Principles
,
as
is
described
in
the
last
Section
;
and
those
Men
are
called
Mathematici
:
The
other
are
they
that
take
up
Maxims
from
their
Education
,
and
from
the
Authority
of
Men
,
or
of
Custom
,
and
take
the
habitual
Discourse
of
the
Tongue
for
Ratiocination
;
and
these
are
called
Dogmatici
.
Now
seeing
in
the
last
Section
those
we
call
Mathematici
are
absolved
of
the
Crime
of
breeding
Controversie
,
and
they
that
pretend
not
to
Learning
cannot
be
accused
,
the
Fault
lieth
altogether
in
the
Dogmaticks
,
that
is
to
say
,
those
that
are
imperfectly
learned
,
and
with
Passion
press
to
have
their
Opinions
pass
every where
for
Truth
,
without
any
evident
Demonstration
either
from
Experience
,
or
from
Places
of
Scripture
of
uncontroverted
Interpretation
.
5.
The
Expression
of
those
Conceptions
which
cause
in
us
the
Experience
of
Good
while
we
deliberate
,
as
also
of
those
which
cause
our
Expectation
of
Evil
,
is
that
which
we
call
Counselling
,
and
is
the
internal
Deliberation
of
the
Mind
concerning
what
we
our selves
are
to
do
or
not
to
do
.
The
Consequences
of
our
Actions
are
our
Counsellors
,
by
alternate
Succession
in
the
Mind
.
So
in
the
Counsel
which
a
Man
taketh
from
other
Men
,
the
Counsellors
alternately
do
make
appear
the
Consequences
of
the
Action
,
and
do
not
any
of
them
deliberate
,
but
furnish
among
them
all
,
him
that
is
counselled
with
Arguments
whereupon
to
deliberate
with
himself
.
6.
Another
Use
of
Speech
is
Expression
of
Appetite
,
Intention
,
and
Will
;
as
the
Appetite
of
Knowledge
by
Interrogation
;
Appetite
to
have
a
Thing
done
by
another
,
as
Request
,
Prayer
,
Petition
:
Expressions
of
our
Purpose
or
intention
,
as
Promise
,
which
is
the
Affirmation
or
Negation
of
some
Action
to
be
done
in
the
future
:
Threatning
,
which
is
the
Promise
of
Evil
;
and
Commanding
,
which
is
that
Speech
by
which
we
signifie
to
another
our
Appetite
or
Desire
to
have
any
Thing
done
,
or
left
undone
,
for
Reasons
contained
in
the
Will
it self
:
For
it
is
not
properly
said
,
Sic
volo
,
sic
jubeo
,
without
that
other
Clause
,
Stet
pro
Ratione
Voluntas
:
And
when
the
Command
is
a
sufficient
Reason
to
move
us
to
Action
,
then
is
that
Command
called
a
Law
.
7.
Another
Use
of
Speech
is
Instigation
and
Appeasing
,
by
which
we
increase
or
diminish
one
anothers
Passion
:
It
is
the
same
Thing
with
Perswasion
;
the
Difference
not
being
real
;
for
,
the
Begetting
of
Opinion
and
Passion
is
the
same
.
But
whereas
in
Perswasion
we
aim
at
Getting
Opinion
from
Passion
;
here
,
the
End
is
,
to
raise
Passion
from
Opinion
.
And
as
in
raising
an
Opinion
from
Passion
,
any
Premisses
are
good
enough
to
inforce
the
desired
Conclusion
;
so
,
in
raising
Passion
from
Opinion
,
it
is
no
matter
whether
the
Opinion
be
true
or
false
,
or
the
Narration
historical
or
fabulous
:
for
,
not
the
Truth
,
but
the
Image
,
maketh
Passion
:
and
a
Tragedy
,
well
acted
,
affecteth
no
less
than
a
Murther
.
8.
Though
words
be
the
Signs
we
have
of
one
anothers
Opinions
and
Intentions
,
because
the
Aequivocation
of
them
is
so
frequent
according
to
the
Diversity
of
Contexture
,
and
of
the
Company
wherewith
they
go
,
which
,
the
Presence
of
him
that
speaketh
,
our
Sight
of
his
Actions
,
and
Conjecture
of
his
Intentions
,
must
help
to
discharge
us
of
;
it
must
therefore
be
extream
hard
to
find
the
Opinions
and
Meaning
of
those
Men
that
are
gone
from
us
long
ago
,
and
have
left
us
no
other
Signification
thereof
than
their
Books
,
which
cannot
possibly
be
understood
without
History
,
to
discover
those
aforementioned
Circumstances
,
and
also
without
great
Prudence
to
observe
them
.
9.
When
it
happeneth
that
a
Man
signifieth
unto
us
two
contradictory
Opinions
,
whereof
the
one
is
clearly
and
directly
signified
,
and
the
other
either
drawn
from
that
by
Consequence
,
or
not
known
to
be
contradictory
to
it
;
then
(
when
he
is
not
present
to
explicate
himself
better
)
we
are
to
take
the
former
for
his
Opinion
;
for
that
is
clearly
signified
to
be
his
,
and
directly
;
whereas
the
other
might
proceed
from
errour
in
the
Deduction
,
or
Ignorance
of
the
Repugnancy
.
The
like
also
is
to
be
held
in
two
contradictory
Expressions
of
a
Mans
Intention
and
Will
,
for
the
same
Reason
.
10.
Forasmuch
as
whosoever
speaketh
to
another
,
intendeth
thereby
to
make
him
understand
what
he
saith
,
if
he
speak
unto
him
either
in
a
Language
which
he
that
heareth
understandeth
not
,
or
use
any
Word
in
other
Sence
than
he
believeth
is
the
Sence
of
him
that
heareth
,
he
intendeth
also
not
to
make
him
understand
what
he
saith
;
which
is
a
Contradiction
of
himself
.
It
is
therefore
always
to
be
supposed
,
that
he
which
intendeth
not
to
deceive
,
alloweth
the
private
Interpretation
of
his
Speech
to
him
to
whom
it
is
addressed
.
11.
Silence
,
in
him
that
believeth
that
the
same
shall
be
taken
for
a
Sign
of
his
Intent
,
is
a
Sign
thereof
indeed
:
for
,
if
he
did
not
consent
,
the
Labour
of
Speaking
so
much
as
to
declare
the
same
,
is
so
little
,
as
it
is
to
be
presumed
he
would
have
done
it
.
CONCLUSION
.
THus
have
we
considered
the
Nature
of
Man
so
far
as
was
requisite
for
the
finding
out
the
first
and
most
simple
Elements
wherein
the
Compositions
of
Politick
Rules
and
Laws
are
lastly
resolved
;
which
was
my
present
Purpose
.
FINIS
.